Recent Developments in the Safety Regime for Naval Ship Design

QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ENGINEERING INTERNATIONAL

Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2006; 22:21–30

Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/qre.745

Special Issue Recent Developments in the SafetyRegime for Naval Ship DesignDavid Andrews∗ ,†

Department of Mechanical Engineering, University College London, Torrington Place, London WC1E 7JE, U.K.

This paper brings together the issues presented by the author to the two InternationalMaritime Conferences on Design for Safety, held in Glasgow in 1999 and in Osakain 2004. To appreciate how the safety issues for naval ships differ from those formerchant vessels, it is necessary to consider how naval ship design differs from thatfor most merchant ships. The paper outlines the features of the U.K. Naval ShipSafety Regime and the most significant change since its 1998 implementation, theintroduction of Naval Ship Classification. The second aspect of relevance is the roleof the Design Authority for a new class of warships, now that the direct design of suchvessels is no longer undertaken within the relevant government procurement agency.An important safety management feature, within this arrangement, is the role of theNaval Authority, which is outlined, prior to a concluding section considering the waysin which the current Naval Ship Safety Regime might be developed further. Copyrightc© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

KEY WORDS: naval ship design; safety management; design authority

1. INTRODUCTION

Naval ships, especially true naval combatants, differ from merchant ships, both in how they are designedand how the naval ship design process differs significantly from that appropriate to their merchantcousins. The Naval Ship Safety Regime was formalized in the U.K. Ministry of Defence (MoD) while

the author was the lead safety director in the surface ship area1. The principal features of that regime consist ofa Ship Safety Management System (SSMS), a Ship Safety Case, the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Processand the Key Hazards.

Of the significant developments in the subsequent six years, the most noticeable has been the introductioninto the acquisition process of most major navies of Naval Ship Classification, following the pioneering workby the U.K. MoD. The key points of this approach, together with the associated aspects of such a regime, are thespecific notation approach it requires and the need for specifying the aspects of, what has been designated,Military Distinction in ship classification. An associated issue, with a major bearing on naval ship safety,is that of Design Authority (DA), given the general trend for even major combatants to no longer be designed‘in-house’. The safety aspects of this development can be seen in the specific example of the U.K. Type 45Destroyer procurement.

An associated feature of the changed safety regime is that of the Naval Authority, which was required to beintroduced once the unity of in-house DA and safety/classification responsibility was broken. The fragmentation

∗Correspondence to: Professor D. Andrews, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University College London, Torrington Place,London WC1E 7JE, U.K.†E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright c© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Received 3 February 2005

Accepted 18 April 2005

22 D. ANDREWS

of responsibility for naval ship safety that has resulted requires a much greater degree of coherence in the safetyregime. This has coincided with the change in military posture following the collapse of the East–West ColdWar confrontation and a greater degree of political awareness of the issues of Health and Safety, requiring amore transparent level of safety assurance and accountability. Following such a survey it is sensible to concludewith a view of how the naval ship safety regime may further develop, both in regard to further enhancementsin the practice of classification and safety management, as well as in the challenges extending the approach tomore aspects of naval ship design and encompassing a wider scope of vessel types.

2. NAVAL SHIP DESIGN AND SAFETY

Naval ships are extremely diverse, ranging from small coastal craft to massive aircraft carriers. While some navalauxiliary vessels, such as supply ships, seem very similar to merchant ships others, such as nuclear submarines,are quite unique. Given submarine design’s inherent focus on safety, even without nuclear propulsion, its safetyregime is quite different from other warships and so is a topic worthy of a separate paper. So, just focusing onthe typical surface combatant, one can summarize naval ship design by emphasizing two characteristics.

• Warships rarely have a single purpose, unlike most commercial vessels, but rather they are multipurposewith an intricate amalgam of frequently conflicting requirements, necessitated by the inherentunpredictability of warfare.

• The naval ship design process is correspondingly multi-faceted, not only at the technical level but alsoin the need to interweave the technical issues with significant considerations of national, international,politico-economic and environmental concerns.

Thus, the process by which naval ships are designed can be characterized as follows2,3.

• Each new design is bespoke for the specific (naval) customer and thus the customer/designer dialogue iscrucial.

