Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy on behalf of the ......Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy Author(s): Michele K. Esposito Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol

Quarterly Update on Conflict and DiplomacyAuthor(s): Michele K. EspositoSource: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Autumn 2006), pp. 114-147Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2006.36.1.114 .

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QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY

16 MAY–15 AUGUST 2006

COMPILED BY MICHELE K. ESPOSITO

The Quarterly Update is a summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and internationalevents affecting the Palestinians and the future of the peace process.

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

This quarter was marked by Israel’s rein-sertion of ground troops into Gaza with Op-eration Summer Rains (launched on 6/28,9 mos. after its unilateral disengagement),followed by its war on Lebanon with Op-eration Change of Direction (launched on7/13). The two operations inflicted a heavytoll on Gaza and widespread devastationon Lebanon, but by the end of the quarterboth operations were seen as having failedto achieve Israel’s military objectives, evenwhile undermining the government of newlyelected Israeli PM Ehud Olmert, forcing himto shelve (most likely permanently) his con-vergence plan for unilateral declaration ofIsrael’s borders by 2010 (see Quarterly Up-date in JPS 140). At the end of the quarter,Gaza’s Operation Summer Rains continued,while a shaky truce was in place in Lebanon,where some 10,000 regular Israeli forcesremained in the south, cheek-to-jowl withHizballah fighters.

As the quarter opened, Israel and theU.S. continued their suspension of all con-tacts with the Hamas-controlled PalestinianAuthority (PA) and to block all but humani-tarian aid to the territories until Hamas mettheir demands (endorsed by the Quartet on1/30/06) to recognize Israel, renounce vio-lence, and adhere to previous agreements.(Israel also demanded that Hamas annul itscharter and that the new PA governmentdismantle all Palestinian militant groups be-fore contacts could resume.) Palestinians inthe West Bank and Gaza continued to suffersevere economic hardship due to the U.S.-and Israeli-led economic sanctions result-ing inter alia in nonpayment of governmentworkers’ salaries for 2 mos. (see QuarterlyUpdate in JPS 140). An Israeli blockade ofGaza remained in place, with all crossings

for goods and persons almost entirely closedeven as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) con-tinued the air strikes and shelling of Gazaunder Operation Southern Arrow (begun on4/4; see Quarterly Update in JPS 140) to haltPalestinian rocket fire (in a ratio of 10 IDFstrikes to 1 rocket attack). The IDF also con-tinued to separate the n. and s. West Bank byclosing (since 4/12) the Zatara checkpoints. of Nablus and severely to restrict move-ment into and out of the n. Jordan Valley.As of 5/15, at least 4,386 Palestinians (in-cluding 46 Israeli Arabs and 17 unidentifiedArab cross-border infiltrators), 1,017 Israelis(including 311 IDF soldiers and security per-sonnel, 206 settlers, 500 civilians), and 57foreign nationals (including 2 British suicidebombers) had been killed since the start ofthe al-Aqsa intifada on 9/28/00.

Ongoing Positioning after ElectionsOn the diplomatic front, Israel’s new

Olmert government continued to pursueits unilateral convergence plan for a lim-ited removal of isolated settlements in theWest Bank, reinforcement of settlementsaround Jerusalem and along the Green Line,construction of the separation wall, and dec-laration of Israel’s borders by 2010, while PAPres. Mahmud Abbas and PM Ismail Haniyehboth pushed for an immediate resumptionof final status negotiations with Israel.

As noted in last quarter’s update, Abbasand elements of Fatah were willing to workwith Israel and the U.S. to strengthen Ab-bas’s roles as elected PA pres. and head ofthe PLO Executive Committee (PLOEC) toenable him to bypass the Hamas-controlledPA structures under Haniyeh’s authority. By5/19, Abbas and Israel reportedly were inactive consultations through Abbas’s negoti-ations adviser Saeb Erakat and Israel’s JusticeM Haim Ramon, as well as unofficial envoys

Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XXXVI, No. 1 (Autumn 2006), pp. 114–147, ISSN 0377-919X, electronic ISSN 1533-8614.C© 2006 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permissionto photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’sRights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.



QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 115

in Europe, on how to achieve this. In hisspeech to the World Economic Forum (WEF)in Cairo on 5/21, Abbas reiterated his call forIsrael to resume talks directly with him ashead of the PLOEC, arguing that negotiationswere under the PLO purview and stressingthat Haniyeh (who had not been invited tothe WEF) had agreed to this (see QuarterlyUpdate in JPS 140). On the sidelines of theWEF, Abbas met with Israeli Vice PM andFM Tzipi Livni and Dep. PM Shimon Peres inthe first senior-level Israeli-Palestinian meet-ing since 6/05. The Israelis repeated theirdemands for changes by Hamas and spokeof a possible Abbas-Olmert meeting in thenear future, but Olmert stated (5/21) thathe would meet with Abbas only if he madeefforts to disarm militant groups and forcethe Hamas-led government to recognize pastdeals with Israel, which Olmert doubted waspossible. (“[Abbas] is helpless. He’s unableto even stop the minimal terrorist activitiesamongst the Palestinians.”) Also on the WEFsidelines, Livni met with Egyptian FM AhmadAbu al-Ghayt and rejected his proposal of im-mediate resumption of final status talks, stat-ing Israel’s interpretation (not accepted bythe international community) that the roadmap required that Palestinians dismantle allmilitant groups and halt all violence (includ-ing incitement) before negotiations could beconsidered. (Of note: Israel’s long-standingposition on the road map is that it is “dead”and “no longer relevant.”)

Meanwhile, Haniyeh endeavored topresent his government as a rational in-terlocutor that could deliver significantprogress toward peace, security, and inter-nal reform if given a chance to act withoutundue political constraints. In a high-profileinterview to the Israeli daily Ha’Aretz (pub-lished 5/23), he reiterated that if Israel wereto withdraw to 1967 borders, peace wouldprevail and the issue of Palestinian recog-nition of Israel could be opened. He alsorestated readiness to deal with Israel im-mediately on day-to-day matters, though herefused to discuss amending Hamas’s char-ter on the grounds that he was speakingas the leader of “the government of all thePalestinians, and not as the leader of a move-ment (i.e., Hamas).” Haniyeh’s Dep. PM Nasral-Sha‘ir also stated (5/24) that the PA was set-ting up a national task force for negotiationswith Israel charged with finding a way to ac-cept “international realities” without cavingin to foreign pressures to recognize Israelformally before parallel recognition by Israelof Palestine and the rights of Palestinians.

Olmert Meets with BushThe main item on the agenda of Olmert’s

upcoming first meeting (as prime minister)with U.S. Pres. George W. Bush was his con-vergence plan (renamed by advisers on theeve of the visit the “realignment plan,” be-lieved to sound more benign in English) forwhich he was to seek U.S. endorsement.Well in advance of the 5/23 meeting, theU.S., whose unquestioning support of TelAviv was incurring criticism from the in-ternational community in light of the wors-ening conditions in the territories causedby U.S.-Israeli sanctions, made it knownthat it could not back further Israeli uni-lateral action, particularly defining borders,without compromising other foreign policypriorities, especially with regard to Iran’snuclear program (see Iran section below).The U.S. pressed Israel to at least make ashow of engaging Abbas in discussion onthe convergence plan, also reportedly fear-ing that bypassing Abbas altogether wouldundermine his standing with the Palestini-ans and strengthen Hamas’s position further.Washington also wanted Jordan to be con-sulted on the plan. (Of note: The U.S. andIsrael also took steps just before the Bush-Olmert meeting to soften their public imagetoward the Palestinians: USAID began dis-tributing $800,000 worth of medicine inthe West Bank and Gaza on 5/17; the Is-raeli cabinet approved on 5/21 the releaseof $11 m. in VAT taxes withheld from the PAto NGOs in the territories unconnected toHamas for medical aid to Gaza hospitals.)

Given U.S. constraints, the 5/23 meetinglargely became what former U.S. consul gen.Edward Abington characterized as the open-ing of Olmert-Bush administration negotia-tions on the convergence plan. According toU.S. officials, Bush privately pressed Olmertto clarify the IDF status in the West Bank afterimplementation, Israeli plans for the JordanValley, whether the separation wall wouldbecome the legal border, and the compati-bility of convergence with a 2-state solution.Olmert reportedly presented the rough out-lines of the plan without a timetable for im-plementation, noting that 6–9 mos. wouldbe required to finalize details (in consul-tation with the U.S.) and hinting that thiswould give Abbas time to crack down onPalestinian militant groups and transformthe PA into a “viable” negotiating partner.

Publicly, Bush praised Olmert’s “boldideas” but stressed that “any final statusagreement will be only achieved on the ba-sis of mutually agreed changes, and no party



116 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

should prejudice the outcome of negotia-tions on a final status agreement.” Bush wel-comed Olmert’s pledge to make a “seriousattempt” to work with Abbas, though bothmen openly expressed doubts that Abbascould deliver an acceptable deal.

Keeping his pledge to Bush, Olmert metwith Abbas for the first time in over a yearon 6/22, at an informal breakfast hosted byKing Abdallah of Jordan on the sidelines of aconference of Nobel laureates in Petra. Noth-ing of substance was discussed, but the menagreed in principle to hold a summit in thenext few weeks. In statements afterward, thePA stressed (6/22) that it would only agreeto the summit with a well-planned substan-tive agenda aimed at reaching some kindof agreement, while Olmert told (6/22) thepress that Israel had 3 “nonnegotiable con-ditions” for resumption of substantive talks:the PA’s “total disarmament of terrorist orga-nizations and total cessation of violence; fullimplementation of agreements; and recog-nition of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewishstate.”

The PA Cash Crisis and theEU’s Temporary InternationalMechanismMeanwhile, the PA faced a deepening

cash crisis, with no money coming into theterritories. EU plans launched last quarterto create a donor financing mechanism, theTemporary International Mechanism (TIM),to bypass the Hamas-led PA were not yet fi-nalized, and emergency funds approved byinternational donors could not reach the PAbecause almost all international banks, Arabbanks included, had suspended operationswith public and personal accounts in theterritories under threat of severe U.S. sanc-tions (see Quarterly Update in JPS 140). On5/17, the Israeli Discount Bank, the last Is-raeli bank doing business with Palestinianbanks, announced that it would suspend itsoperations in the territories in 3–6 mos.)

By mid-5/06, the PA had little optionbut to try to smuggle cash across theRafah border, where Israel had no directpresence. From mid-5/06 to mid-6/06, atleast $26,815,000 (a fraction of the PA’s$125 m. monthly salary budget) was seizedat the Rafah crossing by PA customs officialsalerted by EU monitors and was released tothe PA Treasury. The confiscations include$815,000 on 5/19 from Hamas spokesmanSami Abu Zuhri; $4 m. several days later byan unidentified Hamas official; $20 m. on6/14 by PA FM Mahmud Zahhar returning

from a well-publicized PA fundraising tourof Brunei, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran,Malaysia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; and $2 m.on 6/14 from PA Information M Yusuf Rizqa.On 6/4, the PA began using the funds topay the 3/06 salaries of PA employees mak-ing under $330/mo. (around a quarter ofthe 165,000 civil servants), while arranginginterest-free loans from banks equivalent to1-mo. of pay for others. On 6/19, the PAbegan distributing back payments of $300to civil servants earning over $330/mo.,partially paying their 3/06 salaries; the pay-ments were made through special postalaccounts since banks would not handle thetransactions.

On 6/8, the EU sent Quartet membersa draft proposal for the TIM. With the PAable to generate only $35 m. of its $165 m.monthly budget needs as a result of the siegeand sanctions, the plan envisioned 3 “win-dows” of support: window 1 would disburseupward of $6 m./mo. to cover health andsocial service expenditures; window 2, upto $15 m./mo. for utilities to ensure con-tinued fuel supplies; and window 3, up to$30 m./mo. in “social allowances” and “sub-sidies,” still leaving the PA with a significantmonthly deficit. The U.S. responded thatwindow 3 could violate its sanction laws asit clearly entailed contributions to PA em-ployee salaries and warned that even theWorld Bank could face penalties. On 6/17,after window 3 was modified to create a “so-cial safety net” for poor Palestinians (some ofwhom may have received PA salaries previ-ously) and to pay “emergency allowances” tosome healthcare workers normally paid bythe PA, the full Quartet endorsed the plan,with provisions for the U.S. to review imple-mentation after 3 mos. to judge if the processshould continue. The EU agreed to fund theTIM with an initial donation of $125 m.,pending a donor conference, and hoped tobegin making disbursements in 7/06. EUspecial envoy Benita Ferrero-Waldner metseparately with Abbas and Livni on 6/19 tosecure their backing of the TIM and to pressIsrael to use the mechanism to channel tensof millions of dollars in VAT taxes owed tothe PA. Both sides expressed reservationsbut hoped to see the plan implemented;Israel did not respond regarding the VATfunds.

The TIM disbursed its first funds to payfor fuel for Palestinian hospitals on 7/11 andbegan paying salaries of doctors and nurseson 7/27. By the end of the quarter, the EU hadallocated $12.7 m. to window 1, $50.8 m.




to window 2, and $12.7 m. to window 3,plus an additional $15 m. outside TIM fortechnical assistance and capacity buildingto the PA Office of the President. By 8/15,the PA was also receiving some Arab donoraid through accounts controlled by Abbas,allowing the PA to pay civil servants backsalaries for 3/06. The Palestinian MonetaryAuthority reportedly held (ca. 7/27) talkswith Israel’s Hapoalim and Discount banks,convincing them to continue fund transfersand defrayal services through the end of2006.

Hamas-Fatah Tensions EscalateOn the ground, the internal security sit-

uation in Gaza was deteriorating rapidlyas elements within Fatah (suspected to beled by units of the PA Preventive SecurityForce [PSF] linked to Fatah strongman andU.S. ally Muhammad Dahlan) continued tochallenge Haniyeh’s authority over the PAsecurity services. Last quarter, Haniyeh, frus-trated over the unwillingness of the variousPA security branches to deploy on his or-ders to provide public security in Gaza andAbbas’s unwillingness to intervene, had au-thorized his Interior M Said Siyam to createa volunteer Executive Support Force (ESF)to patrol Gaza’s streets. While all factionshad been invited to participate, Fatah mem-bers had balked, and the majority of the3,000-member ESF was made up of Hamasmembers, with around 500 Popular Resis-tance Comm. (PRC) members comprisingthe remainder (see Quarterly Update inJPS 140).

On 5/17, the Interior Min. began deploy-ing the ESF for the first time, promptingAbbas to order (5/17) 1,000s of PA po-lice into the streets in a show of force.Fatah-Hamas violence quickly escalated,with reports of Hamas members in Gazabeing killed in drive-by shootings and kid-nappings by suspected Fatah gunmen (e.g.,5/16, 5/17, 5/24); exchanges of fire be-tween Fatah-linked PA security forces andESF members (e.g., 5/18, 5/19, 5/20, 5/22,5/24, 5/25), often with fatal results; andshow-of-force parades by armed Fatah mem-bers (e.g., 5/18, 5/21). Unidentified gun-men (suspected Fatah) fired (5/20) on theGaza home of Hamas-affiliated Interior Min.spokesman Khalid Abu Hilal. Bombs plantedby unknown individuals (suspected Hamas)exploded in the PA General IntelligenceService (GIS) offices in Gaza City in an ap-parent assassination attempt on Fatah’s GISGaza head Tariq Abu Rajab (5/20) and un-

der the car of PSF central Gaza chief NabilHudud, killing him (5/24); a massive road-side bomb was also found (5/20) along themotorcade route of Internal Security Servicedir. gen. Rashid Abu Shibak (appointed byAbbas to wrest control of the security forcesaway from Siyam; see Quarterly Update inJPS 140).

After an offer (5/22–23) by Egyptian se-curity advisers (resident in Gaza) to brokeremergency talks between Fatah and Hamasand following further talks, Siyam agreed(5/25) to limit the ESF’s patrol areas to makethe units less visible, and the senior lead-ership of Fatah and Hamas pressured theircadres to hold their fire, temporarily curbingthe violence that as of 5/25 had left 4 Fatahmembers, 3 Hamas members, and a Jorda-nian embassy employee dead and at leasttwo dozen people wounded.

Concerned over the escalation and seek-ing to reinforce Abbas, Israel agreed (5/25)to allow Jordan and Egypt to supply Abbas’spresidential guard (Force 17) with weaponsand ammunition, backing a U.S.-led initiativeto expand Force 17 into a 3,500-memberforce to counterbalance the ESF (see Quar-terly Update in JPS 140). Force 17 beganreceiving 3,000 M-16 rifles and 3 m. roundsof ammunition from Jordan on 6/14–15, andAbbas swore in the first group of 300 newrecruits (of an anticipated 1,000) around theend of the quarter.

Abbas Threatens a ReferendumWith deteriorating conditions in the terri-

tories and a dangerous diplomatic stalemate,Abbas unexpectedly seized the political ini-tiative. At the opening (5/25) of video-linkednational unity talks in Gaza and Ramallahaimed at reaching consensus on how tomove forward, Abbas told the 500 or soreps. of Fatah, Hamas, smaller Palestinianfactions, and civil society groups that unlessHamas endorsed a 2-state solution based on1967 borders within 10 days, he would putthis proposal to the Palestinian people in anonbinding referendum within 2 mos. Thereferendum would be based on the 18-pointprisoners’ initiative issued on 5/11 by jailedsenior Hamas and Fatah officials (see Doc.B8 in JPS 140). The initiative, which hadthe support of the majority of Palestiniansaccording to polls (see the Palestinian Opin-ion section in Quarterly Update, JPS 140),called for a Palestinian state within 1967borders, urged Palestinians to “focus theirresistance on lands occupied in 1967,” andused wording that could be the starting point




for a compromise on Hamas’s recognition ofIsrael and renunciation of violence. Haniyehhad already called the initiative worthy ofdiscussion, and Israel had not rejected this“internal” Palestinian document.

The move tested Change and Reformparty claims that as the elected representa-tives of the Palestinian people as a whole,they would work within the democratic PAsystem and not as Hamas representatives.(An Abbas aide admitted on 5/25 that “We’reescalating the tension a little bit to try to cor-ner them [Hamas] and show them as rejec-tionist.”) Even if Haniyeh politically could notendorse outright a 2-state solution (consider-ing it recognition of Israel without a parallelIsraeli recognition of Palestinian rights), hecould not legitimately oppose a referendum,especially after having threatened Fatah witha referendum on Hamas’s national unity plat-form during coalition talks and promisedthat any viable peace agreement with Israelwould be put to a referendum (see QuarterlyUpdate in JPS 140).

With the Hamas external leadership stat-ing (5/30) opposition to a referendum,Haniyeh moved to negotiate with Abbason the prisoners’ initiative as the basis ofa national unity platform. By Abbas’s 6/4deadline, the sides had narrowed their dif-ferences enough so that Abbas could extendhis deadline until 6/6. Differences centeredon (1) explicit recognition of Israel (Hamasrefused to do this without parallel recog-nition from Israel) and (2) the details ofimplementing the initiative’s call to restruc-ture the PLO to include Hamas. (Of note:Haniyeh reportedly demanded that the talkswith Abbas be held in Gaza, concerned thata Ramallah venue could enable elements ofHamas’s West Bank leadership closely tied tothe hard-line external leadership to scuttlethe negotiations.)

