PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., et al. v. HONORABLE VICENTE Q. ROXAS, et al. 513 SCRA 457 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The failure to report to the court the fact that a similar action had been filed or is already pending before the other courts, regardless of who initiated such similar action amounts to forum-shopping.

Respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a contract with Westinghouse Electric S.A. (WESA), an affiliate or subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WESTINGHOUSE), whereby WESA undertook to construct in favor of the NPC a 620-megawatt nuclear power plant at Morong, Bataan. WESA subsequently executed a deed of assignment transferring all its rights and responsibilities in the contract to its construction arm-agent, respondent Westinghouse International Projects Company (WIPCO).

Pres. Corazon Aquino issued an executive order transferring ownership of the already constructed power plant, together with its equipment, materials and facilities, records and uranium fuel to the National Government or its duly constituted agency. After series of talks, the government panel and Westinghouse eventually agreed on a settlement involving a package of more than 100 million dollars. Petitioners Public Interest Inc., et al., (PICI), as tax payers, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for declaration of nullity the contract with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that PICI were engaged in forum-shopping, their counsel Atty. Reyes having previously filed cases with causes of action identical thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PICI are engaged in forum-shopping and thus can affect the dismissal of their complaint

HELD:

In this case, the court said that granted the PICI were initially unaware of the existence of the first set of cases, albeit their counsel was one of the petitioners therein; such fact was already brought to their attention during a hearing. They failed to report the pendency of the petition for mandamus before the appellate court bearing on the dismissal by the Manila RTC. Thus, the dismissal of PICI‘s complaint is in order.

PICI violated the requirement to report to the courts the fact that a similar action had been filed or is already pending before the courts, regardless of who initiated suchsimilar action. As stated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court for Certification against forum-shopping: The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification: c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided upon motion and after hearing.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORENZO AND FELICIANA MATEO 436 SCRA 502 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost or is no longer available, on this score alone, the Mateos‟ petition for reconstitution fails.

Respondent spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed a petition for the Reconstitution of the

Original Copy as well as the Owner‘s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38769 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Bataan on 16 July 1971 in the name of Jose Tan. The property under the said title was purchased by the spouses Mateo from Jose Tan, however, the original copy of the said TCT was deemed lost and cannot be located in the Registry of Deeds.

The RTC of Balanga denied the petition and the Motion for Reconsideration while the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and granted the same. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari lodged by the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in giving evidentiary weight to the certified photocopy of the title as basis for the reconstitution of the original and owner‘s copy of the title

HELD:

As correctly noted by the RTC ―there is no showing how the parcels of land in question were transferred to Jose Tan‖. The said order and decree, therefore, establish only the prior existence of OCTNo. N-205 but not that of TCT No. T-38769 in the name of Jose Tan. The CA‘s reliance on the certified photocopy of Judge Tizon‘s decision awarding to Donato Echivarria from whose OCT the TCT subject of reconstitution was transferred does not lie for, in the first place, ―there is no showing how the

parcels of land were transferred to Jose Tan,‖ the spouses Mateo‘s predecessor-in-interest.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, ―AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED,‖ which has been quoted by the trial court in its decision, enumerates the sources-documents-bases of a reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title. To repeat, they are, in the following order:

1. the owner‘s duplicate of the title

2. the co-owner‘s mortgagee‘s, or lessee‘s duplicate of the title 3. a certified copy of the title previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal

custodian4. an authenticated copy of the decree of registration or

patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the OCT was issued 5. a document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the

property . . . is . . . encumbered or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed title.

Since, except for the last above-enumerated document, the Mateos have failed to present any of the other documents, the rule on secondary evidence under Sec. 5 of Rule 130 applies. Section 5 of the rule provides that ―when the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on its part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated‖.

As the immediately quoted provision of the Rules directs, the order of presentation of secondary evidence is: existence, execution, loss, contents. The order may, however, be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.

Assuming that the existence and execution of the original of the TCT has been satisfactorily shown and that it was taken in 1973 by the Department of Justice and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in connection with the investigation of the judge on whose order the OCT from which the TCT was transferred, which OCT was also taken by said government agencies, there is no satisfactory showing that the TCT has been lost.

