Refugee Life as an Extension of Pastoral Life: Survival Strategies of

the Gabra Miigo Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia

TORUSOGA

Hirosaki University

This paper explores the refugee life of the Gabra Miigo based on life history data collected from 54 informants. The Gabra Miigo are pastoralists in southern Ethiopia and have often become refugees since the 1960s due to international conflicts. When they became refugees, they applied subsistence strategies developed for the harsh arid environment to manage the dif­ficulties of their lives. This paper evaluates such applications as a major contributor to rebuilding their pastoral life after repatriation. This paper also explains the modern political situation in Ethiopia that causes ethnic conflicts, characterized as the 'new war' according to Kaldor (1999). We then discuss the importance of subsistence strategies for pastoralist survival during the 'new war.

,

Key words: Gabra Miigo, refugee, subsistence strategy, rebuilding, survival, new war

1. INTRODUCTION

Pastoralism is characterized as nomadic movement, and the nomadic lifestyle is the normal condi­tion for such people. Pastoralists move around when the condition of the pastures becomes worse and parasites such as ticks increase. Their daily life is premised on nomadic movement. For many pastoralists, the refugee life seems to be an extension of pastoral life and is intrinsic to pastoral­ism, particularly during droughts. McCabe (2002) reported that the pastoral Turkana who live in Northern Kenya take their livestock as far as Uganda during severe droughts. When pastoralists face such sudden disasters, they may even seek refuge in neighboring countries. In reality, it is a 'forced' displacement in the sense that they respond to adverse circumstances, although such movement is voluntary (Turton 1996). Pastoralists are sometimes forced to escape from raiders. As many anthro­pologists have pointed out, pastoralists in East Mrica often raid other pastoral peoples and rob them of their livestock. The pastoralists value livestock and, therefore, would not balk at raiding to enlarge their herd. On the other side, they take precautions against neighboring pastoralists' raids and escape with their livestock as soon as they perceive increasing tension. Such an escape can be also counted as 'forced' displacement. Escape from drought as well as from raiders is an unusual form of movement, but it is intrinsic to pastoralism.

Moreover, pastoralists also become refugees for external reasons, such as those related to the nation­state. Historically, pastoral societies have resisted the rule of nation-states. For instance, the Anyanya rebel army, which is mainly composed of pastoralists such as the Nuer, Dinka, and Acholi, fought against the Sudanese Government in the 1970s, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, which was also composed of pastoralists, have opposed the Sudanese Government since the 1980s

Nilo-Ethiopian Studies 16: 13-27 (2011) Copyright© 2011.Japan Association for Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

13

14 Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

(Kurimoto 1996). The Somali pastoralists also formed the Greater Somalia movement that proposed both the secession of areas inhabited by Somalis in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya and the annexation by Somalia in the 1960s (Kyle 1999). Through such resistance many pastoralists were forced to leave their homelands and seek refuge across borders, or they became 'internal refugees' (Markakis 1993).

Escape for externai reasons differs from escape for intrinsic reasons in pastoralism, according to the scale and duration of the circumstances. Refugees caused by a nation-state conflict fall within the definition of the international convention on the status of refugees. It is possible for them to stay at a refugee camp operated by the UNHCR. However, not all people who seek refuge across borders stay in UNHCR refugee camps; for example, less than one-fifth of the 500,000 refugees in eastern Sudan stayed in UNHCR refugee camps (ICIHI 1986). Many such refugees attempt to survive in foreign countries without aid through their own efforts. There are also those who try to survive as inter­nally displaced people. Among these internally displaced people, some are forced into this condition because the border is too far away, while others intend to obtain temporary support or protection from relatives or friends until such time as they can return to their homeland when the danger has passed. They do not become official refugees or receive official aid, but try to survive by themselves. As we have seen above, significant numbers of people who escape nation-state conflicts choose to be informal refugees with no official support.

In the past, refugee studies concentrated on both types of factors generating refugees and effective protection measures. Moreover, they concentrated on ultimate reasons, such as the destruction of the environment, ethnic conflict, religious persecution, war, civil conflict, political or racial persecu­tion, and economic or social oppression (I CIHI 1986). Additionally, they concentrated on the social, economic, medical, hygienic, and ecological risks that refugees confront (Ohta & Gebre 2005). Also, lawyers have studied the legal status of refugees who require official protection. However, the refu­gee problem exists not only at the places of origin and official asylum but also between these sites. There are also internally displaced people and refugees in foreign countries who survive by themselves without official approval. Although the UNHCR has afforded such people aid in recent years, it has been a limited program, and informal refugees have not been studied. The differences among refugees residing between the place of origin and the place of official asylum have been neglected.

