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8/11/2019 Rethinking Bicameral Strength
1/28
Rethinking Bicameral Strength: A Three-
Dimensional ApproachMeg Russell*
pages 370-391
The Journal of Legislative Studies
Volume !" #ssue $" %&$
Jump to section
The Two Established Dimensions of...
A Third Dimension: Perceived Legitimacy
UK Bicameralism Post!""": A #$rio$sly...
%$&&orting Evidence: #anada and A$stralia
#oncl$sion: A Threedimensional A&&roach
Bicameralism remains a common legislative arrangement, providing a classic
potential check on political executives But this potential is not al!a"s realised,leading scholars to ask !hich #actors contri$ute to $icameralism that is %strong& 'ne
!ell-esta$lished anal"sis is that o# (rend )iphart, in his account o# maoritarian and
consensus democracies +his $ases $icameral strength on t!o dimensions
%s"mmetr"& o# the t!o cham$ers #ormal po!ers and %incongruence& o# their
composition 'ther theorists reason in similar !a"s But recent British developments,
$acked $" evidence #rom other states, expose #la!s in this approach ( more
convincing theor" must $e %three-dimensional&, recognising the centralit" o# perceived
legitimac" to $icameral strength )egitimac" is #undamental to understanding
$icameralism, due $oth to the composition o# some second cham$ers and to the roleo# all such cham$ers in challenging democraticall" elected #irst cham$ers )iphart did
note that legitimac" a##ected the d"namics o# $icameralism, $ut its role is $oth more
central, and signi#icantl" more complex, than he suggested
'e()ordsbicameralism' legitimacy' Li(&hart')o$se of Lords' #anada*
A$stralia
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Contrib=Russell%2C+Mhttp://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjls20?open=19#vol_19http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fjls20/19/3http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i3http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i4http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i5http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i6http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i9http://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=bicameralismhttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=legitimacyhttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=Lijpharthttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=House%20of%20Lordshttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=House%20of%20Lordshttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=Canada;%20Australiahttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=Canada;%20Australiahttp://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjls20?open=19#vol_19http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fjls20/19/3http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i3http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i4http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i5http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i6http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2013.773639#_i9http://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=bicameralismhttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=legitimacyhttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=Lijpharthttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=House%20of%20Lordshttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=Canada;%20Australiahttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=Canada;%20Australiahttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Contrib=Russell%2C+M8/11/2019 Rethinking Bicameral Strength
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.espite its ancient origins, $icameralism remains a common legislative arrangement
/n 'cto$er 011 the /nter-arliamentar" 2nion recognised 190 national legislatures,
o# !hich 7 !ere $icameral1Bicameral legislatures are diverse, and exist in varied
political contexts /n man" places the" are accepted and respected4 $ut $icameralism
is also o#ten 5uestioned, even in long-standing and sta$le democraciesBicameralism provides one o# the most o$vious potential institutional checks on the
po!er o# political executives 6ence it is integral to some o# the $est-esta$lished
modern anal"ses o# di##erent constitutional #orms iven the diversit" o# existing
$icameral arrangements, and the !eakness or insta$ilit" o# some second cham$ers,
political scientists have #ocused in particular on !hich #eatures create $icameralism
that is %strong& in terms o# a second cham$er that exerts real in#luence on the polic"
decisions o# the executive and #irst cham$er
(n important account o# $icameralism in general, and particularl" o# $icameral
strength, is that provided $" (rend )iphart 819, 1999a: )ipharts classi#ication o#$icameral s"stems is o#ten the starting point #or comparative 8#or example,
.ruckman ; +hies, 004 )lanos ;
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and compositional distinctiveness to the #irst cham$er C is there#ore !idel" accepted
6o!ever, )iphart 819, 1999a: also included re#erence to a third #actor, noting that
a second cham$ers legitimac" ma" a##ect its a$ilit" to use its po!er )egitimac" !as
nonetheless treated onl" as a contri$utor to the s"mmetr" dimension, rather than as
an explicit dimension in its o!n right 8and !as de#ined ver" narro!l", as discussed$elo!: +he central argument in this article is that a convincing theor" o# modern
$icameralism must instead $e %three-dimensional&, and take explicit account o#
second cham$ers perceived legitimac" +here are o$vious reasons !h" second
cham$er legitimac" ma" $e 5uestioned in man" cases due to the composition o#
these cham$ers, $ut also to their #undamental role in challenging elected #irst
cham$ers =econd cham$er legitimac" is not onl" more important, $ut also
signi#icantl" more complex, than )iphart indicated
+he article $egins $" $rie#l" revie!ing the t!o esta$lished #actors contri$uting to
second cham$er strength, then summarises the existing literature on the legitimac"o# political institutions and its relevance to $icameralism /t then presents three case
studies >irst, o# the British 6ouse o# )ords, !hich has $een ver" in#luential on the
development o# theories o# $icameralism, as demonstrated $" its treatment $" all
three authors cited here 8)iphart, 19, 1999a4 =artori, 1994 +se$elis, 00:
Recent re#orms to this cham$ers composition, and resultant changes to its
$ehaviour, demonstrate the importance o# perceived legitimac" to second cham$er
strength, and that such legitimac" is $ased on a complex range o# #actors +he t!o
#urther cases, o# the (ustralian and @anadian =enates, are presented more $rie#l",
and corro$orate the argument +he #inal section o# the paper proposes a %three-dimensional& approach to $icameral strength, more !idel" applica$le than existing
theories
The T)o *sta+lished Dimensions of Bicameralism
Jump to section
The Two Established Dimensions of...
A Third Dimension: Perceived Legitimacy
UK Bicameralism Post!""": A #$rio$sly...