With differences still outstanding on 6/6,Abbas met with the PLOEC, which endorsedmoving forward with setting a date for areferendum. In response, jailed Hamas mem-bers involved in the drafting of the prisoners’initiative issued (6/6) a statement urging Ab-bas to continue the talks, arguing that forcinga vote would cause more division, that a ref-erendum would be costly, that the details ofparticipation (territories only or diaspora aswell) needed to be worked out, and that inany case, the U.S. and Israel would undoubt-edly reject the initiative as falling short ofthe 1/30 Quartet demands. (Indeed, Olmerton 6/11 criticized the initiative as “meaning-less in terms of [creating the conditions for]

some kind of dialogue between us and thePalestinians” and, noting its failure to referto Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state andits insistence on the right of return, statedthat he could not “accept something thatchallenges the very fundamental principlesof Israel’s existence.”) Abbas nonethelessdeclared (6/10) that a referendum wouldbe held on 7/26, but added that talks withHamas would continue up until the vote andthat if a joint position was agreed beforethen, the referendum could be canceled. On6/11, the Hamas and Islamic Jihad prisonleaders withdrew their support for the pris-oner’s initiative, accusing Abbas of “playingpolitics” with the document. As a result,popular support for a referendum droppedto 47%, though the majority of Palestinians(75% as of 6/19) continued to support theinitiative itself.

Meanwhile, Fatah-Hamas violence inGaza had picked up again as of about 6/1,possibly in response to the referendum is-sue. Exchanges of gunfire occurred betweenFatah/PSF and Hamas/ESF members (e.g.,6/1, 6/4, 6/14, 6/18, 6/21, 6/23, 6/24), caus-ing casualties. Suspected Hamas membersfired a mortar at the PSF headquarters inGaza City on 6/6, wounding 4 officers and 2janitors; Hamas members fired grenades at aPSF office in Khan Yunis; Fatah-affiliated PAsecurity forces (6/1) and ESF members (6/8)paraded in shows of force; and Hamas mem-bers raided a pro-Fatah TV station (6/5).On 6/12, a massive clash took place out-side the PSF headquarters in Rafah involvingmore than 100 Fatah and Hamas gunmen fir-ing antitank weapons and rocket-propelledgrenades (RPGs), leaving 1 Hamas memberand a bystander dead and 15 Palestinianswounded; each side claimed the other pro-voked the incident by attempting to kidnapmembers of the other group. Hours later,100s of pro-Fatah PA security forces andal-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AMB; a hard-line Fa-tah offshoot) members rampaged throughRamallah, raiding, firing on, vandalizing, andsetting fire to the Palestinian Council (PC)building; kidnapping Change and ReformPC member Khalil Rabei and setting fireto his offices (he was released hours laterafter Abbas’s intervention); and prompt-ing 7 other Change and Reform PC mem-bers to seek refuge in the Muqata‘a underAbbas’s protection. The following day(6/13), 10,000s of Hamas supporters ralliedoutside the damaged PC building in solidar-ity with the Hamas-led government. Therewere also car bombings in Gaza, killing a




senior Hamas military commander on 6/5and targeting a PSF member on 6/21 thatmay have been products of Hamas-Fatahtensions. The intra-Palestinian clashes left 7Palestinians dead (including 2 Hamas mem-bers and 2 civilians) and more than 2 dozen(mostly gunmen) wounded between 5/26and 6/24.

Israel Changes the Dynamic in GazaOn 5/29, days after Olmert’s return from

Washington and Abbas’s ultimatum to Hamason a 2-state solution, the IDF stepped up mil-itary actions in Gaza. The IDF had routinelycrossed the Gaza border since disengage-ment was completed in 9/05 to search fortunnels and to level land, especially for con-struction of a wall along the n. Gaza border,but this time the IDF made its first groundoffensive into Gaza targeting Palestinian mil-itants since disengagement; though brief,it marked a precedent-setting escalation.Undercover troops entered the former set-tlement area of Dugit to ambush and kill3 Islamic Jihad members preparing to firerockets into Israel, withdrawing back intoIsrael immediately after. After troops clearedthe area, helicopters crossed the border tofire missiles at the site, wounding 4 Pales-tinian medics and 2 journalists. Hours later,helicopters returned, firing on a PA securitydetail investigating the scene, killing 1 PAofficer and wounding a bystander.

Incidents soon spiraled: On 6/8, the IDFassassinated ESF commander and charis-matic PRC leader Jamal Abu Samhadana inan air strike on Rafah, also killing 3 PRC mem-bers and wounding 10. On 6/9, IDF artilleryshelled the Bayt Lahiya beach, killing at least8 Palestinian civilians and wounding 32.(Though Israel immediately denied involve-ment and claimed that the explosion hadbeen caused by a Hamas rocket or plantedbomb, a senior military analyst with HumanRights Watch concluded with certainty thatan Israeli shell had caused the fatalities.) Re-sponding to the 6/9 IDF attack on the BaytLahiya beach, Hamas suspended (6/9) its16-mo. cease-fire and began, along withIslamic Jihad, to lob 10s of rockets/day intoIsrael, wounding 4 Israelis and damaging aschool and a house, before reimposing itsunilateral cease-fire on 6/15. Although theIDF acknowledged (6/20) that Hamas wasagain observing a cease-fire, it announced(6/19) a new policy of attacking Hamastargets for each Palestinian rocket strike, re-gardless of what group was responsible forthe fire. The IDF also increasingly targeted

Gaza militants with air strikes, blurring thelines between outright assassinations (2 Is-lamic Jihad members in n. Gaza on 6/5;another 2 in Gaza City on 6/13, also killing 9and wounding 32 bystanders; an attemptedassassination on 6/21) and more question-able attacks that the IDF claimed targetedPalestinian militants on their way to or fromfiring rockets into Israel (e.g., 6/9, 6/11,6/16, 6/20). On 6/23, the IDF made its firstmajor arrest sweep into Gaza since disen-gagement, temporarily sealing off the Rafahcrossing and sending troops into Rafah to de-tain 2 wanted Palestinians (allegedly Hamasmembers, which Hamas denied).

Adding to tensions, a group of Egyptianborder police patrolling at Rafah accidentallystrayed (6/2) into the Negev and were firedon by IDF troops, who killed 2. Though Israelinitially claimed the Egyptians intentionallycrossed the border and attacked an IDF post,Olmert later (6/4) admitted that the incidenthad been an accident and apologized toEgyptian pres. Husni Mubarak.

Meanwhile, in the West Bank, the IDFcontinued to impose tight restrictions onPalestinian movement, expand the separa-tion wall, conduct arrest raids and housesearches, demolish Palestinian homes, con-fiscate and bulldoze agricultural land, raidand close Palestinian institutions, and fireon residential areas (see Chronology for de-tails). The IDF also assassinated an IslamicJihad member in Qabatiyya on 5/29 and 2AMB members in Jenin on 6/13 and Ramallahon 6/22. Major clashes during an IDF arrestraid into Ramallah on 5/24 left 4 Palestiniansdead and at least 35 Palestinians and 1 IDF of-ficer wounded. Between 5/16 and 6/24, 75Palestinians were killed in Israeli-Palestinianclashes—no Israelis were killed during thatperiod—bringing the comprehensive in-tifada death toll to 4,461 Palestinians and1,017 Israelis.

Capture of an IDF Soldier Triggersa CrisisAgainst this background, 8 Palestinian

militants representing Hamas’s Izzeddin al-Qassam Brigades, the PRCs, and the pre-viously unknown Army of Islam staged apredawn cross-border raid from s. Gaza on6/25, sneaking through a sophisticated un-derground tunnel to attack an IDF borderpost near Israel’s Kerem Shalom crossing.The militants, dressed in IDF uniforms, at-tacking with grenades, rifles, and antitankrockets, killed 2 IDF soldiers, wounded4, and captured the lightly wounded Cpl.




Gilad Shalit, spiriting him back into Gaza; 2of the gunmen were killed by IDF return fire.The attackers dubbed the assault OperationDispel Illusion and said it was in retaliationfor Israel’s 6/8 assassination of ESF head andPRC leader Abu Samhadana, though manyanalysts suspected that it was staged to scut-tle the Fatah-Hamas talks on the referendumand national unity platform (see MideastMirror 6/26, 6/27, 6/29).

Israel immediately sent tanks and bulldoz-ers half a mile into s. Gaza to search for Shalit;sealed all crossings into Gaza, including theRafah crossing (3,000–4,000 Palestinianswere stranded on the Egyptian side of theborder and 400 urgent medical cases seekingtreatment abroad on the Gaza side) by bar-ring the entry of EU monitors through KeremShalom; shut off fuel supplies; barred Pales-tinian fisherman from going out to sea; andtightened movement restrictions through-out the West Bank. Israeli Dep. PM and FMTzipi Livni called on Abbas to order his secu-rity forces to secure Shalit’s release, and ShinBet head Yuval Diskin warned that Israelwould ensure the collapse of the Hamas-ledgovernment unless the soldier was releasedalive.

Abbas immediately called for Shalit’s re-lease, but Haniyeh remained silent amidevident confusion within Hamas over theincident. Hamas’s political echelon quicklydenied (6/25) foreknowledge of the attack,with some figures urging that Shalit be freedimmediately, and reports soon surfaced thata rogue cell from Khan Yunis was suspected.(Analysts noted that Hamas members whojoined the PA cabinet and PC lost their po-sitions in the Hamas leadership and werereplaced, speculating that the resulting pro-motions within Hamas might have empow-ered more militant factions; see New YorkTimes 7/21.) On 6/26, Haniyeh issued a state-ment urging the gunmen not to harm Shalitand to “respect him as a prisoner,” but didnot call for his release. He also urged all fac-tions to maintain a cease-fire so as to avoida massive IDF retaliation and, in coordina-tion with Abbas, deployed security forces toconduct house-to-house searches for Shalit.

Egyptian intelligence officials resident inGaza as mediators among the Palestinian fac-tions and between Israel and the PA quicklystepped in to try to negotiate a release.Their judgment, first stated on 6/26, wasthat the soldier’s capture had been sponta-neous rather than preplanned, that he wasnot being held by the Hamas cadres, and thatdifferences among the three factions on how

to deal with the situation would complicatenegotiations for his release.

On 6/26, the gunmen issued their firstdemands, calling for the release of all 113Palestinian women and 318 children heldin Israeli jails in return for information onShalit’s medical condition. Israel refused andsent 2–3 armored battalions (around 3,000troops) to the s. Gaza border, ignoring U.S.appeals (6/26) to give diplomacy time towork before launching a military operation.Egypt simultaneously deployed an additional2,500 border guards along the Rafah borderto prevent Shalit from being smuggled intoEgypt. IDF preparations for a ground incur-sion into s. Gaza continued into 6/27, withthe deployment of another 2 infantry regi-ments, bringing the estimated force strengthon the border to 5,000 troops, backed byMerkava tanks and D9 bulldozers. InsideGaza, Palestinian militants began buildingsand berms and setting explosive devicesalong likely invasion routes, fearing an as-sault on the level of the 2002 OperationDefensive Shield.

A Sidebar on the ReferendumIn the midst of the confusion and dis-

array following the soldier’s capture, theongoing national unity talks between Ab-bas and Haniyeh were reaching their climax;by 6/25, Haniyeh was reportedly discussingwith his leadership and Abbas the idea ofdissolving his government to avoid a refer-endum and of appointing a government oftechnocrats in its place. The Hamas leader-ship reportedly was seriously consideringthe option but wanted guarantees that thesiege on Gaza and sanctions on the PA wouldbe lifted as a result and that the technocratsappointed would have no party affiliations.Meanwhile, at least 2 high-level meetingsby West Bank Hamas leaders had reportedlybeen held on ways to foil the referendum,with Hamas’s Damascus-based leader KhalidMishal ordering cadres during a conferencecall in Nablus to ramp up tensions with Fatahto prevent any compromise deals.

On 6/27, hours before the IDF launchedan all-out assault on Gaza,Abbas and Haniyeh,possibly eager to demonstrate movement to-ward meeting Quartet demands in orderto preclude a harsh Israel retaliation, an-nounced that they, in consultation withother factions, had agreed on a nationalunity platform and to work toward forma-tion of a national unity government, therebysuspending plans for a referendum on a 2-state solution. The platform, based on but




not identical to the prisoners’ initiative,added new emphasis on the inviolability ofinternational law, especially the Palestinianright of return and to resist occupation, andthe illegality of Israel’s occupation and cre-ation of settlements. Like the original, thetext did not explicitly recognize Israel butimplied endorsement of previously signedagreements recognizing Israel and the 2002Arab League initiative calling for recognitionof Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawalfrom all territories occupied in 1967; calledfor formation of a Palestinian state on ter-ritories occupied by Israel in 1967; recom-mended “concentrating” armed operationsin the occupied territories under a unifiedcommand; and prioritized the release of allPalestinian prisoners. It also called for thereorganization of the PLO by the end of2006, so that Hamas and Islamic Jihad mightjoin. Provided that a new, fully representa-tive Palestine National Council (PNC) wereformed and the principles of democracy up-held, the PLO would be reaffirmed as thePalestinians’ sole legitimate rep., the PNCauthorized to ratify any peace agreement,and the PA supported (as a substructure ofthe PLO) as the core of the future Pales-tinian state. The text was initialed (6/28) byall factions that participated in the nationalunity talks except Islamic Jihad and waspassed to Abbas for implementation. At theend of the quarter, Abbas had not formallyadopted the program, leaving open the pos-sibility of further negotiations and changes.Israel dismissed (6/27) the agreement, stat-ing, “There is an immediate crisis. . . . Thatthe Palestinian leadership was putting en-ergy into this document that has no bearingon the most pressing issue [freeing Shalit]is disappointing.” Notwithstanding, Abbasand Haniyeh continued talks through theend of the quarter on implementation of theunderstandings.

Operation Summer RainsThe military onslaught that had become

inevitable with the capture of Shalit on 6/25began in earnest during the night of 6/27–28,when the IDF launched Operation Sum-mer Rains. Initially, the operation seemedto have a dual aim of freeing Shalit andpunishing the Palestinians to reduce theirsupport for the resistance and the Hamas-ledPA. Ground troops crossed into s. Gaza, tak-ing the Dahaniyya airport area as a base ofoperations, demolishing 5 Palestinian homesand bulldozing wide swaths of land to clearsight lines, and blowing up 3 bridges link-

ing southern and central Gaza. The IDF’sclear assumption, though not officially con-firmed, was that Shalit was being held in theKhan Yunis/Rafah area, and Dahaniyya waswell situated as a jump-off point for a raid tofree him. Later that day (6/28), the IDF con-ducted 7 air strikes on Gaza’s only electricityplant near Gaza City (insured by the U.S.government’s Overseas Private InvestmentCorp., which was liable for up to $48 m. indamages) and 6 transformer stations, black-ing out 45% of the Strip and leaving it fullydependent on electricity from Israel; shelledopen areas of s. and n. Gaza; and repeatedlybroke the sound barrier over the Strip. TheIDF also moved its elite Givati Brigade to then. Gaza border, warning residents to evacu-ate the border area, and threatened to sendin troops if Palestinian rocket fire intensifiedin response to Summer Rains. (Rocket firecontinued at a rate of around half a dozenper day, causing no damage or injuries.)

Publicly, Olmert warned that IDF op-erations would continue to escalate untilShalit was released, placing “the full re-sponsibility” for the current situation on“the Palestinian-Hamas government and el-ements that are connected to it in Syria.”In a warning to Syrian pres. Bashar al-Asadand Hamas’s Damascus-based leadership,the Israeli air force made (6/28–29) over-flights of Asad’s residence in Latakia (wherehe was staying) and along the Syrian coast,which Syria denounced as “an aggressive actand provocation.” The U.S. (6/28) and UN(6/29) stated that Israel was within its rightsto self-defense in launching Summer Rainsbut warned against actions that unneces-sarily harmed Palestinian infrastructure andcivilians.

Instead of making a quick assault to freeShalit, however, Olmert staged a major ar-rest raid across the West Bank the night of6/28–29, detaining 64 senior Hamas politi-cal officials, including 8 PA cabinet members(Finance M Omar ‘Abd al-Raziq, Planning MSamir Abu ‘Aysha, Jerusalem Affairs M KhalidAbu ‘Arafa, Labor M Muhammad Barghouthi,Local Government M Issa al-Jabari, Prison-ers Affairs M Wasfi Kabaha, Religious Af-fairs M Nayif Rajub, Social Affairs M FakhriTurkman) and 26 Change and Reform PCmembers, plus an additional 23 senior Izzed-din al-Qassam Brigades members. The planhad been prepared far in advance (some Is-raeli analysts said since the 1/06 elections;Ha’Aretz 6/29): the arrest warrants deliveredby IDF soldiers had been ordered weeks ear-lier by Israeli Atty. Gen. Menachem Mazuz,




who had denied Shin Bet requests that theofficials be held in administrative detentionunder the Unlawful Combatants Law, insist-ing that the arrests be made on criminalcharges (participation in a terrorist organi-zation) valid in a court of law. During theday, IDF air strikes, shelling, and overflightscontinued in Gaza, cutting all electricity ton. Gaza. Palestinians in s. Gaza (thoughtto be Hamas members) blew a hole in theGaza-Egypt border wall, but PA and Egyptiansecurity forces prevented all but a handfulof Palestinians from crossing.

While heavy aerial assaults on Palestinianinfrastructure and militant targets in Gazacontinued over the next few days, it soonbecame clear that the IDF did not knowShalit’s whereabouts: soldiers at Dahaniyyadid not move off site except to bulldozeland, and DM Amir Peretz ordered (6/29)the Givati Brigade to suspend preparationsto move into n. Gaza. Without a clear rescueplan, Summer Rains came to focus moreobviously on punishing and destabilizingthe Hamas-led government.

The direction the operation was takingwas viewed with concern by large segmentsof the international community: the heavydamage to Gaza’s civilian infrastructure,the arrests of elected PA officials, and thetoll on civilians of cuts to electricity, fuel,and water delivery and sewage treatment(dependent in urban areas on electricity orgas) was seen as a disproportionate responseto a raid on a military target that causedonly limited casualties. The UN’s emergencyrelief coordinator Jan Egeland warned (6/29)that a humanitarian crisis was imminentif electricity and fuel were not restored,particularly to hospitals and clinics.

The U.S., though cautioning (6/29) thatIsrael’s actions could build popular supportfor Hamas, generally fully supported its ally.On 6/30, as IDF air strikes on Gaza heav-ily damaged PA Interior Min. offices anddestroyed several PA intelligence and ESFposts, U.S. Amb. to the UN John Boltonblocked discussion of a UN Security Coun-cil (UNSC) res. calling for an immediate haltto Operation Summer Rains, stating that theU.S. “is of the firm view that a prerequisitefor ending this conflict is that the govern-ments of Syria and Iran end their role asstate sponsors of terror and unequivocallycondemn the actions of Hamas.”

