Rhetorics and Realities of Management

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Rhetorics and realities of managementpractices in Pakistan: Colonial, post-colonial and post-9/11 influencesAshique Ali Jhatiala, Nelarine Corneliusb & James Wallaceb

a Sindh University, Institute of Commerce, Jamshoro, Pakistanb School of Management, University of Bradford, Emm Lane,Bradford, UKPublished online: 12 Sep 2013.

To cite this article: Ashique Ali Jhatial, Nelarine Cornelius & James Wallace (2014) Rhetorics andrealities of management practices in Pakistan: Colonial, post-colonial and post-9/11 influences,Business History, 56:3, 456-484, DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2013.800970

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Rhetorics and realities of management practices in Pakistan: Colonial,post-colonial and post-9/11 influences

Ashique Ali Jhatiala, Nelarine Corneliusb* and James Wallaceb

aSindh University, Institute of Commerce, Jamshoro, Pakistan; bSchool of Management, Universityof Bradford, Emm Lane, Bradford, UK

This study explores how colonial laws and administrative practices shaped theevolution of employment management in Pakistan. It identifies important mechanismsused by the British Raj (the period of British rule of the subcontinent) to institutionaliselegal and administrative frameworks: the legacies of these structures continue toinfluence contemporary management practices in government sector organisations.This article investigates the legacy of the Raj’s ‘quota system’ in the civil services andthe doctrine of the ‘martial race’ in military services, both of which offered enduringstructural advantages in the labour market to designated groups. It further considers theimplications of the study’s findings for international HRM in particular, but alsomanagement theory, comparative HRM and comparative management in post-colonialsocieties.

Keywords: employment policies and practices; colonialism; post-colonialism;discriminatory practices, governance; Pakistan, international HRM, socio-businesselites, praetorianism

Introduction

There is a wide range of definitions of human resource management (HRM), reflecting its

evolutionary phases and mirroring its strengths and limitations by opening up new

academic and research debates. HRM aligns the formal structure of organisation with HR

systems such as recruitment, selection, appraisal and rewards, within a strategic

perspective.1 There is also some consensus regarding the core definition of HRM which is

differentiated from more traditional personnel management practices that are primarily

administratively, not strategically, oriented.2 However, much of what has been written

about the development of HRM has its roots in Anglo-American historical developments

in organisations, law, politics and national culture and values. Therefore there are many

challenges when researching HRM policies and practices in non-Western nations,

especially developing economies, as there will be a different historical path underpinning

them and cultural context in which they are enacted.

It has been suggested that it is important to understand contextual factors in order to

deepen our understanding of HRM, especially in an international context.3 This belief

continues to grow, fuelled by the view that differences in socio-economic factors, history,

education, culture, religion, national orientation and technological development are of

central importance in international HRM theory and practice development.4 Indeed,

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

*Email: [email protected]

Business History, 2014

Vol. 56, No. 3, 456–484, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2013.800970

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mailto:[email protected]

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2013.800970

HRM’s evolution in many of the developing economies such as those in Asia and Africa,

several of which are former colonies, is a mixture of colonial elements intermingled with

distinctive local socio-cultural factors.5 Furthermore, some scholars suggest that colonial

legal and administrative frameworks continue to guide HRM by introducing elements of

subjectivity and discrimination, raising concerns about the integrity and efficiency of

HRM systems in developing countries.6

The growing interest of academia in Asian perspectives of HRM has created fresh

debates in the field.7 There is evidence that British colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent

involved the deliberate institutionalisation of legal and administrative frameworks which

gave socio-economic and employment advantages to specific ethnic groups.8 Some claim

that these historic employment policies and practices continue to inform employment

management across government sector organisations in the subcontinent.9

The focus of this study is on HRM practices in Pakistan, a former British colony. The

literature on HRM, its evolution, and the current state of employment management in

Pakistan specifically, is limited.10 Additionally, in the post-colonial era, internal and

external factors of national, regional and geographical importance have led to a political

alliance, albeit an uneasy one, between Pakistan and the United States of America. US

influence has grown over time and plays a central role in post-colonial Pakistan, but not

necessarily in ways that were anticipated. US support for Pakistan’s military regimes,

especially during the Soviet–Afghan war and in the post-9/11 period has facilitated the

emergence of Pakistani military staff as the heads of many business conglomerates.

Government organisations and leadership have been militarised, with the appointment of

large numbers of serving and retired military officers at the top levels of management.11

In this paper, we investigate the distinctive development of employment management

in Pakistan from a historical perspective. The impact of colonial and post-colonial

employment policies and post-9/11 US influences are explored through examination of

secondary data and archival sources and colonial and post-colonial employment laws in

Pakistan. Further, we consider the implications of the findings for our understanding of the

evolution of management practices generally, and HRM practices in particular, in non-

Western, developing economies.

Literature review

There is a strong belief that cultural factors play an important role in the full or partial

adoption of HRM in developing countries.12 Research on these developing countries

supports the view that local traditions, religion, political, constitutional and legal

frameworks influence the functioning of HRM systems.13 For example, national cultural

factors and organisational strategies influence the way HRM is developing in Iran.14

Another study examined evidence from key national initiatives that are said to be

influential on HRM practices in Oman.15 Their findings are consistent with the view that

national culture, including religion and tribal allegiance, has a significant influence on

HRM practices. Similar evidence has been found in the context of Saudi Arabia where the

political environment and legal frameworks affect the labour market and HRM systems.16

Likewise, it has been suggested that countries with a predominantly Muslim population

typically incorporate Islamic principles into their HRM functions.17 Other Islamic

countries in Asia, particularly the Middle East, and West Africa have also embraced

religious principles in HRM practices. Developing countries in Asia, such as India, Sri

Lanka, Nepal, Thailand and China that have influences from Hinduism, Buddhism and

Business History 457

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Confucianism well blended with their colonial inheritance also reflect this in their HRM

policies and practices.18

It has been suggested that comparative and cross-national human resource management

practice research would benefit from a greater understanding of ‘culture bound’ and

‘culture free’ elements, articulated through national factors, contingent variables and

organisational and HRM strategies and policies.19 Moreover, in the context of HRM in

Asia, the importance of understanding traditional and international best practice

management customs has been asserted, as these are ‘strongly dictated by social-cultural

aspects of a given society and changing, individualistic emphasis on HRM functions’.20

Further, it has also been argued that future research should explore ‘the dynamics of

diversity management in the Asian context especially to highlight the different

mechanisms adopted by firms to manage diversity and also to indicate the challenges

and barriers faced by firms and decision makers in this regard’.21 The latter is especially

important as it engages with a range of identity characteristics that may historically, or

currently, influence labour market opportunities and job, career choice, or barriers to these.

Of particular interest is Budhwar and Sparrow’s idea of a meta-logic that guides HRM

choices: a series of factors that operate at the national level, setting the overall climate.22

However, many of the schema models and constructs that inform international and

comparative HRM are inherently Anglo-Saxon at a number of levels. First, many HRM

theories originate in the USA, theUK, and their spheres of influence; secondly, many of these

theories are rooted in the history, culture and evolution of HRM in the USA and UK; and

thirdly, these theories mirror the democratic, legal and industrial relations and developments

that characterise the US and the UK from the industrial revolution to the present.Many of the

countries for which their HRM practices are being assessed have very different historical

labour market and employment management and legal trajectories. Importantly, evaluation

of comparative practices in the extant literature often reflects an implicitly ahistorical

evaluation of practice rather than an understanding of the evolution of practices, grounded in

a historical perspective, that influence HRM meta-logic, policies and practices.

Indeed, some researchers have also considered the influences that arise from the

legacies of colonialism. It has been observed that the cases of post-colonial societies such

as Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya have religious and traditional beliefs intermingled with

colonial administrative practices in organisational settings.23 Moreover, a large body of

post-colonial literature draws attention to the fact that colonial systems created elites in the

former colonial societies of Africa and Asia and that these persist to this day.24 This

literature highlights important factors that may influence HRM practices in some

post-colonial nations. In general, these studies have focused on current practice, with the

implication that the ‘past will inevitably speak to the present’, that historical factors are

embedded within current practices. However, there has been little, if any, systematic

investigation of how specifically historical factors have shaped current practices, and the

consequences of enduring elements of these factors on practice and, indeed, policy

development in relation to these practices.