%$&&orting Evidence: #anada and A$stralia
#oncl$sion: A Threedimensional A&&roach
Dhen considering the #actors in#luencing $icameral strength, the most o$vious
explanator" varia$le is the #ormal po!er o# second cham$ers, !hich is largel"
speci#ied in constitutions +his di##ers !idel" 8atterson ; Mughan, 19994 Russell,
0004 +se$elis ; Mone", 1997: 2nlike #irst cham$ers, second cham$ers even in
parliamentar" s"stems tend not to have the po!er to remove executives 8though
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/tal" is an exception: +he" ma" variousl" have po!ers #or example over
appointments, treaties or 5uestioning ministers But their clearest and most
universal po!er is that over legislation Even here there is !ide variation, ranging
$et!een the 2= =enate or =!iss Stnderats %coe5ual& right o# veto shared !ith the
lo!er house, to the ver" limited dela"ing po!er o# the olish or /rish =enatesExamples o# moderate po!er include the Fapanese and /ndian parliaments, !here
special mechanisms are re5uired to resolve intercameral disputes3Dithin countries,
variation is also relativel" common $et!een di##erent kinds o# $ills >or example, in
erman" and (ustria, !here the second cham$er represents regional interests, it
has signi#icantl" greater po!er over legislation on regional matters )ike!ise, man"
second cham$ers have less po!er over #inancial than ordinar" legislation, and more
po!er over constitutional change
)iphart 819, 1999a:, +se$elis 800:and =artori 8199:all ascri$e signi#icant
importance to second cham$ers #ormal po!ers 2nderstanda$l" the" conclude that,all things $eing e5ual, second cham$ers !ith the greatest #ormal po!ers !ill have
the $est chance o# in#luencing the polic" process =ome authors go #urther, !ith
#ormal modelling approaches o#ten e##ectivel" treating the presence o# a coe5ual
legislative veto as a condition #or $icameralism 8#or example, Riker, 1994 Rogers,
001:+se$elis, !hile his ke" text cited here #ocuses on veto pla"ers 800:, did
not actuall" go this #ar, ackno!ledging else!here that even second cham$ers !ith
5uite limited #ormal po!ers can $e in#luential 8+se$elis ; Mone", 1997: @omparative
empirical studies support this vie! 8.ruckman ; +hies, 004 6eller, 001: /n some
circumstances the threat o# dela" or pu$lic em$arrassment over ill-consideredlegislation ma" alone persuade executives to concede to second cham$er demands
/n other !ords, ver" strong #ormal po!ers ma" not al!a"s $e necessar" But the"
ma" also not $e su##icient !hich is !here the other dimensions C o# incongruence
and, this paper argues, perceived legitimac" C $ecome important
/t is !idel" ackno!ledged that $icameral relations !ill $e a##ected $" the extent to
!hich the t!o cham$ers mem$erships are distinct ( central rationale #or
$icameralism has o#ten $een inclusion o# mem$ers representing di##erent
perspectives to those in the #irst cham$er +he classic example is 2= $icameralism,
!here the #ounders dre! on the traditional $ene#its o# %mixed government&, asadvocated $" Montes5uieu 6is mixed government ideal !as $ased on stud" o#
Destminster a class-$ased s"stem !here the 6ouse o# )ords represented the
no$ilit" and the 6ouse o# @ommons a !ider citiGenr" (t that time similar elite-$ased
second cham$ers existed in various other European states 8+se$elis ; Mone",
1997:?
+he elite model o# $icameralism has no! ver" much declined and $een overtaken $"
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the territorial model 6ere the #irst cham$er represents citiGens on an e5ual #ranchise
!hile the second cham$er represents territorial units, o#ten disproportionatel" to
population +he classic example is again 2= $icameralism, !ith e5ual =enate
representation #or states irrespective o# population siGe But variants exist in most
other #ederal $icameral states 8#or example, BraGil, /ndia, Mala"sia:, and some non-#ederal states 8/tal", >rance: )iphart 81999a:places particular importance on this
#orm o# incongruence, !hich he demonstrates $" using the ini index to capture
territorial over- or under-representation
6o!ever ust as territorial representation eclipsed elite representation over time, it
can $e argued that in practice partisan di##erences no! o#ten eclipse o##icial territorial
distinctions 8Russell, 001: (s alread" indicated, $oth +se$elis 800:and =artori
8199:instead emphasise the role o# part" $alance in incongruence +hus +se$elis
characterises second cham$ers as %institutional veto pla"ers&, $ut suggests that !hen
such pla"ers are controlled $" the same partisan maorit" as other pla"ers !homthe" seek to in#luence 8most o$viousl" the executive and #irst cham$er: their impact
is diminished, to the extent that the" are e##ectivel" %a$sor$ed& +his means that the
num$er o# veto pla"ers in a given s"stem can var" over time, as partisan control o#
institutions changes /n short, a second cham$er sharing the same partisan makeup
as the #irst cham$er andHor executive ma" have little polic" e##ect
+he three theories distinct approaches to mem$ership incongruence cause them to
make di##erent predictions >or example, a stud" appl"ing )ipharts theor" across
)atin (merica, !hich took no account o# partisan $alance, suggested that )atin
(merican second cham$ers veto po!ers and clear territorial incongruence resultedin $icameralism that !as uni#orml" strong 8)lanos ;
8/11/2019 Rethinking Bicameral Strength
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A Third Dimension: ,erceived Legitimac(
Jump to section
The Two Established Dimensions of...
A Third Dimension: Perceived Legitimacy
UK Bicameralism Post!""": A #$rio$sly...
%$&&orting Evidence: #anada and A$stralia
#oncl$sion: A Threedimensional A&&roach
+he central argument in this article is that, !hile the t!o dimensions a$ove are
undou$tedl" important predictors o# de #acto $icameral strength, the addition o# a
third predictor is necessar" perceived legitimac" Dhile authors such as +se$elis and
=artori have overlooked this dimension completel", )iphart did mention it in his
scheme 819, 1999a: 6e treated legitimac" onl" as a contri$utor to the s"mmetr"
dimension, and speci#ied it in ver" limited terms
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e##icac" in this respect, !holl" depends on the social support !hich it can command
outside the 6ouse& 8p 3I:
)egitimac" is a contested, and !idel" discussed, concept in political science Existing
approaches ma" $e $roadl" divided into t!o camps (uthors in the minorit" camp
take a normative approach, setting do!n criteria against !hich the" $elieve thelegitimac" o# institutions or regimes should $e udged 8#or example, Beetham, 19914
=immons, 001: /n contrast, the maorit" o# social scientists take an empirical
approach, instead seeing legitimac" as a sociological phenomenon 6ere i# %people
hold the opinion that existing institutions are appropriate or morall" proper, then
those institutions are legitimate& 8.ogan, 199?, p ?7: Building on the !ork o#
De$er 819?7:and )ipset 819?9:, this allo!s scholars to measure legitimac"
o$ectivel" in terms o# polled opinion )iphart 81999a:emplo"ed a straight#or!ard
de#inition o# democraticlegitimac", concluding that %Asecond cham$ers that are not
directl" elected lack the democratic legitimac", and hence the real political in#luence,that popular election con#ers& 8p 0I: +his treats direct election as a prox" #or
legitimac", !hich places )iphart in the normative, minorit", camp
( discussion o# !hich o# these t!o approaches $est de#ines %legitimac"& per se is not
!hat matters in the current context4 our concern is !ith de#ining the potential third
varia$le that in#luences second cham$ers de #acto strength (s Mill 81I1H199:
suggested, here %social support& seems to $e the ke" Regardless o# ho! a cham$er is
composed, i# it has support it is more likel" to demonstrate the con#idence to
challenge government, and su$se5uentl" to have its interventions taken seriousl"7
+he notion o# %support&, $" $oth citiGens and elites, is central to Michael MeGe"s81979:!ell-kno!n classi#ication o# legislatures importance in the polic" process,
!hich makes it one o# the t!o dimensions in#luencing the polic" strength o# these
institutions 8alongside their #ormal po!ers: %=upport& is a less contentious term than
%legitimac"&, !ith no normative undertones /n the remainder o# this article the third
dimension is nonetheless re#erred to as %perceived legitimac"& +his is in line !ith
most social scientists, and to an extent !ith )ipharts terminolog", $ut avoids