• As most naval ships are multi-mission and role flexible, identifying a judicious balance of requirementsis difficult.

• Part of determining the requirement is due to performance aspects inherent in marine vessels, not all ofwhich are explicitly expressed and some can be major size and cost determinants.

• Design takes place in a complex political environment, which itself can have a major bearing on the designoutcome.

• The demands or constraints of cost and time, as outward manifestations of the ‘political’ environment,can all seem too pervasive in the design process.

• The lack of a prototype can result in the development of the design seeming to be conservative to minimizerisk given the large-scale integration task.

In considering the specifics of safety in naval ship design, these can be seen to have two distinct facets,i.e. those appropriate to normal peacetime operations and those relevant to operating ‘in harms way’. So theconsiderations that concern merchant ship designers, such as intact stability, structural integrity, fire safety andmanoeuvrability, also have to be addressed in the naval case. However, even here the naval ship designer hasto allow for the fact that the warship commanding officer may well deliberately operate his ship in peacetimein a hazardous manner. Thus, for example, replenishing the ship at sea is a test of close ship manoeuvringand, in extremis, of the ship’s watertight integrity. Also, naval ships are expected to go to the assistance ofother vessels in distress rather than using modern weather prediction systems to avoid such situations. Even inpeacetime warships carry very hazardous munitions and landing large armed aircraft on relatively small shipscan endanger those on the ship as well as those onboard the aircraft.

Despite these peacetime hazards, the naval vessel is clearly designed around operating in a war environment.Thus, it has extensive and comprehensive subdivision so that the ship can sustain a substantial extent ofhull rupture and not readily sink due to flooding or structural failure. The structure is also designed to resist

Copyright c© 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Qual. Reliab. Engng. Int. 2006; 22:21–30

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SAFETY REGIME FOR NAVAL SHIP DESIGN 23

underwater explosions leading to structural features that are too expensive to incorporate in merchant ships.As the warship is expected to ‘fight hurt’ the large, well-trained crew are trained to fight fires. Given thatdamage in action may render parts of the ship ineffective, the power sources and ship services are designed withextensive redundancy and apparent excess capacity so that the intact parts of the ship can continue to operate insuch conditions4.

All of the resultant features, incorporated at considerable expense in comparison with merchant ship practice,enable the naval vessel to survive attacks and continue to perform, when damaged, to a significant degree.Thus, for most of the (peacetime) existence of the ship, the warship has considerable margins of safety, whichwould not be economically justifiable in almost any merchant ship. So, one might ask why, for peacetimeoperations, does the naval ship design community have to justify the safety features adopted and why has thisjustification been recently formalized into a Naval Ship Safety Regime.

3. THE MODERN NAVAL SHIP SAFETY REGIME

As part of the general trend in society to incorporate a safer existence for its citizens, the U.K. in commonwith other advanced nations has brought in legislation, notably the Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974.Part of the ‘political’ environment in which naval ships are designed means that such large-scale governmentprocurement gives government the opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to such legislation as a means toencourage industry and society at large. Thus, while the MoD has been granted exemptions to carry out, evenin peacetime, hazardous evolutions on naval vessels, it has a declared intent to meet the Health and Safety atWork Act. The principle adopted in considering what are acceptable levels of safety is that the probability ofan incident occurring, when related to the possible consequences of that accident, is assessed to be acceptablein relation to the operational need or benefit, and that the risks are kept As Low As Reasonably Practicable(the ALARP principle5).

To demonstrate this principle for ship safety the specific policy and guidance on the Management of ShipSafety was formalized some five years ago with a Ship Safety Board, which is chaired by the Controller of theNavy. The board sponsors the Ship Safety Management System (SSMS) Handbook (Joint Service PublicationJSP 4305), which lays down a ‘risk-based’ and ‘goal-setting’ approach to ship safety management. Thus, thedesignated ‘post holder’ (usually the MoD Project Manager or Integrated Project Team Leader), responsiblefor the acquisition and through life design authority for a given class of naval ship, is required to encompassthe safety management of that class of ships within a suitable SSM. Post Holders have their responsibilitiesestablished in formal Letters of Delegation, which spell out the tasks and how the safety elements of SafetyManagement Plans, Safety Case Reports and Certification of Key Hazards for the specific ships in their chargewill be produced and approved. Given that a naval vessel consists of a large number of disparate but integratedship and combat systems, then part of the function of the SSMS is to integrate the separate Safety Cases forsystems and equipment (including software) within the ship design into the Ship Safety Case as the highest-levelsafety system for that vessel.