In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost or is no longer available. On this score alone, the Mateos‘ petition for reconstitution fails.

In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT was lost or is no longer available, not only is the photocopy of the alleged owner‘s duplicate copy thereof – Exh. ―1‖ partly illegible. When, where and under what circumstances the photocopy was taken and where it was kept to spare it from being also ―lost‖ were not even shown. These, not to mention the conduct by the Department of Justice and NBI of an investigation behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT cautioned and led the Court to rule against the sufficiency of the Mateos‘ evidence and propriety of a grant of their petition for reconstitution.

ZENAIDA GONZALES SERZO v. ATTY. ROMEO M. FLORES

435 SCRA 412 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

A notary public is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public.

Petitioner Zenaida Gonzales Serzo filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores arising from his notarization of Deed of Absolute Sale covering a parcel of land owned by Serzo‘s deceased father Neybardo Gonzales. In the Deed of Absolute Sale, the deceased Gonzales purportedly sold the land to Yolanda dela Cruz, whose signature, as well as that of Gonzales, appears thereon. Further, Amelia Gonzales Laureno, Serzo‘s sister, signed in the document on behalf of their mother, giving marital consent.

Atty. Flores does not deny having notarized the document but he alleged that the parties to the document, especially dela Cruz who is known or familiar to the staff of Atty. Flores‘ office had previous records of executed instruments and documents relating to the land subject of the complaint. The person of the Gonzales may have not been disclosed to him but instead, confused him with another person purporting to be Gonzales, thus, faking the latter‘s presence and allowing the entry of said date. Flores also alleged that he could no longer recall the names and the parties to the Deed of Absolute Sale for they are not familiar to him and considering that the document was notarized almost two (2) years ago.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), found Flores guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as notary public ―by failing to establish the identity of the person appearing before him‖.ISSUE:

Whether or Not Flores should be found guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as notary publicHELD:

The Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken.Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested

with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.

Having, by his act, undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

More particularly Rule 1.01 thereof which enjoins a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, respondent must indeed be faulted.

LAURENCE M. SISON v. EUSEBIA CARIAGA594 SCRA 661 (2009), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The nature of the action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the Answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.

Laurence Sison (Laurence) and his siblings were the donee of a parcel of land

donated by Teofilo and Nelson Sison. They later found out that the house of Eusebia Cariaga (Cariaga) was built in a portion of the land donated to Laurence and his siblings. Laurence repeatedly demanded Cariaga to vacate the property but the same was kept unheeded.

Laurence thereafter filed a complaint to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for unlawful detainer against Cariaga. Cariaga claimed that the land where her and her siblings‘ house stands is covered by Torrens Title in the name of her deceased father Juan Cariaga who possesses the land since 1940. The MCTC ruled in favor of Laurence. The Regional Trial Court, however, reversed the decision of the MCTC and ruled that the Laurence failed to substantiate his allegation that Cariaga‘s occupation was merely tolerated.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. It ruled that unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy because what is involved is possession de jure since both parties claim ownership on the subject lot. It further held that what was involved was a boundary dispute and not a simple case of who has the better right of possession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not unlawful detainer is the proper remedy to be sought

HELD:

The nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction over it are determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. They cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the Answer or pleadings filed by the defendant, and neither can they be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties.

Laurence‘s complaint established the basic elements of a complaint for unlawful detainer to vest jurisdiction over it in the MCTC. That Cariaga has, in her Answer, claimed that her father owned the lot on which her house stands did not render the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissible, for the issue of ownership may, in an ejectment case, be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC., v. SPOUSES GEORGE M. DAI and DIVINA DAI, 539 SCRA 9 (2007), 2ND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Plaintiff cannot evade the application of res judicata by varying the form of its action since the causes of action in the first case and in the present suit are clearly identical.

Spouses George and Divina Dai, (Spouses Dai) obtained a loan from PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (PCI) for the sum of P3,352,892 payable in monthly

installments of P152,265 for the financing of a vessel-fishing boat. To secure the payment of the loan, Spouses Dai executed a chattel mortgage over the vessel in favor of PCI Leasing.