suggesting that institutions perceived as legitimate necessaril" arelegitimate in a
normative sense
(ccepting that perceived legitimac" ma" matter to $icameral strength is onl" the #irststep (s =a!ard 8199:suggests, %the 5uestion goes $e"ond !hat people do $elieve,
to!ard J!hat good reasons might lead people to $elieveKL& 8p : +hat is, in !hat
circumstances !ill a second cham$er $e perceived as legitimate $" the pu$lic and
elitesK 6ere there is much theoretical and empirical literature to dra! on, #rom !ell-
esta$lished de$ates a$out democratic $odies and more recent consideration o# %non-
maoritarian institutions& +his latter literature is clearl" highl" germane, given second
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cham$ers role as non-maoritarian, or even anti-maoritarian, $odies
Dithin this extensive literature, three distinct contri$utors to perceived legitimac" are
cited +hese have $een termed %source&, %procedural& and %su$stantive& legitimac"
8Bodansk", 1999:, or %input&, %throughput& and %output& legitimac" 8apadopoulos ;
Darin, 007:, respectivel"
=ource or input legitimac" is concerned !ith the composition o# institutions, and clea
democratic legitimac", achieved through election But man" scholars recognise, #or e
o# international $odies, that %Jdemocrac"L is onl" part o# the stor" o# political legitima
Deatherill, 00, p 01: Dhere non-maoritarian institutions are concerned, other %
re5uired 8Maone, 199: +hese $odies have o#ten $een designed explicitl" to comple
democratic institutions, and thus to have a %competing& #orm o# input legitimac" +his
through a $od"s a$ilit" to contain di##erences $et!een groups 8)ipset, 19?9:, throug
those !hom it governs, in terms o# its national, racial, religious or ideological identit"
or through the expertise o# its mem$ers 8Ni$ert, 007: +hese approaches descri$e p
#eatures that are o#ten designed into second cham$ers, so are highl" relevant to $ica
rocedural 8or %throughput&: legitimac" has $een !idel" discussed in particular !ith r
ma" $e considered legitimate precisel" $ecause their procedures are less political, an
as more %#air& than those o# elected institutions 8Baird, 0014 +"ler ; Rasinski, 1991:
$odies ma" even come to eno" greater popular support than elected legislatures 86i
199?: (gain second cham$ers C particularl" those some!hat distant #rom the electo
similar reputations =econd cham$ers are o#ten kno!n #or their relativel" less part"-p
their care#ul deli$eration and polic" scrutin", contrasted !ith #irst cham$ers
+he third concept is %output& legitimac", $ased on polic" decisions +his is again !idel
and to international organisations 8Beetham ; )ord, 1994 Maone, 199: /t is sugg
institutions ma" lack conventional input legitimac", the" can develop complementar"
democratic state institutions through the popularit" o# their polic" interventions 8Men
+he same ma" appl" to challenges $" second cham$ers over unpopular or ill-thought
!hen it has #irst cham$er support
+hese three contri$utors to perceived legitimac" are not mutuall" exclusive, and
indeed are interconnected >or example, it has $een noted that perceptions o# the
courts procedural or input legitimac" ma" con#er legitimac" on their output in terms
o# polic" decisions 8Mondak, 199: erceptions o# second cham$er legitimac" could
there#ore result #rom input, procedural or output #actors, !ith various #eed$ack loops
operating $et!een the three
+his discussion helps clari#" that legitimac", !hile potentiall" important to de #acto
second cham$er strength, does not #it under either o# the t!o esta$lished
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dimensions o# $icameralism )iphart 819, 1999a:, !ho is the onl" theorist to have
given legitimac" a role, sa! it as dependent on second cham$ers composition, $ut
then used this in certain cases to do!ngrade their formal powers rom the
#ourteenth centur", English $icameralism principall" re#lected class interests, !ith the
second cham$er representing the no$ilit" and the church (s the 6ouse o# @ommons
#ranchise !idened over time the 6ouse o# )ords appeared increasingl" anachronistic
( maor intercameral con#lict in 1909 resulted t!o "ears later in its veto $eing largel"
replaced !ith a dela" po!er, !hich !as reduced in 199 to around one "ear on most
$ills Mem$ership re#orm then #ollo!ed in 19?, !hen appointed %li#e peers& !ere
introduced, to sit alongside the traditional %hereditar" peers& 8!ho passed their seats
do!n the #amil" line: >urther re#orm in 1999 then removed most hereditar" peers
+his le#t a cham$er largel" made up o# mem$ers appointed to serve #or li#e $"
successive prime ministers =uch appointments continue, !ith ne! peers #or the
three main parties $eing created $roadl" in line !ith these parties electoral strength,
and non-part" mem$ers chosen $" an independent commission 8=hell, 0074
Russell, 013:
)iphart 819, 1999a:considered the 6ouse o# )ords $e#ore its re#orm in 1999, and
it !as clearl" in#luential on his theor" /t is a classic example o# the elite model, and
also demonstrates ho! a cham$er that is po!er#ul on paper can $e undermined $"
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lack o# legitimac" (s earl" as the 1I0s Bagehot had noted ho! despite the )ords
veto its de #acto po!er had signi#icantl" declined, so that it had %$ecome a revising
and suspending 6ouse& 81I7H001, p 79: (#ter 199 the cham$ers #ormal dela"
po!er remained moderatel" strong in comparative terms But in the 190s the
%=alis$ur" convention& also developed, !hich held that the )ords should not seek to$lock policies appearing in the governing part"s election mani#esto B" the late
t!entieth centur" the cham$ers po!ers had #allen into such disuse that scholars
suggested that it had %em$raced a voluntar" impotence& 8=hell, 1999, p 03:
+his is !hat )iphart sought to capture 6is classi#ication o# British $icameralism
appeared per#ectl" accurate at the time despite the 6ouse o# )ords #ormal po!ers,
he concluded that its lack o# democratic legitimac" made the t!o cham$ers
%extremel" as"mmetrical& 819, p 99:9
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accounts o# all three theorists, $ut it !as )iphart !ho recognised its #undamental
!eakness
irst, in terms o# input legitimac", the 1999 re#orm, !hilst not con#erring an" #orm o#
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democratic mandate, resulted in t!o important changes +he most o$vious !as that
it ended the anachronism o# inherited parliamentar" seats +his le#t a cham$er !here
all mem$ers !ere chosen $" a merit principle the great maorit" $eing li#e peers
appointed #or their achievements, plus 9 remaining hereditar" peers !ho !ere
elected $" their colleagues +his !as rhetoricall" important #or )a$our at the time o#re#orm, leading the government to claim repeatedl" that the ne! cham$er !as %more
legitimate&1=econdl", the resultant changes to the cham$ers part" $alance !ere
important to ho! it !as perceived +he ne! and more $alanced 6ouse o# )ords !as
ver" di##erent to and #ar more de#ensi$le than its @onservative-dominated
predecessor /mportantl", it !as also ver" di##erent to the 6ouse o# @ommons, !here
elections $" single-mem$er pluralit" resulted in dominance $" single-part" maorit"
governments $et!een 19? and 010, generall" on a minorit" o# the popular vote
>or example, in 00? )a$ours 3? per cent vote share !as re!arded !ith ?? per cent
o# @ommons seats ost-1999 the )ords, !hile not elected, ironicall" had a partisanmakeup !hich more closel" re#lected pu$lic voting patterns than did the 6ouse o#
@ommons +his $rought the relative legitimac" o# the elected cham$er into at least
some dou$t particularl" given the presence o# an active lo$$" in Britain proposing
proportional representation 8R: #or that cham$er +he )i$eral .emocrats C $eing the
political part" most closel" connected to the R lo$$" C thus $egan vocall" to assert
the right o# the more proportional 6ouse o# )ords to de#eat controversial government
legislation13
6ence $oth the )a$our government and the ne!l" pivotal third part" pu$licl"
proclaimed the greater legitimac" o# the re#ormed 6ouse o# )ords clear evidencethat perceptions amongst some political elites had changed +his same change is
seen in evidence #rom elite surve"s >or example, in a 007 poll 7I per cent o#
mem$ers o# the )ords $elieved that the cham$ers %legitimac"& had %increased& post-
re#orm1/n a 00 surve", a maorit" o# Ms said the same1?
