Rem Case Draft

8/13/2019 Rem Case Draft

1/26

DIMACUHA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 143705

February 23, 2007

GARCIA, J.:

FACTS:

An honest-to-goodness entrapment operation which has repeatedly been

accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law was

conducted on August 10, 1995 against Dimacuha by the team composed of SPO2

Melanio Valeroso, SPO2 Vicente Ostan, Bello Borgueta, Jose Castelo, Jr. and Felipe

Evangelista. SPO2 Valeroso and SPO2 Ostan positively testified that from a distance of

more or less 5 to 7 meters, they saw petitioner took out from her brown shoulder bag

one (1) small plastic sachet, suspected to be "shabu," and handed the same to their

police informant, Benito Marcelo. Immediately thereafter, the two police officers

approached the petitioner, the latter's lady companion and Marcelo. SPO2 Valeroso

confiscated the said small plastic sachet, containing a white crystalline substance from

Marcelo. A subsequent search on the petitioner's shoulder bag yielded another small

plastic sachet, also suspected to contain shabu, which was inserted inside the cover of

petitioner's checkbook. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance

contained in the small plastic sachets was found positive of methamphetamine

hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug.

The petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15

grams and in actual possession of another 10.78 grams of methamphetamine

hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of an entrapment operation conducted by the police on

the basis of information received from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's illegal drug

trade.

From a distance of more or less 5 to 7 meters, the police officers saw the

petitioner took out from her brown shoulder bag one (1) small plastic sachet, suspected

to be "shabu," and handed the same to their police informant, Benito Marcelo.

Immediately thereafter, the two police officers approached the petitioner, the latter's lady

companion and Marcelo. SPO2 Valeroso confiscated the said small plastic sachet,

containing a white crystalline substance from Marcelo.

A subsequent search on the petitioner's shoulder bag yielded another small

plastic sachet, also suspected to contain shabu, which was inserted inside the cover of

petitioner's checkbook. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance

contained in the small plastic sachets was found positive of methamphetaminehydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug. Then, they were brought to

the headquarters.

ISSUE:


2/26

Whether the warrantless arrest of petitioner was justified under Section 5, Rule

113 of the Rules of Court

HELD:

We pointed out that the interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is

not absolute and that warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed

permissible by jurisprudence in the following instances: (1) search of moving vehicles;

(2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5)

stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The

last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally warrantless

arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid

warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)

arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped

prisoners.

Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was lawful and the subsequent seizure of a bag of

shabu inserted inside the cover of her checkbook was justified and legal in light of the

prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any

property found upon his person in order to find and seize things connected with the

crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore, admissible in evidence, being the fruit of

the crime.


3/26


4/26


5/26

TRINIDAD vs ANG

G.R. No. 192898

January 31, 2011

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a

Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa

Bilang 22 against the petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the

Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging this Resolution.

On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the Municipal Trial Court

in Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City, an Information for Violation of

Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. As the case was covered by the

Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their counter

affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the said order.

The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings

and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest praying, among others, for the

deferment of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before

the DOJ.

The MTCC, in its Order

dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion, "subject x x x to

paragraph c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure." On

August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered this order, and set the petitioners arraignment

on September 10, 2009.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. The RTC, in its

decision of January 6, 2010, denied this petition. The petitioners moved to reconsider

this decision, but the RTC denied their motion in its orderdated July 5, 2010.

The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the

petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the

petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the cases cited by the petitioners were

decided before the amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the

amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied the 60-day

limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for review with the

DOJ.

The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari essentially

claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule. They

cited several cases to show that the arraignment of an accused should be deferred untilthe petition for review with the DOJ is resolved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment pending resolution

of petition for review in DOJ is mandatory.


6/26

HELD:

Yes. The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11,

Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the

arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which

effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to

plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental

examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the

Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of

suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition

with the reviewing office.

In Samson v. Daway,the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review

is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the

deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the

petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said

period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer

arraignment.

In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October

10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1

year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit

provided for by the Rules.

In addition, the cases cited by the petitionersSolar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.