Both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage provided that, in case of failure to pay the installments or interest due thereon, the entire amount remaining unpaid shall immediately become due and payable. Spouses Dai failed to pay the second and third installments. This prompted PCI a

complaint of replevin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In their Answer, Spouses Dai claimed that, the possession of the vessel including its registration certificate had beensurrendered to PCI before the filing of the complaint. Spouses Dai thus prayed for the award of damages and attorney‘s fees by way of Counterclaim.

The RTC of Cebu resolved both issues but did not award any damages for both parties. No appeal was filed by either parties making the decision final and executory. After more than a year, PCI filed another complaint for deficiency judgement and/or collection of sum of money before the Cebu RTC. In its complaint PCI alleged that there is still a deficiency of P961,000.00 as of January of 1995 and prayed for other damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PCI LEASING INC. can still file a claim for deficiency of payment after a previous decision of the same facts and evidence has already been decided

HELD:

For res jusdicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.

Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam — in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein.

PCI after realizing the amount of P2,000,000.00 from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, could have prayed for a deficiency judgment in the same action as in fact it pursued its claim for attorney's fees and liquidated damages therein, which claim was however, dismissed by the trial court. PCI, however, did not press any demand for such deficiency judgment in said case and instead filed this present suit for deficiency judgment long after the trial court rendered judgment in the earlier case. It cannot, however, evade the application of res judicata by varying the form of its action herein since the causes of action in the first case and in the present suit are clearly identical.

HEIRS OF THE LATE FERNANDO S. FALCASANTOS, et al. v. SPOUSES FIDEL YEO TAN and SY SOC TIU,

et al.

541 SCRA 211 (2009), ______________, (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Court may dismiss a Petition for Certiorari if it failed to state that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.

Policarpio Falcasantos owned a parcel of land in Zamboanga City, which he transferred to Jose Falcasantos, one of his eight children. The land title was later on transferred to Spouses Fidel Yeo Tan and Sy Soc Tiu, et al. Falcasantos, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City a complaint for quieting of title and/or declaration of nullity of documents against respondent Spouses Tan and Tiu, et al.. It alleged that Jose, through fraud, deceit and/or undue influence caused their father Policarpio to sign a Deed of Sale, making it appear that Policarpio sold to him one-half of the property on account of which Jose was able to have even the entire area of the property titled in his name.

The RTC dismissed the complaint saying that the prescriptive period had already expired. The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Since there was no appeal, a Certificate of Finality of

Judgment was issued. Later on, the Heirs assailed the trial court‘s order via Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), contending that they were allegedly deprivation of due process by the trial court for not giving them the opportunity to present evidence "to prove the causes of action." The CA dismissed the complaint, holding that Certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail a final order of the trial court and, in any event, the petition for Certiorari was not only filed one day late, but was also defective in form and substance. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an appropriate remedy in the case at bar

HELD:

The trial court‘s order of dismissal of the Heirs‘ complaint attained finality on September 2, 2005 following their failure to appeal it, which is a final, not an interlocutory order, within 15 days from August 18, 2005 when their counsel received a copy thereof.

Even if procedural rules were to be relaxed by allowing the Heirs‘ availment before the appellate court of Certiorari, instead of appeal, to assail the dismissal of their complaint, not only was the petition for Certiorari filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. It glaringly failed to allege how the trial court

committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. It merely posited that in dismissing the complaint, the Heirs were deprived of the opportunity to present evidence

to "prove the causes of action." Such position does not lie, however, for the Heirs‘ complaint was dismissed precisely because after considering respondents‘ Motion to Dismiss and petitioners‘ 14-page "VEHEMENT OPPOSITION to the Motion to Dismiss" in which they proffered and exhaustively discussed the grounds for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.

While in their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court‘s decision the Heirs explained why the questioned dismissal by the trial court of their complaint was issued in grave abuse of discretion, the Court finds that just the same, the petition for Certiorari before the appellate court was doomed for it failed to allege that the trial court 1) acted without jurisdiction for not having the legal power to determine the case; 2) acted in excess of jurisdiction for, being clothed with the power to determine the case, it overstepped its authority as determined by law; and 3) committed grave abuse of discretion for acting in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

RAMON J. QUISUMBING v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al. 571 SCRA 7 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court as a party - plaintiff in an action.