Olmert Adjusts His AimsHaving secured tacit U.S. approval for

Israel’s use of military means to achieve its

wider aim of neutralizing Hamas, IsraeliPM Olmert convened (7/1) his securitycabinet and won approval to escalate at-tacks, personally keeping U.S. Secy. of StateCondoleezza Rice briefed by phone. Al-though the full parameters of the IDF’s newdirectives were not spelled out, the cabinetauthorization permitted the IDF to supple-ment air and artillery strikes with moreaggressive ground operations and to tem-porarily reoccupy former settlement sitesas needed to eradicate Gaza’s “terrorist in-frastructure” and halt rocket fire into Israel.Thereafter, little mention was made of se-curing Shalit’s release in the context of IDFoperations.

At the same time, the groups holdingShalit issued (7/1) a second statement de-manding the release of 1,000 Palestinianprisoners, including all women and chil-dren, in exchange for his freedom. Israelignored the offer, prompting Egyptian secu-rity envoy Omar Sulayman to cancel (7/2)plans to go to Gaza to mediate Shalit’s re-lease, stating that his efforts were unlikely toresult in a deal and that negotiations couldbe left to lower-level officials. (Low-level me-diation continued through the end of thequarter.)

Beginning on the night of 7/3 and lastinguntil 7/8, the Givati Brigade moved tanks andtroops into n. Gaza, occupying the outskirtsof Bayt Hanun, the Erez industrial zone, andthe former Nisanit settlement site; orderedPA security forces to withdraw and demol-ished a PA security building; seized Pales-tinian homes as operational bases; leveledland in search of roadside bombs and tun-nels; and conducted air strikes. After Hamasresponded by firing (7/4, 7/5) 2 2-stageQassam rockets at Ashkelon (damaging aschool), the Israeli security cabinet ordered(7/5) the army to expand n. Gaza opera-tions. Over the next 3 days, additional IDFtroops and tanks entered n. Gaza, pushedsouth to Jabaliya refugee camp (r.c.), andreoccupied former settlement sites alongthe coast as bases for launching incursionsinto n. Gaza population centers (especiallyBayt Lahiya). Palestinian militants engagedthe troops using RPGs, rifles, and roadsidebombs. Israel responded with air and ar-tillery strikes, tank and gunfire, as well asby bulldozing houses, fields, and roads towiden the n. Gaza buffer zone and clear ar-eas in and around villages that could providecover for rocket fire and room for troops tomaneuver. Palestinians fired some 25 rocketstoward Israel, lightly injuring 3 Israelis. The




IDF withdrew to Israel overnight on 7/7–8,declaring their military objectives achieved,though Palestinian rocket fire continued atthe same pace. During the 5-day campaign,at least 36 Palestinians (mostly gunmen) and1 IDF soldier were killed, more than 100Palestinians (a third of them children) and1 IDF soldier were injured, and some 100Palestinian homes were destroyed or heavilydamaged.

On 7/8, the same day it moved troopsout of n. Gaza, the IDF sent forces into east-ern Gaza near Qarni crossing, shelled areasaround Gaza City, and expanded shelling andbulldozing around Rafah and Dahaniyya, or-dering residents near the airport to evacuatethe area. (UNRWA opened two schools inRafah to house some 1,000 Dahaniyya resi-dents displaced by heavy shelling.) Althoughinitially it seemed that the operation wouldmirror the 7/3–8 n. Gaza offensive, the IDFwithdrew troops from the Gaza City envi-rons into the Qarni industrial zone late inthe day, leaving only the Dahaniyya airportcontingent. From the launch of ground oper-ations on 7/3 until 7/8, 48 Gazans were killedand more than 100 were injured. Combinedwith ongoing violence in the West Bank (in-cluding 3 assassinations and an attemptedassassination; see Chronology for details),the comprehensive death toll as of 7/8 was4,530 Palestinians and 1,021 Israelis.

Meanwhile, on 7/7, Shalit’s captors hadissued a 3d statement, this one calling fornegotiations to end the fighting and freeShalit, confirming that he was in good health.Hoping to build on these apparently scaled-down demands and the relative lull in Gazafighting, Haniyeh also called (7/9) for amutual cease-fire. Olmert, however, rejectedbargaining, stressing (7/9) that OperationSummer Rains was not over and clarifyingIDF intentions to “operate, enter, and pullout [of Gaza] as needed,” perhaps for severalmonths.

A New Pattern of Battering GazaAfter 2 days of air and artillery strikes

only, the Israeli security cabinet met againon 7/11 to discuss how to move forwardand authorized the IDF to expand the Gazaoffensive, without giving details. Throughthe end of the quarter, Operation SummerRains fell into a more discernable pattern,as laid out by Olmert on 7/9: Once troopsencamped at Dahaniyya and Qarni industrialestate were withdrawn on 7/12, IDF forceswere stationed outside Gaza and were sentin for one or more days at a time to conduct

ground offensives (some sources suggestedthat the IDF had unofficially named thisnew phase of Summer Rains “OperationGrasshopper,” playing on how troops wouldhop in and out of Gaza), clearly stating therewas no intention permanently to reoccupyany part of the Strip. The IDF’s actions duringthe incursion were more aggressive andcharacteristic of IDF operations in the WestBank in recent years than those in Gaza priorto disengagement, where the IDF rarelyentered Gazan towns and villages, moreoften firing on them from a distance. Themajor ground incursions through the end ofthe quarter included the following:

� Central and s. Gaza (7/12–15): the IDFsent 10s of tanks and armored vehiclesthrough the Kissufim crossing under he-licopter and drone escort, and movednorth from positions near Abasan toattack al-Qarara and Dayr al-Balah, cut-ting the Strip in half; ordered PA secu-rity forces to leave the area; bulldozedmore than 183 dunams (d.; 4 d. = 1acre) of land; engaged in heavy air andartillery strikes and major gun battlesin Dayr al-Balah; made heavy air strikeson Khan Yunis; killed 23 Palestinians;wounded at least 18.

� Bayt Hanun (7/16–18): troops con-ducted arrest raids and house searches,bulldozed land and homes (leaving 60–130 homes and an UNRWA clinic de-stroyed or uninhabitable), occupiedhomes as observation posts, killed atleast 7 Palestinians, wounded 30.

� Al-Shuka near Rafah (7/18): troopsforced 97 families (703 Palestinians) toflee (UNRWA set up housing for them inJabaliya r.c.), cut electricity, bulldozedland.

� Al-Maghazi r.c. and areas of central Gaza(7/19–21): troops occupied homes assniper posts, engaged in heavy clasheswith Palestinian gunmen, bulldozed207 d. of land, demolished 4 homes,heavily damaged 9 homes, killed 18Palestinians, wounded 125.

� N. Gaza and Gaza City environs (7/26–28; code named Operation Samson’sPillars): troops engaged in intenseclashes with and conducted air strikeson Palestinian gunmen, leveled widetracts of land, demolished 9 houses,heavily damaged 16 houses, bulldozedat least 80 d. of land, killed at least 14militants and 13 civilians, wounded atleast 66.




� Al-Shuka and Rafah (8/1–6): troops re-occupied the Dahaniyya airport; re-peatedly shelled al-Shuka; sent in 50tanks, armored vehicles, and bulldoz-ers; conducted air and artillery strikes;searched houses; exchanged fire witharmed Palestinians; destroyed a PA se-curity office; bulldozed at least 20 d.of land; forced 100s of families to flee;killed 8 militants, 1 PA security officer,and 11 civilians; wounded more than46.

In addition, the IDF continued through-out Summer Rains to conduct daily IDF airand artillery strikes, especially on n. Gaza,and frequently crossed briefly into Gaza tobulldoze land or search for tunnels along theborder (see Chronology for details). Amongthe air strike targets were government of-fices, including the PA PM’s office (7/2),PA FMin. offices (7/13, 7/16, 8/5), PA Inte-rior Min. offices (7/2, 7/5), PA EconomicsMin. offices (7/15), and numerous ESF postsand training sites; Change and Reform of-fices in Bayt Lahiya were also hit on 7/14.The IDF also made an assassination attempt(7/12) on chief Hamas bomb-maker Muham-mad Dayif (the target of 4 previous Israeliassassination attempts since 2000) in whichthe IDF dropped 2 quarter-ton bombs ona 3-story building in Gaza City, woundingDayif; killing a senior Hamas member, hiswife, and 7 children; and wounding Hamas’sn. Gaza military commander and at least 33bystanders, also damaging 15 surroundinghomes.

By 8/15, at least 213 Palestinians (mostlycivilians) had been killed and 650 had beenwounded in Gaza since Operation SummerRains began on 6/28. By the end of the quar-ter, UN agencies in the territories reportedthat the IDF was firing an average of 200–250artillery shells/day into Gaza (compared toan average of 9 Palestinian rockets/day intoIsrael); that the IDF had made 221 air strikeson Gaza in 7/06 alone; and that the IDF hadbulldozed 3,666 d. of Gaza land between thestart of Summer Rains and 7/31. The povertyrate in Gaza had reached 79% and the costof basic goods was up 10%. Palestinians inurban areas were receiving 6–8 hours/day ofelectricity and 2–3 hours/day of water. UNestimates of overall damages to Gaza’s civil-ian infrastructure since operations began on6/28 were $15.5 m.

In the West Bank, incidents of arrest raidsand house searches tapered in late 7/06 andearly 8/06, but restrictions on movement re-

mained very tight, with the northern andsouthern West Bank virtually cut off fromeach other. The one major military operationin the West Bank was in Nablus (7/19–21),where the IDF sent in 50 armored vehiclesand troops allegedly to search for Palestini-ans “activated by Hizballah” to stage attackson Israel. The Nablus governorate building,the PA compound (mostly destroyed duringOperation Defensive Shield in 2002), 3 secu-rity force buildings, and the central prisonwere put under siege and all Palestiniansinside ordered to surrender: some 165 Pales-tinians (many of them PA security officers)were forced out and detained, but about10 remained inside, prompting the IDF toshell and bulldoze the buildings over 2 days,exchanging fire with Palestinian gunmenand stone-throwing Palestinians; 7 Palestini-ans (including 3 armed AMB members, 3bystanders) were killed and 67 wounded(including 27 children and 3 journalists cov-ering the raid). The IDF completely demol-ished at least 6 other PA buildings beforewithdrawing. An IDF soldier was killed in aseparate arrest raid in Nablus on 7/17. TheIDF also assassinated 4 Islamic Jihad mem-bers in Nablus (7/29) and Jenin (8/6, 2 on8/9). On the Palestinian side, AMB memberskidnapped and killed (7/27) a Jewish settlerfrom Yakir. Unidentified Palestinians took(8/14) 2 Fox News journalists hostage.

Meanwhile, at the G8 summit in St.Petersburg on 7/16, the U.S. effectively se-cured backing for Israel’s military escalation.Under U.S. pressure, the final statement de-clared that the release of Israeli soldiersunharmed and an end to the shelling ofIsraeli territory were the “most urgent prior-ities,” followed by a halt to Israeli operationsand the release of Palestinian parliamentari-ans. Requirements to be met for a return toIsraeli-Palestinian negotiations were, in or-der: a halt to “terrorist attacks” on Israel,Abbas’s assurance that the Hamas-led gov-ernment fulfill the 1/30 Quartet demands,expansion of the TIM (only the EU had con-tributed to date), Israeli compliance with theRafah arrangements for freedom of move-ment into and out of Gaza, resumptionof Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation,unification and reform of the PA securityforces, and resumption of diplomatic con-tacts. The U.S. (7/16) and Britain (7/18)interpreted this to mean that Israel neednot end Operation Summer Rains until thePA released Shalit and halted rocket fire,though other nations’ stances were morenuanced.




The Convergence Plan UnderminedOn the diplomatic and political level,

Operation Summer Rains was a serious set-back for Olmert. The offensive did not meetits initial stated goal to free captured IDFCpl. Shalit (indeed, Israel’s 7/11 decision toescalate scuttled whatever progress mighthave resulted from a secret meeting thatday in Amman between Abbas and Shin Bethead Diskin to discuss a possible prisonerexchange) and did not discernibly advanceits secondary aims of collapsing Haniyeh’sgovernment, undermining support for thePalestinian resistance, halting Palestinianrocket fire, and improving security insideIsrael. Combined with Israel’s deterioratingsecurity situation in the north due to the waron Lebanon, which was also falling short ofgoals (see Lebanon section below), publiccriticism of Olmert’s government was onthe rise, precluding further discussion of hisconvergence plan as of late 7/06 throughthe end of the quarter.

Intifada Data and TrendsDuring the quarter, at least 314 Palestini-

ans and 6 Israelis were killed (compared to101 Palestinians and 15 Israelis last quar-ter), bringing the toll at 8/15 to at least4,700 Palestinians (including 46 Israeli Arabsand 17 unidentified Arab cross-border in-filtrators), 1,023 Israelis (including 315 IDFsoldiers and security personnel, 208 settlers,500 civilians), and 59 foreign nationals (in-cluding 2 British suicide bombers). Of note:7/06, during which 191 Palestinians werekilled, was the deadliest month since Oper-ation Defensive Shield in 4/02. Accordingto the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem,48% of those killed in 7/06 were innocentbystanders.

At the end of the quarter, all crossings intoGaza were closed except Erez, which wasopen to a limited number of VIPs and medi-cal cases. Limited fuel imports were allowedthrough Nahal Oz. According to the NewYork Times (7/4), as of 7/06, 48 of 60 facto-ries in the Qarni industrial zone had closedbecause of Israeli restrictions on movement,and at least half had permanently relocatedto other Arab countries. More than 20 othercompanies in Gaza were considering or inthe process of making similar moves.

This quarter, as Israel stepped up airstrikes on Gaza and media coverage becamespottier because of the focus on the waron Lebanon, determining which IDF killingsin the Strip were targeted assassinationsand which resulted from more generalizedbombing missions became more difficult.

With this caveat, 16 deaths were clear as-sassinations (down from 20 last quarter),accompanied by the killing of 16 bystandersand the wounding of 66. The following in-dividuals were assassinated this quarter: theAMB’s Muhammad Wahish (6/13), AymanJabarin (6/22), Fida’i Qandil (7/4), MahmudHaymur (7/5), and Tamir Kandil (7/7);Islamic Jihad’s Muhammad Dadu (5/20),Tariq Zakarna (5/29), Imad Asaliyya (6/5),Majdi Hammad (6/5), Shawqi al-Saiqali(6/13), Hamad Wadiya (6/13), Hani Uwayjan(7/29), Sami al-‘Imar (8/6), Amjad al-‘Ajami(8/9), and Muhammad Atik (8/9); and PRChead and PA security chief Jamal AbuSamhadana (6/8). The IDF also attempted toassassinate 1 AMB member (7/6), 1 Hamasmember (7/12), and 3 Islamic Jihad mem-bers (6/21, 6/29, 7/6), killing a total of 14bystanders and wounding 51. Incidents on6/21 and 7/12 may have been assassinationattempts targeting an Islamic Jihad and a PRCmember. In addition, a senior Hamas mili-tary commander (6/5) and a senior Hamaspolitical leader (7/5) were fatally shot byunidentified gunmen, and another seniorHamas military commander was killed in acar bombing (6/27) in incidents that couldhave been either orchestrated by Israel andcarried out by collaborators or products ofintra-Palestinian rivalries; 3 such incidentshave occurred previously (see QuarterlyUpdate in JPS 140).

There were no Palestinian suicide bomb-ings this quarter, compared to 2 last quarter.On 7/26, an unidentified Palestinian gunmanfired on Israeli police in Jerusalem, wound-ing 2 before being shot dead; the incidentcould be considered a suicide attack in thatit was almost certain the gunman would die.

Palestinian use of mortars and rocketsremained high this quarter, averaging around25–40/week at the opening of the quarter,increasing significantly to around 75/week inthe 2 weeks following the start of OperationChange of Direction against Lebanon, andfalling back to 11–35/week in the first halfof 8/06. At least 25 Israelis were reportedinjured and damage occurred in 12 instances(see Chronology for details). Of note: Hamasfor the first time fired 2 2-engine Qassamrockets (the largest to date) into Israel on7/4 and 7/5, striking near Ashqelon, causingdamage but no injuries.

Israeli house demolitions were up signifi-cantly this quarter, especially in Gaza, wheremore than 120 homes were destroyed orheavily damaged in the northern district(mostly in Bayt Lahiya), 13 in the centraldistrict, and at least 15 in the south. In the




West Bank, 7 homes were demolished inNablus, 3 in Jenin, 2 in East Jerusalem, and 1each in Hebron, Jericho, Qalqilya, Ramallah,and Tulkarm. Of note: By 7/20, IDF troopsin Gaza were using new tactics introducedin Lebanon, such as phoning Palestiniansto warn them to evacuate their homes inadvance of air strikes destroying them (atleast 18 incidents reported beginning on7/23 through the end of the quarter) andsending (beginning 7/24) automated phonemessages to residents of broad areas warn-ing them to evacuate in advance of air orartillery strikes.

Jewish settler violence against Palestini-ans seemed significantly lower this quarter,but this might be a result of spottier mediafocus on the West Bank. Incidents includedsettlers occupying or raiding Palestinianhomes and stores (6/4, 7/23), bulldozingland for expansion of settlements or creationof new settler-only bypass roads (7/5, 8/14),beating or otherwise attacking Palestinians(5/21, 6/1, 6/4, 6/7, 6/8, 6/13, 6/17, 6/19,6/22, 7/4, 7/16), vandalizing property (6/1,6/7, 6/13, 6/17, 6/19, 6/22, 8/12, 8/13), set-ting fire to property or pouring toxic liquidon land (6/4, 6/13, 6/26, 7/6), and steal-ing or killing livestock (6/17, 6/25). Settlersalso stoned a Palestinian to death (6/20);tossed grenades at shepherds, wounding1 (7/25); and opened fire on Palestinians(7/25, 8/6), killing 1 and wounding 2. Of26 reported incidents (down from 49 lastquarter), most continued to occur in He-bron (21), with a handful of incidents inBethlehem (2), Nablus (1), Tubas (1), andSalfit (1).

By mid-6/06, it became apparent thatIsrael had launched a concerted campaignto expel from or bar entry to the territoriesindividuals in the following categories: Pales-tinians holding foreign passports (includingspouses of Palestinian ID holders); Arab na-tionals; international peace activists; foreignacademics working or studying at Pales-tinian universities; and international NGOemployees. With long-term visas and resi-dency permits almost impossible to obtainfrom Israel, many such individuals who hadbeen working and living in the West Bank foryears on 90-day entry visas, renewing themon quarterly trips abroad, suddenly weredenied visas when attempting to return.While Israel had not infrequently denied re-newals in the past, Palestinian human rightsgroups and the Israeli press stated that thepolicy had been building since 4/06, andby 6/11 had reached the point at which theU.S. emb. had acknowledged that Israeli of-

ficials had “conceded that 90-day visa entrycards, which were once routinely grantedin the past, especially to U.S. citizens, arenow more difficult to obtain, specificallyfor Palestinian American citizens traveling tothe West Bank and for U.S. nationals affiliatedwith humanitarian organizations. Both theU.S. Embassy and the Consulate in Jerusalemare pursuing the issue.”