The Ship Safety Case is the means by which the relevant Post Holder performs the following duties:

• Demonstrates by reasonable argument that reasonable care has been taken to identify, assess and controlhazards and that risk has been reduced to ALARP.

• Communicates to the end user through the Ship Safety Case Report those hazards that can only be closedby operating procedures by the crew.

• Integrates whole ship safety.

An endorsed Safety Case is achieved through a FSA by conducting:

1. Preliminary Hazard Identification;2. Hazard Identification and Analysis;3. Safety Assessment.


24 D. ANDREWS

This includes the creation of a Hazard Log and a Risk Assessment using normal severity classifications andassessed probabilities of occurrence during each ship’s life and leads to the four classes of risk:

• class A, which is intolerable;• class B, which is undesirable and only accepted when risk reduction is impractical;• classes C and D, which are deemed tolerable.

Each of the Key Hazards for surface vessels of Structural Strength, Stability, Magazine Construction(for stowage of ordnance), Escape and Evacuation, and Fire Prevention and Control require appropriate safetycertification, which is produced by established procedures to meet specific standards. The ship’s Post Holder isresponsible for their production and ensures they are independently audited and signed at an appropriate seniorlevel in the responsible organization. Thus, a clear audit trail can be demonstrated.

4. NAVAL SHIP CLASSIFICATION

Two recent papers, each with one author from the U.K. MoD’s Sea Technology Group, which is headed up by theChief Naval Architect, have outlined how the U.K.’s internal ship safety management organization appreciated,with the process of passing evermore responsibility for the through life material management of the RoyalNavy’s ships to industry, that naval ship classification needed to be adopted6,7. It was realized, not just withprocurement but also the through life maintenance of naval ships being undertaken increasingly by industry andwith the reducing size of the Royal Navy, albeit still the U.K.’s largest ship operator, that the ability of the MoDto have a wholly separate regime of technical standards was becoming unsustainable. This was coupled withthe move to keep the cost of naval ships down through increasingly adopting commercial standards for moreand more of the elements of ship design and thus a more commercially based approach to many standards fornaval ships seemed a logical step. Gibbons and James6 list a process of introducing specific Naval Ship Rulescommencing in 1993 with the ordering of HMS Ocean, an amphibious helicopter carrier, to largely commercialship rules (i.e. Lloyd’s Register (LR) (Merchant) Class). This was followed in 1997 by the MoD contracting LRto develop Naval Ship Rules and the process could be said to have culminated in LR Naval Ship Rules beingselected in 2000 for the Royal Navy’s latest major ship design (i.e. the Type 45 Destroyer) due in service in2006.

Naval classification had to fit in with the process by which naval ships are certified as safe, which is basedon the ‘Circle of Certification’ in the U.K. MoD Naval Authority Regulations8 and reproduced at Figure 1.Naval classification is seen as required to reflect the particular needs of naval operations, where there has to bea balance of legitimate safety issues common to seafaring, the needs to continue to operate a naval vessel ‘inharm’s way’ and the exercise of legitimate government policy. Gibbons and James6 summarize the manner inwhich naval classification must function by providing the following.

• The need for a flexible yet authoritative regulatory regime.• Greater emphasis on advisory services than certification of compliance, when compared with existing

ship rules.• Recognition of naval operating patterns, including inherently high manning levels at sea, again in

comparison with merchant ship practice.

These characteristics color the provisions of naval classification, when compared with merchant ship practiceand as identified by LR9.

• The structural strength and watertight integrity of all essential parts of the hull and its appendages,including compliance with suitable stability standards.

• The operation and functioning of suitable systems to achieve the ship’s operational requirements.• The effectiveness of features and systems to achieve and sustain basic conditions onboard so that

personnel, stores, fuel and equipment is safely carried on the ship at sea, at anchor or moored/berthedin harbour.



