REPLICATING BEST STRATEGIES TO SURVIVE DURING A DISASTER, LESSONS

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REPLICATING BEST STRATEGIES TO SURVIVE DURING A DISASTER, LESSONS LEARNED FROM TWO MAJOR DISASTERS IN MEXICO.

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Copenhagen in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of Master of Disaster Management

in Institute of International Health, Immunology & Microbiology

Faculty of Health Sciences

By Ernesto Coss Flores

June 2010

Supervisor: Kurt Petersen, Professor Department of Fire Safety Engineering and Systems Safety

Lund University

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Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Kurt Petersen, Director of the Department of Fire Safety Engineering and Systems of Lund University, for assisting me during the research process of this thesis. My current research and this Master Thesis were made possible by a grant and support from CONACYT (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología) and Funed. I want to thank Engineer Enrique Chacón and his team from INITEC for providing me their assistance with fieldwork. I would also like to thank my new friends and colleagues from the Disaster Management courses for their support and for sharing their knowledge and experience throughout the year. I would like to thank Ralitza Parina for her support on the writing thesis process. Last but not least, I would like to thank my father Moisés for always coming up with solutions when I cannot find them and the rest of my family: my mother Alicia, my brother Pablo and my aunt Ofelia for their unconditional support.

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Table of Contents 1. ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................................... 4

2. I�TRODUCTIO� ............................................................................................................................... 5 2.1 Problem Definition ........................................................................................................................ 8

3. OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................................................... 10 3.1 General Objective........................................................................................................................ 10 3.2 Specific Objectives....................................................................................................................... 10

4. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................ 10

5. RESULTS........................................................................................................................................... 15

5.1 Effective strategies and survival needs identified from residents from Tlatelolco during the

earthquake in Mexico City 1985. ..................................................................................................... 16 5.2 Effective strategies and survival needs identified from the community Las Gaviotas Sur

during the flood in Villahermosa in 2007. ....................................................................................... 20

5.3 Framework to replicate effective strategies to meet survival needs during the response

phase in future disasters. .................................................................................................................. 25

6. DISCUSSIO� OF RESULTS........................................................................................................... 29 6.1. Discussion of results found in Tlatelolco, Mexico City, 1985 ................................................. 30 6.2. Discussion of results found in Las Gaviotas Sur , Tabasco, 2007 .......................................... 32 6.3. Discussion of The Final Framework for Replication of Effective Strategies ........................ 35

7. CO�CLUSIO� .................................................................................................................................. 39

8. REFERE�CES .................................................................................................................................. 40

9. APPE�DIX ........................................................................................................................................ 43 9.1 Questionnaire............................................................................................................................... 43 9.2 Interview Guides.......................................................................................................................... 47

9.3 Estimation of Percentages of people who experienced the scenarios included in tables I and

II. ......................................................................................................................................................... 49 9.4 Event Trees Earthquake ............................................................................................................. 54 9.5 Event Trees Flood........................................................................................................................ 60

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1. ABSTRACT

For decades Mexico has been battling with many different disasters. Earthquakes and floods are the

most common natural hazards in the country. Two major examples of these events can be found in

Mexico’s history in 1985 and 2007 with an earthquake and a flood respectively. Despite of the major

consequences, these events showed an impressive capacity of Mexican society to develop strategies to

meet urgent survival needs (e.g. water, food) during the immediate aftermath of the disaster. However,

there were many gaps in coordination between government, NGOs and society; for instance, some

tasks were duplicated by different stakeholders while others had to be carried out by the society itself.

The identification of the strategies used in the two different disasters and the replication of the most

successful ones in other communities is important because it will constitute a tool that allows

stakeholders to identify more clearly their own responsibilities. This in turn will increase the efficiency

of response strategies and actions.

The event tree methodology combined with a retroactive analysis of the problems faced in the two case

study disasters is used to create scenarios. The magnitude and relative impact of the strategies

developed by local communities and other stakeholders to solve the problems faced in each scenario

are compared in order to draw conclusions about similarities and differences in their perspectives.

Although there are limitations in using the event tree methodology, the analysis is nonetheless useful in

looking at the important problems faced during the emergency response and the strategies developed by

society to solve them.

The conclusion of this research will be a framework that explains how it is possible to replicate the

most effective strategies.

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2. I�TRODUCTIO�

Mexico has a long history of natural disasters. Among them, earthquakes figure prominently due to the

fact that the country sits atop five tectonic plates. (SSN, 2010) Floods have also proved to be a problem

for the country. During the winter, non tropical storms, cyclones and tropical storms can lead to heavy

rainfall in some parts of the country and may cause severe damage. (CENAPRED, 2010)

Two major catastrophes might help to illustrate these scenarios. In 1985, Mexico experienced one of

the major catastrophes in the country’s history. An earthquake with magnitude 8.1 struck Mexico City.

The event caused the deaths of more than 5,000 people and damaged the houses of 180,000 families.

Low and middle income families suffered the worst damage. (Kreimer, 1999) Besides, there were at

least 14,000 people injured and almost 2 million residents of the capital temporarily moved out of their

own homes. Many important public services like local phone communication, electrical installations

and health services were disrupted and some of them could not function normally. Reconstruction and

rehabilitation costs were estimated at US$ 5 billion. (Dynes et alt, 1990)

The second was in 2007 when Tabasco, which is a state in the south of Mexico crossed by two main

rivers Grijalva and Usumacinta, was subject to heavy rainfall which caused the break of the banks of

Grijalva River. As a result, there was massive and widespread flooding all over the state. The damage

was estimated in US$2.5 billion, 80% of the state was under water, 200,000 people were forced to

leave their houses and the homes of around half a million people were destroyed or damaged. Public

infrastructure was devastated, among which 40% of the school buildings, 21% of clinics and health

facilities and 60% of the roads were damaged. The economic loss was estimated at US$5 billion in the

commercial and agricultural sector and it was estimated that 160,000 hectares of crops were lost. A

large number of cattle and livestock was lost as well. (Gobierno del Estado de Tabasco, 2008)

Despite having different origins and natural consequences, both natural catastrophes had one thing in

common: the inadequate and slow response of the Federal government in the immediate aftermath.

(Oliver-Smith, 1999) (Villamil, 2007)

In 1985, within the first few hours after the disaster, the Federal government based its response on the

implementation of the national disaster plan DN-3. Army, marine and navy units were mobilized to the

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impacted sites. An unofficial report indicated that in the early stage about 4,100 soldiers along with 25

ambulances, 500 trucks and 600 motorcycles as well as other equipment were mobilized to rescue and

provide aid to almost 500 people who were trapped in debris and 5,000 people who were injured.

However, after the first assessment and discussions among high national government officials, it was

decided that the implementation of the DN-3 plan in the capital city was complex and faced limitations

and problems because it was not feasible to give full responsibility to the military to respond to the

disaster. The magnitude of the problems, the volume of needed resources and the complexity of

coordinating a massive organizational response in a vast metropolitan area could have led to severe

complications for civilian authority if that the military had assumed total control in the capital city. The

process of decision making to find the best way to respond to the initial phase of the disaster took two

days. The final solution consisted of the creation of two ad hoc coordinating committees. The first one,

the National Emergency Commission (CNE), was intended to coordinate the governmental response to

the earthquake in areas outside of Mexico City. The second one, a Metropolitan Emergency

Commission, was intended to coordinate operations within the federal district. This emergent

management led to a delayed response in the initial phase of the disaster as both committees lacked

disaster planning and prearranged strategies of authority for inter-organizational linkages. In addition,

setting up operations took each committee three days. This further limited the presence of the

government and its effectiveness in providing early response actions such as search and rescue, shelter,

coordination and the gathering of information to mobilize resources, and integration of these response

activities. (Dynes et al, 1990)

In 2007, the initial response after the disaster was based on communication messages from the

Government of Tabasco. The main aim was to encourage the population to leave their houses and move

to temporary shelters run by local authorities and civil protection agencies of the Government of

Tabasco. The response of the federal government consisted of the implementation of the national

disaster plan DN-3. Army and navy units were mobilized to the flooded zone. (Gobierno del Estado de

Tabasco, 2008) The Federal Government deployed 8,000 soldiers, 3,000 navy elements and over 2,000

policemen. The priority was given to search and rescue activities supplemented in some cases by boats

going to the flooded zones and helicopters searching for isolated persons. The navy provided three

MI8s and the police provided smaller helicopters which were performing between 4 and 5 missions a

day distributing supplies and performing sporadic rescue operations. In addition, international

assistance included help from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society

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which launched an emergency appeal for US$1.04 million to be used to provide food as well as relief

items (including hygiene kits, kitchen kits, mosquito nets, home cleaning kits, and other nonfood

items). (OCHA, 2007a)

National and local authorities faced several major problems in responding to the flood. First, even

though they provided support for people who were affected by the flood, the aid in some cases was

significantly delayed. This is evidenced by the fact that at least 20,000 people in Tabasco continued to

live in their flooded houses despite recommendations by the government and thousand were facing a

desperate situation due to a lack of food, water, and shelter. (OCHA, 2007b) In addition, some of the

problems faced during the first week of the disaster such as lack of planned strategies for gaining

access to some geographically inaccessible areas as well as misinformation led to prolonging the

desperation of the thousands affected by a week of tragedy, many of whom remained isolated in

communities surrounded by water. Another challenge the government faced was that people did not

want to leave their homes, even though they did not have adequate living and sanitation conditions,

because they feared having their belongings stolen. (OCHA, 2007a) All of these problems limited the

early response actions by the government as it was necessary to spend more time and resources on

search and rescue activities for two weeks. The delay of the rescue activities brought some other

difficulties such as estimating the number of items and the amount of aid that was required in the

shelters and flooded areas as it was very difficult to know how many people were evacuated or were

still trapped in the flooded areas. As a result, there were discrepancies in the estimates of the local

government and the federal government on how much aid is needed. This delayed their response even

further. (Gobierno del Estado de Tabasco, 2008)

It would be illustrative to look at the response of the people. In 1985, neighborhood groups started

taking an active role, exhibiting self-efficacy and leadership in order to meet urgent survival needs.

There was a collective assistance of others by many individual and group volunteers, especially from

the low-income class. This was a result of the massive convergence on disaster sites. The response was

decentralized and most of the activities were spontaneous and generated by needs such as search and

rescue, disposal of dead bodies, sheltering and feeding victims. (Dynes et alt, 1990) As a result of those

experiences, Mexican society developed a strong sense of solidarity and some gained disaster-specific

knowledge. One example of the latter is the Mexican Rescue Brigade “Moles”, a group with mole-like

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tunneling skills acquired as a result of the 1985 earthquake experience (Grupo Topos, 2009), who have

been involved in search and rescue more recently in the Haiti earthquake of 2010. (Caritas, 2010)

In 2007, neighborhood groups also started taking an active role. During the first days after the disaster,

the individual and organizational response showed volunteer group in search and rescue and emergency

sheltering activities. (Gobierno del Estado de Tabasco, 2008) Moreover, the population kept assuming

an active role during the next weeks, homes that were flooded were cleaned out and were lived in once

again. (Hands on Disaster Response, 2007)

These events in Mexican history are important examples of how cooperation by civil society can find

solutions, acquire valuable knowledge and use effective and improvised tools and strategies for

resolving unforeseen circumstances regardless of the prevailing socio-political context and the different

sets of socio-cultural values and beliefs. The identification of the successful practices could be seen as

a window opportunity for improve the response to disasters.

2.1 Problem Definition

Which of those emergent individual and collective efforts from both disasters could be identified as

successful strategies, in terms of reducing the magnitude of loss of lives and livelihoods, to meet urgent

needs and how can they be replicated in the future?

It is known that during the initial phase of the emergency there was a significant organizational and

volunteer response. Low income class communities performed a big number of informal, emergent and

spontaneous activities and tasks in order to provide help, aid and relief to the most affected. However,

the impact and the relevance of those tasks have not been quantified and remain to be described.

The purpose of this thesis is to identify the strategies used by two low income communities to meet the

urgent survival needs in Mexico City’s earthquake in 1985 and the Tabasco flood in 2007. Then, the

strategies that are identified will be analyzed and their magnitude will be quantified in order to

determine which were the most effective.

The final outcome of the study will be a framework which outlines the different ways to replicate the

individual and group patterns in the future. The reasons that this is important are:

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• Because those patterns will help to build resilience in communities.

• The government will have a framework about how the population will respond in a disaster.

• The study may be used as the basis for future emergency response guidelines.

• Knowing how the population will respond will allow the government to focus its resources and

efforts more effectively – i.e. in coordination of the response strategies already employed by

communities. This will decrease duplication of activities

• The government and other organizations can maximize and capitalize on the public

participation during the emergency response. They can also encourage creativity in the response

efforts of the population.

• The replication of effective strategies can then be promoted as part of preparedness for future

disasters.

• The strategies can be used to help to reduce the risk of disasters in the community studied as

well as in similar communities in Mexico.

• The capacity of communities confronted with any kind of disaster to respond may also be

improved.

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3. OBJECTIVES

3.1 General Objective

• To assess ways to replicate needs-based community coping strategies to meet urgent survival

needs for future disasters within the first two weeks of the emergency response in cases when

government assistance is insufficient.

3.2 Specific Objectives

• To determine the urgent survival needs of two low income communities in the first two weeks

after a disaster, specifically an earthquake in Mexico City and a flood in Tabasco.

• To identify coping strategies used by those two low-income Mexican civil communities in the

first two weeks after a disaster by analyzing the earthquake in Mexico City of 1985 and the

flood in Tabasco in 2007.

• To explain ways to replicate individual and group patterns during the emergency response to be

adapted for future generations in any kind of disaster.