In addition to the 6/28–29 arrest ofHamas-affiliated PA legislators and cabinetministers (at least 2 more, including PCspeaker ‘Aziz Dwayk, were arrested on 8/5and 8/6), Israel revoked the Jerusalem resi-dency rights of 3 Hamas-affiliated PA cabinetand PC members arrested on 6/28–29 (giv-ing them 30 days to appeal or renounce theirpositions within the PA, or ultimately facedeportation to the West Bank when releasedfrom custody). The IDF also continued rou-tine harassment of Change and Reform PCmembers during the quarter (see QuarterlyUpdate in JPS 140), searching their homesand offices (e.g., 5/29, 7/31) and detainingthem for participating in public demonstra-tions or other political activities in Jerusalem(e.g., 5/22, 7/6).

The IDF deported (6/20) Tulkarm resi-dent Rasmi Subayh, held in administrativedetention since 9/05, to Gaza for 2 years.Israel deported several West Bank adminis-trative detainees to Gaza in 2002 and 2003for periods up to 5 years, but has not done sorecently (see Quarterly Update in JPS 133).

Separation WallThis quarter, construction of the West

Bank separation wall was concentrated onsegments s. of Bethlehem, northwest ofNablus, s. of Hebron, and near Qalqilya.

The High Court of Israel approved (5/22)a new segment through Ramallah that wouldcut off Palestinian access to at least 3,900 d.of agricultural land and uproot 1,100 olivetrees. Another new segment around ShaveiShomron settlement northwest of Nablus,approved on 5/30, requires confiscation of53 d. of Palestinian land and the uprootingof 350 olive trees. The High Court rejected(5/23) an appeal by East Jerusalemites chal-lenging the wall’s route around Ma’ale Adu-mim settlement on grounds that the IsraeliDMin. had given “adequate consideration ofthe barrier’s impact on residents while bal-ancing the security needs of Israeli citizens.”

INTRA-PALESTINIAN DYNAMICS

The ongoing struggle between Fatahand Hamas for political dominance that has




followed the 1/06 elections (see QuarterlyUpdate in JPS 140), and particularly thepower struggles for control of security, wasmost evident on the ground this quarterin the above-mentioned clashes betweenHamas and Fatah over the ESF. But it alsoplayed out within the PA between Abbasand Haniyeh. Tensions on both levels wereespecially high during the first part of thequarter but moderated significantly afterAbbas and Haniyeh agreed (6/27) to worktoward a national unity government.

As the quarter opened, Abbas was stillinsisting that the Fatah-dominated securityforces answer only to him and trying to haveauthority over the security forces formallytransferred from the Interior Min. to the of-fice of the president (see Quarterly Updatein JPS 140). To this end, on 6/24, he unilat-erally deployed members of Force 17 (underhis command) to Qarni crossing to take overPA security responsibility from forces un-der Interior M Siyam’s purview. (Abbas haddone the same thing at the Rafah crossinglast quarter.) Haniyeh rejected Abbas’s deci-sion but did not challenge the deploymentson the ground.

After the 6/27 agreement, Abbas appar-ently scaled back his efforts to monopolizesecurity and agreed to work with Haniyehto preserve the lines of security commandmandated by law. By 7/7, commanders ofthe Fatah-dominated security branches (ex-cept Force 17, traditionally under presiden-tial control) had reportedly been informedthat they would henceforth take ordersfrom Interior M Siyam, with only the rad-ically anti-Hamas PSF challenging the newarrangements on the ground. Soon after,Siyam, reportedly in coordination with Ab-bas, dismissed (ca. 7/13) hard-line Fatah GazaPSF head Sulayman Abu Mutliq and replacedhim with West Bank PSF head Ziad Habarih,a Fatah member reputed to lack political am-bitions and not aligned with any particularFatah faction.

Also on the security front, by 8/3, Siyamreportedly was creating a version of the ESFfor the West Bank, called the “mobile forces,”expected to number 4,000 members. Thisvolunteer force was not permanently armed,though members armed themselves whenescorting Change and Reform officials. Themobile forces reportedly started operatingin Nablus (with Nablus’s municipal guardforming the core of the force) and expandedto Hebron and Qalqilya. Siyam reportedlyhoped to integrate them into the PA policeby 2007.

Fatah was less accommodating to Hamaswith respect to the PLO. Most notably,PLO Political Dept. head Faruq Qaddumi(Fatah), charged with the PLO’s externalrelations, continued to challenge PA FMZahhar (Change and Reform) for the rightto represent the Palestinians abroad. On5/29, Zahhar walked out of a meeting of theNon-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Malaysiawhen Qaddumi publicly challenged his par-ticipation in the forum, declaring “I am theminister of foreign affairs of the State ofPalestine; he is only from the local govern-ment.” Zahhar continued, holding bilateralmeetings on the sidelines of the conference,but the row nearly undid Malaysian effortsto pass a NAM motion declaring support forPalestinian unity; the motion was passed on5/29. Zahhar also refused to attend an Or-ganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)meeting in Azerbaijan on 6/20 to protest theOIC’s decision to invite Qaddumi as well.By 7/11, Abbas had informed PLO envoysabroad to take direction from Qaddumi, notZahhar.

Meanwhile, at the operational levelHaniyeh tried to keep the PA functioningand moving forward. Between mid-6/06 andmid-8/06, the Change and Reform bloc re-portedly made some 200 key appointmentsin the PA Foreign, Waqf, Education, Health,Prisoner Affairs, and Agricultural Mins. andestablished internal disciplinary commit-tees for dealing with corruption complaints.Although some saw the appointments asaimed at minimizing Fatah’s influence,Haniyeh reportedly consulted with Abbason the changes and Fatah did not activelyoppose them.

In addition, PA cabinet secy. MuhammadAwad announced (7/2) that the portfolios ofthe 8 cabinet ministers abducted by Israel on6/28–29 had been temporarily transferred toministers in the Gaza Strip, with dirs. gen. ofthe West Bank offices overseeing day-to-dayaffairs. Transportation M Ziad Zaza took overlocal government and labor, Refugee AffairsM Atif Adwan took over prisoners affairs andJerusalem affairs, Health M Bassam Na‘imtook over social affairs, Information M YusufRizqa took over finance and religious affairs,and Economics M Ala’ al-Din al-‘Araj tookover planning.

In late 5/06, Haniyeh made thehighly controversial decision to suspendauthorization of new Palestinian NGOspending a review of the registration processand the criteria required for PA accredita-tion. No explanation was given, but the




move was reportedly aimed at ensuring thatdonor aid would not be wasted on low-impact projects in the event that donor aid isshifted from the PA and run through NGOs.Critics condemned the move as an attemptto control NGO operations and curtail theirfreedom of speech and action. Supportersargued that NGO authorizations under pre-vious governments were often based moreon personal connections than on soundbusiness practice, noting that only a frac-tion of the more than 800 Palestinian NGOswas sufficiently organized to have a seriousimpact on development and civil society.

By late-5/06, critics of Haniyeh’s govern-ment noted that records of PC meetingshad not been put online for transparency,that the PM’s Office Web site had not beenupdated, and that some 100,000 Palestini-ans had been added to the already strappedPA health insurance rolls (hinting at nepo-tism). Ministry officials countered (6/5) thatoutgoing Fatah officials had refused to turnover Web site passwords to their incom-ing Change and Reform counterparts, thatWeb site hosting agreements had expiredwithout funds to renew them, and that theincrease in health insurance rolls was neces-sitated by the rapidly declining humanitarianconditions in the territories.

PALESTINIAN OPINION

The following data are excerptedfrom a poll conducted by the JerusalemMedia and Communication Center(JMCC) on 6 and 7 July 2006. Resultsare based on a survey of 1,197 men andwomen from the West Bank and Gaza.The results of the poll, the 59th in a se-ries, were taken from the JMCC’s Website at www.jmcc.org.

1. Do you support the resumption of themilitary operations that aim to abductIsraeli soldiers as a suitable responsewithin the current political conditions,or do you reject them and find themharmful to the Palestinian nationalinterests?

West Bank Gaza Totala. Suitable

response 65.0% 70.0% 66.8%b. I reject them

and find themharmful 32.5% 27.5% 30.7%

c. No answer/Don’t know 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%

2. In light of the current crisis resultingfrom the abduction of the Israeli soldier[Shalit], in your opinion what is themost suitable option for dealing withthe crisis?

West Bank Gaza Totala. Release the

abductedsoldier to avoidan incursioninto Gaza 16.4% 19.8% 17.6%

b. No release ofthe abductedsoldier until therelease ofPalestinianprisoners 67.6% 70.7% 68.8%

c. Try the Israelisoldier and puthim in aPalestinianprison 12.7% 8.0% 10.9%

d. No answer/Don’t know 3.3% 1.5% 2.7%

3. If the elections were held today,which list would you vote for? (* JPShas combined 9 smaller parties and blocsunder “other” below, including indepen-dents, Democratic Front for the Liberationof Palestine [DFLP], Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine [PFLP], and Islamic Ji-had; see the JMCC Web site for details—Ed.)

West Bank Gaza Totala. Change and 29.6% 39.1% 33.1%

Reformb. Fatah 30.3% 35.7% 32.2%c. Other∗ 20.3% 13.9% 17.9%d. Would not vote 15.5% 10.9% 13.8%e. No answer 4.3% 0.4% 3.0%

FRONTLINE STATES

JORDAN

This quarter was marked by quiet diplo-matic activity by the Jordanian governmentas it sought to weigh in on developmentsthat risked unleashing significant popularbacklash.

Before the Olmert-Bush meeting on 5/23,King Abdallah sent (5/19) a letter to Bushstating that the convergence plan would un-dermine Jordanian security and asking himto press Israel to restart negotiations withthe PA through Abbas. When Olmert vis-ited Amman on 6/8—the first public trip to




Jordan by an Israeli PM since 2003—Abdallahexpressed concerns that further Israeli uni-lateral actions could undermine Palestinianrights, and Olmert pledged to make every ef-fort for progress on a negotiated settlementbefore moving ahead unilaterally. As men-tioned above, Abdallah also facilitated theinformal meeting (6/22) between Abbas andOlmert on the sidelines of a conference inPetra honoring Nobel prize laureates, as wellas a meeting (7/11) between Abbas and ShinBet head Diskin regarding a possible pris-oner exchange for the release of capturedIDF soldier Shalit.

With Israeli’s military operations inLebanon stoking popular outrage alreadyhigh over operations in Gaza, Abdallah de-clined to receive Rice on her regional visit(7/24–26), reportedly fearing that the U.S.’sovert support for Israel’s actions was under-mining Jordanian popular support for theU.S. and himself.

Also of note: On the sidelines of the Petrameeting, Israeli Dep. PM Peres and KingAbdallah agreed (6/21) to move forward withlong-stagnant plans to expand Israel’s Elatairport into an international “peace airport”straddling the Israeli-Jordanian border (seeQuarterly Update in JPS 130). They alsodiscussed expanding Qualified IndustrialZones to create more jobs for Palestinians,Jordanians, and Israelis.

LEBANON

The event shaping the quarter wasHizballah’s 7/12 cross-border attack onIsrael, dubbed Operation True Promise, andIsrael’s immediate decision to launch a mas-sive military response, Operation Change ofDirection (initially called Operation Just Re-ward), on 7/13 that quickly escalated intoa full-scale war that continued with feroc-ity until a tense UN-brokered “cessation ofhostilities” went into effect on 8/14.

The Launch of WarBefore dawn on 7/12, Hizballah fired sev-

eral rockets across the Blue Line into n. Israelas a diversion and then sent fighters acrossthe Blue Line to attack 2 IDF jeeps patrollingthe border between Zarit and Shetula, cap-turing 2 IDF soldiers, killing 3, and wounding2. Soon after, it fired several shells at IDF po-sitions in the disputed Shaba‘ Farms area,causing no damage or injuries. The IDF, inits first ground incursion into Lebanon sinceits 5/00 withdrawal, immediately sent a pla-toon across the border to search for themissing 2 soldiers, losing 4 more when an

IDF tank hit a mine 4 mi inside Lebaneseterritory. (An eighth IDF soldier was killedand 2 others were wounded in Lebanon latethat evening as they tried to recover the 4bodies from the tank.) Simultaneously withthe ground attack, the IDF launched air andartillery strikes on some 40 Hizballah posi-tions, roads, bridges, and power stations ins. Lebanon, with the stated purpose of pre-venting the captured soldiers from beingmoved northward; at least 2 Lebanese civil-ians and 1 Lebanese soldier were killed andat least 10 wounded. Air strikes on a Pales-tinian guerrilla base s. of Beirut caused noreported injuries. Meanwhile, IDF Chief ofStaff Dan Halutz called up a reserve infantrydivision for deployment to the n. Israel bor-der and sent the navy into Lebanese waters,threatening an invasion.

The Lebanese government immediatelyrequested that the UN Interim Forces inLebanon (UNIFIL) broker a cease-fire, butIsrael stated that its offensive would con-tinue until the captured soldiers were freed.Hizballah leader Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah de-clared that the group planned to hold the 2soldiers to exchange for the 3–4 Lebaneseheld by Israel: Samir Quntar, jailed since1979 for his participation in a Palestine Lib-eration Front cross-border attack that killed 4Israelis (see Quarterly Update in JPS 137 forearlier Israeli-Hizballah talks on his release);Yahya Skaff, a Lebanese Christian detainedin Lebanon in 1978 for participating in amilitary operation against the IDF; NissimNasser, a Jewish Lebanese who moved toIsrael and took Israeli citizenship but wasarrested in 2002 for spying for Hizballah;and Muhammad Farran, a teenage fish-erman who went missing off the Lebanesecoast in 10/05. (Israel had acknowledgedholding all but Farran.) Olmert held (7/12)the Lebanese government, which includes 2Hizballah cabinet members, responsible forthe attack, which he declared an act of warby a sovereign state and not an act of ter-ror. Though Israeli officials said (7/12) thatSyria was not, for now, a target, Israel’s Amb.to the UN Dan Gillerman stated (7/12) thatthe Iran-Syria-Hizballah “axis of terror mustbe stopped,” while the U.S. called (7/12) theincident an “unprovoked act of terrorism”and held Syria and Iran responsible for theensuing violence.

Before dawn on 7/13, Israel officiallylaunched what it initially called OperationJust Reward, staging massive air strikes ons. Lebanon that killed at least 44 civiliansand wounded around 100. It was at this




point that Hizballah began its rocket attackson Israeli towns, firing some 60 Katyushasinto n. Israel, hitting Carmiel, Majdal Qrum,Nahariya, Safad, and Zarit, killing 1 Israeliand wounding 29. During the day, the IDFimposed a naval blockade on Lebanese portsn. of Beirut and made air strikes on BeirutInternational Airport and a smaller militaryairport in n. Lebanon, a major oil depotin Jiyeh, numerous roads and bridges, andHizballah’s TV station in Beirut and relay tow-ers in Baalbek. After Israel warned Lebaneseto evacuate Hizballah-dominated areas of s.Beirut, Hizballah warned that it would strikeHaifa if the capital were attacked. When theIDF conducted overflights of Beirut soonafter, Hizballah fired 2 rockets at Haifa, dam-aging a hotel but causing no injuries. Heavyexchanges continued through the evening,with Hizballah firing another 90 rockets andmortars at some 20 towns in n. Israel, killinga second Israeli and injuring around 60,and the IDF attacking 100s of targets acrossLebanon (mostly in the south), firing artilleryat a rate of 1 shell/minute throughout theday, killing at least another 10 Lebanese. Allbut 1 of the day’s 54 Lebanese fatalities andthe overwhelming majority of those injuredwere civilians. Israel warned UNIFIL that itwould target anyone moving near the BlueLine, including the UN observers, prompt-ing UNIFIL to confine to barracks its 2,500troops (who are either unarmed or lightlyarmed for personal defense only).

This first day of fighting set the pattern forthe days to come (see Chronology for detailson clashes). Overnight on 7/13–14, Olmert’ssecurity cabinet approved a list of “moresignificant” Hizballah targets and vowed tocontinue its offensive until Hizballah wasdisarmed. Over the next several days, theIDF steadily intensified attacks with threeaims: first, to disrupt Hizballah’s ability tomove men and materiel; second, to preventHizballah’s resupply by imposing to the ex-tent possible a land, sea, and air blockade onLebanon; and third, to eliminate Hizballah’scommand and control structure. Haltingtransportation and communications meantmassive air strikes on Lebanon’s civilian in-frastructure. In the first few days alone, theIDF targeted the Beirut airport twice more,the Beirut–Damascus highway, numerousother roads and bridges, major power plants,gas stations, and fuel depots, while the Israelinavy blockaded the entire Lebanese coast.Efforts to eliminate the Hizballah leadershipbegan with heavy attacks on s. Beirut, de-stroying Nasrallah’s residence, his headquar-

ters, and Hizballah’s radio station. Hizballahreplied with rocket fire on n. Israel (vary-ing from 20–90 rounds per day) and also hitand disabled (7/14) an Israeli naval vesseloff the coast with a radar-guided C802 anti-ship missile (similar to a Chinese Silkworm),launched with the aid of Lebanese armyradar, prompting Israel to shell (7/15) everymajor Lebanese port to take out Lebanon’scoastal radar system.

Diplomatically, the Israeli and U.S. viewfrom the start was that the 7/12 attack cre-ated a “unique moment” and “moment ofopportunity” to break the “axis of terror”comprising Hamas, Hizballah, Iran, and Syriaand to change the regional dynamic in theirfavor. Some observers saw this as the preludeto a military strike on Iran, perceived as thepreeminent regional threat, by preemptingpossible Hizballah retaliation against Israelfrom the north. In any case, the immediategoal was clear: Hizballah (with an estimatedactive fighting force of 2,000–3,000 men,including elite forces of around 700, withan estimated 8,000–20,000 reservists whocould be mobilized) had to be eliminatedas a viable military and political force inLebanon. Israel reportedly thought it coulddo this quickly through air strikes alone, andthe U.S., backed by Britain and Germany,was willing to stave off all attempts to im-pose a cease-fire to give Israel the time itneeded.

On 7/14, the UNSC convened to debateLebanon’s appeal for an immediate cease-firebut was unable to issue a unified position onthe crisis largely because of U.S. oppositionto statements criticizing Israel. (Two otherUNSC sessions before 7/18 ended similarly.)At the 7/14 session, Israeli amb. to the UNDan Gillerman asserted that Israel was help-ing Lebanon achieve what it could not doitself—end the “terrorist occupation” of itscountry—and that Siniora’s government “se-cretly backs” Israel’s offensive. Meanwhile,the U.S. began blocking UN efforts to imposean immediate cease-fire and ended its earliercalls for Israeli restraint, though it did con-tinue to caution against actions that couldundermine Siniora’s government, which itviewed as an ally and democratic model forthe region.