Figure 1. The U.K. MoD ‘Circle of Certification’ (MoD Ship Safety Management Office8). Reproduced from Rudgley andMarshall7 with permission from RINA.

Thus, the classification society will maintain these provisions through life in the same manner as formerchant ships by design appraisal, survey during construction and periodical in-service inspections to assuremaintenance of compliance with rules appropriate to naval practice. Naval ship classification has also evolved toprovide assurance of propulsion, steering and other essential ship systems such as lifting gear. However, unlikea merchant ship, a naval ship is not bound by international legislation, so its navy can choose to adopt as muchor as little of the classification regime as it deems appropriate. So LR has provided for a range of operatingconditions, features and systems not in (merchant) ship rules. For example:

• engineering systems for chilled water, high-pressure air and aviation fuel;• naval operations such as replenishment at sea while underway and use of ramps for discharging

amphibious vehicles at sea;• regular use of lifting gear at sea while underway, for example launching and recovery of boats.

Gibbons and James6 provide a comprehensive set of examples of the notation provided for in the LR NavalShip Rules. This notation is extensive and is used to address areas not normally covered by merchant shipclassification, such as MARPOL (Maritime Pollution) and SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea). In summary theseconsist of, first, ‘Mandatory Notation’ covering ship type (i.e. large warships, ocean going combatants, smallerspecialist naval vessels) and service area to distinguish those vessels operating worldwide from those withparticular restrictions. The second set of notation is optional and, together with typical classification hull strengthand machinery notation, also includes ‘Military Distinction’, ‘Military Operations’ and ‘Others’ (the latter beinga miscellaneous general ship performance-related category). Examples of the military distinction notation allrelate to the need, in a naval ship’s structure, to resist to an appropriate level certain weapon effects, such asair blast, underwater explosions, fragmentation and small arms induced damage. In this respect the rules arerestricted to aspects of survivability appropriate to the expertise of the classification society, such as structuralperformance post damage, while the other elements of warship survivability4 are, properly, expected to becovered by those military standards still maintained by the Navy/MoD. This was part of the process of moving


26 D. ANDREWS

to naval ship rules so that the limited resources, retained by the MoD ‘in-house’, could focus on the warshipspecific areas and continue to be used to maintain those standards by drawing on military practice, experienceand sensitivities. Nevertheless LR has indicated its intention to extend consideration of survivability to coversuch issues9 as:

• access and layout;• provision of cross- and counter-flooding;• operability of systems and structure when flooded;• salvage systems;• damage control procedures;• provision of damage-tolerant systems.

In so doing LR is drawing on the specific expertise in the U.K.’s defence research establishments and indeed theclose relationship now forged with the MoD Sea Technology Group.

5. THE ISSUE OF DESIGN AUTHORITY

As previously remarked, the issue of DA is very relevant to the current status of safety in naval ship design.This has not always been the case. When the ships of a major navy were designed in-house, at least as far asguidance drawings and calculations, and the shipbuilder, or often the navy’s own dockyard, building the shipproduced the drawings necessary for it to build the ship, then the navy’s design branch oversaw both the detaileddesign and the build process. Thus, the design branch acted as its own DA and undertook the roles of both theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) and the classification society that would apply in the case of amerchant ship. With the recent changes in the procurement of the naval ships (of, certainly, the British and, toa degree, the U.S. Navy), outlined in the previous section, and particularly the introduction of the classificationsociety into warship design assurance, the formerly ‘enclosed’ or ‘in-house’ management has been replacedwith a more involved process. One of the principal players in this more complex and still developing process isthe DA and it is necessary to consider more closely its role in the area of ship safety.

This is best done with reference to a specific example of a major naval ship procurement, with which theauthor has had an ongoing but not direct involvement in: that of the U.K. Type 45 Destroyer, or DARING Class,programme. The programme for the Type 45 has been involved in producing the Anti Air Warfare (AAW)destroyer replacement for the Type 42 Class, with first the NFR 9010, then The Future Frigate and finallythe Anglo–French–Italian HORIZON programme11, all proving to be false starts. Thus, the Type 45 has beencharacterized by a considerable design legacy, which has meant the U.K. MoD was prepared to place with amajor industrial company not just the build and prime contractorship, but also the responsibility for the design,including safety issues. A recent comprehensive paper on the role of the DA for the Type 45 was written by aformer senior member of the BAE Systems team responsible for undertaking that DA role12.

