NYT

Q. and A.: Zhang Weiwei on Why China Will Succeed Under the Communist PartyBy Didi Kirsten Tatlow

June 12, 2015 9:03 am June 12, 2015 9:03 amPhoto

A member of an honor guard at a ceremony outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.Credit Jason Lee/Reuters

When Zhang Weiwei was asked if it was true, as had been whispered among Chinese academics and officials, that President Xi Jinping had read his book “The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State” and recommended it to people such as the former World Bank president Robert Zoellick, he answered, “I’m glad he did.”

Zhang Weiwei directs the Center for China Development Model Research at Fudan University.Credit Courtesy of Zhang Weiwei

Mr. Zhang, 57, who as a teenager spent three years in a Shanghai factory carving jade and in his 20s served as an English interpreter for Deng Xiaoping, is now a professor of politics at Fudan University in Shanghai, where he directs the Center for China Development Model Research, and a leading theorist of the “China model” of political and economic development. This holds that China under the Communist Party is on the right path and is destined to succeed. His most recent book, “The China Horizon: Glory and Dream of a Civilizational State,” which is due out in English this year, continues that theme.

Western critics need to get over their gloomy predictions about China, Mr. Zhang says, which have been wrong for decades. China is not going to collapse; polls show that most people are happier than ever; and the country’s economy is certain one day to overtake that of the United States. In an interview, Mr. Zhang explained why China must craft its own huayu quan (话语权, literally “speech language power”), a “narrative” or “discourse,” to tell its own story and overcome the ideological prejudices of its foreign critics. Excerpts follow:

Q.

You were an interpreter for Mr. Deng. How would you like to see “China’s 话语权” translated into English?

A.

I suggest “Chinese discourse” or “Chinese narrative,” or in certain contexts, “Chinese political narrative.” It means there is a rightful place for Chinese discourse in the world.

Q.

Why is this important?

A.

Discourse is crucial for any country, especially for a superlarge and fast-changing country like China, whose rise has global implications and provokes questions and suspicions. To my mind, the country should face them squarely and explain itself clearly and confidently to its own people and to the outside world. This calls for new narratives, new in content as well as in style.

Photo

“The China Horizon” will be published in English this year.Credit

China has its own official political discourse ranging from the party’s doctrines to China’s foreign policy statements. But it’s also true that such a discourse is not easily understandable to non-Chinese, or even to many Chinese. It requires knowledge of China’s political context. For instance, the “scientific outlook for development” is a concept crucial for China’s own development and for unifying the ideology of the party’s rank and file, but it is hardly understandable to non-Chinese.

Since Xi Jinping came to power he has called for changing the writing and speaking style of the party and he himself took the lead in communicating with the people in a more direct and dynamic way.

Q.

What is needed to create such a discourse?

A.

As far as China is concerned, social, economic and political conditions are ripe for constructing such a new narrative. There is a clear and growing demand for such a discourse. China has risen to such a degree that it can’t evade any questioning from within or without. Both Chinese and foreigners want to make better sense of what China has done and is doing and will do in the future. In economics jargon, when there is a demand, there will be a supply, which is coming naturally.

Q.

What are you researching at the Center for China Development Model Research?

A.

We focus on both political and economic dimensions of the “China model.”

As I told Francis Fukuyama [the Stanford political scientist and author of “The End of History and the Last Man”] during our debate in 2011, we are indeed questioning many assumptions that are often taken for granted in the West, such as what constitutes democracy and good governance. We are also questioning neo-liberal economics and its perception of the Chinese economy and the world economic order.

Let me give you an example of how I perceive the China model.

In the political domain, China has created a model that can perhaps be summarized as “selection+election.” Selection is largely based on meritocracy and this model can compete with the Western model of relying solely on popular elections.

Economically, its “socialist market economy” is essentially a mixed economy: mixing the visible hand with the invisible hand, the state planning with the market forces. Since China put forward the concept of the socialist market economy in 1994, China is the only major economy that has not experienced the kind of financial crisis, debt crisis and economic crisis that have distressed so many countries. This success alone gives significant credit to the China model, however imperfect it is.