4. METHODOLOGY

The methodology chosen for the first objective consisted of a retroactive analysis to predict the risks

and the problems faced in the two case study disasters. First, risk scenarios using the event tree

methodology was conducted. An event tree analysis is a method for illustrating the sequence of

outcomes which may arise after the occurrence of a selected initial event. An event tree starts from an

undesired initiator (in this study the hazard) and follows the possible outcomes through to a series of

final consequences. As each new event is considered, a new node is added on the tree. (Coppola, 2007)

The purpose of using this method was to address unplanned events that may occur during the first two

weeks as a consequence of a disaster triggered by an earthquake in Tlatelolco, Mexico City and a heavy

rainfall in Las Gaviotas Sur, Tabasco. The strategy to create the scenarios was based on six different

categories:

• Search and rescue and evacuation

• Water supply

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• Food aid

• Sanitation and hygiene promotion

• Shelter

• Security

These six categories corresponded to a different number of requirements to satisfy the basic needs of

society where relief and humanitarian assistance is mandatory, including natural disasters and armed

conflict. (Sphere Handbook, 2004) From all that may be needed during the emergency response, these

requirements were identified as the most relevant for this study. This was because they can easily be

carried out by society itself. As such, the probability that collective strategies to solve the problems or

correct the deviations from the planned scenarios would be developed is high. Society is likely to take

an active role and develop individual and collective strategies due to the absence of stakeholders (e.g.

the government or the army). Another reason for selecting these six categories was that these

requirements are less context-dependent than, for instance, coordination and communication.

Each different scenario was quantified in terms of the number of people affected. The estimate for the

earthquake was a rough approximation based on population density and supported by a literature

review of statistical reports, articles and reliable sources containing the statistical information required.

For the flood, the estimate was based on the statistical results obtained from a questionnaire-based

study conducted in the community. The sample results of 200 were used to extrapolate the figures to

the total population of the community.

The event tree methodology led to the creation of 45 scenarios for the earthquake and 65 for the flood

which can be consulted in Appendix section 9.4 and 9.5. A multi-step criterion was set up in order to

filter the scenarios. It is as follows:

1. Select the scenarios with the highest number of people affected (magnitude).

2. Within those with the highest magnitude, select the strategies where society was the major

actor in developing a coping strategy

For the second objective, the research methodology chosen for the earthquake event in 1985 was an

extensive literature review built from secondary academic data.

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The main aim was to identify the coping strategies focused on meeting the urgent survival needs

determined in the first specific objective during the first two weeks after the earthquake in 1985 in

Tlatelolco.

The literature review consisted of the collection of current and significant information within secondary

data including a retroactive analysis of documents, journals, testimonials, magazine articles and

newspapers. The historically relevant guidelines on transportation, public safety, and emergency

management, sanitation and shelter provision were also analyzed. Most of the literature review was in

Spanish and it focused on one low-income community.

The research methodology chosen for the flood event in 2007 was threefold:

First, an extensive literature review of secondary academic data was performed.

Second, primary data was collected using a quantitative questionnaire which is included in Appendix

section 9.1. Due to the scarcity of information available regarding the actions taken by the community

studied, a questionnaire was deemed appropriate, as it identified the strategies developed by people and

the roles of the stakeholders during the response as well as identifying people’s perceptions of these

strategies.

Lastly, qualitative semi-structured interviews were performed in order to further clarify the perceptions

identified in the questionnaire. This was necessary since the strategies developed are related directly to

the beliefs, perceptions and feelings of the people.

The questionnaire created for the research project was divided into three different sections:

The first section tried to identify the people who were affected by the flood and the proportion

who worked as volunteers in the studied community. The volunteers were classified in four different

categories: professionals with experience, professionals without experience, volunteers with

experience, and volunteers without experience.

The second section required the respondents to give information about: the tasks they

performed, the resources they needed to perform them, the different ways they acquired those

resources, the actors who gave support to the respondents on the tasks that they performed and the

complexity of the actions carried out as part of an individual or collective effort.

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The third section tried to identify the stakeholders involved during the emergency, the

perception of the community of their level of participation and the skills that would be helpful in

replicating the successful strategies identified.

At the end of the questionnaire, a set of three open-ended questions was included. These

questions tried to identify the positive lessons learned from the disaster, the negative aspects that must

be improved and an open space for additional comments. The questionnaire contained a total of 26

multiple choice and open-ended questions.

The sampling method for the questionnaire was convenience sampling. This is a type of non-

probability sampling that involves the sample being drawn from the part of the population which is

close at hand. People who were interviewed represented about 10% of the community, 200 surveys. It

was not possible to guarantee that each individual of the target population would have the same

probability of being selected, thus rendering the results subject to a selection bias. This problem could

be minimized with the use of a simple random sample but due to limitations of time, a convenience

sample was deemed a better choice.

The semi-structured interviews were performed with the purpose of clarifying some of the perceptions,

motivations, and experiences of the volunteers in the immediate and longer term of the response and

what can be improved upon for future disasters. This was also done in an attempt to identify what

drives some people, albeit a minority, to engage in active response.

The interview covered the following points:

• A subjective description of what happened as well as the problems that the population faced

during the disaster.

• A description of the volunteer’s experience including the tasks that were performed during the

disaster, the strategies used to acquire these resources, and the skills used to perform the tasks

undertaken

• The response of the rest of the community to the specific volunteer activities – i.e. whether they

were received as legitimate, authoritative and responsible. The focus was specifically on

identifying whether such strategies are viewed as relevant methods of disaster response worth

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replicating or were a one off event. The way the community-based response was received by

other stakeholders – such as the government and the army – was also inquired into

• The lessons learned from the emergency as well as positive and negative aspects that must be

improved or repeated. This section was a valuable source of information for all levels of people

involved in disasters as it identifies the challenges as well as the good things that society

performed well in recovering from a major disaster or at least to reduce the impact of the

disaster.

Three people involved in the emergency response were interviewed face to face. The interview guide

can be consulted in Appendix section 9.2.

The two communities that were studied were picked based on the timeliness and effectiveness of their

local responses. For the 1985 earthquake case study, the community that was studied in detail is located

in Tlatelolco, Mexico City. Marvan has previously established the superior nature of this community’s

response. (Marván, 1987). For the 2007 flood case study the community of Las Gaviotas Sur in

Tabasco was studied. The reason this community was chosen is because it was one of the most severely

affected during the first week after the flood. Furthermore, it is where some of the most effective

initiatives to cope with the disaster without the assistance from the government were taken. (Gobierno

del Estado de Tabasco, 2008)

The outcome of the third specific objective was the identification of which urgent survival needs-based

community coping strategies were effective in each case. Special consideration was given to those that

were similar in both disasters as they may be more easily replicated or more relevant to urgent

community needs.

Some suggestions were made on how it could be possible to replicate these individual and group

patterns in the future within the use of local actors and Government institutions to create high levels of

self organization and synergy, transfer knowledge and gain individual experience and advantageously

utilize the collective memory of those events.

All research for this thesis was carried out in an ethical manner, without exploiting or passing on

others’ findings, ideas, arguments or words in a manner that misrepresents their intent. For the

literature review, all the references to other people’s work were made in accordance with the academic

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conventions on referencing and citations to avoid plagiarism. Data, relevant statistics and figures were

collected from literature after evaluation of evidence relevant to the central argument which is to

identify coping strategies.

With respect to the people who participated in the research interviews and questionnaires, a brief

introduction about the particular research project, its purpose, and the content of the study (background,

objectives, methods and outcome) was given each time prior to administering the questionnaire and

prior to the in-depth interviews. In addition, the respondents were told that the information will only be

used as part of the research for a master’s thesis and it will not be used for any purpose other than

education. With regards to privacy, the participants were ensured that they will remain anonymous and

no personal information will be revealed. Furthermore, they were asked for permission for the use of

audio/visual taping during the interviews. The interviews were taped only with the consent of the

interviewers. In addition, participants were asked to confirm that they have been briefed about the

particular research project and its purpose, and were allowed to end the interview at any point. The

importance of tape recording and the actions that were carried out to assure confidentiality were

explained to the interviewers. The interviews were carried out according to the designed guidelines and

principles of non-maleficience and beneficience.

5. RESULTS

In this section, the results identifying the most effective strategies from the two different communities

and the suggested framework for their replication are presented. First, the most effective strategies

performed by the residents from Tlatelolco and Las Gaviotas Sur based on an analysis of the magnitude

of the different scenarios of the problems that people faced are presented (Section 5.1 and Section 5.2).

These strategies are used in Section 5.3 to create the suggested framework for their replication in future

disasters.

In the aftermath of the earthquake in Mexico City and the flooding in Tabasco, people faced a different

number of situations that threatened their lives. A set of possible scenarios of what people experienced

during the emergency has been identified and classified in six different categories. These categories

correspond to search and rescue and evacuation, water supply, food aid, sanitation and hygiene

promotion, shelter, and security and represent six of the requirements to ensure the provision of basic

needs to people in situations where relief and humanitarian assistance is mandatory.

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5.1 Effective strategies and survival needs identified from residents from Tlatelolco during the

earthquake in Mexico City 1985.

Of the 45 possible scenarios, the 5 with the highest magnitude, in terms of the number of people

affected, are shown in Table I in descending order. The corresponding coping strategy with the highest

magnitude is shown as well.

A two-step process was employed to identify the selected scenarios:

First, the percentage of people affected by the scenario was estimated using: (1) the statistical

information found in Diaz de la Garza article journal Earthquake in Mexico Sept 19 and 20 of 1985.

Disaster Chronicles. No. 3; (2) the demographic information for the population living in Tlatelolco

found in INAH and INEGI websites; and (3) the buildings affected and collapsed found in Emporis

database. This percentage was based on the total population of Tlatelolco obtained from these sources

which is 60,000 (INAH, 2010). The calculations can be consulted in Appendix section 9.3

Second, within the previously filtered scenarios, those where the members of the community

adopted central roles were selected.

The above selection criteria implies that the earthquake scenarios for which the members of the

community played a minor role or where the percentage of people affected was lower than 5% were not

included in table I or in the analysis to create the final framework.

The results presented in Table I show the type of scenario, the stakeholders, the survival needs, and the

survival coping strategies identified. The coping strategies were identified after an extensive review of

the relevant literature as per the inclusion criteria outlined in the methodology. For each flood scenario,

the ‘type of scenario’ is a classification of the different levels of severity categorized according to the

most common approach to scenario-building in humanitarian contingency planning. This approach

consists on best, most likely, and worst case scenarios.

From the results, it can be seen that search and rescue and shelter are on top of the major concerns with

45% of the residents of Tlatelolco needing assistance. Due to the complexity, the patterns identified to

solve these problems were divided in three different stages:

The first stage consisted of individual attempts by the survivors and residents of Tlatelolco to

rescue people who were trapped under debris with their own resources as well as identifying the people

who were missing. The latter task made the search and rescue activities in the second stage easier since

people knew the areas in which their family or friends could be trapped or buried.

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At some point during the first stage, the strategies passed from being individual assistance to

collective assistance since it was necessary to join efforts to remove big structures and design strategies

to rescue those who were deeply buried. This marks the beginning of the second stage. Furthermore,

due to the technical complexity of the operations, especially removing rubble and concrete, it can be

seen that it was necessary to involve public and private companies that own heavy machinery to

remove concrete and heavy structures. As shown in Table I, their activities were aided by the local

groups who had experience with search and rescue activities and were telling them where to dig and

where it was necessary to remove pieces of concrete.

In the third stage, foreign rescue teams arrived to save people who were trapped in very difficult

to access or dangerous areas.

Special attention must also be given to the role of the army - during the three stages it provided

security and controlled the access to resources and people.

Overall, it can be seen that due to the complexity of the rescue activities, the intervention of

different stakeholders was necessary. However, the initial strategies performed by residents allowed for

the optimization of resources and knowledge and to focus on those who were trapped in very

inaccessible areas.

A total of 43% were in need of shelter. This percentage also includes part of the 45% who were rescued

and could not go back to their homes since the buildings had collapsed or were not safe. From the

results, it was identified that the strategies adopted by residents of Tlatelolco consisted of lending their

homes out to friends, neighbors or relatives. In addition, stakeholders such as churches and local

businesses lent their facilities to be used as shelters for the duration of the emergency. The rest

managed to find shelter by setting up tent camps in parks or gardens and with the assistance of local

authorities, NGOs and the army. As can be seen from the results, the demand for accommodation

surpassed the capacity of the residents to host families. However, the response patter by the local

residents was still instrumental in optimizing the assistance in provisional and official shelters.

Food and water aid access was a major problem during the emergency. From the results it can be seen

that 43% were in need of water. The immediate strategy used was to truck water in from other areas

where it was available through the use of vehicles, which were lent out by residents from Tlatelolco as

well as local authorities. The response of the people was based on volunteers trucking the water and

loading and unloading the containers of water. The second strategy consisted of erecting water

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containers with the assistance of local authorities and the army. The materials were provided by the

Government. The containers were filled with the water that was trucked in from other areas since the

neighborhood is in an urban zone far from surface water sources and regular water services were

disturbed. Water quality seemed to be another significant problem. People chose to boil water as a

preventive measure to kill pathogens. However, this strategy required the use of gas or electricity, but

gas, electricity and water services were disrupted for more than one week. The fraction of people who

experienced this problem could be identified as the 13% who received assistance from the health

volunteer groups and local authorities. Although these groups led the response aimed at controlling

sanitation-related diseases, there was a significant contribution by the residents of Tlatelolco who

volunteered in conducting epidemiological surveys. This was an important role as they facilitated the

detection of potential outbreaks in a very prompt and precise way.

Food assistance represented a problem for 34% from the residents of Tlatelolco. Although a lack of

food was not a significant problem due to the massive flow of aid from inside and outside the country,

the distribution and the transportation of the aid from the warehouses to the affected zones seemed to

be a real challenge. In this case, the pattern identified consisted of two different groups of people -

those who were inventorying and collecting food and usable materials and those who were transporting

and distributing food aid to those with the greatest need in Tlatelolco.

Table I. Strategies, Survival Needs and Magnitudes of Earthquake Scenarios for

Mexico City, Tlatelolco

Scenario Type of

Scenario

Survival

�eed Survival Coping Strategy Identified

Stakeholders

Involved on the

strategy

Percentage of

people who

experienced

this scenario

Buildings of Tlatelolco collapsed and people trapped were rescued by individual and organizational volunteers. People couldn't find accommodation in shelters.