(s indicated a$ove, perceptions matter not onl" amongst elites, $ut also amongst
the !ider pu$lic (nd procedural and output legitimac" ma" also $e important to ho!
a second cham$ers interventions are perceived u$lic opinion data on the 6ouse o#
)ords is relativel" limited, and no relia$le time series data exists olls also
demonstrate that the 6ouse o# )ords is o# lo! salience, and relativel" poorl"understood1IBut the availa$le data suggest that the pu$lic vie! the practices o#
the post-1999 cham$er relativel" positivel" >or example, a M'R/ poll in Ma" 00?
#ound that II per cent o# respondents $elieved 8contrar" to the =alis$ur"
convention: that !here government mani#esto $ills had %little pu$lic support& it !as
%usti#ied #or the 6ouse o# )ords to $lock& them17(nother poll in 'cto$er 007 #ound
that a maorit" $elieved %the 6ouse o# )ords generall" carries out its polic" role !ell&,
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!hich 8even prior to the 009 Ms expenses crisis: !as slightl" more than said the
same a$out the 6ouse o# @ommons (t the same time, onl" around a third o#
respondents $elieved that %the process #or choosing mem$ers o# the 6ouse o# )ords
is a good one&, !hile t!o-thirds $elieved that this !as true o# the 6ouse o#
@ommons16ence the cham$er !as a$le to eno" some perceived procedural andoutput legitimac", !hilst nonetheless lacking democratic input legitimac"19
+he pu$lic depends largel" on the mass media #or in#ormation a$out the operation o#
parliament, and the opinion o# media elites is thus likel" to $e in#luential (n anal"sis
o# over I00 national ne!spaper editorials mentioning the 6ouse o# )ords #rom 1999
to 01 #ound that media representations o# the cham$er presented mixed
impressions o# the cham$ers legitimac" 8Russell, 013: (rticles re#erring to the
)ords composition method tended to present its legitimac" negativel", $ut !ith
respect to other aspects o# input legitimac" 8#or example, part" $alance, presence o#
independent mem$ers and experts: coverage !as more positive Re#erences toprocedural legitimac" 8#or example, the )ords relativel" non-partisan ethos: !ere
similarl" largel" positive Dith respect to output legitimac", all ne!spapers tended to
support the )ords !hen it challenged government polic", and the gro!ing #re5uenc"
o# these challenges made such reporting increasingl" common >or example, on 1
March 00?, !hen the cham$er had ust $locked a revention o# +errorism Bill, the
le#t-leaning Independentsuggested that %it is appropriate that the 6ouse o# )ords,
unelected though it is, should have cast itsel# as the guardian o# our rights and
#reedoms&, !hile the right-leaning Daily Maildeclared the outcome %a victor" #or
parliament and particularl" a ro$ust and courageous 6ouse o# )ords&+he )ords recent histor" there#ore holds important lessons #or understanding
$icameral strength /t supports the central propositions in this article that perceived
legitimac" matters, and that its sources are more complex than has previousl" $een
assumed +he post-1999 6ouse o# )ords is !idel" perceived as more legitimate than
its predecessor, despite remaining unelected /ts unelected nature undou$tedl" still
discourages it #rom using its #ull po!ers, and its mem$ers demonstrate considera$le
restraint in challenging government (s Beetham and )ord 8199, p 9: point out,
legitimac" is %not an all-or-nothing a##air, $ut a matter o# degree&, and the )ords is
certainl" not seen as #ull" legitimate, meaning that it is not #ull" con#ident to use itspo!ers But the cham$ers da"s o# %voluntar" impotence& are clearl" over /nput
legitimac" !as enhanced $" t!o aspects o# the 1999 re#orm the departure o#
hereditar" legislators and the advent o# a more proportional part" $alance +he
cham$er also eno"s some procedural legitimac", due to its deli$erative and
relativel" non-partisan atmosphere, and gro!ing output legitimac" through
challenging controversial government policies +hus, !hile )iphart !as correct to
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dra! attention to legitimac" 8a #ocus $ased in large part on his o$servation o# the
pre-1999 6ouse o# )ords:, his treatment o# it !as underdeveloped
Supporting *vidence: .anada and Australia
Jump to section
The Two Established Dimensions of...
A Third Dimension: Perceived Legitimacy
UK Bicameralism Post!""": A #$rio$sly...