The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan for recovery, conveyance and accounting of various properties and assets of Benjamin Romualdez, et. al. Among the properties subject of the complaint are those of the Philippine Journalist Inc. (PJI) including untitled parcels of land situated in Mabini, Batangas (Mabini lots). During the pendency of the case, then PCGG- appointed members of the PJI Board of Directors, executed a Contract of Sale and a Deed of Absolute Conveyance covering the Mabini lots in favor of petitioner Ramon Quisumbing. Said Deeds were in the nature of management contracts. The Sandiganbayan nullified said management contracts. Jaime Cura, then President of the PJI who was the signatory to the contracts, assailed via certiorari the Sandiganbayan Resolution. Sandiganbayan held that PJI is a sequestered corporation and all its properties and assets are considered as under custodia legis.

PCGG and PJI filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Quisumbing and the PCGG-appointed PJI members of the Board, for reconveyance of the Mabini lots. Quisumbing filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action on the part of the PCGG and the Republic. The Sandiganbayan denied Quisumbing's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that the Republic is the real party in interest

HELD:

Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that, ―a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, orthe party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest‖.

―Interest‖ within the meaning of the immediately-quoted Rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the Rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court as a party-plaintiff in an action; if he does, the suit is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Prescinding from these precepts, the Court holds that, contrary to Quisumbing's assertion, the Republic is a real party in interest in Civil Case No. 0172. Quisumbing's arguments that the Republic's failure to pray for the reconveyance to it of the Mabini lots reflects its not being a real party in interest, and that since PJI is already represented by the PCGG, it is superfluous for the Republic to be a co-plaintiff fail.

The purpose of going after the assets and properties of the deposed President et al. is to protect the interests of the Filipino people and the Government, on the premise that those assets and properties were illegally acquired with the use of public funds or government resources or by taking advantage of their power. Hence, in filing the action for reconveyance, the Republic, through the PCGG, is protecting its interests in the Mabini lots owned by PJI which, as earlier determined by the Court, is a sequestered corporation. As the Court cautioned in Meralco v. Sandiganbayan, the deterioration and disappearance of sequestered assets "cannot be allowed to happen, unless there is a final adjudication and disposition of the issue of whether they are ill-gotten or not, since they may result in damage or prejudice to the Republic."

CONRADO QUESADA et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS et al. 581 SCRA 362 (2009), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Dismissal of a notice of appeal for filing beyond the reglementary period is a lost of remedy of appeal and is not allowed to avail of the remedy of certiorari.

Epitacio Asuncion, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners Conrado Quesada, et al. was the owner of the subject lot. One-and-a-half (1 ½) hectares of the lot were leased to one Claro San Luis. The lot is separated from the land occupied by Querubin Derequito, predecessor-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Ildefonso Derequito. Querubin converted a portion of the Balabag River into a fish pond and occupied a portion of the lot leased to San Luis.

Querubin later filed a complaint for forcible entry against San Luis. The Court of First Instance (CFI) rendered a decision in favor of San Luis. The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court but the same was not implemented.

The contract of lease of San Luis expired in 1977. After Querubin died, the Heirs of Querubin succeeded in the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the questioned portion of the lot. San Luis, together with Quesada et al., filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint to revive the

judgment for forcible entry which was decided in favor of San Luis. The RTC ruled in favor of Quesada et al.

The heirs of Querubin filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied due course since it was filed beyond the reglemantary period. A writ of execution was thus issued. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of the heirs of Querubin and held that prescription had set in as 30 years had "already passed" from the time the decision in the forcible entry case became final and executory and that the said decision "may no longer be reviewed in the new action for its enforcement."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly gave due course to the heirs of Querubin‘s petition anent the earlier denial of said their Appeal

HELD:

One of the requirements for certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Heirs of Querubin had the remedy of appeal when the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Quesada et al. Heirs of Querubin did in fact file a Notice of Appeal, which was denied due course, however, because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Having lost the remedy of appeal, they should not have been allowed by the Court of Appeals to avail of the remedy of certiorari.