Based on the above definitions, this paper elucidates the variety of refugee life, focusing on the pas­toral Gabra Miigo of southern Ethiopia. In the last half of the 20th century, the Gabra Miigo have suffered five times from refugee experiences and have moved around the vast Horn of Mrica. Based on life history data, we attempt to detail informal refugee lifestyles. Here, we focus in particular on the relationship between refugees who are in that role due to external factors and those who are refu­gees due to factors intrinsic to pastoralism~ Humans make use of well-established techniques, ideas, and existing resources when they meet new and difficult situations. There is no doubt that when pastoralists become informal refugees through external factors, they make use of survival techniques cultivated through their prior refugee experiences that are intrinsic to pastoralism. This paper focuses on how intrinsically refugee-like pastoralists apply pastoral strategies to new situations in which they become refugees owing to external reasons.

There have been many domestic conflicts over the use and dispensation of government power among Mrican countries. Although the intensity of these conflicts has tended to decrease in recent years, this does not mean that governance has improved, especially in failed states, where weakened countries experience constant low-intensity conflict among ethnic groups or regions or between gov­ernment and local ethnic groups, or government and local regions (NIRA & Yokota 2001). Resource conflicts over material and non-material resources such as land, oil, money, administrative posts, etc, also tend to be increasing {Markakis 1998). While today's refugees are victims of these conflicts, they are also parties who are interested in such conflicts. It is not uncommon for refugees to engage in guerrilla activity, and refugee camps can provide a good shelter for guerrillas; thus, life as a refugee is not necessarily without possibilities for agency. This paper considers how people evaluate becoming a refugee under the political situation today and what people's aims are in taking the risk of a becoming refugee.

SOGA: Refugee Life as an Extension of Pastoral Life 15

2. THE INVISIBLE GABRA Mil GO

This paper takes the Gabra as the subject of a study of pastoralists in the Horn of Mrica. These people keep camels, goats, sheep, and a small number of cattle. There are two groups of Gabra, one living in northern Kenya, and the other in southern Ethiopia. Both speak the Oromo dialect, which is one of the Cushitic families of Mro-Asiatic languages. According to their oral tradition, the two groups were originally united but then split into two in the mid-18th century (Soga 2006). Today, another pastoralist group, the Boran Oromo, live between these two Gabra groups, and the two have limited contact. Both groups call themselves 'Gabra'; however, the Ethiopian group calls the Kenyan group the 'Malbe,' and the Kenyan group calls the Ethiopian group the 'Miigo.' This paper refers to the Kenyan group as the 'Gabra Malbe' and the Ethiopian group as the 'Gabra Miigo' for conve­nience, although these names are not the groups' self-designations. This paper mainly relates to the Gabra Miigo.

The Gabra Miigo, in contrast to the Gabra Malbe, seem to be almost invisible. According to the Kenya Population Census (1994), there are about 30,000 Gabra Malbe. They reside in the Chalbi desert, which is a lowland of 40Q-600 m altitude in the most arid land of northern Kenya. They con­front neighboring ethnic groups on even ground. The Gabra Malbe use the Chalbi desert exclusively and have attracted the attention of anthropologists such as William Torry, Fr. Paolo Tablino, Aneesa Kassam, Gunther Schlee, Paul Robinson, Reizo Harako, Ichiro lmai, Toru Soga, John Wood, and others.

The Gabra Miigo, in contrast, have not been studied. They live on the Dirre high plateau at 1,100 m above sea level, together with the pastoral Boran Oromo, the agro-pastoral Guji Oromo, and the pastoral Carre Somali (I>. The area occupied by the Gabra Miigo widely overlaps with that of the Boran Oromo, and the Gabra Miigo were once subject to the Boran Oromo (Oba 1996). The Gabra Miigo whose population is supposedly the same size as the Gabra Malbe (30,000), are also dissolved in majority groups such as the Boran (230,000) and the Guji (900,000). The government of Ethiopia has never counted the Gabra Miigo as an original group during population census. The minority Gabra Miigo have been nearly invisible to both anthropologists and the central government.

Another reason the Gabra Miigo appear invisible is that they have often become dispersed as refu­gees during clashes in southern Ethiopia during the second half of the 20th century, in 1963,1974, 1977, 1991, and 2006 (Soga 2008). For example, the Gabra Miigo fled in three directions in 1977, to Kenya, Somalia, and within Ethiopia. Because they often fled and were scattered, it has been difficult for anthropologists to detail their existence.

3. THE EXPERIENCE OF REFUGEES OFTHE GABRAMIIGO

3.1. 1he resilience of pastoralism Surprisingly, the Gabra Miigo rebuilt their pastoral life soon after they returned from refugee life. In general, people lose a lot when they become refugees, and Cernea (1985) suggested that refugees are subject to eight risks: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to common property assets, and social disarticulation. Such risks continue even after the refugees return home. The UNHCR proposed three solutions for the refugee problem: voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement to a third country. Among these, voluntary repatriation is regarded as the best option by the UNHCR. However, when repatriated refugees begin to rebuild their lives, this option carries many difficulties, such as animosity and tensions, destroyed infrastructure, volatile politics, limited access to land for both resettlement and agricul­ture, etc. The UNHCR recognized the importance of durable peace building when they helped to repatriate the Namibian refugees in 1989 (UNHCR 2000). However, the Gabra Miigo were able to overcome these risks and return to their pastoral life after repatriation. As a matter of course, a few people decided to abandon the pastoral life and live in towns because they could not rebuild their

16 Ni/o-Ethiopian Studies

livestock herd. However, many were able to rebuild their herd and return to the pastoral life, which is a resilient form of subsistence. How was this possible? Let us see how the Gabra Miigo maintained their herds when they struggled in their refugee life.