Most likely Search and rescue and shelter

Individual survivors started to organize themselves to rescue the people who were trapped under the collapsed buildings. Military groups joined the search and rescue activities. The actions were decentralized. If it was necessary to move piles or concrete some suggestions from people with certain knowledge were evaluated and acted upon as appropriate. In the initial stage, the resources to perform search and rescue activities such as sledgehammers, ropes, and compressors were provided by local companies and people who were helping with these activities. Heavy machinery and equipment to remove concrete, such as tractors, excavators, cranes and compressors, as well as people who can operate them were provided by authorities and local companies. Foreign specialized rescue

Residents of Tlatelolco

Volunteer groups

Local

companies

Local authorities

Local rescue groups

Army

Foreign rescue

45%

- 19 -

Scenario Type of

Scenario

Survival


Stakeholders

Involved on the

strategy

Percentage of

people who

experienced

this scenario

groups arrived 48 hours after the earthquake. They joined the efforts of group volunteers and specialized Mexican groups to rescue and remove the tons of rubble left behind. One of the strategies used for rescue used rescue dogs combined with a calling and knocking method. Collective mass shelters emerged in public areas and places close to the damaged areas. Churches, public facilities, parks, homes of relatives and friends and many others were used as shelters.

groups

Red Cross

People without shelter adopt coping strategies to find it. The shelter found did not have enough covered space and access to water and sanitation services and social facilities.

Most likely Shelter

Provisional shelters run by many different organizations such as the Red Cross and churches emerged spontaneously as the shelters provided by the government were insufficient to meet the increasing demand. Tent camps were set up in parks, gardens and parking lots in addition to the 131 shelters established in the Federal District. Relatives, friends, and neighbors lent their houses to be used as shelters for the duration of the emergency. Two families of 4 or 5 members each shared households. The space was insufficient but they manage to set up provisional beds. People used sleeping bags during the emergency.


Local authorities

Churches

Local business

Red Cross

43%

Inadequate quantity or no access to water. The water provided by local authorities, the government, NGOs, or the Red Cross was insufficient or null in the areas affected. People managed to have access to water.

Most likely Water quantity

and quality

The drinking water network in Tlatelolco was not functional for more than 15 days, presenting supply problems. Water distribution was carried out by 480 water tank trucks which transported water from nearby states. This was done by the army, other institutions and the Federal District. In Tlatelolco, portable water tanks were installed by local authorities in coordination with residents from Tlatelolco. They had an 11,000 liter capacity and multiple faucets for public use. In addition, approximately 15,000 plastic water bags per day were sent to shelters, provisional shelters, health centers, etc. With respect to the water quality, mass media messages instructed people to boil water. In addition, chlorine tablets were distributed to disinfect the water.


Army

Local authorities

41%

People affected by the disaster did not have access to adequate and acceptable food items. Food aid assistance was handled by local authorities, the government, NGOs or the Red Cross but the rations distributed did not reduce the need for disaster affected people to adopt coping

Most likely Food

There was sufficient availability of food as a result of voluntary aid received from within and outside of the country. Donated food was distributed by various institutions and organizations, such as DDF, Red Cross, churches and NGOs. The DFF established five major warehouses in the city for storing the aid and items received. From these warehouses, the aid was distributed to victims at the various shelters. Residents of Tlatelolco helped with inventorying, collecting the aid from the warehouses, transporting, distributing and packing the usable materials and food aid. However, despite the availability of food, the


DFF

Local authorities

34%

- 20 -

Scenario Type of

Scenario

Survival


Stakeholders

Involved on the

strategy

Percentage of

people who

experienced

this scenario

strategies.

distribution process was difficult.

Inadequate quantity or no access to water. The water provided by the local authorities, the government, NGOs or the Red Cross was insufficient or null in the areas affected. People remained without water access and as a result there were health problems in the affected areas.

Worst Water quantity

and quality

To control potential cases of diarrhea, oral rehydration salts were provided as part of the aid distribution. The effectiveness of the oral rehydration salts was low since no effort was made to inform and train people in their proper use. In shelters, epidemiological surveillance was quickly conducted by volunteers in order to evaluate needs, control outbreaks and avoid vaccine-preventable diseases. Measles vaccine were made available in shelters and campsites for children of the required age groups who had not yet been vaccinated. At some campsites, small outbreaks of scabies and pediculosis were detected but rapidly controlled, and in general, no epidemics of any type were observed.


Local authorities

Volunteer groups

specialized in health

13%

5.2 Effective strategies and survival needs identified from the community Las Gaviotas Sur

during the flood in Tabasco in 2007.

Of the 65 possible scenarios, the 8 with the highest magnitude in terms of the number of people

affected are shown in descending order in Table II. For the selected scenarios, first the percentage of

people affected by the scenario was estimated using the statistical results obtained from the survey

conducted in the community. The figures obtained from the survey sample were extrapolated to the

total population of 4,096 (Hernandez, 2008) to obtain the percentage of people affected. This allowed

for the initial filtering of the 65 scenarios. The criterion used to ultimately select the 8 scenarios, was

based on selecting those scenarios where the members of the community adopted central roles and

where the percentage of people who experienced the scenario was representative. The above selection

implies that flood scenarios in which members of the community played a minor role or where the

percentage of those affected was lower than 5%, have not been included in Table II or the analysis to

create the final framework.

Similarly to section 5.1, results presented in Table II show the type of scenario, the stakeholders, the

survival need, and the survival coping strategy identified.

It is noted that six of the eight strategies shown in Table II were performed by people who remained in

the flooded or partially flooded areas, while the other two were performed by people who were in

shelters. From the results, it can be seen that the major concerns for the community were search and

- 21 -

rescue, shelter provision, security, access to food aid as well as water quantity and quality. The

community’s efforts to solve these problems were supported by local actors who provided resources

and joined in the efforts. The only exception was search and rescue activities, which were performed by

the community themselves.

From the results and based on a chronological research, it can be seen that search and rescue, shelter,

and security were the immediate needs after the flood reached its maximum level. During the first three

days, almost 67% of the community managed to evacuate the flooded area with the assistance of

NGOs, the army, the Red Cross, and Civil Protection, while the rest remained in the flooded area.

These 33% of the community managed to move to safer areas with the assistance of members of the

community. It was noted that these tasks were performed without the support of other actors because

the knowledge, skills, and resources were already present in the community, as shown in Table II.

Those who were rescued by family members or friends found accommodation in their homes while

others found provisional housing in churches, schools and public facilities. This pattern represents 22%

of the total population of the community. Thus, it can be inferred that the other 11% that make up the

original 33% who were rescued moved to public mass shelters established by the Government of

Tabasco or in some cases moved outside the state of Tabasco.

Security represented a major concerned for those who remained in the flooded or partially flooded

areas from the beginning and throughout the emergency. This is evidenced by the fact that it had the

highest magnitude as shown in Table II. A total of 35% of the community had to improvise schemes to

prevent looting and thievery. Of those, 22% correspond to those who moved in with relatives and

neighbors and it was found from the survey conducted in the community that 10% corresponds to those

who refused to leave their homes. In addition, it can be identified that this strategy was performed as

part of a collective work between neighbors, friends and relatives who know each other or at least

people who belongs to the community. Moreover, this strategy was developed almost in its entirety by

the community, with the local police being the only other stakeholder involved. The resources and the

knowledge, similarly to those in the search and rescue tasks, were already present in the community.

Considering the other strategies shown in Table II, it can be seen that food and water aid quantity and

quality were also major concerns. For these strategies, the community seemed more reliant on the

intervention of other actors. Some households stored food in advance but in most cases, especially for

- 22 -

those who served as host families, insufficient access to food presented a major problem. The results

show two different patterns the community devised to ameliorate the problem. The first one is based

on detecting the stores that remained open during the emergency where it was possible for them to buy

food and water. This pattern was observed in the 22% who moved in with relatives and friends to

partially- or non-flooded areas. The second pattern was observed in the 10% who remained in flooded

areas. In this case, local authorities and the army, with support from the community, set up a bridge to

transport the aid from the non-flooded areas to the flooded areas. Although this action solved the

problem for those who were in need of food, it created new problems related to the distribution of aid,

which will be discussed in the next section.

With respect to water aid, the patterns were similar to those found for food assistance. Some areas in

Las Gaviotas experienced a complete disruption or only partial access to water for up to one week.

Nevertheless, people managed to access water with the assistance of other stakeholders who

transported water to the affected areas. The other pattern identified was the provision of water by

means of buying bottles or big containers of water in the grocery stores that remained opened. The

figures are very similar to those for food assistance. This means that only 10% of the community

received help through the provisional bridge installed by the army connecting the community to non-

flooded areas. Regarding water quality, the most common strategy to improve the quality was to use

chlorine or boil the water. This strategy was used by those who relied on tap water.

For people who remained in the official shelters, it was identified that 31% had problems accessing an

adequate quantity of food. In this case, the problem was related to the distribution of food and the

rations received in the kitchens from shelters. The strategy used in this case involved volunteer work

from the community in cooking and distributing food. It can be seen from Table II that women took

leadership roles in these tasks and made the distribution process fair. Furthermore, these tasks not only

helped to optimize the available resources and avoid wasting food, but also helped to prioritize the

resources, distributing equitably to the groups with the greatest need, such as the children and elderly.

NGOs were also involved in this strategy, providing assistance and guidance. Local authorities

contributed by sending the food aid received from inside and outside the state to the affected area.

Special attention must be paid to the last strategy included in Table II where churches were one of the

primary stakeholders. In this case, churches played a major role not only in the provision of food itself

but also in reducing the problems of security during the distribution of food items. This was because

- 23 -

the distribution took place in churches, which are considered sacred places by the community members.

In addition, women took up leadership roles of these tasks since they were asked by priests to pre-pack

aid and to distribute it inside the community.

Table II. Strategies, Survival Needs and Magnitude for Flood Scenarios for Tabasco,

Las Gaviotas Sur

Scenario Type of

Scenario

Survival


Stakeholders

Involved on the

strategy

Percentage of

people who

experienced

this scenario

People remained in the flooded area. There was an absence of actors and mechanisms of security in hotspots and aid distribution points. The resources and aid for affected people were scarce or insufficient. There were acts of looting and theft to members of the community and aid supply chain.

Worst Security

The members of the community developed schemes to prevent acts of looting or acts of theft in their neighborhoods. The schemes were based on shifts and a rotating schedule. People who worked or had experience with security were in charge of these activities. They were sitting on the roof of a two-storied house looking over the surroundings. They were provided with lamps and radios to communicate with other members of the community. After, they identified someone trying to steal or attempting to go inside one of the houses, they called the police station. Furthermore, the community used lists to identify the people present in the area. This allowed them detect intruders or people attempting to steal.

Members of the community

Local police

35%

People transferred to shelters. People affected by the disaster did not have access to resources and facilities to achieve minimum hygiene standards. The affected population carried out individual and collective efforts to get access to water of sufficient quality to be drunk and used for personal and domestic hygiene.

Most likely

Water quantity

and quality for hygiene

and sanitation promotion

People started drinking water directly from the tap but they were adding chlorine which was provided by local authorities. Others tried to collect bottled water from some of the aid distribution points set up by the government; others collected water from wells. People boiled water or used chlorine as alternative measures to reduce the contamination of water.


Local

Authorities and Civil Protection

35%

Evacuation failed. People were not rescued from the flooded area by local authorities, the government, NGOs, or the Red Cross. The affected people managed to leave the flooded area but there were no shelter available.

Most likely Search and rescue and shelter

Members of the community started to bring boats and ropes to the flooded areas. Some improvised resources such as plastic crates for sodas and metal boxes were used to transport people from the flooded area to a safer one. The main providers were people who work in the community as fishermen and those who sail or row boats on the river for tourists. Some of the resources such as boats and life vests were borrowed while others were rented. Friends or relatives who rescued those affected by the flood lent their houses to be used as provisional shelters while others paid for an apartment


33%

- 24 -

Scenario Type of

Scenario

Survival


Stakeholders

Involved on the

strategy

Percentage of

people who

experienced

this scenario

located in unaffected areas during the three weeks that it took to drain the excess water in some areas. Churches also provided shelter for the members of the community.

People transferred to shelters. There was access to adequate and acceptable food items but the ration distributed did not reduce the need for the disaster-affected people to adopt coping strategies.

Most likely Food

People skilled in cooking and rationing food were in charge of activities inside the shelter's kitchen and of teaching others how to cook. These activities were undertaken by women. It was possible to reduce the need for people to adopt coping strategies as the food was better rationed and distributed. Provisional kitchens set up in shelters were providing breakfasts, lunches and dinners.


NGO’s

Local authorities

and Civil Protection

31%

People remained in the flooded area without access to adequate and acceptable food items. Food aid assistance was handled by local authorities, the government, NGOs or the Red Cross but was insufficient or null. The affected population carried out individual or collective efforts to get food items.

Most likely Food

The army, with the help of the community, set up a provisional bridge connecting the flooded area with the non-flooded area. This bridge was used to send aid to those in the flooded zones who were affected the most. The government of Tabasco, with the help of the army, made some partially successful attempts to coordinate the distribution of aid. At the end, people collected the donated aid and distributed it. Some grocery stores were not affected by the flood. People were buying food in the grocery stores that remained open during the emergency.


Army

30%

People remained in the flooded area. People without shelter adopted coping strategies to find shelter. The shelter found did not have enough covered space and access to water and sanitation services and social facilities.

Most likely Shelter

People found shelter in the houses of relatives, friends and neighbors which had two floors or were located in safe areas. Households were shared by two families of 4 or 5 members each. The space was insufficient but they managed to set up provisional beds and toilets were shared by both families. Schools and churches also provided shelter for almost 150 or 200 people. There, communal toilets were set up by members of the local community.


23%

People remained in the flooded area. There was an absence of actors and mechanisms of security in hotspots and aid distribution points. The resources and aid for affected people were scarce or insufficient. Conflicts broke out during food aid distribution because of competition of resources.

Worst Security

In provisional shelters, for instance churches, the women were put in charge of distributing aid. Women pre-packed baskets containing food, water and items for cooking. The distribution of pre-packed baskets took place inside the churches. As churches are sacred places and the predominant religion in the community is Catholicism, there were no disturbances during the distribution of aid.


Churches

21%

- 25 -

5.3 Framework to replicate effective strategies to meet survival needs during the response phase

in future disasters.

The findings identified in section 5.1 and 5.2 provide the basis for creating the suggested framework

shown in Table III. It was identified that the effective strategies that the community can perform itself

are search and rescue and sheltering. It was also identified that with the inclusion of other actors, the

community can help with food and water quantity and quality assistance. Security schemes to prevent

acts of looting during the distribution of relief items have also been shown to be effective and can be

performed by the community itself. Water access and food access were identified as major concerns

where the intervention of stakeholders was mandatory as the communities are capable of identifying

the points where they can get food and water, design methods of transportation and use resources for

storage. However, there were missing gaps when it came to the distribution of relief items.