%$&&orting Evidence: #anada and A$stralia
#oncl$sion: A Threedimensional A&&roach
+he British case alread" provides a clear indication o# some o# the !eaknesses in
existing theories ( t!o-dimensional approach is not su##icient to explain the recent
resurgence o# the 6ouse o# )ords Even )ipharts theor", !hile touching on
legitimac", #ails at this task +he )ords there#ore provides a su##icientl" important
counter-example to indicate a need #or theor" to $e revised But evidence #rom other
esta$lished $icameral democracies ma" help to add greater clarit", in terms o# the
role o# perceived legitimac" in second cham$er po!er, and its sources Examples are
thus provided #rom @anada and (ustralia, $ased on the more limited evidence
availa$le
.anadian Bicameralism: An Appointed Senate under Siege
+he appointed @anadian =enate, !hose composition has changed little since
@anadian #ederation in 1I7, is ostensi$l" similar to the 6ouse o# )ords Mem$ers
are chosen $" the prime minister and previousl" served #or li#e, $ut no! retire aged
7? ( vestigial propert" 5uali#ication 8o# 000: remains, and mem$ers must $e at
least 30 +he =enate there#ore maintains ke" aspects o# the elite model But it also
has important #eatures o# the territorial model, as mem$ers o##iciall" represent the
provinces, despite $eing centrall" appointed
2nlike the )ords, the =enate has the same right to introduce, amend or reect
ordinar" $ills as its counterpart, the @anadian 6ouse o# @ommons 'nl" on #inancial
legislation and constitutional amendments does it lack an a$solute veto, and there is
no mechanism #or resolving intercameral disputes @ompositionall" there is also an
important di##erence to Britain, as there is no convention in @anada that the prime
minister should respect a need #or part" $alance !hen choosing appointees, so ne!
senators are normall" dra!n onl" #rom the governing part" overnments taking
o##ice have there#ore o#ten #aced a politicall" hostile =enate, onl" to gain a partisan
maorit" over time
+he =enate has not $een as prominent as the )ords in the #ormation o# theories o#
$icameralism
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$icameralism to $e !eak to medium 8that is, similar or onl" slightl" stronger than
that in Britain: +his lo!l" status, given the =enates veto and its high territorial ini
index, derives !holl" #rom its lack o# legitimac" (ppl"ing this logic, !e !ould expect
the =enate to $e !eak all o# the time /n contrast, appl"ing the theor" o# +se$elis
800:!e !ould expect the =enate to $e a veto pla"er !hen opposition-controlled inthe earl" "ears o# a governments li#e, $ut later to $ecome %a$sor$ed& /n practice
neither o# these competing predictions turns out to $e entirel" correct, $ut again it is
)iphart !ho gets closest to the truth
)egitimac" #eatures heavil" in de$ates on the @anadian =enate, !hich has #aced calls
#or re#orm almost since its creation @anadian experts point out that %dou$ts a$out
the =enates legitimac" are raised constantl"& and suggest that this %is perhaps the
most signi#icant impediment that limits the =enate in having greater in#luence&
8>ranks, 003, p 1?:0
+he @anadian =enates most assertive period !as in the 190s +he rogressive@onservatives !on a large #irst cham$er maorit" in 19, #ollo!ing almost 1
un$roken "ears o# )i$eral government But the ne! government #aced an
over!helmingl" )i$eral =enate +here #ollo!ed a string o# intercameral
con#rontations, including long dela"s over a controversial .rug atent Bill and re#usal
to pass a #ree trade $ill !hich #orced a general election in 19 /n 1990, a#ter
#urther di##iculties over a proposed goods and services tax, rime Minister Mulrone"
used a constitutional provision never used $e#ore to appoint eight additional senators
and create a government maorit" 8Russell, 000: +herea#ter con#rontation a$ated
+his episode sho!ed ho! a change to partisan $alance had potential to alter the=enates de #acto po!er Qet these !ere %unusuall" partisan con#rontations O the like
o# !hich had never $een seen $e#ore& 8>ranks, 003, p 1??: .uring earlier periods
o# opposition control the =enate had generall" $een vie!ed as !eak, some even
suggesting that its %veto po!er Ahad no! $ecome little more than a reserve po!er&
8>orse", 19, p 7:
/n the 190s )i$eral senators sought to overcome concerns a$out the cham$ers
input legitimac" and instead exploit output legitimac" $" opposing controversial
government policies >or example, a 197 poll #ound pu$lic opinion narro!l"
$alanced in #avour o# the =enate $locking the .rug atent Bill1
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legitimac" concerns that threaten their ver" existence rime Minister 6arper has
consistentl" talked do!n the =enates legitimac", and threatened =enate re#orm
+he @anadian case thus con#irms )ipharts 819, 1999a: claim that even
incongruence o# composition com$ined !ith extensive #ormal po!ers are not enough
to make a second cham$er strong, unless its polic" interventions are perceived aslegitimate But it !as too eas" to assume, as he did regarding the 6ouse o# )ords,
that the =enates !eakness derived solel" #rom its lack o# election (s the British
case post-1999 has demonstrated, some unelected cham$ers can $e seen as more
legitimate than others +he =enates unelected nature is certainl" controversial, $ut
concerns in @anada a$out its legitimac" also #ocus on t!o other input #actors +he
#irst is the =enates inade5uac" as a territorial cham$er =enate re#orm proposals
!hich have come closest to $eing adopted !ere part o# larger constitutional re#orm
packages, designed to resolve the territorial tensions !hich dominate @anadian
politics4 including the #ailed Meech )ake (ccord o# 197 and @harlotteto!n (ccord o#199 More recentl" campaigners have called #or a %+riple-E& =enate C %elected,
e##ective and e5ual& C !hich !ould re5uire a signi#icant redistri$ution o# seats
$et!een the provinces to $ene#it the !est o# @anada >or man" @anadians the
=enate is thus a s"m$ol o# unresolved territorial disputes /n addition there are
concerns a$out the nature o# the appointments s"stem that the prime minister C
rather than provincial governments C is responsi$le #or choosing senators, and this
patronage is used in a highl" partisan !a" 8>ranks, 1999: /n contrast to the )ords,
the cham$er tends to $e dominated either $" government or opposition, !ith #e!
minor part" or independent mem$ers Even an elected =enate !ith similar territorialor partisan im$alances might su##er similar legitimac" pro$lems >or evidence on this
point !e turn to our third example, o# (ustralia
Australian Bicameralism: Legitimac( )ithin Limits
+he (ustralian =enate, though also part o# the %Destminster #amil"&, looks ver"
di##erent to its British and @anadian counterparts =ince (ustralian #ederation in 1901
it has $een directl" elected, !ith e5ual representation #or each o# the six states/t
there#ore strongl" #ollo!s the territorial model, as in#luenced $" the 2= /t has co-
e5ual po!ers !ith the lo!er house over most legislation4 the onl" #ormal means o#
resolving intercameral disputes is a %dou$le dissolution& to re-elect $oth cham$ers,
#ollo!ed i# necessar" $" a oint parliamentar" sitting +he most 8in:#amous episode in
the =enates histor" !as its $locking o# a $udget $ill in 197?, !hich #orced a general
election and change o# government
>or )iphart, (ustralia !as an archet"pal example o# %strong& $icameralism E5ual
state representation results in a high ini index, !hile the t!o cham$ers have
s"mmetrical #ormal po!ers +here is no di##icult" !ith democratic legitimac" De
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!ould there#ore expect the =enate to $e a signi#icant polic" actor +he cham$er is
also a potential veto pla"er #or +se$elis 800:, dependent o# course on its partisan
composition =artori 8199:agreed, and cited the 197? crisis as an example o# ho!
