cial that Christians in the West take the first important step of ac­cepting Chinese selfhood and independence and what that acceptance means for historical understanding.

The recognition of the historical relatedness of the rmssionary movement to western economic, political and military penetration into China is all-important to any understanding of what Chinese Christians have strived to do and be, and to any consideration as re­gards future relations with Chinese Christians."

Religious Freedom, Chinese Identity and National Security

In 1950 the Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement became for all intents and purposes the national structure of the Protestant churches in China. Y. T. Wu, its chairman, came out of the Chi­nese Y.M.C.A. tradition of the mid-1920s with strong emphasis on world peace and social justice. We have seen that the main thrust of the Three-Self Movement in the Communist period was anti ­imperialism and Chinese selfhood. Besides participation in the po-

Announcing

The American Society of Missiology will hold its 1981 annual meeting at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, Texas, June 19-21. The theme for the meeting will be "Problems of Church and State: The Churches' Common Wit­ness." The Association of Professors of Missions will meet June 18-19 in conjunction with the ASM. For 1981 the ASM president is Dr. Charles Forman of Yale Divinity School, and Robert Schreiter, Dean of Catholic Theological Union in Chi­cago, is the APM president. Further information may be ob­tained from Wilbert R. Shenk, Secretary of the ASM, Box 1092, Elkhart, Indiana 46515.

litical arena made available by the Three-Self Movement, Chinese Christians met in regular formal worship in churches and also in private informal gatherings in "house churches."

When the Cultural Revolution came in 1966 public worship in churches went out of existence. It is uncertain to what extent pri ­vate worship was kept. It was not until after the mid-1970s that news was received about Christians gathering in small groups for worship, study and fellowship.

The Three-Self Movement itself went out of existence in the Cultural Revolution period. Even the CPPCC, the united front body which cooperated with the government, was dissolved, and it was not revived until after the downfall of the "gang of four" in the Spring of 1978. A year later (1979), committees of the Three­Self Movement were reconstituted in several major cities such as Shanghai, Canton, Hangchow and Tientsin. They had the imme­diate task of opening up for worship churches that were closed during the Cultural Revolution. On September 2, 1979, the former Moore Memorial Methodist Church in Shanghai was re-opened after being closed for 13 years. Two other churches, the Ching­hsin and Ho-pei, were re-opened very shortly. In Canton the Dongshan Church was re-opened for public worship on Septem­ber 30, 1979 with ministers on its staff who were formerly Baptist, Methodist, Church of Christ in China and Seventh-Day Adven­

tist. Attendance at each of these services ranged from the hundreds to over a thousand people of all ages. There is apparent vitality in both public and private Christian worship in China today.6

Similar reappearance of religious groups and their activities can be seen in the re-opening of Roman Catholic churches, Bud­dhist temples, Muslim mosques, and other places of worship. At a national conference on research on religion held in Kunming in February, 1979, it was announced that Muslim scholars are en­gaged in translating the Koran into Chinese for publication and. Christian scholars are to bring out anew, improved version of the Bible in Chinese. Also research is being undertaken in the history of Buddhism, Islam and Christianity in China. (Beijing Review, Sep­tember 14, 1979.)

What might be some of the significance of this new surge of religious activities in China today? Many outside observers see the reappearance of religion as part of the new policy of the Chinese government to be more open towards the West for the much­needed technology in China's four modernizations. In this paper we will mention three points for consideration:

1. Communism in China does not oppose religion as such.

The government says that the policy of religious freedom has al­ways been characteristic of Communism in China, and that anti- . religion was an exaggerated policy only of the ultra-leftists, rep­resented by the "gang of four." The Chinese Constitution of 1954, Article No. 46, originally guaranteed religious freedom to the peo­ple. Under the ultra-leftists, that article was changed so that the 1975 Constitution includes the freedom of not believing in religion and the right to propagate atheism. Therefore, a united front of re­ligious people in the CPPCC at the last National People's Congress (June, 1979) asked that the original version of the article on reli­gious freedom in the 1953 Constitution be restored so that the freedom to propagate, as well as to believe, is implied. Further­more, the Congress passed two criminal codes which will strength­en religious freedom in China: No. 147 which makes it a criminal offense, subject to up to two years imprisonment, for local cadres to interfere with the religious freedom of people. Another article, No. 165, prohibits the use of religion and sorcery to exploit people.

2. Religion is part of being human.

Though Communism has no place for religion in its scheme of things, Mao Zedong himself never strongly opposed religion. Be firmly believed that religion will simply become obsolete when so­cialism is established in China and that the people will voluntarily abandon religion. After 30 years of Communist rule, however, the religious dimension of life in China is not only not dead, but ap­parently is very vital. The recent opening of churches, mosques, temples and other places of worship attended by massive crowds of people seems to testify to the fact that part of being human is to be religious. The Communists themselves have officially ad­mitted that "real life is much more complicated than the defined concepts,"? thus leaving the door wide open for the dimension of unpredictability, surprise and mystery in life. This "religious" di­mension has wide implications for all the people in China, not just the small percentage of those who participate in religious activi­ties. We need to remind ourselves that religion in its institution­alized form did not have much status even in traditional Chinese society.

In the late 19th century when China was seeking to strength­en itself through defense and modernization, it looked to the West for science and technology as "utility" (}lung) but wanted to keep its Confucian ethic as the "substance" (ti) of Chinese selfhood."

62 International Bulletin