Socially, the China model is about highly positive interactions between society and the state, differing significantly from the Western model of society contesting the state. Chinese society today is extremely dynamic, but also in reasonably good order.

Q.

You said recently that “We can learn from Putin,” [the Russian president]. What did you mean?

A.

Like it or not, Putin and his team engage the West in debate on many issues. China should also engage its Western critics in debate on various issues.

In this context, China’s new type of narrative should be comprehensive, thorough, robust and international.

Comprehensive, so as to be able to explain China’s achievements, setbacks and future.

Thorough, to be able to explain Chinese affairs clearly and thoroughly.

Robust, to be vigorous enough to engage critics in meaningful dialogues and debates.

International, to be readily understandable to most non-Chinese.

Q.

You have said that China’s recent history can be divided into three parts: overcoming bullying [before the 1949 Communist revolution], overcoming starvation [under the leadership of Mao Zedong, post-1949] and now overcoming “bad-mouthing” [by foreigners]. Where do you see this “bad-mouthing”?

A.

Look at the Western media, BBC or CNN’s coverage of China. They seem to be 10 times more ideological than the Chinese media’s coverage of the West.

Their ideological bias is so strong that it reminds me of the Chinese media’s coverage of the West during the Cultural Revolution. Whenever the West was mentioned then, the word “capitalist” was added. Today, when the Western media mention China, they always attach such ideologically charged words as “communist,” “authoritarian,” “dictatorship.” And whenever they present a picture of Tiananmen, they put a policeman into the picture suggesting China is an oppressive police state.

This kind of Western propaganda cannot convey accurately what China really is to the outside world and leads inevitably to wrongly crystal balling China all the time. I wonder when the Western media can overcome their own ideological straightjackets and look at this fast-changing society afresh and free from ideological bias. But on the other hand, we cannot do much about it, and we don’t care much about this either, as we are used to this kind of nasty and ridiculous coverage and miserably wrong forecasts about China. Let’s leave them in darkness.

Having lived in the West for over 20 years [Mr. Zhang holds a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Geneva and was a visiting fellow at Oxford], I really think there should be a wake-up call in the West. Look at China objectively and understand how most Chinese perceive their own country. As I told Fukuyama in the 2011 debate, the Western approach to China reminds of me of Lord Macartney’s visit to China in 1793 when he had an audience with Emperor Qianlong [in an unsuccessful mission to open China to foreign trade]. The emperor in fact displayed the Chinese version of “the end of history thesis” at that time, or, “We’re the best, and you’re nothing.” Of course, history witnessed China’s sharp decline after this show of cultural arrogance. Today this fate may befall the West.

Q.

Deng Xiaoping, whom you knew, had a famous saying to the effect that China should “bide its time and hide its hand.” If China is to find its voice, its narrative, are those days over?

A.

Deng did say that China should keep a low profile and focus on its own modernization drive. But Deng expressed this view from [a starting point of ] confidence because China was on the right historical path, and this important part of his idea was somehow missing from many later interpretations of his remark. Keeping a low profile should be from a position of confidence, and under the condition that China’s core interests are respected. That was also Deng’s idea.

With the rise of China, Xi Jinping has gone from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity on a number of key issues [such as the South China Sea, where China has engaged in land reclamation projects to advance territorial claims disputed by other countries]. This is based on self-confidence, and also reflects the new consensus reached within China that, with the rise of China, the country should be more proactive in its strategic and foreign policy. In fact, many countries, including major Western ones, have expressed the hope that China take up more international responsibilities and provide more international public goods.

Q.

Is the United States getting China wrong? What about Europe?

A.

Both the United States and Europe often get China wrong, especially their mainstream media coverage and forecasting about China. The difference is that most European states seem to accept China’s rise and increasingly see it as a win-win opportunity. But the United States is still largely in a mode of zero-sum games and treats China with a lot of suspicion and even hostility. My counsel to the United States is also to treat China’s rise from a win-win perspective.