Gates12 commences with quoting the U.K. Acquisition Management System (AMS)13, which is producedby the MoD to advise all interested parties in industry and government as to the manner in which defenceequipment will be acquired for the U.K. Armed Forces. Thus, a DA is defined as

‘An organization with the professional competence and authority to specify technical designrequirements, undertake design tasks, apply configuration management to design and continuouslymonitor the effectiveness of design/material and its maintenance through life’.

He further points out that while DA has been formally delegated in the case of the Type 45 by the MoD to BAESystems (who have vested it with the Type 45 Prime Contract Office) the term Type 45 DA is specifically used toidentify an individual. Furthermore, that individual is ‘appointed to discharge the key engineering responsibilityfor exercising Design Authority and who, alone, has the authority to delegate aspects of this task’. It is thusthe Type 45 DA who guarantees not just the contractual performance, integrity and fitness for purpose but,importantly in the context of this paper, the safety of the delivered design and accepts liability for that design.



Figure 2. U.K. MoD control of the Type 45 DA (from Gates12).

Gates further lists, under five areas of control exercised by the DA, ten key aspects, which include ‘Assuranceof Product Safety’ and ‘Certification of the Design’. The latter is highly relevant to demonstration of a safetyassurance but goes beyond the specific certification of safety issues.

Gates12 also goes on to draw parallels with the long-standing practice in the acquisition of military aircraft bythe MoD where the DA has been placed with aircraft manufacturers and it is common practice to use experiencedand qualified Chief Engineers together with full flying demonstration of prototypes to a MoD standard. The samearrangements do not exist for warships, both in regard to general design assurance and a specific safety regimeequivalent to airworthiness. Part of the role of the Type 45 DA is to assure the MoD as customer that the deliveredType 45 is safe. Figure 2 shows the principal players in the U.K. MoD to whom the contractor (as the Type 45Prime Contract Office with the Type 45 DA as Chief Engineer) is responsible for contractual and, specifically,safety assurance. Ultimately, the Secretary of State for Defence, as the formally accountable owner of the Navy’sships responsible to Parliament, is the elected politician from whom all responsibilities are delegated. As can beseen there are two ‘Lines of Responsibility’ to the Secretary of State; first, the Duty Holder Line representingthe Project Management function for the delivery of the product, where the principal player is the MoD Type 45Integrated Project Team (IPT) Leader, who has also two reporting lines as shown; second, the Regulator Linethat is said to provide ‘functional checks’ but is primarily focused on the safety assurance of the product in layingdown Safety Standards and Procedures, Regulation of Key Hazards and receiving, via the IPT, disclosure of thedesign. The regulation is administered through regulating safety boards and the two most relevant to a navalvessel are the Defence Ordnance Safety Board (concerned with acceptance of all military explosives), and theShip Safety Board, already referred to. The latter is most relevant to this paper’s safety focus and Figure 2 shows


28 D. ANDREWS

how management of the Safety Case and Key Hazards are conducted. This includes the use of an IndependentSafety Advisor and of the Classification Society, whose role in the procurement of a naval ship has alreadybeen outlined. Finally, Figure 2 shows the pivotal role of the Naval Authorities in this complex arrangement ofresponsibilities between the MoD, as customer, and its contracted supplier.

6. THE ISSUE OF NAVAL AUTHORITY

As Figure 2 shows the place of the naval authorities under the MoD Ship Safety Board, in the situation wherethe MoD Duty Holder (the IPT Leader) has delegated DA to the contractor, it is necessary to further appreciatethe safety assurance tasks of the various naval authorities. Moving from the specific example of the Type 45to perceived general practice, Pomeroy8 first defines the ‘Owner’ of a naval ship, as being the governmentdepartment responsible for naval procurement and support, as distinct from the ‘Navy’ as operator of the ship,although in some instances, unlike the U.K., the navy may be the formal owner. This then enables him toexplain that the naval authorities are nominated by the Owner to be responsible for providing the regulationsassociated with the procurement and support of the ship, and possibly also identifying appropriate standardsand undertaking auditing and certification. In this way the ship safety issues across the navy can be regulatedand the individual ship programmes have consistency in ship safety matters, despite the different procurementcomplexities.