$icameralism can $e toostrong
+he main #ocus o# this article is legitimac", $ut the (ustralian case also presents anopportunit" to re#lect $rie#l" on the ke" components o# compositional incongruence
#or strong $icameralism, as existing theories emphasise di##erent #actors either
territorialit" 8)iphart: or partisan $alance 8=artori and +se$elis: /n (ustralia it is
clearl" the latter that matters most 2ntil 19 the =enate !as, like the lo!er house,
elected using a maoritarian s"stem that exaggerated representation o# the !inning
part" #or example, in 197, 33 o# the 3I senators !ere )a$or ( proportional voting
s"stem !as then introduced, !hich led to minor parties and independents gaining
seats, and government maorities $ecoming unusual >rom 191 to 00? the =enate
!as consistentl" a %hung& cham$er, !ith the $alance o# po!er held $" minor partiesand independents (ustralian commentators note that pre-19 the cham$er !as
relativel" peripheral, $ut the introduction o# R sa! it %trans#ormed& into a central
polic" actor 8=harman, 1999, p 19: +his alread" indicates a pro$lem !ith
)ipharts reasoning, as territorial di##erences alone !ere not enough #or
$icameralism to $e strong pre-193Recent experience, #rom !hen Fohn 6o!ards
)i$eral-
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8@risp, 193, 5uoted in Bach, 00, p ?: 6ence the extreme territorial
incongruence in (ustralian $icameralism C that is, the e5ual state representation that
)iphart considered so important C places limits on perceptions o# the =enate as
legitimate
'ther input #actors nonetheless $oost perceptions o# the =enates legitimac",alongside output #actors concerning its polic" interventions /n de$ating $icameralism
the issue o# %mandate& is central in (ustralian politics 8oot, 1999: Dhile
government claims a mandate to govern unimpeded, elected non-government
senators claim a mandate to oppose, particularl" on unpopular policies +his results
in a constant %clash o# mandates& 8Mulgan, 000, p 30: Evidence suggests that the
pu$lic support, and indeed encourage, such tension %=plit-ticket& voting is common'
and polls sho! consistent support #or non-government control o# the =enate 8Bean ;
Datten$urg, 199: Most recentl", onl" 1 per cent o# respondents to the (ustralian
=urve" o# =ocial (ttitudes approved o# the government holding a =enate maorit"post-00?, !hile ?7 per cent disapproved 8.enemark, Meagher, Dilson, Destern, ;
hillips, 007: (s in Britain post-1999, the =enate tends to re#lect partisan voting
patterns more closel" than does the maoritarian lo!er house /n some !a"s it can
thus $e argued to represent a %truer& electoral maorit" /n other !ords, !hile the
legitimac" o# the =enate can $e 5uestioned, the legitimac" o# the lo!er house can $e
$rought into relative dou$t as !ell +his helps keep the t!o cham$ers in an almost
permanent constructive tension, onl" occasionall" interrupted 8as in 00?C: $"
government =enate control
+he (ustralian case thus rein#orces the conclusions that perceived legitimac" isimportant to understanding the d"namics o# $icameralism, and that its sources are
more complex than previousl" proposed Even directl" elected second cham$ers can
$e accused o# illegitimac" $oth thanks to other compositional #actors and, criticall",
to their #undamental role in challenging %maorit"& rule +he perceived legitimac" o#
second cham$ers is also relative lo!er house maorities can sometimes $e
5uestioned too, particularl" in s"stems !here these are $uilt on onl" minorit"
electoral supportI
.onclusion: A Three-dimensional Approach
Jump to section
The Two Established Dimensions of...
A Third Dimension: Perceived Legitimacy
UK Bicameralism Post!""": A #$rio$sly...
%$&&orting Evidence: #anada and A$stralia
#oncl$sion: A Threedimensional A&&roach
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)ipharts 819, 1999a:theor" o# $icameralism has $een deservedl" in#luential 6e
is uni5ue amongst modern theorists #or recognising the relevance o# second cham$er
legitimac" to $icameral strength +his element o# his theor" !as undou$tedl"
in#luenced $" kno!ledge o# the %old& pre-1999 6ouse o# )ords, and the considera$le
restraint !hich it exercised in the t!entieth centur" despite its signi#icant #ormalpo!ers But recent developments in Britain have revealed ho! )ipharts assumption
that the )ords lacked legitimac" solel" $ecause o# its unelected $asis !as too
simplistic +he 1999 re#orm demonstrated that some unelected second cham$ers can
$e vie!ed as more legitimate than others, and there#ore can exercise their po!ers
more #reel"
+he central conclusion o# this paper is that a convincing theor" o# $icameral strength
needs to $e explicitl" %three-dimensional&, going $e"ond #ormal po!ers and
mem$ership incongruence, to include the perceived legitimac" o# the second
cham$er erceived legitimac" criticall" a##ects the #unctioning o# $icameralism, "etderives neither #rom the second cham$ers #ormal po!ers nor !holl" #rom the extent
to !hich the t!o cham$ers mem$erships di##er /t must there#ore $e considered as
an independent dimension in its o!n right >urthermore, a conception o# legitimac"
$ased purel" on direct election, !here$" directl" elected second cham$ers are
assumed to $e legitimate and strong, and unelected cham$ers illegitimate and !eak,
is #ar too crude Suestions a$out second cham$ers legitimac" can result #rom
various aspects o# their mode o# composition, $ut also #rom their core role o#
challenging elected #irst cham$ers .emocratic %input& legitimac" ma" thus not $e
either necessar" or su##icient #or such cham$ers to $e respected and in#luential (sthe !ider literature suggests, perceptions o# legitimac" can $e in#luenced $" a
com$ination o# input, procedural, and output #actors all three are highl" relevant to
$icameralism u$lic opinion data on attitudes to second cham$ers is o#ten lacking,
and !hat in#luences opinion is clearl" to an extent culturall" speci#ic +his
undou$tedl" creates pro$lems i# seeking to present a general theor" But )ipharts
use o# direct election as a prox" #or legitimac" achieved parsimon" at too great a
cost to validit"
( secondar" point !hich this paper touches upon, concerning $icameral
incongruence, is less original +he evidence #rom all three cases concurs !ith acentral point made $" +se$elis 800:, and supported $" other studies 8.ruckman ;
+hies, 004 6iroi, 00:, that part" $alance is #ar more crucial to the incongruence
dimension than )iphart ackno!ledged 6ere too cultural #actors !ill pla" a part /n
some settings incongruence o# territorial representation ma" $e important in creating
#riction $et!een the cham$ers $ut onl" !here parliamentarians territorial identities
are su##icientl" salient to trump their part" identities Even in #ederal states, as the