A comparison between the two disasters allows us to see that the number of stakeholders involved in

each strategy to meet the survival need is smaller in the earthquake than the flood. This is a result of a

number of different factors such as resources available, geography, demography, urbanized vs rural

environments, political decisions, complexity of tasks, access and dependency on public services and

others. The consideration of these factors is beyond the scope of this study

This framework is conformed by a series of activities and intends to include the stakeholders that

participated on both disasters. The contribution of the suggested stakeholders will have a significant

impact on filling the missing gaps in response that were identified on sections 5.1 and 5.2 as in each

stakeholder is mentioned the description of the tasks that they usually realized. In section 6.3 it will be

discussed the assignation of tasks in more detailed based on the positive things and the bad aspects that

also will be discussed in sections 6.1 and 6.2. Although the framework suggests tasks and resources, it

will have to be developed in the context of available resources and in consultation with the Government

of Mexico, partners and stakeholders. Careful consideration has to be given to ensuring that the tasks

assigned to each stakeholders matches their vision, mission, principle statements and strategic

direction.

- 26 -

Ta

ble

III

. Suggested framew

ork for replication of effective strategies perform

ed by M

exicans during disasters

�ee

d

Sta

keh

old

er

Ex

pec

ted

Ou

tco

me

Pro

pose

d I

nte

rven

tio

ns

Res

ou

rces

nee

ded

Population

• Participate in rescue activities;

provide assistance to m

embers of

the community, friends and

relatives with evacuating the

areas affected by the disaster.

• Assisting with rescue activities helping each other to evacuate the area under the

guidance of rescue groups and civil protection as brigades led by people with past

experience with disasters in the community;

• Drawing up lists of missing persons from the community and the areas where they

could possibly be located;

• Drawing up lists of the mem

bers of the community who were injured, dead, or still

trapped in the area and where they were evacuated to e.g. official shelters, homes of

relatives, or whether they returned to the affected areas;

• Providing assistance with transporting people from affected areas to safer ones.

Civil Protection

• Coordinate efforts from all the

stakeholders

• Coordinating the efforts of all stakeholders;

• Ensuring that the alarm is communicated to the population by local authorities and

guaranteeing constant flow of inform

ation to those who were most affected through the

use of available communication channels;

• Gathering inform

ation collected by the population to ensure that human and m

aterial

resources which are needed are m

ade available;

• Promoting the exchange and dissemination of inform

ation and expertise among rescue

team

s and m

embers of the community involved with search and rescue activities;

• Creating brigades and providing training activities and exercises for the community

mem

bers who were involved with search and rescue activities and who have skills that

can be used in future disasters.

Arm

y

• Provide help to the civilian

population during the disaster

and ensure security in the

affected zones.

• Rescuing people located in the areas which were most affected, inaccessible or isolated;

• Ensuring security in the affected areas;

• Maintaining control and access to the affected areas;

• Ensuring that no one remains in the affected areas;

• Designing search and rescue strategies.

NGO’s

• Assist people on evacuation of

the affected areas

• Providing assistance to transport people from the affected areas to safer ones in

coordination with m

embers of the community;

• Empowering m

embers of the community with the required knowledge and potential

skills to perform

search and rescue activities.

Rescue groups

• Assist in search and rescue

operations

• Designing search and rescue strategies for the community;

• Cooperating with other search and rescue stakeholders;

• Exchanging inform

ation with m

embers of the community.

Search and

rescue

Local business

and companies

• Provide local resources and

operators (e.g. machinery,

vehicles, boats) to assist on

rescue operations

• Providing equipment to be used in rescue operations;

• Operating the equipment lent to be used in rescue operations.

• Sledge

ham

mers

• Shovels

• Ropes

• Compressors

• Tractors

• Excavators

• Cranes

• Boats

• Oars

• Life vests

• Radios

• Helicopters

Shelter

Population

• Provide shelter to m

embers of

the community, neighbors,

friends and relatives.

• Lending out houses to be used as provisional shelters for friends, neighbors and relatives;

• Drawing up lists of the number of people that they are hosting in their houses;

• Perform

ing surveys in coordination with Civil Protection to ensure that the houses

• Sleeping bags

• Tents

• Local materials

- 27 -

�ee

d

Sta

keh

old

er

Ex

pec

ted

Ou

tco

me

Pro

pose

d I

nte

rven

tio

ns

Res

ou

rces

nee

ded

provided have a sufficient am

ount of covered space

Civil Protection

• Guarantee shelter to all the

displaced persons

• Monitoring and controlling that houses used as shelters provide enough covered space

and access to water and sanitation services and social facilities through surveys in

coordination with m

ember of the community;


ation collected by the community about the number of people who are

living with host fam

ilies and in provisional shelters;

• Setting up cam

ps in provisional shelters such as gardens, schools and churches to house

community m

embers who are living in houses with insufficient covered space or no

access to sanitation facilities and services.

NGO’s

• Assist with the transport and

allocation of people in shelters.

• Providing assistance to transport people from the affected areas to shelters;

• Setting up provisional sanitation services and facilities.

Arm

y


population during the disaster and

ensure security in the affected

zones.

• Ensuring security in the areas affected;

• Maintaining control of the access to the affected areas;

• Ensuring that no one remains in the affected areas.

Other actors,

churches,

private schools,

private parking

lots.

• Provide space to set up

provisional tent camps.

• Lending out space to be used to set up provisional cam

ps and shelters.

to build latrines

and provisional

washing

facilities

• Soup

• Water

containers

• Vehicles

• Radios

Population

• Participate in the food assistance

process.

• Inventorying of the quantity of food aid needed based on the number of people located in

houses and provisional shelters;

• Trucking in of food aid from warehouses where the food is stored;

• Pre-packing of food items to be distributed within the community;

• Participating in the distribution process of food items as overseers and assisting m

embers

of Civil Protection.

Civil Protection

• Coordinate the efforts of all the

stakeholders to provide food aid

and guarantee equal distribution

of food items.

• Setting up food distribution points;

• Trucking in of food aid from warehouses with the assistance of the community;


• Coordinating the distribution process of food aid with the assistance of NGOs and

mem

bers of the community;


ation collected by the community about the am

ount of food aid

required.

NGO’s

• Provide assistance with the

process of distributing food aid

• Providing assistance with food aid distribution in coordination with Civil Protection and

mem

bers of the community.

Arm

y




zones.

• Providing security assistance during the food distribution process.

Food aid

Churches

• Provide space to set up

provisional distribution points.

• Lending out space to be used to set up provisional distribution points.

• Bags

• Vehicles

• Radios

• Ropes

• Megaphones

Water quantity

Population

• Participate in the food assistance

• Inventorying the quantity of water aid needed based on the number of people located in

• Soup

- 28 -

�ee

d

Sta

keh

old

er

Ex

pec

ted

Ou

tco

me

Pro

pose

d I

nte

rven

tio

ns

Res

ou

rces

nee

ded

process.

houses and provisional shelters;

• Trucking in of water aid;

• Erecting water containers;

• Participating in the distribution process of food items as overseers and assisting m

embers

of Civil Protection;

• Conducting epidem

iological surveillance to evaluate and control water quality in

coordination with Conagua;

• Conducting epidem

iological surveillance to detect possible disease outbreaks related

with poor sanitation;

• Conducting surveillance to verify the correct usage of sanitation items and best practices.

Civil Protection

• Coordinate efforts of all the

stakeholders to provide food aid

and guarantee equal distribution

of food items.

• Setting up water distribution points;

• Trucking in of water aid from warehouses with the assistance of the community.


• Coordinating the distribution process of water aid with the assistance of NGOs and

mem

bers of the community;


ation collected by the community about the am

ount of water aid

required;

• Distributing chlorine tablets, soup, and m

essages of hand washing promotion and usage

of oral rehydration salts.

NGO’s

• Providing assistance with the

distribution process of food aid.

• Providing assistance with water aid distribution in coordination with Civil Protection and

mem

bers of the community.

Arm

y

• Provide help to the civil



zones.

• Providing security assistance during the water distribution process.

and quality

Conagua

• Provide assistance with verifying

the quality standards of the water

aid.

• Testing of water quality in coordination with m

embers of the community.

• Disinfect water in case that the quality over pass the standards for its consuming.

• Vehicles

• Radios

• Ropes

• Megaphones

• Water

containers

• Local materials

to erect water

containers

• Chlorine tablets

• Rehydratation

salts

• Water quality

testing kits

Population

• Prevent acts of looting and

thievery through the use of alerts.

• Establishing schem

es of security based on shifts and a rotating schedule.

• Identifying attem

pts of looting and thievery on dam

aged areas and send the alert to local

police.

Arm

y

• P

rovide help to the civil



zones.

• E

nsuring security in the affected areas;

• M

aintaining control of the access to the affected areas, shelters and hosting houses.

Security

Local police

• P

rovide help to the civil



zones.

• E

nsuring security in the affected areas;

• M

aintaining control of the access to the affected areas, shelters and hosting houses;

• M

onitoring the areas affected with random surveys;

• R

esponding to alert system

once that communities detect attempts of looting or thievery.

• Radios

• Lam

ps

• Megaphones

- 29 -

6. DISCUSSIO� OF RESULTS

The results in section 5.2 show that the community in Las Gaviotas focused their efforts on meeting

almost the same survival needs as the community in Tlatelolco.

One of the major trends identified from the results is that regardless of the structure of the response or

the stakeholders involved in a particular disaster response, the community affected will always come

up with emergent strategies in order to fill any gaps in the provision of aid. This can be a powerful

observation in structuring future responses as the capacities of the communities can be identified and

utilized in the future. This potential for improving disaster response and planning is further exacerbated

by the fact that the same survival needs are identified from one disaster to the next. This can facilitate

planning, as relevant stakeholders will be aware of how the communities are expected to respond.

These findings will be further elaborated on and discussed in relation to the results presented about

emergent strategies in the aftermath of the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City and the 2007 flood in

Tabasco.

First of all, it is important to note the significantly different distribution of the various stakeholders in

the two disasters. During the earthquake, the government response was late in the immediate aftermath

of the disaster, thus creating a necessity for individual response and allowing for the great involvement

of various other stakeholders, especially NGOs, churches, private companies, local organizations and

international aid organizations. In 2007, on the other hand, the government, having learned from past

major disasters and improving upon the institutional response by the creation of a new body was

significantly more effective in the immediate aftermath; however, its capacity was overwhelmed thus

making the involvement of community members necessary. A further significant difference is that very

few NGOs and other actors were involved in the response to the flood compared to 1985.

A major reason for this difference in distribution of stakeholders is that emergency management in

Mexico has changed significantly from 1985 to 2007. In 1985, the response was informal and

decentralized as the traditional approach for emergency response was based on the implementation of

the DN-3 program and giving total control to the armed forces. This plan is still used and comprehends

operations of search and rescue, assistance with providing food, shelter and medical services to the

people who need them as well as guaranteeing security in the affected areas through the use of the

- 30 -

military forces (SEDENA, 2009). The problem with this traditional approach, as Wright argues, is that

due their organization and command structures military forces are less effective in managing a civilian

emergency since they cannot be as sensitive to civilians’ needs as civilian organizations (Wright,

1997). Due to this fact and the complexity of the operations during the earthquake, the government

decided to assign the army to the role of peacekeepers while it tried to find the best solution to respond

to the disaster. This consisted, as mentioned in the introduction section, of the creation of two

coordinating committees (Dynes et alt, 1990). Nowadays, the response relies on the implementation of

The National Civil Protection System and the DN-3 program of the armed forces. This system is

focused on providing assistance to those with the greatest need through the integration of government

and non-government involvement at all levels (individual, group, and community) and was created as a

result of the experience during the earthquake in 1985 (Sistema Nacional de Protección Civil, 2010).

Although this approach combines the collective efforts of the army, non governmental and

governmental actors through the use of a coordination entity at the aftermath of the disaster, the initial

response still relies on the effective and fast intervention of the army forces. In addition, this approach

does not take into account, during the initial response, the pre-existing conditions such as the level of

preparedness of all the stakeholders including the affected population or quality of emergency planning

at the institutional and community level. These marked disadvantages in the response approach

contributed to the development of search and rescue and sheltering strategies in 2007 which were very

similar to those in 1985, as 33% in 2007 found themselves once again alone without the assistance of

any government or non government figure. The specific reasons for the high magnitude of this figure

will be discussed later.

As such, it was found that regardless of the context of each survival need within either disaster, the

affected community can be expected to come up with strategies to address the gaps in the response. A

discussion of the major survival needs, the way communities responded to them and the set of factors

that led to the need for a community response is provided below.

6.1. Discussion of results found in Tlatelolco, Mexico City, 1985

In 1985, due to the nature of the disaster, people did not have the chance to evacuate. Twenty one of a

total of forty seven buildings in Tlatelolco were affected and one collapsed. The first reaction of the

people can be described as a desperate effort to rescue friends who were trapped under debris with the

resources they had available (Carbajal, 1987). This constituted the first stage of the search and rescue

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strategy and was approximately 42% of all the volunteer work. These people had not received proper

training in search and rescue activities. This is evidenced by the fact that this stage was characterized

by a general lack of organization, leadership and coordination. When considering the characteristic of

these volunteers, it was identified that most of them were residents of the impacted areas, poor, males

and young not necessarily affected by the earthquake. In the second stage, the individual efforts started

to become less spontaneous and more organized as most of the survivors of the earthquake were

already helped to evacuate the area and what became the focus was designing strategies for search and

rescue for the people who were deeply buried. Although groups of volunteers remained in the area

providing support in the removal and clearing of debris, the major problem was the removal of heavy

structures. In response to this, various groups which possessed relevant personnel and resources joined

in the operations. These relevant resources include, for example, heavy machinery to remove the

concrete. It is important to note the involvement of local rescue groups as a significant part of the

response. These groups provided the knowledge to rescue people trapped in very inaccessible areas.