3.2. Refugees in 1979-86 Taking their third refugee experience in 1979-86 as an example, let us clarify how the Gabra Miigo rebuilt their pastoral life after repatriation. In terms of background, the Somali Government had wanted to annex the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1963, but this failed in 1964. However, the Somali Government did not abandon the desire to reunite all Somalis. When a revo­lution occurred in Ethiopia in 1974, and the Dergue, the communist military junta, seized power, President Siad Barre of Somalia discerned Ethiopia's weakness. His Government launched the Ogaden war in 1977 (Marcus 1994).

Before 1977, the Somali Government supported the guerrilla war waged by the Ethiopian Somali rebels. Some Oromo rebels were also sympathetic to the Somalis. The Somali Government organ­ized the Oromo rebels under the banner of the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). The Gabra Miigo lived in the Dirre area of southern Ethiopia, which is adjacent to Ogaden. They also have a mixed Somali and Oromo culture, and some Gabra Miigo have marital relationships with the Carre Somali. When the Somali rebels began the war in Ogaden, some Gabra Miigo who were sympa­thetic to the Somalis joined the guerrilla war in Dirre as members of the SALF (Soga 2008). They fought against the Ethiopian army and created a liberated zone in the Dirre area. During the initial phases of the Ogaden war, Somalia was dominant, occupying 90% of the Ogaden region. Somalia, however, lost the support of the Soviet Union during the war and was defeated in 1978.

The Dergue regime took precautions in the Somali-inhabited southern Ethiopia after the victory over Ogaden. In the Dirre area in southern Ethiopia, for example, the Dergue regime appointed a Boran Oromo local administrator, provided arms, and tried to gain ascendancy over the Somali­inhabited region. Again, the Dergue regime began a clean-up operation in 1979, during which the guerrillas were routed and became refugees in both Kenya and Somalia. The Gabra Miigo who had joined the war as guerrillas fled beyond the borders. This initiated the refugee experience of1979.

In what follows, we will reconstruct this escape through the life histories of 54 men living around Surupa town in Southern Ethiopia between 2001 and 2004. Table 1 and Figure 1 show the escape routes of the informants. It is apparent that the Gabra Miigo escaped not in a body but by way of three discrete routes: to Somalia, to Kenya, and within Ethiopia. Among those using these escape routes, 32% escaped into Somalia and 48% into Kenya, while 20% remained in Ethiopia as internally displaced persons.

Somali route Many of the people who escaped into Somalia were guerrillas. Table 2 shows the guerrilla experi­ences of the informants. Around 53% (nine of 17) of those who escaped into Somalia engaged in guerrilla activities between 1975 and 1979. By contrast, the proportion who engaged in guerrilla activity among those who escaped to Kenya was 15% (four of 26) and of those who remained in Ethiopia was 18% (two of 11). It is apparent that the ratio of guerrillas to refugees in Somalia was

Route

Somalia

Kenya

Ethiopia

Total

Table 1. The Escape Routes of the Informants

number

17

26

11

54

%

31.5

48.1

20.4

100.0

SOGA: Refugee Life as an Extension of Pastoral Life 17

River 0 • Town, Well ....______......._____. _ __. _ __._ _ __.

Fig. 1. Tripartite Border Area of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia.

Table 2. The Guerrilla Experiences of the Informants

Route Engaged Not Engaged unkonwn Total

Somalia 9 7 1 17

Kenya 4 22 0 26

Ethiopia 2 9 0 11

higher than in Kenya and Ethiopia. The guerrilla fighters knew the conditions in Somalia, as they had been trained at a military camp in Somalia under Cuban soldiers for 2-8 months. Mter the guer­rilla activity began, they often went back to Somalia from the batde front to obtain medical treatment or for relaxation in the UNHCR camps. Through these visits, the guerrillas became well informed about life in UNHCR camps in Somalia.

When the Dergue regime began a clean-up operation in 1979, the guerrillas took weak members of their families, such as fathers, mothers, wives, children, brothers, and sisters, to the UNHCR camps along the River Juba in Somalia {see Table 3). In the camp were the Gabra Miigo, Garre, Marihaan, Arusi, Boran, and Guji refugees. As a self-reliance program, refugee people were engaged in cultiva­tion with tractors and irrigated agriculture by pumping water from the River Juba. UNHCR staff handed out cereal grain to refugees. The camp had a hospital and a school and provided a sufficient degree of protection that people had peace of mind.