Respecting the issue of prescription, contrary to the heir‘s contention, the action to revive the judgment in the forcible entry case had not prescribed. The judgment sought to be revived was rendered on August 25, 1975 and the motion for reconsideration of the said judgment was denied on September 15, 1976. A writ of execution was in fact issued.

The writ of execution was not enforced, however, within five years or up to or on or about September 15, 1981. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 16681 the action for revival of judgment on August 26, 1985, was well within the 10-year prescriptive period. STRANGELY, the appellate court, in its challenged decision of May 31, 2006, appears to have reckoned the 10-year prescriptive period from the finality of the trial court‘s decision up to the promulgation of its (the appellate court‘s) decision on May 31, 2006, hence, its ruling that 30 years had already passed from the finality of the trial court‘s decision.

MANIGO K. RAMOS v. PURITA G. ALVENDIA, et al. 568 SCRA 239 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The dismissal of a complaint for failure to file pre-trial brief is discretionary on the part of the trial court.

Manigo filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas for the cancellation of the titles of Spouses Severino and reconveyance of the parcels of land. Manigo alleged that Hermilina Casalan deceived him, and colluded with Purita Alvendia, by making it appear that Manigo and his deceased brother Orlando donated to Purita the parcels of land. It was further

alleged that Purita transferred the titles to their names and then donated the same to Jose and Araceli Severino.

The RTC issued an Order declaring Manigo non-suited for failure of his counsel to appear and to file pre-trial brief. The trial court accordingly dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court ofAppeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the procedural rules in relation to the filing of Pre-Trial brief should be relaxed

HELD:

The dismissal of a complaint for failure to file pre-trial brief is discretionary on the part of the trial court. While Manigo's counsel's explanation behind his failure to file pre-trial brief may not be convincing, given, among other considerations, Manigo‘s presence when the case was called for pre-trial, the nature of the case, the subject involved - real properties and the eventual appearance in the court of Manigo's counsel whose claim that he was, on arrival initially barred from entering it and was even shouted upon by the trial judge has not been disputed, the dismissal of the case by the trial court had been too precipitate and was not commensurate with the level of non-compliance by Manigo's counsel with the order of the court.

The phrase "in the interest of substantial justice" is not, of course, a magic wand that would automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules. But exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application. Considering the circumstances attendant to the

present case, substantial justice can be best served if both parties are given the full opportunity to ventilate their respective claims in a full-blown trial.

PILAR Y. GOYENA v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO395 SCRA 117 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

When it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.

Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo filed a Petition for Letters of Guardianship over the person and property of her sister Julieta since she is not in a position to take care of herself anymore due to her old age, general weakness, and suffering from a mini-stroke thereby requiring the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in various enterprises.

Pilar Y. Goyena, Julieta‘s close friend for more than six decades, opposed the petition. She claims that Julieta is competent and sane enough to manage her person and property. The Regional TrialCourt (RTC) declared Julieta to be ―incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property‖ and Gustilo was appointed to be her guardian. The RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in finding Julieta to be incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself

HELD:

It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of law. The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it is question of fact.

In support of an affirmative answer, Goyena posits as follows:

1.The Court of Appeals‘ basis for its decision that there are no antagonistic interests between Julieta and

Amparo is contrary to the evidence on record,

2.The Court of Appeals‘ erred in holding that there is no showing that Amparo is hostile to the best interest of Julieta, and

3.Julieta Ledesma‘s appointed representatives are most suitable to be appointed as her guardian.

Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of Goyena‘s position require a review of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the petition at bar. The Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them superior credit.

That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by Goyena in her Reply. Goyena claims that the petition falls within the exceptions to the rule because the findings of the Court of Appeals are clearly belied by the evidence on record.

In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties. As the Court said in Feliciano v. Comahort: ―As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.‖

In the case at bar, Goyena has not shown that the lower courts committed any error. Goyena‘s assertion that Amparo‘s intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta‘s properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.