The third stage of the response consisted of the inclusion of foreign rescue groups. These groups

undertook the leadership in complex operations in very inaccessible areas. Although the community

had a positive perception about the response, this was because they viewed themselves as the central

actors in it and cite the way that search and rescue operations passed from spontaneous to organized

and that their success was thus related to the high degree of solidarity in their society. However,

looking at the larger context, these types of patterns of solidarity and mobilizing collective action have

been seen in many past disasters, including ones in developing countries. Furthermore, the role that the

army played as peacekeepers during the emergency enabled the leadership and protagonism taken by

other actors (Dynes et alt, 1990). Therefore, the response for search and rescue activities could be

understood in terms of the public assuming progressively greater responsibility for their own safety and

security while simultaneously including various other actors who have practical knowledge gathered

from work experience that may not be limited to disaster response. This can only be interpreted as an

absolute lack of preparedness and emergency planning at the institutional level. From the strategies

identified in Table I, it can be seen that sheltering victims was another representative activity. The

creation of provisional shelters in camps, public facilities, parking lots as well as host families

contributed to a reduction in the need for shelter. On the other hand, it complicated the distribution

process of relief items as it was difficult to know how much aid and which goods and equipment could

be useful for the community. It is known that the aid sent to Mexico City from inside and outside the

country was substantial. However, the collection of these items was complicated as some of the items

- 32 -

were useless and not for emergencies (Dynes et alt, 1990). In this case, the response from the

community was based on activities such as inventorying, collecting, transporting and distributing the

items. The inclusion of members of the community in this process was effective in reducing the needs

of the community since they knew what aid was necessary. However, there were still problems in

coordinating all the actors. Thus overall, involved in the distribution process and in some cases the aid

received was not used properly. Overall, the urgent needs were met but the coordination failed in a

major way because the three levels of response integration - information sharing, operational

cooperation, and combined operation – were not present (Katoch, 2006). The poor performance in

these three levels resulted in a replication of activities, exclusion of varied actors, and new problems,

most of which were caused by misunderstandings or misuse of relief items. Overall, the response of the

community showed active involvement but lack of leadership and coordination. The community was

placed in a position where it was necessary to act and learn during the implementation of their actions

as well as include many different actors with specific knowledge in order to achieve one task. The

inclusion of many actors in a high-pressure environment led to chaos.

6.2. Discussion of results found in Las Gaviotas Sur , Tabasco, 2007

In 2007, as seen in the findings obtained by the survey conducted in the community, 76% did not

evacuate on time while the other 24% managed to leave the area without anyone’s assistance. The

reason, as shown by the surveys, for the prompt evacuation of those 24% was their increased awareness

of various communication channels and appreciation of the importance of being informed. This

observation shows that there was heavy dependence on mass media before and during the emergency

period. It can be inferred that those who had access to a radio set, television and newspapers agreed to

leave their homes and went directly to the official shelters right after the messages from an imminent

flood were spread in the whole state.

On the other hand, 76% of the community did not evacuate on time. What were the reasons for not

evacuating? The pattern identified from the surveys was that of a general disengagement about the

flood warning provided by the government. This was attributed to the fact that the messages seemed to

be confusing and the real magnitude of the disaster was not transmitted. This pattern has already been

observed in major events such as the eruption of the Colombian volcano Nevado del Ruiz in 1985 in

which prediction and warning became disengaged as well (Voight, 1990). Past experiences have also

contributed to this disengagement as a members of the community described in one of the interviews.

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“My family didn’t evacuate because that happened before and the maximum

level that the water reached was half meter. I decided to not evacuate based on

my past experiences but this time the water started to go inside the main floor of

my house reaching almost 3 meters”.

Disengagement was not the only reason for not evacuating. 10% of that 76% of the community

decided to remain in the flooded area. It was found that the reason for this pattern was fear that their

belongings could be stolen.

According to those surveyed, 35% mentioned that the army’s response was very good. This positive

answer correlates to the number of people who received help from the army which was 28%. This

number could have been higher, had it not been for a series of factors including the complexity of the

operations, the inaccessibility of some of the flooded areas, the high demand for aid needed in a very

short time period, and the huge number of activities in which the army had to intervene.(Gobierno del

Estado de Tabasco, 2008). The figure that is really surprising is that only 5% of the community was

rescued by the Red Cross and NGOs. Their contribution is significantly lower than would be expected.

This is due partially to the complexity of the rescue activities required and partially to the lack of

strong NGOs in the area. The lack of NGOs may be attributed to the fact that in recent years there has

been an increase of funding for large international NGOs, thus displacing smaller local ones. (WHO,

2005) This means that local NGOs from Tabasco with their limited resources have not developed

enough knowledge of the local situation from the past floods to be able to provide aid effectively. The

low perception from the contribution of Red Cross at the beginning of the response obeys to two main

problems that they faced during the first two weeks. The first one was due to the fact that damage

assessments were provided until the third week of the disaster, by that time the community managed to

cover their basic needs with the support from their families or by the local authorities. The second was

due to logistic problems to transport aid items to Villahermosa from outside of Tabasco as

Villahermosa’s airport does not have the capacity to receive heavy airplanes. (IFRC, 2007) Therefore,

it can be deducted that those 33% were found in a situation where all the resources of the army were

focused on rescuing those with the greatest need, especially those who were located in areas where the

water level had reached 7 meters, while the NGOs were trying to provide them assistance but with

fewer resources. The initial reaction from this part of the population to their situation was described by

one of the interviewees as follows:

- 34 -

“Our first reaction was to pick up our belongings and move them to the second

floor. As the water was flowing gradually inside our house, we had enough time

to move the light furniture to the second floor and then the heavy ones. After

that we talked with our relatives and we moved to their homes. We left the area

with their assistance as the streets were totally flooded”.

This assistance with evacuating the area was the strategy identified in section 5.2 for search and

rescue. From the survey it was found that 15% know how to sail or operate a boat. Thus it is inferred

that the rescue scheme they were involved in was going by boat to the flooded areas to rescue people

whose family members were guiding them as to their location.

From the survey it was identified that 100% confirmed that they were affected and 33% volunteer in .

So if they were affected, what motivated them to help other people? From the survey it was identified

that solidarity to the members of the community was the most positive aspect this disaster. Therefore,

it can be inferred that it was an act of solidarity for their friends. In addition, these 15% are people who

are very well known in the community as they work as fishermen or sail or row boats on the river for

tourists. After being rescued, people were transported to the homes of family members and friends.

This represented the 22% identified in section 5.2. From this point and until 2 weeks after the flood,

the main concerns were related to access to food, water quantity and quality and, less commonly, the

control of sanitation diseases. In these cases, there were no emergent reactions. The community tried to

access services that were provided by the relevant actors in the emergency response. This was

confirmed by the respondents as 55% affirmed that the aid to survive during this time was provided by

the local authorities and the army. In addition, it is clearly seen that the strategies identified were

oriented toward speeding up the flow of aid with tasks such as inventorying, collecting, and pre-

packing. Even though members of the community participated actively in this process, the distribution

of aid was assumed and controlled by the local authorities of Tabasco. The exclusion of members of

the community in this process generated thoughts of distrust. This is confirmed as the majority of the

respondents affirmed that one thing that has to be improved during the response to the disaster is the

distribution process of aid items such as water, food, medicine and clothes as it seemed to be

inequitable and unfair. This general concern was not observed among those respondents who received

aid from the local churches where women were included in the whole process including distribution.

The motivation for this type of volunteer pattern was described by one of the people interviewed as

follows:

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“I decided to volunteer because I am used to helping other people, the pastor

from the church that I frequent assigned tasks to everyone, the shifts for each

one and the materials to perform our activities”.

In addition to reducing the unfair perception of the distribution process, it was identified that this

strategy contributed to improving the security in aid distribution points.

The response from the community in this disaster in general could be interpreted as one whose level of

preparedness is high but where the quality of emergency planning at the institutional level must be

improved to take advantage of the local knowledge and the resources.

6.3. Discussion of the Final Framework for Replication of Effective Strategies

The final framework shown in section 5.3 combines the best practices performed by both communities

in different disasters with the inclusion of different stakeholders. From the earthquake it can be seen

that security was not a major problem due to the army focused only in these activities. This is the

reason why in table III apart from the activities assigned in the DN-3 plan the army was chosen as the

main provider of security. A major reason is that their rationale and rigid command structures as well

as the respect that generates their presence in the disasters make it possible the maintenance or

restoration of the law and order. The inclusion of Civil Protection as the main leader and in charge of

the coordination activities obeys in part as the absence of coordination identified on the earthquake of

1985 and as being the actor that the Government of Mexico has created to cope with disasters.

However, some interventions were added to increase the quality of emergency planning one for

instance is the promotion of the exchange and dissemination of information and expertise as well as

exercises with people that has the skills and knowledge and more important that knows the needs from

their community and how to deal with them. In addition, the community will intervene in a different

number of activities but always with the guidance from people with past disaster experiences. NGOs

will play the role in coordination with Civil Protection of guarantee the empowerment of members

from the community getting advantage from the resources, knowledge and skills and knowing in

advance that the community will spontaneously base their efforts on search and rescue activities, food

and water assistance and sheltering. The inclusion of a number limited of stakeholders and the constant

gathering of information from the community enables to reduce replication and optimized resources.

Once that this level is achieve it gets more feasible to reach operational coordination and then

combined coordination.

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Overall, the framework suggests the interventions of the most relevant stakeholders for each survival

need. It calls for allowing the community to assume responsibility of their own needs in the most

appropriate way, and while being provided guidance and direction as required without limiting the

community’s actions. Most significantly, central stakeholders such as the army need to be in charge of

security in order to allow for all other response and relief activities to take place unhindered. This was

noted as one of the main shortcomings in the government’s response to the flood in 2007. Furthermore,

the community needs to be provided with some of the materials and resources they require in order to

carry out their activities. This in turn requires coordination between the community and other

stakeholders which, as shown in the framework, can be provided most effectively by local actors, such

as NGOs, who are already familiar with the community and its needs. While NGOs activities were not

significant in the response to the flood, their unique position in having a developed relationship in

empowering the community means they can be powerful actors in other disaster responses.

Regarding to the limitations of the study, these are mostly methodological.

One was related to the creation of the scenarios as they were based on the Sphere standards. Thus, there

was a possibility that some survival needs will have not be identified so the complete picture of what

could happen in each different risk scenarios might be incomplete. Even though a retroactive analysis

of the problems faced was conducted as well but it was impossible to consider every possibility.

The second limitation was related to the six categorizations in which the creations of scenarios were

based. These were six categories do not fulfill all the possible requirements expected to be covered

during the emergency response phase. Communication, coordination, and nutrition are also necessary

to ought to be taken into account to get the whole picture. However, there are many factors such as

context dependency, involvement of other actors and geographical location that make them difficult to

reproduce and analyze using the event tree methodology.

The third limitation was the criterion used to filter scenarios. This criterion was based on magnitude,

i.e. the scenarios with the highest number of people affected by the different number of problems

detected were selected to be studied. This criterion only comprehends people affected and it does not

take account the impact of the scenarios such as those that may lead to a disruption in the economy,

damage on critical infrastructure, or others. Taking into account these issues would have resulted in a

more precise and real measure of the impact of each strategy detected for those scenarios.

- 37 -

The forth one was regarding the convenience sampling. The limitations of this sampling method were

that was not possible to guarantee that each element of the population target would had the same

probabilities of being selected. Another limitation was that the results could not be representative of the

whole community as there were no controls within the research design to reduce the impact of

randomness. A simple random sampling method would have being a better option but due to limitations

of time, a convenience sample was chosen.

The fifth one was regarding the use of a literature review. This was the sole method of collecting

relevant data for the earthquake event. However, a field-based qualitative method of data collection

would have be useful to compensate the weaknesses of the literature review, as it would have given

more information regarding the patterns identified and the problems that the community faced it during

the implementation of the strategies detected.

The sixth one consisted on the process of conducting the surveys and the interviews. Due to limitations

of time, the surveying and the interviews were conducted with the support from INITEC Tabasco. The

fact that I did not conduct the questionnaires and the surveys brought positives and negative aspects.

On the one hand, it could not be possible to ensure the consistency of the answers provided by the

people surveyed as it was not guarantee that the questions from the interviews were asked in the same

way or in the same order. In addition, it was found that some of the questionnaires were not filled

correctly or some questions were left in blank. This aspect could have been solved with clarification or

guidance about the meaning of the question. For the interviews, it could have been possible to change

the order of the questions or ask follow questions out from the guides in order to get more relevant

information once that something valuable was detected. On the other hand, the positive aspects are

based on the fact that if I had conducted the interviews the answers could have changed in a negative

way, peoples responses could have been altered by the fact of the perception of the researcher as an

expert.

Last, due to the limitation of time, only two low income communities had been studied. Middle income

class and high income class were not included in this study because of the complexity of replicating

strategies having a different number of variables often correlated with socioeconomic levels such as

education and occupation.

Future research will have to be based on those requirements expected to be covered during the

emergency response phase that this thesis have not covered due to the limitations already mentioned

- 38 -

before. The framework for action must have to be use in practice in the community studied but not

before being introduced to the stakeholders included in the framework. They will have to evaluate if

the suggested interventions match with their mechanisms for response, vision and mission. In addition

it will be necessary to focus in those who volunteered in order to go deeper in detailed for the problems

that they faced in order to address how can be improved. Extra research in communities located in

Villahermosa might help to see if it is possible to use the framework suggested. Based on these results,

further investigation of possibilities for improvement of evacuation and use of media, and development

of alternative strategies,e.g., for shelter in place, are strongly recommended

7. CO�CLUSIO�

The strategies developed by two communities in different disasters and different cities from Mexico

have been analyzed in this thesis. The results indicated that the spontaneous behaviors focused on

providing search and rescue as well as shelter do not change regardless of the type of hazard, context

and time. This is not unique to Mexico and it has already been seen before in disasters throughout

history. In addition, it was identified that the stakeholders involved in the strategies identified as

effective change significantly from one disaster to the next. The level of preparedness of government

agencies, non-governmental organisations and the general public as well as the creation of new

institutions to cope with disasters made it possible to reduce the presence of stakeholders without the

necessary experience as well as the number of them converging in a disaster response. It also helped

reduce the impact to communities, making the response more effective and reducing the number of

losses.

Furthermore, the introduction of a new approach enabled the institutionalization of the response to

disasters. From the results, it can be concluded that when there are gaps in the institutional response,

the local communities are forced to act by themselves with their own resources, the knowledge gained

from past disasters and the sense of solidarity to those who are in need of help.

Based on a quantitative analysis of both disasters, it is seen that right at the aftermath of the disaster,

people who were not affected but live close to the affected areas start undertaking spontaneous actions

focused on search and rescue for people they share a bond with, such as neighbors, friends or relatives.