How, Roberts, Jr. v. CA, and Dimatulac v. Villon were all decided prior to the

amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect

on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit

on the suspension of arraignment.


7/26

PEOPLE vs TRINIDAD

G.R. No. 79123-25

January 9, 1989

MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:

FACTS:

While at Buenavista, accused Emeliano TRINIDAD, a member of the Integrated

National Police, assigned at Nasipit Police Station, and residing at Baan, Butuan City,

asked for a ride to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which is on the way to Davao City.

TRINIDAD was in uniform and had two firearms, a carbine, and the other, a side-arm .38

caliber revolver. SORIANO, LAROA, TAN, and TRINIDAD then left Butuan on 20

January 1983 at about 5:20 P.M. bound for Davao City. TAN was driving the Fiera.

Seated to his right was SORIANO, LAROA and the accused TRINIDAD, in that order.

When they reached the stretch between El Rio and Afga, TRINIDAD advised them to

drive slowly because, according to him, the place was dangerous. All of a sudden, TAN

heard two gunshots. SORIANO and LAROA slumped dead. TAN did not actually see the

shooting of LAROA but he witnessed the shooting of SORIANO having been alerted by

the sound of the first gunfire. Both were hit on the head. TRINIDAD had used his carbine

in killing the two victims.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the adduced evidence is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.

HELD:

TRINIDAD's defense of alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over the

straightforward and detailed descriptive narration of TAN.

The other inconsistencies TRINIDAD makes much of, such as, that TAN was

unsure before the NAPOLCOM Hearing Officer whether TRINIDAD was wearing khaki

or fatigue uniform but, in open Court, he testified positively that TRINIDAD was in khaki

uniform; and that while TAN declared that TRINIDAD was wearing a cap, prosecution

witness Felimon Comendador said that he was not but was in complete fatigue uniform,

are actually trivial details that do not affect the positive identification of TRINIDAD that

TAN has made nor detract from the latter's overall credibility.

Nor is there basis for TRINIDAD to contend that the absence of gunpowder burns

on the deceased victims negates TAN's claim that they were shot "point-blank." Actually,

this term refers merely to the "aim directed straight toward a target" (Webster's Third

New International Dictionary) and has no reference to the distance between the gun and


8/26

the target. And in point of fact, it matters not how far the assailant was at the time he

shot the victims, the crucial factor being whether he did shoot the victim or not.

TAN's testimony remained unshaken even during cross- examination. No ill

motive has been attributed to him to prevaricate the truth. He was in the vehicle where

the killing transpired was a witness to the actual happening, and was a victim himself

who managed narrowly to escape death despite the weaponry with which TRINIDAD

was equipped.


9/26

CAMARA vs PAGAYATAN

GR No. 176563

April 2, 2007

CARPIO, J .:FACTS:

Petitioner Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division

of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) was detained under a warrant of arrest

respondent judge issued from a contempt citation against the former for LBPs failure to

deposit the preliminary compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided under the

trial courts order. LBP was directed to deposit the preliminary compensation, in cash and

bonds, in the total amount of P71,634,027.30 with the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from

receipt of this order, and to notify the Court of compliance within such period.

LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its head office in

cash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial courts clerk of court.

However the respondent judge found LBPs compliance insufficient and ordered LBP to

place the deposit in the name of Josefina Lubrica as payee, in the form that is readily

withdrawable.

Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies

with such order. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction when he refused to release Camara

from detention despite LBPs compliance.

HELD:

Yes. Under section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus

does not lie if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in

custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or

judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. Petitioner does not question the trial courts

jurisdiction to issue the Order citing petitioner in contempt. What petitioner assails is

respondent judges refusal to release Camara from detention despite LBPs compliance

of the full amount of the preliminary compensation.

This is grave abuse of respondent judges contempt powers, amounting to lack or

excess of his jurisdiction.


10/26

LEJANO vs PEOPLE

G.R. No. 176389 /G.R. No. 176864

December 14, 2010

ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen

years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City.

Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of

whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually

ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a

mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of

what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced

that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its

informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert

Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A.

Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and

Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an

accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the

public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.

The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge

Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey

Filart remained at large.

The trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged. On

appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut

Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

HELD:

Not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. A positive declarationfrom a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically

cancel out the accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive

an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly

and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.


11/26

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two

criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible

witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past

experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable,

not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs

into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Here, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory

evidencethat (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the

crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

He presented documentary and testimonial proof that he was in the United

States of America from March 1991 to October 1992 such as travel preparations,

immigration checks, details of US sojourn and etc.

Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable,

testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as

sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.

Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with

respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian,

Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the

U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together. Webbs

participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the others

must necessarily fall.


12/26

PEOPLE vs VILLARICO

G.R. No. 158362

April 4, 2011

BERSAMIN, J:

FACTS:

Haide was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of his familys residence in

Bolinsong, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. At that time, Haides sister-in-law Remedios

Cagatan was attending to her child who was answering the call of nature near the toilet.

From where she was, Remedios saw all the accused as they stood at the rear of the

kitchen aiming their firearms at the door Ricky Villarico was at the left side, and

Gilberto, Jr. stood behind him, while Gilberto, Sr. was at the right side, with Ramentos

behind him.

When Gilberto, Jr. noticed Remedios, he pointed his gun at her, prompting

Remedios to drop to the ground and to shout to Lolita Cagatan, her mother-in-law. At

that instant, Remedios heard three gunshots.

Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots just as he was

coming out of the toilet. Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She

recalled that Haide then came towards her from the kitchen, asking for help and saying:

Tabang kay gipusil ko ni Berting (I was shot by Berting). At that, she and Remedios

brought the wounded Haide to Clinica Ozarraga, where he was treated for gunshot

wounds on his left scapular region (back of left shoulder) and right elbow. He

succumbed shortly thereafter due to hypovolemic shock or massive loss of blood.

However, some of the facts were proved corroborated by the Defense with the

help of Peter Ponggos, who narrated that he had been on board a motorcycle (habal-

habal) when Lolita and Remedios asked for his help; and that he then aided Lolita and

Remedios in bringing Haide to the hospital. According to Peter, he asked Haide who had

shot him, but Haide replied that there had been only one assailant whom he did not

recognize.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an identification, to be positive, have to be made by a witness who

actually saw the assailants?

HELD:

The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco about seeing the four

accused standing near the door to the kitchen immediately before and after the shooting

of Haide inside the kitchen were categorical enough, and warranted no other logical

inference than that the four accused were the persons who had just shot Haide. Indeed,

neither Remedios nor Francisco needed to have actually seen who of the accused had


13/26

fired at Haide, for it was enough that they testified that the four armed accused: (a) had

strategically positioned themselves by the kitchen door prior to the shooting of Haide; (b)

had still been in the same positions after the gunshots were fired; and (c) had

continuously aimed their firearms at the kitchen door even as they were leaving the

crime scene. The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the

group of Bertinguttered in the immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the

victim was a true part of the res gestae. The statement was admissible against the

accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of

Court, which provides:

Section 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling

occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect

to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.

So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and

giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that

of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types

of positive identification.

A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the

crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes

direct evidence.

There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have

actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively

identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the

latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before

and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive

identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together

with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and

reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the

exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly

positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever

be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that

there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a

proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the

commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its

conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowedto prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go

free and the community would be denied proper protection.

To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for

conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no

conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed,


14/26

trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome

the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.

The petition was affirmed. The accused shall pay the costs of suit.


15/26

CHUA vs GAW

G.R. No. 160855

April 16, 2008

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business

enterprisesnamely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood

Industries. The couple had seven children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua;

Suy Ben Chua; Chua Suy Phen; Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. On

June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children as his

only surviving heirs. At the time of Chua Chins death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber

was P415,487.20.

On December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial

Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir(Deed of Partition,

for brevity), wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: one-

half (1/2) thereof will pertain to the surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the

conjugal partnership; and the other half, equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided

among Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro indiviso shares equivalent

to P25,967.00 each.

In said document, Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to

voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-

heir, Chua Sioc Huan.