In this UNHCR camp, refugees could not keep their livestock. Table 4 shows whether they brought their livestock or not. This information on livestock management was from 13 of 17 informants who escaped to Somalia, and it shows that no informants brought their livestock. Table 5 shows who

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Table 3. Family Member whom Informants brought

Somalia Kenya Ethiopia

Father 6 3 1

Mother 7 1

Wives 5 4 1

Children 3 1

Brother & Sister 5

All Family Members 1 2

Table 4. Number of informants who brought their livestock

Route brought not brought unknown Total

Somalia 0 13 4 17

Kenya 21 0 5 26

Ethiopia 10 0 1 11

Table 5. Herder of the Livestock of informants who escaped to Somalia

Herder place of livestock

Kenya Ethiopia unknown

Elder brother 2 1

Younger brother 1 5 1

Clan member 1

unknown 2

managed the livestock of informants who escaped to Somalia, revealing that livestock were kept in either Kenya or Ethiopia and were tended by younger (seven informants) or elder (three informants) brothers. One informant entrusted his livestock to a clan member. By leaving their livestock and herders behind, these people could travel light into a refugee camp.

In general, there is an image that people who live in refugee camps are victims of war or conflict. As for the Gabra Miigo, however, it was rather the ex-guerrillas and their relations who stayed in the UNHCR camp. There is also a further image that refugees have lost all their property, but the Gabra Miigo did not lose their property, although they appeared to be impoverished; their brothers had kept the livestock on behalf of the refugees.

Refugee life in Somalia continued from 1979 to around 1986. In the last half of the 1980s, the anti-government forces increased activities, leading to a civil war in Somalia. The refuge life also became worse; food and commodities were often appropriated, and young men in the camp were compulsorily conscripted. Unhappy with this situation, the Gabra Miigo voluntarily returned to Ethiopia after 1986, with support from the UNHCR.

Kenya route All the people who escaped to Kenya brought their livestock (Table 4). Information on livestock management was obtained from 21 of 26 informants who escaped to Kenya. Twenty informants brought their own livestock, and the remaining informant brought entrusted livestock. This is a remarkable contrast with those who escaped to Somalia.

SOGA: Refugee Life as an Extension of Pastoral Life 19

Moreover, very few of the people who escaped to Kenya were guerrillas. Around 85% (22 of 26; Table 2) of those who escaped to Kenya did not become guerrillas. When the Dergue regime began the clean-up operation in 1979, most of the guerrillas fled to Somalia, whereas those who managed livestock escaped to Kenya. Twelve informants from among those who did not become guerrillas explained that they had responsibility for managing their family herd on behalf of guerrillas who had escaped to Somalia. The other informants needed to sustain their household and therefore could not be guerrillas. In two cases, having a young child prevented the informants from becoming guerrillas, whereas in another two cases old parents prevented them.

The people who escaped to Kenya were informal refugees who did not live in UNHCR camps encircled by a fence and isolated from the local community, but lived in open fields together with local pastoral people. Therefore, they could move freely wherever they liked. They escaped to the northern part of the northeastern province of Kenya (Figure 1), 50 to 100 km as the crow flies from the Ethiopian-Kenyan border town ofMoyale, or to the Kenyan-Somalian border town of El Wak 180 km from Moyale. In this province were Somali pastoral groups such as the Ajullan, Garre, Degodia, and others. When the Gabra Miigo escaped to this province, they stayed peacefully among these local peoples, pasturing and watering their livestock. The Gabra Miigo remember these peoples as friendly. In contrast, the Gabra Miigo suffered at the hands of Kenyan police (called kikuyu after the major ethnic group in Kenya), who were guarding against an invasion of guerrillas. The kikuyu ambushed refugees at livestock watering points and asked them for their 'kipande,' or identity cards. The kikuyu suspected that those who could not show a kipande were guerrillas, and they arrested and tortured them by hammering nails into their heads or beating their testes.

The Gabra Miigo and their livestock also suffered in the unfamiliar climate, as the northeastern province is considerably lower than southern Ethiopia, and the vegetation is poor and the water salty. The Gabra Miigo found it difficult to live in the northeastern province, and when they were told that security in southern Ethiopia was better in 1980, they voluntarily returned to Ethiopia, in disgust with the kikuyu and the poor environment for livestock.

Escape in Ethiopia Those who escaped inside Ethiopia also brought livestock {see Table 4); this group can be divided

into three categories. One category consisted of ex-guerrillas (two informants) who had retired when the clean-up operation was launched in 1979 and fled with their families to southern Ethiopia. The second group included the families of guerrillas (three informants) who devoted themselves to look­ing after livestock on behalf of their brothers who were guerrillas. And the final group included non­guerrilla families (two informants). All of those who escaped inside Ethiopia fled freely and lived together with local Somali pastoralists.

Before 1979, the Gabra Miigo lived in the Dirre area where guerrillas were in control {see Figure 1). When the Ethiopian government launched the clean-up operation in 1979, these guerrillas gave ground and escaped eastward to Somalia. The Gabra Miigo also escaped, together with the guer­rillas; seven informants escaped to Galgallo and Chelago 150 km from Moyale and lived with the Garre Somali who were also engaged in guerrilla war. In 1980, the Ethiopian army controlled a vast area in southern Ethiopia and watched the livestock watering points, catching some people when they watered their livestock; others were voluntarily caught while seeking sanctuary with the army. The army forced the Gabra Miigo to live in one place in a type of refugee camp called a keeba, where people were given rations and allowed to keep their livestock. The army escorted the people when livestock were taken to graze. However, the army constructed the keeba not only to protect internally displaced persons but also to sever the logistics lines of the guerrillas. As guerrillas got food from villagers, the army collected villagers, moved them to the keeba, and blocked the guerrilla's access to villagers.

In 1980, Yatani Ali, the Boran local administrator, kept internally displaced and repatriated Gabra Miigo from Kenya together, moved them to Gomole area (Figure 1), and dispersed them to four locations to weaken their power. Although the Gabra Miigo were supposed to stay in an assigned

20 Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

location, they allowed their livestock to graze freely. At this point, the refugee lifestyle of the Gabra Miigo had come to an end.

3.3. Division of labor among refugees Although the Gabra Miigo escaped by way of three discrete routes, there were linkages between the avenues of escape. The Somali route refugees who were guerrillas and escaped without livestock brought their parents, wives, brothers, sisters, and children to the UNHCR camp in Somalia. On the other hand, the Kenya route refugees and the Ethiopian internally displaced persons, who were not guerrillas, escaped with livestock, and most of them did not bring their families, with minor excep­tions. This suggests that the Gabra Miigo built a family network based on division of labor. The Somali route refugees cared for the weak in their family, while the Kenya and Ethiopia route refugees looked after their livestock. In order to understand this, we take the example of the escape story of Mr. Guraacha.

[Case 1] Mr. Guraacha was 28 years old when he escaped from Ethiopia in 1979. He and his family took the Kenya route through Kededuma, a border watering point, and moved east to Takaba, 100 km from Moyale. Northern Kenya is lowland, its climate is very hot, and well water is saline. Their camels had grown up in the calm southern Ethiopian highland and were not accustomed to the harsh environment of northern Kenya. Moreover, the climate of Somalia was much worse than that of northern Kenya. At first, Guraacha wished to go to Somalia with his whole family; however, because of the harsh environment, he abandoned this wish and divided his family into two. Guraacha and his wife stayed behind in Kenya with the livestock, while his younger brother Hassan took other family members, such as mothers, young brothers, and sisters, to Somalia. Guraacha gave up on life in northern Kenya and returned to Ethiopia in 1980, and other family members also returned to Ethiopia in 1986. They have lived a pastoral life together since in 1986.

As this case shows, many Gabra Miigo initially escaped with their whole family and livestock. On the way to Somalia, however, the environment became worse, and they divided their family: a few young people stayed behind in Kenya to keep livestock, and elder parents, daughters, children were taken to a secure refugee camp in Somalia. In Guraacha's case, he originally headed to Somalia; Kenya was not his final destination. He remained in Kenya in order to keep his livestock. This is also applicable to some who escaped through the Ethiopian route. They also headed to Somalia, but aban­doned this route; only the young remained in Ethiopia with the livestock, while elders and children escaped to a refugee camp in Somalia.

At first glance, the escape routes of the Gabra Miigo led to Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia; however, there was a linkage among these three routes. The Gabra Miigo left behind the livestock manage­ment section in Kenya and Ethiopia and sent their families to Somalia for protection. Whether the livestock management section moved in Kenya or Ethiopia depended on which route they took when they broke free. It is important to note that the Gabra Miigo accomplished a division oflabor by dividing and dispersing their families across the vast space. In doing so, those who stayed in the refugee camp could rebuild their pastoral life soon after they returned home. All they had to do was to look for the livestock management section.

4. SUBSISTENCE STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVING THE REFUGEE LIFE

The Gabra Miigo seem to utilize subsistence strategies for surviving the refugee life. Pastoralists have developed many strategies to survive under the harsh dry environment. In this section, we closely examine two subsistence strategies and then focus on how the Gabra Miigo utilize these strategies for refugee life.

SOGA: Refugee Life as an Extension of Pastoral Life 21

4.1. Divide family and livestock Pastoralism is a fragile form of subsistence, with a harsh dry season and some serious droughts. Pastoralists always struggle with a dry environment and divide the family and livestock to appropri­ate locations in this struggle. Today, the residential pattern of the Gabra Miigo has been changed through repeated wars, refugee life, dependence on a town, an increase in polygamous marriage under the advance of Islamization, etc. For example, some live in town because they have lost all their live­stock during the wars. They build a town-style house outside of town and just keep a small number of livestock obtained from an aid organization. Some maintain the first wife's household in a village in the rangeland to manage the livestock and send the second wife's household to a town to conduct business. Some keep both the first and second wife in villages in different rangelands and allocate a small number oflactating camels to one and dry camels to the other. These are exceptions to the tra­ditional residential pattern, which has greatly changed. However, the traditional residential pattern of the Gabra Miigo seen in the 1970s can still be seen in the Gabra Malbe today, where elders, women, and infants remain in the village with a small number of lactating livestock, while the middle-aged men, youth, and older children live at a livestock camp with dry livestock.

The Gabra Malbe do not keep all their livestock in one place because if all livestock were kept together in the dry season, the pasture around the village would soon be overgrazed. To avoid over­grazing, they allocate a few lactating livestock to the village and transfer the dry livestock to the livestock camp. The villages in which the elders, women, and small children live tend to be sedentary. Although the pasture around the village is meager, it is sufficient for the small number of lactating livestock. The early-lactating livestock also provide milk for the villagers. On the other hand, the livestock camp is migratory and looks for better pasture. There are some mid-lactating livestock, although most in the camp are dry. Owing to the better pasture, the lactating livestock can produce more milk than can those in the village. The livestock camp frequently moves and, therefore, they do not have houses; they sleep beneath the open sky. Under these tough conditions, middle-aged men, youth, and boys and girls concentrate on management of the livestock. Such division of family and livestock into village and camp can be seen in many pastoral societies. This is one of the adaptive strategies that pastoralists have invented in accordance with the harsh dry environment.

4.2. Long trek with whole fomily Another strategy of pastoralists is the long trek with the whole family, which is an adaptive strategy to severe drought. The Chalbi desert in Kenya where the Gabra Malbe live in is one of the driest areas in the Horn of Mrica, with annual rainfall of only about 150 mm. There are four seasons in Chalbi: the hot long dry season, rainy season, cold dry season, and short rainy season. However, it does not necessarily rain all over the Chalbi in rainy seasons. The amount and the location of rainfall change capriciously every year. Moreover, there is no rain if an unpredictable drought occurs. Meteorologists have dramatically changed their understanding of the arid-land climate from viewing it as an equilib­rium system to recognizing it as a non-equilibrium system, which gives rise to the traditional pastoral system (Ellis & Swift 1988). The large fluctuations in climate or unpredictable droughts used to be regarded as exceptions within an equilibrium system, but they are recognized as common in the non­equilibrium system. Pastoralists used to move their livestock to distant foreign lands during severe drought as an adaptation to the non-equilibrium arid ecosystem. The long trek with the whole family also can be seen as an adaptive strategy to the non-equilibrium arid ecosystem.

In 1991, there was a heavy drought in northern Kenya, and pastures were dry. In that year, Mr. Bule took his whole family and all of their household effects and livestock on a long trek (Figure 2). In a usual year, his village was located at the periphery of North Horr town and he dispatched dry live­stock to a camp. In the 1990 rainy seasons, however, there was no rain, and even worse, there seemed to be no rain in 1991. Sensing drought, Mr. Bule decided to move his village to seek better pasture, as with a livestock camp. Between February and September of 1991, Mr. Bule moved the village eight times. A village of the Gabra Malbe generally consists of several households. On the long trek, the village gained more households, who also trekked with their entire family and livestock, looking

22

-··- Borderline ""'-...-. Road

• Town, Well

• Village place

Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

0

Fig. 2. The long trek of Mr. Bule's village. • The number gives the date when the village settled.

50km

for better pastures. When the village was in Balessa, the center of Gabra Malbe land, it consisted of only three households, but by the time it reached Sabarei area, the frontier of Gabra Malbe land and close to enemies, the village consisted of 11 households. Mr. Bule's village moved slowly, changing in membership, over a distance of 100 km; this is the distance commonly covered by a livestock camp, but it is very rare for a village to move such a long distance. The long trek with the whole family can also be regarded as an adaptive strategy to a hard drought. Dividing the family and livestock is applicable to the dry season in a normal year, but a serious drought entails a long trek with the whole family and livestock for survival.

4.3. Utilize a subsistence strategy for refugee life The strategy of dividing the family and livestock can be seen in the case of Mr. Guraacha. On the way to Somalia, Mr. Guraacha divided his family in two: the livestock management section and the secure

SOGA: Refugee Life as an Extension ofPastoral Life 23

section of weaker family members. Young husbands and wives were in the former section and lived a migratory life with Somali pastoral groups, seeking better pasture, but living in fear of the violent Kenyan police. The elderly parents, women, and children were in the latter section and lived in the UNHCR refugee camp in Somalia, where they were safe and had food and assistance materials.

This division of family is similar to the subsistence strategy that divides the family into village and livestock camp. The livestock management section is analogous to the livestock camp, and the strat­egy for the weaker family members is analogous to the village in a normal dry season. However, there are some differences: there are early-lactating livestock in the village, whereas there are no livestock in the refugee camp; there is no house or household effects in the livestock camp, whereas some who escaped to Ethiopia and Kenya together with their wives had a house and household effects. The Gabra Miigo applied the subsistence strategy of dividing the family to the situation of escape as a means of saving both family and livestock.

Another strategy of the Gabra Miigo, the long trek with the entire family, can be seen in the fol­lowing case.

[Case 2] Manmado, 28 years old in 1979, escaped with his whole family, heading for Somalia through southern Ethiopia. The journey continued for 10 months from April1979 to January 1980, and they travelled 150 km to Galgallo in southern Ethiopia. On the way to Somalia, Manmado heard that the climate was not fit for their highland camels, so he abandoned his plans. On the way to Somalia, he went ahead at a slow pace seeking better pasture, which tells us that he did not necessarily wish to go to Somalia. Finally, he decided to return to his homeland when he heard that the Ethiopian army had overcome the guerrillas and that the army were not harming escapees.

The slow escape of Mr. Manmado can be regarded as the long trek subsistence strategy. He moved 150 km in 10 months, just as Mr. Bule (see previous section) had moved 100 km in 8 months. Their migration speed was almost the same: Manmado's movements were principally aimed at escape from danger, while he also carefully kept his livestock in good condition, looking for better pasture. This also applies to Mr. Guraacha. When he entered Kenya, he was also escaping with his entire family, before dividing them into two groups, and he slowly moved through northern Kenya. Thus, the Gabra Miigo applied the subsistence strategy of a long trek in drought time when confronted by war.

5. SUBSISTENCE AS A BASIS FOR SURVIVAL

In the preceding chapter, we examined how the Gabra Miigo utilized subsistence strategies for sur­vival based on the example of refugee experiences in 1979. In this chapter, we extend the observations into the way oflife of the Gabra Miigo to examine today's political situation in Ethiopia. It appears that the Gabra Miigo are not afraid of becoming refugees. It is a crippling option for them if they wish to obtain their rights under the present political situation. This option will be examined in rela­tion to the political activity of the Gabra Miigo, which will possibly make them refugees.

5.1. Identity politics and 'new wars' Ethnic conflicts caused by international disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia occurred in 1963, 197 4, and 1977 in southern Ethiopia. The conflict of 1963 preceded fighting with Somali guerrillas before a military clash between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964 (Marcus 1994). Within the context of the political situation in southern Ethiopia, the conflict of 1974 preceded the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977/8. Thus, these ethnic conflicts were all proxy wars between nations.

The ethnic conflicts in 1991 and 2006, however, were apparendy different from previous conflicts. These conflicts related to Ethiopian internal policy. In 1991, the Dergue regime collapsed, and the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power. In 1994, EPRDF

24 Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

established a new Constitution that introduced a federal system of states based on ethnicity. The con­stitution stipulates three categories of ethnicity: 'nation,' 'nationality,' and 'people.' The major ethnic groups categorized into 'nation' and 'nationality' such as the Amhara, Oromo, Tigray, Somali, and Mar obtained their own state and established self-determination<2>. However, since self-determination was established, ethnic conflicts have occurred along state borders as well as inside states.

Before federalism was introduced in Ethiopia, the biggest unit of local government was the prov­ince. Provincial borders were drawn along natural barriers such as large rivers and mountain ridges. By virtue of the new const~tution, however, new state borderlines were to be drawn in accordance with the residential patterns of ethnic groups. But different ethnic groups coexist, and each ethnic group began to try to enlarge its state. Thus began ethnic conflict over borders. In southern Ethiopia, for example, conflicts between the Oromo and the Somali peoples have occurred along borders between Oromia and Somali regional states. These conflicts have been characterized by lasting small-scale violence or murder, but not by holistic armed conflict. These conflicts have led to the evacuation of residents from border areas due to continuous terror.

Inside the state, the 'clans' constitute major ethnic groups. Inter-clan conflicts over the distribu­tion of resources, rights, and interests have occurred among the major ethnic groups. In the Somali regional state, for example, the Somali Peoples Democratic Party (SPDP) and the All Ethiopian Unity Organization (AEUO) have formed a joint council. However, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a separatist group supported by the Ogaadden clan, has complained about the dis­tribution of rights and interests in oil resources and has rebelled against the Somali state council as well as the Ethiopian federal government. From the viewpoint of the Somali state authorities and the Ethiopian federal government, the Ogaadeen is just one of many Somali clans, but from the viewpoint of the Ogaadeen, they constitute the majority in Somali state, and they have argued that they should rule the state.

Not only larger clans such as the Ogaadeen but also small clans have intensified their political activities. They seek approval for their existence and demand rights and interests, particularly admin­istrative and district positions. An administrative district consists of zones, zones consist of waradas, and warada consist of kabales. The small clans have tried to redraw the border of administrative districts to enlarge or establish their own administrative district and obtain administrative posts. In the Oromia regional state, for example, the Guji Oromo and Boran Oromo, which are both now regarded as clans of the Oromo, have tried to redraw the zone border. The inter-clan conflicts in the state have also been characterized by small-scale continuous violence and murder. For example, the Guji Oromo and the Boran Oromo have made limited surgical strikes against each other in attempts to redraw the zone border to their advantage. They have tried to expunge rival people by using terror in the border area and then immigrating into this area.

Whether they are about state borders or zones, these small-scale conflicts aim to exclude different clans and ethnic groups, redraw borders, establish or enlarge administrative districts, and achieve self­determination based on an ethnocentric policy.

Although these conflicts have occurred at the edges of Ethiopia, news of them has reached the Web. Not only the ONLF but also small clans such as Garre Somali have their own website written in English. Using an Internet-based campaign, they have obtained support from diasporas, inter­national NGOs, and Muslim-based groups throughout the world. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has not only a website but also radio stations, with offices in Washington, DC, and Berlin, Germany, and receives financial support from outside Ethiopia. Now, the local conflicts in southern Ethiopia have deep connections with the worldwide organizations of the diasporas. Hence, these local conflicts can become global movements.

Kaldor (1999: 1-11) argues that during the last decade of the twentieth century, a new type of organized violence developed, especially in Mrica and Eastern Europe. She describes this new type of violence as 'new war' in contrast with earlier wars in terms of goals, methods of warfare, and methods of finance. The goals of the new wars are about exclusive identity politics, in contrast to geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars. Although the methods of the new wars draw on experiences of

SOGA: Refugee Life as an Extension ofPastoral Life 25

both guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency, they use the techniques of destabilization aimed at sowing 'fear and hatred'. As for finance, the new wars heavily depend on external resources, such as remittances from the diasporas, 'taxation' of humanitarian assistance, support from neighboring governments, or illegal trade in arms, drugs, oil, diamonds, or human trafficking. The new wars are a global phenomenon, although they take on an intra-national form.

As we have seen, the ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia today often have features of'new war' as described by Kaldor. In Ethiopia, new wars are breaking out at different levels of administrative districts: the state, zone, and warada. Although the new constitution declared the liberty of the nations, nationali­ties, and peoples, it has ignited a storm of exclusive identity politics.

5.2. Subsistence as a basis for political activities Since federalism was introduced, identity politics have risen in southern Ethiopia. The residential pattern of the Gabra Miigo has also changed, reflecting the influence of identity politics. Before 1963, the Gabra Miigo lived together with the Baran Oromo and Garre Somali. However, the more the clans or ethnic groups indulge in identity politics and become exclusive, the more difficult it is for the Gabra Miigo to live together with other ethnic groups. Now, the Gabra Miigo only live in the border area between other ethnic groups. Identity politics has deprived the Gabra Miigo of a living place.

The Gabra Miigo seem to have secured a living place under the framework of the new constitution. They have also been involved in identity politics in their efforts to obtain administrative posts at the warada or kabale level. The Gabra Miigo have lived on the border between the Guji Oromo and the Boran Oromo since 1991, but their desire for their own administrative role is seen as a threat to the Guji Oromo's plan to redraw the border of their zone. In 2006, the Guji Oromo fiercely attacked the Gabra Miigo and Baran Oromo, who also wished to redraw their zone border.

The Gabra Miigo escaped again, utilizing their subsistence strategies of dividing and moving their families. The youngsters and livestock stayed behind, and the elders and children moved to the Ethiopian-Kenyan border town of Moyale. Those who migrated to Moyale became internally dis­placed persons, building cardboard houses on the outskirts of the town. They survived the new war by utilizing their subsistence strategies. When I talked with the Gabra Miigo, I often felt their confi­dence that they would overcome the hard refugee times again. In general, it is difficult to be a refugee, but the Gabra Miigo are not afraid of becoming refugees. Moreover, they seem to assume that they will become refugees if they fail in identity politics. Their preparation for possible risks in becoming refugees gives the Gabra Miigo more options for claiming their rights, and their subsistence strategies have now become a basis for political activities.

It is not only pastoralists such as the Gabra Miigo who utilize subsistence strategies as a base for political activities. The Majangir, a minority forest people of southwestern Ethiopia, also utilize a subsistence strategy as a basis for political activities. In the place where the Majangir live, the rival ethnic group, the Shekacho, occupy the administrative posts. The Majangir complained of this political situation, provoking violent conflicts with the Shekacho. The Shekacho enlisted the armed constabulary of the state government, counter-attacked the Majangir and set their villages on fire in 2002. The Majangir escaped into the deep forest, where the Shekacho and armed constabulary could not pursue them. The subsistence strategy of the forest people enabled the Majangir to escape (Sato 2005).

Hence, a subsistence strategy provides a secure option for dealing with the new wars. Such strate­gies allow people to concentrate on identity politics without having anxieties about their future. We conclude that the importance of subsistence strategies is increasing as a basis for survival in the dif­ficult modern political context.

26 Nilo-Ethiopian Studies

NOTES

(1) The Boran, Guji, and Garre used to be regarded as ethnic groups, whereas they are now regarded as just a clan of a larger ethnic group. The Boran and Guji are clans of the Oromo, and the Garre are a clan of the Somalis. The ethnic consciousness ofboth the Oromo and Somali has risen since the 1960s in Ethiopia.

(2) These categories rank ethnic groups according to group size {Kurimoto 2001). This paper considers a 'nation' or a 'nationality' as a major ethnic group who could have their own regional state. The Amhara and Oromo are regarded as 'nations,' whereas the Tigray, Mar, Somali, etc. are regarded as 'nationalities' in the Ethiopian context.

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TORU SOGA: Faculty of Humanities, Hirosaki University, 1 Bunkyo-cho, Hirosaki, Aomori, 036-8560,]apan.