Then the common pattern identified is that those who provide assistance take the victims to safe areas

or to their houses where they give them shelter and food. Those who remain in the affected areas to

- 39 -

volunteer, start doing various activities. The type of activities they become involved in are dependent

on the stakeholders present in the area, the guidance they can provide them and the extent to which the

stakeholders make an effort to include them.

The presented results are based on the elaboration of a limited number of scenarios of the situations

that two communities affected by two major disasters faced and grouped in 6 different categories. For a

more complete evaluation of the situation, it is recommended to take into account a more complete set

of scenarios and more categories that give a better representation of the possible situations, breach

combinations, and more key stakeholders that may be missing but must be included in the final

suggested framework.

The final results show the most effective strategies based on the quantification of those who

experienced those scenarios and describe the action taken by the communities to cope with those

situations as well as the stakeholders who provided them assistance. The final framework includes the

strategies identified as a list of activities expected to be performed by the community as well as others

who were seen in both disasters but were not carried out successfully as there were gaps during their

execution. Some of the issues found for both disasters, e.g. lack of leadership, time for evacuation,

gathering and distribution of information were included as well in the suggested framework.

The current standards for disaster response identified rely on the effective and prompt intervention of

military forces and other institutions designed to provide assistance and ignores the potential

contribution from the communities in disaster response. The framework suggests the empowerment of

communities through their institutionalized and organized inclusion in disaster activities. This requires

the proactive involvement of relevant institutions as well as local and international NGOs working in

the area.

Overall, the results indicate the necessity of improving the quality of emergency planning at the

institutional and community levels though collective efforts based on a system of organization and

administration which is vertically integrated from local to national levels. The decision has to be made

whether additional stakeholders or new institutions are introduced. The results presented in this thesis

provide the input information for what patterns communities follow after a disaster and the changes

- 40 -

that must be made in order to use the momentum from the people whose main objective in that moment

is to provide support and help to those who need it most.

8. REFERE�CES

Carbajal, Maria Teresa. 1987. Memoria Periodística del Terremoto (19 septiembre-10 octubre 1985). México D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (In Spanish) Caritas. 2010. La reconstrucción será una labor titánica, asegura desde Haití el coordinador regional

de Caritas Latinoamérica y del Caribe. [Online] (Updated Jan 2007) Available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SHIG-7ZSFTK?OpenDocument [Accessed 05 May 2010] (In Spanish)

Centro Nacional de Prevención de Desastres. 2010 Ciclones tropicales. [Online] (Updated 20 Jan 2010) Available at: http://www.cenapred.unam.mx/es/Investigacion/RHidrometeorologicos/FenomenosMeteorologicos/CiclonesTropicales/ [Accessed 20 Jan 2010] (In Spanish) Coppola, D. P. 2007. Introduction to international disaster management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann (Elsevier) Diaz de la Garza JA. 1987. Earthquake in Mexico Sept 19 and 20 of 1985. Disaster Chronicles. 1o. 3. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Health Organization Dynes, Russell R. et al, 1990. Individual and organizational response to the 1985 earthquake in

Mexico City, Mexico. Delaware: University of Delaware Emporis. 2010. Conjunto Urbano 1onalco-Tlatelolco. . [Online] (Updated 01 Jan 2010) http://www.emporis.com/en/wm/cx/?id=109368 [Accessed 15 May 2010] (In Spanish) Gobierno del Estado de Tabasco. 2008. Seguimiento Inundación 2007. [Online] (Updated 30 Nov 2008) http://www.tabasco.gob.mx/minisitio_crono/ [Accessed 20 Jan 2010] (In Spanish) Grupo Topos. 2009. Rescate Topos [Online] (Updated 01 Jan 2009) Available at: http://topos.org.mx/topos.html [Accessed 05 May 2010] (In Spanish) Hands on Disaster Response. 2007. Mexico Tabasco Flooding Assessment. [Online] (Updated 25 Nov 2007) http://hodr.org/pages/Mexico/ [Accessed 20 Jan 2010] (In Spanish) Hernandez, Juan Eugenio, 2008. La Estadística y los Sistemas de Información Geográfica. In Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública VII Reunión de Estadística. Aguascalientes, México 20 may 2008 IFRC. 2007. Mexico: Floods Appeal no. MDRMX002 Operations Update no. 1 [Online] (Updated 14 Nov 2007) http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EDIS-78XSRL-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf [Accessed 20 Jan 2010] (In Spanish)

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INAH. 2010. Historia de la arqueología de Tlatelolco. [Online] (Updated 22 Jun 2010) http://tlatelolco-inah.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=61&showall=1 [Accessed 10 May 2010] (In Spanish) INEGI. 2010. Censos y conteos de población y vivienda 1980. [Online] (Updated 01 Jan 2010) http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/ccpv/cpv1980/default.aspx [Accessed 10 May 2010] (In Spanish) Katoch, Arjun. 2006. The responders cauldron: the uniqueness of international disaster response. Journal of International Affairs, 59 ( 2): 153-172. Kreimer Alcira & Echeverria Edward. 1991. Case Study: housing reconstruction in Mexico City,

Washington D.C.: The World Bank Marvan Ignacio (1987). El movimiento de damnificados de Tlatelolco, México: Revista Mexicana de Sociología, núm. 4 (In Spanish) Oliver-Smith Anthon. 1999. The Brotherhood of Pain: Theoretical and applied perspectives on post-

disaster solidarity, 156-172, in Oliver-Smith, Anthony and Susanna Hoffman (eds.) The Angry Earth.

Disaster in Anthropological Perspective. New York & London: Routledge OCHA. 2007a. Tabasco and Chiapas Floods- Mexico Situation Report 1o.5 [Online] (Updated 09 Nov 2007) Available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/RMOI-78TV3J-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf [Accessed 05 May 2010] (In Spanish) OCHA. 2007b. Mexico: Tabasco and Chiapas Floods OCHA Situation Report 1o. 2 [Online] (Updated 06 Nov 2007) Available at: http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/YSAR-78PQZG?OpenDocument&query=tabasco&rc=2 [Accessed 05 May 2010] (In Spanish) SEDENA. 2009. Información General. [Online] (Updated 19 Oct 2009) Available at: http://www.sedena.gob.mx/index.php?id=127 [Accessed 05 May 2010] (In Spanish) Servicio Sísmico Nacional. 2010. El SS1 y la sismicidad de México. [Online] (Updated 01 Jan 2010) Available at: http://secre.ssn.unam.mx/SSN/Doc/Mx_sismo/mhist.htm [Accessed 20 Jan 2010] (In Spanish) Sistema Nacional de Protección Civil. 2009.Organización. [Online] (Updated 01 Jan 2009) Available at: http://www.proteccioncivil.gob.mx/Portal/PtMain.php?nIdHeader=2&nIdPanel=5&nIdFooter=22 [Accessed 15 June 2010] (In Spanish) Sphere Handbook (2004) Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, Geneva: The Sphere Project.

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Villamil Jenaro. 2007. Tabasco: Caos y Deslindes. La Jornada. 8 Nov 2007 http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/11/08/index.php?section=opinion&article=002a1edi [Accessed 24 Jan 2010) (In Spanish) Voight, B. 1990. The 1985 1evado del Ruiz Volcano catastrophe: anatomy and retrospection. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 42(1/2): 151-188. Wright, W.E. 1997. Incorporating military civil affairs support into domestic disaster management. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 15(2) pp. 283-292.

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9. APPE�DIX

9.1 Questionnaire.

Dear citizen; I am a student of the Master Program in Disaster Management of Lund University in Sweden and the University of Copenhagen in Denmark. Now I am in the process of writing my thesis. In order to confirm my assumptions, I ask you to help me by filling out the following questionnaire. The main aim of this questionnaire is to identify the effective strategies performed by the society during the flood in 2007. The information will be used as part of the research for a master’s thesis and it is not going to be used for anything but education. In order to assure confidentiality, the information content in the questionnaire will not reveal to anyone. It will not take you more than 15 minutes to answer. Thank you very much for your help. Name: __________________________________________________ Survey #: _______ Address: ______________________________________________________________________ Phone number: ____________________ e-mail: ______________________________________ Locality: ______________________________________________________________

A) During the flood in 2007, A1. From the following options, mark if you were affected by the flood and/or if you volunteered in activities related to disaster response

Affected Volunteer From the following list, mark the option that better represents your role during the activities related to disaster response.

Professional with experience Professional without experience Volunteer with experience Volunteer without experience

If you did not mark any of the options listed before do not answer this questionnaire.

If you volunteered go to the next section. If you only were affected go to the section C. B) From the following list of activities, tick the activities in which you were involved and provide a brief description of what you did (if you need to, you can use additional sheets to write):

B1. Search and rescue. Yes No

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B2. Filling and provision of sandbags to contain the flooding.

Yes No

B3. Lending your home to be used as a shelter for those affected by the flood.

Yes No

B4. Maintaining security during the distribution of food and water to prevent looting or acts of theft.

Yes No

B5. Supply and provision of food and water.

Yes No

B6. Community kitchens or community work.

Yes No

B7. Others Yes No

B8. To carry out these activities: Which resources or materials did you use?

How did you get them? Did you buy them? Did you have it already? Who gave it to you?

Did you carry on the activities alone or someone help you?

Who helped you?

C) If you were affected by the flood, please answer the next questions:

C1. Who provided you assistance to evacuate the flooded zone?

Army NGO’s or Red Cross Neighbors You didn’t evacuate (Why?: )

C2. During the flood, you were evacuated to:

A shelter (Name of the location: .) Remained in your home

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Moved with relatives or neighbours C3. Who provided you the aid to survive during the flood (Food, shelter, water)

Army Government of Tabasco NGOs or Civil Society Friends or relative You didn’t receive aid

C4. How would you rate the aid provided by the government of Tabasco?

Good Average Bad

C5. How would you rate the aid provided by NGOs and civil society?

Good Average Bad C6. Did you or any member of your family fall sick in the shelter where you stayed?

No Yes, What disease?_________________ C7. If you suffered an illness during the flood, who provided you care?

Army Government of Tabasco NGOs or Civil Society Friends or relatives

No one

C8. Which of the following activities can you do:

Swim Row Cook Organize people Sail/Operate a boat

C9. If you received care for an illness from an NGO, could you describe what assistance it provided?

C10. Could you mention three positive things that you learnt from the flood in 2007?

- 46 -

C11.Could you mention three things that you consider must be improved on the disaster response phase for future disasters?

C12.Additional comments:

- 47 -

9.2 Interview Guides.

This is an interview guide and the questions given need not necessarily be asked exactly the way they are phrased or in the order given. Good morning/evening/afternoon, this interview will be used as part of the research for a master’s thesis and it is not going to be used for anything but education. This interview will be recorded using an audio/video tape recorder only with your consent. Tape recording is very important to the integrity of the research, because a transcript of a tape recorded interview is infinitely more accurate than the interviewer's recollection. In addition, the interviewer cannot successfully conduct an interview while simultaneously trying to take notes. In order to assure confidentiality, your identity in tape recorded interviews will be further protected by:

• Not revealing to anyone the content of the interview, except as part for the master’s thesis that will be transcripted on the document.

• At any time during the interview, you can ask to turn off the tape recorder temporarily, in order to provide confidential background information.

• As far as possible, you will not be identified in the tape recording. Taped interviews will be identified only by code numbers.

• Tapes, transcripts, and the key connecting taped interviews and individuals' names, will always be kept in secure, locked storage.

If you agree with the protections listed above and if you consent to the tape recording of this interview, let’s begin with. During the flood in 2007, 80% of the state was under water and many people were forced to leave their houses. Also, a significant number of homes were destroyed or damaged. However, throughout the state, individual and collective responses to find solutions and use effective and improvised tools and strategies for resolving unforeseen circumstances were seen. As the probability of the recurrence of a disaster tends to increase over the next years, it is important to replicate those effective individual and group responses in new generations. This will help reduce the risk of disasters in your community as well as in similar communities in Mexico and will also help improve the response capacity of communities confronted with any kind of disaster. Since you were involved in the response of the flood in 2007, this interview is meant to clarify some perceptions, motivations, lessons learned and what can be improved during future disasters based on your experience. Do you have any questions or concerns with the research project and its purpose or anything else? If not let us start the interview:

1. Could you tell me your name, where and how you live and your profession? 2. Were you affected by the flood? 3. What was your initial reaction when you realized that the area was flooded? 4. Did you hear an evacuation alert? 5. Did you lose members of your family as a consequence of the flood? 6. Did you or any members of your family fall sick?

- 48 -

7. How did you manage to survive during the duration of the flood? 8. How did you get food and water? 9. Have you been involved in past disasters or was this your first time volunteering? 10. As a volunteer, what kind of activity did you perform? 11. Why did you volunteer? 12. Which skills did you use to perform these tasks? 13. Who was coordinating the tasks that you were performing? 14. Did you do the activities alone or did someone help you? 15. Did you need any resources or materials? How did you acquire them? 16. During your experience as a volunteer, what kind of problems did you encounter and how did

you deal with them? 17. At some point during the disaster, did the government or any organization help you to perform

any of your activities? 18. What do you think about the response of the government of Tabasco, the government of

Mexico, the army, and the Red Cross during the flood? 19. How did you perceive the response of the community during the flood? 20. What about the response of NGOs? 21. What advice would you give to people who may face the same situation that you experienced? 22. How do you think society could improve its ability to cope with disasters? To conclude:

23. Could you tell me three positive things that you learned from this situation? 24. Is there anything you would do differently if a flood or any type of disaster struck the

community again? I appreciate you taking the time to answer my questions. Thank you.

- 49 -

9.3 Estimation of Percentages of people who experienced the scenarios included in tables I and II.

Estimations in Table I.

Estimation of Total Population in Tlatelolco. Total number of buildings = 47 Source: (Emporis, 2010) Total number of apartments= 11,956 Source: (Emporis, 2010) Average size of family per apartment = 5 Total population =11,956 X 5 = 59,780 = 60,000 aprox. Total of number of habitants per building =(60,000/47)=1,270 Total of buildings affected = 21

Buildings of Tlatelolco collapsed and people trapped were rescued by individual and organizational volunteers. People couldn't find accomodation in shelters.