Q. and A.: Minxin Pei on the Future of Communist Rule in China点击查看本文中文版 Read in Chinese

Sinosphere

By MICHAEL FORSYTHE FEB. 29, 2016

Photo

Xi Jinping, president of China and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, center, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the party’s 18th Central Committee last October in Beijing. Credit Lan Hongguang/Xinhua, via Getty Images

Some social scientists spend their careers researching small-scale topics that may help push forward our understanding of bigger forces shaping our lives. Or not. Many academic papers are never cited.

That’s not an issue with Minxin Pei. He aims high and goes for the jugular, taking on one of the biggest topics imaginable in political science: Will China’s Communist Party stay in power in its present, authoritarian form? Mr. Pei, a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, argues that the odds are high that by 2030, China’s government will be quite different, pushed to change by the endemic corruption of the current party system. Corruption is the subject of his forthcoming book, “China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay.”

In an interview, he discussed why he believes one-party rule in China is unsustainable.

Q. You argue that for the Chinese Communist Party to make it past 2030 in its present form would break a lot of precedents. Why that date?

Op-Ed Contributor: Falling Out of Love With China

A. At present, China’s socioeconomic development, measured in income and education attainment, has reached the median level at which comparable countries (Communist, middle-income and Asian) made the transition from dictatorship to some form of democracy in the last 40 years. If China’s development continues in the next 15 years, even at a much slower pace, it will have created, by 2030, a society in which maintaining an autocratic regime is far more difficult, if not impossible. Historically, no autocratic regimes have survived for more than 74 years, because of the decay of their ideology and the corruption of the ruling elites. The Communist Party will have been in power for 81 years by 2030.

Photo

Minxin Pei Credit Courtesy of Minxin Pei

Q. What do you see happening in China that supports your thesis that the party may already be experiencing regime decay and following the path taken in other countries?

A. The most important evidence is the pervasive corruption of the ruling elites. Elite unity has also disintegrated, as shown by the purge of Bo Xilai, Ling Jihua, Zhou Yongkang and their cronies since 2012. The atrophy of ideology has deprived the party of its sense of mission and a vital instrument of motivating its rank and file. The economic and moral costs of maintaining one-party rule through repression have also reached unsustainable levels.

Q. What’s the most likely scenario? Reform? Revolution? Or, as you put it, a combination of the two, “refolution”?

A. Reform — democratizing reform — is still a preferred scenario, but the window is closing fast, and historically not a single Communist regime has been reformed into democracy successfully. Revolution, a Tiananmen-style mass uprising, is unlikely because Chinese security forces can crush that easily.

Refolution, a process that starts with limited reform but becomes radicalized, is the more likely scenario. We can envision such a scenario in the mid-2020s when the party, after a decade of political decay and economic stagnation, becomes desperate enough to gamble with political reform to save itself. But the window for reform will have closed by then and, like the late Soviet Union, limited reform fractures the ruling elites, mobilizes social forces seeking fundamental change and unleashes a revolution.

Q. You have been making an argument that China’s system will change for some time. You published “From Reform to Revolution” back in 1994, which posited the demise of the Chinese Communist Party. Some argue that the party is in many ways more durable now than a generation ago. Are they wrong?

A. Actually in my 1994 book I referred to the demise of Communism, not the Chinese Communist Party. At that time, like many others, I was optimistic that economic reform could loosen the party’s grip and eventually lead to political change. But subsequent events proved this assumption too simplistic. We did not anticipate that economic success could bolster the party’s rule for a considerable period of time and block political change.

However, because of the predatory nature of one-party rule, such economic success cannot last. I came to this conclusion in my 2006 book, “China’s Trapped Transition,” which makes the case that economic modernization under one-party rule is doomed to fail.

As for other analysts who believe that the party is more durable than before, the factors they cite are no longer there. Growth is slowing. The party is in disarray, because the rules it has established to limit internecine political warfare have collapsed. Beijing’s foreign policy is driving the Sino-U.S. relationship toward conflict. Middle-class acquiescence is beginning to erode because of environmental degradation, poor services, inequality and corruption.

Q. In investing, there’s the adage that past performance is no guarantee of future results. How useful is it to use the example of other nations to predict what may happen to China?

A. Actually this adage also applies to the party itself. This means that its past success does not guarantee its future survival. In thinking about the party’s future, the examples of other nations offer useful insights into how ruling elites react to changing environments.