By 7/15, there was widespread agree-ment that Israel was not merely respondingwith excessive force to a rare but not un-precedented Hizballah attack, but had takenexisting battle plans off the shelf. SeniorIsraeli and U.S. officials were commentingprivately that Israel planned to resist calls




for a cease-fire and to continue up to severalweeks of precision bombing of Lebanon toincapacitate Hizballah permanently.

A Change of DirectionBy 7/18, the IDF was calling the offensive

Operation Change of Direction and, withthe major infrastructural targets knockedout in the first few days, seemed to moveinto a mode more akin to containment andclean-up. Increasingly, the homes of individ-ual Hizballah members were targeted, theremaining bridges and primary roads weredestroyed, and operations were launchedagainst individual towns and villages in s.Lebanon that were Hizballah strongholds.On 7/16, the IDF issued its first warningsto the residents of 7 s. Lebanon villages toevacuate for their safety; by 7/19, Lebaneseacross the south were reporting receivingautomated phone messages from the IDFwarning of pending strikes. At the sametime, however, the IDF warned that it wouldbegin targeting all trucks, including pick-ups, moving s. of the Litani River on theassumption that they were used by Hizbal-lah; the policy increasingly resulted in heavycasualties among civilians trying to flee tothe north and hampered efforts to transporthumanitarian aid. The IDF also stepped upstrikes on Lebanese civil defense and mili-tary targets (notwithstanding Israeli claimsto be “helping” Lebanon regain its rightfulsecurity control). During this period, theIDF also began sending small special forcesteams across the border into s. Lebanon toconduct “pinpoint operations,” searchingfor arms caches and tunnels and withdraw-ing quickly. (Hizballah began engaging theseunits on 7/19.) As of 7/18, the IDF reportedhaving carried out 2,000 air combat sortiesagainst 1,000 targets and fired more than10,000 artillery shells, while Hizballah hadfired as many as 850 rockets into Israel.

By 7/18, the UN estimated that 500,000Lebanese (out of a population of 4 m.) hadfled their homes, and the Lebanese had be-gun reporting shortages and rising costsof essential items, such as food and gas.Though Lebanese casualty statistics at thispoint had become unreliable because ofthe intensity of the fighting and difficult ac-cess to the dead and wounded, estimatesof Lebanese dead by 7/19 stood at over300 civilians, 10 soldiers, and an unknownnumber of Hizballah fighters. On the Is-raeli side, 15 civilians and at least 13 IDFtroops (including the 8 on 7/12) had beenkilled.

In a speech to the Knesset on 7/17,Olmert spelled out Israel’s 5 conditions forhalting the offensive: “expulsion of Hizbal-lah from the area”; release of the 2 soldiersabducted on 7/12; a “complete cease-fire”;deployment of the Lebanese army to thesouth; and full implementation of UN Res.1559, including disarmament of Hizballahand all Palestinian factions. At the sametime, Olmert vowed to “destroy every ter-rorist infrastructure everywhere.” LebanesePM Fuad Siniora countered (7/18) that anysolution to the crisis must include not onlythe release of the 2 captured IDF soldiers butthe release of Lebanese in Israeli custody, Is-rael’s withdrawal from the disputed Shaba‘Farms region, a return to the terms of the1949 Israeli-Lebanese armistice, and provi-sion of maps showing the location of Israeliland mines in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the U.S. stepped up pres-sure on the international community at anemergency session of G8 leaders on 7/16 todraft a united position on the emerging cri-sis. With irreconcilable gaps between theU.S. hard line, supported by Britain, andthe more moderate position of other states,the wording of the G8’s final statement (seeDoc. A1) was left deliberately ambiguousto accommodate differences. (Specifically,the U.S. refused to allow the word “dis-proportionate” to describe Israeli actionsor to call for a “cease-fire,” while Franceand Russia refused to name Iran or Syriaas Hizballah supporters sharing responsibil-ity for Hizballah’s actions.) The statementdeclared that “the root cause of the prob-lems in the region is the absence of a com-prehensive Middle East peace,” placing thewar in a broader historical context, but italso emphasized that “the immediate cri-sis results from efforts by extremist forcesto destabilize the region and to frustratethe aspirations of the Palestinian, Israeliand Lebanese people for democracy andpeace,” placing the blame on Hizballah. The“most urgent priorities” were the releaseof Israeli soldiers unharmed and the end tothe shelling of Israeli territory. The tone ofthe document allowed the U.S. (7/16) andBritain (7/18) to claim an understandingthat Israel need not end its offensive un-til Hizballah released the captured soldiersand halted fire; France, Japan, and Russiacontinued to call for an immediate cease-fire. Britain and France also raised (7/17) thepossibility of sending an international peace-keeping force to s. Lebanon. UN Secy.-GenKofi Annan endorsed the idea, but the U.S.




called it premature, and Israel rejected itoutright.

On returning from the G8 summit, Bushendorsed (7/18) Israel’s military actions andstated that the “root cause” of the crisis was“terrorism and terrorist attacks on a demo-cratic country. And part of those terroristattacks are inspired by nation states, likeSyria and Iran. And in order to be able todeal with this crisis, the world must dealwith Hizballah, with Syria and to continueto work to isolate Iran.” The same day, Ricestressed that the time was not yet appropri-ate for U.S. intervention.

Olmert welcomed the G8 statement,asserting (7/18) that “nobody in the inter-national community is asking us to halt theoperation.” Separately, FM Livni spoke (7/18)of a new diplomatic process “alongside themilitary operation that will continue”; shespecified that diplomacy was not meant to“shorten the window” of the army’s opera-tion but rather “to be an extension of it.” Shefurther stated (7/19), “Israel and the inter-national community have a common goal:to promote a process that will bring abouta long-term and fundamental change in thepolitical reality of the region and that willeliminate the threat of terrorism facing bothIsraelis and Lebanese.”

The Ground War Expands asExpectations DiminishBy 7/20, Israeli operations began to show

signs of disarray as it became clear thatHizballah was not collapsing under the as-sault. While Hizballah rocket fire had beenreduced, 30–50 rockets/day were still hit-ting n. Israel, causing limited casualties anddamage, prompting most of the northernpopulation to take to bomb shelters or tem-porarily head south out of rocket range.While the IDF continued nonstop heavyair and artillery strikes as well as pinpointground operations, it also began evidentpreparations for the wider ground offen-sive it initially had ruled out as unnecessary.Multiple messages on the aim and extentof ground operations led some to speculatethat Israel was adjusting its tactics and goalsmore or less on the fly.

On 7/20, the IDF warned the Lebanesewho remained s. of the Litani River (25 mi n.of the Israeli border) to leave within 24hours or be considered viable targets. Itsimultaneously sent tanks and bulldozersacross the Blue Line for the first time toclear hazards, called up (7/21) 3 battalionsof reserves (around 3,000 units), and be-

gan (7/21) moving more troops and armorto its n. border in preparation for whatit said would be “limited” ground opera-tions to “mop up” Hizballah strongholdsand weapons sites. Meanwhile, the U.S. ap-proved (7/21) an Israeli request to expeditedelivery of precision-guided missiles (in-cluding at least 25, possibly 100, 5,000-lbGBU-28 bunker busters). Later reports byobservers on the ground (see Amnesty In-ternational report in Doc. A3) described theIDF’s pattern at this stage for clearing vil-lages: warning civilians to leave, targetinga house with an air strike to frighten lag-gards, and then targeting sites controlledby Hizballah (including clinics, social cen-ters, youth centers, and media offices) ornecessary to civilians (gas stations, super-markets, water installations). Main streets oftowns and villages were strafed with clusterbombs, the first confirmed such use being inBlida on 7/19. (The first IDF acknowledge-ment of cluster bomb use was by IDF Maj.Gen. Benny Gantz on 7/26.) There were alsorumors of the IDF using white phosphorus.By 7/21, local Lebanese officials estimatedthat 70% of s. Lebanon’s population had flednorth or to Syria. With refugees pouring intoSidon, Tyre, and Beirut, the UN estimatedthat 500,000 Lebanese were in urgent needof humanitarian assistance that could notbe provided without Israeli-guaranteed safe-corridors, while UNIFIL troops themselveswere bunkered down and in need of foodand water.

The actual ground assault began on 7/22,when Israel sent 2,000 troops, including atank brigade and armored units, across theBlue Line into Maroun al-Ras in the centralborder region and moved into Bint Jubaylon 7/23, engaging in what it described asheavy, close combat with Hizballah fightersusing mortars, antitank rounds, RPGs, andsmall arms fire. Although the ground offen-sive remained concentrated in the Marounal-Ras and Bint Jubayl areas through 7/26,the fighting across Lebanon immediatelybecame more intense and the humanitar-ian impact more severe. By 7/24, the IDFhad demolished 95% of Lebanon’s bridgesand 80% of its primary roads while largeswaths of the southern Beirut suburbs (andHizballah strongholds) of Baabda, Chouaifat,Hadet, Haret Hraik, and Kfar Chima hadbeen leveled by IDF air strikes. In responseto the ground incursion, Hizballah steppedup rocket fire on n. Israel to 100–130rounds/day, belying IDF claims that its capa-bilities had been degraded.




By 7/25, returning IDF troops routinelyreported that Hizballah’s infrastructure oftunnels, bunkers, and armories was moresophisticated and better hidden and its fight-ers more determined and better organized,trained, and equipped than anticipated. Inthe most intensive clash, on 7/26, some100 Hizballah fighters ambushed an eliteGolani Brigade unit in Bint Jubayl (whichthe IDF had claimed to have secured on7/25), killing 8 IDF soldiers and woundingat least 22; troops had been forced to en-ter the area on foot because the “roads intotown were littered with antitank mines” andtherefore had to carry casualties for 2 mi un-der heavy fire to tanks that could transportthem to helicopters for evacuation. (The IDFclaimed to have killed 20 Hizballah fighters;Hizballah would not confirm.)

In light of the increasingly difficult bat-tle, Israel scaled back its war objectives:instead of pledging to eliminate Hizballahand alter the regional dynamic, Israel nowstated (7/22, 7/23) that its overall aim was“to weaken Hezbollah sufficiently so thatthe international community can help theLebanese government to carry out [UN Res.1559] and exercise its sovereignty all overLebanon, expelling any foreign fighters anddisarming Hezbollah.” On 7/25, the IDFstated plans to occupy a small strip insides. Lebanon (possibly 2–6 mi deep) until aninternational force of up to 20,000 heavilyarmed troops, preferably from NATO, couldbe deployed to replace it. (NATO quicklystated that its forces were overcommitted.)

For his part, Hizballah’s Nasrallah called(7/24) for an immediate cease-fire, sayingHizballah would accept the Lebanese gov-ernment as its negotiator and would definevictory as the survival of its militia and itscontinued determination to resist. Hizbal-lah’s dep. political chief Mahmud Komatiacknowledged (7/25) that Hizballah had notat all expected Israel’s response.

Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts increasedas civilian casualties mounted in Lebanon.After consulting with special envoys dis-patched to the region on 7/13, UN Secy.-Gen.Annan stepped up (7/20) efforts for UNSCendorsement of a package calling for an im-mediate cease-fire, the release of the 2 IDFsoldiers, and insertion of an internationalpeace-keeping force in s. Lebanon, followedby the full implementation of UN Res. 1559.(The U.S. immediately said it would notcontribute troops to an international mis-sion.) Rice announced (7/21) plans to headto the region on 7/24 to meet with Israeli,

Arab, and EU leaders, warning that the U.S.would not support a cease-fire that did notinclude a solid plan for disarming Hizballahand expanding Lebanese government con-trol throughout the country, warning (7/21)that the parties should not settle for “quickfixes.” “What we are seeing here,” she said,“[are] the birth pangs of a new Middle East,and whatever we do, we have to be cer-tain that we’re pushing forward to the newMiddle East, not going back to the old one.”

Rice’s tour began on 7/24 with an unan-nounced stop in Lebanon, where at a tensemeeting with Siniora she presented plans(discussed by senior Saudi and Bush admin.officials on 7/23) for an international donorconference to raise funds for Lebanon’s re-construction and announced that the U.S.would contribute $30 m. to a UN emergencyappeal to aid Lebanon. While Siniora wantedan immediate cease-fire, Rice discussed theidea of putting a robust international peace-keeping force in s. Lebanon after a cease-firebut emphasized that the U.S. would not backa cease-fire until Hizballah released the cap-tured IDF soldiers. Rice then met (7/25)with Olmert in Tel Aviv. Talks reportedly in-cluded discussion of Israel’s plans for an exitstrategy from Lebanon; senior Israeli offi-cials later said they believed that they haduntil Rice’s return to the region to presstheir military campaign. Indeed, from thenon, the closer the international communitycame to reaching agreement on a cessationof violence, the more Israel intensified andexpanded Operation Change of Direction.

An Immediate vs. a SustainableCease-FireAt a major meeting in Rome at the end

of her tour on 7/26, Rice met with Annan,Siniora, EU diplomats, and reps. from Egypt,Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to discuss a res-olution to the Lebanon crisis. Rice for thefirst time explicitly laid out the U.S.-Israelidemand for a “sustainable cease-fire,” argu-ing that an immediate cease-fire (as desiredby the other parties) would leave Hizballahcapabilities diminished but not destroyedand the Lebanese government weak, allow-ing Hizballah to rearm and reassert itselfquickly. She argued that what was neededwas a “sustainable cease-fire” that wouldpermanently disarm Hizballah, cut its tiesto Iran and Syria, and enhance Lebanesesovereignty and security control; if assuringsuccessful implementation required moretime, it was worth allowing the war to con-tinue. Thus, while EU and Arab participants




called for “urgent work on an immediatecease-fire,” Rice pushed for wording callingon the parties to “work immediately” towarda cease-fire that would be “lasting, perma-nent, and sustainable.” As a compromise,Annan recommended a call for a temporary“pause” in fighting to allow humanitarian aidto be delivered by an international force thatcould remain to support the Lebanese army,but Rice rejected this as a half-measure. Themeeting’s final statement vaguely pledgedto work toward a cease-fire while urgingIsrael “to exercise its utmost restraint” andpromising to provide humanitarian reliefto Lebanon. Annan urged that channels beopened to Iran and Syria to help end theviolence, but Rice disagreed. Participantsagreed that an international force operatingunder UN auspices was needed but failed toreach understandings on its size, make-up,mandate, or exit strategy. Further talks wereplanned for the coming weeks to flesh outdetails on the international force and on 1or 2 UN resolutions to resolve the crisis.

As in the case of the G8 summit, Bushand Blair immediately pressed their inter-pretation of the meeting’s understandings,announcing plans (7/28) to work toward aUN res. that would call for a halt of fightingconditioned on a broader political agree-ment involving disarming Hizballah, withthe aim of ultimately shifting the balance ofpower in the region. Bush reiterated thatthe crisis posed a brief “moment of oppor-tunity . . . for broader change in the region.”The Lebanese cabinet countered (7/28) byissuing a statement, endorsed by Hizballah,calling for an immediate cease-fire followedby a prisoner exchange and reinforcementof UN troops along the Israel-Lebanon bor-der. The same day, the UN called for animmediate 3-day truce to evacuate Lebanesecivilians still trapped in s. Lebanon and todeliver food and medical aid. (The Lebanesegovernment was warning that the countryhad only a few days of fuel supply remainingand that once it ran out, provision of nor-mal health care and relief aid would cease.)Israel dismissed (7/29) the truce as “unnec-essary” but began (7/29) allowing a handfulof planes and ships carrying relief suppliesto enter Lebanon. The IDF also allowed aidconvoys to travel by land if they requestedpre-approval on a case-by-case basis, but fre-quently denied them permission because ofongoing operations.

In a surprise move, Bush sent Rice backto the region almost immediately, where shewas to visit first Israel and then Lebanon.

Her visit was cut short, however. She arrivedin Israel late on 7/29, where Olmert told herhe needed another 10–14 days to continuemilitary operations in Lebanon. But laterthat very night, the IDF dropped 2 2,000-lbMK-84 guided missiles on a 3-story residen-tial building in Qana, s. Lebanon, killingwhat was originally reported as 57 Lebanesecivilians including 37 children (later, it tran-spired that the actual figures were at least28 Lebanese dead, including 16 children,and 11 missing and presumed dead.) Theincident, which Israel blamed on Qana resi-dents who had failed to leave the area whenwarned to do so, sparked outrage across theregion, with Siniora quickly informing Ricethat she would not be welcome and thatLebanon would not participate in furtherdiplomatic discussions that did not involvean immediate cease-fire. Rice, displeasedthat the Israelis had not informed her ofthe attack during their morning meetingson 7/30, leaving her to learn the news froman aide who interrupted her meeting withDM Peretz, immediately announced plans toreturn to Washington on 7/31.

Before leaving, however, Rice obtained(7/30) Israel’s grudging agreement to a48-hour partial suspension of air strikeson s. Lebanon, including a 24-hour windowfor relief agencies to transport humanitariangoods and help civilians to safety, though itwarned that it would resume strikes if it de-tected an “imminent launch” of Hizballahrockets. It also declared that ground opera-tions would continue in the south, as wouldair and artillery strikes n. of the Litani. Mean-while, Annan called (7/30) a UNSC sessionin response to the Qana strike, and whilethe resulting statement expressed “extremeshock” over the incident, at U.S. insistencethere was no call for an immediate cease-fire.

Several days earlier, on 7/27, already con-cerned about the possibility that interna-tional intervention could force an abrupthalt to its military campaign, Israel’s secu-rity cabinet authorized the IDF to call up 3divisions of reservists (15,000–30,000 units)to press a ground offensive in s. Lebanon.On 7/30, immediately after the Qana strike,the IDF began expanding ground opera-tions near Taybeh and n. of the Israelitown of Metula. Hizballah had similarlystepped up its attacks, for the first time fir-ing (7/28) 2 Khaybar-1 rockets, with a rangeof up to 50 mi and payload up to 200 lbs,striking Afula, 30 mi inside Israel, just n.of the West Bank, causing no damage orinjuries.