1,270 X 21 = 26,710 / 60,000 =45%

People in shelters Del. Cuauhtemoc = 7,950 Source: (Diaz de la Garza JA., 1987) People in camps Del. Cuauhtemoc=11,605 Source: (Diaz de la Garza JA., 1987) Assumptions:

• 60% rescued in the first 3 hours as a base considering the time to rescue people and the proximity to shelter identified in Memoría Periodística del Terremoto (19 septiembre-10 octubre 1985) by Carbajal.

• 2% who moved to shelters outside Del. Cuauhtemoc = 26,710 X .02 = 534

People without shelter adopt coping strategies to find it. The shelter found did not have enough covered space and access to water and sanitation services and social facilities.

7,950 X .6 = 4,770 11,605 X .6= 6.962 People in camps and shelters in Cuauhtemoc = 4,770 + 6,962= 11,732 People in camps and shelters outside Cuauhtemoc = 534 People allocated with relatives, neighbors = 26,710 – 11,732 = 14,978 Total percentage = (11,732 – 534 + 14,978)/26,000 = 43%

- 50 -

• Assumptions 35% of Tlatelolco with water access identified in Memoría Periodística del Terremoto (19 septiembre-10 octubre 1985) by Carbajal.

People with water access= 60,000 X .35 = 21,000

Inadequate quantity or no access to water. The water provided by local authorities, the government, NGOs, or the Red Cross was insufficient or null in the areas affected. People managed to have access to water.

15,000 water bags each one cap. 10 liters Total water available in bags= 150,000 150,000/15= 10,000 5 tanks 11,000 liters capacity = 11,000/15= 3,666 People without water access = 60,000-21,000 – 10, 000-3600 = 25,333 %= 25,333/60,000 = 41%

People affected by the disaster did not have access to adequate and acceptable food items. Food aid assistance was handled by local authorities, the government, NGOs or the Red Cross but the rations distributed did not reduce the need for disaster affected people to adopt coping .

154 tons of food were received. Source:

(Diaz de la Garza JA., 1987) Based on number of aid distributed in the area it was found that approx. 20,000 were in need of food Source: (Carbajal, 1987) 20,000/60,000= 34%

Inadequate quantity or no access to water. The water provided by the local authorities, the government, NGOs or the Red Cross was insufficient or null in the areas affected. People remained without water access and as a result there were health problems in the affected areas.

Assumption: 5 members per family and 1 chlorine tablet per household Source: (Diaz de la Garza JA., 1987) 67% of the affected population used the table effectively. [(60,000/5)X .67] / 60,000 = 8040 Then this number is divided by the total number of the population to get the fraction 8040 / 60,000 = 13%

- 51 -

Estimations in Table II.

The results estimated were based on the statistical results obtained from the questionnaire-based study conducted in the community. The sample results of 200 were used to extrapolate the figures to the total population of the community which is of 4,096 (Hernandez, 2008)

People remained in the flooded area. There was an absence of actors and mechanisms of security in hotspots and aid distribution points. The resources and aid for affected people were scarce or insufficient. There were acts of looting and theft to members of the community and aid supply chain.

35% from the sample agreed that security was a major issue in the opening section. 4096 X .35 = 1400 divided by 4096 = 35%

People transferred to shelters. People affected by the disaster did not have access to resources and facilities to achieve minimum hygiene standards. The affected population carried out individual and collective efforts to get access to water of sufficient quality to be drunk and used for personal and domestic hygiene.

It was identified from the survey that people who experienced lack of water were those who remained with host families and remained in the flooded area. People who remained with host families were 60% from those rescued by familiars, neighbors and without help. Evacuated by neighbors and relatives 41% = 4,096 X .41 = 1,680 Evacuated without help 15% = 4,096 X .15= 614 Number of people who remained in the flooded area= 1,680+614= 2,294 That number is multiplied by 60% = 1376 10% remained in the flooded area = 4,096 X .10 = 409 from that fraction it was identified that 8% experienced lack of access to water. = 409 X .08 = 33 Total = 1,376 + 33 = 1,409 divided by 4000 = 35%

- 52 -

Evacuation failed. People were not rescued from the flooded area by local authorities, the government, NGOs, or the Red Cross. The affected people managed to leave the flooded area but there were no shelter available.

People who remained with host families were 60% from those rescued by familiars, neighbors and without help. Evacuated by neighbors and relatives 41% = 4,096 X .41 = 1,680 Evacuated without help 15% = 4,096 X .15= 614 Number of people who remained in the flooded area= 1,680+614= 2,294 That number is multiplied by 60% = 1376 Total = 1,376 / 4,096 = 33%

People transferred to shelters. There was access to adequate and acceptable food items but the ration distributed did not reduce the need for the disaster-affected people to adopt coping strategies.

It was identified from the survey that 31% were transferred to shelters. They agreed that the food distributed was not enough. Evacuated to shelters = 4,096 X .31 = 1,270 Total = 1,270 / 4,096 = 31%

People remained in the flooded area without access to adequate and acceptable food items. Food aid assistance was handled by local authorities, the government, NGOs or the Red Cross but was insufficient or null. The affected population carried out individual or collective efforts to get food items.

People who remained with host families were 60% from those rescued by familiars, neighbors and without help. Evacuated by neighbors and relatives 41% = 4,096 X .41 = 1,680 Evacuated without help 15% = 4,096 X .15= 614 Number of people who remained in the flooded area= 1,680+614= 2,294 That number is multiplied by 60% = 1376 From that total 90% experienced problems according to the survey

- 53 -

1376 X .9= 1238.4 / 4096 = 30%

People remained in the flooded area. People without shelter adopted coping strategies to find shelter. The shelter found did not have enough covered space and access to water and sanitation services and social facilities.

It was found from the survey that .23 experienced this scenario. 4,096 X .23 = 942 942 / 4096 = 23%

People remained in the flooded area. There was an absence of actors and mechanisms of security in hotspots and aid distribution points. The resources and aid for affected people were scarce or insufficient. Conflicts broke out during food aid distribution because of competition of resources.

It was found from the survey that .31 experienced this scenario. 67 % were living in partial flooded and non flooded areas. 4,096 X .67 = 2,744 2744 X .31 = 850 850 / 4096 = 21%

- 54 -

9.4

Even

t T

rees

Eart

hq

uak

e

Eart

hquake

Build

ings d

idn’t

colla

pse

Build

ings

colla

psed

Peo

ple

were

re

scued f

rom

colla

psed b

uild

ings

and d

ebri

s b

y t

he

arm

y

Peo

ple

tra

pped u

nder

colla

psed b

uild

ings a

nd

debris

Houses d

idn

’t s

uff

er

an

y

str

uctu

ral d

am

age

Houses d

idn

’t c

olla

psed

but suff

ere

d s

tructu

ral

dam

ages a

s a

conseque

nce o

f th

e im

pact

of

the e

art

hqu

ake

PH

AS

E 1

: E

VA

CU

AT

ION

S

EA

RC

H A

ND

RE

SC

UE

Peo

ple

rescued b

y

ind

ivid

ual an

d

org

an

izationa

l vo

lunte

ers

Peo

ple

mis

sin

g o

r de

eply

burie

d

Peo

ple

with a

deq

uate

shelter

pro

vis

ion

Peo

ple

witho

ut she

lter

Peo

ple

were

still

aliv

e a

fter

the

eart

hq

uake

Peo

ple

die

d a

fter

the

eart

hq

uake

Peo

ple

with a

deq

uate

shelter

pro

vis

ion

Peo

ple

witho

ut she

lter

Min

or

dam

age h

ouseh

old

s w

ith

adeq

uate

she

lter

Majo

r dam

age, p

eop

le w

ith

out

shelter

pro

vis

ion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

- 55 -

Eart

hquake

Access to

adeq

uate

qu

antity

of

wate

r

Inad

equ

ate

qua

ntity

or

no a

ccess to w

ate

r

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

WA

TE

R S

UP

PLY

Suff

icie

nt

wa

ter

qualit

y to

be d

runk

and u

sed f

or

pers

on

al and

dom

estic h

yg

ien

e

Insuff

icie

nt qu

alit

y o

f w

ate

r to

be

dru

nk a

nd u

se

d f

or

pers

ona

l an

d

dom

estic h

yg

ien

e

Wate

r handlin

g b

y local

auth

orities, g

overn

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red C

ross

Insuff

icie

nt or

no

wate

r hand

ling b

y loca

l auth

orities o

r g

overn

ment

or

NG

O’s

or

Re

d C

ross

Peo

ple

’s a

bili

ty t

o a

ccess to w

ate

r

Suff

icie

nt

wa

ter

qualit

y to

be d

runk a

nd

used f

or

pers

ona

l a

nd d

om

estic h

ygie

ne

Insuff

icie

nt qu

alit

y o

f w

ate

r to

be d

runk a

nd u

sed

for

pers

ona

l and d

om

estic h

yg

ien

e

Peo

ple

rem

ain

ed w

ith

out

wate

r access c

ausin

g h

ea

lth im

pacts

10

11

12

13

14

15

Peo

ple

’s e

ffort

s to d

econta

min

ate

w

ate

r

Peo

ple

dra

nk w

ate

r co

nta

min

ate

d

causin

g h

ea

lth

im

pacts

Peo

ple

’s e

ffort

s to

deconta

min

ate

wa

ter

Peo

ple

dra

nk w

ate

r conta

min

ate

d c

ausin

g

hea

lth im

pacts

16

17

- 56 -

Eart

hquake

Access to a

de

qu

ate

and a

ccepta

ble

foo

d

item

s

Not A

ccess to

adeq

uate

an

d

accepta

ble

food

item

s

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

FO

OD

AID

Food a

id a

ssis

tance h

an

dle

d b

y local

auth

orities, g

overn

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red

Cro

ss

Food a

ssis

tance b

ased o

n

colle

ctive r

ation

pla

nn

ing b

efo

re

the d

isaste

r

Pop

ula

tion c

arr

ied o

n ind

ivid

ua

l or

colle

ctive e

ffort

s to g

et fo

od

ite

ms.

The r

ation d

istr

ibute

d r

educed th

e n

eed f

or

dis

aste

r aff

ecte

d p

eop

le t

o a

dop

t cop

ing

str

ate

gie

s

The r

ation d

istr

ibute

d d

idn’t r

educe t

he

need

for

dis

aste

r aff

ecte

d p

eop

le t

o a

dopt

copin

g s

trate

gie

s

Acts

of

looting

in

superm

ark

ets

or

sto

rage

are

as

Insuff

icie

nt or

nu

ll fo

od a

id p

rovid

ed b

y

local auth

ori

ties’ go

vern

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red C

ross

The r

ation d

istr

ibute

d r

educed th

e

need

for

dis

aste

r aff

ecte

d p

eop

le t

o

adop

t cop

ing s

tra

teg

ies

The r

ation d

istr

ibute

d d

idn’t r

educe

the n

eed

for

dis

aste

r aff

ecte

d p

eop

le

to a

dopt co

pin

g s

trate

gie

s

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

- 57 -

Eart

hquake

Access to r

esourc

es

and f

acili

ties to

achie

ve m

inim

um

h

yg

iene s

tandard

s

No a

ccess to

resourc

es a

nd

facili

ties to a

chie

ve

m

inim

um

hygie

ne

sta

ndard

s

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

SA

NIT

AT

ION

AN

D

HY

GIE

NE

PR

OM

OT

ION

S

uff

icie

nt

wa

ter

qualit

y to

be d

runk a

nd u

sed

for

pers

onal and d

om

estic h

yg

iene

Insuff

icie

nt

wate

r qu

alit

y t

o b

e d

runk a

nd u

sed

fo

r pers

onal and d

om

estic h

yg

iene

Indiv

idu

al and c

olle

ctive e

ffort

s to g

et access

to w

ate

r of

suff

icie

nt qua

lity to b

e d

runk a

nd

used f

or

pers

ona

l a

nd d

om

estic h

ygie

ne C

ontr

ol of

dis

ease

outb

reaks

Outb

reak a

nd s

pre

ad o

f dis

ease in t

he a

rea

Health p

roble

ms c

aused b

y p

oor

hyg

iene d

ue t

o insuff

icie

nt

wate

r or

wate

r conta

min

ate

d b

y d

rain

age

and s

olid

waste

25

26

27

28

29

- 58 -

Eart

hquake

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

SH

ELT

ER

Peo

ple

allo

ca

ted

in f

orm

al

shelters

Peo

ple

witho

ut

shelter

Eno

ugh c

overe

d s

pace a

nd

access to w

ate

r a

nd s

anitation

serv

ices a

nd s

ocia

l fa

cili

tie

s

Not e

nou

gh c

overe

d s

pace a

nd n

o

access to w

ate

r a

nd s

anitation

serv

ices a

nd s

ocia

l fa

cili

tie

s

Peo

ple

ad

opt co

pin

g

str

ate

gie

s to f

ind

she

lter

Eno

ugh c

overe

d s

pace a

nd

access to w

ate

r a

nd s

anitation

serv

ices a

nd s

ocia

l fa

cili

tie

s

Not e

nou

gh c

overe

d s

pace

and n

ot

access to w

ate

r an

d

sanita

tio

n s

erv

ices a

nd s

ocia

l fa

cili

ties

Dis

pla

ced h

ouse

hold

s

Peo

ple

allo

ca

ted

in p

rovis

ional

shelters

Eno

ugh c

overe

d s

pace a

nd

access to w

ate

r a

nd s

anitation

serv

ices a

nd s

ocia

l fa

cili

tie

s

Not e

nou

gh c

overe

d s

pace a

nd

not access to w

ate

r a

nd

sanita

tio

n s

erv

ices a

nd s

ocia

l fa

cili

ties

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

- 59 -

Eart

hquake

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

SE

CU

RIT

Y

37

38

39

40

41

Pre

sence o

f acto

rs a

nd

mechanis

ms o

f security

in

hots

pots

and a

id

dis

trib

ution p

oin

ts

Ineq

uitable

dis

trib

ution o

f re

sourc

es o

r div

ers

ion o

f aid

Scare

resourc

es a

nd a

id

for

people

aff

ecte

d

Eno

ugh r

esourc

es a

nd a

id

for

people

aff

ecte

d

Equ

ita

ble

dis

trib

utio

n o

f re

sourc

es a

nd d

ivers

e a

id

42

43

44

Conflic

ts d

uri

ng

wate

r aid

dis

trib

utio

n

because o

f com

petition o

f re

sourc

es

Absence o

f acto

rs a

nd

mechanis

ms o

f security

in

hots

pots

and a

id d

istr

ibutio

n

poin

ts

Eno

ugh r

esourc

es a

nd

aid

for

pe

op

le a

ffecte

d

Scare

resourc

es

and a

id f

or

peop

le

aff

ecte

d

45

Acts

of

looting

an

d th

eft

to m

em

bers

of

the

com

munitie

s.