China may be huge, but it is governed by human beings who, like their counterparts in smaller nations, make choices that are limited by practical and predictable constraints. In comparative politics, using examples of other nations may not yield the best results, but it is still a better approach than studying a tree as if no forest exists.

Q. China’s leaders want to avoid the “middle-income trap” that has prevented so many countries from transitioning to high-income status. Are the odds stacked against it if it doesn’t reform its politics?

A. The historical record is not encouraging for the Communist Party. Except for oil-producing autocracies, semi-democratic Singapore and the ex-British colony Hong Kong, only established democracies and newly democratized countries have escaped the “middle-income trap.”

Aside from purely economic challenges, history offers two insights. One is that dictatorships are very likely to fall at the middle-income level. That is why we don’t see high-income autocracies outside the oil-producing states. The other one is that dictatorships steal too much from their societies and cannot sustain economic growth. Countries that cannot shake off dictatorships are trapped in middle income. This does not mean that democratization alone will lead to high income. It will not. But getting rid of dictatorship is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition, for reaching high income.

Q. How has your thesis been received by other China experts and political scientists?

A. It has aroused a great deal of interest, but also a lot of skepticism. This is understandable since regime transition is an ultralow probability event. But we also want to avoid making the same mistake as missing the fall of the U.S.S.R. or the Arab Spring. As a serious intellectual exercise with potentially profound policy implications, a systematic and evidence-based debate on China’s future is both healthy and long overdue.

Q. and A.: David Shambaugh on the Risks to Chinese Communist RuleBy Chris Buckley

March 15, 2015 9:00 pm March 15, 2015 9:00 pmPhoto

Chinese paramilitary officers marching on Tiananmen Square before the opening session of the National People’s Congress on March 5.Credit How Hwee Young/European Pressphoto Agency

David Shambaugh, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, is one of the United States’ most prominent experts on contemporary China. He has also been prominent in China. His books have been translated and published there, and his views cited in the state media. He was profiled by the overseas edition of People’s Daily, and in January researchers at the China Foreign Affairs University, which comes under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, named him the second-most influential China expert in the United States, behind David M. Lampton at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Photo

David ShambaughCredit Courtesy of David Shambaugh

Hence the intense debate ignited by Prof. Shambaugh’s recent essay in The Wall Street Journal, where he argued that the “endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun” and the Communist Party’s possible “demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent.” Some experts have endorsed his view that China’s outward order and prosperity mask profound risks for the ruling party. Others have argued that the party is more robust, politically and economically, than Prof. Shambaugh asserts. In an interview, he answered some questions raised by his essay:

Q.

Several years ago you published a book titled “China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation,” which highlighted the party’s potential to overcome or contain its problems, such as corruption and eroded authority, through learning and adaptation. Your latest assessment of the party’s long-term prospects of surviving in power seems much bleaker. What prompted you to shift your views? 

A.

My book on the Communist Party was completed in 2007 and published in 2008. The publication date is important because, as you note, I emphasized in that analysis that the party was taking a number of “adaptive” steps to legitimize, reinstitutionalize and save itself. The book analyzed in detail the reasons for the adaptation — largely the results of the party’s study of the causes of collapse of the Soviet Union and other Leninist states, but also because the party had persons in the top leadership during the period I studied, notably the president and party leader, Jiang Zemin, and his ally Zeng Qinghong, the vice president, who derived the main lesson from the Soviet post-mortem that the party had to be proactive and dynamic in its leadership.

So, the book was mainly about the “adaptation” the party was undertaking. But remember the other word in the subtitle: “atrophy.” The reason that is important is that I argued then, and argue now, that atrophy of late-stage, single-party Leninist, and other authoritarian, states is a normal, natural and ever-present condition. The question is: What do Leninist parties do to cope with the atrophy and stave off inevitable decline? Essentially, they can be reactive and defensive — ruling by repression, in effect — or they can be proactive and dynamic, ruling through opening and trying to guide and manage change. From roughly 2000

through 2008, under Zeng Qinghong’s aegis, the party chose the latter. But in the middle of 2009, after Zeng had retired, it abruptly shifted, in my view.

