[Richard J. Parmentier] Signs in Society Studies

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A D V A N C E S I N S E M I O T I C S

T h o m a s A . S e b e o k , General Editor

S I G N S I N S O C I E T Y

Studies in Semiotic Anthropology

Richard J. Parmentier

Indiana

University Press

B lo o m ingto n and I nd ianapo l i s



© 1994 by R i cha rd J . Parmentier

All rights reserved

No pa rt of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by

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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of

American National Standard for I nfo rm a t io n Sci e nce s— Pe rm a ne nce of

Paper

for

Pri nt ed Li bra ry M a t e ri a ls , AN SI

Z39.48-1984.

™

M a nu fa ct u re d in the United States of Am e ri ca

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Parmentier, Richard J., date

Signs

in

society

:

studies

in

semiotic anthropology

/

R i cha rd

J .

Parmentier.

p.

c m . — ( A d v a n c e s in sem iotics.)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

I S B N 0-253-32757-1 (cloth : alk. paper)

I .

Cu lt u re — Se m i o t i c m o d e ls.

2.

Se m i o t i cs— Phi lo so phy .

3.

Signs

a nd sy m bo ls . I. Title. II. Series.

G N 3 5 7 . P 3 7 1994

3 0 1 — d c 2 0 9 3 - 2 7 7 5 8

I 2. 3 4 5 99 98 97 96 95 94

For Nina and Emma



C o n te n ts

A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

I nt ro d u c t io n

Part I Founda tions of Peircean Semiotics

Peirce Divested for Nonintimates

S ign , Obj ec t , and I nterprétant

Sym bo ls and Leg is igns

L a n g u a g e a n d L o g i c

T he T r ic ho to m ies

Sc ient i f i c Kno wled ge and Cu l tu ra l B e l ie f

Pe i rc e ' s Co nc ept o f Sem io t ic Med iat io n

T he F u nd am enta l Mo d el o f Sem io t ic Med iat io n

Sem io t ic Med iat io n and the Co rre la tes o f the S ign

.^T hird ness as Med iat io n

Sign as Me d iu m o f Co m m u nic a t io n

Part I I S igns in Ethno graph ic Co nte xt

T ransac t io na l Sym bo l i sm in B e lau an Mo rtu a ry R i tes

Respo nses to Death

Initial Funeral Transactions

Burial Practices

Final Transactions

Co nc lu s io n

T he Po l i t ic a l F u nc t io n o f Repo rted Speec h

Authoritative Speech

Ethno graphic Co ntext

Ngiraklang ' s Speec h to the Co u nc i l

Metapragm at ic E lem ents in the Speec h

T extu a l Pragm at ic s



viii

I

Contents

Part I I I Com par ative Perspectives on Com ple x Semio tic Processes

99

Tropical Semiotics

I O I

Levels of Semiosis

I O I

Collectivizing and Differentiating Symbolization

104

Convention and Innateness

106

Obviat io na l Exc hange

n o

T ro pes and Narrat ive

113

Foi Cultural Semiotics

120

The Semiotic Regimentation of Social Life

125

Social Action and Semiotic Text

12.5

Co ntext and T ype in R i tu a l Per fo rm at iv i ty

128

Institutional Regimentation of Touristic Experience

134

Ideological Regimentation in Advertising

142

Part I V So c ia l T heo r y and So c ia l Ac t io n

157

Co m par iso n, Pragm at ic s , and I nterpretat io n

159

Mo d els and St ra teg ies o f Co m par iso n

159

Comparative Philosophy of Religion as a Disc ipline

165

Co m pa r iso n and I nterpretat io n as Prac t ic a l R easo n

167

Directions for Future Research

173

Natu ra l izat io n o f Co nvent io n

175

Arbi t rar iness and Mo t ivat io n

175

Natu ra l izat io n in So c ia l T heo ry

i

7

8

Naturalization and Conventionalization in Social Reality

185

Co nc lu s io n

191

No tes

193

References

199

Index

220

Acknowledgments

I WOULD LIKE TO thank T o m Kirsc h , who ad v ised m y f i r s t fo ray into sem io t ic

anthro po lo gy in an u nd ergrad u ate read ing c o u rse a t Pr inc eto n U nivers i ty in

1 9 6 9 — 7 0 . S u b s e q u e n t c o u r s e w o r k w i t h S t e v e B a r n e t t , V i n c e n t C r a p a n z a n o ,

Ma rk Leo ne , A l fo nso O rt iz , and Mart in S i lverm an pro v id ed the im petu s fo r m y

grad u ate s tu d ies and pro fess io na l researc h in anthro po lo gy . T he in i t ia l o ppo rtu

ni ty to c arry o u t researc h o n Pe i rc ean sem io t ic s was pro v id ed by a po std o c to ra l

fe l lo wship ( 1 9 81 —82) a t the Center fo r Psyc ho so c ia l S tu d ies in Chic ago . I n ad

d i t io n , the Center he lped to fu nd m y f ie ld researc h in B e lau ( 1 9 7 8— 80 ) , pro v id ed

su ppo rt d u r ing a sabbat ic a l l eave ( 1 9 86 ) , and spo nso red m any o f the c o nferenc es

where the c hapters in th is bo o k were f i r s t presented . "S ign s a t the Center " wo u ld

have been an equally appropriate t it le for this book. To Bernard Weissbourd and

B en Lee I ex tend m y tha nks .

That I st i l l acknowledge the powerful influence of Michae} Silverstein more

than ten years after I ceased being his student is testimony both to the continuing

relevance of my educational experience in his c lasses at the University of Chicago

and to the c o nstant ly exp and ing c o rpu s o f h i s pu bl ic at io ns . A l l e ight o f the c hap

ters as well as the overall organization of the volume are indebted to his pioneer

ing efforts in anthr opolog ical l inguistics and semiotically informed soci al theory.

He has provided oral responses or written comments on most of the chapters in

th is bo o k. Spec i f i c a l ly , I ac kno wled ge the im po rtanc e o f h i s wo rk o n the prag

m at ic c o d es o f c u l tu re , o n the c o ntras t between expl ic i t and im pl ic i t

m etapragm at ic s , o n the . l im it s to sem io t ic aw areness , and o n m e tasem io t ic re

g im entat io n .

In the years that I have been working in the area of semiotic anthropology I

have benefited from the insight, advice, conversation, and crit ic ism of friends and

c o l leagu es in severa l d i sc ip l ines who have been m y "u niverse o f d i sc o u rse" : J im

Co l l ins , Cra ig Davis , J u d y I rv in e , Nao m i J ano wit z , Do n J o ra lem o n, B en Lee ,

L a u r ie L u c k i n g , J o h n L u c y , N i n a K a m m e r e r , B e t h M e r t z , D a v i d M u r r a y , B o b

Petersso n, A l fo nso Pro c ac c in i , Nanc y Ru bin , and B enigno Sanc hes-Eppler . I n ad

d i t io n , I gra te fu l ly ac k no wled ge severa l ind iv id u a ls who pro v id ed spo nso r in g

su ppo rt , researc h ass i s tanc e , and c r i t ic a l c o m m ents o n spec i f i c c hapters : Ma rtha

Denney and Debo rah T o r ib io ng ( Ch. 3 ) , V inc ent Crapan zano and Ani ta S kang

J o rd an ( Ch. 4) , Ro y Wa gner and J am es Weiner ( Ch. 5 ) , Mo i se Po sto ne ( Ch. 6 ) ,

ix



x I Acknowledgments

F rank Reyno ld s , Pau l Po wers , and Ro bert H u nt ( Ch. 7) , and Er ic Reeves ( Ch.

8) . I t is a great pleasure to thank the students who have studied symbolic analysis

and semiotic anthropology with me over the years; many of the interpretations

advanced in this book were developed in the dialogic atmosphere of my c lasses

and seminars. F inally, I l ike to think that David Zilberman would have enjoyed

this book.

The chapters inc luded in this volume have been revised from their original

presentation and publication forms. The sources are as fo llows:

Chapter 1 appeared o r ig ina l ly as "Pe i rc e Dives ted fo r No n-I nt im ates , "

RSISI: Recherches Sémiotique I Semiotic Inquiry 7 ( i 9 8 7 ) : i 9 — 3 9 . C o p y r i g ht ©

1 9 87 by the Canad ian Sem io t ic Asso c ia t io n . Repr inted by perm iss io n o f RSISI.

Chap ter 2 was first presented at the Center for Psychoso cial Studies (Chi

c ago ) o n J u ne 8 , 1 9 82 . T his c hapter has been ad apted and repr inted by perm is

s io n o f the pu bl i sher f ro m "S igns ' P lac e

in Médias Res:

Pe i rc e ' s T he o ry o f

Sem io t ic Med iat io n , " in

Semiotic Mediation,

ed . E l izabeth Mer tz and Ric hard

J .

Parm ent ier ( Or land o : Ac ad em ic Press , 1 9 85) . Co pyr ight © 1 9 85 by Ac ad em ic

Press, Inc .

Chap ter 3 was first presented at Brandeis University on Ma rch 4 , 19 88 . I t

o r ig ina l ly appeared as "T ransac t io na l Sym bo l i sm in B e lau an Mo rtu ary R i tes : A

Diac hro nie Stu d y ,

" Journal of the Polynesian Society

9 7 ( 1 9 8 8 ) : 2 8 1 — 3 1 2 . C o p y

right © 1988 by The Polynesian Society. Reprinted by permission of the

journal

of Polynesian Studies.

Chap ter 4 was first presented at The G radua te Cente r, City U niversity of

New Y o rk , o n Marc h 1 1 , 1 9 8 8 . I t appeared o r ig ina l ly as "T he Po l i t ic a l F u nc t io n

o f Repo rted Speec h : A B e lau an Exam ple , " in

Reflexive Langu age: Reported

Speech and Metapragmatics,

ed . J o hn A . Lu c y ( Cam brid ge : Cam brid g e U niver

s i ty Press , 1 9 9 3) . Co pyr ight © 1 9 9 3 by Cam brid ge U nivers i ty Press . Repr inted

by permission of Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 5 appeared o r ig ina l ly as "T ro pic a l Sem io t ic s : G lo ba l , Lo c a l , and

Disc u rsive Co ntexts o f Sym bo l ic Obv iat io n , "

Semiotica

7 9 ( 1 / 2 ) : 1 6 7 — 9 5 . C o p y

r ight © 1 9 9 0 by Mo u to n.

Chapter 6 was first presented ( in two parts) at meetings of the American

Anthro po lo g ic a l Asso c ia t io n o n No vem ber 1 9 , 1 9 88, and o n No vem ber 1 5 ,

1 9 8 9 . I t appeared originally as "The Semiotic Regimentation of Social Life,"

Semiotica 9 5 ( 3 / 4 ) : 3 5 7 - 9 5 . C o p y r i g h t © 1 9 9 3 b y M o u t o n d e G r u y t e r . R e

printed by permission of Mouton de Gruyter (A Division of Walter de Gruyter

& Co . ) .

Chapter 7 was f i r s t presented at the c o nferenc e "T o wa rd a Co m p arat ive

Phi lo so phy o f Re l ig io ns" a t T he D iv in i ty Sc ho o l , U nivers i ty o f Chic a go , o n M ay

9 , 1 9 9 z .

Acknowledgments I xi

Chapter 8 was f i r s t presented a t the sym po s iu m "Co nvent io n and Kno wl

e dg e : T he Anato m y o f Agreem ent in Co ntem po rary I nte l lec tu a l Cu l tu re" o n Oc

to ber 25 , 1 9 8 5 , in No rth am pt o n, Mass . I t appeared o r ig ina l ly as "Na tu ra l iza t io n

o f Co nvent io n : A Pro c ess in So c ia l T heo ry and in So c ia l Rea l i ty , "

Comparative

Social Research

1 1

(l^^-.xj^-^.

Co py r ight © 1 9 89 by J A I Press . Repr inted

by permission of JAI Press.



Introduction

IN REFLECTING BACK on the monuments of its intellectual heritage, modern sem

io t ic anthro po lo gy gazes u po n the twin peaks o f Char les Sand ers Pe i rc e , the

Am er ic an sc ient i s t and m athem at ic ian , and F erd inand d e Sau ssu re , the Swiss l in

guist . Among the many ironies of this dual heritage is a disjunction in the work

of these theorists between the nature of the

facts

they pro po sed to expla in and

the potential of the analytical

tools

they developed. Peirce, in seeking to account

for the homologous character of physical and mental realit ies, developed semiotic

tools (especially his notions of indexical signs and chain-like semiosis) that have

pro ved po wer fu l fo r researc h into so c ia l , h i s to r ic a l , and c u l tu ra l pheno m ena , the

study of which, for the most part, remained only an avocation for Peirce

himself.

Saussure, while attempting to justify historical l inguistics by seeing language as

part o f the " l i fe o f s igns in so c ie ty" ( 1 9 74 : 1 .4 8) , pro d u c ed the f ram ewo rk fo r a

linguistic theory that removes language from its soc ial embeddedness. I t is this

disjunction that motivated me to t it le this collection of semiotic studies

Signs in

Society,

for I fo llow S aussur e in taking sy stems of signs as the data I am interested

in expl ainin g and yet I rely on Peirce for man y specific analytical distin ctions .

Anthro po lo g is t s , a t l eas t in th is c o u ntry , have genera l ly tend ed to see in

Peirce's semiotics rather than in Saussure's semiology a suitable analog for the

conditions and practice of f ieldwork in other cultures. As in field research where

the e thno grapher t r ies to m ake sense o f the s ign sys tem s o f ano ther c u l tu re

through intense, often trying, interpretive abductions, so in Peirce's theory the

meaning of a sign consists of the unforeseen succession of interpreting signs that

serve to represent a c o m m o n o bj ec t ( Danie l 1 9 84 :4z) . Pe i rc e o f fe rs the po ss ib i l

ity that meaning is more than an operation of mental decoding, since semiosis is

an open-ended process in which each moment of interpretation alters the field

for subsequent interpretations. In contrast, Saussure's theory focuses on the pre-

established, f ixed code shared equally by ideal speaker and ideal hearer (Ponzio

1 9 8 4 : 2 7 4 — 7 5 ) .

An d Saussure 's effort to establish l inguistic value withou t tak ing ,

into account positive semantic meaning, the context of utterance, or worldly ref- j

erence is counte red by Peirce's c lose attention to the indexic al anch oring of prop - \

osit ional reference and to the necessity of adequation between representation and j

r e al it y ( S te in e r 1 9 8 1 : 4 2 1 ) .

At the level of the rhetoric of theory, Saussure's reliance on dichotomous op-

xiii



xiv

I

Introduction

positions (speech and system, signification and value, synchrony and diachrony,

parad igm at ic and syntagm at ic ) su ggest s the negat ive d iv i s iveness o f "d i f fe r enc e , "

while Peirce's repeated use of trichotomous concepts (sign, object, and interprét

ant ) po ints to ward the po s it ive r ic hness o f "m ed iat io n . " T h u s , Sau ssu re has c o m e

to represent the status quo, immaterial abstraction, totalizing rules, and false

equality, while Peirce stands as the champion of self-crit ical reflexivity, worldly

engagem ent , and d ia lo g ic a l te r i ty ( B o o n 1 9 9 0 :6 5 ; Danie l 1 9 8 9 : 9 6 ; Ro c h berg-

H a l t o n 1 9 8 5 : 4 1 z ) .

From the fact that I open this book with an extended discussion of Peirce,

however, it should not be concluded that I am an advocate of a "strong" Peircean

theory of cultural semiotics. In fact, as the crit ical commen ts about "do wn shif t

ing" and " t ransparenc y" in the o pening two c hapters sho u ld m ake c lear , I th ink

that Peirce's own philosophical approach is not well equipped to study the diver

sity of cultural sign systems, since it is primarily geared toward the understanding

of sc ientific rationality and since its model of progressive consensus bears l itt le

resemblance to the cultural phenomena anthropologists encounter in the field ,

where "truth" is the premise rather than the conclusion of discourse. Rather, my

attention to Peirce here is justified because his semiotic writings c larify a series

of analytical distinctions in sign operation and structure that can be used as a

starting point for cultural analysis. But just as the calculus, the indispensable

mathematical tool for modern sc ientific research, makes no c laims in itself about

the laws which govern the physical universe, so Peirce's semiotic trichotomies

enable the student of cultural codes to "calculate" many crit ical dimensions of

"signs in soc iety" only when applied to actual cultural phenomena. Moreover, I

am not convinced of the necessity of bringing to our cultural analysis the entire

panoply of Peirce's semiotic distinctions, especially the bewildering complexity

o f s ign typo lo gy revea led in the la te m anu sc r ipts . T r ic ho to m o u s d is t inc t io ns

among interprétants, for example, may serve some logical or philosophical pur

p o s e , but I do not think that cultural an alysis is yet prepared to fru itfully util ize

them. I am, one could say, a "minimal Peircean."

Readers are, of course, welcome to enter into this book wherever their inter

ests point them, but those who do follow the order of chapters wil l , I hope, dis

cover that the overall organization constitutes a diagram of its semiotic

argu m ent : s tar t ing wi th ana lyt ic a l fu nd am enta l s in Part I , m o ving to e thno

graphic explications of text and context in Part I I , then to the possibil ity of com

parative typology of complex semiotic processes in Part I I I , and concluding with

the broader issues of the pragmatics of soc ial theory in Part IV.

Part I contains two complementary studies of Peirce's semiotic theory: Ch ap

te r

I

(Peirce Divested for Nonintimates) is designed to introduce readers to

Peirce's fundamental concepts by showing how they form a coherent, interlock

ing pattern, while Chapter z (Peirce's Concept of Semiotic Mediation) traces the

historical trajectory of the development of Peirce's ideas, especially his concept

Introduction I xv

o f "m ed iat io n . " T hese two c hapters su ggest f ive spec i f i c a reas where Pe i rc e pro

v id es he lpfu l ana ly t ic a l vo c abu lary and m etho d o lo g ic a l o r ientat io ns . F i r s t ,

Peirce's semiotic theory does not privilege spoken language as the "be all and

end all" of sign phenomena, since it provides a generalized model in which l in

guistic and nonlinguistic signs can be inc luded. This contrasts sharply with the

fe t i sh ism o f l angu age whic h c harac ter izes m u c h sem io t ic and s t ru c tu ra l i s t th ink

ing in the Sau su rrean ve in ( Mar ku s 1 9 8 4 : 1 1 3 ) . Sec o nd , Pe i rc e 's insi s tenc e o n the

fu l l rea l i ty o f genera l s o r T hird s pro v id es the e thno grapher wi th a m eans o f

avoiding a naive empiric ism or physicalism that systematically reduces cultural

pheno m ena to rec o rd able ins tanc es o f so c ia l ac t io n . T hird , Pe i rc e re j ec ted a l l

fo rm s o f Cartes ian int ro spec t io n and argu ed that th inking , whether c arr ied o u t

with in the m ind o r thro u gh the m anipu lat io n o f a r t i f i c ia l s igns , requ ires so m e

level of expressive form to convey information about the object. This notion of

the "nec ess i ty o f express io n" m o ves anthro po lo g ic a l theo r iz ing abo u t c u l tu re be

yo nd at tent io n to d i sem bo d ied m eanings to the explo rat io n o f the ways expres

s ive vehic les c o nst i tu te a c o l lec t ive " sens ib i l i ty " ( Geertz 1 9 8 3 ) . F o u rth , h i s

recognition that the indexical dimension of semiosis does not necessarily imply

that contextually anchored signs are without type-level correlates opens the way

for ethnographers to attempt cultural description of the pragmatics of soc ial l i fe.

And f i f th , Pe i rc e ' s pathbreaking d isc o very o f the " th i rd t r ic ho to m y" ( rhem e, d i -

c ent , a rgu m ent ) , invo lv ing ho w s igns s t ipu la te the way they are to be interpreted ,

suggests rich avenues for research into the complex semiotic processes of natu

ra l iza t io n , c o nvent io na l izat io n , m etapho r izat io n , and reg im entat io n , where s ign

phenomena are inflected with power relations.

The ethnographic studies of Belau in Part I I are inspired by the twin Peircean

c o nc erns fo r the s t ru c tu ra l pat tern ing o r " textu a l i ty " o f s igns and the tem po ra l

( bo th d iac hro nic and pro c essu a l ) natu re o f sem io s i s . Chapter 3 ( T ransac t io na l

Sym bo l i sm in B e lau an Mo rtu ary R i tes ) i s an ana lys i s o f the h is to r ic a l c hanges in

the indexical and symbolic values of exchange valuables at funerals. I t shows that

various kinds of objects acquire specific meanings because of the kind of soc ial

"paths" fo l lo wed by the peo ple m anipu lat ing them and bec au se o f the pre

su ppo sed m o d al i ty o f exc hange re la t io nship these o b j ec t s rea l ize , whether ba l

anc ed rec ipro c i ty , a sym m etr ic a l paym ents , o r t ransgenerat io na l inher i tanc e . A

d iac hro nic perspec t ive , t rac ing the c o d ing o f ex c hange va lu ables f ro m the ear l ies t

nineteenth-century references to the ethnographic present, reveals that the mod

ern substitution of cash for certain traditional exchange objects makes it difficult

fo r B e lau ans to c o nc eptu a l ize fu nera ls as a c o nsangu inea l " fam i ly a f fa i r . " Cha p

ter 4 (The Polit ical Function of Reported Speech) analyzes an instance of polit ical

oratory which tries to generate performative effectiveness by bringing into the

context of the speech event highly valued rhetorical forms (such as proverbs) and

by organizing them to make ongoing speech an icon or diagram of its polit ical

pu rpo se . I n th is par t ic u lar c ase , tho u gh, c er ta in c u l tu ra l assu m pt io ns abo u t



xvi I Introduction

chiefly rhetoric which the audience brings to the event serve to defuse the

speec h ' s po l i t i c a l e f fec t iveness . Co ntextu a l ized per fo rm anc e , as th i s exam ple

shows, entails risks, for the richness of metapragmatic signals in the speech be

comes a liabil ity in a culture caught between a traditional norm of chiefly "w hi s

per ing" and a m o d ern t rend to ward the expl ic i t d i sp lay o f o rato r ic a l pro wess .

The chapters in Part I I I focus on the question: to what degree can complex

semiotic processes be used as the basis for cross-cultural typologizing? In other

words, are there certain semiotic processes that distinguish kinds of soc ial orders,

in much the same way that some social researchers use the notion of modes of

pro d u c t io n to typo lo g ize the wo r ld ' s c u l tu res ( J am eso n 1 9 82 : 1 7 3) ? Cha pter 5

(Tropical Semiotics) investigates the process of metaphorization, that is , the con

struction of innovative tropes grounded in but creatively transforming l iteral or

normative meanings. A reanalysis of tropes found in the myths and exchanges of

the Foi people in Papua New Guinea provides the setting to evaluate one particu

lar theo ret ic a l m o d el , the theo ry o f " sym bo l ic o bv ia t io n" d eve lo ped by Ro y

Wagner and appl ied to the F o i by J am es Weiner . Whereas Wagner and Weiner

insist that the cultures of New Guinea differ systematically from Western culture

in the way that l iteral and tropic meanings are related, I challenge this global

typologization with the c laim that these processes can be found on both sides of

the "great d iv id e . " T his genera l ly negat ive c o nc lu s io n abo u t the explanato ry

po wer o f sem io t ic typo lo gy i s su ppo rted in Chapter 6 ( T he Sem io t ic Regim ent

ation of Social Life) by the three case studies of semiotic "regimentation," that

is , the way one level of semiotic structure organizes, controls, or defines another

leve l . I a rgu e here that three k ind s o f reg im entat io n—textu a l , ins t i tu t io na l , and

ideological—do not correspond to types of soc ieties but rather are cross-cultur

ally widespread in phenomena as varied as ritual, tourism, and advertising.

Finally, Part IV goes one step farther to examine the relationship between

c u l tu ra l pro c esses and the theo ret ic a l d i sc o u rse abo u t them . T he parad o x ic a l

c laim advanced in these two concluding chapters is that theoretical discourse,

whether in the c o m parat ive phi lo so phies o f re l ig io n d isc u ssed in Chapter 7

(Comparison, Pragmatics, and Interpretation) or in the soc ial theories analyzed

in Chapter 8 (Naturalization of Convention) , shares many of the same semiotic

structures and constraints as the cultural data under study. These chapters, fo l

lowing both Peirce's insight into the metasemiotic character of al l semiosis and

Silverstein's more detailed explication of the metapragmatic function, show that

members of a soc iety are constantly interpreting their soc ial interaction and his-

; torical experience by constructing interpretive models or accounts that represent,

in a l imited way, the practices and conventions of the culture. Of course, philos

o phers and so c ia l theo r i s t s a re ext rem e c ases , s inc e the i r wo rk a t tem pts to

d ec o ntextu a l ize the very gro u nd s o f the i r d i sc o u rse—the phi lo so phers by asser t

ing the absoluteness of their truth c laims and the soc ial theorists by naturalizing

the so u rc e o f c u l tu ra l c o nvent io ns in ext ra-sem io t ic rea lm s . T he two exam ples

Introduction

I

xvii

c ho sen fo r s tu d y , c o m parat ive interpretat io n and natu ra l izat io n o f c o nvent io n ,

reveal an unavoidable tension between the actor's point of view and the analyst 's

po int o f v iew. B u t s inc e bo th d ec o ntextu a l izat io n and natu ra l izat io n are fam i l ia r

c u l tu ra l pheno m ena , the c o nc lu s io n c an be d rawn that theo ret ic a l d i sc o u rse i s

i t se l f a c u l tu ra l pheno m eno n su bj ec t to textu a l fo rm s , pragm at ic ru les , and c o m

plex sem io t ic pro c esses . T his c o nc lu s io n sho u ld no t , ho wever , be taken as a re

jection of the possibil ity of comparative research but as a reminder that scholarly

discourse can never escape its soc ial groundedness.

L ike a go o d Pe i rc ean d iagram m at ic s ign , the o rganizat io n o f th i s vo lu m e i s

intend ed to represent i t s o vera l l sem io t ic a rgu m ent , beg inning wi th the expl ic a

tion of its analytical foundations, fo llowed by the study of the tension between

text and c o ntext , then m o ving to the i s su e o f c o m parat ive typo lo gy o f c o m plex

sem io t ic pro c esses , and c o nc lu d ing wi th the pragm at ic s o f theo ret ic a l d i sc o u rse .

I have intent io na l ly avo id ed pro gram m at ic d i sc u ss io n o f the "sem io t ic s o f c u l

t u r e , "

no t o nly bec au se su c h po s i t io n papers abo u nd ( Z . B au m an 1 9 6 8 ; B o o n

1 9 8 2 ;

E c o 1 9 7 5 ; H e r z f el d 1 9 8 6 ; M e r t z 1 9 8 5 ; P o s n e r 1 9 8 8 , 1 9 8 9 ; S c h w i m m e r

1 9 77 ; S inger 1 9 8 4 ; Win ner 1 9 88 ) bu t a l so bec au se I be l ieve that bet ter theo r iz

ing m u st awai t ad d i t io na l sem io t ic a l ly in fo rm ed e thno graphic researc h . T o the

degree that these essays are effective in persuading others of the virtues of prac

tic ing a semiotic approach to cultural analysis, the volume will become, for its

readers, an enacted indexical icon.



P A R T

I

Foundations of Peircean Semiotics





4 I Foundat ions ofPeircean Semiotics

cognitions to involve true knowledge, however, object and sign must be con

nec ted in suc h a way that the fo rm er "d eterm ines "—spec i f ies o r spec ia l izes— the

character of the latter which represents it . So there must be some kind of prin-

c ipled l inkage or reason, what Peirce calls the "ground," between the two if the

sign is to become a mediate realization of the object in this process of constantly

d eve lo ping kno wled ge-c o m m u nic at io n .

There are, thus, two opposed yet interlocking vectors involved in semiosis,

- the vector of determination from object to sign and the vector of representation

from sign to object. I f these vectors are brought into proper relation, then knowl

edge of objects through signs is possible:

" I

shall endeavor consistently to employ

the word 'object ' , namely, to mean that which a sign, so far as it fulfi l ls the

function of a sign, enables one who knows that sign, and knows it as a sign, to

k n o w " ( M S 5 9 9 : 3 1 - 3 2 ) .

The insertion of the phrase "and knows it as a sign" might seem at first to

be introducing an unnecessary complexity into the situation. I f a sign displays

its object as the object has determined it to be represented for some further in

terpreting sign, why is it necessary that the knower need not only know the sign

but also know it

as

a sign? Peirce's point is a subtle yet crucial one for his entire

argument: "A sign does not function as a sign unless it be understood as a sign"

(MS 599:32) . In other words, two parts of reality might be in a relationship of

mutual determination and representation, but unless the knower had some inde-

pendent know ledge of this fact, there would be no sense in which on e of the parts

V could function as a sign of the other part

for

this interpreter. So signs must be

interpreted in order to be signs, but their "significa nt ch aracter w hich causes

them to be so interpreted" (MS 462:86) , namely, the ground, is the basis for this

interpretation, when it occurs.

While I am out golfing the scorecard acc identally fal ls out of my shirt pocket

and flutters several feet to the left ; my partner drops bits of grass from her raised

hand and carefully observes them flutter to the left . Now, the wind will act to

blow both the scorecard and the grass to the left quite apart from my partner's

interpretation of the movement of the grass as a sign of the wind direction so as

to aim her tee shot with the proper compensation. In this elementary semiotic

situation, the relationship between the object ( the wind blowing in a certain di

rection) and the sign (the grass blowing in a certain direction) is useful only to

the golfer who is already acquainted with the object ( that is , that there is this

physical phenomenon of wind) and who further understands the ground involved

' in the wind -gras s connection , namely, a comb ination of physical conne ctedness

between wind and grass , what Pe i rc e c a l l s " ind ex ic a l i ty , " and o f fo rm al resem -

* b lanc e between wind d i rec t io n and grass d i rec t io n , what Pe i rc e c a l l s " i c o nic i ty . "

The importance of this point is that, for Peirce, the vectors of determination

and representation are each more complex than suggested initial ly. Determina

tion does not just f low from object to sign but from the object

through

the sign

Peirce Divested for Nonintim ates I 5

to some further action or mental representation, what Peirce terms the "inter

prétant , " whic h i s thu s m ed iate ly d eterm ined by the sam e o b j ec t ( CP 6 .347) . T he

interprétant i s the t rans la t io n , explan at io n , m eaning , o r c o nc ep tu a l izat io n o f the

sign-object relation in a subsequent sign representing the same object; a sign

which is highly determine d is one which offers l itt le "latitude of in terp reta tion"

( MS 283 : 1 36 ) fo r the t rans la t ing s ign . I n the go l f ing exam ple , m y partner ' s t ee

shot will be determined, that is , causally influenced, by the wind direction, but

to the degree that her shot is directed by an aim corrected

because

o f the kno wl

edge afforded through the fall ing grass, the shot is mediatedly determined by the

wind. Peirce's frequent metaphor for this mediate determination is skewing or

slanting, so that the effect of the object operates on the interpreting sign through

the mediating role of the sign.

What about the vector of representation? I f the fal l ing grass is known "as a

sign," then the tee shot will also be a representation, but not simply of the phys

ical fact of wind direction (though the shot will , o f course, be acted upon by the

w i n d ) . I t wi l l d i sp lay o r exh ib i t—perhaps fo r the go l fe rs wa i t ing to tee o f f

next —th e c o m plex sem io t ic re la t ionship of " tak ing ac c o u nt o f the wi nd . " I n

other words, what is actually represented is the l inkage or ground relating the

wind and the grass: or, the object becomes the "grass taken semiotically." Thus",^

the vector of representation is also more complex than originally stated, since'

each subsequent representation in the semiotic chain represents the prior object- '

s ign relation, taken itself as a higher-level semiotic object.

S y m b o l s a n d L e g i s i g n s

The next step Peirce takes in the argument is truly revolutionary. He postu

lates that there is a kind of sign in which the ground between object and sign

would not exist at al l unless interpreted by a subsequent sign to be of some kind.

Recall the previous example: the wind continues to determine the direction of

fall ing grass whether or not we read it as a sign; when interpreted semiotically,

the ground is understood to be the causal patterning of grass direction by wind

direction. To repeat, the grass would not function as a sign unless interpreted

semiotically, but when interpreted the interpr etation is based on the indepen

dently existing grounds between object and sign (that is , the indexicality and

i con ic i t y ) .

No w c o ns id er the exam ple o f the wo rd

book,

a l inguistic sign standin g

for a c lass of objects consisting (roughly) of printed pages bound together and

found in l ibraries. What is the ground between this particular phonic shape and

this particular c lass of objects? In what sense does this c lass of objects determine

any of the identifying properties found in the word as a sign? Peirce's solution

to these qu est io n i s h i s c o nc ept o f the "sym bo l , " a k ind o f c o m plex sem io t ic

entity in which there is an irreducibly triadic relation among the sign, the object,

and the interprétant such that the sign and object would not be in any particular



6

I

Foundation s of Peircean Semiotics

Peirce Divested for Nonintim ates

J

relationship if not for their being represented as being so related. There is no

reason inherent in the nature of the phonic form book why i t sho u ld be appro

priate for referring to this c lass of objects ( indeed, other languages equally suc

cessfully use other l inguistic forms) , nor is there any physical connection to trans

mit the vector of determination from object to sign. A symbol is , thus, a fully

"conventional" sign that "represents its object solely by virtue of being repre

sented to represent it by the interprétant which it determines" (MS 599:43) .

Our everyday experience as speakers of a language confirms this. A person

î wh o does not kno w a foreign language is able to hear the sounds of that lang uage

j j but has no grasp of the meanings of words or sentences and cannot utter sounds

in functionally appropriate ways. So for l inguistic signs, al l very good examples

\ol

Peircean symbols, the interprétant consists of the rules of the relatively invari-

' ant l inguistic coding shared by members of the language community.

Book

has

the meaning it does for speakers of English only because the language community

accepts this convention. Contrast this example with the previous example of the

fall ing grass: i f the golfer fails to recognize (to the detriment of his or her score )

the semiotic function of this sign, the grass will continue to be blown by the

wind. But if a community of speakers does not accept a convention according to

w h i c h

book

stands for bound printed pages found in l ibraries, this particular

form has absolutely no status as a meaningful entity of any sort. As Peirce ex

p la ins , sym bo ls a re

( those signs which are made to be signs, and to be precisely the signs that they

\ are, neither by possessing any decisive qualities [i.e., icons] nor by embod ying

I effects of any special causation [i.e., indices], but merely by the certainty that

\ they will be interpreted as signs, and as just such and such signs. (MS 2 9 8 : 12 - 13

)

As is c lear from this quotation, Peirce envisioned the triad of icon, index,

{and sym bol to form a nested hierarchical set . Th e internal construc tion of this

set can best be understood from four perspectives. The first concerns the require

ments for completeness found in the three memb ers of the set. An icon "is f itted

to be a sign by virtue of possessing in itself certain qualit ies which it would

equally possess if the interprétant and the object did not exist at al l " (MS 7 :1 4 ) ;

without its object an icon could not function as a sign, but as a sign it has the

characteristics it does independently of any reason or force exerted by the object

or by the interprétant. Next, an index has the qualit ies it does apart from its

\ interprétant but not from its object, which mu st be in a relation of spatiotem po

ral contiguity with it . And finally a symbol would not have any of its character

istics if the object or interprétant were subtracted. Thus, the symbol, as a neces

sarily triadic relation, has the greatest internal complexity of the three signs. A

second way of viewing the triad is to compare their respective foregrounded as-

1 pects. For an icon the ground appears most prominently; for an index the object

1

attracts our attention; and for a symbol the interprétant is the focus of interest.

T hird , the t r iad c o rrespo nd s to Pe i rc e ' s o nto lo g ic a l t r iad o f F i r s tness , Sec o nd -

ness, and Thirdness, three degrees of reality which he believes exhaust the uni

verse: F irsts are qualitative possibil it ies; Seconds are reactive objects; and Thirds

are nec essar i ly i t r iad ic pheno m ena , inc lu d ing ru les , l aws , m ed iat io ns , and repre-

é

sentat io ns/T he gro u nd o f an ic o n i s a F i r s t , the gro u nd o f an ind ex i s a Sec o nd ,

and the gro u nd o f a sym bo l i s a T hird .

4

And , fo u rth , we c an o bserve the c o m

po s i t io na l " syntax" ( CP 2 .26 2) o f these three k ind s o f sem io t ic re la t io ns . Every

index, in order to convey information, must embody an icon. The fall ing grass is

an index of the wi nd , but it is also an icon in that the direction of the grass 's fal l j

resembles the direction of the wind. (Think of this in these terms: an index di-t

rects the mind to some aspect of reality and an icon provides some inform ation .

abo u t i t . ) And a sym bo l m u st em bo d y an ic o n and an ind ex , the fo rm er to ex

press the in fo rm at io n and the la t ter to ind ic ate the o b j ec t to whic h th is in fo rm al

'

t io n perta ins .

5

The postulation of the symbol as requiring the role of the interpretant 's im

puting a conventional relationship between sign and object introduces a further

wrinkle involving the status of the sign itself, that is , viewed apart from the sign-

object relation. There appears to be a fundamental difference in status between

the action of fal l ing grass and the action of uttering the word book, namely , that

in the latter case the identity of the sign, as st ipulated in the rules of the language,

is not dependent upon any par ticula r instance of uttering these sound s. The wor d '

f

I pro no u nc e th is m o rning i s the "sam e" wo rd yo u pro no u nc e to m o rro w; the

word printed on the first l ine of a page is the "s am e" w ord wh en printed on the

last l ine of the page. So l inguistic symbols are "general signs," that is , s igns which

have the identity they have ( in this case, spec ified by the code) independently of

any c o nc rete speec h events o r c o ntextu a l appl ic at io n . T he c o nvent io ns o f a l an

guage do not stipulate the meaning of book a s d epend ent u po n any part ic u lar

c ircumstances of someone's using the word in conversation or in writing; and

should no one pronounce the word for a year or should someone go around eras

ing all occurrences of it in written works, the word itself would continue to be

part of the language:

A symbol

is itself a kind and not a single thing. You can wr ite dow n the word

"star" but that does not make you the creator of the word, nor if you erase it

have you destroyed the word. The word lives in the minds of those who use it.

Even if they are all asleep, it exists in their memory. (MS 404:45)

Contr ast this with the grass examp le, where the sign is an actual physical event ;

and is not an instance of a more general representational form.

Peirce developed a technical vocabulary to describe these phenomena: a sign

whic h i s an o c c u rr ing event and fo r whic h "ac c id e nts o f ex i s tenc e m ake i t a s ign "

( MS 339 :248t ) i s a " s ins ign" ( a s in-gu lar th ing) o r " to ken" ; and a s ign whic h

is a "d e f in ite ly s igni fic ant F o rm " ( CP 4 .53 7) fo r pro d u c ing and interpreting in-



8

I

Foundation s ofPeircean Semiotics

s tanc es i s a " l eg i s ig n" ( f ro m the Lat in wo rd for " l aw ") o r a " ty pe . " T h e c o n

text-specific pronunciation of a word is a "replica," that is , a spec ial kind of

sinsign, namely, one which corresponds to a "type." I t is important to see the

peculiarity of l inguistic utterances. Speakers and hearers cannot communicate

with each other without producing physical events or sinsigns, yet these instances

would have no meaning were it not for the system of conventional understanding

operating at the type level. (Of course, in everyday conversation speakers often

[assume that the token utterance is directly l inked to the contextually realized

^linguistic meaning.)

hjjsgisign is a law that is a Sign. Th is law is usually established by men. Ev ery

/ conventional sign is a legisign. It is not a single object, but a general typ e

which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through

an instance of its application, which may be termed a

Replica

o f it. Thu s, the

word "the" will usually occur from fifteen to twentyîve times on a page. It

is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each sin

gle instance of it is a Replica. The Replica is a Sinsjgn. Thus, every Legisign

requires Sinsigns. But these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar oc

currences that are regarded as significant. Nor would the Replica be significant

if it were not for the law which renders it so. (CP 2.2.46)

Despite these prec ise terminological distinctions it is easy to confuse a sinsign

and a replica (which is a spec ial kind of sinsign) . Compare a footprint made in

the sand and an utterance of the word

book.

B o th are ac tu a l ly o c c u rr ing events ,

both have the potential for functioning semiotically, and both are subject to reg

ular repetit ion with similar significance. What, then, is the important difference?

(I t is not, by the way, that the footprint would retain the character it has even if

no one interpreted it as a sign. This is very true, but has to do with its being an

index rather than a symbol.) I t is that the footprint is an actual phenomenon

which, in certain contexts, can be used as a sign, whereas the utterance of a word

could not possibly be interpreted as the sign that it is without the interpreter 's

recognition of its corresponding type: a footprint is

possibly

a sign ; an utterance

of a word is

necessarily

a sign. On e interesting implicatio n of this is that, while

not all s ingular phenomena (what Peirce labels Seconds because they are essen

tially dyadic or reactive in character) are signs,

all

g e n e r a l p h e n o m e n a — l a w s ,

habi t s , a s so c ia t io ns , evo lu t io nary tend enc ies , abs t rac t io ns , ru les , lo g ic a l a rgu

m ents , and c o nc ept io ns—are fu nd am enta l ly sem io t ic ent i t ies .

A wo r d , o r any sym bo l , i s thu s a c o nvent io na l s ign in two inter lo c king

senses. F irst , the semiotic identity of a given spoken or written instance of lan

guage is governed by a rule for recognizing each occurrence as a replica of a

l inguistic type, rather than as merely incoherent babble or meaningless scribbling.

This rule of recognition gives users of a sign system the abil ity to evaluate various

occurring phenomena to determine which are to be c lassified as proper signs. Of

course, there needs to be a certain degree of f lexibil ity built into this rule, how-


I

9

ever, since each replica of a wor d will be in some respec ts diffe rent —sp eake rs

talk with different pitches, accents, intonation patterns, and writers never pro

duce exactly the same shape of handwritten letters. Second, the significance of a

symbol is interprétable only because of the prior collective agreement or "habit-j y

u al ac qu a int anc e" ( C P 2 .32 9 ) spec i fy ing the s ign-o bj ec t l inkage . T his im pu ted

ground relating sign and object is provided by a general habit , rule, or disposition

\

embodied in the interprétant. Thus, our abil ity to utter a l inguistic sign on a

part ic u lar o c c as io n in o rd er to c o m m u nic ate a m eaning abo u t so m e o b j ec t to

someone (or to oneself) presupposes the conventional rule associating sign and

object. But note that, in the case of symbols, the sign and object cannot be sin

gular things but must always be general, whether a general sign or legisign or a

general object.

An important implication of this intersection of symbols and legisigns is that

all symbols are legisigns but not all legisigns are symbols. In other words, al l s igns

which represent their objects solely because they are interpreted to do so must

also have the character of governing replicas in actual instances of communica

tion. This is easily understood: a sign which is such because of a conventional

ground must itself be of a general rather than a singular character and must also

represent a general idea rather than a singular object. But there can be legisigns—

signs whic h fu nc t io n o nly by go verning repl ic as o f them se lves—whic h are no t

purely conventional. How is this possible? Consider the second-person singular

personal pronoun you. This c learly is a legisign, since speakers of English recog

nize the same word in all the various contextual instances of saying you, but this

legisign represents its object by virtue of a less-than-symbolic ground: you refers

to whomever the speaker is addressing, an object which by this rule must be

co-present in every successfully referring act of uttering a replica of

you.

T h e r e

is a built-in indexical dimension in the meaning of

you,

a fac t whic h c an be

quickly tested. Open a dictionary to the word

you

and ask : wh at i s the o b j ec t

represented by th is genera l s ign? T he answer i s : that d epend s o n who m the

speaker is talking to when uttering a replica of the word. As Peirce observes,

these indexical legisigns " do not possess the generality of pur ely conven tional

s i g n s " ( M S 7 4 8 ) .