Acts

of

looting

an

d th

eft

at

all

leve

l of

the

supply

cha

in o

f aid

Conflic

ts d

uri

ng

food a

id d

istr

ibution

because o

f com

petition o

f re

sourc

es

Thre

ats

for

wom

en a

nd a

do

lescent

girls

to

sexual vio

lence o

r explo

ita

tion w

hen u

sin

g

com

munal w

ate

r an

d s

an

ita

tion facilities

- 60 -

9.5

Even

t T

rees

Flo

od

Flo

od

ing

Peo

ple

evacu

ate

d to

a s

afe

are

a

Evacuation

faile

d

Peo

ple

were

rescued

by loca

l au

thori

ties,

govern

ment, N

GO

's o

r R

ed C

ross f

rom

the

flooded

are

a

Peo

ple

were

not

rescued b

y local

auth

orities,

govern

ment, N

GO

's

or

Red C

ross f

rom

th

e f

loo

ded

are

a

Peo

ple

allo

ca

ted in

shelters

insid

e

Vill

aherm

osa

Peo

ple

allo

ca

ted in

shelters

outs

ide

Vill

aherm

osa

PH

AS

E 1

: E

VA

CU

AT

ION

S

EA

RC

H A

ND

RE

SC

UE

Peo

ple

managed t

o lea

ve

the f

loo

ded

are

a

Peo

ple

rem

ain

ed in t

he

flooded

are

a

Peo

ple

allo

ca

ted in

shelters

insid

e

Vill

aherm

osa

Peo

ple

allo

ca

ted in

shelters

outs

ide

Vill

aherm

osa

Househ

old

s w

ith

adeq

uate

she

lter

Peo

ple

with

ina

deq

uate

she

lter

and

peop

le m

issin

g

Peo

ple

with

adeq

uate

she

lter

pro

vis

ion

Peo

ple

witho

ut

shelter

pro

vis

ion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

- 61 -

Flo

od

ing

Peo

ple

tr

ansfe

rred to

shelters

Peo

ple

re

main

ed in

flooded

are

a

Access to

adeq

uate

qu

antity

of

wate

r

Inad

equ

ate

quan

tity

or

no

access to w

ate

r

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

WA

TE

R S

UP

PLY

Suff

icie

nt

wa

ter

qualit

y to

be d

runk a

nd

used f

or

pers

ona

l a

nd d

om

estic h

ygie

ne

Insuff

icie

nt qu

alit

y o

f w

ate

r to

be

dru

nk

and u

sed f

or

pers

on

al and

dom

estic

hyg

iene

Insuff

icie

nt or

no

wate

r ha

ndlin

g

by loca

l au

thori

ties o

r govern

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red

Cro

ss

Peo

ple

rem

ain

ed w

ith

out

wate

r access c

ausin

g

hea

lth im

pacts

Wate

r handlin

g b

y local auth

orities,

govern

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red C

ross

Access to

adeq

uate

quan

tity

of

wate

r

Inad

equ

ate

quan

tity

or

no

access to w

ate

r

Peo

ple

’s a

bili

ty t

o a

ccess

to w

ate

r

Wate

r handlin

g b

y local auth

orities,

govern

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red C

ross

Suff

icie

nt

wa

ter

qualit

y to

be d

runk a

nd

used f

or

pers

ona

l a

nd d

om

estic h

ygie

ne

Insuff

icie

nt qu

alit

y o

f w

ate

r to

be

dru

nk

and u

sed f

or

pers

on

al and

dom

estic

hyg

iene

Insuff

icie

nt or

no

wate

r ha

ndlin

g

by loca

l au

thori

ties o

r govern

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red

Cro

ss

Peo

ple

’s a

bili

ty t

o a

ccess

to w

ate

r

Peo

ple

rem

ain

ed w

ith

out

wate

r access c

ausin

g

hea

lth im

pacts

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

17

18

19

Peo

ple

dra

nk the w

ate

r conta

min

ate

d c

ausin

g

hea

lth im

pacts

Peo

ple

’s e

ffort

s to

deconta

min

ate

wa

ter

Peo

ple

’s e

ffort

s to

deconta

min

ate

wa

ter

16

Peo

ple

dra

nk w

ate

r conta

min

ate

d c

ausin

g

hea

lth im

pacts

20

- 62 -

Flo

od

ing

Peo

ple

tr

ansfe

rred to

shelters

Peo

ple

re

main

ed in

the

flo

ode

d a

rea

Access to a

de

qu

ate

and a

ccepta

ble

foo

d

item

s

Not A

ccess to

adeq

uate

an

d

accepta

ble

food

item

s

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

FO

OD

AID

Food a

id a

ssis

tance h

an

dle

d b

y

local auth

ori

ties,

go

vern

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red C

ross

Food a

ssis

tance b

ased o

n

colle

ctive r

ation

pla

nn

ing

befo

re the d

isaste

r

The r

ation d

istr

ibute

d r

educed

the n

eed

for

dis

aste

r aff

ecte

d

peop

le t

o a

dop

t cop

ing

str

ate

gie

s

Pop

ula

tion c

arr

ied o

n

ind

ivid

ual or

colle

ctive e

ffort

s

to g

et fo

od ite

ms.

Food a

id a

ssis

tance h

an

dle

d b

y

local auth

ori

ties,

go

vern

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red C

ross

Pop

ula

tion c

arr

ied o

n ind

ivid

ua

l or

colle

ctive e

ffort

s to g

et fo

od

item

s.

Access to a

de

qu

ate

and a

ccepta

ble

foo

d

item

s

Not A

ccess to

adeq

uate

an

d

appro

priate

fo

od

The r

ation d

istr

ibute

d d

idn’t r

educe

the n

eed

for

dis

aste

r aff

ecte

d p

eop

le

to a

dopt co

pin

g s

trate

gie

s

The r

ation d

istr

ibute

d r

educed th

e n

eed f

or

dis

aste

r aff

ecte

d p

eop

le t

o a

dopt co

pin

g s

trate

gie

s

The r

ation d

istr

ibute

d d

idn’t r

educe t

he n

ee

d f

or

dis

aste

r aff

ecte

d p

eop

le t

o a

dop

t cop

ing s

tra

teg

ies

Food a

ssis

tance b

ased o

n

colle

ctive r

ation

pla

nn

ing b

efo

re

the d

isaste

r

Insuff

icie

nt or

nu

ll fo

od a

id p

rovid

ed

by loca

l au

thori

ties’ g

overn

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red C

ross

Acts

of

looting

in

superm

ark

ets

or

sto

rage

are

as

Insuff

icie

nt or

nu

ll fo

od a

id

pro

vid

ed b

y local auth

ori

tie

s’

govern

ment or

NG

O’s

or

Red

Cro

ss

Acts

of

looting

in

superm

ark

ets

or

sto

rage a

reas

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

- 63 -

Flo

od

ing

Peo

ple

tr

ansfe

rred to

shelters

Peo

ple

re

main

ed in

flooded

are

a

Access to r

esourc

es

and f

acili

ties to

achie

ve m

inim

um

h

yg

iene s

tandard

s

No a

ccess to

resourc

es a

nd f

acili

ties

to a

ch

ieve m

inim

um

h

yg

iene s

tandard

s

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

SA

NIT

AT

ION

AN

D

HY

GIE

NE

PR

OM

OT

ION

Suff

icie

nt

wa

ter

qualit

y to

be d

runk a

nd u

sed

for

pers

onal and d

om

estic h

yg

iene

Insuff

icie

nt

wate

r qu

alit

y t

o b

e d

runk a

nd u

sed

fo

r pers

onal and d

om

estic h

yg

iene

Outb

reak a

nd s

pre

ad o

f dis

ease in t

he a

rea

Health p

roble

ms c

aused b

y p

oor

hyg

iene d

ue t

o insuff

icie

nt

wate

r or

wate

r conta

min

ate

d b

y d

rain

age

and s

olid

waste

Contr

ol of

dis

ease

outb

reaks

Suff

icie

nt

wa

ter

qualit

y to

be d

runk a

nd u

sed f

or

pers

ona

l a

nd d

om

estic h

yg

iene

Insuff

icie

nt

wate

r qu

alit

y t

o b

e d

runk a

nd u

sed

for

pers

ona

l a

nd d

om

estic h

yg

iene

Access to r

esourc

es

and f

acili

ties to

achie

ve m

inim

um

h

yg

iene s

tandard

s

No a

ccess to

resourc

es a

nd f

acili

ties

to a

ch

ieve m

inim

um

h

yg

iene s

tandard

s

Indiv

idu

al and c

olle

ctive e

ffort

s to g

et access to

wate

r of

suff

icie

nt qu

alit

y to

be d

runk a

nd u

se

d f

or

pers

ona

l a

nd d

om

estic h

yg

iene

Indiv

idu

al and c

olle

ctive e

ffort

s to g

et access to

wate

r of

suff

icie

nt qu

alit

y to

be d

runk a

nd u

se

d

for

pers

onal and d

om

estic h

yg

iene

Contr

ol of

dis

ease

outb

reaks

Outb

reak a

nd s

pre

ad o

f dis

ease in t

he a

rea

Health p

roble

ms c

aused b

y p

oor

hyg

iene d

ue t

o insuff

icie

nt

wate

r or

wate

r conta

min

ate

d b

y d

rain

age

and s

olid

waste

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

- 64 -

Flo

od

ing

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

SH

ELT

ER

Househ

old

s u

sed a

s

shelters

Peo

ple

witho

ut she

lter

Peo

ple

tr

ansfe

red to

shelters

Peo

ple

re

main

ed in

flooded

are

a

Eno

ugh c

overe

d s

pace a

nd

access to

wate

r a

nd s

anitation s

erv

ices a

nd

socia

l fa

cili

ties

Not e

nou

gh c

overe

d s

pace a

nd

not access to w

ate

r a

nd

sanita

tio

n s

erv

ices a

nd s

ocia

l fa

cili

ties

Peo

ple

ad

opt co

pin

g s

trate

gie

s

to f

ind s

helter

Eno

ugh c

overe

d s

pace a

nd

access

to w

ate

r an

d s

an

itatio

n s

erv

ices a

nd

socia

l fa

cili

ties

Not e

nou

gh c

overe

d s

pace a

nd n

ot

access to w

ate

r a

nd s

anitation

serv

ices a

nd s

ocia

l fa

cili

tie

s

Dis

pla

ced h

ouse

hold

s

Eno

ugh c

overe

d s

pace

and a

ccess to w

ate

r and

sanita

tio

n s

erv

ices a

nd

socia

l fa

cili

ties

Not e

nou

gh c

overe

d

space a

nd a

ccess to

wate

r a

nd s

anitation

serv

ices a

nd s

ocia

l fa

cili

ties

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

- 65 -

Flo

od

ing

PH

AS

E 2

: H

UM

AN

ITA

RIA

N

AC

TIO

N C

OO

RD

INA

TIO

N

SE

CU

RIT

Y

Thre

ats

for

wom

en a

nd a

do

lescent

girls

to s

exua

l vio

lence o

r explo

ita

tio

n w

hen u

sin

g c

om

munal

wate

r a

nd s

anitation facilities

Conflic

ts d

uri

ng

wate

r aid

dis

trib

utio

n

50

51 52

55

57

56

Peo

ple

tr

ansfe

red

to s

he

lters

Peo

ple

re

main

ed in

flooded

are

a

Pre

sence o

f acto

rs

and m

echanis

ms

of

security

in

hots

pots

and a

id

dis

trib

ution p

oin

ts

Eno

ugh r

esourc

es a

nd

aid

for

pe

op

le a

ffecte

d

Eno

ugh r

esourc

es a

nd a

id f

or

peo

ple

aff

ecte

d

Scare

resourc

es a

nd a

id f

or

peop

le

aff

ecte

d

Absence o

f acto

rs a

nd

mechanis

ms o

f security

in

hots

pots

and a

id d

istr

ibutio

n

poin

ts

Scare

resourc

es a

nd

aid

for

pe

op

le

aff

ecte

d

54

53

Equ

ita

ble

dis

trib

utio

n o

f re

sourc

es a

nd d

ivers

e a

id

Ineq

uitable

dis

trib

ution o

f re

sourc

es o

r div

ers

ion o

f aid

Conflic

ts d

uri

ng

food a

id d

istr

ibution

58

59 60

64

65

62

61

Pre

sence o

f acto

rs

and m

echanis

ms

of

security

in

hots

pots

and a

id

dis

trib

ution p

oin

ts

Absence o

f acto

rs a

nd

mechanis

ms o

f security

in

hots

pots

and a

id d

istr

ibutio

n

poin

ts

Eno

ugh r

esourc

es a

nd a

id f

or

peo

ple

aff

ecte

d

Scare

resourc

es a

nd a

id f

or

peop

le

aff

ecte

d

Eno

ugh r

esourc

es a

nd

aid

for

pe

op

le a

ffecte

d

Scare

resourc

es a

nd

aid

for

pe

op

le

aff

ecte

d

Equ

ita

ble

dis

trib

utio

n o

f re

sourc

es a

nd d

ivers

e a

id

Conflic

ts d

uri

ng

food a

id d

istr

ibution

Ineq

uitable

dis

trib

ution o

f re

sourc

es o

r div

ers

ion o

f aid

Acts

of

looting

an

d th

eft

to m

em

bers

of

the

com

munity

at a

ll le

ve

l of

the s

upp

ly c

hain

63

Conflic

ts d

uri

ng

wate

r aid

dis

trib

utio

n

Acts

of

looting

an

d th

eft

to m

em

bers

of

the c

om

munity a

nd a

t all

level of

the s

up

ply

cha

in o

f aid

Thre

ats

for

wom

en a

nd a

do

lescent

girls

to s

exua

l vio

lence o

r explo

ita

tio

n w

hen u

sin

g c

om

munal

wate

r a

nd s

anitation facilities,

Documents

REPLICATING BEST STRATEGIES TO SURVIVE DURING A DISASTER, LESSONS