A further definition of responsibilities is made by Rudgley and Marshall7 with regard to Key HazardsCertification between the Duty Holder (and, by implication, any prime contractor—as in the case of the Type 45just outlined), the Naval Authority for a particular key hazard and the Operating Authority, which in the case ofthe Royal Navy is the Commander in Chief Fleet (CINCFleet). Thus, the Naval Authority is responsible for:

• providing advice on standards and criteria;• maintaining regulations, guidance information and sponsoring standards;• auditing certification submissions;• issuing certification;• informing the Duty Holder of non-compliance;• maintaining professional competence.

The last of these is particularly relevant to the maintenance of a safety regime, for which not only is DA likelyto be wholly or partially placed with industry but also much of the actual trials and technical work associatedwith safety certification is likely to be undertaken under contract. Rudgley and Marshall7 detail how the role ofthe naval authority can be delegated to a ‘Recognized Organization’ in a similar manner to that recommendedby the IMO for merchant ships, with three levels of authorization, namely Limited, Partial and Full.

In the specific case of the U.K. MoD Naval Authority, responsibility has been defined for ten key hazard areasof which five are specific to submarines and will not be discussed further here. The others are:

• surface ship stability;• surface ship structural safety;• surface ship escape and evacuation;• surface ship and submarine explosive safety;• surface ship fire prevention and control.

For the first four of these the MoD Sea Technology Group, as the naval architectural ‘specialist’ group, isthe authority, while for fire the Directorate of Operations in the Defence Logistics Organization, as the marineengineering ‘specialist’ group, is the authority. It can be seen that the introduction of naval ship rules, aside fromthe broader implications for naval ship design assurance, has had an implication for the second of the key hazardsand, to a degree, the others, due to the survivability related issues listed earlier. The whole process of certificationsummarized at the end of Section 4 has thus been further formalized to account for the extensive and disparatelevels of delegation across both the procurement and through life support of the ships of the Royal Navy.



This process has now been applied to the in-service fleet and to ships coming into service. Thus, in thefirst 18 months of the Naval Authority regime some 60 ships have been certificated and 80 ‘Conditions ofCertification’ issued, which has revealed the virtue of such an approach to ship safety7.

7. THE WAY AHEAD

Despite the substantial changes outlined in this paper it seems more than likely that further developments willoccur to the safety regime applied to naval ship design. Rudgley and Marshall7 consider that the developmentof this approach to ship safety for naval vessels is likely to continue, both in the short term and the longer term.

• The two well-established ship safety areas, those of stability and strength, are biased for naval ships toa standards or comparative based approach, for reasons associated with complexities of the phenomena.However, fire regulations are based on a risk-based approach and so the different approaches need to beblended under a common naval authority regime.

• The scope of certification may well be extended from just those aspects currently subject to formalcertification in specific cases as part of the ship safety case approach.

• Naval Class is being extended beyond ship structural certification concerns into areas of propulsion andlifesaving. Therefore, this could logically be such a path for extending the scope of certification and thenaval authority regime.

• The possibility of a ‘Naval IMO’ might be seen as convenient amongst major naval powers, since thiswould give assurance on baseline safety standards, with naval authorities providing the essential safetycertification under a ‘Military Flag State’.

• Common arrangements for regulatory standards across navies or combining standards and agreeingcriteria might be both economically attractive and provide wider assurance.

Beyond the wider compass of certification than the current key hazard areas just outlined, there are otherexamples where the developments discussed in this paper might even be further extended to provide navies andtheir nations’ citizens and governments with the confidence that all issues concerning the safety of their navalships and personnel were being adequately addressed. These include the following.

• The extension of certification to what used to be called Advanced Naval Vehicles14 may require the scopeof certification to be extended, especially if such hybrid vehicles as wing-in-ground or ekranoplanes15

become serious naval craft.• Submarine safety issues have been mentioned as part and parcel of the naval authority regime, however

many of the comments on the growing links between merchant ship and naval ship safety practice do notcurrently apply to submarine safety. Perhaps only a much greater exploitation of the deep oceans willbring such a synergy about.