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(ustralian case in particular demonstrates, incongruence o#partisanrepresentation
ma" matter #ar more
( more convincing and !idel" applica$le theor" o# $icameral strength !ill there#ore
see this as in#luenced $" the #ollo!ing three dimensions
1
+he #ormal po!ers o# the second cham$er Most o$viousl" legislative po!ers, as set d
documents
/ncongruence o# mem$ership $et!een the cham$ers artisan $alance !ill normall" $
contri$utor, though other #orms o# incongruence C territorial, demographic, racial or r
contri$ute !here these are culturall" salient
3
erceived legitimac" o# the second cham$er +his depends on pu$lic and elite opinion
in#luenced $" a com$ination o# input, procedural and output #actors @ruciall", even d
cham$ers are not guaranteed un5uali#ied support+his three-dimensional conception is necessaril" more general than )ipharts 819,
1999a:theor" /n cases !here there are no serious legitimac" concerns a$out the
second cham$er, the #irst t!o dimensions !ill in practice determine de #acto
$icameral strength Dhere $oth conditions are met, the result ma" $e legislative
gridlock C as o#ten occurs in the 2= under divided government But since there is
o#ten de$ate a$out the legitimac" o# interventions even $" elected second cham$ers,
this does not al!a"s appl" >or example, in (ustralia, lingering dou$ts over
legitimac" protect the s"stem #rom gridlock most o# the time
/n essence a properl" #unctioning $icameral s"stem re5uires the second cham$er to
have some kind o# competinginput legitimac" to the #irst !hich ma" $e achieved
through di##erent voting s"stems or other distinct means o# composition +he onl"
alternative is t!o cham$ers !hich are essentiall" identical, there$" $reaching the
incongruence condition, and resulting in !eak $icameralism But #inding a
compositional method !hich is $oth distinct #rom that in the #irst cham$er and
perceived as su##icientl" legitimate is al!a"s lia$le to $e challenging
+he three-dimensional approach o##ers some novel indications to those #acing
5uestions a$out $icameral design /n @anada, #or example, !here the #ormall" strong
=enate is hampered $" legitimac" pro$lems, most re#ormers assume that $uilding
legitimac" depends on moving to an elected =enate But, as the British case
indicates, a great deal might $e gained through re#orming appointments to create
#airer partisan $alance and remove discredited prime ministerial patronage
8particularl" i# this !ere passed to the provincial level: /n Britain, too, the 6ouse o#
)ords could $e #urther strengthened $" re#orming the appointments process to make
it more transparentl" #air /ndeed, various proposals over recent "ears C including
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those #rom a Ro"al @ommission !hich reported in 000 C have suggested that the
British prime ministers #ormall" un#ettered po!er over appointments should $e
regulated7Moves to an elected second cham$er on the other hand, i# not care#ull"
thought through, could potentiall" im$ue the 6ouse o# )ords !ith greater perceived
legitimac" than the 6ouse o# @ommons 6ence man" groups 8including the Ro"al@ommission and the present government: have proposed that elected mem$ers
should serve long, non-rene!a$le terms o# o##ice in order to retain !eaker links to
the electorate than do Ms
/n general those considering design o# $icameral s"stems must think a$out the likel"
salient #actors in their o!n cultural setting regarding $oth incongruence and
perceived legitimac" (s the other!ise %strong& (ustralian =enate demonstrates,
government politicians ma" put considera$le e##ort into tr"ing to damage the
perceived legitimac" o# an assertive second cham$er, even i# it is elected =econd
cham$ers are $" their nature controversial and vulnera$le to challenge +his makese##ective $icameralism dependent on ro$ust institutional design
/oteshttpHH!!!ipuorgHparline-eHparlinesearchasp >or a recent overvie! o# second
cham$er composition and po!ers see Russell 801:
+he olish =enate can dela" $ills $" ust 30 da"s, a#ter !hich it can $e overridden $"
an a$solute maorit" o# the #irst cham$er +he /rish =enate has a 90-da" dela" po!er
a#ter !hich it can $e overridden $" a simple maorit"
+he Fapanese cham$er can $e overridden onl" $" a t!o-thirds maorit" o# the lo!er
house4 in /ndia disputes must $e resolved $" a oint session o# arliament
+his approach is clearl" in#luenced $" 2= arrangements, $ut does not re#lect practice
in most $icameral s"stems, since onl" a minorit" o# national second cham$ers
actuall" possess such a po!er 8Russell, 01:
Even in later periods man" second cham$ers set higher propert" re5uirements on
either mem$ers or voters relative to the #irst cham$er 8see section $elo! on @anada
#or a contemporar" example:
'# the remainder, 19 !ere !holl" elected $" other means, 19 !ere onl" partl"
elected and 17 contained no elected mem$ers at all 8Russell, 01:
/ndeed the pro$lems o# e5uating legitimac" !ith direct election !ere evident even
!ithin )ipharts o!n anal"sis, as he noted that the erman Bundesrat, !hose
mem$ers are appointed $" state governments, is in #act exceptionall" strong Dithin
the context o# erman #ederalism, it is clearl" considered legitimate #or such a
cham$er to have an assertive role in the polic" process
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(s Michael =a!ard 8199:points out %moral legitimac" ma" never $e re#lected
accuratel" in the prevailing state o# opinion, or perceived legitimac"O at a given time
a morall" illegitimate state might $e perceived to $e legitimate, or vice versa& 8p
7:
)ipharts classi#ication 819, 1999a: di##ers $et!een versions /n 19 the )ords!as %extremel" as"mmetrical& and in 1999 %as"mmetrical& in $oth cases the lo!est
ranking on this dimension /n 1999 8although legitimac" !as o##iciall" part o# the
s"mmetr" dimension:, the )ords dropped hal# a point on the congruencedimension,
#or $eing a %relic o# a predemocratic era& 81999a, p 13:
/n 19 )iphart had three categories, %strong&, %!eak& and %insigni#icant&
$icameralism, !ith Britain ranked %!eak& /n 1999 the categories !ere %strong&,
%medium-strength& and %!eak&, !ith Britain udged as %$et!een medium-strength and
!eak& 81999a:
( direct comparison in terms o# de#eats over time is di##icult Bet!een 1979 and199 8under @onservative government: there !ere 179 government de#eats in the
6ouse o# )ords, $ut $et!een 197 and 1979 8under )a$our: there !ere 33 +he
more important measure ma" $e the extent to !hich de#eats are overturned in the
@ommons, on !hich there is little pre-1999 data, and the extent to !hich the 6ouse
o# )ords insisted on its polic" position >or a discussion see Russell 8010:
>or example, )eader o# the 6ouse o# )ords, Margaret Fa", )ords 6ansard, 1 'cto$er
199 col 9?