The 48-hour partial suspension of airstrikes took effect at 2:00 A.M. local timeon 7/31. Hours later, the Israeli cabinetapproved yet another major escalation,pledging that combat would not cease untilan international force was deployed to dis-arm Hizballah and to monitor the Lebanon-Syria border to prevent its resupply. Thatsame day (7/31) Olmert defiantly declaredthat “there is no cease-fire and there willbe no cease-fire,” while IDF Northern Com-mand spokesman Maj. Siva Golan clarifiedthat “on the ground, it’s not a cease-fire at all,just a limitation of planes shooting towardbuildings and villages.” During the day, theIDF launched air strikes in support of groundtroops in Taybeh, on targets in Bint Jubayland near the Syrian border, and at a Lebanesearmy jeep near Tyre, killing 1 Lebanese sol-dier and wounding 3. Relief agencies re-ported that the IDF was still significantlyhampering the transportation of aid despitethe 24-hour relief window, though Lebaneserescue workers were able to begin combingbombed-out areas for dead and wounded. On8/1, the IDF sent up to 7,000 troops (6 com-bat brigades) into villages stretching fromAyta al-Sha‘b near the center of the borderregion, east to Bint Jubayl and Maroun al-Ras,and north to Taybeh and Kafr Kila, wherethe Litani approaches the Israeli border,bringing the estimated IDF force strength in-side Lebanon to around 10,000 troops, withas many as another 8,000 troops on the n.Israel border for rotation. Observers on then. Israel border reported (see WashingtonPost 8/2) that “areas where no troops wereseen less that a week ago [have become]teeming military camps, with buses regu-larly dropping off new arrivals.” Hizballahmeanwhile fired (7/31) 3–4 mortars intoKiryat Shimona on 7/31 and fired 8 rocketsand 4 mortars into Nahariya on 8/1.

When the partial suspension was lifted on8/2, Hizballah immediately and dramaticallyescalated rocket fire to its highest level sincethe start of the conflict, firing some 230rockets into Israel (including a 3d Khaybar-1that struck just outside Jenin, 43 mi insidethe border, causing no damage or injuries).Over the succeeding days, rocket firingsaveraged 150–200, hitting Hadera (50 mifrom the border) on 8/4, marking its deepeststrike into Israel. Nasrallah stated (8/3) thatHizballah’s purpose in observing the 48-hoursuspension and then ramping up rocketstrikes was threefold: to prove that, unlikeIsrael, it was able and willing to observea cease-fire; to match the IDF escalationsstep for step; and to prove to the world that

its ability to coordinate large, synchronizedstrikes had not been diminished since thestart of the war. At the same time, he offeredto halt rocket attacks altogether if Israelstopped targeting Lebanese cities, villages,civilians, and infrastructure, but warnedthat if the IDF expanded attacks on Beirut,Hizballah would target Tel Aviv.

The IDF steadily expanded ground op-erations through 8/4, engaging Hizballah inheavy clashes in some 20 villages and townsin s. Lebanon, mostly concentrated within2–4 mi of the border, reportedly with theaim of creating a free-fire zone cleared ofHizballah that could eventually be up to10-mi deep. Air strikes also escalated, partic-ularly in s. Beirut but also for the first timehitting bridges and roads in Christian areasn. of the capital to cut transportation routesto Syria.

Meanwhile, France and the U.S. had beenleading UN talks to narrow differences be-tween the “immediate” versus “sustainable”cease-fire calls. On 8/5, they announcedagreement on a draft res. that would callfor a “full cessation of hostilities” in place(i.e., with some 10,000 Israeli troops in-side Lebanon), with Hizballah required tostop “all attacks” and Israel required to haltonly “offensive military operations.” Therewere no provisions for a prisoner exchange.Instead, the res. would cite the “urgent”need for the “unconditional” release of the2 IDF soldiers, while noting that the UNwas “mindful” of the sensitivity of the is-sue of Lebanese political prisoners in Israelijails and encouraged that their “status” beresolved. The draft also proposed that af-ter Israel and Hizballah agreed to the termsof a cease-fire, to be outlined in a secondres., Hizballah and the IDF would withdrawfrom a buffer zone in s. Lebanon that wouldbe taken over by a 10,000-member interna-tional force. Separately, the UN would betasked with determining the borders in theShaba‘ Farms area.

Neither Lebanon nor Israel endorsed theproposal. After 4 hours of debate on 8/5, theLebanese cabinet, including its Hizballahmembers, said it could not approve a draftthat called for Hizballah to abide by a trucewith IDF forces still in Lebanon, with Hizbal-lah arguing that this would cede its legitimateright to resist occupation under internationallaw. While Israel did not comment on thedraft as a whole, Israeli officials said (8/5)that allowing IDF troops to stay in Lebanonwas a crucial condition for its approval ofa plan. Though the U.S. pushed (8/6) for aquick vote on the draft to “see who’s for




peace and who isn’t,” the UN was unwillingto press a draft that could deepen splitswithin the fragile Lebanese government.

The Race to a TruceOver the next several days, the Lebanese

cabinet, including Hizballah reps., unan-imously approved (8/7) its own proposedamendments to the French-U.S. draft res. thatincluded an offer to deploy 15,000 Lebanesearmy troops to s. Lebanon to augment theUNIFIL forces and a staged plan involving animmediate cease-fire, UNIFIL deployment inall areas where Israeli troops were operating(including Shaba‘ Farms), and UNIFIL trans-fer of those areas (minus the Shaba‘ Farms)to the Lebanese army within 72 hours. TheU.S. rejected (8/7) the proposal, the ArabLeague backed it (8/8), and Israel stated(8/8) that the offer of Lebanese troops wasworth consideration.

Meanwhile, Olmert’s security cabinetagreed (8/7) to speed up the IDF’s advanceto the Litani and to increase attacks onLebanon’s civilian infrastructure to pressureLebanon to accept a cease-fire proposal ac-ceptable to Tel Aviv. After destroying (8/7)the last remaining bridge across the Litani,the IDF announced (8/7) that any vehicu-lar traffic s. of the river would henceforthbe considered Hizballah activity and a le-gitimate target. Signaling a pending majorassault, Israel effectively ordered an evac-uation of n. Israel, announcing (8/8) thatit would fund a 5-day “respite” in s. Israelfor 15,000 residents remaining in KiryatShimona (the n. Israeli town most heavilytargeted by Hizballah rocket fire) and othernorthern areas, bussing them there withinthe next 24-hours and housing them in ho-tels or on military bases.

With its security cabinet on 8/9 orderingthe IDF to “expel [Hizballah] from southernLebanon” and eliminate its rocket-launchingcapabilities, the IDF moved another 1,000troops into s. Lebanon and began (8/9) re-inforcing troops on the n. Israel border. On8/10, it dropped leaflets on Beirut, warn-ing residents to expect massive bombingand ordering residents of Burj al-Barajneh,Hay Sullum, and al-Shoah neighborhoods toevacuate immediately, and on n. Lebanon,warning truck drivers to stay off roads toSyria. Israel also asked (8/10) the U.S. tospeed delivery of M-26 artillery shells (short-range antipersonnel rockets armed withcluster munitions) along with other unspec-ified weapons. Meanwhile, daily IDF air andartillery strikes across Lebanon and groundoperations in the south continued, resulting

in the highest casualty rates to date for theIDF. Hizballah also continued rocket fire inton. Israel at a rate of c. 150/day.

Meanwhile, France and the U.S. con-tinued tough negotiations on a UN draft,with France endorsing and the U.S. rejectingLebanon’s amendments and the U.S. warn-ing on 8/9 that if no deal were reachedwithin 24 hours, “then you’re looking ata major Israeli ground invasion.” In a finalpush that stretched overnight on 8/10–11,France and the U.S. both moderated theirstands and agreed on a new draft, whichthey passed to Israel and Lebanon and sentto the UNSC for an immediate vote. On 8/11(after Olmert had seen the draft), the IDF be-gan moving additional troops and armor intoLebanon.

Late in the evening on 8/11, the UNSCunanimously approved Res. 1701 calling fora truce to go into effect as of 8:00 A.M. on8/14 (see Doc. A2). The final res.’s maindifference from the 8/5 draft was its adop-tion of a modified version of Lebanon’scall for a staged IDF withdrawal, calling forIsrael to pull out of s. Lebanon “in parallel”with the deployment of 15,000 Lebanesearmy troops “support[ed]” by 15,000 inter-national troops (an expanded UNIFIL) toprevent arms smuggling to Hizballah andcreate a zone free of Israeli and Hizballahforces. The international contingent, autho-rized through 8/31/07, would be allowedto take “all necessary actions” to secure thesouthern zone, but the parameters for usingforce were vague. Similarly, while the textreiterated UN Res. 1559’s call for disarmingall militias, specifics on disarming Hizballahwere apparently left to an anticipated sec-ond res. on a political settlement. Crucially,the res. still called for a “halt in place” anddemanded that Hizballah cease all actionswhile Israel cease only offensive actions.Though Rice said (8/11) that “no one canexpect an immediate end to all acts of vio-lence,” the U.S. did specify expectations thatthe IDF would not “move any further north”but would “stop where they [are]” and that“the large-scale bombing [would] stop.” Sep-arately, Rice announced (8/11) that the U.S.would increase its humanitarian funding toLebanon from $30 m. to $50 m.

Hizballah and the Lebanese governmentendorsed UN Res. 1701 on 8/12, thoughNasrallah said Hizballah would maintain its“natural right to resist” in keeping with in-ternational law as long as IDF troops “arepracticing an occupation and acts of aggres-sion” inside Lebanon. The Israeli cabinetapproved (24–0, with 1 abstention) the res.




on 8/13, but separately DM Peretz warnedthat “there is no situation in which Hizbal-lah fires at [Israeli] forces that we will notretaliate” against.

In the two days before the truce took ef-fect, the IDF sent in additional troops andartillery and rapidly expanded ground offen-sives in the south to secure control of asmuch land as possible by the deadline, re-sulting in heavy clashes. It also intensifiedair strikes, particularly on s. Beirut. On 8/12,Halutz stated that Israel had tripled its forcesin Lebanon in the previous 2 days, whichwould place the number of IDF soldiers in-side Lebanon at around 30,000 (though someU.S. military experts placed the number sig-nificantly lower at ca. 10,000). In response,Hizballah escalated its rocket fire, sendingas many as 250 rockets into n. Israel on 8/13(the most in 1 day to date), mostly targetingHaifa, killing 1 Israeli.

Israeli air strikes and Hizballah rocketstrikes continued overnight on 8/13–14, butminutes before the 8:00 A.M. deadline bothsides went quiet. Over the next 2 days, theUN reported no violations of the truce, de-spite Hizballah and the IDF being in closeproximity in many areas. Hizballah held itsfire, whereas the IDF fired on groups ofHizballah members in 8 incidents it claimedwere defensive (and therefore permitted un-der UN Res. 1701), killing at least 8 Hizballahmembers. The IDF also vowed to maintain itsair and sea blockade on Lebanon, continuedto fly drones over s. Lebanon, and droppedleaflets around the country blaming Hizbal-lah for the devastation and warning that theIDF would “return and utilize the necessaryforce against every terrorist act launchedfrom Lebanon which affects the State ofIsrael.” While UNIFIL noted no significantIsraeli withdrawals across the Blue Line, theIDF did pull out several hundred reservistsand tanks to positions just inside n. Israel.

As soon as the truce took effect, 10,000sof Lebanese began returning to their homesto assess the damage (at least 5 civilianswere killed by unexploded IDF ordnance,heralding one of the many hurdles to recon-struction to come), and 10,000s of others be-gan returning from Syria. (Few Israelis whofled n. Israel went home by 8/15.) In a tele-vised address, Nasrallah promised (8/14) thatHizballah would provide funds to rebuild,including pledging money for 1-year’s rentand furniture to each family whose homewas made unlivable. On 8/15, Hizballah be-gan disbursing financial aid to displacedfamilies, reportedly allocating $150 m. (al-

ready supplied by Iran) to the task. On theground, Hizballah officials in s. Lebanon ands. Beirut took charge of clean-up efforts,with Lebanese civil defense teams and armyunits often operating under their direction.Hizballah teams also began recording andassessing damage to personal property andinfrastructure, with the aim of executing along-term reconstruction effort, expected totake 2–3 years.

In terms of UN Res. 1701 implementa-tion, Hizballah and the Lebanese governmentheld (8/15) a day of talks on the army’s de-ployment to the south and the withdrawalof Hizballah fighters and their weapons tothe north, without reaching an agreement.(Hizballah expressed willingness to with-draw its core fighters and heavy equipmentnorth if the army pledged not to probe toocarefully for underground arms caches andbunkers, while the government insisted thatit would not deploy the army until all ofHizballah’s missiles, rockets, and arms weretaken n. of the Litani.) The IDF met withUNIFIL chiefs at the UNIFIL headquartersin Naqura on 8/14 to discuss the mechan-ics of the phased withdrawal and preventionof further exchanges of fire. The UN begantalks on the mandate and make-up of theexpanded UNIFIL, holding (8/13–14) brief-ings with the military attaches of interestedcountries. Sweden announced (8/15) plansto host a donor conference for Lebanon on8/31 to raise funds for humanitarian needsand reconstruction. The UN reported (8/15)that $81 m. had already been committedto its $165 m. emergency appeal fund forLebanon.

Operation Change of Direction’s TollAt the close of the quarter, it was still

far too early to give a final assessment ofthe magnitude of the war’s devastation ineither Lebanon or Israel; estimates variedsignificantly, even from the same source, butare useful in conveying a general sense ofproportionality.

In Lebanon, an estimated 1,200 civil-ians (a third of them children) and 100–400Hizballah fighters and army troops had beenkilled, some 4,000 civilians wounded, andnearly 1 m. displaced. At least 15,000 resi-dences had been destroyed (including 80%of homes in Ghanduriyya and Taybeh, 50%in Markaba and Qantara, 40% in Bint Jubayl,and 30% in Mays al-Jabal, plus entire neigh-borhoods of s. Beirut as mentioned above)and 30,000 damaged beyond repair. Almostall primary roads and bridges had been




destroyed, while wells, water mains, pump-ing stations, sewage treatment plants,electrical facilities, power plants, gas sta-tions, and ports had been deliberatelytargeted and extensively damaged. Strikeson the Jiyeh oil terminal caused a massiveoil slick that approached the proportionsof the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill by the endof the quarter. Losses were estimated at$2.5 b.–$3.6 b. for infrastructure, $2 b. forhousing, and $2 b. for lost tourism, withreconstruction thought to take anywherefrom 2 to 7 years.

In Israel, 43 civilians (including 18 IsraeliPalestinians) and 117 IDF soldiers had beenkilled. Statistics for civilians injured rangedfrom 850 to 5,000, with the lower figurelikely representing actual cases of shrapnelwounds, etc. and the higher including casesof shock. No statistics for wounded soldierswere available. The Israeli government putthe figure of residences destroyed at 12,000,but observers found the figure highly ques-tionable since Hizballah was estimated bythe IDF to have fired fewer than 4,000 rock-ets. Economic losses were estimated at $1 b.for lost tourism and $2.3 b. representing thecost of conducting the war. No estimateswere advanced for damage to personal prop-erty or the environmental cost of extensivebrush fires caused by Hizballah rockets.

The IDF reported (8/16) that the air forcehad made more than 15,500 combat sor-ties against 7,000 targets in Lebanon, whilethe navy hit an additional 2,500 targets. Thenumber of IDF artillery shells fired was inthe 10,000s (the IDF reported having firedmore than 20,000 shells as of 7/23). In thelast few days of the offensive, the IDF re-portedly dramatically escalated its use ofcluster munitions on civilian areas of thesouth, raising concerns for Lebanese return-ing their homes. The IDF also reportedlycaptured and brought back to Israel severaldozen alleged Hizballah members as well asdozens of bodies of Hizballah fighters killedin combat.

Hizballah destroyed at least 20 IDFtanks, 1 naval vessel, and at least 1 heli-copter. By 7/26, sources in Lebanon re-ported that Lebanese security forces work-ing with Hizballah had detained more than80 Lebanese (at least 36 of them formermembers of Israel’s proxy militia, the SouthLebanon Army) suspected of spying forIsrael in s. Beirut, s. Lebanon, and the Biqa‘Valley.

Of special note: The IDF overwhelm-ingly refrained from targeting Palestinians

during the campaign, prompting 100s if not1,000s of Lebanese unable to flee north toseek shelter in Palestinian refugee campsin s. Lebanon. In total, the IDF reportedlystruck only 1 Palestinian guerrilla base s. ofBeirut on 7/13, the home of a Hamas offi-cial in s. Beirut on 7/15, 2 Popular Front forthe Liberation of Palestine–General Com-mand (PFLP-GC) bases in the Biqa‘ Valley on7/19, targets on the outskirts of a Palestiniancamp s. of Tyre on 8/5, and the home of analleged Hizballah member in ‘Ayn al-Hilwacamp on 8/9.

Fallout in IsraelBy the end of the quarter, the Israeli

military and government had come underincreasingly heavy criticism by residents ofn. Israel (complaints of lack of prepared-ness to protect them, rundown state ofbomb shelters, etc.), reservists (severe sup-ply shortages, inadequate refresher training,poor command), and the public at large (re-peated downscaling of the war’s goals; theIDF’s inability to defeat Hizballah quickly anddecisively). The first public acknowledge-ment of the military’s failings came on 8/8,when IDF Chief of Staff Halutz appointedhis deputy, Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky, ashis personal rep. to supervise the Lebanonoffensive, overseeing the head of the North-ern Command and commander of groundoperations in Lebanon, Maj. Gen. Udi Adam,effectively firing him. After the truce was inplace, Olmert addressed (8/14) the Knessetand acknowledged that mistakes had beenmade, while DM Peretz promised (8/14) a“deep and wide investigation on all that oc-curred before the war erupted and throughits duration.”

Hizballah’s MotivationAt the end of the quarter, a number of

explanations were circulating concerningHizballah’s motives in staging the 7/12 at-tack. Some analysts argued that Hizballah’shighly compartmentalized, autonomous cellstructure, the lack of fallout from previous in-cidents in which soldiers has been captured,and standing orders to seize soldiers whenpossible as bargaining chips pointed to anact of opportunity. Many U.S. commentariesaccused Iran of ordering the kidnapping todeflect attention from the mounting conflictover its nuclear weapons program (see Iransection below), though U.S. admin. officialsand intelligence analysts stated (ca. 8/4) thatthere was no evidence of coordination be-tween Iran and Hizballah either in staging




the attack or during the war itself. The inci-dent’s timing during the IDF assault on Gazaled some to suggest a desire to relieve the be-sieged Palestinians, particularly Hamas, butwhile Nasrallah made statements of supportfor the Palestinians, Hizballah’s demands re-mained focused on Lebanon: the release of4 Lebanese still in Israeli custody; an imme-diate cease-fire and withdrawal of IDF forcesfrom Lebanon, including from Shaba‘ Farms;and provision of maps showing locations ofIDF landmines placed in s. Lebanon beforethe 5/00 pullout.

A more complex explanation linkedHizballah’s action to domestic Lebanesepolitics, particularly to the national recon-ciliation talks that opened last quarter (seeQuarterly Update in JPS 140) and which byearly 7/06 had become focused on disarm-ing Hizballah under UN Res. 1559. Underthis explanation, Hizballah staged the kid-napping to relieve pressure on itself and toremind the Lebanese of its importance as aresistance force, believing Lebanese back-lash would be minimal thanks to a recentalliance with Christian leader Michel Aounand the backing of pro-Syrian pres. EmileLahoud, who also controlled senior militaryechelons. In all cases, Hizballah assumed,as Komati stated on 7/25, that Israel’s retal-iation would be limited, of a magnitude itcould absorb.