One can date it very precisely — Sept. 17, 2009 — the day after the Fourth Plenum of the party’s 17th Central Committee closed. That plenum meeting, which was on “party building,” put out a very progressive “decision” basically codifying everything Zeng and the party had been undertaking the previous eight years. I was living in Beijing that year, and when I read it I thought, “Great!”

But it was not to be. The party had, in fact, already grown very nervous during the previous spring and summer with riots in Tibet and Xinjiang. So, my guess is that the Plenum document was a kind of summary of previous years’ reforms, but had to be released because it had been in preparation for nearly a year and it was difficult to publicly announce that the party was going to reverse course, turn towards harsh repression and abandon the proactive political reforms. But that is what happened.

I have my theories about why they reversed course, essentially having to do with the coming together of strong bureaucracies that have a vested interest in control — propaganda, internal security, the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police, state-owned enterprises — what I call the “Iron Quadrangle” — being able to persuade the party general secretary, Hu Jintao, who no longer had to deal with Zeng Qinghong, that the party was losing control if it did not crack down and get better control over a variety of spheres. There were other factors as well, but in Chinese politics bureaucratic explanations are usually important. There is also big money in repression. Those bureaucracies’ budgets all ballooned as a result.

So, there has been a shift in my views of China and of the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy and tactics of rule — simply because China and the party changed! No China watcher can remain wed to arguments that have lost their empirical basis. I have, in fact, been speaking publicly, teaching and publishing along these lines for the past five years. I am the first one who would applaud a return to Zeng Qinghong-like political reform. The party has choices. Repression may be its “default mode,” but it is not its only option. Opening and proactively managing political change is an alternative.

True, if they tried that — again — there is no guarantee that they could keep control of the process and, as in the Soviet Union, the reforms could cascade out of control, and they would fall from power anyway. So, they have a kind of Hobson’s choice or Catch-22. They can repress and bring about their own demise or they can open up and still possibly bring about their own demise.

But it is not quite so simple. That is, even if they lightened up on the repression, the other elements affecting the party, economy and society are already hemorrhaging to the point that they may not be able to reverse or halt the slide. This is where the exodus of the elite and the systemic traps in the economy come in. I would add other factors that are contributing to public discontent with the regime: high levels of social inequality, inadequate provision of public goods, pervasive pollution and stagnating wages along with a slowing economy. For these reasons, this is why I see the “endgame” of the Communist Party as being underway. That said, my views about the protracted process of atrophy and decline of the party are more nuanced than the catchy headline used by The Wall Street Journal.

Q.

What has most surprised you about Xi Jinping since he became Communist Party leader in 2012? At the time, you judged that he was likely to be shackled by the influence of rival leaders and party elders. That doesn’t seem to be the case, so far at least.

A.

In most ways I am actually not surprised by Xi Jinping. I was one of the few observers to write at the time of the 18th Party Congress that we should not expect reform from Xi and were likely to get much more of what we had been witnessing since 2009.

I think that judgment has been proven largely correct. The one area where Xi has surprised me, though, is the rapidity with which he has consolidated his own personal power as China’s leader. I expected, like most China watchers at the time, a two-to-three-year protracted process of power consolidation, which clearly has not occurred. But, as I argued in the Wall Street Journal piece, we should not mistake Xi’s personal consolidation of power either with the overall strength of the party or even his own grip on power. I see both as very fragile.

Q.

You say that he’s determined not to follow Gorbachev’s fate, and yet he may end up having the same effect as Gorbachev. Could you explain how? We think of Gorbachev as a liberalizing leader who, for better or worse, opened the way to political relaxation in a way that Mr. Xi appears set against. So where do the two leaders’ fates possibly converge?

A.

My argument on this point in the article is very simple: Xi has deep animosity about what Gorbachev did in the Soviet Union with his reforms and has zero interest in pursuing similar reforms, because he thinks that they would lead to the collapse of the party and state. My argument is that he will likely have the same effect by resisting political reforms and by embracing harsh repression. I believe that repression is seriously stressing an already broken system and could well accelerate its collapse. That is why I compared Xi to Gorbachev. Different tactics, same likely result.