• It seems likely that not just the pressure to acquire and maintain modern naval vessels for the minimumeconomic resource commensurate with an ALARP philosophy will lead to further changes in the mannerin which they are designed and their safety assurance will be sought. In addition, one of the naval authorityissues already addressed, that of maintaining professional competence particularly in ship design16,17,may well lead to further changes in both acquisition approaches and the manner in which safety assurancecan be provided.

REFERENCES

1. Andrews DJ. Naval ships-design for safety. International Conference on Maritime Safety, Strathclyde University, May1999.

2. Andrews DJ. The Management of Warship Design. Transactions of the RINA 1993; 135:1–24 (reprinted in Journal ofNaval Engineering 1993).


30 D. ANDREWS

3. Andrews DJ. Preliminary Warship Design. Transactions of the RINA 1994; 136:37–56 (reprinted in Journal of NavalEngineering 1995).

4. Manley D. Procuring for survivability. RINA Warship 2001 Conference, London, June 2001.5. MoD Ship Safety Management Office. Joint Service Publication JSP 430: Issue 2, Part 1: Policy. Naval Authority

Secretariat, MoD DPA, Bristol, May 2002.6. Gibbons GE, James P. The design, construction and maintenance of naval ships to classification society rules. Warship

2001 Conference, London, RINA, June 2001.7. Rudgley G, Marshall S. Independent safety assurance. International Journal of Maritime Engineering 2003;

145(A1):41–56.8. MoD Ship Safety Management Office. Naval Authority Regulations. Naval Authority Secretariat: MoD DPA, Bristol,

draft issue, October 2003.9. Pomeroy V. Further development and experience with application of naval classification. Proceedings of the 9th Naval

Platform Technology Seminar, Singapore, November 2003.10. Schaffer RL, Kloehn HG. Design of the NFR90. U.S. Naval Engineers Journal 1991; 103(2):29–49.11. van Griethuysen WJ, Juliot P. Project HORIZON—Design management in a multi-national environment. INEC96.12. Gates PJ. Design authority of the DARING class destroyers. Journal of Naval Engineering 2004; 41(3):399–432.13. MoD Smart Procurement Implementation Team. The MoD Acquisition Handbook: Faster, Cheaper, Better; A Guide to

SMART Procurement (4th edn), 2002. http://www.ams.mod.uk [2000].14. Lavis DR, Rogalski WW, Spaulding KB. The promise of advanced naval vehicles for NATO. Marine Technology 1990;

27(2):65–93.15. Cross NH. WIG (Wing in Ground Effect) past designs and operational theory. Warship 2003: Air Power at Sea

International Conference, RINA, London, June 2003.16. Rydill LJ. Comment in discussion to Andrews DJ: A creative approach to ship architecture. RINA International Journal

of Maritime Engineering 2004; 146(A3):50–51.17. Andrews DJ. Author’s response to discussion on Andrews DJ: A creative approach to ship architecture. RINA

International Journal of Maritime Engineering 2004; 146(A3):58–64.

Author’s biography

David Andrews was given a new Chair in Engineering Design at University College London in September2000, following his early retirement from the U.K. MoD where he was Director of Frigates and MineCountermeasures. Having joined the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors as a cadet, his career in naval shipdesign and procurement management included being the Warship Project Manager for the procurement of theRoyal Navy’s Replacement Amphibious Shipping Programme (the LPD(R) and LPH) and for the AviationTraining Ship (RFA ARGUS) as well as the in-service Steam Powered Warship Group. He was subsequentlyHead of Preliminary Design in the Future Projects (Naval) Directorate, where he was responsible for the initialstudies on the main elements of the future fleet, and then the MoD’s sponsored Professor of Naval Architectureat UCL. He is a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering, a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, a Fellow ofInstitution of Mechanical Engineers and Fellow of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA), for whomhe was Chairman and is now Vice Chairman of the Membership Committee.


Documents

Recent Developments in the Safety Regime for Naval Ship Design