Other Events of the QuarterA number of events that took place prior

to the war should be signaled. On 6/10,Serge Brammertz, head of the UN team inves-tigating the 2/14/05 assassination of formerLebanese PM Rafiq Hariri, issued a periodicreport, saying that his team had made signifi-cant progress in the investigation and askingthe UN to extend his mandate and to allowhim more time to investigate 14 other po-litical bombings and assassinations over thepast two years. Brammertz said that Syria’scooperation had been “satisfactory,” that hisinterviews with Syrian pres. Asad and VPFaruq al-Shara‘ provided useful information,and that the team was now considering notonly possible involvement of the Syrian gov-ernment and corrupt Lebanese officials butof other extremists. The UNSC voted (6/15)to allow Brammertz’s investigation to con-tinue for another year and to broaden itsscope as requested.

As of late 5/06, Israeli defense officialshad reportedly started promoting withintheir government a long-standing plan pro-posed by Lebanese PM Fuad Siniora and UN

special envoy Terje Larsen (and reportedlydiscussed with Syrian pres. Asad) to recog-nize Lebanese ownership of the disputedShaba‘ Farms region in exchange for dis-armament of Hizballah and the Palestinianfactions. Under the 4-stage plan, Syria wouldlegally forgo Shaba‘ Farms and formally ac-knowledge it as Lebanese territory; Lebanonwould deploy its army to the Israeli border;Israel would withdraw from Shaba‘ Farmsand halt overflights of Lebanon; and Siniorawould formally announce the end of oc-cupation and order the disarmament of allmilitias in Lebanon, including the Palestinianfactions and Hizballah. Despite discussions,Israeli defense establishment reportedly stillbelieved the chances for implementation ofsuch a plan, particularly of Syria’s agreement,were low.

On 5/26 in Sidon, senior PalestinianIslamic Jihad official Mahmud Majzub andhis brother were assassinated by a car bomb.Israel denied responsibility, but on 6/13, theLebanese government reported that it hadbroken up a Mossad spy ring led by LebaneseMahmud Rafah, who had confessed to beinga Mossad operative since 1994 and to stagingseveral assassinations including that of theMajzub brothers, Hizballah’s Ali Hasan Dibin 1999 and Ali Salih in 2003, and Jihad Jib-ril (son of PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril) in2002. Israel did not comment on the Mossadspy ring accusations. On 6/18, an Israelimilitary court in Tel Aviv sentenced IsraeliArab army officer Lt. Col. Omar el-Heib to15 years in prison on charges of passing clas-sified information to Hizballah. Heib deniedthe charges and appealed.

Two days after the Majzub killings,unidentified militants in s. Lebanon (thoughtto be Hizballah mbrs. retaliating on behalfof Islamic Jihad for the 5/26 assassination)fired Katyusha rockets across the border atan IDF post, seriously injuring 1 soldier. TheIDF inexplicably carried out air strikes on 2PFLP-GC command posts, a weapons depotnear the Syrian border in the Biqa‘ Valleyand on targets in s. Beirut, killing 1 PFLP-GCmember, wounding at least 5. The IDF ac-tion triggered Hizballah mortar and rocketfire on at least 10 IDF outposts along the n.Israel border, wounding 1 IDF solider; theIDF responded with artillery and air strikeson Hizballah targets in s. Lebanon, killing atleast 1 Hizballah member and wounding 2civilians. Hizballah fired more rockets inton. Israel, causing no damage or injuries, be-fore UNIFIL brokered a cease-fire late in theday.




SYRIA

The U.S. and Israel turned up the diplo-matic pressure on Syria this quarter byrepeatedly holding it responsible, because ofits support for Hamas and Hizballah, for thecapture of 3 IDF soldiers in the Palestinianand Hizballah cross-border attacks on 6/25and 7/12 respectively. Israel’s above-notedbuzzing (6/28–29) of the Syrian border andoverflying Pres. Asad’s palace in Latakia wasa clear message after the Palestinian inci-dent. While the U.S.-Israeli tone suggestedthat Syria could become a target for retali-ation (political, economic, or military) if itdid not break its ties to Hamas and Hizbal-lah, some analysts noted (see New YorkTimes 7/26) that since Syria had been forcedout of Lebanon under UN Res. 1559, it hadsignificantly less control over Hizballah orability to control what was happening inLebanon.

Several reports this quarter indicatedthat in an effort to assuage the U.S., Syriahad responded favorably to diplomatic mis-sions (mid- and late 6/06) by Egypt, SaudiArabia, and Abbas adviser Ahmad Qurai‘(made at the U.S.’s behest) encouraging Dam-ascus to press Hamas formally to accept the2002 Arab League initiative as a step towardrecognition of Israel and to press Hamasleader Mishal to order the release of cap-tured IDF Cpl. Shalit. Nothing resulted fromwhatever (if any) efforts Syria made.

On 5/17, before the upswing in violence,the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed (13–0, with China, Russia abstaining) res. 1680urging Syria to set its border and establishdiplomatic relations with Lebanon and call-ing on “Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias”to disarm. Syria denounced (5/17) the res.as interference in its internal affairs and un-justified political pressure. China and Russiasaid (5/17) that they abstained because theres. addressed a purely bilateral affair anddid not encourage states to negotiate theirdifferences through the UN.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Once again this quarter, the Arab stateswere unable to form a united position on theimportant issues at hand. On 7/4, nearly aweek after Operation Summer Rains began,the Arab League dropped efforts to holdan emergency session to discuss the Gazasituation after failing to achieve consensusamong members that could be translatedinto an Arab League statement. Egypt and

Jordan led the camp lobbying to denouncethe 6/25 Palestinian raid and to call forShalit’s release, while Syria led the camp thatrefused to do either, believing the 6/25 raidon a military target constituted legitimateresistance.

Only after the Lebanon war began didFMs agree to hold an emergency session todiscuss both Gaza and Lebanon. In the 7/15closed-door session, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, andthe Palestinian rep. reportedly condemnedHizballah for its “unexpected, inappropri-ate, and irresponsible acts,” while Syria sup-ported Hizballah’s targeting of the IDF on7/12 as legitimate resistance under inter-national law and the UN charter. The finalstatement released condemned Israel’s ac-tions, expressed solidarity with the Lebanesegovernment, called for an immediate cease-fire in Lebanon, denounced U.S. actionsin the UN to block measures denouncingIsraeli aggression against the Palestinians,and agreed to appeal to the UNSC to inter-vene. Separately, Saudi Arabia issued (7/14) astatement blaming Hizballah for the situationin Lebanon, stating that “a distinction mustbe made between legitimate resistance anduncalculated adventures taken by elementsinside Lebanon and those behind them with-out recourse to the legal authorities or con-sulting and coordinating with Arab nations.”The statement added that “these elementsshould bear the responsibility for their ir-responsible actions, and they alone shouldend the crisis they have created.”

As the Lebanon conflict escalated, Arabpopulations in many states increasinglydemonstrated in support of Hizballah andagainst their own governments’ inactionand implicit acquiescence in U.S. policy.Widespread popular strikes began as early as7/14 in Bahrain but escalated dramatically af-ter the 7/30 Israeli attack on the UNIFIL basein Qana, spreading beyond the occupied ter-ritories, Egypt, and Jordan to such U.S. alliesas Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.Of note: massive protests were held (7/31,8/4) in Baghdad, with senior political fig-ures, including Pres. Jalal Talabani, PM Nurial-Maliki, VP ‘Adil ‘Abd al-Mahdi, Grand Aya-tollah Ali al-Sistani, and Shi‘i cleric Muqtadaal-Sadr, attending or making statements insupport of Hizballah. By late 7/06, the do-mestic tensions had prompted many nationsthat initially denounced Hizballah to moder-ate, if not halt, their criticism. By late 7/06,Egypt was working for a cease-fire, Jordanwas condemning “Israeli aggression,” and




Saudi Arabia was warning that the ongoingviolence might jeopardize Arab support ofthe 2002 Arab League initiative for compro-mise with Israel. When Rice made her tourof the region 7/24–26, Egypt and Saudi Ara-bia agreed to send reps. to meet with herin Europe, but declined (as did Jordan; seeabove) to host her in their country, fearingdomestic repercussions absent a call for animmediate cease-fire. Similarly, during con-sultations with Rice before her trip, Saudi FMPrince Saud al-Faisal and former amb. to theU.S. and current National Security Councilhead Prince Bandar Bin Sultan urged (7/23)Bush, Rice, and VP Dick Cheney to sup-port an immediate cease-fire, warning thatit was difficult to continue supporting theU.S. posture without appearing to be a U.S.proxy. They also delivered a letter from KingAbdallah with a similar message. Saudi Ara-bia also pledged (7/25) $1.5 b. toward thereconstruction of Lebanon, in part to offsetdomestic discontent.

Arab states also continued to try to getfinancial aid to the PA despite U.S.-led sanc-tions. The PA and Arab League confirmed(7/4) that $50 m. from the Arab League and$50 m. from Saudi Arabia had been trans-ferred to an account controlled by Abbas,marking the first funds to reach the PA sincesanctions were imposed. Kuwait transferredanother $45 m. to Abbas controlled accountsby 7/19. The PA used all the funds to payoverdue civil servants’ salaries. In addition,the Arab League sent (ca. 7/1) $15 m. toPalestinian refugees in Lebanon and to PLOreps. at Palestinian embassies worldwide.

The OPEC Fund for International De-velopment (OFID) approved (6/13) $15 m.for its Special Grant Account for Palestine,which is used to fund education, health,and infrastructure rehabilitation projects inthe occupied territories, adding to $40 m.already in the fund. OFID also announced(6/19) $3 m. in grants to support educa-tion, health, and social welfare projectsin the West Bank. There was no word onhow the money would be transferred to thePalestinians.

PA Undersecy. for Energy and ElectricitySulayman Abu Samhadana held (6/18–19)talks in Cairo with Egyptian officials onimplementing a plan, recently approved byEgypt, for an electricity plant in Egypt to sup-ply cheaper power to Gaza; electricity fromthe Egyptian plant was estimated to cost 44%of that currently purchased from Israel. TheKuwait Development Fund agreed to paythe $15 m. construction costs. Meanwhile,

Jordan agreed (6/21) to a PA request to sup-ply Jericho with electricity by linking up tothe East Jerusalem Electricity Company, eas-ing the West Bank’s dependence on Israelfor electricity. Neither side had approachedIsrael regarding logistics.

Also of note: On the sidelines of theWEF meetings in Egypt, Israel’s Tourism MYitzhak Herzog met (5/20) with his counter-parts from Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, andTurkey.

INTERNATIONAL

UNITED STATES

This quarter was characterized by theBush admin.’s virtually total alignment withIsrael on its military offensives in Gaza andLebanon, in keeping with the shared U.S.-Israeli view that the two conflicts providedunique opportunities to eliminate Hamasand Hizballah and advance U.S.-Israeli agen-das for the greater Middle East. By the end ofthe quarter, however, Washington’s all-outsupport for Israel combined with Israel’sfailure to achieve its objectives in Palestineand Lebanon had exacerbated tensions withallies and hostility to the U.S. worldwide,with possible repercussions for other long-term U.S. policy goals (e.g., on Iran’s nuclearprogram, Iraq, and “democratization”).

Encapsulating the message repeatedthroughout the quarter was Bush’s weeklyradio address of 7/29, where he stated: “Thismoment of conflict in the Middle East ispainful and tragic. Yet it is also a momentof opportunity for broader change in theregion.” Lebanon, he said, was only “the lat-est flashpoint in a broader struggle betweenfreedom and terror that is unfolding crossthe region,” and “the only way to secure ournation is to change the course of the MiddleEast—by fighting the ideology of terror andspreading the hope of freedom” by support-ing democratic forces in Lebanon, Palestine,and Iraq and by defeating “terrorists, insur-gents, and illegal militias,” such as Hamas,Hizballah, Iran, al-Qa‘ida, and Syria.

Despite warnings by key Arab allies thatthe U.S. pro-Israel policy was causing detri-mental strains in the region (as early as 5/17,Saudi FM Prince Saud, preparing for a meet-ing with Rice, told American reporters thatthe U.S. policy to isolate Hamas was basedon “twisted logic” and would only radicalizethe Palestinians against the peace process),the Bush admin. failed to take them seriously.U.S. officials speaking off the record stated




(7/15) that Bush believed that “whatever theoutrage on the Arab streets,” the Israeli offen-sives had “strong behind-the-scenes supportamong key Arab leaders . . . with a tacit agree-ment that the timing is right to strike.”

Government Action and LegislationAs the midterm election campaigns

heated up this quarter, members of Congresswere quick to take strong legislative actionin favor of Israel, occasionally placing themat odds with the White House. On 5/23,the House approved (361–37, with 9 vot-ing present) the Palestinian Anti-TerrorismAct of 2006 (H. R. 4681; see Quarterly Up-date in JPS 140), which would officiallydesignate Palestinian territory as a “terror-ist sanctuary,” impose greater restrictions onaid, deny visas to Palestinian officials, reduceU.S. dues payments to the UN by the amountof UN support to the Palestinians, and limitthe president’s authority to waive the bans.The White House protested (5/23) that thebill “unnecessarily constrains” the presi-dent’s action. Olmert’s speech to Congresson 5/24, praising the House passage of themeasure and warning that Israel “cannotwait forever” for the Palestinians to becomeacceptable negotiating partners, was inter-rupted by 16 standing ovations. On 6/23,the Senate adopted its version of the act(S. 2370), which has 90 cosponsors, by con-sensus. The Senate and House versions mustnow be reconciled.

Within days of the start of the Lebanonwar, the Senate unanimously approved(7/18) S. Res. 534 “condemning Hezbol-lah and Hamas and their state sponsors andsupporting Israel’s exercise of its right toself-defense” and urging Bush to “continuefully supporting Israel as Israel exercises itsright to self-defense in Lebanon and Gaza”and to implement sanctions on Iran andSyria. On 7/20, the House passed (410–8,with 4 present and not voting) a compan-ion version (H. Res. 921) affirming “steadfastsupport” for Israel’s actions in Lebanon. Ef-forts by 4 lawmakers of Lebanese descent(Darrell Issa [R-CA], Nick Rahall [D-WV], RayLaHood [R-IL], Charles Boustany [R-LA]) toadd wording quoting Rice’s call for restraintagainst civilian targets were rejected, eventhough the 4 approved the language sup-porting Israel’s “right to self-defense” andplacing blame for the crisis solely on Hamas,Hizballah, Iran, Syria, and elements of theLebanese government. Instead the measurerecognized “Israel’s longstanding commit-ment to minimizing civilian loss.”

Other “dissenting voices” included Rep.James P. Moran (D-VA), who warned (7/18)that unquestioning political support couldbe dangerous for Israel because Israeli offi-cials “know they can only go so far as theUnited States backs them” and unwaver-ing support “can encourage their leadershipto overreach and create a situation thatbecomes more problematic.” Rep. SheilaJackson-Lee (D-TX) presented (7/25) a draftres. (H. Res. 945) expressing “deep concernfor the ongoing violence in the Middle East,”especially in Lebanon, and calling for animmediate cease-fire, an immediate halt totargeting of civilian infrastructure, provisionof humanitarian aid, and a comprehensiveand just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.At the end of the quarter the draft had beenreferred to the House Comm. on Interna-tional Relations. After Israel’s 7/30 attackon UNIFIL’s base at Qana, Sen. Chuck Hagel(R-NE) issued the first strong criticism fromthe Senate of Bush’s handling of Lebanon,stating that “President Bush must call foran immediate cease-fire. This madness muststop.”

After Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki denounced(7/19) Israel’s massive bombing of Lebanon,U.S. Senate Democrats threatened (7/24)to boycott his scheduled 7/26 address toCongress, saying he must clarify his remarks,condemn Hizballah, and tell the Americanpeople “which side is he on when it comesto the war on terror.” Senate Democraticleader Harry Reid and several other senatorssent (7/24) a letter to Maliki stating, “Yourfailure to condemn Hezbollah’s aggressionand recognize Israel’s right to defend itselfraise serious questions about whether Iraq,under your leadership, can play a construc-tive role in resolving the current crisis andbringing stability to the Middle East.”

On 6/9, the House approved (374–34)$2.46 b. in aid to Israel for FY 2007—$2.34 b.in military aid and $120 m. in economicaid, plus another $40 m. for immigrant ab-sorption. The figures were unanimously ap-proved by the Senate Appropriations Comm.on 6/29 and sent with the rest of the foreignaid bill to the full Senate for consideration.

A bipartisan group of 13 representativesled by Reps. Michael McCaul (R-TX) andJoseph Crowley (D-NY) began (6/6) circulat-ing a draft res. “condemning the persecutionof Palestinian Christians by the PalestinianAuthority.” The drafters acknowledged thatthe text was written by controversial Israeliresearcher Justus Reid Weiner for a Likudnikcenter based in Jerusalem and that neither




the Palestinian Christian community nor anymajor religious bodies in the West that haveties to Israel/Palestine had been consulted.The res. was quickly denounced by Pales-tinian Christians and the Catholic, Protes-tant, and Orthodox leaderships in the U.S.,prompting McCaul and Crowley to shelve(by 7/3) the measure, which reportedly hadsecured 21 cosponsors.

The Pro-Israel LobbyPro-Israel groups were quick to urge

strong support from Congress and the Bushadmin. following the launch of Israel’s op-erations in Lebanon. For example, some 50American Jewish leaders from across thecountry met (7/20) with Bush admin. offi-cials and congressional leaders in Washing-ton to urge that Israel be “given ample timeand freedom of action to inflict as muchdamage as possible on Hizballah’s infras-tructure.” Lobbying by heads of AmericanJewish groups had reportedly begun sev-eral days previously, including an unusualvisit by Anti-Defamation League national dir.Abraham Foxman to Saudi amb. Prince Turkial-Faisal to thank Saudi Arabia for blaming(7/14) Hizballah for the violence (see above).Within days of the launch of hostilities, sev-eral groups sent “emergency missions” toIsrael to meet with leaders and tour thenorth in a show of solidarity.

United Jewish Communities (formerlyUnited Jewish Appeal) launched (8/2) a cam-paign to raise at least $300 m. in emergencyhumanitarian funds for Israel. The moneywould be used to offset the Israeli govern-ment expenses of evacuating (beginning8/8) Israelis from n. Israel, add air condi-tioning to and otherwise refurbish bombshelters, provide trauma counseling, andcreate a $20 m. fund for the victims of theHizballah rocket attacks and their families.

Leaders of the newly formed ChristiansUnited for Israel (CUFI; see Quarterly Up-date in JPS 140) gathered (7/19) some 3,400evangelicals in Washington for a press con-ference and rally in solidarity with Israel.Participants met with their members ofCongress to urge them to support Israel.