In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw,

asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use for the

construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be

payable within six (6) months without interest. Suy Ben Chua issued a check in the

amount of P200,000 to the couple. However, the latter failed to pay the amount within

the designated period. Suy Ben Chua sent them a demand letter, requesting to settle

their obligation with the warning that he will take the appropriate legal action if they fail to

do so. Failing to heed his demand, Suy Ben filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against

the spouses Gaw with the Regional Trial Court.

During trial, the spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness

under Section 10, Rule 132. On direct examination, respondent testified that Hagonoy

Lumber was the conjugal property of his parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were

both Chinese citizens. He narrated that, initially, his father leased the lots where

Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his fatherconstructed the two-storey concrete building standing thereon. According to respondent,

when he was in high school, it was his father who managed the business but he and his

other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc Huan, managed Hogonoy

Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters. He stated that he also managed

Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high school, but he stopped when he got married and


16/26

found another job. He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is

operating.

On cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a stockholder

of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other stockholders on January

1, 1991. He further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of

a Deed of Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner

of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of

Sale dated August 1, 1990.

On re-direct examination, respondent stated that he sold his shares of stock in

Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He also paid the

purchase price of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which payment was not

covered by a separate receipt as he merely delivered the same to Chua Sioc Huan at

her house in Paso de Blas, Valenzuela. Although he maintains several accounts at

Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he paid to Chua Sioc

Huan was not taken from any of them. He kept the amount in the house because he was

engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the public market.

Prior to the RTC decision Antonio died due to cardio vascular and respiratory

failure. Thereafter RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua declaring that the latter is entitled

to the payment of the amount of P200,000 with interest. Concepcion appealed to the

Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA

denied Concepcions motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Concepcion contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs

treatment of the Suy Ben Chuas testimony as adverse witness during cross -examination

by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Concepcion argues that the adverse

witness testimony elicited during cross-examination should not be considered as

evidence of the calling party.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the adverse witness testimony elicited during cross-examination

should be considered as evidence of the calling party.

HELD:

A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the

latters testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other

evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. A rule thatprovides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony

does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that

the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching

him. This, the petitioner failed to do.


17/26

In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the

respondents testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The

petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer

of the property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary. On cross-examination, she

confessed that no other document was executed to indicate that the transfer of the

business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that, after

their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber,

and it was only in her counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a

claim over the business.

Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the

entire evidence presented.All the parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound

by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. As already

mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be

considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more

vital consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one

party, but whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight by the court. The

testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper

weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the

witness or contradict his testimony.


18/26

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs ATIENZA

G.R. No. 156052

February 13, 2008

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S.

Tumbokon, in an original petition formandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila,

to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted by the Sangguniang

Panlungsodof Manila on November 20, 2001, approved by respondent Mayor on

November 28, 2001, and became effective on December 28, 2001 after publication.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to

commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the

reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months

from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area

are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies.

On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)

entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They

agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and

practicable option." The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No.

97.In the same resolution, theSangguniandeclared that the MOU was effective only for

a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,

the Sanggunianadopted Resolution No. 13extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to

April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to

the oil companies.

This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of

our March 7, 2007 decision. We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the

Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the

governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. We also held that we need not

resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies

and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sangguniancould amend or repeal

Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on

the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. We

concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing

Ordinance No. 8027.

Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, alsoknown as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.

This was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006.

According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the area

covering the Pandacan Terminals to "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-


19/26

3/MXD)"whereas Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the same area from Industrial II to

Commercial I.

The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No.

8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron

assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in their joint

motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that "the issue ...has been

rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]. They

contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not judicial admission is applicable against the respondent.

HELD:

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take

a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not

applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil case

nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not "the same" as this case before us.To

constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it

is offered.

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a

party in the course of the proceedingsin the same case, does not require proof.

The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through

palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did

not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should

be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119

superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119s) validity.


20/26

REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 152375

December 16, 2011

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as

Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos,

Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio

(collectively,therespondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and

damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the

respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and

Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which

shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and,

through their holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents

Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.

In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-

controlled board of directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders

convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors was

elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.

Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with

prayer for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan

(docketed as Civil Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9,

1991 Orders of the PCGG.

These Orders directed Africa: to account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and

to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on the sequestered shares in the

special stockholders meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing himself

as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or

indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.

During the pendency of Africas petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a

motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had

been "illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI,"especially in the election of

the members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the

"calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourts

control and supervision and prescribed guidelines."In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africas motion.

The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court and it enjoined the

Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution.


21/26

In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the

consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the

latter as the main case and the former merely an incident.

During the pendency of PCGGs petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with

this Court a "Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for

[the] Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPIs] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In

our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for

reception of evidence and immediate resolution. The Sandiganbayan included the

Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130. In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition,

the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was

takenat the petitioners instance and after serving notice of the deposition -taking on the

respondents on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination

(Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in

London, England.

Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the

petitioner to depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the

defendants have filed their answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition

is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit x x x so as to prove

the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish the prima faciefactual

foundation for sequestration of [ETPIs] Class A stock in support of the [Urgent Petition]."

The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in evidence in

the main case of Civil Case No. 0009."On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa

was present and he cross-examined Bane.

Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners Motion to Admit the Bane deposition, the

Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice and Motion to Admit Supplemental

Offer of Evidence regarding the aforesaid deposition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deposition is admissible in court.

HELD:

The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with

the usual requisites of admissibility

In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in threedifferent senses:

(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which

case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This

is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)


22/26

(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity,

and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is

illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same

parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint.

(actual consolidation)

(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its

separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of

consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties

to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)

Considering that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one

another and the fact that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No.

0009 (an action for reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties

to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder involving a

corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended

an actual consolidationand, together with the parties affected,acted towards that end -

where the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one another and where the

evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated in another action must find

support in the proceedings held below. This is particularly true in a case with the

magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the

respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear support in the

provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence, and even in the proceedings before the

Sandiganbayan itself and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an

outright deprivation of the petitioners right to due process. We reach this conclusion

especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in

one of the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another

jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on

evidence.

Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original,

albeit incidental, case, the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being

measured against the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court the

rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding.

The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice

The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been

previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayanshould have taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act

on without proof because these facts are already known to them. Put differently, it is the

assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support.

The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing


23/26

evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona

fidedisputed.

The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law

maxim, manifesta(or notoria) non indigent probatione. The taking of judicial notice

means that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of evidence.

In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would not be

disputed.

The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on

Evidence. Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the

official acts of the x x x judicial departments of the Philippines," or gives the court the

discretion to take judicial notice of matters "ought to be known to judges because of their

judicial functions."On the other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial

notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of

taking judicial notice of the matter involved.In the present case, after the petitioner filed

its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard

through their corresponding oppositions.

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial

notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been

tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have

been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule though admits of

exceptions.

As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court mayproperly treat all or any

part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case

pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, andabsent an objection from, the

adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some

other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the

former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's

direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the

record of the case then pending.

Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases,

where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal

of the latter case.

The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory

taking of judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of

judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of

judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in

any of the "children" casesCivil Case 0130as evidence in the "parent" case CivilCase 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases." To the petitioner, the supposed

relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice.

We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases the petitioner cited are

inapplicable either because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an


24/26


25/26


26/26

overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might

affect the result of the case

The conclusions reached by the trial court on the credibility of the

contending witnesses are not to be disturbed. This is not only because of

the peculiar competence of the trial court to observe first-hand the

witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and deportment as they

confronted each other during the trial, but also because its conclusions

are justified upon a judicious review of the evidence. As the records

stand, there appears nothing of substantial importance that could justify a

reversal.

The appellants have not shown that the trial court overlooked important facts

which may change the result of the case. Indeed, the arguments in the brief of the

appellants are concentrated on the alleged error of the trial court in giving credence to

the testimony of the eye-witness, Reynaldo Rojas.

It is to be noted that the trial court did not rely exclusively on the sole testimony of

Reynaldo Rojas. The trial court considered established circumstantial evidence which

supported the testimony of the eye-witness, Reynaldo Rojas.

Documents

Rem Case Draft