HRM and cultural factors in Pakistan

Currentmanagement inPakistan has been characterised as amixture ofmodern-daypractices

interwoven with more traditional ones. However, there has been very limited assessment of

the development ofHRMpractices inPakistan.HRMinPakistan hasbeenpassing throughan

evolutionary phase under the permanent influences of the colonial, post-colonial and

post-9/11 climate.25 Though the core practices of recruitment, selection, training, etc. would

458 A.A. Jhatial et al.

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be familiar in any country where HRM is practised, there are strong national characteristics

present, for which networks, connections and deference to seniors are central.26 These

characteristics widely affect the operationalisation of HRM policies and practices in

Pakistan.27 Organisational justice, affirmative action policies, merit-based recruitment and

selection, promotion, appraisal and training in Pakistani organisations are often

compromised, leading to disillusionment among some ethnic and religious minorities.28

Consequently, this study examines the development of HRM practices in

contemporary Pakistan by focusing on the historical colonial and post-colonial national

employment policies as central concerns. In turn, we consider the likely impact of these

national policies on HRM organisational practices. In order to understand national

employment policies, it is imperative to explore the way the subcontinent was eventually

partitioned in 1947 under the British Raj. Additionally, it is also of great importance to

examine growing US influence in Pakistan from the end of the twentieth century,

facilitated through support for successive military regimes which has potentially

far-reaching implications for institutional development and management practices. This

has been undertaken through examination of secondary data sources, including

contemporary and archival documents, and by scrutiny of Pakistan’s colonial and post-

colonial employment laws. For the latter, we create a timeline of British colonial laws and

Pakistan’s post-colonial government employment laws and administrative practices,

discuss the rationale for their evolution and identify their implications for the development

of HRM policy and practice in the country.

Research methods

The major objective for undertaking qualitative document analysis – the approach

adopted in this study – is to comprehend the historical connection of documents and to

highlight their implications. Document analysis methods help in the understanding of the

‘pattern of behaviour’ of document creators or authors.29 Previous research emphasised

the importance of authentication of the research method.30 A number of scholars propose

data triangulation in order to seek convergence and corroboration of the results, through

different data sources, to establish authentication, representativeness and credibility of

findings.31 In our qualitative study we triangulated the data to substantiate and supplement

findings from documentary evidence with current employment data from Pakistani

government organisations and contemporary media reports. Media analysis was

undertaken using a content analysis approach that focuses on the construction of cultural

meaning within media sources.32 Other documents were analysed using content analysis

employed for secondary data analysis.33 Specifically, the datasets comprised colonial

legislation (1858–1947); post-colonial legislation and key governmental documents

(1956–2010); and contemporary accounts in the media (1972–2010). The main themes

emerging from these analyses are discussed with reference to the extant literature.

Data collection and analysis

To address the central aim of the research, this study is based on findings from three sets of

data. The first dataset covers British colonial laws from 1858 to 1947 and post-colonial

Pakistani laws from 1947 to 2010 (see Appendix 1). This dataset was collected from

several sources, including the British Library (London), State Bank of Pakistan Library

(Karachi), Liaquat National Memorial Library (Karachi), National Library of Pakistan

(Islamabad) and the Government of Pakistan’s websites (Appendix 1).


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For the second dataset, current employment data was collected from sources including

the Government of Pakistan, World Bank, Transparency International and an extensive

literature review. For the third dataset, media reports were analysed.

In order to understand the historical, colonial and cultural influences on Pakistani

employment management, we followed the protocol suggested by Altheide by preparing a

list of documents to be investigated.34 For analysis of the legal framework, we adopted the

‘document analysis worksheet method’, designed and developed by the US Education

Staff of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The key advantage

of using this method is that it identifies the fundamental characteristics such as type, date,

author or creator, title and purpose of the document with the freedom to develop the codes

to be investigated. According to Mason, it is important to investigate the characteristics of

documents as they are constructed in particular contexts, by particular people, with

particular purposes and with intended and unintended consequences.35 For each case, we

coded case characteristics such as document type, year of creation, author or creator,

location, purpose and consequences. The main characteristics that were coded included:

colonialism, post-colonialism, quota system, regionalism, provincialism, employment, the

civil service, elites, federal government, military services, trade unionism, nationalisation

and privatisation.

Documents were analysed using the constant comparative method whereby line,

sentence and paragraph segments of the document were reviewed to decide what codes fit

the concepts suggested by the data.36 Since the data contained many legal and government

documents, we reviewed each document clause by clause. Each emergent code was

compared to all other codes to identify similarities, differences and general patterns. Thus,

data were analysed in a three-level process. Themes gradually emerged as a result of the

combined process of becoming familiar with the data, making logical associations with the

main objectives of the research and considering what was learned during the initial review

of the literature. At successive stages, themes moved from a low level of abstraction to

become major, overarching themes rooted in the concrete evidence provided by the data.

The emerging themes together with a substantive, formal theory of development-focused

collaboration became the major findings. This method has been widely advocated in

business history research.37

Findings

British colonial influences: ethnic tensions and employment pressures

The British Raj (also known as the period of Crown Rule) ruled the undivided Indian

subcontinent (comprising what are now India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir and Sri

Lanka) for over 200 years until independence in 1947. During this period, the British

administration required competent Indian civilian and army staff to control what was

essentially a loose state.38 By the time of the Charter Act of 1853, Crown Rule introduced

open competitive examination and recruitment on the basis of merit to the Indian Civil

Service.39 The first such examination was held in London in 1855.40 From the outset, the

merit principles of the ICS were criticised by both the British Raj and the ethnic and

religious minorities of India and termed ‘discriminatory employment policies’.41 The

British Raj was criticised for largely confining the benefits of the ICS to Anglo-Saxon

candidates and high status Indians. Minority ethnic and religious groups in colonial India,

especially Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, protested on the grounds that the ICS would

result in the domination of upper caste Hindus. The Raj honoured these minority voices

and subsequently, introduced the system of nomination to the ICS in 1879.42 However,


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Highlight

according to Potter, the system of nomination was arbitrary and minorities were more

aggrieved at the decision. This forced the Raj to set up the Muddiman Council. Sir

Alexander Muddiman, in the Council of State in 1925, pledged to reserve ‘some places’

for Muslims in the ICS, which is known historically as ‘the Muddiman pledge’ out of

which emerged a more transparent quota system for religious and ethnic minorities.43

It has been observed that Muslim civilians in British India, including some who later

administered Pakistan in the initial years after the country’s independence from

post-colonial independent India, were nominated into the civil service.44 Of the 87

Muslims who entered the ICS during the period 1922–43, 11 were successful in the

London examinations, 18 were successful in the examination in India and the remaining

58 (68% of the total) were not successful but were nominated to the ICS in order to redress

communal inequalities.45 The British rulers introduced ethnic quotas, first in legislative

bodies and then in the ICS through the Indian Council Act of 1909, the Government of

India Act, 1919 and the Government of India Act, 1935. The employment quota for

minorities was formally introduced on 14 July 1934 on the basis of origin of religion and

caste, and not region.46

Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy, which was described as the ‘steel frame’ enabling the Raj

to rule the large and unwieldy Indian empire, has its roots in the ICS.47 Although the

current structure of the civil service in Pakistan was established under Article 240 of the

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973), the current policy of a quota

system in Pakistan’s civil service was inherited from the Government of India Act, 1935.48

Since then, the quota system has been a fundamental guiding principle for employment

and HRM practice in federal government organisations, public corporations and the civil

service. The first Constitution of Pakistan was enacted in 1956 which guaranteed the

principle of non-discrimination in public service. However, Article 17 of the same

constitution made an exception to the merit principle by asserting that the quota system

would remain effective for 15 years. A similar constitutional provision was made in

another Constitution of Pakistan, promulgated in 1962. Article 14 provided a 10-year time

limit for the quota system.49 Long before the first Constitution of Pakistan, the statistics in

Tables 1 and 2 suggest that a thread of employment discrimination had already been

inherited from the colonial quota policy by the decision to introduce the regional quota

system in September 1948.

Close examination of the statistics in Table 1 suggests three important features of the

early quota system: (a) no quota for merit – all appointments were made against the

regional quota; (b) there were regional biases within the quota system – for example, what

was East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) found the regional quota policy to be inequitable and

Table 1. Regional quota system in central government in Pakistan (September 1948).

Region/Province Quota (%)

Percentage of regionalpopulation in

total population

East Pakistan (Bengal) 42 56.75Punjab 24 28Karachi 2 1.5All other provinces and princely states of West Pakistan 17 13.75Potential migrants from India 15 0Total 100 100

Source: Waseem, “Affirmative Action.”


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biased; and (c) 15% of the quota was for potential migrants from India to Pakistan.50

Moreover, the migration of millions of people from India to Pakistan, especially to the

Karachi-Sindh region, structurally changed the ethnic and demographic balance of the

indigenous people, the Sindhis.51 The 1948 quota policy was consequently subjected to

harsh criticism which forced the central government to review the decision and in

November 1949 a new quota policy was introduced by the Government of Pakistan

(Table 2).

The figures in Table 2 show that the new quota system had 20% reserved for merit

recruitment and abolished the quota favouring potential migrants. However, East

Pakistanis still claimed that there were regional biases as they secured only 40% of the

quota but were more than 50% of the population; later, in 1967, East Pakistan’s quota

share was increased to 50%. Importantly, though, the region-based quota system in

Pakistan still failed to protect minority ethnic and religious groups and underprivileged

local candidates.52 Furthermore, from Tables 1 and 2, statistics show no quota reservation

for Hindus, Sikhs and the Christian minorities in Pakistan, which is contrary to the spirit of

the ‘Muddiman pledge’ of 1925 which granted a corresponding separate quota for the

Muslim populace in the ICS.

The post-colonial framework of the civil service

Under Article 240 of the Constitution of 1973, civil service appointments, and their terms

and conditions, are regulated by an Act of Parliament, i.e. the Civil Servants Act of 1973.

The Civil Establishment Code (ESTACODE), a vast compendium of laws, provides the

operating procedures and rules and regulations which shape HRM policies and practices

from the macro to the micro level in government organisations.

Table 3 reveals current regional quotas calculated on the basis of the population of the

provinces and regions, with 7.5% reserved for merit.53 For the remainder, about 50% is

allocated to the Punjab, 19% to Sindh Province (of which Sindh Urban gets 40% and

Table 2. Regional quota system in central government in Pakistan (November 1949).

Category Quota (%)

Merit 20East Pakistan (Bengal) 40Punjab (including Bhawalpur) 23Karachi 2All other provinces and princely states 15

Source: Waseem, “Affirmative Action.”

Table 3. Population, quota and employment in the federal government.

ProvincePopulation asa percentage

Provincial/regionalquota as a percentage

Share of totalemployment

Percentage of totalemployment

Punjab 53.06 50 129,078 54.94Sindh 21.67 19 44,415 18.91Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 15.42 11.5 26,060 11.09Balochistan 3.57 6 10,588 4.51Others 6.28 6 24,792 10.55

Source: CIA The World Factbook; ICG report, 2010; Government of Pakistan, “The Thirteenth Census.”


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Sindh-Rural 60% respectively), 11.5% to Khyber Pakhtunkhawa, 6% to Balochistan, 4%

to FATA and Gilgit-Baltistan and 2% to Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Since 2007, a 10%

quota has been allocated to women from the share of each of the provinces and regions.54

Moreover, a 10% quota for military officers in the civil service has been legalised since the

military government of the 1980s.

Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali (Z.A.) Bhutto’s nationalisation programmes of the 1970s

served as a catalyst for the continued expansion of the quota system. Between 1972 and

1975, Bhutto nationalised numerous industries (banking, insurance, heavy machinery,

natural resource extraction, rice, cotton, textiles, cement, automobiles, etc.). As a

consequence, such industries, formerly in the private sector, instantly became subject to

the terms and conditions of federal employment laws.55 Table 4 presents further support

for the view of the dominance of specific ethnic groups in civil and military services, a

historical phenomenon that continues today.56

A sense of ‘internal colonialism’ was intensified for communities such as the Sindhi,

Baloch and Bengalis (i.e. before the 1971 break-away of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh)

who had limited access to a Punjabi-dominated army.57 Pashtun ethnic nationalism, on the

other hand, has been co-opted by a growing presence in the military-run establishment.58

Arguably, the military are the group that remain most dominated by a single ethnic group,

with over 70% originating from the Punjab region.59 As a result, ethnic Punjabis hold

almost 60% of civil service positions along with 70% in the military: this group continues

to hold sway.60 Similar evidence can be drawn from the compositions of board of directors

across multinationals, private and military-owned enterprises.

The continuity of discriminatory colonial traditions of employment aggrieved East

Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971.61 This is when separation from West Pakistan was

achieved just 20 years after independence. Other research contributions report that the

colonial legacy of civil–military and landed elites, dominated by particular ethnic groups,

have bred frustration in other constituent parts of Pakistan, e.g. Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,

Baluchistan and tribal areas. This sense of injustice has caused intra-provincial and

inter-provincial grievances and thus damaged national cohesion.62

Senior appointments and socio-business elitism

A large body of literature suggests that in post-colonial societies of Asia (and Africa), a

social and business elite class – i.e. the indigenous bourgeoisie – emerged and became

embedded in politics, government, civil–military and businesses.63 Social elites in

civil–military administrative systems and major businesses in East Africa, especially

Tanzania, that emerged during British colonial rule also prevail in the post-colonial era.64

Table 4. Ethnic origins of the top civil bureaucrats in 1973.

Ethnic origin Number Percentage

Punjabis 1727 48.89Pashtoons 287 8.12Muhajirs 1070 30.29Sindhi 90 2.50Balouch 9 0.25Others 349 9.95Total 3532 100.00

Source: 4th Triennial Census of Central Government Employees, Islamabad, GOP, 1973.


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Some studies observe that former colonies of Britain, France, Germany, Spain and

Portugal still continue colonial traditions in employment, governance and

entrepreneurship.65 The British administrative legacy remains prominent in countries

such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia,

Uganda and Botswana; the French traditions are dominant in former French colonies such

as Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Upper Volta and Senegal and the Spanish systems are

prevalent in former Latin American colonies.

In fact, the theory of the social elite proposed by Pierre Bourdieu explains the

phenomenon of colonial systems that produced and reproduced socio-business elites in

France and Germany, and also Britain. According to social elite theory, colonial systems

of education, training and orientation helped native colonial beneficiaries and such

mechanisms reproduce the ‘dominant or ruling class’.66 Other European scholars have

also indicated the prevalence of socio-business elites in several countries, such as France,

Germany and the UK. Studies trace the educational and business ties of powerful elites

which benefited in the French privatisation process.67 More evidence of European elites,

their roots and influences in socio-business life, have been reported in several studies.68

Similarly, several investigations identify colonial elites in specific historical stages:

firstly, pre-independence ‘preparation’ for self-government based on colonial education

and orientation; secondly, orientation to post-colonial administrative training to govern

the masses; and lastly, efficient use of legal–administrative frameworks.69 Likewise, it has

been identified that the post-colonial ruling elites were by-products of colonial education

and orientation which were perpetuated under the strong colonial administrative

frameworks.70

Over almost two centuries there have been strong influences from colonial and post-

colonial civil–military and landed elites that extensively impacted on HRM practices in

Pakistan.71 Indeed, the dominance of 22 families in government and business has been the

centre of attention in post-colonial Pakistan. A landmark speech by Mehbub ul Haq in

1968 in Karachi highlighted the power and wealth of 22 industrial family groups.

He observed that these families had come to dominate the economic and financial life of

Pakistan and that they controlled about two-thirds of industrial assets, 80% of banking and

79% of insurance.72 In order to limit the influence of these families in business and

government, Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto nationalised a number of private sector

businesses.

The impact of nationalisation and privatisation on employment management

In the early 1970s, populist Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto initiated nationalisation of private

sector industries, which led to unprecedented expansion in the public sector and instantly

brought them under the federal government employment laws and quota system. In January

1972, the government nationalised the emerald mines in Swat, along with other basic

industries including iron and steel, basic metals, heavy manufacturing, engineering motor

vehicles, chemicals, petrochemicals, cement, gas and oil. The life insurance industry was

also nationalised inMarch 1972, and the vegetable industry was brought under state control

in August 1973. In 1974, the Banks (Nationalisation) Act was passed enabling government

to take control of all private banks. Subsequently, in July 1976, over 2000 rice-husking and

wheat flour mills and cotton ginning factories were also nationalised.

This nationalisation process greatly impacted on the education sector of the country by

nationalising all private schools and colleges. The University Ordinance (1973) partly

democratised the management of academic and administrative affairs of universities


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through elected syndicate and senate bodies. The University Grants Commission (UGC)

was subsequently set up to regulate higher education and university affairs across the

country.73

Though popular with voters, many critics of nationalisation argue that the decision was

inherently flawed and that it virtually crippled economic progress in the 1960s.74 Among

the concerns raised was that nationalisation provided bureaucrats with new wide-ranging

powers as they suddenly became heads of banks, industries and public corporations.75

Critics also argue that it eroded the spirit of private entrepreneurs and the competitive

labour market, thus failing to achieve its stated objectives of making the government of the

time more dependent on civil bureaucracy in order to manage the expansion of the public

sector.76 Some studies suggest that the nationalisation reform effort was used to punish

opponents and to benefit supporters.77 Consequently, the military regime of General Zia in

1977 introduced denationalisation, disinvestments and decentralisation, which later

became the cornerstone of the privatisation process in Pakistan. Critics of privatisation

contend that the process resulted in over 500,000 people becoming unemployed in the two

decades up to 2008.78 They specifically cite the privatisation of the Muslim Commercial

Bank (MCB), Pakistan Telecommunication Limited (PTCL) and the Karachi Electric

Supply Corporation (KESC) as evidence of corruption, cronyism and business elites

benefiting. Recently, the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) nullified the privatisation

of Pakistan Steel Mills on suspicion of such corruption and cronyism. The restructuring of

Habib Bank and United Bank resulted in the loss of 10,000 jobs. Similarly, 2225 out

of 3495 employees in the heavy engineering sector have taken a golden handshake or

voluntary retirement and 2195 employees in the vegetable ghee mills, not yet privatised,

have elected to take voluntary retirement. Table 5 suggests that total employment in the

manufacturing units was around 35,000, of which 63.3% opted for a golden handshake in

these privatised organisations.

Nonetheless, despite frequent changes in government since 1985, with five regularly

elected and six caretaker administrations, there has been a consensus on the continuation

of the privatisation policy.

Distortion of practice: corruption and political party influences

Another source of profound and perpetual influence on HRM development in Pakistan

comes from rampant corruption, especially in mainstream political parties.79 Corruption

Table 5. The incidence of golden handshakes.

Industries Total employment Percentage opting for golden handshake

Automobiles 4604 38.0Cement 8289 36.1Chemicals 6342 70.8Fertiliser 688 10.5Engineering 2661 77.5Ghee Mills 5057 74.3Rice 810 93.3Roti Plant 676 99.1Newspapers 1142 100.0Miscellaneous 5056 97.3Total 34649 63.3

Source: Privatisation Commission of Pakistan.


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remains a substantial obstacle for Pakistan; even the most popular and democratically

elected five governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were overthrown on

corruption charges in the 1990s.80 Bribery is claimed to be widespread in law

enforcement, procurement, employment and the provision of public services.81 The

judiciary is not seen as independent and is considered to be shielding corrupt political

practices from prosecution.82 In its corruption perception survey, Transparency

International (see Table 6) consistently reports Pakistan as one of the most corrupt

countries in the world in terms of petty bribery, and further revealed that its government

and political parties rank as the most corrupt institutions in the country.

Examples of corruption, cronyism and favouritism include the protection of loan

defaulters, the protection of tax evaders, the allocation of public resources such as

infrastructure construction budgets to clients of politicians and bureaucrats, and

employing unqualified, incompetent political supporters.83 Anecdotal evidence and

newspaper reports suggest that the interlocking of bureaucratic and political interests

results in the misallocation, waste or misappropriation of billions of rupees of public

resources every year.84 In recent years a number of measures have been put in place for

institutional mechanisms to bring corruption to a manageable level. For example, the

National Anti-Corruption Strategy was developed in 2002, along with its executing

agency, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), which was endowed with

comprehensive powers to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.

However, anti-corruption proceedings have long been suspected of being partial. They

are mainly directed against members of the political opposition and minor civil servants,

while the conduct of military officials has not been adequately scrutinised. Consequently,

the impartiality and transparency of the NAB were questioned and the government at the

time made it virtually ineffective. Moreover, the National Reconciliation Ordinance of

October 2007 granted blanket immunity for past corrupt actions, shielding many public

officials and members of the government from prosecution.85

On several occasions, political parties have bypassed constitutional and legal

requirements when appointing and promoting senior executives. There are numerous

examples of recruitment, selection, transfer and promotion cases where civil, military and

political influences prevail. More recently, former Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani

appointed the chief of the National Insurance Company Limited (NICL) and several other

close associates without following regulated due process. Appointments were challenged in

Table 6. Pakistan’s CPI rating.

Year Number of countries Pakistan’s rank Pakistan’s score out of 10

1995 41 39 2.251996 54 53 1.01997 52 48 2.531998 85 71 2.71999 99 88 2.22000 NA NA NA2001 91 79 2.32002 NA NA 2.62003 133 92 2.52004 145 129 2.12005 158 144 2.12006 163 142 2.2

Source: Transparency International.


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the Supreme Court of Pakistan, where the orders were nullified. In another case, the SCP

declared the promotion of 54 senior civil servants by Prime Minister Gilani null and void,

ordering him to make the appointments and promotions based on merit. Earlier, he served

four and a half years in prison on charges of appointing hundreds of his constituents and close

associates when he was speaker of the National Assembly in the last Pakistan Peoples’ Party

(PPP) government.86

In 2010, the government passed into law the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Bill

(2010) to reinstate over 7700 government employees 15 years after their dismissal. These

were originally appointed in former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s tenure from 1993 to

1996 and were removed from service from 1996 to 1998 by the Pakistan Muslim League

(PML) government led by the then PrimeMinister Nawaz Sharif on the basis of allegations

of corruption, political favouritism and cronyism. The decisions to remove staff were based

on claims of high levels of overstaffing. In particular, the PML governments (1990–93 and

1997–99) identified excessive employment in the public sector and introduced an

employment ban.87 As the 2010 Bill was passed by the National Assembly and Senate, so

reinstatement of employees could not be nullified.88 The reinstatement of employees cost

the government Rs8 billion in salaries and Rs2 billion of recurring annual expenses.89

Trade unionism

In the 1960s, governments introduced labour laws that brought substantial changes in

workers’ participation in management and changed the structures of salaries, bonuses,

compensation, leave, gratuities and retirement. Employers were made responsible for the

educational expenses of one child per worker, and the settlement of industrial disputes was

revised to prevent the victimisation of the workforce by management.90

Trade unions in Pakistan have been considered important players in the development of

employment management. The Government of Pakistan inherited British colonial labour

laws, such as the Trade Union Act 1926, the Factories Act 1934, the Industrial Employment

(Standing Orders) Act 1946 and the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and interventionist

policies of managing labour relations.91 These four laws paved the way for the right to

demonstrate, strike, for union activism and formed the basis of labour laws in the country.92

Civil–military leaders of the country have long believed trade unions to be pressure

groups and considered them a powerful challenge.93 In order to curtail this power, the

Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was replaced with the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959 by

the then military regime of General Ayub Khan. Here, employees’ right to strike or go

slow was withdrawn.94 The second martial law regime of General Yahya Khan also

continued the anti-union stance of his predecessor.95 In an attempt to resolve disputes

through statutory bodies, the military regime of Yahya Khan merged new legislation and

trade union ordinances into a new law called the Industrial Relations Ordinance (IRO)

1969.96 This left few options for strikes and activism.

The IRO 1969 was later amended by the Bhutto government, making it

labour-friendly, and subsequently trade union activism grew as a result of his

nationalisation programme. However, this law was again amended by General Musharaf

in 2002 to ban union activism across the country. More recently, the PPP government

repealed the IRO 2002 Act and enacted interim legislation: the Industrial Relations Act

(IRA) 2008. This act guarantees freedom of association and the right to strike, alongside a

three-pronged strategy of employee participation in management decision making in the

organisation.97 Nevertheless, the IRA 2008 does deny unions a voice in retention,

suspension, dismissal or laying off employees.


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Clearly, trade unionism in Pakistan has experienced and been impacted by episodes of

rise and fall in democratic and military regimes over the past several decades. Tables 7 and

8 show the trends in union membership over this period. The percentage of the total labour

force in the country stood at approximately 0.7% in 2000, with more than 7200 registered

unions. Of these, only 1900 (26%) unions retain collective bargaining status.98 Table 7

shows an estimated labour force of about 51.78 million that includes some 10 million

women. Table 8 also shows the increasing trend in the number of registered unions from

708 in the 1960s to 2522 in the 1970s and 6551 in the 1980s. Similarly, their declared

membership rose from 350,000 in the 1960s to 736,000 in the 1970s and 870,000 in the

1980s. After the privatisation programme during the 1990s and the subsequent ban on

trade unionism by the military regime, there has been a fall in membership.

A feature that emerges from Table 9 is the occupational segregation and social and

religious exclusion of religious minority groups such as Hindus, Sikhs and Christians.

Faltering modernisation and colonial echoes: ethnic composition of the Pakistani military

The Pakistani military is one of the nation’s largest organisations in terms of the number of

personnel (over 600,000 in active service). The evidence gathered from secondary sources

suggests that the Pakistani military retains a colonial tradition of recruiting from

predominantly three districts of northern Punjab.99 Approximately 70% of the recruits are

taken from here, with another 20%-odd being recruited from four districts in the Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa province and the remaining provinces, i.e. Sindh and Balochistan, providing

only about 5% of the military personnel. Some investigations suggest that the ethnic

composition of the Pakistani armed forces is deliberate and plays an important role in

national politics, the civil service, the government and private business sectors.100

The Pakistani military as landed elite class

In the 1890s, the British Empire opened ‘canal colonies’ and initiated a process of land

allocation to win the loyalty of the soldiering classes, ultimately aiming to depoliticise

Table 7. Population and labour force.

National population 187,342,721 (July 2011 est.)Population growth rate, annual 2.2%Labour force estimated 51.78 millionAge of labour force 10 years and aboveWomen in labour force 10 millionAgriculture 44% of the labour forceServices 35%Industry & manufacturing 20%

Source: CIA World Factbook; World Bank 2010; Labour Force Survey of Pakistan, 2007–08.

Table 8. Trade unions and membership.

Year Registered unions Membership

1960 708 350,0001970 2522 736,0001980 6551 870,0001990 7080 952,4882000 7220 1,009,897

Sources: Labour Force Survey 2007–08; Ghayur, “Evolution”; CADTM 2008.


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them.101 The government of Pakistan, in its early years of independence, adopted the

colonial tradition of granting land to military personnel by amending the Colonisation of

Land Act 1912, in 1965, to allocate land to military officers.102 Land allocations, including

agricultural, commercial and residential, against the rank of military officers are shown in

Table 10. The land is usually allocated to military officers on retirement.

Details of the landholdings of military officers since the Act was amended in 1965 are

further shown in Table 11. As a consequence, retired military officers emerged as a feudal

elite in post-colonial Pakistan. Large landholdings, and associated business interests,

compel the military to play a pervasive role in politics.

Pakistani military as business conglomerate

The Pakistani military controls a large network of organisations and charities under the

umbrella of charitable foundations, but there is limited research in this area.103 Much

more research has been undertaken on the military’s involvement in private and public

organisations.

The military’s investments in Pakistan’s private sector have traditionally focused on

the primary industry, with projects in oil, gas and agriculture, but in recent years it has

undertaken projects in high technology sectors, such as software production.104 The army,

navy and air force foundations have invested strongly in the service sector, such as real

estate, insurance, media, shipping, private security and banking.105 Some of the

foundations’ businesses have become so powerful that they dominate their industry and

are able to marginalise competitors. The military-owned corporations have successfully

participated in the state’s privatisation programme, bought up public corporations through

competitive price bidding and established a £10 billion business empire.106 Indeed,

military officers readily acknowledge that armed forces’ companies are able to gain an

advantage over purely civilian firms in the allocation of government contracts, and in some

Table 9. Ethnic make-up of the Pakistani military.

Ethnic group Province Percentage

Punjabi Punjab 70Pakhtun Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 20Muhajirs Sindh 5Sindhi Sindh 3 (approx.)Balouchi Baluchistan 2 (approx.)Total 100

Source: Siddiqa, Military Inc.

Table 10. Land entitlement for military personnel.

Serial No. Rank Acreage

1 Maj. General and above 240 acres2 Brigadiers and Colonels 150 acres3 Lt. Colonels 124 acres4 Lieutenants to Majors 100 acres5 JCOs 64 acres6 NCOs 32 acres



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cases this practice has pushed civilian firms into bankruptcy. There are several instances of

socio-business elites taking advantages of privatisation programmes elsewhere as well.

The privatisation was considered as a privileged window of opportunity, mirroring the

rewards reaped by the French business elite from the privatisation process from 1986 to

1998 in terms of access to positions and financial gains.107

Apart from fighting on the battlefields and safeguarding the national borders, the

Pakistani military has emerged as a business elite in the country through performing

multiple roles including building roads, apprehending electricity thieves, running a large

network of commercial enterprises and identifying and tackling corruption.108 Pakistani

military’s involvement in economic ventures is directly proportional to their sense of

judgement regarding the political control of the state.109 Since political power nurtures

greater financial control, the military perpetuates its pervasive existence in political

spheres to safeguard its vested economic interests.

Military influences on Pakistani public sector HRM systems

The continuation of discriminatory colonial employment policies, the traditions of

regional quotas and the martial race in civil–military services have far-reaching

implications for the HRM systems of government organisations at the micro level.110

Consistent regional quota policy frameworks guide HRM practices of government

corporations, such as Pakistan Steel, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC)

and others. As a result, ethnic group dominance can be found in the employment of PIAC.

Table 12 presents statistics of over 18,000 employees of PIAC where 43% originate from

the Punjab (e.g. central and north) followed by 27% from Urban Sindh (which has been

dominated by Indian migrants from 1947).

The situation is even more extreme as over 50% of those employed by PIAC, the

state-owned airline, are residents of just three cities, namely Karachi, Lahore and

Rawalpindi. This, of course, resonates with the civil–military dominance by particular

ethnic groups in other government sectors. Such an environment causes marginalisation

and disengagement in an already fragmented Pakistani society. Moreover, the rhetoric of

Table 11. Land allotments to military personnel, 1965–2004.

Serial No. District Province Acreage

1 DI Khan NWFP 185,0002 Muzaffargarh Punjab 173,000.73 DG Khan Punjab 153,000.54 Rajanpur Punjab 133,000.35 Vehari Punjab 170,9876 Pakpattan Punjab 193,6767 Multan Punjab 123,7938 Khanewal Punjab 143,2839 Sahiwal Punjab 173,40710 Lahore Punjab 273,41311 Kasur Punjab 387,28312 Sheikhupura Punjab 193,863Sub-total 2,303,706.514 Sindh Province 400,000Total 2,703,706.5



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affirmative action policies and merit fails, leaving the integrity and ethicality of HRM

questionable.111 With the historical discrimination in employment policies and practices

in Pakistan in mind, Article 38 (g) of the 18th Amendment Bill 2010 requires all

stakeholders to respect the shares of provinces in civil, military and federal government

jobs. It would appear that this amendment is having little effect in this regard.

Indeed, it could be argued that the management of HRM has been dominated by the

military regimes who have often ruled since independence.112 For example, the nine-year

military regime of General Musharraf saw the appointment of hundreds of serving

and retired military personnel, ostensibly to reduce corruption, increase accountability and

monitor governance.113 Military officials were also appointed to key civilian posts,

including the chairmanship of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), which is

responsible for recruitment of the federal civil bureaucracy and some organisations which

require technical expertise, such as the chief executive of the Alternative Energy

Development Board, chairman of Pakistan Steel Mill and chairman of the Pakistan

Telecommunication Authority.114

Post-9/11 influences: intensification of militarisation

The military regimes of General Zia during the Soviet–Afghan war (1979–89) and, more

recently, General Musharraf in the post-9/11 climate profoundly informed national

values, institutions and management practices. Both generals ‘militarised’ the government

sector organisations with their military associates and affected the policy and practice

of transparent HRM systems.115 In the recent past, the military regime of General

Musharraf earned support from the US and other Western allies due to the rhetoric

of bringing about enlightened modernisation, good governance and transformation of

state enterprises which provided external support for him to rule the nation and earned over

US$10 billion in aid.116

Lengthy military rule adversely undermined the democratic and political institutions

and national integration, paving the way for ethno-national politics and social unrest which

is reflected in workplace and management practices. Paradoxically, military personnel

continue to claim that it is the failure of civilian institutions and the corruptibility of civil

bureaucrats and political elements that invite them to protect the national interests.117

Another major factor that makes the integrity of Pakistani military questionable is the

single-ethnic dominance of northern Punjab – a major cause of frustration to other ethnic

groups. The deployment of military personnel in top management positions in government

sector enterprises brings them on a par with the civil ruling elite.118

Table 12. Ethnic composition of PIAC employees.

Region No. of employees %

Azad Jamu & Kashmir (AJK) 213 1Balochistan 699 4Foreigners 388 2Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2076 11Northern Areas 217 1Punjab 7800 43Sindh (Rural) 1919 11Sindh (Urban) 4889 27Total 18,201 100

Source: PIAC’s unpublished employment statistics.


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Militarisation, the state and enterprises in the post-9/11 period

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US are believed to have changed the world dramatically.

They strongly affected geo-politics, economics, international relations and foreign policies

worldwide.119 They brought the Bush administration in Washington very close to

Moscow, the EU, Beijing and Islamabad. The US–EU partnership duly recognised the

geo-strategic position of Pakistan in peace-building operations and as a vital partner in the

war on terrorism; by virtue of that, General Musharaf was afforded global support.

The financial assistance and political support of the United States, in the post-9/11 climate,

for the military regime in Pakistan has been purposive and linked with poverty alleviation

and more funds for education and health, and was agreed to by the Musharaf regime.120

Good governance, fair employment practices and public sector reforms were said to be

a high priority in order to keep the civil service on the right path and make it more

responsive to the people.121

In an attempt to fulfil his promises, Musharraf appointed hundreds of military

personnel to top executive positions of government sector organisations. Many consider

that the Musharraf regime’s ‘enlightened moderation and transformation’ of society,

governance and management practices sponsored by the US and international donor

agencies failed. Since 9/11, the US influence on Pakistan has been substantial as the US

supplied aid and support to the military regime to reform education, health, infrastructure

and the public sector. However, indigenous problems such as ethnic homogeneity in the

armed forces, military infiltration in the public sector and, above all, ethno-nationalism

and religious extremism, have flourished and impacted on national integrity, institutional

capacity and management practices.122

Four coups d’etat, an extensive business empire, a substantial presence in the civil

service, heading government institutions and the promotion of single-ethnic hegemony in

military services suggest a particular form of ‘governmentality’, or control of the

population, with particular emphasis on the ‘apparatuses’ of security through the political

economy or market mechanisms of the neo-colonialists in Pakistan. The military regimes

of General Zia and General Musharraf deployed hundreds of military personnel in top

management positions in government organisations and bypassed principles of fair and

transparent HRM. An absence of sound and effective HRM practices, favouritism,

sycophancy and nepotism are common practices in employment management. The

evidence suggests that the former military regime militarised state, society, enterprises and

management practices in the post-9/11 climate and all promises of bringing about

enlightened moderation and transformation proved to be no more than rhetoric.

What emerges is the role of praetorianism in shaping and maintaining HRM practices:

intervention by the military in the political process, in order to secure and advance military

power and control. Typically, performance failure by civilian regimes is the catalyst for

military action. Although the prompt to military intervention may share common features

in many post-colonial societies,123 the reason why praetorianism is established, and what

sustains it, may differ.

The past speaking to the present: modern-day practices and historical echoes

Specific examples are helpful in encapsulating the colonial and post-colonial legacy that

continues to inform organisations in modern-day Pakistan. The dominance of civil,

military and landed elites is a source of dissatisfaction for many in the society as a whole,

and there are many illustrations of the influence of clan, ethnicity and praetorianism on

recruitment and selection.


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The Pakistani media has highlighted the prevalence of Punjabi ex-servicemen in key

government posts, for example, for key appointments in the civil service.124 Moreover,

unease remains that the latest proposals for modernisation are not being implemented.

A recent article on Pakistan International Airlines (PIAC) reveals not only that the new

head will be ex-military, but also the changes necessary to tackle problems facing public

sector organisations such as PIAC have not been made.125 These proposals, aimed at

improving governance, tackling mismanagement and addressing corruption, as part of a

National Governance Plan, argued for the appointment of professional CEOs and heads of

organisations, ratified by parliament. Thus, attempts to modernise management practices

continue to be proposed, including at the level of government, but struggle to take root,

hindered by the institutionalisation of historical privileges.

Conclusion

Pakistan has been passing through an evolutionary phase, with political and administrative

structures deeply rooted in British colonialism.126 Civil–military and political institutions

appear to have an undue influence on the country’s policies, affecting socio-economic,

political and employment management structures.127 The legal and administrative

frameworks, e.g. colonial and post-colonial, and data collected from various other sources

reveal civil–military and mainstream political parties influence the development of HRM

practices.

The civil, military and landed elites dominated by particular ethnic groups have

emerged as historical by-products in most post-colonial societies in Asia, Africa and Latin

America.128 Pakistan is therefore not an exceptional case.129 Similarly, Pakistan is

characterised by praetorianism: the right of the military to intervene when the civilian

government is deemed by military leaders to have failed. This places militarism not only at

the core of the political process, but also as a powerful influence over employment laws

and HRM decision making and practices.

The rollercoaster decisions of nationalisation in the 1970s and denationalisation

followed by the policy of privatisation affected employment management and

strengthened civil bureaucracy, with serious implications for HRM in the public

sector.130 This study contributes to understanding the historical perspective of

employment management policies inherited from the colonial past that informs the

current functioning of HRM in government-owned enterprises in the country.

Since national independence, civil, military and landed elites have become involved in

state-formation efforts by institutionalising power bases. The elite, dominated by

particular ethnic groups, promote their clans in civil and military services, in other

government sector enterprises and the private sector. Although the presence of specific

groups with an advantage has been noted by researchers of HRM in Asia,131 the

antecedence of such practice (and by implication, the roots of its enduring nature) has been

articulated less well. Modern HRM has developed specific areas of practice to enhance

diversity and fairness in organisations. However, the challenge to post-colonial societies is

the evolution of fairer practices against a backdrop of instability and long-standing

structural inequalities in the labour market. Importantly, although HRM practices may be

used to change cultural values in relation to inequality and fairness, it can also be

configured to reinforce the latter. In this light, quota systems may mask, rather than loosen,

the realpolitik of structural inequalities.

The US patronage of military regimes in Pakistan during the Soviet–Afghan war and

the current contextual dynamism of the post-9/11 climate have far-reaching implications


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for politics, society, institutions and management practices in Pakistan, and the region in

general. In terms of management practices generally and HRM specifically, there has been

a reinforcement of praetorianism within organisations. The promises of enlightened

moderation and transformation of society and enterprises from the General Musharraf

regime have not materialised. The current fragile civilian government (2011) and societal

structures influence management practices, and set challenges for HRM theory, cross-

cultural research and international HRM in post-colonial societies like Pakistan.

Structural and institutionalised advantages within the society generally make it

difficult for modern HRM practices to develop, especially with regard to the most

desirable governmental and national-level appointments. As highlighted earlier in this

article, scholars of international HRM have encouraged the exercise of caution when

attempting to understand HRM in non-Western settings. Although most highlight the

importance of socio-cultural factors, it is Budhwar and Sparrow’s idea of a meta-logic

or factors that operate at the national level, setting the overall climate, and Gardiner’s

observation of the importance of post-colonialism, religion and traditional beliefs on

organisational practices that resonate most strongly with our studies on Pakistan.132

However, these scholars have largely neglected the significance of power, business

elites and praetorianism: these are likely to be important elements within national meta-

logics and highlight the need for a clear understanding of meta-logic elements and the

depth of their historical roots. An understanding and engagement with these is

important for multinationals, government policy makers and those wishing to

professionalise and modernise management practices in a manner that is both credible

and achievable. Researchers would benefit from the development of a more

sophisticated understanding of the influence of meta-logics on organisations and

management practice.

More generally, our findings indicate the importance of understanding the nature of the

evolution of national employment policies and, in turn, how these influence practices. As

discussed earlier in this article, there is an established literature on the adoption of Western

management practices in non-Western countries and the pressures of globalisation, in

particular on the adoption of practices, and how similar practices will be enacted

differently. However, there has been limited exploration of these issues from a historical

and, more specifically, a post-colonial perspective. The focus of our study, the evolution of

HRM policies and practices in Pakistan, highlights how the ‘translation’ of Western

practices into a non-Western context is better understood not only from the more familiar

‘cross-cultural’ similarities and differences but, importantly, how historical elements have

embedded themselves culturally and institutionally in a manner that has, and continues, to

shape management practices.

Notes

1. Fobrum, Tichy, and Devanna, Strategic Human Resource Management.2. Torrington and Hall, Personnel Management; Storey, Developments in the Management;

Boxall and Purcell, “Strategic Human Resource Management”; Storey, New Perspectives;Legge, Human Resource Management; Redman and Wilkinson, Contemporary HumanResource Management; Dessler, Human Resource Management.

3. Budhwar and Debrah, “Future Research of HRM.”4. Adler, “Cross-cultural Management”; Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences; Jaeger, Kanungo,

and Srinivas, “A Review of Human Resource Management”; Khilji, “Modes of Convergenceand Divergence”; Maznevski et al., “Cultural Dimensions”; Styhre, “How ProcessPhilosophy can Help”; Stehle and Erwee, “Cultural Differences”; Budhwar and Debrah,“Future Research of HRM.”


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5. Kanugo, Jaeger and Srinivas, “A Review of Human Resource Management”; Kamoche,“Towards a Model of HRM in Africa”; Dowling, Festing, and Engle, “International HumanResource Management”; Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?”

6. Kiggundu, Jorgensen, and Hafsi, “Administrative Theory and Practice”; Kiggundu,Managing Organisations.

7. Budhwar and Debrah, “Future Research of HRM”; Sparrow, “Integrating People”; Zhu,Warner, and Rowley, “Human Resource Management.”

8. Alavi, “Authoritarianism and Legitimation”; Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?”; Kennedy,Bureaucracy in Pakistan; Mushtaq, “Managing Ethnic Diversity”; Waseem, “AffirmativeAction Policies”; Yong, The Garrison State.

9. Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?”; Waseem, “Affirmative Action Policies”; Yong, TheGarrison State; Aycan et al., “Impact of Culture.”

10. Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?,” 113.11. Siddiqa, Military Inc.; Abbasi, “The Men in Uniform.”12. Boxall, “Placing HR Strategy”; Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?”; Schneider and Barsoux,

Managing across Cultures; Tayeb, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”; Adler, “Cross-cultural Management”; Budhwar and Debrah, “Future Research of HRM”; Khilji and Wang,“New Evidence”; Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences.

13. Thompson and Luthans, Organisational Culture; Newman and Nollen, “Culture andCongruence.”

14. Namazie and Tayeb, “HRM in Iran.”15. Al–Hamadi, Budhwar, and Shipton, “Management of Human Resources in Oman.”16. Mellahi, “The Effect of Regulations on HRM.”17. Tayeb, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations.”18. Budhwar and Debrah, Human Resource Management.19. Aycan et al., “Impact of Culture”; Budhwar and Debrah, Human Resource Management;

Budhwar and Sparrow, “An Integrative Framework”.20. Budhwar and Debrah, “Future Research of HRM,” 207.21. Ibid., 208.22. Budhwar and Sparrow, “An Integrative Framework.”23. Gardiner, “Managing in Different Cultures.”24. Alavi, “The Post-Colonial Societies”; Saul, “The State in Postcolonial Societies”; Haque,

“Incongruity between Bureaucracy”; Arora, Corporate Colonialism.25. Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?”, 116; Jamil, “Human Resource Management.”26. Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?”; Islam, “Sifarish, Sycophants”; Abbasi, “The Men in

Uniform”; Siddiqa, Military Inc.27. Gardezi, “Making of the Neo-Colonial State in South Asia”; Hussain, “Institutions of

Restraint.”28. Hussain, “The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan”; Islam, “Sifarish, Sycophants”; Ismail,

“Impediments to Social Development in Pakistan”; Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?”;Kennedy, “Policies of Ethnic Preferences”; Waseem, “Affirmative Action Policies.”

29. Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research, 160.30. Atkinson and Coffey “Analysing Documentary Realities,” 73.31. Bowen, “Document Analysis”; Thomas, Research Skills, 97; Berger, Media Analysis;

Bryman, Social Research Methods.32. Altheide, Qualitative Media Analysis.33. Krippendorf, Content Analysis.34. Altheide, Qualitative Media Analysis, 29.35. Mason, Qualitative Researching, 110.36. Strauss and Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research.37. Wiersma, Research Methods.38. ICG, “Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan”; Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism

in South Asia.39. Khan and Ahmed, “Quota System for Civil Service.”40. Maheswari, Public Administration in India.41. Moon, The British Conquest.42. Khan and Ahmed, “Quota System for Civil Service.”43. Potter, “Manpower Shortage and the End of Colonialism.”


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44. Khan and Ahmed, “Quota System for Civil Service.”45. Potter, Indian Political Administration.46. Samujh, Reservation Policy.47. Jones, “Pakistan: A Civil Service in an Obsolescing Imperial Tradition.”48. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan; Waseem, “Affirmative Action Policies.”49. ICG, “Reforming Pakistan’s Civil Service.”50. Khan and Ahmed, “Quota System for Civil Service.”51. Waseem, “Affirmative Action Policies.”52. Khan and Ahmed, “Quota System for Civil Service.”53. ICG, “Reforming Pakistan’s Civil Service.”54. FPSC Rules, 2007.55. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan.56. MacMunn, The Martial Races of India; Khan, Politics of Identity; Kennedy, Bureaucracy in

Pakistan; Jalal, Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia; Waseem, “AffirmativeAction Policies.”

57. Alavi, “Nationhood”; Misra, “Intra-State Imperialism: The Case of Pakistan,” 30;Galvani, “Introduction to Pakistan,” 3; Khan, “Economy, Society and the State in Pakistan,”182.

58. Khan, Politics of Identity, 101; Haleem, “Ethnic and Sectarian Violence,” 468; Rashid, “Islamand Nationalism in Pakistan.”

59. Wilke, “State-formation and the Military in Pakistan”; Siddiqa, Military Inc.; Yong, TheGarrison State.

60. Misra, “Intra-State Imperialism: The Case of Pakistan,” 30; Talbot, “The Punjabisation ofPakistan”; Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, 181–208; and Waseem, “Affirmative ActionPolicies.”

61. Khan and Ahmad, “Quota System for Civil Service.”62. Adeney, “The Limitations of Non-consociational Federalism”; Alavi, “The Post-Colonial

Societies”; Haque and Khan, “The Economics Profession in Pakistan”; Jalal, The State ofMartial Rule; Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan; Mushtaq, “Managing Ethnic Diversity”;Waseem, “Affirmative Action Policies.”

63. Alavi, “The Post-Colonial Societies”; Haque, “Incongruity between Bureaucracy”; Kennedy,Bureaucracy in Pakistan, 181–208; Yong, The Garrison State, 57–89.

64. Saul, “The State in Postcolonial Societies,” 353.65. Arora, Corporate Colonialism; Saul, “The State in Postcolonial Societies.”66. Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste.67. Maclean, “Privatisation in France 1993–94”; Maclean, Economic Management; Maclean,

“New Rules – Old Games?”68. Kadushin, “Friendship among the French Financial Elite”; Giddens and Stanworth, “Elites

and Privilege”; Stanworth and Giddens, Elites and Power in British Society; Hartmann,“Bank Lawyers”; Maclean, Harvey, and Press, Business Elites and Corporate Governance;Maclean, Harvey, and Press, “Managerialism and the Post-war”, Suleiman, Politics, Powerand Bureaucracy in France; Suleiman, Elites in French Society; Mills, The Power Elite;Morin, “Transformation in the French Model”; Oh, Chung, and Labianca, “Group SocialCapital.”

69. Schaffer, “Administrative Legacies”; Braibanti, “Concluding Observation”; Dwevidi andNeff, “Crises and Continuities.”

70. Haque, “Incongruity between Bureaucracy,” 433.71. Alavi, “The Post-Colonial Societies”; Haque, “Incongruity between Bureaucracy.”72. The Times, “The System is to Blame for the 22 Wealthy Families.”73. Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, 152.74. Yoganandan, “Globalisation of Pakistan.”75. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule; Siddiqa, Military Inc., 79.76. Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia; Yoganandan, “Globalisation of

Pakistan,” 134.77. Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan.78. Kemal, “Retrenchment Policies.”79. Khan, “Bureaucratic and Political Corruption in Pakistan,” 6; Islam, “Sifarish, Sycophants,”

322; Hussain, “Institutions of Restraint.”


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80. ADB Report, “Private Sector Assessment.”81. Khan, “Bureaucratic and Political Corruption in Pakistan.”82. Khan, Pakistan: A Dream Gone Sour.83. Khan, “Bureaucratic and Political Corruption in Pakistan,” 6.84. ADB, “Private Sector Assessment,” 38.85. Anti-corruption Resource Centre, “Overview”; Samad, “Combating Corruption.”86. New York Times, “Pakistani Party’s Leader Chooses a Prime Minister.”87. Khan, “Bureaucratic and Political Corruption in Pakistan,” 12.88. Dawn, “Zardari Signs Employees’ Reinstatement Bill into Law.”89. Daily Times, “Cabinet Approves Rehiring of 7,000 Sacked Employees.”90. Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan.91. Candland, “The Cost of Incorporation.” 70; Shaheed, The Labour Movement in Pakistan, 83.92. Amjad and Mahmood, “Industrial Relations and Political Process in Pakistan,” 34.93. Candland, “The Cost of Incorporation.”94. Ibid., 71.95. Shaheed, The Labour Movement in Pakistan.96. Siddique, Ansari, and Qazi, “Governing the Labour Market,” 992.97. Ghayur, “Evolution of Industrial Relations Systems in Pakistan.”98. Ibid.99. E.g. Siddiqa, Military Inc.; Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan; and Yong, The Garrison State.100. Behuria, “How Military Dominates the Political Space in Pakistan.”101. Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History; The Punjabisation of Pakistan.102. Siddiqa, Military Inc.103. Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement; Siddiqa, Military Inc.104. Siddiqa, Military Inc.105. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule.106. Siddiqa, Military Inc.107. Maclean, “New Rules – Old Games?,” 796.108. Behuria, “How Military Dominates the Political Space in Pakistan”; Chengappa, “Pakistan:

Military Role in Civil Administration.”109. Siddiqa, Military Inc.110. Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?”; Waseem, “Affirmative Action Policies.”111. Alavi, “Pakistan: Women,” 1328; Ahmed, “Pakistan: Ethnic Fragmentation or National

Integration?,” 632; Behuria, “How Military Dominates the Political Space in Pakistan”;Waseem, “Affirmative Action Policies.”

112. Mushtaq, “Managing Ethnic Diversity”; Siddiqa, Military Inc.; Yong, The Garrison State.113. Abbasi, “The Men in Uniform”; Behuria, “How Military Dominates the Political Space in

Pakistan.”114. Abbasi, “The Men in Uniform”; Siddiqa, Military Inc.; ICG, “Reforming Pakistan’s Civil

Service.”115. Abbasi, “The Men in Uniform”; Siddiqa, Military Inc.116. Cohen and Chollet, “When $10 Billion Is Not Enough.”117. Abbasi, “The Men in Uniform”; Behuria, “How Military Dominates the Political Space in

Pakistan”; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Siddiqa, Military Inc;Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics.

118. Abbasi, “The Men in Uniform”; Siddiqa, Military Inc.119. Kakihara, “The Post-9/11 Paradigm Shift.”120. Cohen and Chollet, “When $10 Billion Is Not Enough.”121. Behuria, “How Military Dominates the Political Space in Pakistan”; Siddiqa, Military Inc.122. Haleem, “Ethnic and Sectarian Violence,” 468; Mushtaq, “Managing Ethnic Diversity.”123. Rashid, “Islam and Nationalism in Pakistan.”124. Abbasi, “Punjabi Officers Dominate.”125. Abbasi, “Outgoing PAF Chief.”126. Alavi, “The Post-Colonial Societies”; Khilji, “To Adapt or Not to Adapt?”127. Siddiqa, Military Inc.128. Haque, “Incongruity between Bureaucracy,” 432.129. Alavi, “The Post-Colonial Societies.”


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130. Naqvi and Kemal, “Privatisation, Efficiency, and Employment in Pakistan”; ICG,“Reforming Pakistan’s Civil Service.”

131. Budhwar and Debrah, “Future Research on Human Resource Management.”132. Budhwar and Sparrow, “An Integrative Framework”; Gardiner, “Managing in Different

Cultures.”

Notes on contributors

Ashique Ali Jhatial is Associate Professor in Institute of Commerce, University of Sindh, JamshoroPakistan. He completed his PhD in Human Resource Management from Bradford University Schoolof Management, England. Dr. Jhatial was also awarded Postdoc on his extensive research onCorporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Role of Social Enterprises in Development andSustainability of local communities. His co-authored research has been presented at the BritishAcademy of Management (BAM) Conferences, UK, The renowned Satter Conference on SocialEntrepreneurship at Stern Business School, New York University, Skoll Colloquium Fuqua BusinessSchool, Duke University and Said Business School, Oxford University.

Dr. Nelarine Cornelius is Professor of Human Resource Management and Organisational Studies andAssociate Dean Research at the School of Management, University of Bradford, UK. ProfessorCornelius’ current research is in the area of business and society, in particular social justice, socialorganisations and the historical development of management practice in emerging and fragileeconomies. She has published many book chapters and books and her work has appeared in manyinternational journals that include Business History, British Journal of Management, Journal ofBusiness Ethics, Organization and Urban Studies. She is currently Visiting Professor at theUniversity of Paris (Ouest) and University of Lagos). She is co-editor of Personnel Review and Chairof the Research, Development and Publications Committee of the British Academy of Management.

Dr. James Wallace is Senior Lecturer in Research Methods, Enterprise and Ethics and a Director ofthe PhD Programme at the School of Management, University of Bradford, UK. Dr. Wallace’scurrent research is in the area of entrepreneurship, business ethics, information and management, andthe use of advanced statistical methods for social science-based business research. His research hasbeen published in journals including Business History, European Journal of Marketing, Informationand Management and Journal of Business Ethics and he has published a number of book chaptersalso. Dr. Wallace is a Visiting Fellow at the University of Paris (Ouest) and Head of ResearchMethods for PRIMAL (Paris Research in Norms, Management and Law) a virtual research centresupported by the University of Paris. He is a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society.

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Appendix 1

The key colonial laws evaluated as secondary data sources included: the Government of India Act,1858; the Indian Council Act, 1909; the Colonisation of Land Act, 1912; the Government of IndiaAct, 1915; the Indian Civil Service (Temporary Provisions) Bill 1915; the Government of India Act,1919; the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923; the Government of India (Civil Services) Act 1925;Trade Union Act, 1926; the Factories Act, 1934; the Government of India Act, 1935; Payment ofWages Act 1936; Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946; and Industrial DisputeAct 1947.


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http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan

http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan

The post-colonial legal frameworks of the government of Pakistan under analysis include: theConstitution of Pakistan, 1956; Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959; the Trade Union (Amendment)Ordinance, 1960; the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962; the Constitution of the Islamic Republic ofPakistan, 1973; the 18th Amendment Bill 2010; the Civil Servants Act, 1973; the Service TribunalsAct of 1973; University Ordinance, 1973; the Banks (Nationalisation) Act, 1974; the CivilEstablishment Code (ESTACODE); the Federal Public Service Commission (Composition andCondition of Service) Regulations, 1978; the Federal Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules,1978; the Rules for Competitive Examination, 2009; the Industrial Relations Ordinance (IRO), 1969,2002, 2008; Industrial Relations (Interim) Act, 2008; Labour Force Surveys, 2007–2008; SackedEmployees (Reinstatement) Bill, 2010.


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