Legal ActionsA federal judge rejected (8/10) an ap-

peal by former AIPAC officials Steven Rosenand Keith Weissman that the espionage caseagainst them be thrown out on the groundsthat prosecution under the Espionage Actinfringes on their constitutional right to freespeech. The pair have been indicted on

charges of conspiring to pass classified na-tional security information to journalists andto Israel (see Quarterly Update in JPS 140).They are the first nongovernment officialsto be charged under the act with verbally re-ceiving and passing classified material. Thetrial has been delayed several times becauseof the massive amount of classified informa-tion involved; no date had been set by theend of the quarter.

The 19-year-old LA-8 case, brought bythe government against 7 Palestinians and aKenyan with alleged ties to the leftist PFLP,resumed on 6/20. In 1987, the governmenthad argued that the defendants should bedeported for supporting “doctrines of worldcommunism,” but as the government repeat-edly lost its case over the years the chargeswere revised at least 3 times, most recentlyincorporating charges of supporting terror-ism. In 1997, a court granted the 8 legalresidency, but the Justice Dept. raised newcharges of lying on visa applications. In thislatest hearing, the U.S. federal judge quicklyruled (6/23) that Aiad Barakat, one of thePalestinians in the case, should be grantedU.S. citizenship since the Justice Dept. hadnot credibly proven that he had falsely de-nied knowing that an acquaintance was asenior PFLP member.

U.S.-Israeli Military IssuesDuring his visit to Washington on 5/23,

Israeli PM Olmert met with U.S. DefenseSecy. Donald Rumsfeld. The men agreed tobuild closer defense and security ties follow-ing setbacks over Israel’s arms sales to China(see Quarterly Update in JPS 139). Furtherdiscussions were planned for Rumsfeld’svisit to Israel as part of a regional tour laterin the year.

At the time of the visit, the U.S.-Israelimilitary relations were still strained over theU.S.’s refusal (apparently earlier in 5/06) toallow Israel to upgrade its F-35 Joint StrikeFighters with its own technology. The U.S.sells the plane as a finished product, con-tractually barring purchasers from addingcomponents. Israel argues that it must addits own, more advanced navigation, sight-ing and fire control systems, and missilesto maintain the Israeli air force’s qualitativeedge.

Also of note: On 7/20, the U.S. approveda more than $6 b. military equipment saleto Saudi Arabia to offset expected criticismof an expedited arms delivery to Israel (an-nounced 7/21; there was at least 1 deliveryca. 7/23) and to facilitate Bush’s meeting




with the Saudi FM and National SecurityCouncil head on 7/23, ahead of Rice’s mis-sion to the region.

RUSSIA

Russia’s activity this quarter was largelyconfined to the UN, where it was one of themain opponents to U.S. policy, challenging(7/16) the U.S. insistence on holding Iran andSyria responsible for the 6/25 Palestinianand 7/12 Hizballah attacks, pressing hard(e.g., 7/20, 8/6) for an immediate cease-fire in Lebanon, and urging (throughoutthe quarter) against imposing UN sanctionson Iran over its continued enrichment ofuranium. In the negotiations over the UNres. on a Lebanon cease-fire, Russia becameso frustrated with U.S. attempts to dictatethe wording that it threatened (8/10) to offerits own draft res.

Of note: Israeli Dep. PM and FM Livni re-ceived (6/15) new Russian special envoy onthe Middle East Sergei Yakovlev (appointedon 3/15/06), who reaffirmed Russia’s com-mitment to a safe and secure Israel. The pre-vious envoy, Alexander Kalugin, was madeamb. to Jordan.

EUROPEAN UNION

Despite the importance of developmentsin Gaza and Israel, the EU played only aminor role this quarter. Before fighting be-gan on either front, Israeli PM Olmert touredBritain (6/12–13) and France (6/14–15), dur-ing which British PM Tony Blair supported(6/12) Israel’s refusal to have contact withthe Hamas-led PA until it renounced vio-lence and recognized Israel. Israeli Dep. PMand FM Livni met (6/14) with the EU Coun-cil of Minters in Luxembourg, where shediscussed Israel’s request to join the EU ed-ucational agreement, the European spaceprogram, the EU environmental agreement,and the EU research and development pro-gram, but no agreements were reached.(The EU has allowed only a handful of non-EU member-states to participate in any ofthese fora; exceptions have been made forAustralia, Egypt, Japan, Morocco, Turkey,and the U.S.)

After Israel’s launch of war againstLebanon, EU tensions with the U.S. roseslightly but noticeably. On 7/26, British for-eign secy. Margaret Beckett announced thatBritain planned to lodge a formal protestwith the U.S. after learning that U.S. aircrafttransporting “bunker buster” bombs to Is-rael refueled at a Scottish air base the week-end of 7/22–23 without notifying Britain.

(The plane refueled in Scotland after theIrish government refused landing rights atShannon airport to protest the cargo.) Bushapologized to Blair on 7/28, though Blair de-fended the use of the airport, which hadalready been the subject of public contro-versy for refueling U.S. flights involved in the“extraordinary rendition” of alleged terrorsuspects in the U.S. war on terror.

On 8/1, the EU rejected a request by 213members of the U.S. Congress in a lettersent to EU foreign policy chief Javier Solanathat the EU add Hizballah to its terrorist list,calling the proposed action too provocative“given the sensitive situation.”

Also of note: Ireland’s Foreign AffairsComm. issued (ca 8/4) a statement callingfor an immediate cease-fire in Lebanon andconsideration of economic sanctions by theEU on Israel to protest its killing of UNpersonnel and civilians and the destructionof Lebanese infrastructure.

UNITED NATIONS

The UN’s efforts this quarter to haltIsrael’s offensives against Gaza and Lebanonwere largely unsuccessful, and its role forthe most part consisted of providing human-itarian aid to civilians in both areas, raisingfunds from member states, and monitoringand reporting on events on the ground. On7/30, UN Secy.-Gen. Annan acknowledgedthe growing frustration of the internationalcommunity, especially in the Arab and Mus-lim world, with the UNSC’s inability to takequick, forceful action to protect the Pales-tinian and Lebanese populations. Referringto the blocking effect of U.S. objections toany moves critical of Israel, he warned that“the authority and standing of this councilare at stake” and that “people have noticedits failure to act firmly and quickly duringthis crisis.”

Undeterred, the U.S. vetoed (7/13) aUNSC res. accusing Israel of using “dispro-portionate force” and jeopardizing the safetyof Palestinian civilians in Gaza, and order-ing Israel’s immediate withdrawal from theStrip. Although the measure also called forPalestinians immediately to release Shalitand halt rocket fire on Israel, U.S. Amb. tothe UN John Bolton called the measure “un-balanced” and said passage “would haveexacerbated tensions in the region” at a cru-cial time. (The last UNSC veto was cast in10/04, also by the U.S. over a res. condemn-ing an Israeli operation. The U.S. has cast 8of the last 9 UNSC vetoes, 7 of which wererelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict.)




UN special rapporteur John Dugard is-sued (6/21) a report on his 6/9–17 tour ofthe West Bank and Gaza, stating that humanrights conditions had substantially deterio-rated since the Hamas-led government tookpower. He noted especially that the n. Gazano-go zone declared by the IDF had beenextended to 500–600 m, that the numberof IDF checkpoints and roadblocks acrossthe West Bank has increased dramatically(particularly around Nablus), and that Israelicontrol over the Jordan Valley had intensi-fied, with the purpose of “de-Palestinization.”UN special rapporteur on the right to healthPaul Hunt similarly noted (7/19) the deterio-ration, stating that poverty rates in Gaza hadreached 75%, and called for an investigationinto whether Israel’s 6/28 strike on the Gazapower station constituted a war crime.

UN High Commissioner for Human RightsLouise Arbour, a former chief prosecutor ofwar crimes tribunals, stated (7/19) that thelevel of the killing and maiming of civiliansin Lebanon, Gaza, and Israel could constitutewar crimes and that members in decision-making positions could be personally liable.Meanwhile, the International Comm. of theRed Cross (ICRC) stated (7/19) that Israelhad violated the principle of proportionalityprovided for under the Geneva Conventions.

The new UNHRC (see Quarterly Updatein JPS 140) devoted its first 2 special ses-sions to Israeli actions in Gaza and Lebanon.On 7/6, the UNHRC issued (7/6) a res. ex-pressing “grave concern” over Israeli actionsin Gaza and demanding an immediate haltto operations. Eleven members (includingBritain, Canada, France, and Germany) votedagainst the measure, calling it “unbalanced”in favor of the Palestinians. Separately, theU.S., which is not a UNHRC member, voiced(7/6) “regrets” over the res., stating that itshould have criticized the “failure of thePalestinian Authority to denounce terror.”On 8/11, the UNHRC voted (27–11, with 8abstaining, 1 not present) to condemn Is-rael for “massive bombardment of Lebanesecivilian populations” and other “systematic”human rights violations, and called for an in-vestigation into “the systematic targeting andkilling of civilians by Israel in Lebanon.” EUcountries, Canada, and Japan voted against.

The UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) increased(5/31) the UN emergency appeal for 2006by 79% to $384 m. to cover emergency jobs,food, and medical supplies for the occu-pied territories. UNOCHA dir. David Shearerstated (5/21), “That amount is not what we

think is necessary but what we think wecan handle.” UNRWA, which was to fundhalf of this year’s $384 m. emergency appealbut had only received donations amount-ing to 30% of its commitment, held (7/17)a meeting in Geneva to encourage interna-tional donors to increase aid transfers inlight of deteriorating humanitarian condi-tions in the territories. Finland pledged anadditional $2 m., increasing its 2006 fund-ing to $6.6 m. UNRWA also reported (6/18)that 14,500 PA employees had newly regis-tered for aid in Gaza and 4,500 have done soin the West Bank; the number in Gaza wasexpected to reach 23,000 soon. UNICEF sim-ilarly tripled (6/18) its emergency appeal forthe Palestinian territories to $23 m. for 2006,noting that 1 in 3 newborns is at risk of dy-ing in Gaza because of lack of medicines andessential drugs.

On 7/27, the UN Economic and So-cial Council passed (45–3, with 3 absten-tions; Australia, Canada, and the U.S. votingagainst) res. E/206/L17/Rev.1 calling on Is-rael immediately to lift the siege on Gaza,observe the 1994 Paris Protocol provisions,and transfer tax revenues to the PA. The U.S.explained (7/27) its vote on the grounds thatthe res. “failed to address the fundamentalcauses of those hardships, including the ac-tions of the Hamas-led government” and “didnothing to encourage peace and stability.”Canada gave a similar explanation, denounc-ing the UN’s “continual one-sided criticismof Israel.”

The UN Comm. on the Exercise of theInalienable Rights of the Palestinian Peopleissued (7/27) a statement expressing graveconcern over ongoing IDF operations inGaza, accusing Israel of “deliberately causinga major humanitarian crisis among the inno-cent civilian population . . . and hamper[ing]any sustained international relief efforts,”noting that “deliberate attacks . . . againstcivilian property and infrastructure in theGaza Strip violate international humanitar-ian law,” and stating that Israel should payreparations immediately.

Meanwhile, Israel made two advances inits efforts to normalize its standing in inter-national bodies. After years of discussion,the ICRC passed (237–54) a res. on 6/21 en-dorsing the red crystal (used alone or fram-ing another symbol) as a neutral emblemto allow Israel’s Magen David Adom (MDA)to participate in the ICRC while maintain-ing its red Star of David symbol. Adoptionof the red crystal was approved in princi-ple in 12/05 (see Quarterly Update in JPS




139), and the official endorsement followedICRC rejection (6/20) of controversial last-minute amendments proposed by Pakistanand Tunisia that included denunciation ofIsrael’s occupation. MDA announced (6/23)that as part of the 6/20 agreement withthe ICRC, it was launching a short-term ar-rangement with the Palestine Red CrescentSociety (PRCS) involving supplying the WestBank PRCS with 6 ambulances with Israelilicense plates to facilitate passage throughcheckpoints and the pre-approval of 23 PRCSstaff members to cross IDF checkpoints withminimal security checks.

At the UN, the Israel Women’s Lobby wasgranted (5/16) consultative status on the UNEconomic and Social Council, enabling itto participate in deliberations advancing thestatus of women. Israel hailed the decision as“a further stage in the Foreign Ministry’s ef-forts to integrate Israel in the important civilactivity of the UN and as part of the normal-ization and upgrading of Israel’s status in theactivities of the international community.”

TURKEY

Turkish PM Tayyip Recep Erdogan wasreportedly deeply involved this quarter inmediating efforts to end Operation SummerRains in Gaza. During the war in Lebanon,Turkey sent (7/29) a warship with medicalsupplies to Beirut and indicated (7/26, 8/8)willingness, in principle, to commit troopsto a UN peace-keeping mission to Lebanonafter a cease-fire.

Within days of the Israel’s 7/30 attackon a UNIFIL post in Qana, the Turkish dailyEvrensel published a previously undisclosedlist of parliamentarians who were mem-bers of the Turkey-Israel Friendship Group,founded several years ago, and denouncedtheir continued participation in light of theongoing war in Lebanon. By 8/2, 27 parlia-mentarians had resigned their membershipor announced that they had done so pre-viously. By 8/4, the number of resignationshad reportedly reached 70 (the Turkish par-liament has 550 members).

IRAN

Pressures on Iran increased this quar-ter to halt uranium enrichment (begun lastquarter) and dismantle its nuclear program(although, technically, Iran’s nuclear pro-gram to date has not violated the NuclearNon-proliferation Treaty, of which Iran is asignatory). Iran’s nuclear program was highon the agenda during Israeli PM Olmert’s

visit to the U.S. early in the quarter. In his5/23 meeting with Bush, Olmert argued thatthe turning point in Iran’s development ofa nuclear program could be months away.While Bush said that all diplomatic optionsneeded to be exhausted before discussing amilitary strike, he emphasized that the U.S.had been laying the groundwork for toughaction against Iran at the UN, “spending alot of time working with our Russian friendsin particular [as well as China] to make itclear to them that Iran is showing no goodfaith” in negotiations. Olmert’s 5/24 addressto Congress (which had been drafted by Re-publican party strategist Frank Luntz andIsraeli Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel) warnedthat a nuclear-armed Iran would pose an“intolerable threat” and “cannot be permit-ted to materialize.” Afterward, Senate ArmedServices Comm. chairman Sen. John Warner(R-VA) pledged to use Olmert’s comments topush the question of how the internationalcommunity should react to Iran.

On 6/6, EU foreign policy adviser JavierSolana presented Iran with an offer by the 5UNSC permanent members plus Germany:if Iran halted uranium enrichment, the sixnations would help build nuclear reactorsand guarantee supply of nuclear fuel forpeaceful purposes, and the U.S. would agreeto direct talks on all issues except diplomaticrelations and lift some bilateral sanctions.The offer also included the sale of EuropeanAirbus aircraft.

On 7/3, the six states pressed Iran to ac-cept their offer and halt enrichment by 7/12or risk sanctions (though China and Russiahad not yet agreed to back sanctions). WhenIran failed to meet the deadline, the 6—especially the U.S.—began (7/13) to pressfor a UNSC res. threatening sanctions. On7/31, days after Iran said it would reply by8/22, the UNSC passed a res. setting thedeadline at 8/31; with the Lebanon war fullyunderway, the U.S. had not protested thedelay.

The timing and ferocity of Israel’s as-sault on Lebanon fueled speculation that itmight be a prelude to military action againstIran’s nuclear facilities or at the very least topressure Tehran in the UN on the nuclear is-sue. (On 5/22, Hizballah dep. chief ShaykhNa‘im Qassim stated explicitly that Hizballahwould not come to Iran’s defense if the U.S.targeted its nuclear program.) Meanwhile,the claims by Israel, the U.S., and to a lesserextent Britain blaming Iran for Hizballah’s7/12 cross-border attack on Israel had beenlargely discredited by the end of the quarter,




with anonymous Bush admin. officials andintelligence analysts acknowledging (8/4)that there was little evidence supportingIranian involvement (see New York Times8/5).

Also of note: An Iran specialist at JohnsHopkins University, Trita Parsi, leaked (5/25)to the Asia Times a 2-page document re-ceived from an Iranian official in 2006. Thedocument, which Iran sent to Bush via theSwiss Embassy in late 3/03 or early 4/03,offers to accept peace with Israel, to “stopany material support to Palestinian opposi-tion groups (Hamas, Jihad, etc.) from Iranianterritory,” to put “pressure on these organiza-tions to stop violent actions against civilianswithin [the] 1967 borders,” to take “actionon Hizbollah to become a mere politicalorganization within Lebanon,” and to givethe International Atomic Energy Agency fullaccess to any facility it asks to see in ex-change for a “halt in U.S. hostile behaviorand rectification of [the] status of Iran inthe U.S.” and recognition of Iran as a re-gional power. According to anonymous se-nior Iranian national security officials, Iran’sSupreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei hadbeen “directly involved” in drafting the pro-posal. According to Flynt Leverett, at thetime senior specialist on the Middle Eastat the U.S. National Security Council, therewere “literally a few days” between receiptof the letter by Bush and an admin. messageto the Swiss amb. expressing displeasure thatSwitzerland had forwarded the document.

OTHER

Venezuela recalled (8/3) its amb. to Israelto protest Operation Change of Direction.

DONORS

Donor activity was limited this quarter asthe donor bodies continued to go through areorganization (see Quarterly Update in JPS140) and in light of the U.S.-led sanctions

on the Hamas-led PA. While the Local De-velopment Forum (the replacement to theLocal Aid Coordination Committee, the cen-tral body overseeing donor activities fromwithin the territories) had not yet held itsfirst meeting by the end of the quarter, the4 donor strategy groups on humanitarianassistance, economics, infrastructure, andgovernance and reform continued to meetregularly, with all work coordinated througha committee that included reps. from theAbbas’s office, the PA Finance Min, and thePA Planning Min. Donor reps. reportedlywere eager to hold more meetings, identifypriorities with the PA, and increase coor-dination the PA given the deteriorating hu-manitarian and economic conditions on theground, but kept contacts low key in lightof U.S. opposition to contacts with Hamas.

All donor projects ongoing before thesanctions were imposed were continuingexcept those funded by Britain, Canada,and the U.S., which were halted. No newdonor funds were pledged or contributed,since funding was being rerouted throughthe EU-led TIM (see above), coordinatedwith the World Bank not officially withinthe donor structures. At the close of thequarter, Sweden announced plans (8/15)to host a donor pledging conference forthe Palestinians on 9/1 to raise funds forhumanitarian assistance and reconstructionin Gaza, but this would not be within thecontext of the donor mechanisms.

Of note: At a donor meeting on 8/8, U.S.special envoy for security affairs Maj. Gen.Keith Dayton proposed a $19.2 m. project($10.4 m. in 2006) to expand the Qarni com-mercial crossing into Gaza to ease pressureon the Palestinian economy. To preserveIsrael’s security, he proposed putting 90 in-ternational observers on the Palestinian sideof the crossing. The PA endorsed the idea;Israel said it would consider the proposalonly after the IDF soldier captured on 6/25is released.



Documents

Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy on behalf of the ......Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy Author(s): Michele K. Esposito Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol