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  • 1.Concerning ERGA OMNES: (A) what is its literal meaning? (b) What does it mean

    within the context of international law? (c) Give two examples of erga omnes.

    a. Erga omnes is a Latin phrase which literally means "towards all" or "towards everyone". In

    legal terminology, erga omnes rights or obligations are owed toward all. For instance a property

    right is an erga omnes entitlement, and therefore enforceable against anybody infringing that

    right. An erga omnes right (a statutory right) can here be distinguished from a right based on

    contract, which is only enforceable against the contracting party.

    b. In international law it has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by states

    towards the community of states as a whole. An erga omnes obligation exists because of the

    universal and undeniable interest in the perpetuation of critical rights (and the prevention of their

    breach). Consequently, any state has the right to complain of a breach.

    c. Examples of erga omnes norms include piracy, genocide, slavery, torture, and racial

    discrimination. The concept was recognized in the International Court of Justice's decision in the

    Barcelona Traction case [(Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 1970 3 at paragraph 33]:

    2. Explain the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus. What is its literal meaning? As a

    legal doctrine, what does it mean? What are the two justifications for its invocation?

    In public international law, clausula rebus sic stantibus (Latin for "things thus standing") is the

    legal doctrine allowing for treaties to become inapplicable because of a fundamental change of

    circumstances. It is essentially an "escape clause" that makes an exception to the general rule of

    pacta sunt servanda (promises must be kept).

    Because the doctrine poses a risk to the security of treaties as its scope is relatively unconfined, it

    requires strict regulations as to the conditions in which it may be invoked.

    The doctrine is part of customary international law, but is also provided for in the 1969 Vienna

    Convention on the Law of Treaties under Article 62 (Fundamental Change of Circumstance),

    although the doctrine is never mentioned by name. Article 62 provides the only two justifications

    of the invocation of rebus sic stantibus: first, that the circumstances existing at the time of the

    conclusion of the treaty were indeed objectively essential to the obligations of treaty (sub-

    paragraph A) and the instance wherein the change of circumstances has had a radical effect on

    the obligations of the treaty (sub-paragraph B).

    If the parties to a treaty had contemplated for the occurrence of the changed circumstance the

    doctrine does not apply and the provision remains in effect. Clausula rebus sic stantibus only

    relates to changed circumstances that were never contemplated by the parties. This principle is

    clarified in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland, 1973).

    Although it is clear that a fundamental change of circumstances might justify terminating or

    modifying a treaty, unilateral denunciation of a treaty is prohibited; a party does not have the

    right to denounce a treaty unilaterally.

  • 3.What do you understand by the modern international law of the acquisition (or

    attribution) of territory?

    The modern international law of the acquisition (or attribution) of territory generally requires

    that there be: an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of

    jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis. The latter two criteria are

    tempered to suit the nature of the territory and size of its population, if any.2

    In the 1931 award in the dispute between Mexico and France over the sovereignty of Clipperton

    Island, located in the Pacific Ocean 1280 km (about 690 nautical miles) southwest of Acapulco,

    Mexico, the King of Italy as sole arbitrator had previously stated the rules this way:

    It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the force of law, besides the animus

    occupandi, the actual, and not the nominal, taking of possession is a necessary condition of

    occupation. This taking of possession consists in the act, or series of acts, by which the

    occupying state reduces to its possession the territory in question and takes steps to exercise

    exclusive authority there. Strictly speaking, and in ordinary cases, that only takes place when the

    state establishes in the territory itself an organization capable of making its laws respected. But

    this step is, properly speaking, but a means of procedure to the taking of possession, and,

    therefore, is not identical with the latter. There may also be cases where it is unnecessary to have

    recourse to this method. Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely

    uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at

    the absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of possession

    must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed.

    4. Explain the concept of association of states in international law. In international

    practice, what is the use of these associative states? Is concept of association recognized

    under the 1987 Constitution? Explain.

    The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely

    in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of

    "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law

    instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association

    may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.

    Keitner and Reisman state that

    [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links.

    In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the

    principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a

    middle ground between integration and independence. x x x150

    For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of

    Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific

  • Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The

    currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet

    they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international

    legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN

    membership.

    According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally

    have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending

    to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and

    cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to

    consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S.

    government) regards as relating to or affecting either government.

    X X X

    In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a

    transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that

    have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-

    Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become

    independent states.153

    xxxx

    These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the

    BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

    The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution

    5. Palmas, also referred to as Miangas, is an island of little economic value or strategic

    location. It is two miles in length, three-quarters of a mile in width, and had a population of

    about 750 when the decision of the arbitrator was handed down. The island is located

    between Mindanao, Philippines and the northern most island, known as Nanusa, of what

    was the former Netherlands East Indies. In 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United

    States in the Treaty of Paris (1898) and Palmas sat within the boundaries of that cession to

    the U.S. In 1906, the United States discovered that the Netherlands also claimed

    sovereignty over the island, and the two parties agreed to submit to binding arbitration by

    the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

    The question the arbitrator was to resolve was whether the Island of Palmas (Miangas), in

    its entirety, was a part of the territory of the United States or the Netherlands.

    The legal issue presented was whether a territory belongs to the first discoverer, even if

    they do not exercise authority over the territory, or whether it belongs to the state which

    actually exercises sovereignty over it.

    How was the issue resolved? In short, what country is the real owner of the territory?

    Discovery alone, without any subsequent act, cannot at the present time suffice to prove

    sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas); and in so far as there is no sovereignty, the

    question of an abandonment properly speaking of sovereignty by one State in order that the

  • sovereignty of another may take its place does not arise.

    If on the other hand the view is adopted that discovery does not create a definitive title of

    sovereignty, but only an inchoate title, such a title exists, it is true, without external

    manifestation. However, according to the view that has prevailed at any rate since the 19th

    century, an inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a reasonable period by the

    effective occupation of the region claimed to be discovered. This principle must be applied in the

    present case, for the reasons given above in regard to the rules determining which of successive

    legal systems is to be applied (the so-called intertemporal law). Now, no act of occupation nor,

    except as to a recent period, any exercise of sovereignty at Palmas by Spain has been alleged.

    But even admitting that the Spanish title still existed as inchoate in 1898 and must be considered

    as included in the cession under Article III of the Treaty of Paris, an inchoate title could not

    prevail over the continuous and peaceful display of authority by another State; for such display

    may prevail even over a prior, definitive title put forward by another State. This point will be

    considered, when the Netherlands argument has been examined and the allegations of either

    Party as to the display of their authority can be compared

    6. In an 1892 revolution, General Jos Manuel "Mocho" Hernndez expelled the existing

    Venezuelan government and took control of Ciudad Bolivar, where plaintiff Underhill lived

    and ran a waterworks system for the city. Underhill, an American citizen, repeatedly

    applied to Hernandez for an exit passport, but his requests were refused, and Underhill

    was forced to stay in Ciudad Bolivar and run the waterworks. Hernandez finally relented

    and allowed Underhill to return to the United States, where he instituted an action to

    recover damages for his detention in Venezuela. In finding for the Defendant, a New York

    Court determined that Hernandez had acted in his official capacity as a military

    commander so his actions were those of the Venezuelan government. The Court therefore

    refused to hear Underhill's claim against the government.

    Questions: Is the Court correct? What principle of international law is used in this

    dispute? Explain.

    ANSWER:based on the Act of State Doctrine. The Court reasoned, "Every sovereign state is

    bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country

    will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.

    7. The UN Secretary General sometimes to settle a dispute between two states, visits each,

    and proposes a solution to their problem. He may do this either privately or publicly. What

    is the international term for this mode of settling an international dispute?

    Answer: The UN Secretary General uses what is termed his "good offices" (generally meaning

    his prestige and the weight of the world community he represents) when he meets with world

  • leaders, either publicly or privately, in an effort to prevent international disputes from

    developing, escalating, or spreading. For example, in 1998 Kofi Annan negotiated a settlement

    of the dispute between Iraq and the U.S. over arms inspections in Iraq. He used the prestige of

    his office and the threat of UN Security Council action if no agreement was reached to force

    Saddam Hussein to allow continuation of UN inspections. Earlier examples include U Thant's

    assistance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Javier Perez de Cuellar's mediation of the Soviet

    withdrawal from Afghanistan

    8. What is a thalweg? How is it used to solve a dispute on boundaries between two states?

    The Thalweg Doctrine defines the border between two states separated by a watercourse or

    flowing body of water as lying along the thalweg, which is the line of greatest depth of the

    channel or watercourse.

    9. Every statute is understood, x x x , to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to

    effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or

    jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as

    may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.Ex necessitate elegis . . . .

    What is the name of the doctrine exemplified by said statement?

    the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:

    No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is

    always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of

    enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding

    events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of

    statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine

    states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every

    statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to

    effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction

    which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and

    logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right

    or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the

    greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus

    10. Mr. X filed a case of Abuse of Authority against the Mayor. The Mayors Budget

    Officer and Legal Officer were also included in the suit, as conspirators of said abuse.

  • Another criminal case was filed against the Mayor for Technical Malversation. The Mayor

    won by a landslide vote in the next election. The mayor and his other co-

    accused/respondents file a motion to have all the cases dismissed.

    Question: As hearing officer/ judge, will you dismiss the above mentioned cases? Explain.

    No, I will not dismiss the case. Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election

    of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. Ingco v. Sanchez, et al.

    [22] clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case