Q.

In your assessment of the party’s faltering political hold on the population and its own apparatchiks, you describe your experience at a mind-numbingly dull conference where party scholars appeared as bored as you were. But surely they were no less robotic under Hu Jintao? Don’t the broader messages spread by the party, especially under Xi, have some holding power over many people — such as the party’s claim to be the means of national unity and rejuvenation that will bring China prosperity and strength?

A.

What I argued at the end of the article is that: “Looking ahead, China-watchers should keep their eyes on the regime’s instruments of control and on those assigned to use those instruments. … We should watch for the day when the regime’s propaganda agents and its internal security apparatus start becoming lax in enforcing the party’s writ — or when they begin to identify with dissidents. …”

That is future tense — the potential for the regime’s enforcing agents to become lax in their enforcement. I was not arguing that it has already occurred for the propaganda authorities, media, Internet and social media monitors and the Public and State Security apparatchiks. Thus far, these enforcers are showing no such signs of lax enforcement or civil disobedience.

What you seem to refer to are my observations of “intellectuals” in the system and whether their “robotic” behavior — your term but I agree with it — is more pronounced than under Hu Jintao. Yes, I think it is and that there has been a qualitative shift in the more routinized direction since Xi came to power and launched his Mass Line campaign in the summer of 2013.

I participate in several such conferences per year — five in 2014, including three sponsored by Central Committee party organs — and have been doing so for a number of years, so I am in a pretty good position to monitor change over time in the behavior of party “intellectuals” and cadres. I lived there from 2009 to 2010 as well. With the exception of the “national rejuvenation” narrative, I do not find that Xi’s slogans and “broader messages,” as you put it, are resonating with the population. Everyone I talk with in China is not at all “inspired” by the unrelenting tsunami of slogans pouring out of the propaganda system, many attributed to Xi himself.

The national rejuvenation narrative seems to have had greater traction. But I would remind you that virtually every leader of China since the Qing dynasty — Li Hongzhang, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao, Deng and every leader up to Xi – has asserted this meme. So, Xi is hardly unique. To be strong again, and thereby respected in the world, has long been the primary craving of Chinese.

People also seem very put off by the mounting personality cult around Xi and his breaking of the collective and consensual decision-making norm that the Chinese leadership has worked so hard to build and maintain since the days of Mao.

Q.

Under Mr. Xi, the party has waged an intense offensive against dissent, independent civic groups and maverick news media, which you note. Why do you expect that will ultimately come back to haunt the party? For the time being, the government appears to have extinguished many sources of potential criticism or opposition with little backlash. Do you expect that to change?

A.

Please see my previous reply about repression stressing the system and the need to carefully watch the enforcer-agents of repression of these sectors. If — and that is if — they begin to get lax in their enforcement, then the party system could all unravel rather quickly. But, for the time being, like you, I see what I describe as the “coercive apparatus” as being quite strong and doing their jobs effectively. It is unfortunate for China, but it is the reality.

Q.

What is likely to happen if the party opts for a path of political liberalization? You say that it’s Mr. Xi’s best hope for escaping a crackup, and he could resume the tentative embrace of greater engagement and openness that you say China saw under Jiang Zemin and even Hu Jintao. But party leaders appear convinced that liberalization would stir social demands and pressures that could seal their demise. So, are they damned if they do liberalize, and equally damned if they don’t?

A.

Again, go back to examine what the party was doing circa 2000-2008. A return to that politically reformist path could conceivably be managed by the party, implementing step-by-step, incremental political opening and change without losing control and falling from power. It is not certain, but given what I know about Chinese political culture and society, I think it is a far better option for the party than the default repression option they are currently exercising. So, I am hopeful this might occur.

But, actually, I’m very doubtful it will, because of the way that Xi Jinping, Liu Yunshan — the party leader responsible for ideology and propaganda work — and other senior leaders think about political reform. Still, I would note that Chinese politics since Mao has undergone a series of opening-closing cycles (known in Chinese as fang and shou). Normally the open phases last about five to six years and the closing cycles

two to three years. We are currently in year seven of “closing.” An optimist would say that we are well overdue for an opening period! I would like to be optimistic, but my analytical judgment, unfortunately, tells me otherwise.

Falling Out of Love With ChinaBy DAVID SHAMBAUGHMARCH 18, 2013

Washington

NOW that China is becoming a world power, it is beginning to recognize the importance of its global image and the need to enhance its “soft power.” It is tracking public opinion polls worldwide and investing huge amounts into expanding its global cultural footprint, “external propaganda work” and public diplomacy. Unfortunately for China, that’s not enough.

While pockets of positive views regarding China can be found around the world, public opinion surveys from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project and the BBC reveal that China’s image ranges between mixed and poor. And the negative view is expanding: for almost a decade, European public opinion toward China has been the most negative in the world, but that is now matched in America and Asia.

There are likewise increasing signs of strain with Russia: on the surface, there is considerable harmony of worldviews and interests, but underneath lie lingering historical suspicions, growing trade frictions, problems stemming from Russia’s military sales to China, immigration controversies and nascent strategic competition in Central Asia.

China’s reputation has also deteriorated in the Middle East and among the Arab League due to the country’s support for the Syrian and Iranian regimes as well as its persecution of Muslim minorities in far western China, a policy that has also sullied its image in Central Asia.

Even in Africa — where relations remain positive on the whole — China’s image has deteriorated over the past three years as a result of the flood of Chinese entrepreneurs, its rapacious extraction of oil and other raw materials, aid projects that seem to benefit Chinese construction companies as much as recipient countries and support for unsavory governments. A similar downturn is apparent in Latin America for the same reasons.

Finally, China’s most important relationship — with the United States — is also troubled. It is now a combination of tight interdependence, occasional cooperation, growing competition and deepening distrust.

For both sides, the critical question is how to manage an increasingly competitive and distrustful relationship without its becoming a full-blown adversarial relationship. Neither country has any experience handling such strategic competition amid deep interdependence, although we can hope that the latter feature will buffer the former.

While the decline in China’s image may be global, the reasons differ from region to region.

China’s huge trade surpluses have contributed directly and indirectly to job losses around the world, but the impact on its image has been most pronounced in Europe, Latin America and the United States, where China seems to loom as an unprecedented economic threat.

Meanwhile, China’s military modernization and regional muscle-flexing in Asia has tarnished its reputation among its neighbors. Its unprecedented cyber-hacking has skyrocketed to the top of the agenda of Sino-American relations in recent weeks, while China’s domestic human rights situation has been a long-standing concern in the West.

Underlying many of these complaints are China’s authoritarian political system and its business practices, which are opaque and riddled with corruption.

While trying to broaden their global operations, China’s multinational corporations often encounter substantial difficulties establishing themselves abroad and gaining global market share. China does not have a single corporate brand listed in the top 100 of the annual Businessweek/Interbrand global rankings of respected corporate brands.

Given China’s growth rates, its image might not seem to matter much. But it does. As a result of China’s declining image, its new president, Xi Jinping, and his new foreign policy team face mounting foreign policy difficulties and challenges, both perceptually and substantively.

Mounting suspicions and growing frictions are part and parcel of being a global power. But China would be better advised to substantively engage foreign criticisms than to reflexively dismiss them or respond with unconvincing public-relations campaigns.

There are any number of immediate steps China could take. It should work to halt its hacking. It should open its markets and reduce its trade surpluses, while restricting subsidies to its foreign investment and exports. It should protect intellectual property rights and ratify and adhere to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which commits its members to protect individual liberties.

In foreign policy, it should involve itself in multinational negotiations under the Law of the Sea Treaty to resolve its disputes in the South China Sea, negotiate a settlement with Japan over its disputed islands and pressure North Korea and Iran to end their nuclear programs. It should also be transparent in its overseas aid programs and military budgets, and it should better respect sensitivities in developing countries over China’s extraction of natural resources.

Taking such steps would go much further toward enhancing China’s international image than the billions of dollars the country is currently pumping into its overseas propaganda efforts.

David Shambaugh, a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of “China Goes Global: The Partial Power.”