>or example, the )i$eral .emocrat leader in the 6ouse o# )ords, )ord Mc
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representative:
(uthors research carried out $" Mori, #unded $" E=R@ under grant RE=-000-3-
0?97 80 valid respondents, !ith results adusted to the demographicall" and
politicall" representative: 'n %doing a good o$&, #igures #or entire sample !ere ?7
per cent #or )ords and ?3 per cent #or @ommons, and II per cent and ?7 per centrespectivel" amongst those claiming to kno! %a great deal& or %5uite a lot& a$out the
Destminster parliament 'n the %process #or choosing mem$ers& the #igures !ere 3I
per cent #or )ords and I per cent #or @ommons, changing to 3 per cent versus I
per cent respectivel" amongst more kno!ledgea$le respondents
( #urther 5uestion #rom the same poll supports this !hen speci#icall" asked %!hich
#actors are important to determining )ords& legitimac", 73 per cent $elieved that it
!as ver" important %that the 6ouse considers legislation care#ull" and in detail&
8procedural legitimac":, !hile onl" ?0 per cent said the same o# the proposition that
there should $e %some mem$ers elected $" the pu$lic& 8democratic input legitimac":>or @anada 8and (ustralia: !e are more dependent on expert opinion and anecdotal
evidence !ith respect to perceived legitimac" than #or the 2P, !here polls have $een
commissioned explicitl" on this 5uestion
Environics >ocus @anada surve" 197-, =eptem$er 197, 013 respondents I per
cent !ere in #avour and 3 per cent against4 dont kno!s !ere 0 per cent
Each state originall" had six seats, $ut no! has 1 +!o seats #or each o# the t!o
territories !ere added later
)iphart himsel# noted the importance o# the t!o (ustralian cham$ers distinct
electoral s"stems, $ut suggested that this simpl" %rein#orces their incongruence& #or!hich the" %alread" 5uali#" O as a result o# e5ual representation o# the states in the
=enate& 81999$, p 31?: =u$se5uent events 8and indeed the situation pre-19:
sho! this reasoning to have $een #la!ed
arliamentar" .e$ates, ?
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u$lic (dministration =elect @ommittee 800, 007:, Russell et al.8011:
>or the governments most recent proposals, !hich included a short !hite paper as
!ell as a $ill, see @a$inet '##ice 8011: +hese re#orms #ailed see Russell 8013:
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peerages* Second report of session 4556758, )ondon 6ouse o# @ommons
-2. Riker, D 6199 +he usti#ication o# $icameralism International
Political Science #e)iew, 1381: 101C11I
8doi101177H019?11901300107: A@rossRe#, ADe$ o# =cience V, A@=(
-!. Rogers, F R001 (n in#ormational rationale #or congruent
$icameralismJournal of Teoretical Politics, 13 13C1?
8doi101177H09?1I90101300001: A@rossRe#, ADe$ o# =cience V, A@=(-+. Ro"al @ommission on the Re#orm o# the 6ouse o# )ords 000A
ouse for te future, )ondon 6M='
-,. Russell, M000 #eforming te 'ouse of %ords* %essons from
o)erseas, 'x#ord 'x#ord 2niversit" ress A@rossRe#
--. Russell, M001 +he territorial role o# second cham$ers Te
Journal of %egislati)e Studies, 781: 10?C11 8doi10100H71003?:
A+a"lor ; >rancis 'nline, A@=(
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Rethinking Bicameral Strength
27/28
-. Russell, M010 ( stronger second cham$erK (ssessing the
impact o# 6ouse o# )ords re#orm in 1999, and the lessons #or $icameralism
Political Studies, ?8?: IIC? 8doi101111H1I7-90090010x:
A@rossRe#, ADe$ o# =cience V
-/. Russell, M01 Elected second cham$ers and their po!ers (n
international surve" Te Political $uarterly, 381: 117C198doi101111H1I7-93W0107?x: A@rossRe#, ADe$ o# =cience V
-0. Russell, M013 #orthcoming Te contemporary 'ouse of %ords*
estminster (icameralism re)i)ed, 'x#ord 'x#ord 2niversit" ress
-1. Russell, Mand =ciara, M007 Dh" does the government get
de#eated in the 6ouse o# )ordsK +he )ords, the part" s"stem and British
politics Britis Politics, 99C3 8doi1010?7Hpalgrave$p000I:
A@rossRe#
-". Russell, Mand =ciara, M00 +he polic" impact o# de#eats in
the 6ouse o# )ords Britis Journal of Politics and International #elations,
108: ?71C?9 8doi101111H1I7-?IW0000331x: A@rossRe#, ADe$
o# =cience V
2. Russell, M, (donis, (, (llen, , Boothro"d, B, Butler, R, .ean,
Band Dright, +011 'ouse full* Time to get a grip on %ords appointments,
)ondon @onstitution 2nit
!. =artori, 199 "omparati)e constitutional engineering* An
in9uiry into structures, incenti)es and outcomes, )ondon Macmillan ress
+. =a!ard, M199 "o1opti)e politics and state legitimacy,
(ldershot .artmouth
,. =harman, @1999 J+he representation o# small parties and
independentsL /n #epresentation and institutional cange* :5 years of
proportional representation in te Senate, Edited $" =a!er, Mand Miskin, =
19C1? @an$erra .epartment o# the =enate
-. =hell, .1999 J+o revise and deli$erate +he British 6ouse o#
)ordsL /n Senates* Bicameralism in te contemporary world, Edited $"
atterson, = @and Mughan, (199C @olum$us 'hio =tate 2niversit"
ress
. =hell, .007 Te 'ouse of %ords, Manchester Manchester
2niversit" ress
/. =iaro##, (003 Narieties o# parliamentarianism in the advanced
industrial democracies International Political Science #e)iew, 8: ?C
I 8doi101177H019?11030003: A@rossRe#, ADe$ o# =cience V
0. =immons, ( F001Justification and legitimacy* !ssays onrigts and o(ligations, @am$ridge @am$ridge 2niversit" ress
1. +se$elis, 00 ;eto players* 'ow political institutions wor-,
rinceton,
8/11/2019 Rethinking Bicameral Strength
28/28
repl" to i$sonL /n %aw and Society #e)iew4:83:, I1CI9
/!. Ni$ert, >007 Te rise of te unelected* Democracy and te new
separation of powers, @am$ridge @am$ridge 2niversit" ress A@rossRe#
/+. De$er, M19?7 Te teory of social and economic organi+ation,lencoe, /) >ree ress
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