I f al l symbols are general signs, which signify their general objects by virtue

of a general interprétant, it must be the case that al l three components must be •

equally symbolic : the object of a symbol is a symbol and the interprétant of a 1 ^

symbol is a symb ol. A nd if this is so , then there is no such th ing as an isolated i

symbol. As F igure 1 . 1 i l lustrates, Symbol 1 has Symb ol 2 for its interpré tant, and

this Interprétant 1 must in turn function as a symbol for its Interprétant 2, and

so on infinitely. A similar expan sion is found in the oppo site direc tion: O bjec t 1

of Symbol 1 is a symbol, so that it also stands for some general Object 2 by virtue

of being represented to do so by its Interprétant 3 (which is identical with Symbol

1 ) . Thus, sign, object, and interprétant are not three distinct kinds of semiotic



io

I


SYMBOL

L

INTERPRETANT 3

OBJECT 1 .

SYMBOL

3

INTERPRETANT 1

' SYMBOL

• INTERPRETANT

OBJECT

Figure

I . I

. The sign relation

g-H entit ies; they are dimensions of semiotic functioning . (M uch c onfusion can b e

avoided if Peirce's notion of the object is not conflated with the Saussurean no-

. A t i o n o f the "s igni f ied " c o nc ept o r "m e anin g . " I n Pe irc e ' s m o d el the o b j ec t is~

î wha t the sign is about and the meaning is the "significative effect of a sig n" [CP

I 5.473] embodied in the interprétant.)

The key point is that every symbol necessarily involves "two infinite series,

' j

the o ne bac k to ward the o b j ec t , the o ther fo rward to ward the interprétant " ( MS

5 9 9 : 3 8 ) .

Not only is there no ultimate object which could be represented in some

symbol and not itself a representation, but there is no ultimate interprétant.

Peirce c learly recognizes the almost incredible ramification of this theory: sym

bols are essentially al ive. Not in the sense of having breath and locomotion but

in the sense of having an evolving, growing, developing nature:

Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, par

ticularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons and

symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature; the

symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it is

by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol

can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo. A symb ol, once in being, spreads

among the peoples. In use and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words

as force, law, wealth, marriag e, bear for us very different meanings from those

they bore to our barbarous ancestors. (CP 2.30z)

Peirce feels that this potential for growth or self-development in symbols is the

central way in which reality and representation resemble each other, since both

natural laws and logical conventions govern, respectively, the actions of objects

and the course of ideas in reasoning, in essentially the same triadic manner.

Symbols appear to be wonderful entit ies indeed. But there is something ex

tremely puzzling about Peirce's concept of symbol. A symbol, by definition, ex

ists as a sign only because of the interprétant, which imputes a conventional rela-

Peirce Divested for Nonintimates

I 11

t ionship between sign and object. But, for Peirce, the object, through the medium

of the sign, determines the interprétant . H o w c an a sym bo l d eterm ine , that i s ,

spec ify, an interpreting sign at the same time that it presupposes this same inter

prétant? Peirce himself was very consc ious of this seeming paradox:

A Symbol differs from b oth of these types of sign [icon and index] inasmuch j

as it represents its object solely by virtue of being represented to represent it by

j

the interprétant which it determines. But how can this be, it will be asked. How

4

can a thing become a sign of an object to an interprétant sign which itself

determines by virtue of the recognition of that, its own creation? (MS 599 :43 )

The solution to this paradox, l ike the solution to so many apparent para

doxes, is that the vector of determination operates at a lower logical level than

the vector of representation: the interprétant represents the sign-ob ject relation

as

capable of determining the interprétant that it in fact does. Peirce's own il lus

tration is c lear: a particular form of logical argumentation is a complex sign

whic h represents the t ru th ; bu t o nly when an interpret ing m ind ac kno wled ges

that a rgu m entat io n

as

a sign of the truth, does it indeed function as a sign of

that truth. An argument that, for its interpreters, fails to represent the truth is

not a sign at all.

L a n g u a g e a n d L o g i c

Pe i rc e re j ec t s the assu m pt io n that the " law o f tho u ght" ( MS 6 9 3 : 1 84) was

s t ipu la ted by the gram m at ic a l o r syntac t ic a l pro pert ies o f Eu ro pean o r "Aryan"

langu ages , e spec ia l ly Greek and Lat in ( N EM 4 : 1 7 1 ) . T he su bj ec t ( what Pe i rc e

prefers to call the "object") of a sentence need not be coded by the nominative

case but appears in some languages, Gaelic for instance, in an oblique case; many

" n o n - A r y a n " l a n g ua g e s di s pl a y a m a r k e d p a u c i t y o f " c o m m o n n o u n s " ( N E M

3/2 :843) and u se , ra ther , expand ed verba l fo rm u lat io ns in the pred ic ate . And ,

most strikingly, the copula

is,

enshrined by Western logic ians as an essential com

ponent of the categorical proposition, did not even appear normatively in Latin

u nt i l the la te Mid d le Ages . Y et peo ple speaking langu ages wi tho u t c o m m o n

nouns or copulas presumably "had probably not spoken in earlier t imes entirely

w i t h ou t t h i n k i n g " ( M S 6 9 3 : 1 8 6 ) .

Peirce attempts to replace these logocentric assumptions with an alternative

appro ac h to the re la t io nship between th inking and express io n that sho ws ho w

d i f fe rent l angu ages c an be c o m pared in te rm s o f m o re fu nd am enta l sem io t ic

fu nc t io ns whic h langu age shares wi th o ther s ign sys tem s : "T he s tu d y o f l an

guages ought to be based upon a study of the necessary conditions to which signs

m u st c o nfo rm in o rd er to fu l f i l l the i r fu nc t io n as s igns" ( MS 6 9 3 : 1 88) . T his

foundational sc ience, termed by Peirce "speculative semeiotic ," should not adopt



iz

I



I J J ,

e unreflective prejudice of language spea ker s— a person is , after al l , "a n an imal

at has c o m m and o f so m e syntac tic a l l angu age" ( MS 6 59 : 1 0 ) — w ho assu m e

at language, or more accurately, their language is essential for thinking.

6

For

Peirce, some "form of expression" is necessary for rational thought, but articu

late or written language need not be elevated to this posit ion of priority:

It might be supposed that although such a study cannot draw any principles

from the study of languages, that linguistics might still afford valuable sugges

tions to it. Upon trial, I have not found it to be so. Languages have never fur

nished me with a single new idea; they have at most only afforded examp les

of truths I had already ascertained by

a priori

r e as o ni n g. ( M S 6 9 3 : 1 9 0 - 9 2 )

Though human languages can well i l lustrate semiotic princ iples discovered

by other means (primarily, for Peirce, logical analysis by means of his Existential

G r a p h s ) ,

they must be treated with healthy suspic ion. Prec isely because language

is "m an ' s ins t inc t ive vehic le o f tho u ght" ( MS 6 54 :4) , reaso ning has a tend enc y

to bec o m e " t ram m el led by the u sages o f speec h" ( MS 6 54 :3 ) . Even lo g ic ians

have fallen victim to the "pernic ious idleness of consulting ordinary language"

( M S 5 5 9 ) :

I do not, for my part, regard the usages of language as forming a satisfactory

basis for logical doctrine. Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions

to which signs must conform in order to function as such. How the constitu

tion of the human mind may compel men to think is not the question; and the

appeal to language appears to me to be no better than an unsatisfactory

method of ascertaining psychological facts that are of no relevancy to logic.

( N E M 4 : 2 4 5 )

(part of the danger involved in a logic ian's taking language as a guide is that there

ys

a tendency to confuse the proposition itself with par ticular " l ingu al expres

s i o n s" ( N EM 4 :2 48 ) o f i t . A lo g ic a l pro po s i t io n is a leg i s ign , not a repl ic a o f a

sign. I t is the same proposition whether it "happens to have a replica in writing,

in o ra l speec h , o r in s il ent tho u ght " ( N EM 4 : 24 8) , o r whether "o n e se lf sam e

tho u ght m ay be c arr ied u po n the vehic le o f Engl i sh , Germ an, Greek , o r Gae l ic "

( MS 29 8:7) , that i s , whatever the

form

o f instances of its express ion. An d it is

also the same proposition regardless of the particular purposive

function

in

tended or accomplished by its instantiation: "One and the same proposition may

be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted, inwardly inquired into, put as a question,

wished, asked for, effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does

no t thereby bec o m e a d if fe rent pro po s i t io n" ( N EM 4 :2 48 ) . F u rtherm o re , the

symbols constituting language are logically defective in that they are involved in

what we would today call "conversational pragmatics." As Peirce notes, "As l itt le

as possible is spoken, as much as possible is left to implication, imagination and

belief"

( N E M 3 : 1 4 0 ) .

Abst rac ted f ro m bo th express ive fo rm and pu rpo s ive fu nc t io n , a pro po s i t io n

is a complex symbol which represents to its interprétant that the qualit ies or char

acteristics signified in the predicate portion pertain to existing objects, the same

o bj ec t s d eno ted in the su bj ec t po rt io n . T hese two c o m po nents o f a pro po s i t io n

can be c lassified as icons and indices: the predicate is an "im ag e" and the sub ject

is a "lab el, " and when jo ined together in a full proposi tion these parts con vey

real information about the world, namely, that these qualit ies "iconized" apply

truly to the objects indexed: "But the particular proposition asserts that, with

suffic ient means, in that universe would be found an object to which the subject

term wo u ld be appl ic ab le , and to whic h fu r ther exam inat io n wo u ld pro v id e that

the im age c a l led u p by the pred ic ate was a l so appl ic ab le " ( CP 2 .3 6 9 ) .

T his sho u ld seem c o m plete ly im po ss ib le H aving c la im ed in u nequ ivo c a l l an

guage that a proposition is a symbolic legisign, that is , an abstract type distinct

f ro m i t s var io u s m o d es o f fo rm al rea l izat io n and c o ntextu a l fu nc t io ning , whic h

represents its general object only on the basis of being interpreted to do so , Peirce

then insists that a proposition must carry information about the world, that it is

subject to being judged true or false. The path out of this perplexity l ies in

Peirce's observation that, although signs are related to their objects in diverse

ways— by fo rm al resem blanc e ( ic o ns) , by c o ntextu a l c o nt igu i ty ( ind ic es ) , and by

conventional attribution (symbols)—these same signs can determine their inter

prétants to represent them as being related to their objects

as other than

they are

in fact related. We know that words and propositions are both symbols (and thus

legis igns); but they differ radically in how they specify their interprétants to rep

resent the relation with their respective objects: a single term (a common noun,

for example) determines its interprétant to represent it as being merely an icon

of its object (book or is black reter to any possible thing that has the qualit ies

expressed by the s i g n ) , whi le a pro po s i t io n , the book is black, determ ines its

interprétant to represent it as being merely an index of its objec t. N ow this is not

to deny that the interprétant sti l l represents both a term and a proposition to be

conventionally related to their objects; the c laim being made is that, in addition

to this level of representation, interprétants have the power to apprehend semiotic"

grounds as being other than they are. And, of course, Peirce invented a set of

technical terms for these distinctions: a " j j asme" is a sign which is apprehended

to be an ic o n; a "d j c c nt " o r "d ic i s ign" i s a s ign whic h i s apprehend ed to be an

ind ex ; and an "argu m ent" i s a s ign whic h i s apprehend ed to be a sym bo l .

Cases in which a sign's actual relation to its object is identical with that

relation as apprehended by the interprétant are easy to grasp but rather uninter

esting. A weathervane is an index of its object, the wind, because it is in direct

physical connection with it ; a weathervane grasped semiotically as a dicent con

veys the information it does only because it is apprehended to be in this relation

of causal connection. For a farmer to interpret a weathervane as being merely



14

I

Foundat ions of Peircean Semiotics Peirce Divested for Nonintim ates

I 1 5

iconic , that is , as a rheme, would be to form an interprétant representing the

weathervane as s tand ing fo r so m e po ss ib le wind c o nd i t io n—perhaps resem bl ing

yesterday's breeze. Obviously, this farmer could not rely on the weathervane to

provide reliable information about the arrival of the storm c louds hovering in the

western sky.

In contrast, cases in which a sign 's actual relation to its object differs from

the ground apprehended by the interprétant are fasc inating prec isely because they

suggest the possibil ity for creativity built into semiotic processes. Take the l in-|

guistic sign the king is dead. Though c learly composed of purely conventional

symbols, this complex sign is interpreted as a proposition when the subject,

the

king,

is interpreted as referring to or denoting a parti cular perso n (e.g. , El vis

Louis XIV) with which the interpreter is in prior acquaintance; and the predi-j

ca t e , is dead,

is interpreted to apply to that object. An d the noun phras e

a tall

man, though a symbol ic legisign, is also a rhem e, since it is apprehended as an|

icon of its object

{the tall man

wo u ld , o f c o u rse , be a d ic ent sym bo l) .

And the argument, being a symbol taken as a symbol, is for Peirce the high-

est kind of semiotic entity. A series of propositions in syllogistic reasoning is an;

argument because the interprétant represents the syllogism as being related to its '

object by virtue of "the law that the passage from all such premises to such con

c lu s io ns tend s to the t ru th " ( CP 2 .26 3) . As

a

symb ol that comp els an interpreting;

representation to represent it as a fully conventional sign, the argument is a par

ticularly important feature of cultural phenomena that call attention to their sem

iotic shape or that impose constraints on the abil ity of members of a soc iety to j

generate their own interpretations of messages (see Chapter 6) :

\ The argumen t is a representamen whi ch does not leave the interprétant to be

\ determined as it may by the person to wh om the symb ol is addresse d, but sep-

\ arately represents what is the interpreting representation that it is intended to

1

determine. (CP

5

. 76 )

T hu s , rhem e, d ic ent , and argu m ent fo rm a lo g ic a l sequ enc e :

Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol "a tall man," it is by no

means requisite to understand it to relate, or to profess to relate, to a real

Object. I ts Interprétant, therefore, does not represent it as a genuine Index;

so that the definition of the Dic isign does not apply to it . I t is impossible

here fully to go into the exam inatio n of w hether the analysis given d oes

justice to the distinction between propositions and arguments. But it is easy

to see that the proposition purports to intend to compel its Interprétant to

refer to its real Object, that is represents itself as an Index, while the argu

ment purp orts to intend not compulsion but action by means of compre

hensible generals, that is , represents its character to be specially symbolic .

( C P 2 . 3 2 1 )

I t might appear that, in using English-language examples to i l lustrate the logical

structure of the proposition, we have violated Peirce's f irm warning against fo l

lowing the model of l inguistic usage. But a moment's reflection on these examples

wi l l sho w that a l l l ingu is t ic u sages , whether wo rd s , pro po s i t io ns , o r a rgu m ents ,

can be reduced to the elementary princ iples of their semiotic functioning because I

they share these princ iples with all semiotic phenomena and not because any par-,

t i c u lar l angu age ' s gram m at ic a l , syntac t ic a l , o r l ex ic a l c o nvent io ns are d i rec t ex- 1

pressions of these princ iples. In fact, Peirce often remarks on the necessity off

penetrating beneath these surface conventions in order to see logical regularity

s t ru ggl ing to em erge . F o r exam ple , d iverse l ingu is t ic c a tego r ies need to be rec o n-

c eptu a l ized in sem io t ic te rm s : pro per nam es , perso na l pro no u ns {you), d em o n

stratives {that), and locatives {here) a r e a ll " g e n u in e i n d i c e s " ( C P 2 . 3 0 5 ) . M a n y

distinctions which would be essential for a perfectly logical language are missing

entirely in many languages:

I f a logic ian had to construct a language de novo—which he actually has al

most to do—he would naturally say, I shall need prepositions to express the

temporal relations of

before, after,

an d

at the same time with,

I shall need

prepositions to express the spatial relations of

adjoining, containing, touching,

of m range with, of near to, far from, of to the right of, to the left of, above,

below, before, behind, and I shall need prepo sitions to expr ess motion s into

and out of these situations. For the rest , I can manage with metaphors. Only

if my language is intended for use by people having some great geographical

feature related the same way to all of them, as a mountain range, the sea, a

great river, it will be desirable to have prepositions signifying situations rela

tively to that, as

across, seaward,

etc . But when we examine actual languag es,

it would seem as though they had supplied the place of many of these distinc

tions by gestures. The Egyptians had no preposition nor demonstrative having

any apparent reference to the Nile. Only the Esquimos are so wrapped up in

their bearskins that they have demonstratives distinguishing landward, sea

ward, north, south, east , and west. But examining the cases or prepositions of

any actual language we find them a haphazard lot. (CP 2.29on)

Inversely, distinctions overtly expressed in languages often need to be null if ied in

semiotic analysis: in the proposition John gives the book to Mary, the semiotic

object is a complex unit consisting of the denoted objects of John, book, Mary,

despite the different case markings these may have.

I f languages are such imperfect i l lustrations of semiotic functioning, why

does Peirce persist in using l inguistic examples? The answer to this question l ies

in the answer to a more general question: why analyze

forms

o f expr ession at al l ,

s ince they seem inevitably to muck up the logically prec ise picture? Peirce's an

swer is that, although "internal signs" ( that is , mental ideas) and "external signs"

(that is , representations c lothed in perceptible forms) do not differ in princ iple,

o nly the la t ter o f fe r an o ppo rtu ni ty to per fo rm exper im enta l m anipu lat io ns .





18 I Foundations of Peircean Semiotics

ind ex c anno t be an argu m ent ( b lo c king o u t two po ss ib i l i t és in the m id d le ro w) .

The resulting ten sign possibil it ies are given below, along with a concrete i l lus

tration for each c lass:

( i ) (rhematic iconic) qualisign ; feeling of red

(2.) (rhematic) iconic sinsign; individual diagram

— (3) rhematic indexical sinsign; spontaneous cry:

ouch

(4) dicent (indexical) sinsign; telephone ring

(5 ) (rhematic) iconic legisign; architec tural order

«- (6) rhematic indexical legisign; type of shout: hello

(7) dicent indexical legisign; vendor's cry: beer here

— (8) rhematic symbol (legisign); the noun book

— (9) dicent symbol (legisign); proposition

(ro) argument (symbolic legisign) ; syllogism

Plac ing certain words in parentheses indicates that they are not essential in de

fining a sign c lass because of certain logical implication s ( identical with the

principles of exc lusion used abov e) . Th us a qualisign , being a F irs t , must be an

icon, and being an icon it can only be a rheme. Similarly at the other extreme of

the hierarchy, an argument must be a symbol, and being a symbol it must be a

legisign.

" Th at this l ist of sign c lasses was generated by a metho d of exc lus ion should

not be taken to imply that the resulting types do not have positive connections

and interactions as well . Peirce specifies three such positive l inkages (though not

with these labe l s ): rep l ic a t io n , c o m po s i t io n , and d o wnsh i f t ing . R epl ic at io n re fers

to the necessity that al l legisigns generate replicas of themselves ( in fact, to be a

legisign is to be something that produces tokens of its type) . I f a sign is c lassed

as an indexical legisign, for example, we know that its replica will be c lassed as

an indexical sinsign—although, as noted previously, this replica will not have

identical properties with the "run of the mill" indexical sinsign (e.g. , telephone

r in g ) . Composition refers to the internal complexity of certain sign c lasses such

that they nec essar i ly c o nta in o r em bo d y lo wer-ranking s igns . T he d ic ent sym bo l ,

a proposition for example, is built up of two rhemes, a rhematic symbol (com-

\ mon noun) as well as a rhematic indexical legisign (demonstrative prono un), the

\ fo rm er " to express i t s in fo rm at io n " ( C P 2 .2 6 z) and the la t ter " to ind ic ate the

\ subject of that info rma tion. " F inally, down shift ing refers to the tendenc y of cer-

\ tain of the c lasses to be systematically app erceived by their interpré tants as being

\ lower-ranking signs. A rhematic indexical legisign will regularly be interpreted

as if it were only a (rhematical) iconic legisign. The

that

in the phrase

that book,

though interprétable at al l only because it is in proximity to its object, the book

be ing d eno ted , fu nc t io ns to d eterm ine an interprétant whic h represents i t a s

being related to this book by virtue of formal resemblance, thus not as picking

out a particular object ( the task of a dicent) but as st ipulating a possible c lass of


I 1 9

o bj ec t s shar ing the sam e featu re , nam ely , whatever m ight po ss ib ly be " re la t ive ly

far from speaker." In order to distinguish regular members of a sign c lass from

other variants or varieties that fal l into this c lass because of these processes of

repl ic a t io n , c o m po s i t io n , o r d o wnshi f t ing , Pe i rc e so m et im es c a l l s these la t ter in

s tanc es "d egenerate" s igns—a term d er ived f ro m m athem at ic s ra ther than f ro m

morals.

An im po rtant im pl ic at io n o f Pe i rc e ' s th i rd t r ic ho to m y ( rhem e, d ic ent , a rgu

ment) for historical analysis is that the identical representamen can shift ranks in

d i ffe rent per io d s . J app y ( 1 9 84 :23 — 25 ) g ives a par t ic u lar ly c lear exam ple o f th i s :

fo r a no nspec ia l i st m o d ern m u seu m go e r , the presenc e o f u l t ram ar ine p igm ent o n

a Qu at t ro c ento a l tarp iec e pa int ing o f a Mad o nna i s interpreted as a rhem at ic

iconic sinsign, that is , a sign that is a particular occurrence, that stands for its

dark blue object by resemblance, and that can only be interpreted as representing

so m e po ss ib le o r ig ina l o b j ec t . F o r the c o ntem po rary v iewer , ho wever , th i s p ig

m ent generated severa l ad d it io na l interprétants : kno wing that th is p igm ent was

rare and expens ive , the c o ntem po rary v iewer wo u ld interpret i t s presenc e as a

d ic ent ind ex ic a l s ins ign po int ing to the wea l thy pat ro n who c o m m iss io ned the

work; and sensitive both to the place of ultramarine in the overall color code of

the per io d and to the po s i t io n o f par t ic u lar shad es o f u l t ram ar ine , the c o ntem

po rary v iewer wo u ld interpret the p igm ent as a repl ic a o f a d ic ent ind ex ic a l l eg i

sign, since the color is part of a system of general regularit ies. Note that, in this

example, the passage of t ime corresponds to a lowering o f the ran k of the sign,

as the r ic hness o f "c o l la tera l kno wle d ge " ava i lab le to the v iewer d ec reases .

Cu l tu ra l sym bo ls wi th em bed d ed ic o nic pro pert ies a re f requ ent ly interpreted

as less than fully symbolic , that is , as "naturalized" signs that inherently, rather

than c o nvent io na lly , s igna l the i r o b j ec t ( H erz fe ld 1 9 9 2 : 6 9 ; Lo t m a n 1 9 8 5 : 56 ) .

One l imitation of Peirce's view is that it does not allow for the possibil ity of the

opposite to happen, the "upshift ing" of signs as a result of the structure of inter

prétants . B u t th is i s prec i se ly what happens in c ases o f the "c o nvent io na l iz ing" '

of relatively motivated signs (see Chapter 8) .

A lways sens i t ive to the d i f f i c u l t ies invo lved in grasping thèse inter lo c king

regularit ies among sign c lasses, Peirce tries to ease the student's mind: "I t is a

nice problem to say to what c lass a given sign belongs; since all the c ircumstances

of the case have to be considered. But it is seldom requisite to be very accurate;

for if one does not locate the sign prec isely, one will easily come near enough to

i t s c harac ter fo r any o rd inary pu rpo se o f lo g ic " ( CP 2 .26 5) .

Scientific Knowledge and Cultural Belief

For Peirce, semiotic relations are anchored in the l inkage between signs as

c o nst i tu ents o f c o gni t io ns and externa l rea l i ty , the c harac ter o f the wo r ld "wh at

ever yo u o r I o r any m an o r m en m ay th ink o f them to be" ( MS 29 6 : 1 8) . T his



2 0 I

Foundations

of

Peircean Semiotics

l inkage is not a static relationship, since human knowledge and belief about re

ality must be acquired through inferential processes in whic h s igns and the i r ob

jects come into truthful relation: "The who le e f fo r t in investigation is to m ake

our beliefs represent the realit ies" (MS 379). Reaso ning invo lves c o m ing to be

l ieve true representations of reality. It is semiotically mediated in that all tho u ght

takes place through

the

medium

of

s igns

and it is

realist ically grounded

in

that

the most perfect representations are those that depict reality so c learly that the

semiotic means are not d istorting factors.

T he a t ta inm ent of true opinion is a c o m m u nal ac t iv i ty , s inc e the inferential

process arrives at " se t t led belief" among sc ientifically logical minds. But if the

t ru th is what people ultimately agree on, it is not bec au se a so c ia l gro u p has

collectively dec ided upon some belief but rather because a sc ientifically rigor ous

c o m m u n i t y of minds will ult imately agree on the representation of reality. So,

that generations of people believe something to be t ru e c o u nts for no th ing if "suf

f ic ient experience and reaso ning " show this belief to be false. In o ther wo rd s ,

truth as the "f inal settled opinio n" arrived at throu gh sc ientific rationality is a

future-oriented notion (in d istinction to the p as t -o r ientat io n of historically inher

ited cultural beliefs) .

And yet

truths

are, in a

sense , "pred est inated "

to

reac h

the

point they do in fact reach: "The m etho d we pu rsu e or the ac t io n of our wi l l ,

may hasten or retard the t ime when this conclusion is reac hed ; but it is fated to

em erge at last . And every cogn ition consists in what inves t igat io n is destined to

result i n" (MS 379).

So that the object of a final settled opinion not merely coincides with the truth,

bu t

is the

truth

by the

definition

of

wo rd s .

The

truth

is

independent

of

what

we may think about it and the object of an opinion is a creation of thought

whic h is entirely dependent on what that opinion is. It exists by virtue of that

opinion. There seems to be a contradiction here. But the secret of the matter

is this. Th e final settled opinion is not any particular cognition, in such and

such a m ind , at such and such a t ime, although an individual opinion may

chance to coincide with it. If an opinion coincides with the final settled opin

ion, it is because the general current of investigation will not affect it. The

object of that individual opinion is whatever is thought at that t ime. But if

anything else than that one thing is thought, the object of that opinion changes

an d it thereby ceases to coincide with the object of the final opinion which

does not change. T he perversity or ignorance of m ankind may make this thing

or that to be held for true, for any number of generations, but it can not affect

what would

be the

result

of

sufficient experience

and

reasoning.

(W 3:79)

Peirce consistently rejected the possibil ity of acquiring firm, sc ientific knowl

ed ge of anything nonreal, namely, whatever possesses the attributes it does solely

bec au se of the o pin io n of "any perso n or d e f in i te ex i s tent gro u p" (NEM

3 / 2 : 8 8 1 ) .

Th e

real does, however, correspond

to the

o b j ec t

of the

o pin io n

of a

Peirce Divested

for

Nonintimates

I 2 1

c o m m u n i t y if that o pin io n is the resu l t of su f f ic ient ra t io na l d i sc u ss io n . Of

c o u rse ,

that

a perso n or g r o u p has a false or nonsensical idea can be a true fact

about that person or g ro u p. Pe i rc e is qu ic k to po int out, howev er, that reality is

not confined to the universe of existent objects (Seconds) but m u st inc lu d e as well

the class of ens

rationis

or "c reat io ns of tho u ght " ( T hird s) . T hese genera l ent i

t ies, inc luding abstractions

in

m etaphys ic s

and

l ingu is t ic typ es ,

are not

" f i c t i o n s "

( N E M 3 / 2 : 9 1 8 ) — c o n t r a r y to the phys ic a l i s t or behav io r i s t pre j u d ic e aga ins t

them (N 1 : 3 5 ) — b e c a u s e t h e y are the " inev i tab le resu l t of suf f icient th o u g ht"

( N E M 3 / 2 : 9 1 8 ) .

Peirce's sc ientific realism, at f irst glance, leaves l itt le room for the s tu d y of

cultural units, categories, or ent i t ies whic h d epend on the h i s tor ic a l ly t ransm it ted

beliefs of a so c ie ty and for whic h t ru th-va lu e is not a lways re levant . He is c are fu l ,

however, to indicate that the o b j ec t of a s ign can be real "as far as the ac t io n of

the Sign is c o n c e r n e d " (MS 6 3 4 : 2 7 ) , as long as the vec to r of determination sti l l

f lows from object to s ign:

T h e w o r d " w i t c h " is a s ign having a " rea l Obj ec t " in the sense in which this

phrase

is

used, namely

to

mean

a

supposedly real Object,

not the

S ign ,

and in

intention or pretension not created by the s ign. . . . It is real in the sense in

whic h a dream is a real appearance to a person in s leep, although it be not an

appearance of objects that are Rea l . (MS 6 3 4 : 2 7 )

A m o re c o m plex exam ple is the l ega l c o ntrac t , o bv io u s ly a so c ia l pheno m eno n

d epend ent u po n hu m an agreem ent at two levels: agreement as to the genera l na

ture of b ind ing , va l id c o ntrac t s and agreem ent between the par t ies to a par t ic u lar

c o ntrac t .

T he

issue

is

whether

or not a

c o ntrac t

is

rea l , ac c o rd ing

to

Pe i rc e ' s

def

init ion.

At

first

it

wo u ld appear that

the

a n s w e r

i s "no,"

s inc e every c o ntrac t

depends

u po n what peo ple th i nk —a c o ntrac t

is

defined

as

so m ething

you

m u st

enter into intentionally. As Peirce tentatively concludes, "s o that no th ing whic h

merely inheres

in an

agreem ent

can be

r e a l "

(MS 296). But

Pe i rc e pro c eed s

to

consider the question in g reater d epth . I m agine two perso ns , eac h d ream ing of

entering into a c o ntrac t of identical spec ification with the other. Clea rly these

c o ntrac t s are totally dependent upon the mental states of the perso ns invo lved

an d so w o u l d not be real , despite the historical fact of " j u d ges d ec id ing o ther

w i s e . " So it seems that the c o ntrac t ing part ies m u st c o m e to gether in a genu ine

triadic way, such that each part y assents to the agreem ent and, fu r ther , rec o g

nizes the other's assent as an essential reason for their assent. "I wi l l say that

there must be some volunt ary, some deliberate molit ion of so m e k ind , tho u gh it

be merely mental, in which both parties shall be involved as a g e n t s " (MS 296).

T his c o ntrac t now appears real , s ince it exerc i ses an effic ient force in c o o rd inat

in g the behav io r of the par t ies ac c o rd ing to the t e rm s of the a g r e e m e n t . As Peirce

concludes

h is

d i sc u ss io n ,

"It is

thus demonstrated that what

is

subjectively general



zz

I


is not thereby incapacitated for being real , that is , for holding its characters in

dependently of thoughts of individual minds about its possession of them" (MS

2 9 6 ) . This example is extremely important in that it shows how action deriving

from social norms or cultural conventions can share Peircean reality—and thus

o penness to sem io t ic u nd ers tand ing— with the o b jec t s o f phys ic a l l aws and lo g i

cal reasoning.

2

Peirce's Concept of

Semiotic Mediation

All my notions are too narrow. Instead of Sign," ought I not to say M e d i u m }

— Cha rle s Sa nd ers Pe irce (M S 3 39 , 19 06 )

The Fundamental Model of Semiotic Mediation

ONE OF THE most significant contribut ions to semiotic theory made by Peirce

is his conception of sc ientific episte mology as the study of the logic of sig ns .

1

For

Pe i rc e , hu m an c o gni t io n , inc lu d ing senso ry perc ept io n , em o t ive fee l ing , as we l l

as inferential reasoning, involves "internal signs" l inked, on the one hand, to each

other in an endless series of states of mental "dialogue" and, on the other hand,

to external reality represented as objects interacting in ways similar to the inter-

actions among constituents of sign relations. In every mental act some feature of

reality, defined as that which is as it is apart from any and all thought about it ,

is brought into connection with a chain of mental representations that has the

unique power of interpreting reality in ways other than it is in itself. But since

reality 's objects possess the qualit ies or characteristics they do independently of

human representation, the pattern of sc ientific representation is always "deter

m ined " o r c au sed by natu ra l regu lar i t ies ; resu l t ing c o gni t io ns are t ru e to the d e

gree that the relations inhering among mental signs match the relations inhering

among external signs. There is , to be sure, a world in itself an d a wo r ld as rep

resented, but Peirce's fundamental insight is that these two realms are brought

into articulation by the mediating role of signs.

This chapter explores Peirce's theory of the semiotic mediation of thought

and reality as it developed in the course of his persistent yet consta ntly shift ing

reflection on the nature of signs. Where possible the argument keeps c lose to

Peirce's own words as found in his voluminous published writings and in the

massive manuscript collection now available to scholars. After describing the es

sential features of the sign relation, the discussion examines the rec iprocal vectors

of determination and representation which constitute all moments of semiosis. A

distinction between chains of semiosis and levels of semiosis then leads to a de

tailed consideration of Peirce's early views on the mediating function of thought

in signs. A subtle shift in Peirce's point of view after his incorporation of the

logic of relations is seen to have important implications for the theory of media-

2-3



Z4 I Foundations of Peircean Semiotics

Peirce's Concept of Semiotic Mediation

I 2 5

known about its Object. There is thus a triadic relation between any Sign, an

Object, and an Interprétant. (MS 654.7, 1910)

The sign relation, thus, necessarily involves three elements bound together in a

semiotic moment. The sign itself considered as the sensible vehic le or expressive

fo rm , what Pe i rc e o f ten labe l s the " representam en, " c an be e i ther an externa l

object functioning as a means of communication or an internal, mental represen

tation conveying meaning from one act of cognition to the next. Second, the

object of the sign is that which the expressive form stands for, reproduces, or

presents " in i t s t ru e l ight " ( MS 59 9 .28 , 1 9 0 2) . And , th i rd , the interprétant i s a

resulting mental or behavioral effect produced by the object 's influence on the

sign vehic le in some interpreter or interpreting rep resentation . In more mode rn

vo c abu lary , the interprétant c o nst i tu tes the "m eaning" o r " s igni f ic anc e" o f the

s ign , whi le the o b j ec t c o nst i tu tes the " re fer ent " o r "d e no tat io n" o f the s ign .

Since these three elements can, in themselves, belong to various orders of reality,

such as single objects, general c lasses, f ic tions, mental representations, physical

impulses, human actions, or natural laws, what constitutes the sign relation is the

particular way in which this triad is bou nd together. Peirce expresses this un ique

semiotic bond as a relationship in which the object or denoted entity "deter

mines," spec ifies, or influences the sign vehic le or representamen to further de

termine the interprétant so that this interprétant comes to represent the origina

object in the same respect as the representamen does:

A

Sign,

or

Representamen,

is a First whic h stands in such a genuine tria dic

relation to a Second, called its Objec t, as to be capable of determining a Thi rd,

called its

Interprétant,

to assume the same triadic relation to its objec t in which

it stands itself to the same Object. (CP 2.2 74 , c .1 902 ) -

In insisting that the representamen and the interprétant are both signs represent

ing the same object, although to different degrees of spec ific ity, and that the ob

ject of the sign determines not just that first sign but, mediately, a second

interpreting sign, Peirce implies two things about the sign relation. F irst , the sign

relation is constituted by the interlocking of a vector of representation pointing

from the sign and interprétant toward the object and a vector of determination

pointing from the object toward both sign and interprétant. Second, one semiotic

moment in which the sign elements are in a genuine triadic relation requires an

infinite series of similar moments; in other words, the sign relation is a process.

I take up these two issues in turn.

Determination and representation are the opposed vectors in any sign rela

tion. Determination, for Peirce, is the causal process in which qualit ies of one

element are specified, transferred, or predicated by the action of another element.

This process of adding to the determination of an element is equivalent to an

inc rease in the "d ept h" o r intens ion o f a te rm ( CP 2 . 42 8, 1 8 9 3 ) ; a nd the sem io t ic

transmission of this further determination is registered in the resulting characteri-

t ion taken more generally as the essential feature of the highest metaphysical cat

ego ry , whic h Pe i rc e c a l l s "T hird ness . " T he c hapter c o nc lu d es wi th an ana lys i s o f

Pe i rc e ' s no t io n o f "m ed iu m o f c o m m u nic at io n , " whic h o c c u pied h is l a te th ink

ing and which ironically implies a devaluation of the semiotic properties of ex

pressive vehic les for the sake of a comm itmen t to truth-f unction al epistem ology.

In its most basic sense, the notion of mediation can be defined as any process

in which two elements are brought into articulation by means of or through the

intervention of some third element that serves as the vehic le or medium of com

munication. In bil l iards, for example, the action of the cue is capable of knocking

the black eight ball into the corner pocket thanks to the white cue ball , which

carries or transmits the directional impe tus of the cue to the eight ball (C P 1 . 5 3 2 ;

c f . Wi ld 1 9 47 :2 1 8) . T his s im ple ac c o u nt o f m ed iat io n in whic h the c u e ba l l m e

diates between the cue and the eight ball is , to use Peirce's term, "degenerate"

for four reasons. F irst , in this case the process of mediation can be easily reduced

to two independent dyadic moments, cue and cue ball , cue ball and eight ball .

Second, the eight ball responds to the cue ball without taking into account or

forming any representation of the initial impetus from the cue. Third, there is no

dimension of relationship among the three elements involved other than that of

d yad ic phys ic a l c o nnec t io n , what Pe i rc e c a l l s " i c o nic i ty . " And fo u rth , no th ing o f

a general nature is transmitted in this sequence of st imulus-reactions that would

be equivalent to the noetic quality conveyed when a speaker delivers words to a

listener who understands thereby the speaker's meaning. These four observations

suggest that the bil l iards model is only an example of degenerate rather than

genuine mediation: the three elements are reducible without residue to indepen

dent dyads; there is no interpretation or representation by the resultant moment

of the earlier moment; no symbolic or conventional relations exist among the

elements; and no thought, idea, or meaning is embodied and transmitted in the

pro c ess .

In order to understand how a genuine example of sign mediation would dif

fer from the degenerate bil l iards example, we need to introduce Peirce's defini

t ion of the sign and the sign relation, since the sign is the most perfect example

of "mediation" conceived of as a generalized category. In doing this we are op

erating in a fashion similar to Peirce's own style of argumentation, for he com

pletes his deduction of his three fundamental ontological categories, "F irstness"

o r qu a l i ta t ive po ss ib i l i ty , "Sec o nd ness " o r ex i s tent o therness , and "T hird ness "

or general regularity, by first generating a model of then necessary components

of the sign relation. One of the c learest of Peirce's many attempts to define the

sign relation is as fo llows:

By a Sign I mean anything whatever, real or fictile, which is capable of a sen

sible form, is applicable to something other than itself, that is already known,

and that is capable of being so interpreted in another sign which I call its In

terprétant as to communicate something that may not have been previously



z6 I Foundations of Peircean Semiotics

zation of the interprétant, so that the object is considered as the "determinant"

and the interprétant the "d eterm ina nd " ( MS 49 9 ) . T hu s , c o lo r i s a d eterm inat io n

of an object, red is a determination of the color of an object, and scarlet is a

d eterm inat io n o f the red c o lo r o f an o b j ec t ( CP 1 .4 6 4 , 1 8 9 6 ; CP 8 . 1 7 7) .

Representation, in this triadic scheme, works in the opposite direction from

determination and is defined as the act or relation in which one thing stands for

something else to the degree that it is taken to be, for certain purposes, that

second thing by some interpreting mind. Because the representation substitutes

o r i s regard ed as su bst i tu t ing fo r the o b j ec t , the interpret ing m ind ac qu ires

knowledge about the object by means of experience of the representing sign.

Peirce's notion of representation inc ludes a broad range of phenomena:

The term representation is here to be understood in a very extended sense,

which can be explained by instances better than by definition. In this sense, a

word represents a thing to the conception in the mind of the hearer, a portrait

represents the person for whom it is intended to the conception of recognition,

a weathercock represents the direction of the wind to the conception of him

who understands it, a barrister represents his client to the judge and jury whom

he influences. (CP 1 .553,

l 8 é

7 ; c f. M S 3 8 9 , c . 1 8 7 3 )

Obviously there must be some constraint or l imitation on the abil ity of an inter

preting mind to form representations of aspects of reality if these representations

are to afford true knowledge of that reality:

If a thing has whatever characters it has utterly regardless of what any men

existing either now or at any assignable future date may opine that its charac

ters are, that thing is, by definition, perfectly real. But in so far as it is whatever

the thinker may think it to be, it is unreal. Now I say that the object of a sign

must resist in some measure any tendency it may have to be as the thinker

thinks it . (MS 499)

This need for the object of the sign to "resist" the interprétante powers of rep

resentation is answered in the definition of the sign relation c ited earlier: the ob

ject spec ifies the sign in a particular way so that the sign determines a third

element in a particular way, namely, that this third element (the interprétant)

represents or stands for the

same

object in similar respects that the sign represents

( see F igu re 1 . 1 ) .

I t is important to note that the position of the sign or representamen is me

diate between the object and the interprétant both for the vector of determination

and for the vector of representation. Also, the triad of elements at one semiotic

moment implies a constant expansion of the process of semiosis as the inter

prétant, in turn, acts so as to determine a further sign, becoming thereby a sign

to that further interprétant. I t is c lear why Peirce says, f irst , that the action of

the object upon the interprétant is "mediate determination" and, second, that the

interprétant itself is a "mediate representation" of the object.

2

The first is the


I 2 7

\ case since the specifyin g po tential of the object must pass throug h the repre senta-

I men, which f unctio ns to convey or translate its determina te properties mediately

j to the interprétant . Wind b lo wing f ro m the eas t d eterm ines a w eatherc o c k to

point in that direction and mediately determines a cognition in the mind of an

I observer w ho un derstands the function of the instrument that the wind is from

the east. The second is the case since the particular representation formed by the

interprétant of the object is constrained by the "stood for" relation already ex

isting between the representamen and the object; the accumulation of determined

qualit ies present in the object apart from all representation is attributed to the

sign of that object by the interprétant in the case of a true representation. Thus

the sign itself faces simultaneously in two directions: it faces toward the object

in a "passive" relation of being determined, and it faces toward the interprétant

in an "ac t iv e" re la t io n of d eterm ining ( MS 7 9 3 ) . T his inter lo c king of the vec to rs

of representation and determination implies that the three elements in the sign

re la t io n are never perm anent ly o b j ec t , representam en, and interprétant , bu t

rather each shifts roles as further determinations and representations are realized.

Sem io s i s i s , thu s , an " in f in i te pro c ess " o r an "end less ser ies " ( MS 59 9 . 32 ,

c i9 0 2 ) in whic h the interprétant appro ac hes a t ru e representatio n o f the o b j ec t

as further determinations are accumulated in each moment. This process operates

in two d i rec t io ns , "bac k to ward the o b j ec t " and " fo r war d to wa rd the interpré

t a n t " ( M S 5 9 9 . 3 8 , C . 1 9 0 2 ) .

The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the

first representation is the interprétant. But an endless series of representations,

each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute ob

ject at its limit. .. . So there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interpré

tant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is

handled along; and as representation, it has its interprétant again. Lo another

infin ite series . ( CP 1 . 33 9 = N E M 4 .3 0 9 ; c f. MS 59 9 .33 , c . 1 9 0 2 ; MS 79 2)

An important implication of the processual nature of semiosis is that there

is an inherent asymmetry in what can be termed the level of semiosis between

the vector of determination and the vector of representation. This asy mm etr y

derives from the fact that the representamen is f it to stand for the object in several

distinct ways. The representamen can be taken for the object because of a par

ticular quality or form which both share, and so in that respect they are practi

c al ly i n te r c ha n g ea b l e ( C P 1 . 5 5 8 , 1 8 6 7 ; C P 3 . 3 6 2 , 1 8 8 5 ) . A l t er n a t iv e l y , t h e s p a

tial or temporal posit ion of a representamen may make it naturally fit to stand

for some object in the same experiential f ield . But Peirce recognizes a third pos^Tj

sible mode of relation between representamen a nd object that transc ends bo th I

the realm of common q uality and the realm of comm on con text , and this is wh at I

j he calls a symbo lic relation, in which the representamen and ob ject are re lated

H

I

only because

the interprétant represents them as related. _ _ j f



z8

I


representamen.

object,

ob ject j

( " g r o u n d " )

interp rétant ,

r e p r é s e n t â m e s

i n t e r p r e t a n t

2

Figure

2. 1 .

Hypostatic abstraction

It is this third symbolic

3

mode of relation between representamen and object

that causes the asymmetry between determination and representation, since the

first vector passes through the representamen to the interprétant at the same level

of semiosis, while the second vector introduces a metasemiotic level at which the

interprétant represents its object only by virtue of having formed a conception

of the

relation

between the initial representation and the object. Because the in

terprétant is determined not just to represent the same object that the representa

men represents but also to represent that object in the "same respect" and with

the "same meaning" (although more highly determined), it must first form a rep

resentation of "second intention" in order to form a representation of first inten

tion.

4

("Second intention" [intentio secunda] is a term used by medieval philos

ophers to refer to knowledge involving not the thing itself but the mental or

linguistic act of knowing the thing.) Figure

2 .1

suggests an approximation of this

essential asymmetry and is to be interpreted as follows: all the vectors of deter

mination and representation that existed in Figure

1 . 1

are assumed to be in place

linking the three elements labeled with subscript

1

. The second level of semiosis

occurs when the interprétant] functions as a représentâmes by representing the

relation between representamen] and object] as a new semiotic entity, namely,

object2. The solid and broken arrows depict, respectively, the vectors of determi

nation and representation at this second level of semiosis.

Peirce has a technical term for what is labeled here object2, namely, the

"ground" of the relation between representamen and object. The ground is some

respect, character, reason, or quality that brings the sign into connection with its

object (CP 5 . 2 8 3 , 1 8 6 8 ; cf. C P 2 . 2 2 8 , C . 18 9 7 ; MS 7 3 2 , se c.6). Th e power of

the interprétant to create this new entity is called by Peirce "hypostatic abstrac

tion," since it involves taking a quality or predicate as an abstract subject. And

this power is the key to the interpretant's capac ity to fulfill its orig inal charge of

representing the same object with the same meaning that the first representamen

does.

That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create

entia rationis

[mental entities] that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes

us with the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think

through, into being subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign

Peirce's Concept of Semiotic Mediation I

2Q

itself,

making it the object of another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat

the operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions de

rive third intentions. (CP 4 . 5 4 9 ,

1 9 0 6 ;

cf. MS 2 8 3 . 1 4 6 ,

1905)

In shifting levels from red as a possible predicate or quality shared by representa

men and object to redness conceived of as the grou nd of char acter of the sign

relation between representamen and object, the interprétant exercises a synthetic

function at the level of second intention. But, more important, in the special case

described previously in which the sole relation connecting representamen and ob

ject is the relation of being represented by an interprétant, the ground of this

relation is

necessarily

triadi c, involving as it does the third element, the inter

prétant itself.

And so here we have finally arrived at the derivation of semiosis at the sym

bolic level as triadic in the genuine sense: the interprétant must form a conception

of the semiotic process itself that is not reducible to any dyadic relations existing

independently of semiosis. An d this triadic structur e is the result of fully s ymbolic

representation, since the function of creati ng a ground at the second level of semi

osis, which becomes the basis for the connection of object and representamen,

opens up Peirce's system to a universe of semiotic entities (Thirds) whose char

acter of being differs vastly from that of both qualities (Firsts) and existing ob

jects (Seconds).

Semiotic

Mediation and the Correlates of the Sign

Peirce's comments on the nature of semiotic mediation can be located in his

manuscripts, published articles, and reviews stretching from the early attempts

to construct the categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness through his

late writings on Pragmaticism. Historical examination of these references shows

that Peirce shifted the emphasis on mediation between two general poles. The

first pole focuses on the synthetic role of the interprétant in forming a represent,

tation of the relation between the object and the representamen so that these two

elements become linked in a semiotic web they would not be in by themselves;

thus, the interprétant is said to be the "mediate representation" of the object of

the sign relation taken as a whole . Th e second pole focuses on the idea of medi

ation by the representamen as the vehicle or medium of linkage between objects

and further mental representation by interprétants. Thus, the sign itself, that is,

the perceptible form, is said to mediate between object and interprétant, and the

interprétant is mediately determined by the representation standing in place of

the object. These two poles correspond to Peirce's twin concerns with, on the

one hand, the level of semiosis and mediate representation and, on the other

hand, chains of semiosis and mediate determination. Toward the end of his life

Peirce gradually moved away from the doctrine of mediate representation and



)o I Foundations of Peircean Semiotics

adopted a theory of "medium of communication" which, in some respects at

least, nullifies the usefulness of the overall appr oach to semiot ic mediation for

disciplines other than formal logic.

In Peirce's early writings on semiotics the mediate position of the representa

men between the object and the interprétant is partially obscured by his philo

sophical struggle to solve the essentially K ant- jan

P

Ifbjprn

_nf_hQw

abstract forms

can become realized in such a way that consciousness is modified to some degree.

' As early as îTfSï ~nê was convinced of the necessity for some level of expression

in which "Form," quality, or pure meaning is united with substance or sensuous

matter, a union roughly parallel to Kant's discussion of the "unity of appercep

tion":

If the object is expressed purely, all of the abstraction it contained (the expres

sion) would be meaning. Pure expression therefore is pure meaning. But this

the mind would not notice for the mind notices through resemblance &c dif

ference. . . . For an abstraction to emerge into consciousness, it is necessary that

it should be contained in a manifold of sense. . . . Abstr action, therefore, to

become modification of consciousness needs to be combined with that which

modification of consciousness as yet unrelated to any abstraction is, that is to

the perfectly unthought manifold of sensation. Well, how shall abstraction be

combined with manifold of sensation? By existing as a form for matter, by

expression. (MS 11 05 , 1861 ; variant in W 1:85 )

Peirce found the "necessity of expression" not just in language but in other cul

tural forms as well: "Every religion must exist in some forms or rites in order to

find the least realiz ation" (MS 1 10 5, 1 8 6 1 ) .

From this determination of matter according to form by expression Peirce

deduced an ontology consisting of three elements, things, forms, and representa

ti ons , related so that representations stand for things by vi rtue of or in respect

to forms. Form or Logos is the quality or characteristic that, when linked with

a representation, constitutes its "connotation" or "intension"; Object is some

real or fictitious thing whi ch, when linked with a representation, constitutes its

^denotation" or "extension." Peirce's model of representation here is closely con

nected with his concern for the logical properties of propositions, in which the

thing denoted by the subject of the propositi on is said to emb ody the form con

noted by the predicate (W 1:288, 1865). And from this ontological tripartition

based on propositional form Peirce further deduced the three necessary "refe r

ences" or "correlates" of every representation: a representation "stands for" its

Object, it "realizes" its Form, and it "translates" an equivalent representation,

as shown in Figure 2.2.

The third correlate of a representation is, thus, another representation in

which the product of the first representation's denotation and connotation is

translated or communicated; this product Peirce termed the "information" of the

representation. And, finally, given the distinction between denotation and con-

Peirce's Concept of Semiotic Mediation I 3 1

relate or equivalent representation

representation (interprétant)

(representamen)

>

' \J Logos or Form

\1 (ground)

object

Figure 1.2. Correlates

of

representation

notation, that is, between that about which something is said and that which is

said about something , Peirce produced a tripartiti on of types of repre sentations.

First, "copies" or "analogues" are representations that connote without denoting

by virtue of resembling in themselves their objects (for example, pictures, statues,

and hieroglyphs); second, "signs" or "marks" are representations that denote

without connoting on the basis of some previous fixity of convention (as when

a proper name is assigned in baptism); third, "symbols" are representations that

denote by virtue of connoting and that, when presented to the mind, immediately

call up a conception of the object, not because of previous convention or because

of formal resemblance but rather by virtue of the equivalence relations to another

representation or symbolic system (W 1:304, 1865).

The semiotic theory proposed by Peirce in the late 1860s stresses the role of

cognitive representation as the synthesis of form and object and depends largely

on the logical analysis of propositions, in which the form is an abstract quality

predicated of an object denoted by the subject (CP 1.548,

1867).

Although

Peirce often made clear that his notion of representation included everything,

mental as well as nonmental, that possesses attributes (WCP 1.326,

1865),

he

gave little attention to the sensible or material qualities of signs in the nonmental

category, or what he later termed the representamen. In fact, the need for some

"med ium of outward expr essi on" (CP 5.284, 1868) is admitted only as some

thing that may be necessary to translate a "thought-sign" to another person; and

these material qualities are, in themselves, only a residue of nonsemiotic proper

ties of the sign that play no positiv e role in the sign' s representat ional funct ion.

It was from this theory of representation that Peirce developed the ontologî

5

cal categories presented in his 186 7 paper "O n a Ne w List of Categ orie s" (CP

1

-5 45 -5 9) . The three correlates or references of a representation (form, obje ct,

and equivalent representation) become here the three universal conceptions or"

categories: reference to a "Ground," reference to a "Correlate," and reference

to an "Interprétant." In this revised terminology, ground is the quality or respect \

in which the representation stands for its object or correlate; and the interprétant

1

is the mediating representation that "represent s the relate to be a representation j



3 2 I


of the same correlate which this mediating representation itself represents" (CP

1 . 55 3 , 1 8 6 7 ) . T here are , thus , three d is t inc t leve ls o f re ferenc e : singular refer

enc e to the gro u nd o f "Qu al i ty , "

double

reference to the groun d-corre late pair

o r " R e l a t i o n , " a n d

triple

reference to the ground-c orrelate-int erpretant triad or

"Representation." And these three levels, in turn, correspond to three fundamen

tal categories, which Peirce labels F irstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.

The conception of a third is that of an object which is so related to two others,

that one of these must be related to the other in the same way in which the

third is related to that other. Now this coincides with the conception of an

interprétant. And

other

is plainly equivalent to correlate. The conception of

second differs from that of other, in implying the possibility of a third. (CP

1 . 5 5 6 , 1 8 6 7 )

This direct l inkage of semiotic constituents and metaphysical categories depends

not on isolated properties of the three terms of the sign relations, but rather on

the necessarily hierarchical architectonic in which reference to the correlate or

object presupposes reference to the ground and reference to the interprétant pre

supposes reference to both ground and correlate.

From this analysis Peirce proceeded to deduce that there must be three types

of representation. In the first and simplest case, reference to the ground involves

a quality that the representation and object share; in the second case, reference

to a ground involves a quality that sets the representation over against the object

so that their correspondence is a matter of fact; and in the third case, reference

to the ground is impossible without (cannot be "presc inded" from) reference to

the interprétant, which supplies the imputed quality founding the relation be

tween the representation (relate or sign) and object (or correlate) . These three

cases correspond to the well-known trichotomy of icon, index, and symbol (al

tho u gh in the 1 86 0 s Pe i rc e o f ten u sed the term s "c o p y" and " l ik eness " fo r i c o n

and "s ign" fo r ind ex) .

Peirce summed up his early posit ion on the semiotic mediation of cognition

in the twin c laims that there is no point in speaking about Being except as that

B e ing i s c o gnizable ( CP 5 .257 , 1 86 8) and that a l l c o gni t io ns are nec essar i ly

tho u ght in sequ enc es o f s igns ( CP 5 .25 1 , 1 86 8) . No t j u s t inte l lec tu a l o perat io ns

such as conceptions and judgments but also feelings and perceptions are all in

herently semiotic , that is , involve the processual mediation of cognitions by sub

sequent representations, with each additional representation bringing about the

synthetic unity of the previous one:

In short, the Immediate (and therefore in itself unsusceptible of mediation—the

Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the Unintellectual) runs in a continuous stream

through our lives; it is the sum total of consciousness, whose mediation, which


is the continuity of it, is brought about by a real effective force behind con

sc io u sness . ( CP 5 .289 , 1 86 8)

B y genera l iz ing the Kant ian no t io n o f Vorstellung " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " ( W 1 : 2 5 7 ,

1 8 6 5 ) to inc lu d e al l c o gni t ive pro c esses v iewed f ro m the po int o f v iew o f p ro po -

s i t io na l red u c t io n , Pe i rc e d i rec ted h is ph i lo so phic a l a t tac k in the la te 1 86 0 s

aga ins t a l l t ypes o f Cartes ian intu i t io nism , whic h po stu la tes the ex i s tenc e o f im

m ed iate ( and thu s no nsem io t ic ) c o gni t io n ( B u c zynska-Garewic z 1 9 78, 1 9 79 ; Es -

posito 1979) . Peirce's achievement here is no less than the synthesis of ontology

(that is , the theory of categories) , epistemology (that is , the theory of universal

representation) , and logic (that is , the analysis of representation-object relations)

by the mediating unification of the semiotic perspective.

Thirdness as Mediation

Over the next fo r ty -o d d years Pe i rc e m o d i f ied th is te rm ino lo gy f requ ent ly ,

su bst i tu t ing fo r the c atego ry o f T hird ness o r Representat io n labe l s su c h as Me

d i a t i o n , B r a n c h i n g , S y n t h e t i c C o n s c i o u s n e s s , T h e o r y , P r o c e s s , L a w , R e a s o n ,

T ransu as io n , T ransac t io n , B etweenness , Co nt inu i ty , and Regu lar i ty . T here i s a

general tendency, however, for him to prefer Mediation for the most general char

acteristic of Thirdness in writings after the early 1870s, that is , after he fully

integrated the " lo g ic of re la t io ns" into his ph i lo so phy ( CP 1 . 56 0 —6 7; Mu rph ey

1 9 6 1 : 1 5 0 — 5 2 ; c f . R o se n s o h n 1 9 7 4 ) . B u t th e c o m m o n e l em e n t t y i n g t o g e t h er

Peirce's various views is the fundamental idea that anything that either comes

between two things in order to l ink them together, transfers a characteristic fea

tu re f ro m o ne th ing o ver to ano ther , o r synthes izes e lem ents f ro m d isparate

realms of reality must exist at a higher logical and ontological level than the ini

t ial two things. And it is this insight that led him to c laim that there is more to

reality than brute existence (Secondness) and qualitative possibil ity (F irstness) . In

fact, the genuine reality of Thirds or triads, inc luding prototypically fully sym

bolic representations with their three references, implies that they are not re

ducible to either Seconds or F irsts, although they require these lower-ranking

categories as much as they determine them. Peirce summarizes his view as of

1 87 2— 73 as fo l lo ws : "A representat io n genera l ly . . . i s so m ething whic h br ings

one thing into relation with another. . . . A representation is in fact nothin g but

a

so m ething whic h has a

third

thro u gh an

other"

( q uo t ed i n K l o e s el 1 9 8 3 : 1 1 5 ) .

Having identified Thirdness on the basis of the triple references of a truly

symbolic representation, Peirce generalized this highest level category to realms

o f exper ienc e no t o bv io u s ly tho u ght o f as sem io t ic . As ear ly as 1 875 the c o nnec

tion between Thirdness and a variety of processes of mediation is apparent, as

in the f ragm ent t i t led "T hi rd " :



)4 I Foundations of Peircean Semiotics

By the third, I mean the medium or connecting bond between the absolute first

and last. The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third. The end is

second, the means third. The thread of life is a third; the fate that snips it, its

second. A fork in a road is a third, it supposes three ways; a straight road,

considered merely as a connection between two places is second, but so far as

it implies passing through intermediate places it is third. Position is first, ve

locity or the relation of two successive positions second, acceleration or the

relation of three successive positions third. But velocity in so far as it is con

tinuous also involves a third. Continuity represents Thirdness almost to perfec

tion. Every process comes under that head. Moderation is a kind of Thirdness.

The positive degree of an adjective is first, the superlative second, the compara

tive third. All exaggerated language, "supr eme ," "ut ter," "matc hless," "roo t

and branch," is the furniture of minds which think of seconds and forget

thirds. Action is second, but conduct is third. Law as an active force is second,

but order and legislation are third. Sympathy, flesh and blood, that by which

I feel my neighbor's feelings, is third. (CP 1 . 33 7, c .1 87 5)

Two themes emerge from this fragment: f irst , Thirdness as pertaining to a middle

position or term in a system, and second, Thirdness as pertaining to a rational

or normative princ iple that regulates objects, perceptions, and events. Peirce's

fundamental insight here is the l inkage between what can be called the "cohesive

pr inc ip le " o f T hird ness and the " regu la t ive pr inc ip le " o f T hird ness—and th is in

turn suggests the continuing influence of Kant on Peirce's thought, since Kant

stressed both the synthetic and the regulative functions of pure reason. There is ,

unfortunately, no c lue in the fragment how Peirce would express the sign relation

in terms of Thirdness as mediation; fortunately, he returned to this question in

several manuscripts written after the late 1870s.

The explic it connection between Thirdness, mediation, and the elements of

the sign relation occurs in an undated manus cript t it led "T he Ca teg ori es, " in

which Peirce applies the logic of relations to distinguish systems with one object,

systems with two objects in dual relation, and systems with three objects associ

ated in pairs but in such a way that the "triad is something more than a congeries

o f pa i rs " ( MS 7 1 7 = N E M 4 .3 0 7 , c . 1 8 9 3 ) . A ro ad that branc hes into two ro ad s

cannot be reduced to the sum of the two road s egme nts, since the presen ce of

the fork introduces a qualitatively new alignment whereby a traveler can pass

along the main road, proceed along either fork,

an d

r eturn from one fork across

the juncture to the other segment without ever traversing the undivided portion

of the main road. Similarly, i f A gives B something C, this cannot be reduced to

the dyadic fact of A's giv ing up C and B's receiv ing C , for the process of giv ing

is not two l inked acts but a single act, as can be easily seen in the example Peirce

gives in which A lays something d own and then an hour later B comes b y and

picks it up, a sequence utterly devoid of triadic relations. Peirce then generalizes

this analysis of triads to constitute the highest "formal ideal" or category:

Peirce's Conc ept of Semiotic Mediation

I 3 5

I t wil l , at any rate, be found a most helpful maxim, in making philosophical

analyses to consider, first, single objects, then pairs, last triads.

We have already applied this maxim in Artic le 1 , where Cunning is that skil l

that resides only in the single persons, Wisdom is that which can be stated to

others, Theory is that which can be fortified by means (observe that a

means,

or medium, is a third) of a reason.

Art.

4. That above maxim crystallizes itself in the statement that there are

three grand elementary formal ideas, as fo llows:

I . The First, or Original, expressed by the root AR. The plough goes first .

II . T h e

Second,

or Opponent, expressed by the root A N , as in Latin

in,

our

other,

and also more strongly, but with an idea of

success

in opposition, in AP,

whenc e

ob ,

apt ,

opus, opes, optimus,

copy.

III . T h e Third, or Branching, or Mediation expressed by such roots as PAR,

TA R, M A . These three ideas may be called the Categories. ( N E M 4 . 3 0 8 )

In another manuscript Peirce adds a brief comment on the notion of branching:

Namely, he must recognize, first, a mode of being in itself, corresponding to

an y quality; secondly, a mode of being constituted by opposition, correspond

ing to any object; and thirdly, a mode of being of whic h a bran ching line is

an analogue, and which is of the general nature of a mean function correspond

ing to the sign. (MS 7.13)

He then goes on to address the sign relation as one of the "easiest" ideas of phil

osophic al relevance in wh ich this third category of branchin g or media tion is

predominant. I have already c ited the crucial passage from this manuscript, but

it is important to recall that at this point in the development of Peirce's thinking

the third is

no t

the more familiar representamen, object, and interprétant, but

rather o b j ec t , m eaning , and interprétant :

A sign stands

for

something to the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, it

is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for which

it stands is called its

Object;

that whi ch it conve ys, its

Meaning;

and the idea

to which it gives rise, its

Interprétant.

( M S 7 1 7 = N E M 4 . 3 0 9 )

Clearly, the sign itself is conceived of as a nodal point analogous to the fork in

the road, where the three termini of object, meaning, and interprétant (parallel

to the three references or correlates of the sign from the 1860s: object, ground,

and mediating representation) come together or, more accurately, are bound to

gether. From the earlier notion that the interprétant functions as a synthetic

power in uniting in a further representation of the sign both a meaning and an'

object (a logos and a correlate, in the earlier vocabulary) , Peirce here focuses on

the mediating role of the sign itself as constituting an irreducible triad.

A crucial modification in this model of Thirdness, mediation, and sign oc

c u rs abo u t 1 8 85 in a m anu sc r ipt t it l ed "O ne , T wo , T hree : F u nd am enta l Ca te

g o r ie s o f T h o u g h t a n d o f N a t u r e " ( M S 9 0 1 = C P 1 . 3 6 9 - 7 2 , 1 . 3 7 6 - 7 8 ) a n d in



)6 I Foundations of Peircean Semiotics

a published article , "O n the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy

of Notation" (CP 3.359—403). In the manuscript Peirce stresses the synthetic

function of consciousness as the key to the ability of the mind to learn, make

inferences, and cognize relations of more than dual character. This consciousness

of synthetic facts is clearly present in cognition through symbols, for in this class

of signs there is a triadi c system of elements parallel to the three termin i of a

forked road and to the three terms of the rela tionship of gi ving:

We have seen that the mere coexistence of two singular facts constitutes a de

generate form of dual fact; and in like manner there are two orders of degen

eracy in plural facts, for either they may consist in a mere synthesis of facts of

which the highest is dual, or they may consist in a mere synthesis of singular

facts. This explains why there should be three classes of

signs;

for there is a

triple connection of sign, thing signified, cognition produced in the mind.

There may be a mere relation of reason between the sign and the thing signi

fied; in that case the sign is an icon. Or there may be a direct physical connec

tion; in that case, the sign is an

index.

Or there may be a relation which

consists in the fact that the mind associates the sign with its object; in that case

the sign is a name. (CP 1.372, c.1885)

It is important to note that in place of the three references or correlates of the

sign Peirce has substituted the triad of sign, thing signified, and cognition pro

duced in a mind. In this semiotic model it is the sign relation itself rather than

one element taken alone that reveals a triadic, synthetic, a nd mediati onal q uality:

It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first, feeling, the

consciousness which can be included with an instant of time, passive conscious

ness of quali ty, without recognition or analysis; second, consciousness of an

interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external

fact, of another something; third, synthetic consciousness, binding time to

gether, sense of learning, thought.

If we accept these [as] the fundamental elementary modes of consciousness,

they afford a psychological explanation of the three logical conceptions of

quality, relation, and synthesis or

mediation.

The conception of quality, which

is absolutely simple in itself and yet viewed in its relations is seen to be full of

variety, would arise whenever feeling or the singular consciousness becomes

prominent. The conception of relation comes from the dual consciousness or

sense of action and reaction. The conception of

mediation

springs out of the

plural consciousness or sense of learning. (CP 1. 37 7- 78 , c. 188 5; emphasis

a dde d)

5

The "plural" character of mediation, Thirdness, and sign relation, and Peirce

means by plural more than dual, is the test of "g enui ne" as opposed to "dege ner

ate"

triads.

In the paper "O n the Algebr a of Logi c" P eirce notes that the triple relation

of sign, object, and cognition in the mind is not equally genuine for the three


classes of signs. Taken as the "conjoint relation" of sign, thing signified, and

mind, the sign relation can be degenerate in two degrees: (1) if the sign has a

genuine dual relation with its object apart from the mental association supplied

by the mind, then the sign resembles a natural sign or physical symptom and is

labeled an index; (2) if the sign has a degenerate dual relation with its object

apart from any function of the mind, then the sign consists of mere resemblance

between sign and object and is labeled an icon (CP 3 .3 61 , 1 885 ). There ar e,

obviously, two other dual relations, sign-mind and object-mind, which could

possibly be either genuine or degenerate, but, as Peirce notes, without the pres

ence of the sign and object dyad (in either degenerate or genuine status) there

would be no question of a semiotic relation, since this would be the case of the

mind thinking of both object and sign

separately.

Since plural relations have two

degrees of degeneracy (index and icon) and since a dual relation can have only

one degree of dege neracy (as in the combinati on of two independent facts about

two subjects), the resulting possibilities form a system depicted in Figure z.3.

6

Peirce finds these two degrees of degeneracy in many forms of experience:

Among thirds, there are two degrees of degeneracy. The first is where there is

in fact itself no Thirdness or mediation, but where there is true duality; the

second degree is where there is not even true Secondness in the fact

itself.

Con

sider, first, the thirds degenerate in the first degree. A pin fastens two things

together by sticking through one and also through the other; either might be

annihilated, and the pin would continue to stick through the one which re

mained. (CP 1.366, C

. 1 8 9 0 )

We now come to thirds degenerate in the second degree. The dramatist Mar

lowe had something of that character of diction in which Shakespeare and

Bacon agree. This is a trivial example; but the mode of relation is important.

. . . In portraiture, photographs mediate between the original and the likeness.

In science, a diagram or analogue of the observed fact leads on to a further

analogy. (CP 1.367. c.1890)

The stress on the essentially triadic or plural character of genuine Thirdness

might seem to contradict Peirce's original definition of the categories as quality,

relation, and representation, for triadic relations are clearly "relations" of some

kind. In substituting a logic of relations for a logic grounded on propositional

predication in the 1880s and 1890s, Peirce was able to realize that not all rela

tions are dual and that the notion of mediation better expresses the reality of

relations between a triad of elements. As he wrote in 1 898:

I did not then [in 1867] know enough about language to see that to attempt

to make the word representation serve for an idea so much more general than

any it habitually carried, was injurious. The word mediation would be better.



3 8

I


I. Non-Sem ioric Sign II. Doubly Degene rate (Icon)

Sign Sign

degenerate

dual • /

Object Mind Object Mind

III. Singly Degen erate (Index) IV. Genuine Triad (Symbol)

Sign Sign

genuine

dual

Object Mind Object Mind

Figure

2 .3 .

Semiotic degeneracy

Quality, reaction, and

mediation

will

d o . ( CP 4 .3 , 1 89 8;

c f.

M S 3 3 9 , 1 9 0 6 ,

August 30)

Scholars disagree about the significance of this terminological shift (Murphey

1 9 6 1 ; Ro sensohn 1 9 74 : 1 2— 1 3 ) : in the 1 8 6 7 sys tem the three c atego r ies were

quality, relation, and representation, while in the 1898 paper Peirce prefers qual

ity, reaction, and mediation. At least one significant implication of this termino

logical shift is that Peirce now comes to see representation as one species within

the genus of mediation. In other words, the phenomenon of "standing for" is one

variety of the broader phenom enon of "stan ding be twe en." Th us, by 189 0 Peirce

defines his three categories as fo llows: F irst is being simply in

itself;

Second is

that which is by force of something else; and "the Third is that which is what it

is owing to things

between

whi ch it mediates and which it brings into relation

to eac h other" ( CP 1 . 3 56 , c . 1 8 9 0 ; em phas is ad d ed ) . T his new d e f in it ion o f the

Thi rd as mediation occurs frequently in Peirce's work in the 1890 s. In "A Guess

at the Riddle" he l inks Thirdness, representation, and mediation:

The third is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and

last, and brings them into relationship.. . . We have seen that it is the immedi

ate consciousness that is preeminently first, the external dead thing that is pre

eminently second. In like manner, it is evidently the representation mediating

between these two that is preeminently third. (CP 1 .359—61 , c .1890)

S im i lar ly in a paper pu bli shed in 1 8 9 1 Pe i rc e ( 1 8 9 1 : 1 6 3) d e fines T hird in te rm s

of mediation or that "whereby a first and a second are brought into relation"

and then generalizes this point to comprehend a range of sc iences and disc iplines:


I

39

First is the conception of being or existing independent of anything else. Sec

ond is a conception of being relative to , the conception of reaction with, some

thing else. Third is the conception of

mediation,

whereby a first and second

are brought into relation. . . . The origin of things, considered not as leading

to anything, but in itself, contains the idea of First, the end of things that of

Second, the process mediating between them that of Third . . . . The idea of the

Many, because variety is arbitrariness and arbitrariness is repudiation of any

Secondness, has for its princ ipal component the conception of F irst . In psychol

ogy Feeling is F irst , Sense of reaction Second, General conception Third, or

mediation. In biology, the idea of arbitrary spo rting is F irst , heredity is Second ,

the process whereby the acc idental characters become fixed is Third. Change

is F irst , Law is Second, and tendency to take habits is Third. Mind is F irst ,

Mat ter i s Sec ond , Evo lu t io n is T hird . ( CP 6 .32 , 1 89 1 ; em phasis added)

A second implication of this new terminology is that the concept of relation

is freed from the l imitations of Secondness and can be applied as well to Third

ness. Th e discovery of relations of greate r logical com plex ity than dual or dyadic

relations enabled Peirce to combine his earlier concern with prepositional repre

sentation with a greater sensitivity to the Thirdness inherent in certain soc ial

ac t s , su c h as g iv ing , c o nc lu d ing o f a c o ntrac t , and fo rm ing behav io ra l habi t s . A

lega l c o ntrac t , to take o ne exam ple , c anno t be ac c o u nted fo r m ere ly by the c o m

bination of two dyadic relations, the first being A's signature on document C and

the second being B's signature on document C. The essence of the contract l ies

in the " intent " o f the c o ntrac t , whic h s t ipu la tes c er ta in c o nd i t io na l ru les go vern

ing the fu tu re behav io r o f A and B ( CP 1 .475 , c . 1 89 6 ) . T hu s the ac t o f m aking

a c o ntrac t c anno t be red u c ed to the c o m po s i t io n o f the c o m po nent d yad s , and

yet the function of Thirdness inherent in the contract itself is to bring these two

dyads into a relationship binding for the future. In 1902 Peirce returned to this

c o nnec t io n am o ng T hird ness , intent io n , and m ed iat io n :

In all action governed by reason such genuine triplicity will be found; while

purely mechanical actions take place between pairs of particles. A man gives a

brooch to his wife. The merely mechanical part of this act consists in his laying

the brooch down while uttering certain sounds, and her taking it up. There is

no genuine triplicity here; but there is no giving, either. The giving consists in

his agreeing that a certain intellectual principle shall govern the relations of the

brooch to his wife. The merchant in the Arabian Nights threw away a date-

stone which struck the eye of a J innee. This was purely mechanical, and there

was no genuine triplicity. The throwing and the striking were independent of

one another. But had he aimed at the Jinnee's eye, there would have been more

than merely throwing away the stone. There would have been genuine triplicity,

the stone being not merely thrown, but thrown at the eye. Here, intention, the

mind's action, would have come in. Intellectual triplicity, or Mediation, is my

th ird c atego ry . ( CP 2 .86 , 1 9 0 2 ; c f . MS 46 2 .6 8-70 ,

1 9 0 3 )

7



40 I Foundations of Peircean Semiotics

I t is the intentional charac ter of "throw ing at ," of "gi vin g to , " that constitutes

these acts as examples of genuine Thirdness; the l inkage of two dyads creates

something that has reality only by virtue of the "bringing together" or mediation

of component elements.

A few years after writing the passage just c ited, Peirce took a further step in

his generalization of Thirdness by combining his earlier insights into the nature

of symbolic representation and his new discoveries about triadic relations. Put

simply, Peirce c laimed that Thirdness is that which brings together or mediates

Firstness and Secondness. In 1902 the c laim was that mediation is a modification

o f F i r s tness and Sec o nd ness by T hird ness ( CP 2 .9 2) , and in 1 9 0 3 aga in T hird

ness is de f ined as the "m ed iat io n between Sec o nd ness and F i rs tness " ( CP 5 . 1 2 1 ) .

And finally in 1904 Peirce stated explic it ly: "A Third is something which brings

a First into relation to a Second" (SS 31 ) and then glossed the sign relation in

identical language:

In its genuine form, Thirdness is the triadic relation existing between a sign,

its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as constituting

the mode of being a sign. A sign mediates between the

interprétant

sign and

its object. . . . A

Third

is something which brings a First into relation to a Sec

ond. A sign is a sort of Third. (SS 31 , 190 4)

It would seem from this that Peirce is stressing the middle posit io n of the sign

vehic le or representamen rather than the function of mediate representation as

exemplified in the work of the interprétant, which, as we have seen, characterized

his earlier posit ion.

8

Throughout the first decade of the century Peirce consis

tently held two doctrines about Thirdness and signs: f irst , this function of

"br ing ing to ge ther" i s gro u nd ed o n a ra t io na l , intel lec tu al , and law- l ike regu lar

ity that provides the common feature of natural as well as cognitive processes;

and second, the sign itself is the middle, medium, means, or mediation that l inks

o bj ec t and interprétant in a c o m m u nic at io n sys tem ( SS 32 , 1 9 0 4) .

Sign as Medium of Communication

Having established the third category in terms of bridging, bringing together,

and coming between two other elements, Peirce extended this doctrine sti l l fur

ther in h is wr i t ing between 1 9 0 2 and 1 9 1 2 by fo c u s ing o n the no t io n of c o m m u

nication as an essential feature of al l semiosis. The endless series of signs stretch

ing toward the object, on the one hand, and toward the interprétant, on the

other, forms a unified continuum because throughout this process the "torch of

truth" is passed on. That is , knowledge gained through the study of external and

internal signs is not something which is later available for communication or

transmission within the sc ientific community; rather, truth and communication

in Peirce's view are completely isomorphic because the inferential character of


I

41

argu m entat io n i s a lways d ia lo g ic — no t between tw o d if fe rent peo ple wh o are " in

c o m m u nic at io n" bu t between two d i f fe rent m o m ents o f the sam e m ind in whic h

the unity of the semiotic continuum is realized.

9

No w, in any pro c ess o f c o m m u

nic at io n there m u st be a m ed iu m , m eans , o r veh ic le thro u gh whic h the m essage

is conveyed from one cognition to the next, and it is prec isely the quality of signs

as "mediating thirds" that enables Peirce to c laim that a sign is a spec ies of a

"m ed iu m o f c o m m u nic at io n" between two m ind s that a re thereby bro u ght to be

o n e m i n d ( M S 3 3 9 , 1 9 0 6 ; M S

4 9 8 ) .

1 0

As he notes, a third or

tertium

i s , e t y m o -

logically at least , a middle or

medium,

and anyth ing that fu nc t io ns in th is c a

pac i ty i s pro per ly a s ign .

11

In the act of throwing a stone, for example, there is

a genu ine d yad ic re la t io n between the perso n who thro ws and the s to ne thro wn,

but there is also a triadic relation involved when the air, the medium through

whic h the s to ne is thro wn, i s t aken into ac c o u nt ( M S 1 2 . 5— 6 ,

1 9 1 2 ) .

T h o u g h

scarcely noticeable, the fric tion of the air exerts an influence on the stone's mo

tion and thus on the character of the triad as a whole. Like the air in this ex

am ple , a s ign fu nc t io ns as the m ed iu m o f c o m m u nic at io n and serves to t ransm it

some form that it embodies:

For the purposes of this inquiry a

Sign

may be defined as a Medium for the

communication of a Form. I t is not logically necessary that anything possessing

consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality of all our feeling

should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if not three,

quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied determination as to forms of

the kind communicated. As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic r ela

tion, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interprétant which it deter

mines. . . . That w hich is communicated from the Ob ject through the Sign to

the Interprétant is a form; that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a

power, is the fact that something would happen under certain conditions. This

Form is really embodied in the object, meaning that the conditional relarion

which constitutes the form is true of the form as it is in the Object. In the Sign

it is embodied only in a representative sense, meaning that whether by virtue

of some real modification of the Sign, or oth erwise, the Sign becomes endowed

with the power of communicating it to an interprétant. (MS 7 9 3 .1 - 3 , c . 19 05 )

In this passage Peirce is c learly interpreting his new notion of medium of com

munication in terms of his earlier theory of semiotic determination and represen

tation, but here the stress is on the function of "mediate determination" rather

than of "mediate representation." The role of the sign is to mediately determine

or influence the interprétant by functioning to "deflect the emanation from the

o b j e c t u p o n t h e i n te r p re t in g m i n d " ( M S 6 3 4 . 2 4 , 1 9 0 9 ; c f. N E M 3 . 8 3 9 , 8 4 1 ,

1 9 0 5 ) .

In focusing on the sign's function as a medium of communication, Peirce is

returning to an earlier concern, manifested in the earliest manuscripts from the

18 60s, wit h the necessity of a level of expres sion for the modification of c on-





44

I


the intervention of the human mind and which perfectly transmits the meaning

fro m the f i r s t l angu age into the sec o nd ( MS 283 . 1 0 z , 1 9 0 5) . A l tho u gh he

founded his semiotic philosophy on the notion of the mediation by signs of

thought and reality, Peirce in the end reduced the role of signs to being blind

vehic les for communication of meanings that they do not influence.

P A R T I I

Signs in Ethnographic Context



3

Transactional

Symbolism in Belauan

Mortuary Rites

We people are clever in fixing what is becoming too long

We lessen what is getting too big, and what is growing too long we cut short

This making smaller and making shorter balances out

But death is the one thing about which there is nothing that can be done

When I was growing up

1

yearned to see the world

Cursed and now dead, death is all that remains

If it was human, seen by us, we would lash the canoe board and

anchor the world

These houses and the chebtui-t ree on the hillside are just the same

Who is going to sneak away, passing by this way or that?

If one goes around death, then we just travel in circles

Death still tips us over in the end

These mothers who bore us exhausted themselves giving answer to

the falsehood

That we would not become people wiped out together by sickness

Death is all that remains

If it was human, seen by us, we would lash the canoe board and

anchor the world

These houses and the chebtui -tree on the hillside are just the same

Who

is

.going to sneak away, passing by this way or that?

If one goes around death, then we just travel in circles

Death still tips us over in the end

—Augustin Krämer

( 1 9 1 7 - 2 9 , 4 : 2 9 7 - 9 8 ;

my trans.)

1

HE DEATH OF a mature, married person in Belau (Palau) in western Microne

sia

sets into motion a series of ritual processes which regulate the successive ter

mination

of four aspects of the deceased's social status: as a "titleholder" (male

rubak

and female mechas), as a living human being , as a senior kinsper son, and

as

a "spouse" (buch). Corresponding ly, the ritual action, lasting in some cases

as

long as six months, (1) transfers the male or female title (dui) to a successor,

(z)

transforms the dead person's dangerously proximate "ghost" (deleb) into a

controllable

yet distant "ancestral spir it"

(bladek),

(3) redraws the ties of ki nshi p

solidarity

and affection among the living, and (4) channels the inheritance of

Responses

to Death

47



48

I


valuables and real property by finalizing the exchange balance between affinal

sides. These four tasks are accomplished by the highly prescribed activity of in

dividuals and soc ial groups, action focusing primarily on the manipulation of

four c lasses of meaning-laden objects: various kinds of food, "male valuables" in

the form of ceramic and glass beads

{udoud),

"fema le valu able s" in the fotm of

hammered turtleshell trays and oystershell sheers

(toluk

or

chesiuch),

and funeral

m ats

(badek

or

bar).

In the contemporary period, additional Western items have

become inc luded in these four traditional categories. And, finally, the interplay

between the presupposed symbolic meaning of these objects and the interpersonal

and intergroup relationships activated at the moment of death is pragmatically

mediated by several distinct modalit ies of transaction, inc luding asymmetrical ex

c hange , rec ipro c a l g i f t -g iv ing , and t ransgenerat io na l inher i tanc e . T his th i rd a na l

ytical variable is designed to integrate what Bloch and Parry ( 1982:6) call the

"so c io lo g ic a l " and the "sym bo l ic " d im ens io ns o f fu nera l s .

The full course of the mortuary sequence can be divided into two comple

mentary segments, the first being the week-long "funeral feast" (kemeldiil) and

the second being the final "death settlement talks" (cheldecheduch) held several

months later in cases where the deceased leaves a surviving spouse. The first seg

ment, primarily a female rite, focuses on the kinship relationships which the l iv

ing have to each other by virtue of their l inks to the deceased; thus, consan-

guineal (and, in particular, matrilateral) t ies play an extremely important role.

2

The second segment, primarily a male rite, focuses on negotiating the c losure of

affinal relations between husband's and wife 's kin and on transmitting property

( land, money, status) to the offspring of the marriage. This chapter is confined

to the analysis of the first segment, which can itself be divided into four ritual

components: the taking of the t it le, the burial proper, divination of the cause of

death, and the paving of the grave. In all the funerals I witnessed, the third and

fourth components took place together one week after the burial .

Funerals held in Ngeremlengui distric t differ from those described in the eth

nographic record in five basic ways.

3

F i r s t , c o ntem po rary B e lau an c u sto m s are

c o m plete ly in fu sed wi th Chr is t ian sym bo l i sm , langu age , and sent im ent . A l so , the

strength of Modekngei, a local syncretistic religious movement, colors the funer

als of members of this group l iving in the distric t . Second, the events themselves

are far more soc ially and financially elaborate than any described in the eigh

teenth and nineteenth centuries. This is partly because of better intervil lage com

munication and transportation and partly because of the overall inflation of cus

tomary exchange which has occurred since the influx of American dollars into

the economic system. Third, funerals and death settlement talks regularly take

place in the distric t 's chiefly meeting house ( located in Ngeremetengel vil lage)

rather than in private houses. The ritual procedures begin, of course, in the house

where the person dies, but soon thereafter the coffin and the mourners, along

with piles of funeral goods, food, and mats, move to the meeting house. I think

Transactional Symbolism in Belauan Mortuary Rites

I

49

that th is sh i f t , whic h to o k p lac e fo r Ngerem lengu i d i s t r ic t in the 1 9 30 s , c ann o t

be a t t r ibu ted m ere ly to the la rger nu m bers o f peo ple a t tend ing fu nera l s . Equ a l ly

important is the fact that many houses of t it leholders no longer stand on their

ancestrally prescribed spot, so that senior people from these houses would rather

us e , or actually rent, the public meeting house to feed and honor distinguished

invited guests.

F o u rth , in the c o ntem po rary sc ene d eath no lo nger au to m at ic a l ly enta i l s the

d isso lu t io n o f the ho u seho ld . Pr io r to the c o lo nia l per io d s , res id ent ia l ho u ses

(blai) were lo c ated o n presc r ibed land parc e l s c o ntro l led by the senio r m em bers

o f the m atr i l inea l gro u p. At m arr iage , a wo m an went to l ive in her hu sband ' s

v i l l age , and when her hu sband was m atu re eno u gh to rec e ive a c h ie f ly t i t l e , the

couple and their children moved to his matril ineal house. The result of this dis

harmonie pattern is that married women regularly l ived in vil lages where they

had no strong kin t ies and where t it leholding men ruled over houses in which

they did not grow up. In fact, the higher the soc ial rank the greater the dishar

mony, since chiefs try to use nonlocal marriages to form polit ical al l iances. Death

o r d ivo rc e , ac c o rd ingly , m eant that in-m arr ied wo m en and the i r c h i ld ren no lo n

ger received the deference of members of the house and had, in fact, to struggle

to protect forms of wealth (valuables and household items) from forced seizure

by the deceased 's younger brothers or mother's brothers. Kubary, the bril l iant

Po l i sh e thno grapher o f Mic ro nes ia , d esc r ibes the s i tu at io n in the m id -nineteenth

c entu ry :

The wife l iving abroad with het husband manages his house and enjoys great

respect from her husband's family as long as he lives. She is called

chedil

"mother" by everyone, but in many respects her influence is limited by the

conditions maintaining inside the blai. She is watche d in secret by the ochellel

"younger brothers" of her husband, and special attention is paid to the

udoud

"male valuables" given by the husband. I f the husband dies, and even befote

the corpse is buried, as much money as possible is squeezed out of her, this

attaining patticular prominence in the important houses, where greater values

are at stake. She then remains for the whole period of mourning in the house,

and leaves it, together with her children, after a formal

osumech

"d epartu re

payment" on the part of the dead man's relatives. (Kubary 1 8 8 5 : 5 8 )

With the introduction of private ownership of domestic houses in this century,

men take steps to provide for their surviving wives and children, who frequently

continue to l ive in the same house aftet the spouse's death. In Ngeremlengui at

least, widowed women who were married to t it led men continue to be called by

the correlative female t it le, despite the fact that another woman (married to the

successor to the male t it le) also commands the same respectful form of address.

And fifth, burial no longer takes place, as it d id in precontact t imes, beneath

the stone pavement in front of the house but rather in community graveyards

located on the empty hil lside behind the vil lages. This change was the direct re-



j r o I Signs in Ethnographic Context

s ui t o f o r de r s f r o m G e r m a n ( 1 8 9 9 - 1 9 1 4 ) a n d J a p a n e s e ( 1 9 1 4 - 4 4 ) c o l on i a l o f

fic ials , whose fear of "pu blic health " contamin ation parallels the Bela uan s' fear

of spiritual contamination caused by the presence of death.

Immediately after a death many different groups spring quickly into coordi

nated yet seemingly undirected action. Close female kin who happen to be l iving

nearby gather at the house of the deceased and attend to the intimate details of

preparing the body for burial . In traditional t imes, a person who became seri

ously i l l would move to the house of a senior member of his or her matril ineal

group, to be visited there by the spouse. Even today terminally i l l patients leave

the hospital in Oreo r town to die in their own h ouses, althoug h wom en fre

quently die in the familiarity of their husbands' houses rather than move to an

other vil lage. As the news spreads throughout the archipelago by means of re

peated rad io anno u nc em ents , ad d i t io na l fem ale k in wi l l j o in th is "m o u rning

g r o u p "

(remengeung).

Thre e sorts of messages are com mon : the first in the name

of the deceased 's eldest male child ,

4

the second in the name of the c lose male

matril ineal relatives of the deceased, and the third in the name of the t it leholder

of the deceased 's spouse's house. While the second solic its aid from relatives of

the deceased, the third summons tit leholders from many other distric ts who are

l inked by the c o m plex sys tem o f "ho u se a f f i l i a t io n"

(kebliil)

(see Parm entier

1 9 8 4 ) .

The women arrive carrying funeral mats of various sizes, weaving styles, and

value, most of which are piled up in a corner of the house. Said to be "presents

for the deceased," these mats will play an important role in the burial rites and

subsequent distributions. Meanwhile, senior t it led men from the vil lage assemble

together, either in a different partit ion of the house, in a nearby house, or else in

the vil lage meeting house. As the day wears on they too are jo ined by t it leholders

from affi l iated houses in other vil lages. I f the deceased is a woman, these t it led

men do not have much to do during the funeral, s ince the heaviest obligation falls

upon the woman's brothers. I f the deceased is a fel low tit leholder, then they must

engage in discussions about finding a suitable successor to the t it le. And if the

deceased is the wife of one of the high-ranking tit leholders of the vil lage, this

man will take responsibil ity for orchestrating the funeral sequence, although he

is l ikely to ask a junior relative or friend to transmit his dec is ions, keep financial

records, and oversee the t iming of events. In this case there is also l ikely to be

some tension between his dec ision-making role and that of the woman's brothers,

especially if they too are high-ranking. This was exactly the situation at one of

the more elaborate funerals I attended, where the surviving male t it leholder

warn ed his male associate s, "O ur responsibil ity is to be careful to help out those

on the [wife 's] side, but we should not take charge of anything. Together, we are

all subject to debt

[obals]."

(The meaning of this last com men t will be explai ned

below.) Of course if the deceased is already a widow, then a senior matril ineal

Transactional Sym bolism in Belauan Mortuary Rites

I 5 j

re la t ive takes c harge . B u t pr im ar i ly , the senio r m en wi l l spend the next few d ays

s i t t ing to gether , t e l l ing s to r ies , c hewing bete lnu t , g iv ing o rd ers , and be ing served

m eals .

Death has suddenly created a dangerous situation in the house and vil lage,

both because the ghost of the deceased has become separated from its physical

bo d y ( the two are tho u ght to be m irro r im ages o f eac h o ther) and bec au se the

malevolent spirit which caused the death continues to l inger, identity sti l l un

kno wn, near the l iv ing . T his s i tu at io n requ ires severa l sym bo l ic respo nses by fe

m ale m o u rners and v i l l agers . T he fo rm er bec o m e "c o nf ined "

{chelsimer)

in the

ho u se , where they are pro hib i ted f ro m c o o king o r washing and where they spend

the i r t im e weeping and s ing ing "d i rges "

(kelloi).

Co o kin g and o ther d o m est ic

activit ies are transferred to a small , makeshift structure near the main house. At

the heart of this core group of mourners sits the deceased 's o ldest sister, who

ho ld s the hand bag o f the perso n B e lau ans say i s "o ne o f her . " I n th is d angero u s ,

isolated state, these women are labeled

meai

" t ab o o , " a te rm c o nnec ted to the

w o r d

meang

" s a c r e d " ( P a rm e n t ie r 1 9 8 7 3 : 2 4 1 ) . I w a s t o l d b y a m o u r n i n g w o m a n

that their task is not only to stay c lose to the deceased but also to prevent strang

ers from being able to look upon the corpse:

It is prohibited for a stranger to view the death of my relative, since then this

person would have the opportunity at some later t ime to insult me by saying:

"I held the dying person." I would be ashamed to hear a stranger say this. (F)

As c lose kin, these women have the obligation and the strength to withstand the

po l lu t io n o r c o ntam inat io n o f the c o rpse/gho st d i s j u nc t io n , a l tho u gh they d o

take steps to protect themselves, the most important act being covering the corpse

with layers of mats. In addition, women overtly signal the affection they have for

the deceased by rubbing the body with oil and turmeric , which is said to repre

sent the "feelings of the women." The ritual use of turmeric is widespread in

Austronesian cultures (see Sopher 1964) . In Belau the word for the plant, reng,

i s a l s o t h e w o r d fo r " c o n t e n t s , " " c o r e , " an d " i n n e r f e e li n g s " ( K r ä m e r 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 ,

3 : 3 4 7 ; K u b a r y 1 9 6 9 : 1 - 2 ) . A n el d er l y m a n t ol d m e , " W o m e n u s e a l ot o f t u r

meric on the corpse, until it is red all over. The turmeric [reng] represents the

feelings of the women [rengrir a mechas}. An d when wo m en f ro m re la ted ho u ses

come to the vil lage they will carry turmeric as a sign of their feelings."

5

The vil lage as a whole also reacts to the presence of contamination by be

ginning a period of funeral restriction (taor), d u r ing whic h t im e c h i ld ren m ay

not play in the road and all loud noises are prohibited. The purpose of this im

posed silence is not so much to show respect for the deceased but rather to avoid

scaring off the hovering ghost before it can be properly sent on its f inal journey.

6

This period of restriction does not imply, however, that the vil lage becomes sti l l ,

for much intensive activity is taking place. The local men's c lub goes fishing to





5 4 I Signs in Ethnographic Context

women of the house will be very pleased. And so they will prepare a female

valuable and give it to these visitors. This presentation is called "gifts of

wom en." . . . T his female valuable is truly the money of women, and this is an

authentic practice from ancient times in Belau. (M)

Note that the same "female" objects are involved in very different kinds of

t ransac t io ns , the a f f ina l paym ent to in-m arr ied wo m en and the em o t io na l ly

charged gift to female friends (a third usage will be discussed below). What l inks

them, of course, is that the exchange objects f low between women.

Food and labor provided by vil lagers

{uus er a kemeldiil)

are not paid for,

since these local people know that their efforts wil l be rec iprocated when a death

occurs in their houses. One exception to this is that pigs are purchased by the

deceased 's kin, usually from young men who raise them commercially for just

this purpose; the cost of these pigs, in fact, constitutes one of the major expenses

o f the fu nera l . F igu re 3 . 1 su m m arizes the pat tern o f c o ntr ibu t io ns d esc r ibed

so far.

B u r i a l P r a c t i c e s

Constantly attended by female mourners and carefully wrapped in a shroud

made of six to a dozen fine mats stitched together,

8

the body is placed in a

wooden coffin, which replaces the traditional bier made of bamboo or betelnut

sticks. Formerly, the unburied corpse

(klloi)

o f a t it led individual remain ed on

d isp lay fo r a per io d o f t im e c o m m ensu rate wi th h is o r her rank. Sem per

( 1 9 8 2 : 79 -8 0 ) pro v id es im po rtant deta i l s c o nc erning the d em eano r o f the

mourning party seated around the corpse of the wife of the chief of Ngebuked

vi l l age in the 1 86 0 s :

"D o you see ," he [Semper's friend] said, l i fting the curtain which temporarily

divided our little room from the rest of the house, "all those women there?

There are more than twenty from Ngkeklau, Chelab, and even Melekeok, al l

relatives of my mother and Mad. They're staying in the house for twenty days.

During this time, I must always be ready to serve them and make sure that my

own people and the rest of the villagers provide enough to eat. The death of

such a woman caused much work in the state. She was the highest-ranking

woman here, Mad's sister, and considered here what you call a queen. " . . . At

the t ime of the mourning ritual at Ngiralulk's house, I again had an opportu

nity to admire the dignity with which the assembled women took up their ap

parently quite boring business. My mother sat in front opposite Mad's wife.

Each of the two had gathered ten or twelve women around her, so that they

formed an open halfcircle around the doorways. They wore their best clothes,

whose hems they had dyed black as an external symbol of mourning. Red and

white stones [male valuables] stood out brilliantly against their dark necks;

they were carried to proudly display proof of their families' wealth.

Transactional Symbolism in Belauan M ortuary Rites

I 5 5

"2

G



j o ' I Signs in Ethnographic Context

I was told that, in Ngeremlengui, the mourning period at the death of the first-

ranking m ale t i t l eho ld er , Ngir tu ro ng , wo u ld be ten d ays , fo r the sec o nd -ranking

m ale t i t l eho ld er , Ngiraklang , n ine d ays , and fo r the th i rd - and fo u rth-ranking

tit leholders seven days. Also, elderly informants recall funerals of high-ranking

individuals at which the bier itself became an elevated platform (also called

toluk),

c o nst ru c ted no t o f bam bo o bu t o f so l id wo o d .

9

The family of the deceased

did not bear this expense, however. At the funeral of the first-ranking tit leholder,

senior women from the house of the second-ranking tit leholder purchased the

platform from the local men's c lub; and at the death of the second-ranking tit le-

holder the tribute was rec iprocated. Mention must also be made of the remark

a b le an d és i te sa r c o p h a g us w h i c h H i d ik a t a ( 1 9 7 3 : 8 5 - 9 1 ; s e e a l s o O s b o r n e

1 9 6 6 :2 0 6 , fig . 6 4) fo u nd in Ol le i v i l l age ( no rthern B abe ld ao b) in 1 9 3 9 .

1 0

A l

though this is a unique object in Belau, its original placement does suggest that

mor tuar y practices have long been used to mar k rank differentiation (Osb orne

1 9 7 9 : 2 7 0 ) . Today, this gradation in soc ial rank is more c learly demonstrated by

the length of t ime the female mourners remain confined after the burial and by

the number of pigs kil led for the various feasts.

Ac c o rd ing to pre-Chr is t ian c o sm o lo gic a l no t io ns , j u s t as the c o rpse m u st be

shielded so as not to contaminate the l iving, the ghost must be prepared for the

journey which results in its f inal transformation into an ancestral spirit . Ethno

graphic information on concepts of ancestral spirits is sketchy but suffic ient to

point out that they were considered intermediaries between l iving people and

m o re fo rm al ly rec o gnized , nam ed go d s

{chelid),

and that o nly h igh-r ankin g

houses generated significant spirits . This is one reason that these houses require

extensive and expensive funeral feasts, s ince the transformation from personal

ghost to ancestral spirit results in an entity which continued to exert powerful

forces in the vil lage's polit ical l i fe. In the domestic context, ancestral spirits

played a posit ive role as guardians of the house, as sources of information and

good fortune, and as guarantors of generational continuity (resembling to some

degree the famous

baloma

sp i r i t s o f the T ro br iand s) ; and the i r c o o perat io n was

secured by regular offerings of food and prayer at the house's altar (Kubary

1 9 6 9 : 6 — 7 ) . Indeed, part of the authority of the male t it leholder of a house rested

in his role as the offic iant of this domestic cult and in the fact that, through his

carrying the house's sacred tit le, he was c loser to the ancestral

bladek,

who he ld

the sam e t i t l e in prev io u s generat io ns ( Ku bary 1 9 0 0 ^25—26 ) .

Personal ghosts from all over Belau travel in a southerly direction, f irst to

Melachel island (near Oreor) , where they are purified in a bathing pool, then to

the southern coast of Beli l iou, and finally to Ngedelech beach on Ngeaur island,

the "dancing place of ghosts," from which place they cross a bridge to the spirit

w o r l d i n a we s t er l y d i r ec t i on ( K r ä m e r 1 9 1 7 - 2 9 , 3 : 3 4 8 , 4 : 1 9 5 ) . T h e b el ie f w a s

that the ghost takes along the spiritual image or shadow of items placed near the

corpse. Alongside a female corpse might be placed her finest female valuables,

Transactional Symbolism in Belauan M ortuary Rites

I 5 7

whereas a m ale c o rpse m ight be ad o rned wi th m ale va lu ables and h is favo r i te

h a n d b a g . K u b a r y (19008:38) wr i tes :

Women's corpses are covered with turtleshell trays, which are the princ ipal

kind of female money. According to the wealth of the house, these extend up

to the hips, and the trays lean on the legs, or they may be placed as far up as

the shoulders, if the family is rich. If a man has died, his handbag is placed at

his left side, it is filled with fresh betelnut and tobacco, and the native

udoud

([male] money) is piled up on its outer edge. His shoulder axe, which was his

inseparable companion, rests on the body, and his battle lance stands against

the door.

These particular beliefs have faded today, though I have seen photographs of the

deceased placed on top of the coffin, and people sti l l talk, though in a Christian

id io m , o f the " j o u rney" o f the d ead .

T hese be l ie f s and o ther graves id e r i tu a l s a re we l l su m m arized in Capta in B ar

nard ' s d esc r ipt io n o f a fu nera l he wi tnessed in 1 8 32 :

In a few days after, his brother was taken sick and soon was very sick. M y

friend came to the Prophetess with a piece of money for her to cure him, but

he soon died. I was then told the cause of his death. It was because his brother,

belonging to another town from where I was, had become m y friend, and the

prophetess being the wife of my friend in Ngebiul, she had spoken to her God

and he had caused his death. I attended his funeral and witnessed that cere

mony; after his death he was taken to his brother's house. When I entered the

town it appeared like a fair; many little huts were stuck up, large enough to

hold three or four individuals. The large

ba i

[meeting house] was filled with

Chiefs cooking a hog, and a sack of tobacco ready for distribution, at the

house of mourning, for such it was in reality. The Corpse was laid within the

door, the head on the sill. Red paint [turmeric] was strewn over the body. By

his side lay his basket with nut leaves, fireworks, etc., and a sword belonging

to his brother. Accor ding to the universal custom, a grave wa s dug a few feet

from the door into which the body and its ornaments were placed. On the

tenth day after, stones were placed over the grave. Then all mourning ceases,

except that the females do not wash themselves for three Moons. (Barnard

1980:29; spell ing and punctuation modernized)

One spec ia l ized prac t ic e per ta ins to fu nera l s o f u nm arr ied wo m en, who by

definition no longer have affinal relatives to provide active financial assistance.

These women require an additional piece of male money called

diall

" s h i p " t o

ac c o m pany them o n the i r j o u rney .

11

Peo ple expla ined that the wo m an' s gho st

travels with this piece of money to Ngeaur, where she confronts Orrekim, the

guardian of the bridge to the spirit world. Without the

diall,

the wo m a n wo u ld

not be allowed to pass over this bridge to attain the status of ancestral spirit

( F o rc e and F o rc e 1 9 81 :87) . T o d ay th ings have bec o m e even m o re c o nfu s ing be

cause most people no longer c ite this traditional justification for the practice and

because, now, married women too are presented with the

diall.

Prior to the in-



j8

I

Signs in Ethnogra phic Context

t rad u c t io n o f Western c u rrenc y , the

diall

was a very sm al l p iec e o f B e lau an

money, or even a piece of polished glass. This is not to be taken as an insult to

the woman, but is typical of f inancial dealing with spirits , who are always pre

sented with low-valued or even counterfeit pieces. Though Belauan money is st i l l

used at funerals, more commonly the diall consists of a sum of American cash

collected during the funeral, which is put to use in paying off the incurred debt.

In Ngeremlengui, a distinction is made between the

diall

c ollection at a fu

neral of a widow ed wom an and that at the funeral of a wom an wit h a surv iving

spouse. In the former case, the diall is collected princ ipally from the dec eased 's

male and female children and from the children of her male brothers. In the latter

ca s e , it is collected from the "senior men" (okdemaol) o f the house of the de

ceased. These men are quite happy to contribute this cash because they know

that, in so doing, they are marking themselves out as people entit led to receive a

portion of the money at the affinal death settlement talks several months later.

At this point the focus of activity shifts to the meeting house, where visit ing

men and women have been waiting. They have not been unattended, however,

since local women and children have been entertaining them with comic dances

and singing intended to l i ft their sorrowful state of mind. These dancers and

singers are rewarded for their efforts by small gifts of money

(sengk)

provided

by the senior men of the house. In addition, visit ing mourners are thanked for

their patience by the presentation of "food for sitt ing so long"

(kallel a kltom el

but), which is more properly called "traveling food"

(ukerael):

We call this "food for sitting so long" because these women have been in the

meeting house all day and night, and so the food is to thank them. . . . But if

a person joins the mourners at the house, they do not receive this. In olden

times this would consist of taro and coconut sytup

[ilaot],

but today it is just

r ice , biscuits, soy sauce, and sugar. Also, there is something called "food of

the vil lage" [kallel a beluu]. If a lot of food is left over from the evening meal,

it is divided up and sent to houses in each village. Even if people did not attend

the funeral, it is taken to them. They will not receive the food for sitting so

long, howevet, since they did not stay in the meeting house. (F)

This traveling food is provided by the female children of the house (and thus

specifically no t by the spouses of men), wh o are thereby thankin g these women

for helping them mourn their dead kinsperson. These gifts of cash and traveling

fo o d exac t ly para l le l the presentatio ns d esc r ibed by Ku bary ( 1 9 0 0 3 :40 —4 1 ) o ver

o ne hu nd red years ago :

Custom demands that the mourning house distribute something to drink to

everyone present, and the first task of the relatives [at the house] is to purchase

stone pitchers of coconut syrup [ilaot], in a number commensurate with the

importance of the family. This syrup is mixed with water, and everyone drinks

it, but it is chiefly given to the visitors and the mourners. Then the women,

Transactional Symb olism in Belauan Mortuary Rites

I 5 ^

who sing during the night, receive Gekur, a present made of turtleshell ob

j e c t s .

12

With the coffin now resting in the meeting house, al l is set for the next two

stages o f the fu nera l , the " tak ing the t i t l e "

(omelai er a dui)

r i te a n d t he " b u r i a l "

p r o p e r

{omelakl).

At o ne o f the fu nera l s I a t tend ed , ho wever , i t was a l read y

gro win g dark by this t im e, and people were afrai d that it wou ld be difficult to

proceed any farther. Everyone simply stayed put until morning: the visit ing male

and fem ale m o u rners c ro wd ed a t o ppo s i te end s o f the m eet ing ho u se , the c lo se

female mourners sitt ing inside the house of the deceased, and the male t it leholders

affi l iated with the surviving spouse gossiping in front of his house. I must confess

that at about 1 :00 a.m. I returned to my house to type fieldnotes and to sleep.

Men in the v i l l age , ho wever , to ld s to r ies to gether thro u gh the n ight .

13

The funeral resumes in the morning with the final expressions of grief on the

part of relatives of the deceased. Dressed in black, the c lose female mourners

come slowly out of the house and take their place near the coffin in the center

of the meeting house. Several emotional eulogies ate delivered by spouses, sisters,

adult children, ministers, and others l inked to the deceased; some of these utter

ances resemble Christian prayers, while others directly address the deceased. I

was impressed by the degree to which men joined women in overt emotional

d isp lay—the e thno graphic rec o rd i s c o ns is tent that su c h pu bl ic express io ns o f

grief were confined to women.

Then the coffin is carried to the central door, where the taking-the-tit le rite

is performed. A minor t it leholder known to be a specialist in this practice stands

at the head o f the c o f fin and , s lo wly waving a c o c o nu t f ro nd wrap ped w ith wi ld

taro leaves back and forth three t imes, quickly rec ites formulaic words, such as

the fo llowing:

I am going to take this sacred title [meang el dui]. The person who carried this

title was unfortunate. She did not have a mwr-feast in her honor, and now she

has nothing at all. But there were plenty of pieces of oraw-valuables. And so

now she is dead and takes all this misfortune and departs. Good luck now

comes to the house, to all of us, and to myself.

14

The symbolism here is complex. A male chiefly t it le is known as dui, whic h i s

the wo rd fo r c o c o nu t f ro nd , the id ea be ing that a h igh-ranking m an "c arr ies the

t i t l e " (meluchel a dui) on his head. In this portion of the rite, the coconut frond

is wrapped in a wild taro leaf (dudek el bisech), s ince this is the same word for

the white-tailed tropic bird (dudek), kno w n to be a par t ic u lar ly s t ro ng f l ie r .

15

S o

the frond, emblematic of the t it le, is taken by the chosen successor, who places

it behind his or her heel, indicating thereby the c loseness of the new tit leholder

to the maternal affection of the senior women of the house. This seemingly minor

detail of ritual action is connected with an expression used to describe men who

have c lose matril ineal relations to the senior woman

(ourrot)

o f the house:

merrot







64 I Signs in Ethnographic Context

And, finally, mats (or small cash amounts referred to by the same label,

badek)

are presented to the wido wed husba nd by his male friends and p olit ical

all ies "simply out of affection." These become his personal property and are not

directly rec iprocated, at least not until subsequent funerals involving these same

male associates, at which time they will be returned.

Cash given as

badek

thus differs from cash given by a person c laim ing senior

okdemaol

status to pay the debt of the funeral. Semp er

( 1 9 8 2 : 1 7 5 - 7 6 )

c o m

ments on the strategic aspect of these prestations at the funeral of high-ranking

tit leholders. The tw o chiefs of Ngebuk ed vil lage, where he was l ivin g, appe ared

to be hassled at having to deliver elaborate funeral mats at the rites fo llowing the

d eath o f Rekla i Okerange l , the c h ie f o f po wer fu l Melekeo k v i l l age . "Kra i [ o ne

of the chiefs from Ngebuked] is upset that he has to go to Melekeok, but he must

pay his last respects to the dead chief. That is the custom here in Palau." I also

observed several cases in which tit leholders from different vil lages sent and re

ceived badek ( in the form of cash) because the two vil lages are said to be "rela ted

v i l l a g e s " (kauchad el beluu). T it leholders who send cash badek are entit led to

receive in return a portion of the funeral feast , even if they do not themselves

attend; called dikesel a rubak, these portions used to be calculated by the graded

division of the pig, but more recently they are simply combinations of rice, sugar,

soy sauce, and instant coffee.

19

The significance of this custom [of

omadek]

is reciprocity. The money might

be only

$ 2 5 ,

but it is a badek for me. It is given by a person who has affection

for me. Lots of money arrived this way, perhaps about $ 4 0 0 . N ow I can use

this money to help pay for the funeral, but this money is different from the

money collected by the

okdemaol.

Th at money is just to pay the debt, so it

does a different kind of work. (M)

People keep written records of al l the funeral mats they have received, since, as

should be obvious, the complexity of these transactions over a l i fetime would

defy even a Belauan's soc ial memory. These transactions also severely challenge

the ethnographer, since the prestations are very numerous, since people often

bring or carry away mats on behalf of others, and since each gift presupposes a

history of prior funerals.

This is a very long-term affair. People definitely remember [who gave

mats] .

If

they do not recall, and there is no reciprocity [olteboid] to those who once gave

them mats, then they are to be pitied. People are extremely careful about this.

. . . Women are especially skilled at this and rarely make a mistake. (M)

We are now in a posit ion to apprec iate the semantic motivation which con

nects the word badek " fu nera l m a t " and the wo rd bladek "anc es t ra l sp i r i t . " T he

infixed -/- signals the state resulting from the operation or instantiation of the

thing referred to in the base form, so that an ancestral spirit is an entity which

is l iterally constructed throug h the rec iprocal exchang e of funeral mats amo ng

Transactional Symb olism in Belauan Mortuary Rites

I 6 5

kin o f the d ec eased . And c o nverse ly , the so c ia l gro u ps bro u ght into h igh d e f in i

t io n a t fu nera l s a re perpetu ated u nd er the pro tec t ive , generat ive gu id anc e o f th i s

c o l lec t iv i ty o f anc es t ra l sp i r i t s ( c f . Po o le 1 9 84 : 1 9 2) . T his ana lys i s enables u s ,

further, to see that the correlation between the soc ial rank of t it leholders and the

ritual elaboration of their funerals is not simply a matter of conspicuous distri

bu t io n , s inc e a h igh-ranking perso n requ ires m o re expand ed e f fo r t o f so c ia l c o

o perat io n to c o nst ru c t h im o r her as a m aj o r anc es t ra l sp i r i t .

T he sec o nd t ransac t io n that c o m es to a c o nc lu s io n a t the d iv inat io n-grave-

paving rite is the distribution (called

mengesiuch

after the wo rd for turtleshell

tray) of funeral goods to the spouses of men who have labored for the past week

to ensure a constant supply of food for the kin of the deceased and for visit ing

m o u rners . As was expla ined abo ve , th i s presentat io n invo lves var io u s s to re-

bought goods useful in food preparation; to these are added more traditional

items such as female valuables (princ ipally, turtleshell trays) . Although this pre

sentation of funeral goods to wives of men in payment for food and service fo l

lows exactly the directionality of normal affinal exchange, there is reason to be

lieve that this is not the way people try to categorize the exchange in the funeral

context. F irst , it should be recalled that the main axis of affinity activated by a

fu nera l i s the bo nd between hu sband ' s ho u se and wi fe ' s ho u se , no t that between

men of these two houses and the houses of al l in-married women. As one man

expla ined to m e , there are real ly two im po rtant c atego r ies o f peo ple p art ic ipat ing

in fu nera l r i tu a l s , tho se "who be lo ng a t the so rro wfu l event " [ngar er a tia el

chelbuul) and the spouses of men , wh o c learly are view ed as periphe ral serve rs

entit led to payment for their efforts. Second, the many overt gestures of rec iproc

ity and cooperation between "sides" of this main affinal axis suggest that the

ritual as a whole attempts to downplay this inevitable source of division. Every

o ne ta lks in c o nsangu inea l l angu age

(tekoi er a klauchad),

say ing that "w e are

all children of the deceased" or "we are all mourning the loss of our mother/

f a t h e r . "

20

Taken together, these two points help to explain what might seem to be a

peculiarity of the symbolic dimension of

mengesiuch

prestations , namely, that in

contrast to the norms of affinal exchange, food (here,

ngeliokl)

passes again st

funeral goods (here,

klalo

an d

toluk)

rather than against male valuables. In other

words, the fact that these women are given female valuables and other kitchen

equipment rather than objects which would emphasize the affinal character of

the relationship points to the conclusion that vil lagers conceptualize mengesiuch

paym ents by ana lo gy to f r iend ship-serv ic e g i f t s—w o m en to wo m en— rathe r than

by analogy to affinal payments of orau valuables—men to men. (Recall that women

give each other female valuables when they help each other in various domestic ,

agricultural , or customary tasks, and that a man gives male valuables to his wife 's

brothers.) This is an excellent example of the power of ritual objects to convey

their inherent symbolic meaning so that the context itself is transformed, here



66

I


through the female associations of turtleshell items—deriving, I am sure, from

the facts that they are made out of the shells of animals which lay eggs on dry

land according to lunar cyc les and that the production process involves the soft

ening of the she ll m ater ia l into a m o ld ( cf . A . Weiner 1 9 9 2 : 1 2— 1 3 ) .

T his , in tu rn , a l lo ws u s to u nrave l the m ystery o f o ne o f Ku bary ' s

( 1 89 5 : 1 9 0 ) s ta tem ents abo u t n ineteenth-c entu ry fu nera l c u s to m s , nam ely , that

trays and sl icers are "paid at funerals to the outsiders who have come to mourn."

This is confusing, since in the modern context these two kinds of objects are

given not to "outsiders who have come to mourn" but rather to the wives of men,

people not technically considered to be mourners. And as we have seen, visit ing

mourners are given traveling food rather than tokens of female wealth. The so

lution seems to l ie in the fact that neither Kubary nor Semper observed an im

portant role for wives of men at funerals; in fact, both state c learly that

relatives

of the deceased prepare food for visit ing mourners and that these mourners re

ceive coconut syrup (destined to be the princ ipal ingredien t of traveling food)

purchased by women of the house.

The historical development appears to be this: that the gradual inflation of

funeral rituals in the modern period led to the increased involvement of wives-

of-men houses, people who seize upon funeral service as one more way to obli

gate their in-laws to contribute male valuables to them in the future. But, in order

to downplay the affinal nature of these activit ies and to stress the "female" qual

ity of the rite

itself,

mourners gave them

female

valuables rather than male valu

ables, thus putting them in the category of friendly female helpers rather than

greedy male affines. So Kubary's observation about turtleshell trays most l ikely

refers to rec iprocal presentation

(mengebar)

o f fem ale va lu ables am o ng d i rge

singers, who perfectly fit the description of being "outsiders come to mourn."

The final irony of this development is a new pattern which I witnessed in

979> when the female relatives of the husband and of the deceased wife dec ided

to give the spouses of men cash amounts graded by the c loseness of their l ink to

the deceased 's brother s: wives received $ 1 5 0 , more distant telatives such as sis

te rs , c o u s ins , and c h i ld ren o f these wives rec eived $ 1 0 0 , $ 5 0 , and $ 30 . One o f

the women involved in this explained to me:

Yes, this is very new. The women said, "We have to go all the way to Oreor

and purchase these plastic basins and soap and carry them all back here, and

then we give these goods to the spouses of men, who must pack them up and

carry them right back to Oreor. This is a lot of extra work. So they decided

just to put cash in their handbags, so they could depart carrying only a light

load." . . . They said that it would be good if this became the custom in Belau.

I think that Belauan customs have started to change, and I think that at some

point [these prestations] will be just cash , with no good s at all. . . . I have a

whole room full of these funeral goods, and yet every time I go to a funeral I

Transactional Symbolism in Belauan Mortuary Rites

I

67

feel that I need to purch ase new on es. My show er room is full of them ; my

garbage area is full of them. I have so many basins that I should open a store

So I think it is much better what [personal name] began, that is , just using

money. We can take the money and use it to buy food and drink. And that is

a lot better than plastic basins. (F)

And, as if to compensate for the intentional modernism of this substitution, the

women in charge of this funeral tried to prepare traveling food baskets with lo

cally produced items such as taro, tapioca, f ish, and coconuts, rather than with

s to re-bo u ght fo o d .

Co ns id ered in d iac hro nic perspec t ive , th i s c hange i s l ad en wi th ad d i t io na l

significance, since it is one of the first instances where women use cash, normally

parallel to but not intersecting male valuables, in their transactions. The first sub

stitution, that is , the use of store-bought kitchen goods in place of turtleshell

t rays and o ys tershe l l s l i c ers , re ta ins the " fem ale" sym bo l ic m eaning . B u t the sec

ond substitution, cash for goods

(klalo),

c anno t m ainta in the gend ered d i f fe ren

t ia t io n o f exc hange o b j ec t s , thu s u nd erm ining the para l le l i sm between m ale and

fem ale va lu ables ( c f. B arnet t 1 9 4 9 : 56 ) and m aking i t m o re di f f ic u l t to o ver lo o k

the penetration of affinity into the funeral context. The presentation of cash

opens these exchange s to the interpretation that they are , after al l , just l ike finan

c ial presentations in the affinal exchange system.

The thitd and final transaction to be completed is the gift to the children of

the d ec eased . Gend er d i f fe rent ia t io n bec o m es im po rtant o nc e aga in , s inc e m ale

children are given carved wooden plates

(ongall),

whil e female children are pre

sented wi th o ne o f a var ie ty o f tu r t leshe l l i t em s , e i ther a ham m ered t ray

(chesiuch),

a large spoon

(terir),

or an elongated ladle

(ongisb).

T hese o b jec t s a re

the personal possessions of the deceased, who leaves careful instructions with her

sisters as to the eventual disposition of the treasured objects. Every senior woman

would have had only one each of these plates and trays, and so the children who

inherit them are thereby acknowledged to be the "real" children of the house.

The wooden plates are given to male children at the death of a senior man by his

c losest sister, while turtleshell objects go to female children at the death of their

mother. The plates and trays are functionally distinguished by gender in that

wood en plates are used to hold "pro tein f oo d" ( fish, fow l, pig) , the collection of

which is the task of men, whereas turtleshell objects are used by women in food

preparation. Furthermore, the individuality of the present is signaled by the fact

that a t it leholder eats off a single wooden plate, and no one else (with the excep

tion of very small children) is permitted to use it . So the presentation of this

object to a son implies that the child will some day become a t it leholder with his

own reserved plate. (Although tit leholders eat off china and plastic dishes today,

the practice of reserving a bowl for the "father of the house" sti l l remains.) While

this pattern of transgenerational inheritance certainly identifies the young heirs



68

I


with their parents through the continuity of inheritance of these gendered ob

jects, it also suggests a hierarchical relationship between the subordinated rec ip

ients and the i r generat io na l su per io rs ( c f . Mu nn 1 9 70 : 1 58) .

Now, with the techniques for carving wooden plates a lost art , both male

children and female children receive similar turtleshell trays, although the l inguis

tic differentiation sti l l remains firm. I t is c lear that this transgenerational trans

ac t io n sym bo l izes the c o nt inu i ty o f m aterna l k insh ip , expressed , i t m u st be

noted, by the same objects that are employed in asymme trical affinal exch ange s

with the spouses of men. Given the completely different emotional attachment

found in the maternal bond, however, no one in Belau would confuse the distinct

meaning adhering in these objects functioning in the two disparate soc ial con

texts. And, in contrast to the chiasmic , rec iprocal exchange of funeral mats, the

ongall an d chesiuch gifts to children are intended to be the perm anen t, personal

possessions of the heirs. Last, whereas both mats and funeral goods for spouses

of men have undergone substitution by American cash, these intimate forms of

m aterna l inher i tanc e m ainta in the i r a t tac hm ent to the t rad i t io na l tu r t leshe l l

form.

Conclusion

From the foregoing.analysis, it is c lear that both traditional and contempo

rary variations in Belauan funerals rites c losely parallel the well-documented pat

terns of funerals in the Indonesian and Oceanic worlds.

21

We have noted wide

spread themes such as the journey of the ghost to a western land of spirits , the

role of mats and c loth in sedimenting the affect of kin, the imposition of si lence

and inactivity during the mourning period, the use of mortuary practices to sig

nal differential soc ial rank, the lengthy period of delay between the burial and

the final settlement of affinal obligations, and the transformation of the dead into

fructifying ancestral spirits . Although these general areal similarit ies are worth

noting and do aid our understanding of the Belauan case, I think that each so

c iety needs to be studied in terms of spec ific patterns of intersection involving

kinds of meaningful objects, soc ial roles and groups brought into play during the

ritual, and modalit ies of transaction or exchange which couple these objects and

these soc ial relations.

But the ethnographic evidence from Belau suggests that it is impossible to

simply read off the understood meaningfulness of exchange events from the pre

supposed symbolic meaning of transacted objects. We have seen examples where

identical objects carry different meanings when they are present in soc ial con

texts requiring distinct transactional modes: baskets of taro being both

ngeliokl

an d

chelungel;

and , inversely, radically distinct obje cts, such as mats and cash ,

can be categorized as

badek

for senior men. Clea rly, it is the soc ial relationships

themselves which provide the contextual spec ification of the meaningfulness of

Transactional Sym bolism in Belauan Mortuary Rites

I

69

o bj ec t s . Y et we have a l so seen ins tanc es where c hanges in the c harac ter o f ex

c hange m ed ia m ake i t near ly im po ss ib le fo r par t ic u lar sym bo l ic m ean ings to b e

d i f fe rent ia ted , e spec ia l ly where o ne r i tu a l prac t ic e ad o pts an o b j ec t a l read y asso

c ia ted wi th a po lar m eaning , as in the exam p le o f wo m en su bst i tu t ing ( m ale) c ash

for ( female) kitchen goods. In other words, the vectors of intersection of these

three ana lyt ic a l d i s t inc t io ns c anno t be pred ic ted pr io r to em pir ic a l researc h . I n

fact, the assignment of f ixed symbolic meaning to objects, the

ti

p lant and tu r

meric for instance, may be an indication that these objects have lost_rJ ie_power

to create soc ial contexts, a power sti l l maintained by male and female valuables.

And , by lo o king a t the fu nera l d ata f ro m a d iac hro nic perspec t ive , i t i s po s

sible to see how different aspects of the soc iety are intertwined. For example, the

abrupt termination of the practice of burial in front of houses ( in favor of com

munity gravey ards) correlates with the increased impo rtan ce of intervil la ge af-

fi l iative relations, so that "lateral" rather than "vertical" paths of relationship

contribute to soc ial identity; this lateral expansion also correlates with the infla

tion of the importance of spouses-of-men houses. Together these two develop

ments in turn l ink up with the gradual severing of Belauan soc ial groups from

the ir presc r ibed land parc e l s ( cf . B lo c h 1 9 8 2 : 2 1 2 - 1 3 ) . T hu s , so c ia l id ent i ty i s

almost entirely a product of customary transactions l ike the ones described above

rather than, as was the case in the traditional situation, of presupposed territori

ally anchored hierarchies. Whereas, in the traditional situation, a person's strong

est c laim to status at a given house was to say (actually, to insult) "M y moth er

is buried here," soc ial status today is roughly calculable by the number of visitors

from affi l iated houses who attend a funeral. Thus, the irony is that, despite the

apparent c o m m erc ia l iza t io n o f fu nera l s and the grad u a l lo ss of c o s m o lo gic a l

groundings for many of the ritual actions, the mortuary sequence is destined to

play an even greater role in Belauan soc ial l i fe.








o f c o ntac t wi th fo re ign c o m m erc ia l , c u l tu ra l ,

and

polit ical forces

and

w h i c h

fu nc t io ned

as the

D is t r ic t Center u nd er

the

Trusteeship.

D u r i n g

the

s u m m e r

of 1979 the

d istric t

of

Ngerem lengu i , l ike m any o ther

distric ts

in

B e lau ,

was

involved

in a

bitter polit ical struggle prompted

by the re

cently drafted national constitution.

Th e

o r ig ina l d o c u m ent , appro ved

by the

c o nst i tu t io na l c o nvent io n whic h

met for

four months

in

O r e o r ,

was

scheduled

for final ratification

in a

public referendum

on

J u ly

9. The

draft con stitution

pro u d ly pro c la im ed

the

polit ical independence

and

territorial integrity

of

Belau

and carefully balanced democratic princ iples with respect

for

traditional leaders

and customs. Several provisions of the d o c u m ent , ho wever , were d i rec t ly inc o n

sistent with the t e rm s of the so-called Hilo Princ iples, previously adopted by the

Polit ical Status Commission negotiators, which defined the relationship of Free

Asso c ia t io n between B e lau and the United States (Parmentier 1 9 9 1 ) . But the del

egates to the convention refused to modify their draft and, confident that the

pu bl ic wo u ld o verwhelm ingly appro ve th is h i s to r ic d ec larat io n of B e lau aness

(klbelau), u nd erto o k a massive and costly effort in polit ical education at the v i l

lage level.

' T ry ing

to

avoid jeopardizing

the

ongoing ne gotiations over Bela u's Free

As

sociation status, members

of the

national legislature effectively v oted

to

undercut

th e

new

c o nst i tu t io n

by

repea l ing

the

enabl ing leg i s la t io n

of the

a l read y

ad

journed convention, arguing that

the

delegates

had

failed

to

draft

a

d o c u m ent

consistent with

the

established princ iples

of

F ree Asso c ia t io n .

The

legislature's

bil l would effectively cancel

the

scheduled referendum

and

tu rn

the

c o nst i tu t io n

over

to a

spec ially appointed legislative redrafting committee. Thus,

as

J u ly

9

appro ac hed

two

polit ical factions were operative:

the

pro -c o nst i tu t io n fo rc es ,

led

in Ngerem lengu i

by the two men who had

been delegates

to the

c o nvent io n ,

and

the pro—Free Association

(or

pro-status) forces,

led by the

d istric t 's traditionally

sanc t io ned

chief,

N g i r t u r o n g ,

and the

d istric t 's elected representative

to the

leg

islature.

O n

the

m o rning

of

J u l y

7

peo ple f ro m Ngerem lengu i assem bled

in

N g e r e -

metengel vil lage to m eet wi th the U nited Nat io ns V is i t ing Miss io n , a g r o u p of

international observers sent to Belau to ensure that the electorate was informed

and u nc o erc ed and that there would be no irregularit ies in the election process.

Whi le wa i t ing for the p a r t y to arrive by boat, vil lagers talked informally with

their

t wo

convention delegates.

A n

elder complimented them, saying that, having

chosen

two

"c h i ld ren

of

N g e r e m l e n g u i "

to

represent

the

vil lage

in

this important

task ,

the

people

of

Ngeremlengui would surely continue their support

for the

d o c

ument they

had

"g iven b i r th

to." The

offic ial me eting, whic h finally

got

under

w ay

in the

early afternoon,

was

c o nd u c ted

in the

normally polite style, with

re

spec t sho wn espec ia l ly to ward

the

foreign visitors. After

a

rather formal

ex

c hange

of

qu es t io ns ,

the

head

of the

visit ing mission asked

for a

sho w

of

hands

to

see how

m a n y

of

those registered

to

vo te

had

actually read

the

pro po sed

con-

The Political Function of Reported Speech

I

75

s t i tu t io n ; o nly

a few

peo ple ra i sed the i r hand s .

As

th i s m eet ing

was

d r a w i n g

to

a c lo se ,

a

sec o nd bo at a rr ived c arry ing

the

d i s t r ic t ' s h igh c h ie f Ngir t u ro ng

and

i t s l eg i s la t ive representat ive ,

tw o

ind iv id u a ls who se ant i -c o nst i tu t io n o pin io n s

w e r e at var ianc e wi th the general sentiment of the lo c a l peo ple , who had recently

bec o m e u nc harac ter i s t ic a l ly vo c a l in their crit ic ism of these two leaders.

Mo m ents a f te r the speed bo at c arry ing the U ni ted Nat io n s gro u p d isa ppeared

d o w n

the

m angro ve c hanne l , c h ie f Ngir tu ro ng began

to

ad d ress

the

a s sem bly ,

bu t

the

s e c o n d - r a n k i n g

chief,

who se t i t l e

is

N g i r a k l a n g , w a v e d

him off

w i t h

the

w o r d s :

"Not

eno u gh ears , " m eaning that

a

th i rd im po rtant t i t l eho ld er , Ngiru -

te lc h i i ,

had yet to

jo in

the

m eet ing .

He

so o n

did, and

N g i r t u r o n g b e g a n a g a i n ,

but this t ime three vil lagers interrupted

him

w i t h

a

series

of

crit ical statements

to

the

e f fec t that Ngi r tu ro n g

and the

l eg i s la t ive representat ive were t ry ing

to

" k i l l "

the

very c o nst i tu t io n w hic h these d e legates ,

"the

c h i ld ren

of

N g e r e m l e n

g u i , "

had

given birth

to, and

that they

had

rem ained

for too

lo ng

in

O r e o r w i t h

o u t re tu rning

to the

vil lages

to

in fo rm lo c a l peo ple what

was

t ranspir ing there .

A t

one

p o i n t

a man

actually shouted

at the chief: " A t

every m eet ing

I am

s itt ing

right here

in the

m eet ing ho u se ,

but

w h e r e

are

y o u ? " S t u n g

by

th i s h igh ly inap

pro pr ia te a t tac k f ro m

an

u nt i t led k insm an,

the

chief replie d:

"Are you

d a r i n g

to

challenge

my

l ead ersh ip?

If so, let me

rem ind

you

that

J am

N g i r t u r o n g , w h i l e

yo u

are the

child

of [a

fo rm er] Ngi r tu r o ng . " S inc e t i tl e s no rm at ive ly pass m atr i -

l ineally,

to be the

" c h i l d

of a chie f" is to be

rem o ved f ro m

the

d irect l ine

of

po wer .

At th is po int I was to ta l ly sho c ked , for I had never seen such overt and

pointed challenges to the au tho r i ty of the chief, a l tho u gh I knew that there was

wid espread o ppo s i t io n to his polit ical posit ion. But what happened nex t m ad e

the prec ed ing lo o k tam e. A m id d le-aged wo m an s i t t ing at the end of the m eet ing

ho u se began to sc ream and s to m p her feet violently on the f loor. I bare ly m an

aged to d ec ipher what she kept repeat ing : "Ng ir tu r o ng and N g i r a k l a n g are not

at I m iu ngs I m iu ngs , Im iu ngs , I m iu ngs I hate it, I hate it, I hate i t " T h i s w o m a n ,

I later learned,

was

c o m plete ly u naware

of her

behav io r

and

s p o k e

the

w o r d s

of

U c hererak ( F o rem o st of the Y e a r ) , the t rad i t io na l god of N g e r e m l e n g u i . The im

p o r t of these words was th i s : Ngir tu ro ng and N g i r a k l a n g are the legit imate lead

er s at I m iu ngs (the po et ic nam e for I m eio ng) , the capital of Ngerem lengu i d i s

t r ic t ,

and yet the

present t it leholders

are

l iving

and

m eet ing

in

Ngerem etenge l ,

a

lo wer-ranking v i l l age

in the

d istric t

(see

Parm ent ier 1 9 8 6 ) . A l s o , there

is no

sense

ta lk ing abo u t c o nst i tu t io ns

and

treaties,

for the

go vernm ent

of

B e lau

is not

su b

ject

to

democratic election

but

rather

to the

rule

of

traditional chiefs.

N o

one

m o ved

to

restrain

the

po ssessed wo m an

as she

c o nt inu ed

to

sc ream

and s to m p

for

several minutes. F inally

a

lower -rank ing tit leholder from Im eiong

shouted

at

N g i r t u r o n g : " L i s t e n

to her

words, since they

are

ind eed t ru e . " I ro ni

cally,

the

w o r d s

of the god

U c hererak were taken

to be

su ppo rt ive

of the

local

c ha l lenge

to the chief, who was in

favor

of

increasing Belau's dependence

on



76

I


Western forms of polit ical leadership and economic assistance. At this point the

three ranking tit leholders al l s l ipped out of the meeting house, Ngirturong to his

o wn ho u se ac ro ss the path , Ngiraklang to h is nearby c ano e shed , and Ngiru te l -

chii to another house in the vil lage.

In the absence of his polit ical al ly Ngirturong, the legislator was now on his

o wn, and the sam e vo c a l v i l l agers s tar ted to bo m bard h im with angry qu est io ns

abo u t h is e f fo r t s to " k i l l " the d ra f t c o nst i tu t io n . H is respo nse was to c la im

meekly: "I did not write it , but now we legislators have to deal with it an d wi th

the F ree Asso c ia t io n agreem ent . " Ngir tu ro ng re tu rned sho rt ly to h is presc r ibed

corner seat, where he sat quietly with his eyes staring blankly at the floor. During

a lull in the polit ical debate, he addressed a rhetorical question to the gathering:

"What is the reason for this misbehavior?" The phrasing of this question and the

chief 's impatient tone of voice indicated to all that he did not consider the inc i

dent to be a valid communication from the god Uchererak (an impression con

firmed in my subsequent discussions with him).

When Ngiraklang re tu rned to the m eet ing ho u se he sa id , "We sho u ld p lead

with the god to seek an appropriate person through whom to speak his words

and beg him not to send his message through this woman or anyone else not in

the proper role to receive these important words." He instructed the vil lagers that

I m eio ng ' s n inth-ranking ho u se , Ngeru nge lang , he ld the t i t l e Che l id ( Go d ) and

that the man holding this t it le is the proper spokesman

(kerong)

of the go d (this

house and the corresponding tit le have been vacant for some time). Then Ngir

tu ro ng spo ke d i rec t ly to Ngiraklang : "Od isan g [ J apanese ho no r i f i c ] , why d o n ' t

you appo int a perso n yo u rse l f? " B u t Ngi rakl ang repl ied sharply, "N o o ne c an

select the person to speak the words of the god; only he can seek out the proper

p e r s o n . "

After abo u t an ho u r , when m any had had a c hanc e to speak, var io u s m ec h

anisms of personal reconcil iation began to operate. F irst , the woman who had

been possessed by the god went over to ask Ngirturong for some betelnut, and

they exchanged a few words in private. Ngirturong and the legislator then pur

chased two cases of soft drinks from the local store and distributed them as peace

offerings

(tngakireng)

to the people sti l l in the meetin g house. Takin g his cue

from this gesture, the man who had been most vocal in his crit ic ism of the chief

thanked him for the drinks and said that everyone was once again "of one spirit"

(tarrengud).

He also tried to blunt the directn ess of his early crit ic ism by putting

it at a metalevel, saying that his real complaint had been the lack of communi

cation between chief and vil lage. The legislator, too, promised to keep in better

touch with the vil lages.

Just as the meeting was about to end on this relatively peaceful note, one of

the convention delegates (perhaps embrazened by the obvious support of the as

sembled vil lagers) put a blunt question to Ngirturong: "Before you return to


I 7 7

Oreo r , we wo u ld l ike to hear yo u pu bl ic ly s ta te yo u r o pin io n c o nc erning the u p

c o m ing e lec t io n . " T he c h ie f hes i ta ted and then repeated the qu est io n fo r Ngirak

lang , who had no t heard the o r ig ina l qu ery . Qu ic kly , Ngiraklang c am e to the a id

o f h is fe llo w c h ie f by ask ing : " W ho w as i t that asked Ngir tu ro n g th is? I c ann o t

approve of this

bo y

a sk ing Ngir tu ro ng to reveal h i s tho u g hts . " Ng ir tu r o ng then

ad d ed that he wo u ld vo te ac c o rd ing to h is perso na l o pin io n , bu t that he wo u ld

never try to manipulate the vil lage by using the weight of his t it le to back his

position. Ngiraklang concluded this discussion by stating that it was sil ly to try

to find out what the vil lage would do before the election, since after the election

is over everyone will know, and the chiefs and all the people will fo llow that

decision.

These events of July 7, though obviously prompted by the current polit ical

c r i s i s o ver the d ra f t c o nst i tu t io n , were a l so re la ted to severa l lo ng-s tand ing

sources of tension within the distric t . F irst , the distric t has long been a center of

su ppo rt fo r Mo d ek nge i ( Let U s Go F o r ward T o g ether) , an ind igeno u s yet syn-

cretistic religious movemen t whi ch preaches the self-suffic iency of Belau 's natu ral

env i ro nm ent and who se m em bers wo rsh ip c er ta in go d s f ro m the t rad i t io na l pan

theo n ( Ao yagi 1 9 87) . When th is m o vem ent f i r s t d eve lo ped d u r ing the J apanese

colonial period, its leaders in the distric t dec ided to ignore Uchererak, the estab

lished god of Imeiong, in favor of other pan-Belauan dieties. The religious ten

s io ns between fo l lo wers o f Mo d eknge i and m em bers o f var io u s Chr is t ian gro u ps

(Protestant, Catholic , and Seventh Day Adventist) paralleled to some degree the

district 's polit ical factions, since Modekngei people generally supported the orig

inal draft constitution and opposed those legislators who argued for c loser polit

ical t ies with the United States at the expense of local self-determ ination. No t

i ro nic a l ly—given the we l l -es tab l i shed tend enc y fo r yo u nger bro thers and "off

spr ing o f m en" (ulechell) to seek no nc hie f ly avenu es o f po wer and r epu tat io n —in

Nger emlen gui the Mo dek nge i faction is led by individuals wh o are patrilaterally

related to chief Ngirturong, who is not only Protestant but also an advocate of

the pro-status position.

Second, the turmoil in the meeting house touched on the sensitive issue of

relative vil lage rank within the distric t . This problem has its roots in the fact that,

while Imeiong is regarded as the capital of the distric t , the four highest-ranking

or "cornerpost" t it leholders of Imeiong (and thus the leaders of Ngeremlengui as

a who le) m o ved to lo w-ranking Ngerem etenge l sho rt ly a f te r Wo r ld War I I . Ngar-

aimeiong, the council of t it leholders which is the traditional governing body of

the distric t , now mee ts in a Japane se-style me eting house in Ngere meten gel. T he

central square of Imeiong is overgrown with weeds; its two meeting houses were

destroyed by typhoons decades ago and were never rebuilt . People sti l l l iving in

Imeiong, many of them related to the highest-ranking house owning the t it le

Ngirturong, feel that their leaders have abandoned the legitimate locus of their



7 # I Signs in Ethnographic Context


I

79

Later in the speec h , events f ro m 1 9 34 are a l so re ferred to as m arking the

po int a t whic h the v i l l age go d began a per io d o f u ninterru pted s i l enc e , bro ken

o nly in 1 9 79 . T here are , then, three re levant tem po ra l c o ntexts re ferred to in the

speec h : the t im e o f the speec h i t se l f ( J u ly 1 4) , the prev io u s week ' s m eet ing wi th

i ts em bed d ed po ssess io n u t teranc es ( J u ly 7 ) , and c er ta in para l le l events and wo r d s

fro m 1 9 34 and 1 9 6 6 . As wi l l be seen , par t o f the rheto r ic a l fo rc e o f the speec h

d epend s o n the c o nst ru c t io n o f a para l le l i sm o f "m eaning" o r " im po rt "

(belkul)

am o ng these var io u s c o ntexts and o n the u se o f pro verb ia l and no rm at ive expres

sions, which establish an ovetall authoritative, traditional aura.

M y t rans la t io n o f Ngi rakla ng ' s J u ly 1 4 speec h to the m u nic ipa l c o u nc i l fo l

lo ws . Nu m bered l ine d iv i s io ns are based o n pau ses ra ther than o n syntac t ic reg

ularit ies; lettered divisions mark the thematic and formal segments to be ana

lyzed below. In order to fac il itate discussion I have underscored all segmentable

m etapragm at ic po rt io ns o f the speec h , inc lu d ing verbs o f speaking , qu o tat ive

complementizers (some represented by

that

and o thers by : ) , d i rec t and ind irec t

qu o ted speec h , re ferenc es to verba l behav io r , c i ta t io ns o f pro verbs , qu as i -

per fo rm at ive fo rm u lae , f i r s t - and sec o nd -perso n perso na l pro no u ns , and l ingu is

tically relevant deictical references to the parameters of the present moment (ex

c lu d ing perso na l nam es and spat ia l d e ix i s ) . I enc lo se explanato ry interpo la t io ns

in brackets.

A

[ 1 ] M y speech is like this: when / start speaking now, I am go ing to talk of

affairs f ro m abo u t 1 9 6 6 u p u nt i l the present day

W h e n / speak like this, tho se who want to listen should listen, and tho se

who want to re f lec t sho u ld re f lec t , and a f ter you have re f lec ted /

w a n t you to ask questions; i f some disl ike what comes out, that is al l

right too

B ec au se / am go ing to say m a n y proverbs c o nc er ning the v i l l age o f

Ngeremlengui, not about the [munic ipal] council and not about Ngarai-

meiong [chiefly council]

B

Ngeremlengui is l ike a canoe, and J have watched this canoe for almost

seventy years

[ 5 ] And as / o bserve

us

peo ple l iving in Ngerem lengu i , when th is c ano e c ap

sizes there is not one of us who could right it , s ince no one is skil led

in the technique of bringing a canoe back to the surface

W h e n

you

were bu i ld ing the sc ho o l ,

you,

N g i r a i k e l a u , a n d

you,

Okerd eu , were wo rking , and T ebe lak o ver there and Ngir tu ro ng here

rank. F inally, there is an institutional as well as personal tension between Ngir

turong and Ngiraklang, the two leaders of the distric t . For many centuries the

Ngiraklang tit le was first in rank, but in the late nineteenth century a Ngirturong

tit leholder had Ngiraklang assassinated and then usurped the leadership of Im

eiong. Today, the incumbent Ngiraklang is considerably older and much more

skil led in the "ways of polit ics" (kelulau) than Ngir tu ro n g , a l tho u gh he ho ld s h is

tit le by virtue of weaker patrilateral t ies

(ulechell);

Ngir t u ro ng , yo u nger and far

more involved in a Western l ife-style, is nonetheless a legit imate matril ineal (oc-

hell) holder of the t it le. All three of these l ines of tension, Modekngei/Christian,

I m eio ng/Ngerem etenge l , and Ngir tu ro ng/Ngiraklang , bec am e im pl ic ated in the

po l i t ic a l s t ru ggles o f J u ly 1 9 7 9 .

N g i r a k l a n g ' s S p e e c h t o t h e C o u n c i l

Toward the c lose of a lengthy meeting of the democtatically elected Ngerem

lengui munic ipal council a week later, Ngiraklang made several unsuccessful at

tempts to get the floor, but each time Ngirturong put him off, knowing that this

second-ranking chief was l ikely to bring up the events of the previous week. F i

nally, Ngiraklang left his prescribed seat in the corner of the meeting house and

moved c loser to the center of the floor. From this vantage point he repeated his

request, but this t ime to the elected magistrate, saying: "I have already asked

Ngir tu to ng fo r an o ppo rtu ni ty to speak and i t has no t been granted , so no w I

am asking the magistrate for an opportunity to speak before the public ." The

magistrate had no option but to acknowledge this request from his soc ial supe

rior, and so Ngiraklang began an impassioned, stylist ically bril l iant speech di

rected primarily at those present who had been involved in the previous week's

verbal f ireworks. Ngi rak lan g had alerted me the night before that he intended to

mak e a speech, so that I was ready with my taperecorder.

This speech focused not so much on what might appear to be the most im

po rtant wo rd s spo ken the week be fo re , nam ely , the d ram at ic m essage o f U c her

erak delivered through the medium of the possessed woman, as on the highly

i r regu lar c ha l lenges f ro m yo u nger , u nt i t led , and lo wer-ranking m en m ad e im m e

diately prior to and after the possession inc ident. And in order to communicate

what he felt to be the danger of these challenges to vil lage leadership, Ngiraklang

began by establishing a pointed analogy to events which took place in 1966,

when the local men's c lub

(cheldebechel)

temp orarily usurped the role of the

chiefly council

(klobak)

by imposing a monetary fine on a young man and when

the high chief ( in fact, the mother's brother of the present t it leholder) subse

quently left the vil lage in anger. This historical al lusion c learly establishes Ngir

aklang's reading of the danger of the present situation: that these public insults

directed towar d Ngirt uro ng might have a result parallel to the events of 19 66 ,

namely, the departure of the chief from the vil lage.



8o I


I

was at my house, and when you assembled as Ngaratebelik [c lub] to

build the school, there was a coconut tree log which was brought up

to be u sed as the lau nc hing lo g ; then Ngir tu ro ng d eparted and

Ngiraklang d eparted

You kno w th is

J am not decorating my speech in saying that: I watched this situation

gro w wo rse

[ 1 0 ] H o w m any t r ips d id / m ake to that qu o nset hu t to speak in order to

br ing you al l together, in place of the absent Ngi rtu ron g?

What served as a sign of this for me is that when you were setting up

the launching log, you acted l ike Ngaraimeiong and fined people l ike

T ebe lak and Ngira lu lk and to o k a k ld a i t - type va lu able

That was a sign to

me that:

Ngara im eio ng had vanished , that Ngara

tebe l ik had bec o m e the new Ngara im eio ng , bu t that was a l l r ight be

c au se Oingerang , the c h i ld o f Ngir tu ro ng , was there , as we l l a s

Reche diterong , the one from Ch oi [vil lag e] , wh o was the offspring of

a wo m an f ro m Klang [ ho u se]

Ngir tu ro ng igno red a l l th i s and rem ained pat ient , knowing that:

Oingerang and Otao r were there

And / also rested easy

knowing that:

Rem ar i i was there

[ 1 5 ] B u t then

I

watched the situation turn even worse

And when vow fined Ngiralulk, then Ngirutelchii , the father of Maidesil ,

should have paid the fine, right?

H e

said, "I am not going to pay the fine"

T h e meaning w as like this:

He did not pay the fine on behalf of Ngiralulk, for yo u m em bers o f

Ngaratebe l ik [ c lu b] had bec o m e Ngara im eio ng [ c o u nc i l ]

[20] I f only those of Nga raim eion g had fined Ngi ralu lk, then it would have

been a simple matter for Ngirutelchii Rechuld to pay his [son's] f ine

J observed this situation become worse, and so / spent a kldait-type valu

able to pay the fine of Ngiralulk and to quiet down the situation

Perhaps it did not exactly remedy the

situation,

but at least it smooth ed

it over for a while, and enabled you to re tu rn to wo rk , and yo u fin

ished the school and took payment for it , and you were of one spirit

as yo u began to pave the road from U mad [cha nnel] to Imeiong

What happened when you went to Imeiong? Yo u were very unified and

had even d ec id ed to c lear the m angro ve c hanne l . What happened

there?

Ngi r tu r o ng d eparted and went to Oreo r , and

you

m em bers o f

Ngaratebe l ik d i sband ed

[ 2 5 ]

These things I am listing, I

do not

list

them so

that:

they will necessarily

become true

The Political Function of Reported Speech I 81

F irs t we need to u nd ers tand what happened f ro m that t im e u p, u p , u p ,

up until the present day

Well , i f we d o no t kno w these th ings , then Ngerem lengu i wi l l d eto u r

f ro m the path , and there i s no t o ne am o ng

us

who is able to put it

bac k o n c o u rse

Abso lu te ly no t , and I think that: the c ano e i s o vertu rn ed , and / think

that

the canoe is sunk and not one of us inside this meeting house is

able to bring it back to the surface

This

is one thing

[ 30 ] T h e d ay be fo re

yesterday,

what happened then was the lau nc hing lo g fo r

something

c o nc erning the go d , r ight?

B e fo rewarned , / am go ing to say words w h i c h you wi l l perhaps d is l ike

T he d ay be fo re

yesterday,

the eighth [sic ] day of the mon th, what oc

curred in this very meeting house?

J

believe that

i f i t was rea l ly U c hererak who c a m e d o wn an d

spoke his

words and that if we j u s t rem ained wi th closed mouths, then J know

that: Ngeremlengui has not detoured from the path

B u t when U c hererak c am e d o wn and

spoke,

peo ple

said, "Go ahead and

speak your words Go ahead and speak your words "

[ 35 ] Wha t was the

meaning

of

this?

M a y b e

my tone of voice

is a bit severe conc ern ing this

affair; I

a m

merely

clarifying

When they a l l said, "Go ahead and speak "

What was the

meaning

of this

expression

fo r

we

peo ple o f Ngerem lengu i

or else for the people of Imeiong?

J think that th e meaning is not at all go od , since it is capable of push ing

the vil lage of Ngeremlengui off the path because no vil lage can have

two leaders in it

[40] An d if we invite the god to come in, the god ca nnot be interrogated an d m

cannot be subject to fining; rather, we can be fined or else be subject

to questioning

D

I am t ry ing to explain this situation clearly, and this does not have any

significance for me personally, but it is extremely significant for me if

you cause the vil lage of Ngeremlengui to detour and take a different

course, for this would be to ignore the words whic h c am e d o wn here ,

whic h they

said

were the

words

o f U c hererak



8i

I



I

83

F

W h e n

yo u

went to I m eio ng to bu i ld the ro ad th is l as t t im e , Ngir tu ro ng

f led and went to Oreo r and s tayed there fo r m any m o nths

Whic h m an in I m eio ng bro u ght h im bac k by m eans o f an c he lebu c heb-

type va lu able , so that he c am e bac k c arry ing th is c he lebu c heb?

This is a very difficult

thing

to ac c o m pl i sh

We

d o no t kn o w fo r su re : what was i t that bro u ght Ngir tu ro ng bac k to

the vil lage?

[65] Perhaps this wa s

just talk

Who ever the perso n was who was sk i l l ed in these

techniques

b r o u g h t

Ngir tu ro ng bac k to the v i l l age , as i f he had been p lay ing aro u nd in

Oreo r , and no ne o f the e ld ers

complained , saying, "This person is

coming here without having paid his entry money"

J u s t

listen

to

these things I am saying

and d isc ard them if

you

wish , s inc e

the world is growing different; but / really hate to be alive at almost

e ighty years o ld and

hear these strange words

whic h threaten to d eto u r

Ngerem lengu i

I f it detours after

I

am d ead , then / wo u ld fee l go o d bec au se

I know

that:

there is no one left in Ngeremlengui who is skil led at bringing a

large canoe back to the surface, and no one is skil led at bringing a

sail ing canoe back to the surface, and no one is skil led at bringing a

swift canoe back to the surface, and a war canoe is the most difficult

of al l to bring back to the surface, and Ngeremlengui is even more

difficult to bring back to the surface than a war canoe

L e t

us

remain calm in our spirit , for Belau has need of

us, knowing that:

Ngerem lengu i s t i l l s tand s prepared

[70 ] But if

we

are going to

talk

about the

"poker and tongs"

o f N g e r e m

lengui, then no one will have need of Ngeremlengui

Agreed

G

/ know . . . the one / have just mentioned . . . I have kno wn two d eaths

o f Ngerem lengu i , like we say, "the death of the canoe which races

with the goatfish "

I know two [deaths]

And a person also caused them, not money

[ 75 ] And they d id n ' t

think:

this person will take care of it so that it wil l wo rk

out fine and be all right

A n d n o w yo u are just talking, bu t / kno w what i s wro ng; an d as we say,

"you are talking, so why don 't you go do it?"

And then

yo u

raise up

your

hands

It would be ignoring them, just l ike taking up stones and throwing them

at the vil lage

This at least was

my

perception of what happened, Shiro ; these are not

bad things to say

I am just reminding, s ince should Nger emlen gui take a detour, then its

sp i r i t a l so d eto u rs , and i f the sp i r i t o f Ngir tu ro ng d eto u rs , then

Ngeremlengui detours and no one can bring it back

[45] An d so / ask you who are here, is there one of yo u who c an patc h u p

the rela t ionship between the go d and N gara im eio ng? ( No ) A l l r igh t ,

then, and if the god comes down, we people are to be in charge of

him

J also

remind you,

Ched e lngo d , and

you

peo ple o f I m eio ng

that:

who in

Imeiong is capable of

commanding

U c hererak?

Do n ' t d i s l ike what I am

saying

Who in I m eio ng

today

is capab le of

commanding

U c h e r e r a k :

"Go ahead

and speak your words to someone"?

I really think there is no one

[50] N o one at al l

Uchererak is a god and is not to be commanded

Altho u gh in anc ient t im es Ngara im eio ng c o u ld claim that Ngara im eio ng

commands him , or else they could ask him for his words

And yet today all of us here have bec o m e like this, a n d I speak these

words because J am worried abou t the vil lag e, about the spirit of the

vil lage

These things we are talking abo u t these days [ i .e . , the constitu tional de

bate] and in the future are certainly good things, and yet concerning

these

affairs

which recently took place / strongly

remind you that:

when the spirit of Ngirturong detours, then / detour and the chiefs of

Ngara im eio ng d eto u r

[55 ] I t is not the case that, should Ng irt uro ng 's thoughts be upset,

we

can

steady the

affairs

of the village

Keep calm and think about the old people who stil l know about these

matters

E

And so J am just reminding

I am reminding you today

If I had just

kept silent

and walked by , c o m e the next m eet ing , then

what?

[60] These

words

whic h J am

saying,

the i r

meaning

is this: / am not

scolding

and / am no t angry ;

my tone of voice

is severe toward

yo u

because /

am

reminding

the vil lage of Nger emle ngui




If

this

happens when we are assembled together, then J am very sorry

fo r the publ ic of Ngeremlengui and for the Ng i r t u r o n g t i t l e and the

Ng i r u t e l ch i i t i t l e and the Ng i r a k l a n g t i t l e , all of wh i ch are abou t to

vanish

The respect for these things is about to vanish and, they stand today l i ke

ag ing men who can no longer accompl ish anyth ing for Ngeremlengu i ,

an d

yo u

should

now

be prepared

to

steady the village

of

Ngeremlengu i

an d the taro patches of Ngeremlengui, and to show honor toward old

people

[ 1 1 5 ] Do n' t just stay away at school and then come back no longer c ar ing for

the vi l lage

J

think that

now my

words

are coming to a close

/ just

sa y again that:

I

think

N g i r t u r o n g was shocked at

hearing

these

words,

but I hate that they were even

spoken

And if

I

were to go to

speak

to Ngaraimeiong,

"Together we know who

spoke,

so let us

summon them

and ask

them about

it, and

then fine

them, then

yo u

wou ld just take

us

to cou r t

/ th ink so

[ 1 2 0 ] Yet wh a t / have said are just words, and maybe it w i l l not t u r n out to

be l i ke this

N g i r t u r o n g is no longer so unhappy about the

words

wh ich were

spo

ken, and / feel like: "biting the bitter fig fruit" from the eighth day

o f the mon th up un t i l

today

A n d

n ow

wha t / ha d to

say has been said,

an d

m y

bad though t conce rn

in g the publ ic o f Ngeremlengui has gone, and / w i l l fo rge t it

They do not remain any longer, since the publ ic of Ngeremlengui is not

my possession; it is the possession of the vi l lage of Ngeremlengu i , and

you

young peop le own

i t

A n d so, thank

yo u

very much

Ng i r a i ke l a u , one of the men involved in the vocal attack on the ch ief, then

t o o k the f l oo r and in mu ted , con t r i te tones thanked Ng i rak lan g for teaching the

village lessons (llach) wh ich they had never heard so clear ly ar t icu lated before.

He assured h im that, knowing these pr incip les, they would never again speak th is

w ay i n pub l i c . A ll the p eople assembled in the meeting house should be g ra te fu l ,

he con t inued , for wha t Ng i rak lang had sa id and should be ca re fu l to avoid the

same errors in speak ing . Ng i rak lang then took the f l oo r to add a b r ie f coda to

his speech, suggesting that the people of Imeiong vi l lage should investigate the

reason

for

Uchererak's sudden return

to

l ife. Since the god does

not

speak

for no

The Political Function of Reported Speech I

8

y

reason,

it shou ld be possib le to d iscover some specif ic problem in one of the

houses which was the cause of the god's anger . If the p rob lem is not uncovered

and rect i f ied, there is no chance tha t Uchere rak w ou ld not r e t u r n to the vi l lage.

Ng i rak lang conc luded th is coda w i th h is usua l sel f - dep reca ting good hu mor , say

ing that h is speech sounded l ike a "pe rsona l ghost "

(deleb)

ta lk ing .

The conversation continued for a few more minu tes wi th mi ld laugh te r and

other expressions

of

renewed sol idar i ty.

One

man confessed that he was star t led

when the possessed woman star ted to speak because she was not exact l y a

st ranger—tha t is, he is related to her The tension generated by the speech was

thus d i f fused and the municipal counci l meeting proceeded as if no th ing had hap

pened. What had happened?

M e t a p r a g m a t i c E l e m e n t s in the Speech

This speech provides an exce l len t con f i rma t ion of Bakh t in ' s obse rva t ion ,

noted above, that much of our ta lk involves speaking about the wo rds o f o thers

or about language more general ly. This d ia logic apprehension of o thers' speech

is cer ta in ly to be expected in th is ethnographic case, since Ngiraklang is address

in g

a

pol i t ica l cr isis essential ly invo lving langu age, both speech events and norm s

for speaking. The i n i t ia l m ee ting of Ju ly

7

focused on var ious interpretat ions of

the wr i t ten d ra f t const i tu t ion , i tse l f the f ina l b i l i ngua l cod i f i ca t ion o f mon ths of

verbal debate among elected delegates to the const i tu t iona l conven t ion he ld in

Koro r . The str ict ly pol i t ica l character of th is meeting 's d iscourse was interrupted

by the message of Uchererak del ivered by a w o m a n t h r o u g h w h o m the god

spoke; the god's utterance was taken to be a pa r t i san cr i t ique of the speech (or

absence of speech) of the d is t r i c t 's ch ie f . The immediate reactions to the p o s

session incident focused more generally on problems of commun ica t ion be tween

leaders and v i l l age rs , w i t h the ch i ef c l a i m i n g i m m u n i t y f r o m the verbal assaults

of his l ower - rank ing re la t i ves and w i t h the second- rank ing t i t l eho lde r ,

Ng i rak lang , de fend ing the ch ief ' s r igh t to ignore demands for the publ ic expres

sion

of

h is op in ion . An d then the Ju ly

1 4

speech

by

Ng i rak lang a t tacks the p rob

lem of d ivided leadership from a largely l inguist ic angle, arguing that the words

of the god can only be usefu l i f del ivered through an appropr iate spokesperson

selected by the g od but in accordance with tradi t ional pr ivi leges of the vi l lage's

n in th - rank ing house , Ngerunge lang . A lso , he insists that younger relatives of a

t i t l eho lde r must re f ra in f r om a i r ing domest ic s t r i fe in a publ ic con text, since such

publ ic scold ing

{ngeroel)

not only undermines the stature of the ch ief but also

repudiates, by i m p l i ca t io n , the au tho r i ty of all o ther t i t leholders.

Th is l ingu is t i c comp lex i ty of the su r round ing s i tua t ion is matched by the

r ichness of reference to d i f ferent contexts of language use in the speech itself.

Ng i r a k l a n g not only makes reference to the var ious utterances and in teractions

f r o m

the

previous week's meeting

but

a lso br ings

in

instruct ive paral le l words



88

I


and deeds fro m

1 9 6 6 ,

as wel l as comments on t imeless cul tur a l ru les of speaking .

There are, thus, three classes of l inguist ic con texts involved here: (1) deict ica l or

indexical se l f- reference to the language and con textual parameters of the on going

speech itself, (2 ) repor ts of and reference to tokens o f speech uttered in other

con texts (e.g.,

1 9 6 6 , 1 9 3 4 ,

and the previous week ) , and

(3 )

reference to semantic

and pragmatic types (proverbs, cul tura l routines, pragmatic ru les, etc.) , that is,

speech fo rms wh ich a re no rmat ive o r " t r ad i t io na l . " A tabu la t ion o f r eferences to

these three classes is given below:

I.

References to ongoing speech event

[ 1 ]

My speech is l ike th is:

[ 1 ]

when I star t speaking now

[ 1 ]

I am going to ta lk of affa irs

M

when I speak l ike th is

[2]

to ask questions

[3]

I am going to say many proverbs

[9]

I am not decorating my speech in saying that

[ 25 ]

These th ings I am l ist ing, I do not l ist them

[ 36 ]

Maybe my tone of voice is a b i t severe

[ 36 ] I am merely clar i fying

[ 4 1 ]

I am t r y ing to exp la in

[ 43]

these are not bad things to say

[ 44]

I am jus t r emind ing

[ 45 ]

An d so I ask you

[ 47]

Don ' t d is l i ke wha t I am say ing

[ 53 ]

and I speak these words

[ 54]

I strongly remind you

[ 57]

And so I am jus t r emind ing

[ 5 8 ]

I am remind ing you today

[60]

These words which I am saying, their meaning is th is

[60]

I am not scold ing

[60]

my tone of voice is severe

[60]

I am reminding the vi l lage

[ 6 7]

these th ings I am saying

[ 7 1 ]

the one I have just mentioned

[ 9 7]

Now I am ta lk ing to you in o rde r to remind you

[ 1 0 5 ]

the reason that 1 spoke up so qu ick ly

[ 1 0 6 ]

what I have spoken

[ 1 0 8 ]

I am jus t r emind ing you

[III]

my tone of voice in this speech has been very severe

[III]

as I procla im


[116]

now my words a re coming to a c lose

[ 1 1 7 ] I just say again

[ 1 2 0 ] wh at I have said are just words

[ 1 2 2 ] wh at I had to say has been said

2. Reference to other speech events

[1 ]

a f fa i rs f r om abou t

1966

[ 10] to speak in order to br ing you a l l together

[ 17 ] He sa id ,

"1

am no t go ing to pay the f ine "

[33] and spoke h is words

[33]

w

6

J

u s t

r ema ined wi th c losed mou ths

[34]

Uchere rak came dow n and spoke

[34]

peop le sa id , " Go ahead and speak you r word s "

[37] Whe n they a l l sa id , " Go ahead and speak"

[38] Wh a t was the mean ing o f th is exp ress ion

[39] I th in k tha t the mean ing is no t a t a l l good

[41] the words wh ic h came dow n he re

[41]

wh ic h they sa id were the words o f Uchererak

[48] " Go ahead and speak you r words to someone"

[54] These th ings we are ta lki ng about these days

[59] I f I had just kept si lent

[ 6 5 ]

Perhaps th is was just ta lk

[66] none of the e lders com plained

[66] saying, "Th is person is coming here with out having paid h is entry

[67]

these strange word s

[84] In 1 9 3 4 he became silent

[86] he spread th is message of Mod ekn gei

[89] [ the names] "N g i rak lang and Ng i r tu ron g" were men t ioned

[9 1]

these words have weighed upon my hear t

[94] Wh en they opened their mouths to speak

[94] was the purpose to declare that

[98] Those who spoke

[ 1 1 7 ] these word s, but I hate that they were even spoken

[ 1 1 8 ] to go to speak to Ngara ime iong , "Toge ther we kno w who spoke ,

us summon them and ask them abou t i t , and then f ine them"

3. Reference to speech types

[3] many proverbs concerning the vi l lage

[40] i f we invi te the god to come in

[40]

the god cannot be interrogated




[40] we can be f ined or e lse subject to questioning

[46] wh o in Imeiong is capable of com mand ing Uchererak?

[48] Wh o in Ime iong today is capable o f comm and ing Uchere rak

[ 5 1 ] no t to be comm anded

[52]

Ngara ime iong cou ld c la im

[52] Ngara ime iong commands h im

[52]

or e lse they could ask h im for h is words

[70] i f we a re go ing to ta lk abou t the "poke r and tongs" o f Ngeremlengu i

[72] l ike we say, "t he death of the canoe whi ch races w it h the goatf i sh"

[76] as we say, "yo u are ta lk ing , so why don ' t you go do i t? "

[80] we wi l l a l l keep si lent

[80]

No one knows h is words

[81] whoever knows h is words

[82] he has been si lent up unti l today

[84] he became silent

[92] speak the words of Uchererak

[94] the messengers of Uchererak

[96]

Ngeremlengu i i s no t "a snake wi t h two tongues"

[97]

"co ld on the way ou t , ho t on the way back"

[97] "words wh ich go ou t uncrowded canno t f i t back in to ou r mou ths "

[ 1 0 1 ] the signif icance of saying that: respect is vanishing

[ 1 0 8 ] speak the words of the vi l lage

[ 109] words of the vi l lage

[ 109] say ing th ings wi tho u t th ink in g

[ i n ] neve r speak l i ke tha t again to Ng i r t u ro ng

[ 1 1 2 ] go home to say these bad words and make decisions together

[ 1 2 1 ] "b i t ing the b i t te r f ig f r u i t "

Throughout the speech, the orator 's strategy is to draw close attention to the

unfold ing meaning of the d iscourse and to the attr ibuted paral le l ism between

contemporary pol i t ica l events and events of 1 9 6 6 , so that the l isteners wi l l anal

ogously attr ibute simi lar object ivi ty to the basical ly t imeless or normative refer

ences to ru les of speaking. The speaker bui lds up h is rhetor ica l author i ty to pass

judgmen t on c on tempora ry v io la t ions o f r u les o f speak ing by demonst ra t ing h is

abi l i ty to impose a coherent in terpretat ion on h istor ica l ly d ist inct events. Histor i

cal omniscience, thus, creates an aura of decontextual ized wisdom, which is for

ma l ly suppor ted by the numerous swi tches in tempora l r e fe rence wi th in the

speech itself.

Beyond these mult i p le references to var ious contexts of s peaking, the speech

contains many examples of reference to what Si lverste in ( 1 9 9 3 ) ca l l s "exp l i c i t

metapragmatics," that is, speci f ic lexical machinery for referr ing to the re lat ion-


ship between l inguist ic signals and their contexts of use. The most frequent meta-

p ragmat ic fo rm is

tekoi,

t h e u n m a r ke d n o u n f o r "wo r d " o r " t a l k " ( a s i n 5 3 ,

6 0 ,

9 2 , 9 8 ,

n é ,

1 1 7 , 1 2 1 ) .

M u c h l i ke t h e L a t i n

res, tekoi

can a lso combine language

and act ion in the sense o f "a f fa i r , " "accomp l ished deed , " o r "s i tua t ion " (as in

I 2 1 ,

5 4 , 5 5 ) . Final ly,

tekoi

can en ter in to more comp lex const ruct ion s, such as

di tekoi

" j u s t t a l k "

6 5 ) ,

i n con t rast to rea l accomp l ishmen t ;

m o tekoi

" b e co m e

t r u e "

2 5 , 9 3 ) ;

belkul a tekoi

" p r o ve r b "

( 3 ;

l i tera l l y the jo in t o r e lbo w o f speech) ;

tekoi el beluu

"words o f the v i l l age"

( 1 0 8 ) ;

an d

mekngit el tekoi

"bad th ings to

say"

( 1 1 2 ) .

In the twenty-seven instances of use, Ngiraklang takes advantage of the un

marked qua l i ty o f tekoi i n o rde r to con t rast th is word wi th a va r ie ty o f more

semantical ly restr icted metapragm atic verbs label ing types of speech acts, such as

dmung "say, " kallach "make decisions together ," Imuk "keep s i len t , " mededaes

" e x p l a i n , "

melekoi "speak, " mellach " a d m o n i sh , " mengedecheduch "speak fo r

m a l l y , " mengerodel " c o m p l a i n , " moilikoik "ta lk carelessly," oker "ask ques

t i o n s , "

oldurech " c o m m a n d , " oleker " s u m m o n , " omasech "enumera te , " omeke-

takl " c l a r i f y , " omeklatk " r e m i n d , " ongeroel " s c o l d , " orrenges " h e a r . " T h i s

expl ici t label ing of speech acts a l lows the speaker to impose his own "analysis"

on h is own and o the rs ' language by ca tego r iz ing be fo re ( " I am go ing to say

wo r d s wh i ch yo u w i l l p e r h a p s d i s l i ke " ) , d u r i n g ( "No w I a m t a l k i n g t o yo u i n

o rde r to remind y ou" ) , and a f te r ( " I am no t sco ld ing " ) the d iscou rse re fe rred to .

An even more power fu l way fo r the speaker to impose an in te rp re ta t ion on

the ongoing d iscourse is the use of the metapragmatic term belkul " m e a n i n g . " A

Belauan equivalent to Peirce 's semiotic concept of " in terprétant," belkul can re

fer to the signi f icance, impl icat ion, in tended purpose, and accompl ished effect of

both speech and action. The text conta ins e leven instances of th is d irect form of

metapragmatic g lossing:

4.

Metapragmatic glosses

[ 1 8 ]

The mean ing was l i ke th is :

[35]

Wh a t was the mean ing o f th is?

[38] Wh at was the meaning of th is expression

[39] I th i nk that the meaning is not at a l l good

[ 4 1 ] th is does not have any signi f icance for me personally

[ 4 1 ]

but i t is extremely signi f icant for me

[60] These words wh ich I am say ing , the i r mean ing is th is :

[82] I do not not know the meaning of the depar ture of Uchererak

[94] was the purpose to declare that:

[ 1 0 1 ] An d th is is the signi f icance of saying that:

[ 1 0 7 ] M y phys ical body has no impor tance



92.

I Signs in Ethnographic Context

The interaction of a l l these classes of metapragmatic forms can be observed

in the speech's e leven instances of d irect quotat ion, including f ive repor ts which

represent contextual ly specif ic utterance tokens and six repor ts of cul tura l ly t y p i

f ied pro verbia l expressions (belkul a tekoi).

5. Reports of utterance tokens

[ 1 7 ] He said , " I am no t go ing to pay the fine "

[34] people said, " Go ahead and speak your words Go ahead and speak your

w o r d s "

[37] When they a l l sa id , " Go ahead and speak"

[66]

none o f the e lde rs comp la ined , say ing , "Th is pe rson is coming he re wi th

ou t hav ing pa id h is en t r y mon ey"

[ 1 1 8 ] i f I we re to go to speak to Ngara im e iong , "Toge ther we kno w wh o

spoke, so let us summon them and ask them about i t , and then f ine

t h e m "

6. Reports of proverbs

[72] l i ke we say, " the death o f the canoe wh ic h races wi th the goa t f i sh "

[76] and as we say, "you a re ta lk ing , so why do n ' t you go do i t? "

[96] because Ngeremlengu i i s no t "a snake wi th two tongues"

[97] because "co ld on the way ou t , ho t on the way back, "

[97] o r else , "w ords wh ich go ou t uncrowded canno t f i t back in to ou r

m o u t h s "

[ 1 2 1 ] I feel l i ke : "b i t in g the b i t te r f ig f r u i t "

Addit ional ly, the mult ip le embeddedness of these passages is evident in the fact

that three of the token repor ts ( 3 4 ,

3 7 ,

an d 1 1 8 ) conta in speech about speech;

simi lar ly, four of the ci ted proverbs ( 7 6 ,

9 6 , 9 7 ,

an d

9 7 )

a re conce rned wi t h

no rms o f s peak ing . A lso , the impor tance o f the speaker ' s constan t m on i to r ing o f

in terpretat ion is seen in the fact that the f i rst three token repor ts

( 1 7 , 3 4 ,

and

37 )

a re a l l fo l lowed immed ia te ly by exp l i c i t d iscuss ion o f the i r "m ean ing"

[bel

kul).

In contrast, the im por t of proverbs is in each case enti re ly presupposed. This

pattern suggests that the rhetor ica l r isk of d irect ly repor t ing specif ic utterances

is that the speaker surrenders the ro le of "analysis" in favor of the ro le of "trans

l a t i o n " ( in Bakhtin 's sense of these terms) whereas, in indirect quotat ion, gains

in analysis are countered by loss of author i tat ive d iscourse. In Ngiraklang's

speech, however , th is danger is som ewhat attenuated, s ince analysis of the speech

tokens fo l lows immediate ly in many cases.

But more is involved here than monitor ing of in terpretat ion, for each case of

token repo r t i s ac tua l l y an examp le o f wha t I wan t to labe l " typ i fy ing repo r ted

The Political Function of Reported Speech I 9)

speech," that is, repor ted speech that has the sur face l inguist ic form of d irect

quo ta t ion bu t wh ic h does no t in fac t r epo r t d iscou rse wh ic h eve r occu r red in the

past. I was not present in the vi l lage in 1 9 6 6 , bu t i t wo u ld be h igh ly unchar

acter ist ic for a t i t leholder to make the statement repor ted in [ 1 7 ] , fo r these k inds

of f inancia l deal ings are general ly handled pr ivate ly and si lently. I was present in

the con text r epo r ted in [ 34 ] a n d [ 3 7 ] and no such words were spoken . The d is

course represented in

[66]

is expl ici t ly stated

no t

to have occurred, and the speech

repor ted in [ 1 1 8 ] is expressed in the future condit ional.

Pragmatica l ly , Ng i r ak lan g is us ing his au tho r i ty as a h igh - rank in g t i t l eho lde r

and as an accep ted exper t on Be lauan t rad i t ion and v i l lage h is to ry to typ i fy

rather than merely to repor t d iscourse, and to do so under the guise of transpar

ent or iconic quotat ion forms. Rather than simply presupposing the existence of

previous utterances, the l inguist ic form of which is represented, these examples

of repor ted speech enti re ly create the utterances through the convention that d i

rec t quo ta t ion na tu ra l l y m i r ro rs some o r ig ina l even t o f speak ing . As a resu l t ,

what appears formal ly as the extreme case of "translat ion," that is, the accurate

rep roduct ion o f a p rev ious u t te rance , emerges as the most pow er fu l m ode o f " an

alysis," since the speaker creates the utterance as wel l as imposes upon i t a d efin i

t ive in terpretat ion (see Larson

1 9 7 8 : 5 9 ) .

I t is in teresting, by contrast, that at no

po in t in h is speech does Ng i rak lang d ign i fy the words o f Uchere rak, wh ich he

cla ims not to have heard (or more accurate ly, which he intentional ly avoided

hear ing by leaving the meeting house) with the h istor icizing mantle of h is repor t

ing d iscourse.

The funct ion o f c i t ing t r ad i t iona l p rove rbs can be unders tood , f ina l l y , in

terms of the speaker 's need to legi t imize h is own posit ion as an author i tat ive

voice.

The p roverbs no t on ly con t r ibu te exp l i c i t l y t oward f i x ing the g loba l me ta

pragmatic theme of the speech (see Seitel 1 9 7 7 : 9 1 ) but a lso convey their pre

supposed natura lness ( i .e ., they are quoted exactly as prescr ibed) to the other

creative examples of quoted speech. In other words, a speaker who can per fect ly

reci te proverbs is judged to be l ike ly to repor t other utterances with the same

transparent object ivi ty.

Textual Pragmatics

Our analysis of the rhetor ica l devices of the speech is not exhausted by ty-

pologizing var ious instances of expl ici t ly metapragmatic signals, with no concern

for the temporal order and contextual l inkages of the d iscourse. There is an im

por tant sense in which the l inear or syntagmatic archi tecture of the text, that is,

i ts " tex tua l i ty , " con t r ibu tes an add i t iona l me tap ragmat ic d imens ion to the

speech's socia l effect iveness—and, in th is case, to i ts ineffect iveness as

w e l l .

In

order to show how the text as per formed consti tu tes what Peircean terminology




ca ll s an " index ica l i co n , " tha t i s , a con textua ll y anchored d iag ramm at ic s ign , by

means of which the speaker in tends to effect a change in the vi l lage's pol i t ica l

s i tua t ion ,

I have d ivided the speech into ten component segments ( labeled A-J)

on the basis of thematic and formal coherence and paral le l ism. Segments A and

J bracket the enti re speech event: the prefatory remarks in A indicate what the

hearers can look forward to ("many proverbs concerning the vi l lage of Ngerem

l e n g u i " ) ,

and the conclud ing remarks in J express the s peaker 's changed personal

feel ings having uttered these words ("my bad thought concerning the vi l lage of

Ngeremlengui has gone") . With in these framing brackets the speech consists of

two paral le l groups of segments, depicted in Figure 4 . 1 .

In the f i rst group, segments B and C narrate the h istory of events from 1 9 6 6

an d

1 9 7 9 ,

respectively; these two segments are clear ly separated fro m each other

by the tex tua l marke r in [ 2 9 ] : "Th is i s one th ing . " Segmen ts B and C have pa r

a l le l in ternal organization, with an instance of repor ted speech ( 1 7 an d 3 4 )

f o l

l owed by d iscuss ion o f the "mean ing" o f the quo ta t ion

( 1 8 - 2 0

an d

3 5 ) ,

and a

summary of the points made in each segment

( 2 5 - 2 8

an d

3 8 - 4 0 ) .

Fo l lowing

th is extended histor ica l narrat ive, segment D provides a more focused commen

tary on the signi f icance of events descr ibed in C. The cl imax of D is

[ 4 5 ] ,

wh i ch

is c lear ly an examp le o f " ch ie f l y admo n i t ion "

(mellach)

about ru les of speaking:

i f a god descends to the vi l lage, author ized persons are in charge of prompting

and interpret ing the god's utterance. The next section, E, changes referentia l lev

e ls and monitors the meaning of the ongoing d iscourse thus far , by insist ing that

Ngiraklang's own speech is to be taken as "reminding" rather than as "scold ing."

Exactly hal f-way through the speech (at l ine 6 1 ) Ng i rak lang re tu rns to the

events of 1 9 6 6 in segment F and to 1 9 7 9 i n segmen t G , bu t th is t ime f rom the

new perspective of d iscussing the agents of solut ion to each cr isis. In F, Ngirak

lang reminds eve ryone—ind i rec t l y , to be su re—tha t

he

was the one who man ip u

lated the si tuation by means of a chelebucheb- type valuable. And segment G,

marked off from the preceding segment by

[ 7 1 ] ,

"A g reed" (para l le l to line

2 9

in


the f i rst group) , returns to the events of the previous week. And th is is then

f o l

l owed by segmen t H, wh ich (pa ra l le l to segmen t D) conce rns the "mean ing" o f

the even ts descr ibed in G . Just as in D, in segmen t H a "c h ie f l y admo n i t ion " i s

pronounced: that respect is vanishing from the vi l lage. Segment I (paral le l to E)

takes the whole of the present d iscourse as i ts object and announces the centra l

metapragmatic theme of the oratory: don' t ever scold the chief in publ ic ( i n — 1 3 ) .

The apparen t symmetry o f the tex t ' s o rgan iza t ion concea ls an essen t ia l

asymmetry, the clue to which is the presence of the str ing of proverbs in segment

H. My analysis is that the quotat ion of proverbs in p lace of the quotat ion of

token utterances (as in B and D) is in tended to focus the aura of chief ly author i ty

(d iscussed above) at th is exact mom ent, that is, at the turn in g poi nt

(belkul)

wh e n

the speech shi f ts from being a ref lect ive clar i f icat ion to being a per formative po

l i t i ca l enactmen t . Ho w th is works ou t can be easi ly seen by loo k ing once more

at the overal l thematic movement of the oratory, as represented in Figure

4 . 1 .

Ng i rak lang 's speech is an e f fo r t by a h igh - rank ing t i t l eho lder to so lve a pa r

t icu lar pol i t ica l cr isis in the vi l lage by means of a verbal per formance which,

under the guise of being a gentle reminder ("I am merely reminding") or clar

i f icat ion ("I am just clar i fying") of past events paral le l to the present si tuation,

actual ly in tends to effect the solut ion through i ts utterance. The basis for th is

"pseudo-per formative" force (Si lverste in

1 9 8 1 b )

i s the syn tagmat ic const ruct ion

o f a p ropo r t ion be tween , on the one hand , two even ts wh ich se rious ly d is tu rbed

the pol i t ica l stabi l i ty of the vi l lage and, on the other hand, two agents of resolu

t ion to these cr ises. The paral le l events, what the speaker cal ls the "two deaths

of Ngeremlengui," both have to do with devastat ing chal lenges to legi t imate au

tho r i ty , essen t ia l l y invo lv ing the tempora ry usu rpa t ion o f the power o f ch ie f l y

speech.

In 1 9 6 6 unti t led members of the local men's club, Ngaratebel ik, imposed a

fine on one of their members, a r ight reserved to sacred t i t led members of Ngar

a imeiong chief ly counci l . The young man's father refused to pay the f ine, the

legi t imate chiefs depar ted from the vi l lage, and the men's club d isbanded—three

events whic h left the vi l lage in shambles. In

1 9 7 9 ,

j us t one week p r io r to the t ime

of the speech, the words of the god Uchererak, si lent since

1 9 3 4 ,

were enthusi

ast ica l ly received by younger re lat ives of chief Ngir turong, whose pro-status po

l i t ica l posi t ion was being chal lenged by lower- ranking vi l lagers. Both of these

events, acco rd ing to Ng i rak lang 's exp l i ca t ion , i l lus t ra te tha t the p r inc ipa l danger

o f a v i l l age wi th two vo ices o f au tho r i ty ( the "snake wi th two tongues") , e i the r

two counci ls (Ngaratebel ik and Ngaraimeiong) or two leaders (Uchererak and

Ng i r tu ro ng ) , i s the po ten t ia l depar tu re o f the leg i tima te t i t l eho lde rs . An d , as he

repeats, i f the t i t leholders "detour ," then the vi l lage i tse l f "detours."

The speech completes the analogy by construct ing, in the second half of the

text, a paral le l argument concerning the agents responsib le for the solut ion to

these cr i ses. W i thou t iden t i fy ing h imse l f by name, Ng i rak lang d raws upon the




comm on h is to r ica l knowledge o f a l l presen t tha t i t was h is own sk i l l fu l nego t ia

t ion wh ich made i t possib le fo r Ng i r tu ro ng to re tu rn to the v i l l age in

1 9 6 6 .

A n d

it is the d iagrammatic organization of the speech i tse l f which suppl ies the missing

fou r th p a r t o f the p ropor t ion : as Ng i rak lang c leve rly repa ired the po l i t i ca l dam

age created by spl i t au thor i ty in

1 9 6 6 ,

so h is same sk i l l , as abundantly evidenced

in the rhetor ica l br i l l iance and tradi t ional knowledge displayed in the proverbia l

ci tat ions conta ined in the speech i tse l f (especia l ly in H) , wi l l br ing the present

si tuation to a resolut ion. This resolut ion is not, however , merely referred to in

the speech, but i t is in tended to be accompl ished

by its very performance.

W h a t

appears at f i rst to be a stat ic d iagram turns out to be a syntactica l ly generated

indexical icon with per formative force designed to be the solut ion.

In a t tempt ing to remind the v il l age o f ce r ta in t r ad i t iona l no rms o f language

use and to per form a resolut ion of c er ta in pol i t ica l tensions exacerbated by recent

vio lat ions of these ru les, Ngiraklang obviously p laces great store not only in h is

own pol i t ica l weight but a lso in the power of speech in general to effect the goals

sought. For some people in the vi l lage, however , the speech accompl ished an un

in tended pu rpose—th a t o f s tand ing as a "h is to r i ca l m arke r " (olangch) (Parment-

ier 1 9 8 7 3 : 1 2 ) o f the demise of chief ly author i ty and respect. Par t of th is reaction

stems f rom the fac t tha t , desp i te i ts " t r ad i t iona l " o r ien ta t ion , themes, and re fe r

ences, the speech i tse l f consti tu tes a h ighly modern, id iosyncratic event. First of

a l l , the speech fo l lowed no establ ished genre for the chief ly use of language. Tra

d i t ional ly, meetings of assembled t i t leholders were carr ied out according to a sys

tem o f re layed wh ispe r ing (keltdau), in which messages passed si lently from

lower - rank ing men to the fou r h igh - rank ing t i t l eho lde rs , who commun ica ted

among themselves through two messengers. The t i t leholders remained seated

whi le the messengers, heads bent low, passed up and down the f loor of the meet

ing house. High-ranking chiefs had l i t t le need to persuade others of their views

through publ ic oratory, since their f ina l decisions (telbiil) were not subject to

questioning or even debate (cf. Comaroff

1 9 7 5 : 1 4 5 ) .

In fact, passive silence was

one of the hal lmarks of presupposed chief ly author i ty; as one proverb puts i t :

"The dugong [sea cow] sleeps in deep water ," that is, a chief h ides h imself from

easy publ ic scrut iny. So Ngiraklang's h ighly persuasive speech about the re le

vance of tradi t ional ru les of speaking bel ies i ts own message; or to put the point

the other way aroun d, to the degree that the speech was perceived as persuasive,

i t was so judged acco rd ing to no n t rad i t ional c r i te r ia .

Second,

the context of the speech contr ibuted to a lessening of i ts pol i t ica l

effect iveness. Ngiraklang was forced to ask permission from a democratica l ly

e lected magistrate to get the f loor , and h is speech was basical ly an extended in

ter ruption of the meeting of the e lected municipal counci l , a body representing

exact ly the so r t o f dua l au tho r i ty Ng i rak lang c r i t i c i zes so s t rong ly . Th is second

point re lates to the analysis presented above according to which the speech as

The Political Function of Reported Speech I ^ 7

per fo rmed is an index ica l i con , s ince pa r t o f the mean ing o f any index ica l o r

p ragmat ic s igna l i s de te rmined by the p resupposed e lemen ts in the con text in

wh ic h the s igna l appears . In th is case the negat ive con t r ib u t ion f r o m the co n text

was strong to the degree that the speech anchored i tse l f , both spatia l ly and t e m

pora l l y , in tha t con text .



P A R T I I I

Comparative Perspectives on Complex

Semiotic Processes



5

Tropical Semiotics

Levels of Semiosis

THE FIELD OF cu l tu ra l semio t i cs , in i ts many man i fes ta t ions, has increas ing ly

addressed the me thodo log ica l i ssue o f how to ana lyze fo rma l ly comp lex semio t i c

construct ions, such as mythic narrat ives, r i tual processes, and aesthetic objects,

wi th ou t reve r t ing to the s te r i l i t y o f s t ruc tu ra l i sm. Just because these k inds o f

c u l

tu ra l p roducts appear to have a h igh deg ree o f " tex tua l i ty " i s no reason to as

sume tha t tex ts can be analyzed wi tho u t re fe rence to the co nnect ion be tween the

shape o f the i r d iscu rs ive fo rms and the cond i t ions o f the i r con t extua l enactmen t .

Fo r examp le , i t i s apparen t f r om the cross-cu l tu ra l s tudy o f r i tua l tha t the re i s

often a re lat ionship between the d iscourse—internal textual i ty of formula ic

l a n

guage (cons ide red in te rms o f i ts f o rma l comp lex i ty , in te rna l segmen ta t ion , an d

prescr ip t i ve f i x i ty ) and the "p e r fo rm a t ive " power re leased in i ts con textua l l y a n

chored real izat ions. I t is as a contr ibution to th is area of semiotic research, what

Si lverste in

( 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 8 1 b , 1 9 9 3 )

has labe led "me tap ragmat ics , " tha t the theo ry

o f "symbo l ic obv ia t ion " can be eva lua ted . Symbo l ic obv ia t ion i s a semio t i c

c o n

cept developed by Roy Wagner in several books, including

Habu: Th e Innovation

of Meaning in Daribi Religion ( 1 9 7 2 ) , Lethal Speech: Daribi Myth as Symbolic

Obviation ( 1 9 7 8 ) , The Invention of Culture ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Asiwinarong: Ethos, Im age,

and Social Power amo ng the Usen Barok of New Ireland ( 1 9 8 6 ) , an d Symbols

That Stand for Themselves

( 1 9 8 6 ) . M ore recen tly , i t has been g iven an imp or tan t

empir ica l appl icat ion by James F. Weiner in

Th e

Heart

of

the Pearl Shell:

The

Mythological Dimension of Foi Sociality

( 1 9 8 8 ) , a superb e thnograph ic s tudy o f

a Papua New Guinea people. The purpose of th is chapter is to expl icate the

method o f sym bo l ic obv ia t ion , to po in t ou t a number o f p rob lems wi th i ts deve l

opment in the wr i t ings of Wagner and Weiner , and to suggest a broader set of

semiotic issues that are engaged by these studies.

Wagner and Weiner share the basic premise that semiotic phenomena should

be d ivided into a least two h ierarchical levels. The f i rst level of meaningfu lness

(wha t they f r equen t ly ca l l "seman t ic , " " l i te ra l , " o r "s t ruc tu ra l " ) invo lves the d is

t inc t ion be tween one e lemen t funct ion ing as a s ign o r "s ign i f ie r " and a second

element functioning as a referent, object, or "signi f ied." At th is f i rst level , these

functional ly d i f ferentiated e lements can be re lated (and can be interpreted as re-

101





I 0 4 I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes

tematici ty of the l inguist ic system. Not only is reference pro jected upon the wor ld

from systems of semiotic value, but that wor ld takes on the order l iness generated

f rom i ts semio t i c mode l ; in Wagner ' s te rmino logy, when "words, p ic tu res, d ia

g r a ms ,

models" combine together they present a "consistent, co l lect ive order ing

o f th ings" ( 1 9 7 7 ^ 3 9 2 ) .

Collectivizing and Differentiating Symbolization

At the tropic level , semiotic processes paral le l to the paradigmatic and syn

tagmatic chains emerge when metaphor ical signs are studied as cul tura l com

plexes.

Whereas the systematici ty of signi fying systems becomes r ig id i f ied to the

degree that their component signs are purely conventional, the f low of metaphors

in cul ture guarantees the dynamism of their innovations. This is because tropes

have the power to b r ing in to a r t i cu la t ion in ce r ta in con texts te rms wh ich have

not been previously l inked (Fernandez 1 9 8 6 : 3 7 ) and because the result ing met

aphor ic equivalences consti tu te new, "nonconventional" layers of cul tura l mean

ing (Wagner

1 9 7 2 : 6 , 1 9 8 1 : 4 3 ) .

Tropes, as Schw imm er

( 1 9 8 3 : 1 2 4 )

po in ts ou t in

a more general d iscussion of images and metaphors in New Guinea, re ly on the

her i tage of conventional symbols and meanings "but creative use of th is set in

volves drawing on i t in unexpected contexts and in response to inner prompt

i ng . " An innova t ive t r ope man i fes ts a f r agmen t ing o r "d i f fe ren t ia t ing " symbo l

izat ion in that, by refusing to adhere to the establ ished order of cul tura l

meanings, i t "operates upon other signi f iers to draw them into a new re lat ion"

(Wagner 1 9 7 2 : 6 ) :

Since tropic usage sets one symbol (or denominate entity) into some relatively

nonconventional relation to another such symbol (or entity), replacing the

"nonarbi trar iness" of conventional usage wi th some more specific mo tivation,

it is obvious that a notion of simple (literal) reference no longer applies. The

nonconventional relation introduces a new symbolization simultaneously with

a " n e w "

referent,

and the symbolization and its referent are identical.

We

migh t say that a metaphor or other trop ic usage assimilates symbol and referent

into one expression, that a metaphor is a symbol that stands

for

itself—it is

self-contained. Thus the symbolic effect of a tropic usage opposes or counter

acts that of conventional usage in tw o ways: i t assimi lates that which i t "sy m

bol izes" with in a d ist inct, uni tary expression (col lapsing the d ist inct ion

between symbol and symbolized), and it differentiates that expression from

other expressions (rather than articulating it with them). (Wagner

1 9 7 8 : 2 5 )

The opposit ion between f ixed, ordered, and presupposed semiotic structures

and innovative, open-ended, and creative semiotic structures which, at f i rst, char

acter izes the d ist inct ion between the formal semantics of language and the p lay

of tropic symbols can a lso be seen in the operation of tropes themselves. That is,

metaphors generated in one context that are then repeated across contexts be-

Tropical Semiotics I J 0 5

come regu la r ized and thus "decay" (Wagner

1 9 7 2 : 6 )

in to what appears to be a

"conven t iona l i zed" lex ica l fo rma l i ty . ( I p lace th is word wi th in quo ta t ion marks

to ca l l a t ten t ion to i ts f igu ra t i ve usage in th is con text , a p rob lem tha t wi l l be

considered below.) These automatized, habitual symbol ic expressions, what Wag

ne r ca l l s "co l lec t i v iz ing symbo l iza t ion , " in t u r n , tend to congeal in to general ized

inter locking patterns such as socia l ideologies (Wagner 1 9 7 2 : 1 7 0 ) , techn ica l

ru les ,

ma themat ic equa t ions, ra t iona l i zed ju r id ica l in te rp re ta t ions (Bourd ieu

1 9 8 7 ) , and norms of personal demeanor (Wagner 1 9 7 8 : 2 2 , 1 9 8 1 : 4 2 ) . Co l l e c t i v

i z ing symbo l iza t ion , be ing "obsessed wi th the a r t i f i ce o f o rde r " and a t tempt ing

to t r ansparen t ly m i r ro r the na tu ra l wor ld th rough some fo rma t o f r ep resen ta

t ional r igor , necessar i ly renders the presence of ser ious cul tura l polysemy as mere

"co n n o t a t i o n " ( W ag n e r 1 9 7 2 : 2 3 ) .

Co l lec t i v iz ing an d d i f fe ren t ia t ing modes o f symbo l iza t ion can be con t rasted ,

fu r the r , by the ways s igns refe r to con textua l phenomena : wh i le the fo rm er p re

suppose a separation between symbol and referent, the latter work to erase th is

d is t inc t ion in favo r o f me taphor ica l se l f -r e fe ren t ia li ty by iden t i fy ing d ispa rate ex

pe r iences as s im i la r o r homo logous. A t the co l lec t i v iz ing po le , "symbo ls them

selves are thus contrasted w i th the i r r e fe ren ts , they fo rm an idea l "se t " o r " f a m

i l y "

among themselves, one that must necessar i ly separate and d ist inguish i tse l f

f r om the phenomena l wor ld " (Wagner

1 9 7 2 : 2 2 ) .

A t the d i f fe ren t iat ing

p o l e ,

" t h e

tension and contrast between symbol and symbol ized col lapse, and we may speak

o f such a const ruct ion as a "symbo l " tha t s tands fo r i tse l f . The un ique exper i

ences,

people, objects, and p laces of everyday l i fe a l l c orrespon d, in those features

tha t render them d is t inc t , to th is mode o f symbo l iza t ion—as " ' symbo ls , ' they

stand for themselves" (Wagner

1 9 8 1 : 4 3 ) .

And, again paral le l to the referentia l

pro ject ion precip i tated by the l inguist ic system, these centered, organized, or in

tegrated patterns promote the object i f icat ion or re i f icat ion of the objects they

denote.

Un fo r tuna te ly , in exp l i ca t ing Wagner ' s semio t i c mode l We ine r ( 1 9 8 8 : 6 ) i n

t r oduces a deg ree o f con fus ion by mod i fy ing the de f in i t ion o f the cen t ra l

c o n

cepts:

The crucia l character ist ic of a trope is that i t is a re lat ionship between two

elements that are simultaneously similar and dissimilar. The symbolic operation

that focuses on the simi lar i ty between elements in a tropic ("trop e- ic") equa

t ion can be termed collectivizing symbol izat ion, in Wagner's scheme, whi le the

converse operation that takes the differences as the focus of intent can be la

beled as differentiating sym bol izat ion.

Part o f the d i f f i cu l ty , I t h in k , i s tha t We ine r i s rely ing on a d i f fe ren t se t o f

c o n

no ta t ions o f the te rms "co l lec t i ve " and "d i f fe ren t ia t ing " ; by "co l lec t i ve " he

wan ts to suggest the mora l fo r ce o f the Durk he im ian soc ial co l lec t i v i ty , as in h is

discussion of "col lect ive ly defined status" (Weiner

1 9 88 : 1 0 )

— w h e r e a s

Wagner ' s



io6 I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes

Tropical Semiotics I 107

The second sense of convention that we have encountered refers to the ha

b i t u a l , typ ica l , taken - fo r -g ran ted , l i te ra l , o r no rma t ive qua l i ty o f cu l tu ra l symbo l

i za t ion—what I w i l l ca l l conven t ion -N ( fo r no rma t ive ) . Conven t ions-N inc lude

no t on ly non f igu ra t i ve seman t ic mean ing bu t a lso , and more impor tan t l y , the

" d e a d "

o r "s tandard " (We ine r 1 9 8 6 : 1 2 5 ) t r opes whose innova t ive f r agmen ta

t ion has g iven way to t i r ed o r "coun te r innova t ive " (Wagner 1 9 8 1 : 4 4 ) r e p e t i

t i o n .

1

Wagner i s re fe rr ing to co nven t ion -N when he describes the d ia lec t i ca l r e

la t ion be tween conven t iona l and d i f fe ren t ia t ing symbo l ism ( 1 9 8 1 : 4 4 ) . A n d i t i s

in th is sense tha t he speaks o f " l ingu is t i c conven t ions o f Dar ib i na r ra t i ve fo rm"

(Wagner 1 9 7 8 : 3 8 ) o r " the conven t iona l open ing o f a Dar ib i s to ry" (Wagner

1 9 7 8 : 4 5 ) , and when We ine r ta lks abou t "conven t iona l soc ia l r o les" ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 0 )

or o f women and marsup ia ls as " two conven t iona l l y con t rasted e lemen ts"

( 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 4 ) . And i t i s in th is sense o f conven t ion -N tha t Wagner can say tha t ,

just as tropic usages metaphor ize l i tera l meanings (conventions-P) , "so conven-

t iona l [ -N] nonarb i t r a r iness o f ten th rea tens to d isp lace the t rop ic va r ie ty"

( 1 9 7 8 : 2 5 ) .

The seeming ly con t rad ic to ry fo rmu la t ion o f the seeming ly con t rad ic

tory phrase "conventional nonarbi trar iness" (recal l that arb i trar iness is a charac

ter ist ic of conventions-P) refers to the standardization or habituation of socia l

rules.

As i t tu rns ou t , bo th t r opes and conven t ions-N a re "mo t iva ted , " a l though

in d i f ferent ways: tropes are motivated because, as signs at the second level of

semiosis, they creative ly asser t fresh associat ions; conventions-N are motivated

because they code the sel f-evident force of cul tura l tradi t ions.

Since both Wagner and Weiner ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 8 — 3 9 ) regular ly conflate conven

t ion -P and conven t ion -N, i t i s o f ten d i f f i cu l t to f igu re ou t—othe r than f igu ra

t i ve ly—what a g iven sen tence means. In pa r t i cu la r , the i r a rgumen ts f r equen t ly

sl ip between the h ierarchical opposit ion of semantic and metaphor ical signs ( the

fo rmer be ing conven t iona l -P) and the con textua l oppos i t ion be tween s tandard

ized cu l tu ra l images (conven t ion -N) and innova t ive , d i f fe ren t ia t ing t r opes, as , fo r

examp le , when We ine r ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 ) wr i tes : "M ean in g , as I argue , resu l ts when the

elements of conventional [-P] syntagm atic orders are inser ted into nonc onven

t ional [-N] cont exts. The result ing f igurat ive or metaphor ic al expressions define

at once both the par t icu lar izing nature of metaphor and i ts dependence upon

conventional[-P] semantic or syntagmatic references for i ts innovative impact."

Cer ta in passages in Wagner ( 1 9 7 8 : 5 4 ) seem actual ly calculated to obscure the

d is t inc t ion be tween conven t ion -P and conven t ion -N:

Unlike our [Western] literature, [Daribi] myth belongs to an ideological regime

in which the conventional aspect of symbolization (the semantic mode) is be

lieved to be innate or immanent in man. This means that the conventions that

per ta in to the narrat ive medium are perceived as "g iven," a kind of impl ici t

moral appropriateness appearing spontaneously within an activity whose ap

propriateness is itself self-evident.

usage p lays on the conno ta t ion o f co l la t ion o r co l lec t ion o f symbo ls—and by

"di f ferentiat ing" he wants to imply a ser ies of contrasts or complementar ies in

socia l ro le re lat ions, that is, "socia l d i f ferentiat ion" (Weiner 1 9 88 : 9 )— w h e r e a s

Wagner 's usage re l ies more on the sense of "making d i f ferent" or fragmenting

some standar ized semantic re lat ions. Wagner h imself sometimes speaks of col lec

t i v i z ing symbo ls as de r iv ing f r om the "co l lec t i v i ty " ( 1 9 8 6 3 : 1 7 5 ) and even re

verses the definitions at several points, such

3S

i n h is d iscuss ion o f "co l lec t i v iz ing

acts . . . that recharge the symbols of their o rd inary d i f ferent iat ing existence"

( 1 9 8 1 : 1 1 8 ) . Despite th is defin i t ional confusion, the key point is clear : the oppo

si t ion between convention and innovation paral le ls the d ist inct ion between

c o l

l ec t i v iz ing symbo l iza t ion and d i f fe ren t iat ing sy mbo l iza t ion ; indeed , innova t ion i s

the "s i gn " o f d i f fe ren t iat ion (Wagner 1 9 8 1 : 4 3 ; Weiner 1 9 8 8 : 1 4 3 ) .

Convention and Innateness

At th is point i t becomes essentia l to begin d isambiguating several contra

d ictory senses of the term "convention" that appear in the Wagner and Weiner

tex ts .

Tw o usages have a lready been noted. In the str ic t Peircean sense, "c onv en

t i o n a l "

labels a semiotic ground l inking sign and object such that the sign would

no t s tand fo r the ob ject i t does wi thou t some fu r the r s ign , i ts " in te rp ré tan t , "

representing i t to be so re lated. Thus, a conventional sign (a Peircean "symbol")

i s maxima l ly unmot iva ted , s ince i t r equ i res ne i the r k ind o f "na tu ra l " l i nkage ,

name ly , i con ic i ty o r index ica l ity . The impo r tan t po in t to keep in mind abou t Pe i r

cean conventional signs is that they are inherently semiotic, since apar t from the

tr iadic process of semiosis the sign and the object would not even exist as func

tionally related entities (see Chapter 1 ) . I wi l l represent th is sense of convention

as convention-P (for Peirce) . Clear ly, conventions-P can belong to the f i rst level

of semiosis, for example, many l inguist ic signs. As Wagner ( 1 9 8 6 b : 8 ) notes:

The conventions—rules, syntax, lexicon—of language stand in a reciprocal

relation to that which can be, and is, said in the language. As we speak by

working transformations upon those conventions, figuring our meanings

throug h th em, so the set of conventions can be seen as the metaphor o f all that

could be said in this way.

Tropes such as metaphors and other f igurat ive expressions are not , str ict ly speak

ing , conventional-P because, in establ ish ing the mutual transformation of vehicle

and tenor , their motivat ion l ies in r ich layers of cul tura l associat ion, "analogic

const ruct ion " (Wagner 1 9 8 6 ^ 3 0 ) , and " recu rs ive imp l i ca t ion " (Wagner

i 9 8 6 b : i 2 6 ) rather than in grammatical regular i t ies. But note that even the most

highly innovative metaphor re l ies for i ts str iking effect on conventional-P signs,

namely, the l inguist ic components (Wagner 1 9 7 8 : 2 5 ) .



io8 I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Semiotic Processes

In th is passage, Wagner skips between ta lking about the semiotic character of

language ("the semantic mode," clear ly convention-P) and about a par t icu lar

cu l

tura l in terpretat ion of typ ical or habitual genre ru les (clear ly convention-N) "be

l ieved to be inna te o r immanen t in man " —w h ic h they most obv ious ly a re no t in

the least.

The cr i t ica l point to observe in th is re lat ive d ist inct ion is that i t is based on

a cu l tu ra l " in te rp re t i ve d is t inc t ion " (Wagner

1 9 8 1 : 5 1 ) ,

that is, an indigenous

theory

of

semiosis employed in contexts of socia l act ion. Both Wagner and W e i

ner consider the possib i l i ty that, in some societ ies, the taken- for-grantedness of

conventions-N results in their being regarded as not produced by individual in

ten t ion o r cu l tu ra l a r t i f i ce ( i .e . , as wor conven t ion -P) bu t ra the r as " inna te , "

" g i v e n , "

o r "se l f - ev iden t " in the cosmos, the env i ronmen t , o r human na tu re

(Wagner

1 9 7 7 b ) .

The rhetor ica l thrust of th is argument seems to be to re lat ivize

the classical opposit ion between thesei an d physei, that is, between phenomena

in the realm of human responsib i l i ty or cul tura l ar t i f ice and phenomena that are

viewed as products of the natura l order . For example, whi le from the neutra l

stance of comparative cul tura l semiotics a codif ied legal system can be assumed

to be the h istor ica l product of cul tura l in tention, for people subjected to i t th is

same legal system, especia l ly i f i ts tota l izing moral author i ty is acute ly fe l t , is

l ike ly to be interpreted as a force of nature, a product of d ivine w i l l , or a deduc

t ion f r om p r inc ip les o f human na tu re. Th is , in

t u r n ,

opens up the possib i l i ty that

there could be a systematic inversion in the "c haracter ist ic mo de of sym bol ic

con

s t r u c t i o n "

(Wagner

1 9 7 8 : 2 9 )

between tr ibal societ ies l ike the Dar ib i and the Foi

of New Guinea and Western industr ia l ized societ ies:

The core of any and every set of cultural conventions is a simple distinction as

to what kind of contexts, the nonconventionalized ones or those of convention

itself, are to be deliberately articu lated in the course of human actio n, and wh at

kind of contexts are to be counter invented as " mo tivatio n" under the conven

t ional mask of "the g iven" or "the innate." Of course, for any g iven set of

conventions, be i t that of a tr ibe, comm unity, "c ul tur e," or socia l class, there

are only two possibilities: a people who deliberately differentiate as the form

of their act ion wi l l invar iably counter invent a motivating col lect ivi ty as "in

nate," and a people who deliberately collectivize will counterinvent a motiva

t ing d i f ferentiat ion in th is way. As contrast ing modes of thoug ht, perception,

and action, there is all the difference in the world between these two. (Wagner

1 9 8 1 : 5 1 )

In New Guinea, tropic symbol izat ions are understood to belong to the realm of

human ar t i f ice and responsib i l i ty, whi le conventional-N regular i t ies of society

( " ru les , laws, t r ad i t ions") a re seen as pa r t o f the " inna te " f low o f the o rde r o f

nature (Wagner

1 9 7 8 : 2 7 ) .

This point is needlessly b lur red when Weiner asser ts

tha t , fo r the Fo i , "d i f fe ren t ia t ion

is

conven t ion "

( 1 9 8 8 : 1 0 ) ;

what he means, I


guess, i s tha t Fo i innova t ive , t r op ic symbo l iza t ions a re acknowledged to be hu

man ly p roduced , whereas no rms o f co l lec t i ve conduct appear to be pa r t o f the

na tu ra l o rde r o f th ings, tha t i s , as be ing a se t o f " inna te conven t iona l d is t inc

tions"

( 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 9 ) .

In the West , in con t rast , fo rms o f co l lec t i v iz ing symb o l iza t ion a re cons idered

the p roduct o f cu l tu ra l const ruct ion opposed to the inna te , g iven tendenc ies o f

ind iv idua l pe rsona l i t ies , and d i f fe ren t ia t ing symbo l iza t ion i s re lega ted to the

wo r l d o f a e s t h e t i c ( " a r t i s t s , w r i t e r s , m u s i c i a n s " ) , su b cu l t u r a l ( " b l a ck A m e r i

c a n s " ) , a n d f i c t i o n a l co u n t e r cu l t u r e s ( "Ho l l ywo o d sc r i p t w r i t e r s " ) ( W e i n e r

1 9 8 8 : 1 0 ) :

In such a [Western] mi l ieu, ru les are the focus of conscious hum an ar t ic u lat ion ,

since they are designed to regulate and systematize an inherently chaotic and

differentiated cosmos. Our view of social artifice basically derives from such

early social philosophers as Locke: society is the systematic application of

c o n

stra ints upon the inherent wi l l fu lness of the sel f-conta ined individual. The

meaning of a l l socia l and cul tura l forms—including myth—is thus above a l l

e lse referrable to their function in mainta in ing societa l order . Convention in

this worldview thus emerges as a result of progressive acts of collectivizing

sym bol izat ion, focusing on the ar t i f ica l ly imposed s imi lar it ies among elements

and statuses to arrive at the occupational, educational, and geographical spe

cializations (to name a few) that comprise our social categories and the system

of laws, wr i t t en and un wr i t t en, that govern their re lat ionship to each other . In

such a system, the differences that are also a part of the metaphor of social

identity are seen as innate or inherent; and indeed, the morality of convention

l ies in the fact that i t is seen to accommodate and contro l such d i f ference. (Wei

ner 1 9 8 8 : 7 - 8 )

Th is typo log ica l con t rast imp l ies a co r respond ing d i f ference in cu l t u ra l the

or ies of the sel f , that is, the "point to which conception, act ion, and response are

a t t r ibu ted " (Wagner

1 9 7 7 3 : 1 4 7 ) .

I f in the West the sel f , whether as "ego" or

"personal i ty," is considered to be enti re ly personal, for tr ibal peoples the sel f is

the product of socia l mediat ions involving other people and objects of exchange.

Conversely, socia l conventions such as language and moral i ty are d i f ferentia l ly

eva lua ted . In t r iba l soc ie ties they a re though t to be "d iscove red" w i th in the pe r

son, who is be l ieved to be a "homuncu la r s imu lacrum o f a cu l tu ra l ' human i ty ' "

(Wagner 1 9 7 7 3 : 1 4 7 ) , whereas in the West the individual 's t3sk is to become so

cia l ized into conventional norms exist ing outside the person.

My own react ion to th is g loba l typo logy o f cu l tu res i s tha t i t shou ld no t be

taken too ser iously, since the character izat ion of Western cul tures at least seems

gross ly m is taken and s ince the semio t ic p rocess o f the " na tu ra l i za t ion " conven

t ion can be iden t i f ied in bo th t r iba l and indust r ia l i zed soc ie t ies (S i l ve rs te in

1 9 8 7 b : 5 ; see Chapter 8 ). Cer ta in ly many scholars have documented for Western



no I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes

Tropical Semiotics I i n

ner 's d iagram

[ 1 9 8 8 : 1 4 0 ]

r eve rses the symbo l ism o f th is ana logy by l in ing up

"ma le and fema le " wi th "wi fe -g ive rs and wi fe - take rs . " ) The r i tua l a l ignmen t o f

the doma in o f in te rsexua l d i f fe ren t ia t ion and the doma in o f a f f ina l oppos i t ion i s

i tse l f a trope, not only because the "female" wife-g ivers are in fact men but a lso

because the "male" valuables

an d

mea t they rece ive f r om the wi fe - take rs inve r t

the reciprocal exchange of the valuables

fo r

mea t in nona f f ina l con texts ( i .e . ,

aname kobora

exchanges o f " fema le " po rk and "ma le " pea r l she l l s ) . Next , the

p resen ta t ion o f p igs by wi fe - take rs when the f i r s t ch i ld i s bo rn in tu rn "sh i f ts "

the conven t iona l -N mean ings be long ing to the s tandard ized image o f a f f ines.

Whereas aff ines are supposed to be normatively d i f ferentiated, they have become

re la ted th roug h a c h i ld ; the w i fe -g ive rs a re now the ch i ld ' s m a t r i la te rals . F ina l l y ,

the status of cross-cousins in the next generation becomes ambiguous, since i t

uneas i l y comb ines two p rev ious id ioms o f exchange , the sha r ing consangu in i ty

o f "b ro the rs" and the oppos i t iona l s tance o f a f f ines (We ine r 1 9 8 8 : 1 4 5 ) ; the i r

exchanges act out the most inclusive metaphor : "aff ines are consanguines" (Wei

ner

1 9 8 8 : 2 8 6 ) .

Weiner uses Wagner ' s te rm "obv ia t ion " (Wagner

1 9 7 8 : 3 1 — 3 3 )

to descr ibe

the complex d iscursive process whereby, f i rst, innovative symbol ic meaning is

created out of the raw mater ia ls of conventional-N associat ions and, second, the

mot iva t ion fo r the o r ig ina l assoc ia t ion i s e i the r exposed o r ra t iona l i zed . Ob v ia

t ion i s a "p rocessua l fo rm o f the t r ope" (Wagner

i 9 8 8

: x i ) tha t tacks back and

fo r th be tween conven t iona l -N symbo l ism, where s ign and mean ing tend toward

funct iona l separat ion , and t rop ic d is loca t ion , where the f i r s t s ymbo l iza t ion i s

u n i

f i ed in the mu tua l i ty o f me taphor . A l though Wagner and We ine r i l l us t ra te obv i

a t ion wi th r i tua l and na r ra t i ve examp les taken f rom the i r r espect ive Papua New

Guinea ethnographic cases, the model is not in tended to be a local genre ru le nor

an emic mode of indigenous interpretat ion. Presumably, however , par t of the

mean ing fu lness o f cu l tu ra l const ruct ions fo r the peop le who p roduce them de

pends on an impl ici t recognit ion of semiotica l ly wel l - formed instances (cf.

H a n

son and Hanso n

1 9 8 1 , 1 9 8 3 : 1 9 1 ) .

Wha t i s spec ia l abou t obv ia t iona l s ymbo l ism

is that the sequence of tropes in a r i tual or in a myth achieves a degree of closure

whereby the last metaphor returns to the or ig in point of the d iscourse:

As this continues, the effects of the tropic assimilations become cumulative;

eventually the distinction between the modalities, recast into ever more liminal

f o r m , is eroded away, and the in i t ia l cons truct ion, pushed to the point of par

adox, collapses into its modal opposite. The metaphorizing of one element or

episode by another leads, progressively and cumulatively, to the metaphorizing

of one modality by the other. The effect suggests the closing of the traditional

hermeneutical circle, for, in the final metaphorization, the reflexive component

of construction, normally "out of awareness," becomes apparent

as a

conse

quence of the construction.

(Wagner

1 9 7 8 : 3 2 - 3 3 )

cu l tu re a pe rvas ive tendency to t u rn h is to r i cal l y de r ived "s t ruc tu ra l cond i t ions"

in to " ind iv idua l inev i tab i l i ty " (MacKinnon 1 9 8 7 : 3 0 6 ) and a corresponding de-

onto logical effor t to just i fy the practices and inst i tu t ions of the status quo as

good by reveal ing them as natura l (Ki tcher

1 9 8 5 : 2 4 5 ) .

I t was the g rea t con t r i

bution of John Locke to locate in the "state of nature" the essentia l bui ld ing

block of l ibera l ism, pr ivate proper ty. Rather than seeing, with Weiner , conven

t ion as the ar t i f icia l attempt to harmonize innate d i f ferences, convention can a lso

be viewed as the propensity to impose systematic d i f ferentiat ions or d iscr imina

t ions on the basis of assumed given simi lar i t ies among people. And rather than

t rea t ing ,

wi th Weiner , socia l conventions as imposing constra ints on individual

w i l l s ,

the natura l order can be considered as sett ing constra ints on the possib i l i t

ies of the socia l system, or socia l systems can be calculated to be the deductive

consequence o f ind iv idua l dec ision making o r u t i l i t y maxi miza t io n . The d i f f i c u l

t ies involved in Wagner 's g lobal typolo gy are so severe that, at one po int, Wagn er

himself reverses the terms of the argument by stat ing that the "order , structure,

o r system" o f soc ia l con t ract i s r ega rded in Weste rn soc ial th i nk in g as be ing " in

nate" ( 1 9 8 6 3 : 1 7 6 ) .

Despite these reservations, I bel ieve that a m ore interesting ethnog raphic pro

ject can be salvaged: to descr ibe the semiotic constructs of a single cul ture in

te rms o f

( 1 )

the d ia lect ica l h ierarchization of the levels of semantic and tropic

semiosis and (2 ) the con textua l p lay o f con ven t iona l -N ( "c o l lec t i v iz ing " ) vs . in

novating ("d i f ferentiat ing") symbol ic forms at the second level of semiosis. And

th is is precisely the ambit ious task that Weiner has set for h imself in

Th e Heart

of the Pearl Shell.

Obviational Exchange

Fundamental to Foi conceptual izat ion of their socia l l i fe are two inter locking

postu lates. First, the Foi bel ieve that male and female spheres are com plementary,

continuous, and contrapuntal (Weiner

1 9 8 8 : 9 0 ) ,

so that consanguineal l ineal i ty

is the prerogative of men yet requires the "natura l" generative powers of women.

As a resu l t, " the respons ib i li t y o f men . . . i s con t inua l l y to t r ansfo rm the sexua l

productivi ty of their own females into the ar t i f ice of male patr i l ineal i ty" (Weiner

1 9 8 8 : 9 0 ) .

Second, the impasse of th is conjunc ture of nature and ar t i f ic e requires

the mediat ion of objects of value that, in socia l exchanges, simultanously objec

t i fy and me taphor ize "ma le " and " fema le " doma ins. Exchanges a re t r op ic be

cause they set in motion a ser ies of analogies between conventional-N images of

soc ia l d i f fe ren t ia t ion . Fo r examp le , the wi fe - tak ing g roup 's ac t o f p resen t ing

" m a l e "

va luables to the wife-g iving group, who give both a female and "female"

i t ems,

invokes the standard images of the forces of male/female complementar i ty

which the Foi see as pervading human and cosmic realms. (Unfor tunate ly, Wei-



uz I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Semiotic Processes


Tropes and Narrative

The "hear t" of Weiner 's ethnography is the analysis of Foi tutti " m o r a l s t o

r ies,"

which d isplay substi tu t ional sequences paral le l to those descr ibed for ex

change r i tuals. Weiner and the ear l ier ethnographer of the region, Francis Edgar

Wi l l iams, bo th no te a funct iona l d i f fe ren t ia t ion be tween two genres o f Fo i na r

rat ives, namely, amusing stor ies to ld for recreational purposes and cul t ic myths

associated with magical spel ls. Wil l iams

(1977:302—3)

d iv ides Fo i na r ra t i ves

into

tuni

an d

hetagho.

The former are shor t ta les involving nameless characters

and unspecif ied locales; they are to ld by both men and women in var ious socia l

con texts and are wi tho u t m ag ical s ign i fi cance. The la t te r a re " t r ue m yths " dea l

ing with "ancient events of fundamental impor tance and consequently possess a

re l ig ious as we l l as mag ica l mean ing" (W i l l i ams

1 9 7 7 : 3 0 3 ) ;

a l though these

myths involve named characters associated wit h c ul t ic ro les, these names are sup

pressed in per formance. This d ivision suggests a connection between the ideology

of texts and the pragmatics of per formance such that greater contextual speci

f ici ty, including restr ict ion on utterance (secrecy, name suppression) , si tuational

app rop r ia teness (cu l t i c con texts) , and con t igu i ty wi th o the r d iscu rs ive fo rms

(magical spel ls) corre lates with the h igher degree of col lect ivizing symbol izat ion

o f " t r ue myths. " In con t rast , Fo i tuni (co r respond ing to Dar ib i namu po " m o r a l

tales" studied by Wagner) are acknowledged to be ar t i f icia l construct ions rather

than cosmo log ica l l y impor tan t myths. The Fo i s to r ies typ ica l l y invo lve fanc i fu l

plo ts , imaginary characters (g iants, ogresses) , magical transformations, and

c o l

or fu l reversals of conventional moral i ty (Weiner

1 9 8 8 : 1 5 0 ) .

Whether because the contemporary Foi prefer to keep those myths associ

ated with magical spel ls secret or because the cul t ic si tuation has decl ined in im

por tance, Weiner 's data consist pr imar i ly of the recreational stor ies.

3

Weiner uses

one s to ry , "The Hornb i l l Husband ," as a me thodo log ica l demonst ra t ion (a l

though the par t icu lar procedures appl ied in th is case are not, in their enti rety,

repeated e lsewhere in the book) .

4

Fundamen ta l to the me thod is the de te rmina

t ion of a sequence of thematic substi tu t ions or transformations that ( 1 ) move the

p lo t a long i ts "ac t iona l " pa th and (2 ) i nvoke unspoken cu l tu ra l p resuppos i tions.

No p r inc ip led cr i te r ia a re adop ted fo r iden t i fy ing these t rop ica l subst i tu t ions,

which can involve two actions, characters, values, or categor ies with in the text

whose re lat ionship can be metaphor ical equivalence (A equals B) , transformation

(A in to B ) , nega t ion (A in to no t -A) , subst i tu t ion (A replaced by B) , o r t r ansact ion

(A for B, B for A) (cf. Todorov

1 9 7 1 : 3 9 ) .

In add i t ion , subst i tu tions a re iden t i f ied

in wh ich the second te rm ex is ts on ly as an ext ra - tex tua l p resuppos i t ion . The

su b s t i t i t i o n s a r e se l e c t e d w i t h a n e ye t o wa r d p l a c i n g t h e m i n a n i n t e r l o ck

ing pattern such that they a l ternate between those involving re lat ive ly conven

t i o n a l - N ,

co l lect ive ly consti tu ted cul tura l associat ions (cal led, fo l lowing Wagner

For example, the mult i t iered analogy set up between sexual i ty, aff in i ty, and c o n

sanguin i ty is an emergent rather than a stat ic ser ies of substi tu t ions. At every

point in the r i tual sequence when one trope "metaphor izes" the previous one,

tha t p rev ious me taphor i s " rendered apparen t " o r "obv ious" (hence "obv ia

t i o n " ) .

Con t ra ry to We ine r ' s c la im

(1988:143)

tha t obv ia t ion i s a semio t i c p ro

cess working between the h ierarchical levels of c onventional-P semantic meaning

and metaphors or tropes, the examples he g ives clear ly demonstrate that obvia

t ion operates enti re ly w ith in the second level of semiosis as the process by wh ich

innovative usages fragment, deflect, and "d i f ferentiate" conventional-N symbols.

Why is exchange such a productive arena for tropic obviat ion? Exchange is

a co l lec t i ve soc ia l ac t i v i ty invo lv ing , on the one hand , ind iv idua ls and soc ia l

groups and, on the other hand, symbol ica l ly charged mediat ional objects ( food,

wealth i tems, persons) . These activi t ies are organized so that paradigmatic or

categor ical opposit ions (male vs. female, wife-g ivers vs. wif e- takers) are real ized

in syn tagmat ic in te ract ional con texts . A nd , more im por tan t l y , the syn tagms can

be viewed as "forms of d iscourse" (Weiner

1988:149)

that set up sequential sub

st i tu t ions which consti tu te equivalences without denying d i f ferentia l va lues. They

do th is i n tw o senses:

( 1 )

equivalences between objects given for each other (e.g.,

valuables for wives) or in replacement for each other

(e.g.,

pearl shells for

kara'o

oi l ) and (2 ) equivalences between analogous exchange scenarios (e.g., in tersexual

and a f f ina l ) .

2

This is, of course, an e laboration of Jakobson's

(1987)

famous

pr incip le of poetic pro ject ion: in poetry, syntagms are broken up into paral le l

l inguist ic segments and create an ar t i f icia l "pro ject ion" of equivalence, usual ly

restr icted to the paradigmatic axis of conventional-P semantici ty, in to the syn

tagmatic axis. Poetry tropical ly turns language upon i tse l f , since any and a l l o f

i ts conventional-P features can be the effect ive source of paral le l ism. In Foi ex

change, "the ar t i f ice of socia l i ty" (Weiner

1988:139)

is created in and by the

playing out of an asymmetr ica l ser ies of transactions in which var ious media

invoking conventional ly-N defined values are rendered contextual ly equivalent.

Soc ia l r o les , ca tego r ies , and g roups a re , thus, "d i f fe ren t ia ted " (Wagner

1 9 7 4

: 1 1 1 )

throu gh exchange, a process Weiner descr ibes as " the trop ic c reation

of the Foi moral universe" ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 4 9 ) .

Like the f leeting character of poetic equivalence, Foi aff in i ty is an inherently

contextual re lat ionship, since a man and h is wife 's brother , opposed foci of the

br idewealth transactions that created h is marr iage, jo in together in contr ibuting

br idewealth for h is male chi ldren and share the wealth brought in as a result of

the marr iages of h is female chi ldren. Yet Foi exchanges are subject to the same

potentia l for "dying" in to sta le repeti t ion that can be the fate of even the most

creative poetic metaphors. That is, r i tual reenactments necessari ly encourage the

"co l lec t i v iz ing " tendency o f symbo l iza t ion (Wagner

1 9 7 8 : 2 9 ) .

For tunate ly, Foi

exchange, considered as an independent semiotic modal i ty, can a lso become the

metaphor ical tenor for a fur ther innovative semiotic vehicle, storyte l l ing.



né I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Semiotic Processes

th e

k a

buru said to the young woman, "Remove all your clothing and leave it

at the base of the tree here; take my clothing instead before you climb up."

The young woman did so and cl imbed up the tree. Whi le she was in the top

branches picking leaves, she heard the

ka

buru whispering to herself below.

"What is she saying?" the young woman wondered and cal led out to the

k a

buru. " No , i t is only that some bi t ing ants have stung me," the o lder w oman

replied.

Then the young woman heard the sound of the tree trunk being struck

repeatedly. "Now what is she doing?" she wondered. The

ka

buru

called out

to her , "I am going to marry your husband. You wi l l stay here and d ie." And

wi th tha t , the t r unk o f the hagenamo tree elongated greatly and the branches

spread out in a l l d irect ions and the young woman was m arooned in the top of

the tree. She looked down at the ground now far below her and thought, " Ho w

shall I leave this place now?" and she cried. That night she slept. In the morn

ing she awoke and found that someone had built a fireplace and a s mall house.

In this house she lived. At night while she slept, someone had fetched firewood

and w ith th is she made a f i re.

She lived in this manner in the little house in the hagenamo treetop and

presently she became pregnant. She continued to live in this manner, and then

she bore a son. She gave birth to this child in a small confinement hut that

someone had built for her. The unseen provider also began to bring food for

the smal l in fant boy as wel l as the mother . When the chi ld grew up to be atoddler, one night the woman merely pretended to be asleep. Waiting there in

the dark, a man arr ived and held the chi ld . The woman quickly arose and

grabbed the man's wrist. He said to the woman, "Release me," but she refused.

Final ly, the man said to her , "The

ka

buru who trapped you here is marr ied

to your husband. But here near this tree where you live, they will soon come

to cut down a sago palm. You must make a length of

hagenamo

rope and tie

one end onto the middle of the sago frond. In th is m anner, you may pul l your

sel f and your chi ld onto the top of the palm. When they come to cut down the

p a l m , you can then jump off and return to the ground." The woman did as

the man instructed her, and with the aid of the rope she and her child pulled

themselves onto the sago palm.

Th e ka buru and her husband arrived to set up the sago-processing equip

ment. Whi le the

ka

buru

erected the washing trough, the man began to chopdown the palm. When i t

fe l l ,

he went toward the top to remove the fronds and

gave a cry of surpr ise when he saw his other wife si t t ing there with a chi ld .

Th e ka buru heard h is exclamation and cal led out to h im , "Wh at is i t?" " No ,"

he replied. "Some wasps have stung me." The

ka

buru asked suspiciously,

"You haven' t found another woman perhaps?" The m an meanwhi le looked at

his long-abandoned wife and was fil led with shame. He brought her over to

where the

ka buru

was making sago and the two women continued working

together. They all returned when the task was done and lived together.

The two women began making a garden together , but the ka buru wou ld

constantly shift the boundary marker between her ground and the younger co-

wife 's groun d, making her own bigger. The younger wom an repeatedly moved

the marker back to its proper place and the two eventually fought. The hus

band discovered their quarrel and blaming the younger wife, hit her on the

Tropical Semiotics I n j

head wit h a st ick, draw ing b loo d. The young wom an became very d isconsolate

and remembered the words of her treetop husband: "Whi le you l ive with your

husband on the ear th, I wi l l be around. I f he mistreats you, cal l out to me, I

wi l l be f lying in the sky above." For he was real ly a hornbi l l and h is name was

Ayayawego or Yiakamuna. Now the young woman cal led out to h im, "Ayaya-

wego, Yiakamuna, come fetch me " There she waited and she heard the cry

of the hornbi l l . I t approached and grabbed the woman by her hair and pul led

her up a long with her chi ld . They then returned to their treetop home. The

overwrought husband cr ied, "Come back, wife " But in vain. At the same

t i me ,

t he

k a buru

turned into a cassowary and crying "h oahoa," she depar ted.

That is a l l .

Any ma tu re Fo i pe rson hear ing a rec i ta t ion o f th is s to ry wou ld b r ing to the

act of in terpretat ion a ser ies of col lect ive understandings, expressions, categor i

za t ions, and me taphors wh ic h do no t need to be exp l i c i t l y s ta ted in the na r ra t i ve .

In the case at hand, these presupposit ions might include: ( i ) the pr incip le that

provid ing nour ishment for a chi ld is an essentia l par t of being a parent, (z) the

metaphor o f ca l l ing co -wives "s is te rs" and the no rm tha t , despi te inev i tab le

t e n

sions,

they are supposed to cooperate in suppor t ing their husband,

(3 )

the ru le

that col lect ing leaves of the

hagenamo

tree is a task for female labor , whi le pro

duction of sago requires the intersexual cooperation of a mar i ta l couple,

(4 )

the

knowledge o f o the r fo lk ta les say ing tha t , o r ig ina l l y , the ho rnb i l l hawk l i ved on

land and the cassowary in the sky, un t i l the two exchanged pos i t ions, and (5)

the metaphor ical label ing of the hornbi l l and the cassowary as "cross-cousins."

G iven these assumpt ions, the s to ry i s obv ious ly a com menta ry o n the "d i f f i cu l t ies

o f po lygyny and i ts reso lu t ion th rough the separa te mar r iages o f wom en" (We i

ne r 1 9 8 8 : 1 6 3 ) .

Weiner 's formal analysis can be condensed in the fo l lowing l ist of substi tu

t ions (some of which I have expressed di f ferently for clar i ty) :

A: solitary female labor in the garden to collaborative female labor gathering

edible hagenamo leaves

B: wife puts on ogress's cloth ing

C: throu gh treachery, ogress replaces wif e, who moves from g round to treetop

D: terrestrial female treachery replaced by arboreal male nurturance

E: wif e, who ascended on hagenamo tree, descends on sago p alm

F: terrestrial husband replaces arboreal husband; female cooperation replaces

r ivalry

Subst i tu t ion F re tu rns the p lo t to the o r ig ina l s i tua t ion , wh ich has been s ign i f i

cantly transformed: whereas at the beginning the ogress, though cal l ing the

young woman 'sister , ' tr ies to steal her husband, at F the two women f ind them

selves in the re lat ion of co-wives.

Although up to th is point only hal f of the story has been segmented, i t is

possib le to subject the method to a provisional evaluation by seeing i f these sub-



8 I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes

sti tu t ions fu l f i l l the requirement that they a l ternate between the conventional,

co l lec t i ve , fac i l ita t ing moda l i ty and the innova t ive, ind iv id ua l , mo t iv a t ing m oda l

i ty. What is immediate ly str iking is that two h ighly par t icu lar , clever , even mag

ical acts in the story, the ogress's stranding the woman up in the tree in order to

steal her husband (C) and the arboreal male 's clever p lan to repay th is tr ickery

by having the woman descend by the very sago palm the ogress and her new

husband are cutt ing down (E) , are p laced in the faci l i t ing modal i ty. Consider ing

the fact that these two acts are per formed by the two metaphor ical personae in

the story ( the ogress is a cassowary and the arboreal male is a hornbi l l ) , th is

label ing is even more puzzl ing. Fur thermore, the narrat ive i tse l f provides an im

por tant clue that these are the operant, paral le l magical moments: after each

event, the person being duped by the tr ickery th inks he or she hears something

being said (perhaps a magical spell?) and each time is reassured (falsely) that

noth ing is amiss: "Some bi t ing ants have stung me" and "Some wasps have stung

m e" (cf. R. Bauman 1 9 8 6 : 9 7 ) . What is equal ly strange is that the two substi tu

t ions which best mir ror conventional norms of Foi socia l i ty, the provisioning of

the woman by her arboreal husband who bui lds a f i re, a house, and a b ir th hut

and nur tures the woman's chi ld (D) and the return to cooperative labor by co-

wives (F) , are both l isted as motivating modal i t ies. These problems should be

suff icient to ra ise suspicions, especia l ly in l ight of Wagner 's pr incip le, ci ted

above, that an interpretat ion must have rappor t with the sense of the ta le.

Nevertheless, Weiner ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 6 5 ) c la ims tha t h is iden t i f i ca t ion o f the two

classes of substi tu t ions is proper : "The faci l i ta t ing modal i ty represented by sub

st i tu t ions ACE deta i l the transformations in the re lat ionship between the two

women,

whi le the motivating modal i ty represented by substi tu t ions BDF deta i l

their competi t ive re lat ionship to husbands, impel l ing their assumption of a co-

wife re lat ionship." Again, ser ious problems ar ise. First, i t is not clear what these

two sets of condit ions have to do with the re lat ionship between conventional and

innovating d imensions of symbol izat ion, which are by defin i t ion the cr i ter ia for

identi fying the faci l i ta t ing and motivating modal i t ies. Second, i f anyth ing serves

as a metaphor for the transformation in the re lat ionship between the wife and

the ogress i t is the act of switching cloth ing (B) , but th is is l isted in the opposite

modal i ty; and i f anyth ing serves as a metaphor for the competi t ive r iva lry these

two women have in re lat ionsh ip to the man i t is the ogress's steal ing the wom an's

husband (C) , which is a lso l isted in the opposite modal i ty.

The next phase of Weiner 's analysis involves the demo nstrat ion that the sec

ond ha lf o f the p lo t fo rms an inver ted t r iang le in wh ic h fac i l i ta t ing and mo t iva

t ing modal i t ies are subject to point-by-point reversals:

D-inverted: rejoins husband (obviating bond with arboreal husband)

C-inverted: co-wives cooperate gardening (obviating treacherous collecting tree

leaves)


B-inverted: ogress appropriates land (obviating exchange of clothing as personal

identities)

A- inver ted: f ight ing between co-wives (obviat ing sol idary cooperation)

F- inver ted: young woman cal ls hornbi l l in sky (obviat ing return to ter restr ia l

husband)

E-inverted: rescued to arboreal home (obviating descent to terrestrial home)

Al though i t i s no t pa r t o f the fo rma l subst i tu t iona l ana lys is , We ine r po in ts ou t

that the end of the story is to be interpreted as effect ing not only the change of

the ogress into a cassowary (expl ici t in the narrat ive) but a lso the change of the

young wom an in to a ho rnb i l l (no t exp ressed in the na r ra t i ve ) . These obv ious m e t

aphor ical transformations are not, however , the crucia l points in Weiner 's ac

count, which insists that the second half of the ta le involves the transformation

of the mar i ta l destin ies of the two women, whereas the f i rst hal f involves the

t ransfo rma t ion o f the re la t ionsh ip be tween the women f rom coopera t i ve "quas i -

so ro ral iden t i f i ca t ion " to r i va ls and f ina l l y to ( tempo ra r i l y ) coopera t i ve co -wives.

I have not been able to determine how the substi tu t ions in the second half are

examples of inversions of the faci l i ta t ing/motivational modal i t ies of the f i rst hal f .

Bu t more impo r tan t —and a po in t no t c lea rly a r t i cu la ted by We in e r—i t i s ev iden t

that these latter substi tu t ions have a d i f ferent semiotic status than the substi tu

t ions in the f i rst hal f . In the f i rst hal f , the two poles of each of the substi tu t ions

(A through F) are establ ished at the point of the substi tu t ion i tse l f (e.g., chang ing

c l o t h i n g ,

mov ing f rom t reetop to g roun d , e tc . ) ; in the second ha l f , the two po les

of the substi tu t ion exist in d i f ferent halves of the narrat ive. That is, i t is not so

much tha t the subst i tu t ions in the second ha l f o f the s to ry (D- inve r ted th rough

E- inver ted) are formal inversions of counterpar t substi tu t ions in the f i rst hal f ;

rather , the second-half points supply one pole of a d iscourse- internal trope, the

other pole being a point in the f i rst hal f o f the narrat ive. In th is way, the narrat ive

turns back upon i tse l f in order to harness enough rhetor ica l energy to accompl ish

the magical transformations descr ibed and impl ied at the end.

This observation does match the sense of the text, which clear ly begins an

asymmetr ica l r epe t i t ion a t the moment when the co -wives go ou t ga rden ing to

gether (recal l that the story opens with the sol i tary young woman on her way to

garden) . This suggests that the second group of substi tu t ions does not star t in

ver t ing at D, as Weiner cla ims; rather , i t recapitu lates the narrat ive from the be

ginning in a ser ies of obvious paral le l isms:

First Hal f Second Hal f

solitary female gardening

trickery of ogress

ogress hits tree so woman will die

co-wives gardening

scheming of c o-wife

husband hi ts wife, drawing b lood



izo

I

Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes

ogress calls to wom an: "I am wom an cal ls to future husband:

going to marry your husband" "come rescue me"

wom an and child descend by rope wom an and child ascend to treetop

to sago palm by hair

wom an l iving as hornbi l l returns co-w ife transformed into casso-

to be human spouse wary

husband has tw o wives husband has no wives

This pattern of inver ted paral le l isms can be found in many of the

tuni

presented

in

Th e Heart of the Pearl Shell,

and i t is unfor tunate that Weiner 's emphasis on

the a l ternation of faci l i ta t ing and motivating modal i t ies h ides th is structure.

The moral lessons of the story seem clear : i f in myth ogresses turn out to be

co-wives, in real l i fe co-wives tend to be ogresses; i f in myth cassowar ies nur ture

a wom an and her chi ld up in th e trees, in real l i fe husbands better be out h unti ng

cassowar ies to feed their famil ies; i f in myth a man can try to be marr ied to

creatures as symbol ica l ly opposed as a hornbi l l and a cassowary, in real l i fe a

man m ar r ied to such con t rar ies i s l i kely to end up w i th no wives a t a l l—just l i ke

i n t h e m y t h

Foi Cultural Semiotics

By standing back from these cr i t icisms of the deta i ls of Wagner 's obviat ional

method i t is st i l l possib le to appreciate at a more general level Weiner 's in terpre

tat ion of the genius of tuni in re lat ion to other semiotic construct ions of Foi

cu l

t u r e ,

including magical spel ls (kusa) and exchange r i tuals. Magical spel ls are

f ixed metaphor ical formulae the utterance of which transfers power from

l an

guage i tse l f to some object or act ivi ty. Wil l iams's

( 1 9 7 7 : 2 4 6 )

character izat ion is

remarkable g iven the fact that i t was wr i t ten in the ear ly

1 9 4 0 s ,

p r io r to the

spread of semiotic techniques into anthropology:

It is pl ain, then, th at the spell in essence consists in a statement, a setting f ort h,

of the hoped-for result as if it were sure to happen; but in so far as this is a

plain statement it seems very doubtful if anyone would be prepared to call it

magic. It is in a certain round-aboutness that the spell finds its characteristic

magical value. The component factors in the situation are represented by sym

bols—in the manual r i te by natura l symbols or symbol ic act ions; in the spel l

by verbal symbols, substi tu tive words. I t w ould be a thesis wor th propounding

that magic in th is verbal guise was simply metaphor w ith a purpose. The sym

bol used is something which the magic-maker desires to emulate, to copy, to

reproduce in act ion or being; i t is a substitute on a large scale, or in some more

potent sense, for the actuality of the moment. He wishes things to turn out

that way, so he imagines, makes believe that they do.

For example, pr ior to leaving h is house to hunt marsupia ls, a hunter pronounces

a spel l over red leaves used in th is act ivi ty (Weiner

1 9 8 8 : 1 3 0 ) :

Tropical Semiotics I I Z I

I am chewing the leg, the ta i l o f the dark marsupia l

I am c hewing the leg, the ta i l o f the igini cassowary

I am chewing the leg, the ta i l o f tree kangaroo

I am chewing the leg, [long list of desired species]

Perhaps because the closing l ine is omitted, th is spel l does not i l lustrate the asym

metry found in other Foi spel ls (Si lverste in 1 9 8 1 b ) . W i l l i a m s ( 1 9 7 7 : 3 2 5 , n . 2 1 )

prov ides an exce l len t examp le , the spe l l assoc ia ted wi th the impor tan t myth o f

the or ig in of pear l shel l va luables. In order to magical ly acquire pear l shel ls, the

chanter reci tes:

furubu tree I desire (in my liver)

konjuguri tree I desire

fogabu

bird I desire

ware bird I desire

aba

bird I desire

fifi tree I desire

tugu tree I desire

Kobira Piwi I desire

The repeti t ion of conjo ined classes of objects ( trees and b irds) shar ing the red

qual i ty thought to resemble the h ighly pr ized color of pear l shel ls culminates in

the utterance of the unique, secret name of the mythic character responsib le for

the introduction of these valuables.

Spel ls are pr ivate ly owned, purchased as commodit ies, and reta in a f ixed

l i n

gu is t i c fo rm; though c lea r ly t r op ic , they a re ins tances o f co l lec t i v iz ing symbo l

i za t ion .

Weiner

( 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 )

points out a systematic opposit ion between magical

spel ls and my th ic ta les ( though the fo r ce o f the compar ison is du l led by awk war d

wo r d i n g ) :

The re lat ion between myths [read magical spells] and their associated magic

spells [read myths] is a good example of the relative distinction between

co l

lect ivizing and d i f ferentiat ing modes of symbo l izat ion, and hence between se

mantic (structura l) and tropic (obviat ional) analysis Whi l e both rest on the

force of tropic construct ion for their effect iveness, myth and magic occupy op

posed discursive contexts. Myths are above all else public narration; the long-

house is the most common and perhaps only socially approved setting for their

tel l ing.

A magic spel l , on the other hand, is individual pro per ty, and spoken to

no other person, except in the act of its transfer for payment, like any other

valuable. . . . The magic spell focuses on the deliberate articulation of a simi

larity; it is a collectivizing trope, stressing the resemblances between the two

elements that form the point of transfer of a specific capacity or power. One

might say that magic is the Foi's own form of structura l analysis, drawing s im

i larities between putatively distinct domains, articulating metaphor in its

co l

lect ivizing mode and, in addit ion, having the function of transferr ing or

focusing power between those domains. The myth, by contrast, achieves its

1 2 2 I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Semiotic Processes




moral force by differentiating a sequence of tropes from a conventional image

of ordinary social discourse, revealing the conventional nature of this image

itself, indeed, recreating it by a particular innovation or individual perspective

on convention.

T h u s ,

m agical spel ls, though secretly held, re ly on col lect ive ly shared conventions

for their effect iveness; myths, on the other hand, though publ icly reci ted, are

I creative products of individual inventiveness. This is one p lace where the danger

o f We ine r ' s con f la t ion o f "co l lec t i v iz ing " symbo l iza t ion and Durkhe imian

" c o l

lect ivi ty" manifests i tse l f : spel ls are "col lect ivizing" as semiotic forms yet

p r i

va te ly he ld as cu l tu ra l ob jec ts , wh i le myths a re "d i f fe ren t ia t ing " semio t i c fo rms

yet col lect ive ly shared cul tura l objects.

Fur thermore, whereas magical spel ls generate sets of metaphor ical equiva

lences,

myths are free to d i f ferentiate cul tura l conventions by p lacing into fresh,

tropic juxtaposit ion Foi ro les and categor ies that, in socia l l i fe , would forever

rema in con t rad ic to ry , pa radox ica l , o r incompa t ib le ; and in do ing so myths "p re

sent such contradict ions in terms of images not g iven by the conventions of nor

mative socia l process and language" (Weiner

1 9 8 8 : 2 8 7 ) .

The ta les do not offer

"so lu t ions " so much as suggest the f ie ld o f "p lay" : na r ra t i ve f low can accomp l ish

in a moment of storyte l l ing what socia l exchanges spend generations working out

(e.g., the creation of agnatic l ineal i ty out of female reproductive power) and can

place in the same syntagmatic context opposit ions which are normal ly kept con-

textual ly separate (e.g., aname kobora [pork/shel l ] exchanges and aff inal ex-

] changes) . Final ly, th is freedom of composit ional innovation is matched by a free

do m from contextual enta i lment (Si lverste in 1 9 9 2 ) : whereas spells are uttered

only w hen m agic power is being del ivered or wh en the spells as objects are being

purchased, ta les are to ld in the most neutra l socia l sett ing possib le, in the after -

d inner re laxation of the longhouse. Moral ta les are, as Weiner correct ly argues,

obviat ional devices because they simultaneously metaphor ize cul tura l norms and

render these same norms apparent.

Wagner and Weiner use the d ia lect ica l d ist inct ion between col lect ivizing,

conven t iona l -N sym bo l izat ion and d i f fe ren t ia t ing , t r op ic symbo l iza t ion in th ree

con texts :

( 1 )

as a g lobal typological opposit ion between Western societ ies and

tr ibal cu l tures such as the Dar ib i and the Foi ( implying a reversal in the valuation

o f " a r t i f i c i a l " a n d " i n n a t e " cu l t u r a l f o r m s ) , ( 2) as a contrast between the closure

and the openness of local semiotic constructs ( the d ist inct ion between Foi mag

ical spells and moral tales), and

(3 )

as a l ternative poles in s equentia l m etaphor ical

substi tu t ions with in the texts of a d iscursive genre ( the motivating and faci l i ta t

ing modal i t ies of socia l exchanges and stor ies) .

5

I have voiced doubts about the

value of the g lobal typology argument and the sequentia l a l ternation argument;

the former seems to be a naive var iant of the theoretica l ly vacuous "great d ivide"

mode l o f the wor ld ' s cu l tu res (Goody 1 9 7 7 ) , and the latter does not seem ade-

quate e i ther to the narrat ive data themselves or to the indigenous interpret ive

models (Foster

1 9 8 9 : 1 5 4 ) .

I am, however , in t r igued by the midd le hypo thes is

tha t , w i th in a g iven cu l tu re , semio t ic const ructs can be p laced a long a con t inu um

in te rms o f ce r ta in fo rm- funct ion co r respondences. Th is ana ly t i ca l focus cou ld

h igh l igh t the connect ions be tween the obv ia t iona l me thod and o the r semio t i c

proposals, such as Bakhtin 's

( 1 9 8 1 )

con t rast be tween monog loss ic poe t r y and

heteroglossic novels in European l i terature an d h is analysis

( 1 9 6 8 )

o f d ia log ica l l y

l inked layers of the petr i f ied cler ica l cu l ture and the carnivalesque universe of

popu la r laugh te r in the late Midd le Ag es,

6

Turner 's

( 1 9 6 9 )

descr ip t ions o f s t ruc

tu ra l and an t i - s t ruc tu ra l moments in Ndembu soc ia l l i fe , and Boon 's

( 1 9 8 2 ,

1 9 8 4 : 1 9 9 )

ref lect ions on monastic and ludic or parodie stra ins in Bal inese

c u l

tu ra l symbo l ism.

Final ly, Wagner and Weiner both provide an interesting chal lenge to the by- I

now no rma l assumpt ion tha t the powers- tha t -be in a soc ie ty leg i t im ize the i r

power by increasing the systematici ty of the symbol ic order , often to the degree

tha t i ts ve ry a r t i f i c ia l i ty i s fo rgo t ten , espec ia l l y by those who canno t b reak ou t

o f the reg imen t ing au tho r i ty o f a dominan t wor ldv iew. As Bourd ieu

( 1 9 7 9 : 8 0 )

pu ts i t :

The different classes and class fractions are engaged in a specifically symbolic

struggle to impose the defin i t ion of the socia l wor ld that is most consistent

with their interests; the field of ideological positions reproduces the field of

social positions, in a transfigured form. They may pursue this struggle either

direct ly, in the symbol ic confl icts of d ai ly l i fe , or vicar iously, through the strug

gle between the specialists of symbolic production (full-time producers), for the

monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence, i.e., the power to impose (and even

inculcate) instruments of knowledge and expression (taxonomies) of social re

a l i ty, which are arb i trary but not recognized as such.

Figurative symbol izat ion, on the other hand, remains the one arena of cul tura l

oppos i t ion , a poss ib i l it y fo r au then t ic coun te rcu l tu ra l o r r evo lu t iona ry a l te r i ty by

which subordinate voices can be heard in the d iverse languages of inversion,

humor , pa rody, and cr i t i c i s m. Bu t Wagner and We ine r h in t a t ano the r poss ib i l i t y :

societ ies in which "the revelat ion of socia l power must necessar i ly involve the

nu l l i f i ca t ion , o r obv ia t ion , o f conven t iona l soc ia l mean ings" (Wagner

1 9 8 6 3 : 2 1 7 ) . Semiotic creativi ty, according to th is idea, is not pr imar i ly the ref

uge of antistructura l socia l categor ies ( the mystics, matr i la tera ls, and mummers

of Turner ian comparative symbology) ; rather , i t is the power to recontextual ize

or ref igure exist ing cul tura l categor ies so that the force of cosmic or sexual en

e rgy i s constan t ly channe led in to the " f low" o f soc ia l r e la t ions. Th is i s no t to

deny that metaphor ic innovation often takes the form of aesthetic vision in which

the ar t ists " invoke and compel the power that 'new' meanings represent through

the creative d isplacement of 'g iven' meanings" (Wagner

1 9 7 2 : 1 7 1 ) .

I t is the rec-

I Z4

I

Comparative Perspectives on Complex Semiotic Processes



ognit ion that such creativi ty l ies at the very hear t and not at the margins of "so

cia l i ty." In some societ ies, then, power might be best viewed as the harnessing

of forces through innovative semiotic tropes rather than as the manipulat ion of

cul tura l conventions by d i f ferentiated socia l h ierarchies (J. F. MacCannel l

1 9 8 5 : 4 5 2 ;

Wagner

1 9 8 3 : 4 ) .

6

The Semiotic Regimentation of

Social Life

Social Action and Semiotic Text

RECENT INTERDISCIPLINARY WORK in the socia l sciences and humanit ies em

p loy ing semio t i c concep ts and me thods, Social Semiotics as Praxis by Paul J .

T h i

bau l t ( 1 9 9 1 ) being an exemplary case, has benefi ted greatly from the real izat ion

r

~j[

that the analysis of cul tura l ly consti tu ted sign systems is doubly grounded in con-

texts

o f socia l act ion. First, many kinds of semiosis engage indexical modes of

meaningfu lness and, consequently, the work of analysis requires d iscover ing c o n

textual parameters that are involved e i ther on an ad hoc basis or as a matter of

systematic regular i ty. Since these indexical parameters themselves par take of the

concrete" real it ies of

space,

t ime , and ma t te r , and s ince the token occu r rence o f

indexical sign types requires physical ly manifested, temporal ly exper ienceable

sign vehicles, the operation of indexicals permits no absolute d isjunction between

mean ing fu l and ma te r ia l wo r lds . As Th ibau l t ( 1 9 9 1 : 7 ) p u t s i t : "T h u s , t e x t u a l

p roduct ions,

the ir ,|<3ntextualizations,

and the socia l agent/d iscursive subject re- r^

lat ions these produce are*always immanent in some p^terned^transactions of/

ma t te r , ene rgy, and in fo rma t ion . " Th is po s i t ion , ca l led "neomate r ia l i sm" by T h i - )

bau l t , doeFnoraTa l l imp ly tha t the systemat ic i ty o f cu l tu ra l s ign systems is de

termined by a ref lect ionist representat ion of nonsemiotic referents—though such

a logic of referentia l correspondence does character ize cer ta in ef

/?Hosemiotic

pe r

spectives, such as the rel ig ious wo r ldv iew o f the Ch r is t ian M idd le Ages and the

"copy theo ry" in modern Weste rn ep is temo logy/The po in t i s s imp ly tha t index i -

ca l i ty cons is ts o f the semio t i c con textua l i za t ion o f the "p red iscu rs ive " wor laX

Second,

semiotic analyses and subsequent abstract theor izing are forms of

socia l act ion and, as such, not only employ l inguist ic codes of expression but a lso

a re subject to ins t i tu t iona l const rain ts as in any "d isc ip l ina ry" d iscou rse:

Theory must become par t of praxis and praxis par t of theory. Cr i t ica l socia l

semiotics must ar t icu late i ts own re lat ions to and functions in the meaning

making practices of which i t is a par t. . . . Al l theor ies, however , inevi tably take

part in the play of praxis, enacting either the stabilizing social discourse

th rough w h ich the system o f d is junct ions i s ma in tained o r the po ten t ia l l y

destabilizing discourses that resist and potentially alter these. (Thibault

1 9 9 1 : 2 4 3 - 4 4 )

iz

5

iz6

I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Semiotic Processes

The

Semiotic Regimentation

of Social

Life

I

Z 7



Thibault captures these two axes of contextualization in the title phrase "social

semiotics as praxis," which implies a sensitivity both to the pragmatic character

of social codes and to institutional embeddedness of modes of theoretical reflec

t i on .

Parallel to this complementarity of real-space/time contextualization and in

stitutional contextualization is a second realization witnessed in recent semiotic

scholarship, namely, that the distinction of levels between object language and

metalanguage pertains not just in obvious cases where, for example, a relatively

detached theoretical discourse refers to the operation of signs in social contexts

/" bu t also in the realm of social action, much of whi ch, as Balchtin ( 1 9 8 1 : 3 3 8 ,

1 98 6 : 1 0 3 )

and Geertz ( 1973 : 1 5 ) tirelessly observe, involves "talk about talk"

or "interpretations of interpretations" (see Chapter 4 ) . No semiotic analysis can

claim to be-adequate-wfithout -j^ cognit ion of these multi ple levels of semiosis,

whether

intertextual or hermeneutjcal, as part of the explanation of semiotic the

ory. While~;~äs Taylor ( 1985 : 1 1 7) so forcefully argues, it would be a gross error

merely to accept as a full analytical account the metasemiotic expressions of a

text or an action, this meta^-leyel potential must always be itself accounted for in

a systematic rather than in an ad hoc fashion. The existence of metasemiotic

understanding in the social,collectivity is never a matter of complete agreement

by social actors, since the ability to create accepted meta-level discourse is a key

to the pti wer^ bf dominant versus "mu ted" groups (Ardener 1 9 7 5 : 2 z ;

Goldschläger i 9 8 z : i 3 ) . And t he "semiosphere," to use Lotman' s t erm, of a

given culture or cultural era can also be characterized by the relative degree of

metasemiotic strength in the center or core of the tradition:

As a result, in the centre of the cultural space, sections of the semiosphere

aspiring to the level of self-description become rigidly organized and self-reg

ulating.

But at the same time they lose dynamism and having once exhausted

their reserve of indeterminancy they became inflexible and incapable of further

development. On the periphery—and the further one goes from the centre, the

more noticeable this becomes—the relationship between semiotic practice and

the norms imposed on it becomes ever more strained. Texts generated in ac

cordance with these norms hang in the air, without any real semiotic context;

while organic creations, born of the actual semiotic milieu, come into conflict

with the artificial norms. (Lotman 1990:134)

Not all texts or actions, however, contain in themselves the stipulated rules for

interpreting meanings, so the metasemioticj eyeljieeds to be, additionally , sought

- — i n general ideological assumpüons\his joncaljy transmitted in each culture, that

transcend paftîcûTâr events or utterances. As Thibaul t (1991:233—34) observes:

Texts do not tell us how to read them, nor are meanings simply contained "i n"

texts, waiting for the reader to extract them during a purportedly asocial read

ing process. Textual meanings are made in and through specific socially and

historically contingent meaning making practices, which enact specific systems

i r

of foregrounded meaning relations. Meaning making practices construct and I

index both local and global relations of equivalence, contrast, generality, and J

specificity in the part ial hierarchies of thematic and actional resources in the /

social semiotic.

Few would take exception to these two general points, but Thibault goes

further in specifying several more axioms that should meet with equally enthu

siastic approval. As enacted social practices, cultural semiosis usually takes place

neither in the condition of an isolated sign (along the axis of semantic meaning-

fulness Saussure

[ 1959 : 1 14 ]

called "signification") nor in the condition of

a

fully

enacted code, the completeness of which is only a matter of potentiality and the

coherence of which a matter of virtuality. Rather, action and discourse occur in

realizations of "texts," a term which refers to middle-order Semiotic forms, be

tween signs and codes. From a semiotic point of view, texts are type-level dis

cursive regularities, in whatever medium of expression (contra Harris

1 9 8 4 ) ,

the

meanings of which involve conventions of organization beyond that of their com

ponent signs (see Hanks

1 9 8 9 ) .

Texts.^when contextually realized, encounter

each other in social li fe, which can thus be seen as an Tritërfëx tual f iel d—no t only

because texts refer to each^mef

"burälSö

~'becausr materially embodied texts are

items jof exchange, negotiation, and valuation. And texts are products of so ci al ]

actors if f

:

nonrand om ways, such that a correlation exists between tfre social po- ;

sitions of actors and the discursive fields of intertextuality. - J

Next, like Foucault (1978:97, 1 9 8 0 ) , Bourdieu ( 1 9 8 4 ) , and others, Thibault

stresses the close connection between social action as the realization o f positioned

texts and local power relations, in its many dimensions. I think it is useful to

further conceptualize semio tjcj jower along distinct dimensions of semiosis. At

the level of codes, power involves the delimitation of potentially meaningful ut

terances and the correlated degrees of awareness, misperception, and projection

channeled by these form-function regularities. As Jakobson (1985) points out,

the grammatical codes of language condition what must be conveyed, not what

can be conveyed. This accounts for the Whorfian dimension of "semiotic medi

ation" (Mertz and Parmentier 1 9 8 5 ) . At the level of texts as organized discursive

types, power resides in the conventional understandings that control genre pro

duction, in the institutional stricturës that regulate the occurrence or nonoccur

rence of text tokens in particular contexts, and in the valuation of prototypical

or exemplary text-types in specific discursive fields. Textuali ty is the key to un

derstanding the creative or performative power of certain utterances and actions

such as ritual and oratory where the degree of formal o rganizati on foregrounds

the collective origination of the semiotic complex (Valeri 1 9 9 0 : 2 5 5 ) .

Beyond the levels of code and text,.,pQyyer can be further analyzed in terms

of tV e> Jcinds of metasemiotic "r egiment atio n^ to use a term introduced by Sil -

verstein ( 1 9 8 1 0 4 , 1 9 8 7 a , 1992) to label the sçmiotic process of stipulating, c o n

trolling, or de_fining the contextual, indexical, or pragmatic dimension of sign

iz8


The


of Social

Life I iz?



function in "discursive texts" by means of the construction of a relatively fixed

or coherent "interactional text." Although Silverstein intends the term to refer

primari ly to l inguistic phenomena, he suggests that i t can be extended to describe

the normative constraints on social behavior and understanding derivi ng f rom

sociopolitical

forcesTThe

first deals with varieties of institutionally enforced

metasemiotic, includ ing "metapragmatic" (Silverstein 1 9 7 6 ) , discourses that reg

ulate the range of cceEtabJe_interpretants of specific segments of social semiosis.

The enforced closure of the play of interprétants can be accomplished by explicit

metasemiotic framing (" the meaning of X is Y" ) or by constructing an impli cit

yet systemarfc representational wor ld that silences subaltern "voices." The second

i^^deological regimentation^ rriat is, metasemiotic discourse that creates a general,

relatively dëcontextualîzeci atmosphere of

perception ,Tcnowledge,

and expecta

tion about semiosis. Whereas institutional regimentation controls the interpret-

ability of specific discursive forms.in context, ideological regimentation operates

to create a presupposed cult ural theory of semiosis. ~ —

While all four of these ways that semiosis is inflected with power are dis

cussed by Thibault, though under different labels and with different theoretical

aims, his book offers few empirical examples that would illuminate them in terms

of the comparative study of social and historical processes. In his analyses of

passages from Nabokov's novels, Thibault privileges the realization of power re

lations in the realm of literary intertextuality, whereas a semiotically inclined e t h

nographer would focus more on patterns of social activity and collective experi

ence. I propose here to offer three

7

related

studies drawn from my current

research, each illustrating a different^dimension of semiotic regimentation. The

-eases have been arranged in a continuum, moving from the semiotic dimension

of explicit. typeTleyel

. textual i ty ,

to the implicit text-internal metasemiotic power

of sign complexes, to the ideological p rojection of fully^metasemiolic-d^scojurse.

In the following sections I discuss, first, the way ritual action and language in

many societies foreground the conventionality of systems of textual signfiers;

second, the way historical museums communicate to tourists about history but

also about how to interpret the historical signs contained within; and third, how

legal discourse about commercial advertising skews popular assumptions about

the general communicative function of advertising messages.

Context and Type in Ritual Performativity

My f irst example concerns the phenomenon ö^ nt uaj ^ vh ic h in many

c u l

tural traditions functions to change social relationships, convey divine powers,

cure diseases, or coerce natural forces. The argument will be that the high degree

of presupposed textuality of ritual forms is the key to this contextual power, a

position that can

best

be explained by using as a foil Tambiah's influential essay,

" A Performative Approach to Ritu al." Fundamental to Tambiah's argument is

his delineation of the "dual aspects of rituals

as

performances" ( 1 9 8 5 ^ 1 2 4 ) . On

the one hand, rituals ex hibi t "i nvariant and stereotyped sequences," whi le on the

other hand, their efficacy depends on socially anchored "variable features." He

describes ritual's "duplex existence" in terms of its being "an entity that sym

bolically and/or iconically represents the cosmos and at the same time indexically

legitimates and realizes social hierarchies"

( 1 9 8 5 b :

1 5 5 ) . I want to investigate

further this dualism of formalization and contextualization from an explicitly

semiotic point of view in order to explore the fundamental question of the source

of ritual power.

Rather than speak of "dualism," I prefer to think of these two dimensions

as a paradox, namely, that while the action and language of ritual often appear

highly structured and conventional, the powerful efficacy released by ritual is

narrowly channeled or "situationally patterned" (Turner 1 9 7 7 : 2 0 7 ; cf. Whee-

lock 1 9 8 2 ) . Rappaport ( 1 9 8 0 : 1 8 7 ) expresses this paradox as the reflexive rela

tionship between order and performance: "By participating in a ritual, the per

former becomes part of an order which is utterly dependent for its very existence

upon instances, such as his, of its performance."

Tambiah, along with almost everyone else who has written about the nature

of ritual, notices several cross-cultural features of ritual action, including segmen

tation (clear division into sequential parts), hierarchical organization (multiple

levels of embedded structures), and stereotypy (careful prescription on exact

repetition). We can condense these properties by saying that rituals have struc

tural properties, that is, they are cultural constructions with a high degree of

textuality. Ritual acts are not just patterned, they are "among the most perfectly

recurrent social events" (Rappaport 1 9 9 2 : 1 4 ) .

Of course, many cultural phenomena showing complex semiotic organiza

tion are structured. The architecture of a building, with four front pillars on the

first level, three pillars at the second level, two on the third level, and a single

cupola on top shows a triangular organization that is its syntagmatic structure.

But rituals are not just structured; they are "hyperstructured" in that these

c u l

tural forms literally call out: behold the structure

1

Compare this triangular ar

chitectural form with the Beaubourg museum in Paris, where the architect took

elements from the infrastructure—pipes, wiring, and other mechanical fea

tures—and put them on the outside of the building visible to the public, thus

reversing the "container" and the "contained" (Baudrillard 1 9 8 2 : 3 — 5 ) . There is

no way to look at this building without thinking: the "deep structure" and the

"surface struc ture" have been inverted, and, thus, to reflect on the nature of ar

chitectural form. Poetry, as Mukarovsky ( 1 9 7 7 b ) and Jakobson ( 1 9 8 7 ) demon

strate, is another example of a hyperstruct ured semiotic phenomenon. In contrast

to decorative orelegant language often found in political oratory, persuasive ad-

vertising" and fictionaTprose, the language of poetry, with its rhythmic pattern,

metrical verse structure, sound alliteration, and metaphorical sequence, calls at-

i}o I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Semiotic Processes

The Semiotic Regimentation of Social Life I 131



tendon to the "s t ruc tu re o f the l ingu is t i c s ign " (Muka fovsky i 9 7 7 b ) : 6 8 ) . Just

as great archi tecture is r ea l ly abou t a rch i tec tu ra l des ign , g reat poe t r y , acco rd in g

to these two theor ists, is about the structure of language. In a paral le l fashion,

r i tual can be interpreted as hyperstru cTïïfèïsocraTacïion, in wh ich segm entation,

h ierarchy, and stereotypy are not just conting ent aspects of per form ance but are

the means of cal l ing attention to the struct i i redness of act ion.

r \ The second aspect of r i tu al which generates the paradox noted above is that

Rituals are context specif ic. Rituals are often assigned to very restr icted temp oral

intervals: calendrical or seasonal r ites that take place at the passing of the New

Year, or when the Pleiades rise at sunset, or when the Tigris and the Euphrates

over f low their banks. In add it ion , r i tuals are prescr ibed for cer t a in p laces: on the

a l ta r wi th in the cen t ra l chamber o f Ezek ie l ' s imag ina ry temp le (J . Z . Smi th

1 9 8 7 : 6 2 — 6 3 ) ,

over the "domestic f i re" burning in the nor theast corner of the

house where Vedic texts say invisib le spir i ts dw el l (B . Smith

1 9 8 0 ) ,

or a long the

sightl ines of megal i th ic stones point ing to sunr ise at the equinox. Ritual ru les

alsosdefine the socia l ro les a l lowed to par t icipate in or take on assigned respon

sib i l i t ies for the per formance, and specify the pr ior condit ioning required for a l l

par t icipants. Only in i t ia tes knowledgeable of the sacred myth and pur i f ied by

batrnng can march a long the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis to par t icipate

in the "myster ies," where the main pr iest, torchbearer , and herald come from

specif ic ar istocrat ic famil ies (Burker t

1 9 8 7 : 3 7 ) .

For the Baruya of Papua New

Guinea, the master of male in i t ia t ion ceremonies, the contro l ler of powerfu l r i t

ual sacra, must come from the founding clan, a lso named Baruya, which repre

sents the society as a whole (Godelier

1 9 8 6 ) .

Mayan shamans cure their patients

by mainta in ing verbal deict ic l inkage with them throughout the r i tual d iscourse

( Ha n ks

1 9 9 0 : 2 4 0 ) .

Bu t the word "con textua l " can a lso be taken in a pe r fo r

mative sense, that r i tuajs chang e_gr jmo djf j^ j th^ ^ A col lege student

approved to undergo the r i te of fraternal in i t ia t ion cannot stay in the l ibrary; a

couple about to get marr ied must appear in person before a minister or magis

trate and witnesses must sign a document test i fying to their physical presence; a

Cathol ic pr iest del ivers a b lessing upon those in attendance and, in fact, only

upon those with in the arc of the cruci form hand gesture. The effect iveness of

r i tual does not usual ly extend beyond the spatia l and temporal contexts of the

occurrence of the actions, and when i t does the extension is carr ied by some

mate r ial veh ic le—wate r , s tones, re l i cs—eno p jv ed^Mb ê j ien t -wi th du ra t i ve sa

cred powers.

So the paradoxical d imensions of r i tual are, f i rst, excessive formal i ty and,

second,,

contex tual anch or ing. A t f i rst g lance these seem to be strange i f no t c o n

tradictory "thUfgy to put tog ether , since the formal pattern o f r i t ual ac t ion , l ike

the formal pattern of archi tecture and poetry, might suggest that r i tuals are re la

tively decontextualized in several related senses. First, r itual appears decontext-

ual ized in being "d istantiated" from the intentions of par t icipants, as in the me-

d ieva l doct r ine o f

opus operatum

( " the work accomp l ished") wh ich gua ran tees

the e f f i cacy o f the sacramen ts apa r t f r om the sp i r i tua l s tand ing o r in ten t iona l

state of the off iciant or recip ients or as in the operation of the Hawai ian temple

r i tua ls in wh ic h the au tho r i ty o f r i tua l o f f i c ia ls der ives f r om the superio r au th o r

i ty o f the r i tua l tex t (Vale r i

1 9 8 5 : 3 4 2 ) .

Th is imp l ies tha t the mean ing o f a r i tua l

is recoverable across the var iabi l i ty of par t icu lar contextual enactments.

Second,

r i tua l i s decon textua l i zed in be ing "decen te red , " tha t i s , f r eed f rom

the l im i ta t ions o f con textua l spec i f i ca t ion and re fe rence . High ly conven t iona l ,

ru le-governed per formances can transcend contextual" reference and be interpre

ted as referr ing to general rather than par t icu lar contexts. In many cases the de

nia l of referentia l speci f ici ty enables r i tuals to concentrate on reference to eternal

o r un ive rsa l t r u ths , in much the same way tha t , as Muka fovsky '

( 1 9 7 7 3 : 8 4 ^ )

argued^ th~e~aesthe t ic funct ion o f a work o f a r t i s f r eed f rom pa r t i cukr déno ta - ' ^

t ional value. There is a sense in which the hyperstructure of r i tual can be appre-

ciated outside the

actuaf

context of occurrence because i t d isplays a complete ly

sel f-conta ined conventional shape. At the recent consecration of the f i rst female

b ishop o f the

Episcopal

Church , the ce remony was taken ou t o f the Boston ca

thed ra l (wh ich i s , a f te r a l l , the p roper "sea t " o f the b ishop) and pu t in to a c iv ic

bu i ld ing in o rde r to hand le the crowds and med ia . Th is i s one o f the most h igh ly

s t ruc tu red r i tua l pe r fo rmances in the Ep iscopa l Church , and one in wh ich the

indexical or contextual features are h ighly evident—especia l ly the focal act of

" lay ing on hands" tha t phys ica l l y gua ran tees the h is to r ica l cha in o f con t igu i ty

from St. Peter to the present. But th is r i tual could be decentered and moved to a

nonrel ig ious environment precisely because of i ts power to overcome the l imita

t ions of a par t icu lar context. So th is sense of decontextual izat ion is evident in

the cha racte r o f r i tua l to su rv ive rad ica l spa t ia l d is loca t ion^ .

T h i r d ^ r i tua l i s decon textua l i zed by encourag ing a phenomeno log ica l

"b racke t ing^ o f the su r round ing soc ia l wo r ld and by creâ t lng lTco f ië ren t wor ld

wi th in the r i tua l sphere . In r i tua l t ime and space , mundane concerns a re sup

pressed and the universe for assigning truth-value is marked off as a "separate,

sel f-conta ined wor ld ru led exclusively by the comprehensive and exhaustive order

o f the r i tua l " (Heeste rman 1 9 8 5 : 3 ) . By replacing everyday socia l logic with a

specia l set of equivalences, r i tuals can make symbol ic asser t ions which cannot be

held up against the standards of mundaneff iuni is and goals—despite the fact that

r i tua ls may funct ion spec i f i ca l l y to leg i t ima te rea l po l i t i ca l power (Ke r tze r

1 9 8 8 : 5 1 ) . Alexander ( 1 9 8 6 ) argues that par t of the, dynamic of the Watergate

hear ings was that Congress constructed thç event as a^ptual rather than as a

purely pol i t ica l process, thus bracketing the question of personal motives, par t i

san strategies, and h istor ica l deta i ls.

F o u r t h ,

r i tu a l i s decon textua l i zed in be ing " se l f - r efe ren t ial . " In o the r w ords,

the hypers t ruc tu red componen ts o f r i tua l fo rm a ne twork o f mu tua l imp l i ca t ion

(each par t in the sequence is l inked to previous and subsequent par ts) and inter-

X

i) z

I


The of

Social



rial metareferenge (rules for ritual action, like liturgical rubrics, become part of

the structure of the ritual). The self-referentiality of ritual is also manifest in the

taxonomic relationship among different ritual sequences: a particular ritual is

taken to be asubspecies of aTfïorëHipmêratxategery (a minor sacrament vs. a

major sacrament) or else in systematic opposition to parallel ritual actions within

the same culture (male initiation vs. female initiation in Baruya; Luakini vs.

Makahiki rites in Hawaii) or to analogous rites in contradictory traditions (He

brew sacrifice vs. Canaanite sacrifice).

In semiotic terms, then, all these dimensions combine so that the prescribed

series of actions in ri tual is understood as a £t ype" fat her tha<q a "t oken," that

is, a systetfTof general conventional regularitiesfatrier thaffa sequence of c o n

crete,

"realized

instances/No one doubts that rituals occur as token instances; but

their hyperstructural self

-4eference

leads participants to look beyond the "event-

ness" of

r i t u a l ^ « o n * â n d

to concentrate on their formal textuality. In the terms

of the paradox: on the one hand, the power of ritual requires contextual enact

ment at the token level; four dimensions of this situational anchoring were spec

i f ied:

temporal sequence, spatial location, prescribed participant roles, and

c o n

textual effectiveness. On the other hand, the focus on form or structure implies

a decontextualized view of ritual in which a token performance demands that it

be viewed as a type of social action. This decontextualization was seen to be the

result of a combination of factors, including distantiation, decentering, bracket

ing , and self-referentiali ty. I want to suggest that this is an empir ical paradox,

and the trick is not to try to mediate it or avoid it but rather to see what the

paradox signals about the nature of rituals in many societies.

I think that the organization of Tambiah's argument does not make suffi

ciently clear how his theoretical approach solves the initi al paradox of the " du

plex" character of ritual. He is trying to account for ritual effectiveness in c o n

text , as in the Austinian sense of the word " gerfojrnative." And then he says that

rituals must be performed, that is, they must be instantiated as tokens or replicas

of general types of action. And then he observes that rituals have indexical sign

features, as opposed to sign phenomena which do not require any contextual

knowledge. So the three features are effective power, tokenness, indexicality. But

it seems that he has put the most difficult thing to explain, namely, effective

power, as the first step in the argument, using tokenness and indexicality as sup

plementary components of effectiveness. But if the question is asked: how are

rituals effective in context? then the features of tokenness and indexicality are

not in themselves sufficient to account for the power of ritual. We need to add

another feature, the notiqn of hyperstructure discussed above. Now, Tambiah

does in fact talk about hyperstructure, but he does not precisely show the the

oretical importance of it. The socially effective power of ritual performances in

context cannot be accounted for without noting the sejniotic contribution of the

highly .structured, conventional, rule-governed character oi.rit jual action. \

Semiotic Regimentation Life

As noted above, rituals are events in which the component signs are highly

indexical. But where does effective power come from? When the king of Babylon

comes out from the akitu building on the tenth day of the New Year festival to

marry his royal bride, they dress up like the god Marduk and the cosmic bride

(Black 1 9 8 1 ) . Their earthly marriage is an instance of a divine prototype or

m o d e l , and their human fertility is iconically understood as cosmic generativity.

The marriage ritual is collective, that is, involving the whole society (as we know

from Dürkheim, there is power emanating from the very sociality of ritual

events), but the presence of lots of people and the contextual anchoring of the

event cannot, in themselves, account for the power. Hyperstructure is the key to

t h i s , since ritual actions arejTojtjusnconventional, they are so conventionalized

that they highlight or call attention to the rules, that is, to th e

'pattern,

model, or

semiotic type whieh-the ritual action instantiates. And it is the CQsmological or

transcendent grounding of these cultural prototypes that is the ultimate source

of tne power oLri rnal t aj^ ojf erjy djmp se of a higher order of things" (Babcock

1 9 7 8 : 2 9 3 ) .

As Eliade ( 1 9 5 4 ) repeatSflyHstressHTan earthly marriage is an in

stance of a divine marriage; a liturgical performance is an instance of a divine

sacrifice; a New Year ri te is an instance of a cosmogonie event (Pallis

1 9 2 6 : 2 4 7 ) ;

the dismemberment of raw flesh of sacrificial victims is a repetition of the para

digmatic event when the infant Dionysus was torn to pieces (O'Flaherty

1 9 8 8 : 1 0 6 ) . (But El iade sometimes forgets to stress equally the other side of ri t

ual: power residing in cosmology cannot be realized as socially effective other

than in context-specific events.) The Mambi of East Timor believe that the e f f i

cacy of ritual depends on the continued and invariant observance of p

syjubeli cacti on started by the ancestors, whose role as the source of t he

(archetype)' (Traube 1 9 8 6 : 1 6 3 ) provides the motivation for their bein^

m"rTtuaI chants: " My mother di d not pass on some different th ing/My father d id

not hand down some altered thing/I follow in the footprint/I know the grass

track" (cf. Parmentier 1 9 8 7 3 : 1 3 2 — 3 5 ) .

But it is

3 n

illusion to think that the power comes

de

novo

out of the moment

of performance, despite the fact that participants in ritual events might feel that

this power emerges at that moment (cf. Boyer

1 9 9 0 : 7 9 - 9 0 ) .

A moment's event

is simply a token, but-ajitusl event is 3 token which is

a n

instance of 3 general

regularity, that is, ayPeircean "replicaJ that brings

into

context the legitimized

suthority, divine precedent, or mythological charter behind ^t ug X j c t io ri) One of£-

the results of ritual "repetition is thst the token q u a l i f yö f the action is lifted out

of the category of "sinsign," that is, a token sign without a corresponding gen

erative type, to be grasped as a replica, which is created by

cultural

rather than

natural semiosis. In this way, ri tual performance signals not just cultural conven

tions but^ nventionafîtyTtsêTÇ (Rappaport

1 9 7 9 : 1 9 4 ) .

And this, t hen, is the

function of the hyperstructure of ritual processes, since rituals call attention to

the existence of cult ural templates or predictive^. "Jj luejjr jnts" (Tambiah



136 I

Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes

* . . i i :

e 0 9



scr ibed in te rms o f the "F ive Corne rs tones o f F reedom": in teg r i ty o f the

i n d i

v i d u a l ,

responsib le leadership, sel f-government, individual l iber t ies, and equal i ty

o f oppor tun i ty . The tou r is t

is

.con tinua ll y reminded th a t e igh teen th -cen tu ry

W i l

l i amsburg was a pe r fec t examp le ' o f the ha rmon ious ming l ing o f d i f fe ren t soc ia l

c lasses: the Br i t i sh a r is tocracy, the loca l p lan te r e l i te , the "midd l ing so r t " o f

hard-working farmers and craftspersons, and the slaves—Indians, as we shal l see,

occupy an u t te r l y ou tcaste pos i t ion . And those members o f the commun i ty who

found themselves at the lower end of th is h ierarchy were, at least, engaged in the

p rocess o f " becom ing Am er icans. " The re i s , thus, an exp l i c i t l y const ructed iden

t i ty be tween the "me l t ing po t " p rocess o f modern mu l t ie thn ic Amer ica and an"

or ig inal coexistence of socia l d i f ferences under the aura of democratic ideals.

An d w h i le a t Co lon iaLWi l l iamsburg v is i tor s a re encouraged to use the exper ience

as a means to ^ reded ica te^ themse lves to t feè j t tans h is t o r ic a l ve r i t ies .

Wh a t the tou r is t ' s exper ience ) o f th is " ln nn ^ " n^ ë i ïm ' ' cons ists o f i s , how - ~ \ '

ever , qui te d i f ferent fror t l the off icia l or ienting ideology. The pervasive message

of the d iscourse, images, in terpret ive signs, and overal l si te organization taken as

;

,

an imp l i c i t semio t i c tex t i s tha t o f r ig id soc ia l "d is t inc t ion " (Bourd ieu 1 9 8 4 ) .

Not only do the costumed interpreters repeat the h ierarchy of ar istocracy, p lant

ers,

c ra f tsmen , and s laves, bu t even f ine r d is t inc t ions a re d rawn wi th in each o f

these categor ies: for example, between masters, journeymen, and apprentices,

df r \Z '

between ski l led and unski l led slave labor . This lesson is communicated largely

v

(

th rough the in te rp reta t ion o f ma te r ial ob jec ts . Fu rn i tu re i s d iv ided in to f ine , im - ^ f

,c >

"

por ted i tems and rough, local ly produced i tems; houses are evaluated in terms of

the presence or absence of mult ipurpose rooms; patterns of act ivi ty are separated

>p*w*

i n to le isu re (such as "po l i t i cs" ) and labo r (such as cra f t p roduct ion ) ; d i f fe ren t

terms of address are used to set off " ladies" and "gentlemen" from the rest of

the popu lace ; and d is t inc t s ty les o f c lo th ing mark f ine g rada t ions in the soc ia l

ladder (gentlemen's shoes are designed to be too t ight to actual ly walk in) . This

system o f d is t inc t ion , though r ig id , d id no t p roh ib i t m idd le - rank ing pe rsons

from hoping to cl imb up the socia l ladder : I a ttended an evening per formance of

"Keep ing the Best Company, " descr ibed as a d ramat iza t ion o f the "c lo th ing ,

manners , and d ive rs ions o f the gen t r y o f e igh teen th -cen tu ry V i rg in ia to wh ich

the midd l ing c lass asp i red . "

At the Gaol we were to ld that "upper class" people received b a i l ; deb to rs ,

middle-class women, and the insane were confined in not-so-uncomfor table spar

tan rooms ( " the on ly p lace in W i l l i amsburg wi th indoor p lumb ing") , wh i le cr im

inals from the lower classes—that is, real cr iminals—were bound in miserable

cel ls.

The to ur ist 's exper ience is that these last are the stereotypical or foc al cr im

inals,

a l though the gu ide d id no te tha t , in e igh teen th -cen tu ry W i l l i amsb urg , m ost

cr iminal cases involved the proper t ied

classes.

After leading us through these var

ious gradations of incarceration, the interpreter commented that, lucki ly, "today,

The Semiotic Regimentation of Social Life

L

137

But the "smal lness of [ i ts] wor ld" d id not h inder i ts eagerness to "receive the

latest fashions, to be in touch with the pol i te wor ld, and to enjoy the benefi ts of

a cul tured h igh society" ( Isaac 1 9 8 1 : 2 3 5 ) . A f te r the admin is t ra t i ve funct ions

moved fu r the r in land to Richm ond in

1 7 8 0 ,

the c i ty con t inued to be the locat ion

o f the Co l lege o f W i l l i am and Mar y and o f the Pub li c Hosp i ta l fo r the insane .

The contemporary tour ist si te is the result of f inancia l contr ibutions of John

D. Rockefe l ler , Jr . Star t ing in

1 9 2 6 ,

Rockefe l ler ar ranged for the purchase of

l a n d , the removal of n ineteenth- and twentieth-century structures, and the c o n

st ruct ion o r reconst ruct ion o f e igh teen th -cen tu ry bu i ld ings. Modern bu i ld ings

were added to accommoda te the tou ris t c row d , such as the Abby A ld r ic h Rocke

fe l le r Fo lk Ar t Cen te r , the DeWi t t Wa l lace Decora t i ve Ar ts Ga l le r y (se l f - p ro

cla imed as "one of the foremost col lect ions of Engl ish and Amer ican decorative

a r ts o f the 1 7 t h , 1 8 t h , and ear ly 1 9 t h cen tu r ies" [Cooper c i ted in Leone

1 9 8 7 : 4 ] ) ,

t h e "a wa r d - w i n n i n g " W i l l i a m sb u r g I n n , t h e W i l l i a m sb u r g L o d g e ,

Conference Center , and Auditor ium, and var ious reta i l stores, including one for

Co lon ia l W i l l i amsburg fu rn i tu re rep roduct ions. In sho r t , Co lon ia l W i l l i amsburg

o f fe rs a " to ta l h is to r i ca l env i ronmen t" (Fo r t ier 1 9 7 9 : 2 5 2 ) , i f no t a " to ta l soc ia l

order" (Wal lace 1 9 8 6 3 : 1 4 8 ) .

Today, Co lon ia l W i l l i amsbu rg i s an eno rmously popu la r tou r is t d est ina t ion ,

hosting over a mi l l ion visi tors per year ; and i t is an equal ly impor tant educational

and h is to r ica l ins t i tu t ion , wi th an ope rat ing budge t o f ove r $ 7 5 m i l l i on . I ts ho

tels,

restaurants, gol f course, and meeting rooms make i t su i table for a l l sor ts of

corporate, educational, and pol i t ica l conferences (such as the Summit of Indus

t r ia l i zed Na t ions in

1 9 8 3 ) .

I ts prominence is ref lected in the names of the men

serv ing as the Board o f Di rec to rs , wh ich inc luded in

1 9 8 5

the Cha i rman o f the

Board o f A T& T, the Sen io r V ice -Pres iden t o f I B M , the Pres ident o f the Roc ke

fe l ler Brothers Fund, the L ibrar ian of Congress, the Secretary of Education, an

Associate Justice of the Supreme Cour t, the President of the Universi ty of Vir

g in ia , the C.E.O. o f New York L i fe Insu rance Company, the C.E.O. o f Brooks

Bro the rs , and Dav id Br ink ley o f AB C News. p

The thesis I want to argue is that Colonia l Wil l iamsburg 's over t educational

and recreational functions^mask "à* power fu l cove r t fun ct ion o f r ep roduc ing and

legit imizing a system of socia l d ist inct ions in contemporary Amer ican society,

an d that"this4s accomp l ished by the p romot ion o f a i f deo logy o f sc ien t i f ic t r ans

parency that anchorsj>resent d ist inct ions in the colonia l past. From the moment

a tou r is t en ters the V is i to r Cen te r on the ou tsk i r ts o f the His to r ic A rea and v iews

the th i r ty - f i ve -minu te docudrama o r ien ta t ion f i lm Williamsburg—The Story

of

a Patriot,

Colonia l Wil l iamsburg procla ims i tse l f to be a story of freedom and

democracy and presents the tour ist exper ience as a "journey through history."

The reconstruct ion is said to represent not just a remarkably impor tant colonia l

c i ty bu t the ve ry b i r thp lace o f the " idea o f Amer ica . " Th is idea is fo rma l ly de -

i

)8

I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes




t imes have changed," meaning that horr id condit ions and arb i trary just ice no

longer character ize our penal system; a man next to me disagreed, mutter ing,

"I t 's a better system than we have now."

On ly a f ter v is i t ing a range o f d i f fe re j r ^ xh ib i t ions d id I Beg in to real i ze tha t ,

in ad diti on to th e[ pervasiveness of tHe enscriptiSr^ of differejhce at th e level of

manifest content, there was a subtler regimenting mecl ianism at work at the

"phenomenojogical" level of tour ist ic exper ience. The exhib i t ion si tes can be

loosely arranged in a h ierarchy of regimentation, using several in tersecting v a r i

ables,

i nc lud ing f inanc ia l ou t lay fo r admiss ion , re la t i ve res t r i c t ion o f v is i t ing

hours ,

d i f f icu l ty of access, r ig id i ty of in terpretat ive program, and comprehen

siveness of textual mater ia l provided. This phenomenological h ierarchy corre

sponds to the posi t ion on the h ierarchy of e ighteenth-century society instantiated

a t each exh ib i t ion .

The streets and lawns of the Histor ic Area are open to the walking publ ic

at a l l hours of the day and n ight and require no admission fee. One can, for th is

min imal level of engagement, see the outsides of bui ld ings , enjoy the gardens, and

ming le wi t h o the r tou r is ts . Hav ing t raveled a l l the way to Co lon ia l W i l l i am sburg ,

however , few w i l l fa i l to purchase one of three general admission passes: the Basic

Admiss ion , the more expens ive—though ta in ted wi th a loya l i s t labe l—Roya l

Governor 's Pass, and the st i l l more expensive val id- for -a-year Patr io t 's Pass. The

Basic Admission a l lows one to see the or ientat ion f i lm at the Visi tor Center , to

visi t var ious everyday si tes such as the Blacksmith, the Wigmaker , the Gunsmith,

and the Wheelwr ight, and to tour the (democratica l ly inexpensive) Capito l bui ld

i n g ; the Royal Governor 's Pass is good for a l l these p lus entry to the Governor 's

Palace and the Wal lace Gal lery; but only equipped with the Patr io t 's Pass can

you enter Car ter 's Grove Plantat ion or the Rockefe l ler mansion, Bassett Ha l l .

Addit ional specia l admission t ickets are required for specia l programs, f i lms, mu

sical concer ts, theatr ica l productions, lectures, seminars, and other act ivi t ies.

Tour ists with e i ther l imited t ime or specif ic in terests can a lso enter some of the

more popular exhib i ts such as the Governor 's Palace and Car ter 's Grove Planta

t ion by purchasing a Separate Ticket. There is, I understand, an addit ional Mu

seum Ticket, designed for those visi tors who want noth ing of h istor ica l recon

struct ion and desire only to see the formal gal ler ies and the Rockefe l ler

homestead, i tse l f housing a pr ivate col lect ion of Amer ican fo lk ar t. L ike the f ine

gradations in e ighteenth-century fashion, the t icketing system at Colonia l

W i l

l iamsburg requires carefu l study and practice.

The h ierarchical regiment ation of to ur ist ic exp er ience can a lso be seen in the

regulat ions st ipulat ing visi t ing hours and reservation requirements. The or ienta

t ion f i lm is shown continuously and t ickets may be obta ined moments before a

s h o w i n g .

Most of the craft bui ld ings are open al l day, though every other day—

requir ing the d i l igent tour ist to spend more than one day in local hote ls, restau

rants ,

and shops—without reservation and without the presence of a specia l in-

te rp re te r o the r than the cra f tspe rson wo rk in g the exh i b i t io n . Tou r is ts a re f r ee to

wander around, ta lk with the craftspersons, and stay for as long or as l i t t le as

they wan t . Domest ic houses a re s ta f fed by costumed in te rp re ters w ho in fo rm a l ly

assemble a smal l group of tour ists and guide the group around the house and

grounds; their d iscourse is conversational rather than scr ipted, and they do not

act the ro le of e ighteenth-century persons. The one-hour Patr io t Tour requires

advance reserva tions to jo in a g roup o f abou t tw en ty peop le , a l l wear ing d is t inc

t i ve badges, who a re led a round the c i ty on foo t and in bus by one tou r gu ide ,

whose mono tone rec i ta t ion va r ies l i t t l e f r om g roup to g roup .

In contrast, l ines form outside the Capito l and there is no possib i ly of visi t ing

th is s i te wi thou t de lay o r apa r t f r om a numer ica l l y l im i ted g roup . V is i to r s a re

accompanied at a l l t imes by an interpret ive guide who engages in scr ipted c o n

ve rsa t ions wi th costumed acto rs p lay ing e igh teen th -cen tu ry ro les . The Gov

ernor 's Palace is much l ike the Capito l , except that the l ines are longer and the

entry t icket is more expensive; a separate guide pamphlet is d istr ibuted indicating

the signi f icance of every room, descr ib ing the exper ience the tour ist is supposed

to have , and jus t i fy ing the imag ina t ive " l i v ing in te rp re ta t ion " o f the reconst ruc

t ion—a touchy po in t s ince the o r ig ina l bu i ld ing was dest royed in 1 7 8 1 and a l l

researchers had to go on was an image on a copper p late found in the Bodle ian

L i b r a r y a t O x f o r d .

St i l l h ighe r on the sca le o f r eg imen ta t ion and d is t inc t ion i s Car te r ' s Grove

Plantat ion, located on the James River about e ight mi les from the ci ty. To get

there one must have a pr ivate car or h ire a l imo. The Country Road i tse l f , de

scr ibed and m apped in a separate pamph let, is designed as a tour ist ic exper ienc e:

"You have se t o f f on a d r ive tha t wi l l take you th rough the wood lands, rav ines,

meadows, and marshlands that compose a landscape typical of t idewater Vir

g in ia . " The jou rney is no t on ly th rough space and t ime , bu t a lso th rough soc ia l

class,

since at the end stands the p lantat ion, whose masters, l ike the f lora a long

the road , emerged na tu ra l l y f r om the scenery . As the o f f i c ia l gu ide b rochure

states:

The Co untry Road has brought you fro m prehistory through the f i rst years of

European settlement and into the eighteenth century. By the middle of that

century a class of wealthy planters appeared in Virginia. Because they had suf

ficient capital to invest in vast acreage and many slaves, the biggest planters

profited greatly by producing tobacco.

Car te r ' s Grove P lan ta t ion i s l i ke Co lon ia l W i l l i amsburg in m in ia tu re . A lav

ish ly i l lustrated or ientat io n d isplay welcomes the traveler at the Reception Center ,

where I wa tched in te rp re te rs- in - t r a in ing p repar ing fo r a compe tence exam by

t ranscr ib ing the in fo rma t ion in the d isp lay windows—an exce l len t examp le o f

the c i r cu la r i ty o f the hab i tus—and where a b r ie f f i lm p rov ides the ove rv iew o f

the exper ience about to be exper ienced. This heavy interpretat ion contrasts with

1 4 0

I


The


of Social

Life

I

141



colonial past and rendered part of our cultural heritage worth preserving and

perpetuating. As Leone (19813:309) notes with reference to the museum at

Shakertown in Kentucky: "Naturalizing the present by imposing some part of it

on the past is, as all historiographers know, inevitable and unavoidable."

4

Two brief observations need to be made in closing, though each requires

more extensive e amât^ on than is possible here. First , I believe that the scien

tific or educatiönarfunction of Colonial Williamsburg is one of the principal

ways it legitimizes its reproduction of social distinction. A motto repeated by

interpreters is that Colonial Williamsburg is constantly changing, for "the more

we learn the more things change" as the exhibitions draw closer and closer to an

accurate depiction of the past. Indications of serious scholarly activity abound,

including ongoing archaeological excavations, research publications for sale, an

impressive schedule of academic conferences, and periodic announcements of im

portant "discoveries." As Cotter ( 1 9 7 0 : 4 2 2 ) , a professional archaeologist, ob

serves:

The backbone of the physical restoration, reconstruction, and interpretation

here is Colonial Williamsburg's remarkable research facilities. An enormous

corpus of microfilm, usefully indexed, and excellent library resources, together

with curatorial and archaeological expertise fortified with many thousands of

artifacts and hundreds of thousands of fragmentary objects from the earth—all

provide the researcher with incomparable components of the historicaLscene.

Colonial Williamsburg's interpretive program is strong to the degree that it is

motivated by what I would call the goal of historicaltransparency, that i s, for the

authority of the site to appear to the tourist as flowing naturally from the scien

tific accuracy of the reconstruction and from the

scholarly

' afiSfity of tfTëTnter-

pretation

without

the processes of reconstruction and interpretation's revealing

any signs of regimented "semiot jcj mediation" (Culler 1 9 8 1 : 1 3 4 — 3 7 ) . Thiêvi-

dence of academic créditais, coupled with the metasemiotic rhetoric insisting on

the realismof.the reconstruction, combine to create what Barthes (1986:139)

labels the\"reality effect^ that is, the function of any historicizing sign "whose

sole pertinenTfeature is precisely to signify that the event represented has

really

taken place." Or, as Handler (1986:4) puts it, " in modern society, the temple of

authenticity is the museum." / u „

Second, the message of Colonial Williamsburg is not only communicated to

tourists while at (hTcïty or taken back to the classroom by schoolchildren who

visit on fieldtrips, but it is alsojpr sale in the form of corrunoditjes at various

retail stores.

5

The tourist is encouraged to take advantage of these free-market

shopping opportunities, since all the stores are "ticket not required" sites.

W i l

liamsburg Reproductions, claiming to be authentic replicas of period furniture

and thus embodying the aura of history so carefully constructed by Colonial

W i l

liamsburg, are sold

in

fifty-nine stores throughout the country. Small signs on

the poverty of information provided on the short path leading to the mansion.

Here, we are told, is the future site of the slaves' quarters currently being recon

structed as a one-room shelter; slaves shared a single room because "they had no

need for privacy." The poverty of the people and the poverty of the information

are mutually justi fied by the exigencies of scientific reconstruc tion: " li ttl e docu

mentation is available to indicate what objects slaves actually owned."

3

This sign

echoes a comment made in

1 9 7 2

by the museum

's

resident audiovisual expert,

that while filming " Music of Will iamsburg," "i t was desired to depict the bury

ing of a field slave, but to the astonishment of the film makers not a single scrap

of information was available on method, emotion, practice, and music (if any) [ ] of

black burials. The sequence had to be abandoned" (Smith 1 9 7 2 : 7 ) . And across

the path stands a small sign pointing into the woods where the hunting-gathering

Indians roamed. The Indians, we are informed, put up strong resistance to the

early English settlers, and if their assaults had been as successful elsewhere as

here "the course of American history might well have been changed." This was

not to be, and the Indians, "weakened by disease, were no match for the En

glish" —as if their eventual destruction was, in the end, their fault. Throughout

this site, the language of description systematically uses ergative verbs for the

vic tors (" a planter class emerges") and transitive verbs for the victims (who

"burned" houses, "killed" settlers, and "embraced" Christianity).

Partial validation of my hypothesis about social distinction came when, just

prior to my departure from Colonial Williamsburg, I attempted to visit Bassett

H a l l , now a museum but formerly the residence of the Rockefeller family .

Though armed with my Patriot's Pass, I discovered that admission is very limited

and that a potential visitor must register ahead of time (in a large volume looking

like a guest-book) for an " appointment." In contrast to other exhibit sites, which

permit those without proper passes to stroll the grounds, Bassett Hall's 58 5- ac re

tract is restricted to pass-holders. Unfortunately I did not have time to wait for

my appointment and went away only wi th the comfort of authenticity, knowing

that the house has been kept in exactly the same shape as when the Rockefellers

lived there in 1 9 5 6 - 6 0 . At the top of the hierarchy of regimenting historical in

terpretation stands the home of the Rockefellers, the very agents responsible for

the preservation and reconstruction of the surrounding eighteenth-century city.

Although their residence dates only thirty-five years into the past and although

their national economic power originates only in the late nineteenth century, the

Rockefellers have managed to place themselves at the apex of a hierarchy of dis

tinction anchored at the very birth and birthplace of the democratic ideal.

Wallace

( 1986^170)

is certainly correct in claiming that both Rockefeller

and Henry Ford (at the reconstruction of Greenfield Village near Detroit)

"sough t j pa r t l y-t o eelebratejheirjiewly won preeminencejmdjgartly to construct

a retrospective lineage for

themseTveTTw

buying tKëu way into the American

past." The" power

t

>f

™so

^nfl

^dîsTmct ionu i

the present is thus

projected

into the

142



;



each piece of furniture resemble the signs on the pieces on display in the various

reconstructed buildings except that "do not touch" is replaced by a price tag and

an order number. In Colonial Williamsburg's annual report for

1 9 8 2 ,

the proud

claim is made that

Colonial Williamsburg has enhanced a wide public awareness of the value of

good design which, in turn, has had a profound effect on the general level of

taste. A distinguished editor of a prestigious house furnishings magazine has

suggested that the Williamsburg Reproduction program has been the greatest

single influence on elevating American taste and teaching appreciation of the

lasting values of fine craftsmanship and design.

The reproduction of distinction is disseminated through the commoditization of

historical reproduction.

Ideological Regimentation in Advertising ^ . 6

Colonial Williamsburg does not put forth a decontextualized ideology about

"history" in general. Its interlocking signs work to structure possible interpreta

tions of theijteforjdsitors at the site

itself;

its semiotic regîmêrïfafîon is, in other

words, indayfialfy-anehored. This final section, in contrast, deals with a set of

independent signs (commercial advertisements) that, together^rely on a pervasive

„ _ \ ideology about communication and referentiality.

It is a omrnbffp1'äeFför"änalysts of contemporary American culture to point

out the powerful impact of advertising on the development of a "culture of con

sumption," characterized by the shift from production to consumption as the

basis for socially recognized values and as the source of artificial or symbolic

needs unrelated to relatively more objective use-values (Lears 1 9 8 3 ; Leiss, Kline,

and Jhally 1 9 9 0 : 2 8 1 - 8 4 ) . What is less clear, however, is precisely how advertis-

ing succeeds in this manipulation of consciousness, that is, how the pragmatic

^rrmctions of advertising

as_

a system of communication are achieved. My~~afgu-

mentheré is that the functional effectiveness of advertisements cannot be under

stood apart from its "sjnuotic ideolog^," a term modeled after the notion of

"linguistic ideology" formulated~bVSirverstein ( 1 9 7 9 ) , namely, a culturally de

termined, historically grounded set of interpretive standards for understanding

linguistic and, by extension, visual communication. In other words, messages of

any sort are received in the context of explicit understandings and implicit as

sumptions of a general nature about how various communicative signals func

tion. And these understandings and assumptions are themselves products of so

cial institutions which, for example, regulate communicative usages, impose

canons of interpretation, and codify the principlesToTcommunicative ideology.

To make an argumentjjaiallel to Silverstein's ( 1 9 8 5 a ) paper on gender categories

and Mertz and Weissbourd's ( 1 9 8 5 ) work on legal ideology, I argue that modern

^ i^ L& jJ <<>V >

' : . t v t . . . ^

consumers' understanding of particular ads is significantly skewed by the effects

of a_regimented view of the general nature of commercial speech and, further,

that this official ideology is so far from being an accurate account of the forms

and functions of advertising n^ssages that their manipulative potential derives at^

least in partJjomjaaosumersênforced misunderstanding^) ^ J ^ ^(^4 «i fW

-

h

.-..<''

I thenClrypothesiz/tnat the senders of advertising messages, namely, the agen

cies represenj[nfWrious commercial interests, are fully aware of this disjunction

between th&tommunicative character of advertising

and

the available interpretive '

standards and have, in fact, structured their commercial messages to maximally

expl6it_thjs.gap.

The <£verall pragmatic function of advertising becomes result**,/*

of the combination of its communicative character (e.g., the ways language is '

employed, the role of visual images, and the presentation of vajue-laden symbols) "

and the surrounding standards that reinforce consumers' interpretive standards /

/(e.g., assumptions about whether or not ads are to be believed, awareness of the

I "official" informational function of commercial speech, and tacit knowledge of

* existing governmental regulations). The basis for the argument consists of a study

of the legal and regulatory decisions dealing with/ commercial speech,i a review

of empirical research done by others on the impact 61 ceirtain deceptive forms of

advertising on consumer beliefs, and continuing analysis of linguistic a jd visual

forms of contemporary advertising on television and in magazines. — ) \\ ?

English and American jurisprudence has for centuries recognized a distinc-

«.

•>

tion between factual representations of commercial products subject to rules of. «.

<% >

warranty and misrepresentation and statements of personal opinion or exagger- *v

ations of product qualities considered typical of "seller's talk" (Preston

1 9 7 5 ) .

0 -

K

This second category of statements, called "puffery," falls within the tradition -4^

of caveat emptor: the buyer is expected to know that sellers are wont to exag

gerate and state opinions for which they are not to be held literally accountable. „,

Consumers in the nineteenth century were expected to

distnTsFcommercial

sell

ers and to exercise "that caution and attention which all prudent men ought to

observe in making their contracts" (Seixas and Seixas v. Wood, 2 Cai. R [N.Y.]

4 8 ,

54

[ 1 8 0 4 ] ,

cited in Pridgen and Preston

1 9 8 0 : 6 3 9 ) .

Sellers could even delib

erately design such "puffs, " since, as a Massachusetts court ruled in 1 8 5 3 , "it

always having been understood, the world over, that such statements are to be

distrusted."

The exclusion of these exaggerations and opinionsJrom the category of ac

tual misrepresentation thus rests on the explicit understanding that puffs are con

ventional linguistic routines involving the following features: a statement uttered

in the~o5ntext of commercial persuasion that, though it may appear formally to

be a claim capable of verification, is regarded by all reasonable persons as f une-

J

tionally irrelevant to the process of rational market decisions. For example, -J

salesperson representing a soap manufacturer says, "This soap is made of the

purest ingredients available anywhere in the world." The buyer's expected inter-

144 ' Comparative Perspectives on Complex Semiotic Processes

The Semiotic Regimentation of Social Life I J 45



pretation of this claim, under the legal doctrine of puffery, is to discount it as

the expected inflation by an interested party, rather than to expend energy eval-

ûating^hêTrum-vaTuèTo .

Courts originally drew the line between puffery and misrepresentation by

distinguishing-statements that, on the one hand, magnifyjhe advantages or quali

ties a product in fact has to some degree from statements that, on the other hand,

invent or falsely assert the existence of qualities which the product does not de-

y monstrativefy possess. This distinction suggests that the legal understanding of

this type of communicative routine was that the product descriptions being pat

ently inflated or personally slanted functions itself as an obvious indexical sign—

a warning, in fact—of the biased attitude of the seller. In other words, exagger

ated predication signals the motivated intentionality characteristic of sellers and

alerts buyers to take a skeptical attitude. The expressed opinion or exaggeration

is the clue for buyers to know that they are dealing with puffery rather than

purported factual claims, despite the well-formed propositionality of the utter

ance; and the presupposed context of the persuasive sales talk signals the appli

cability of the rule of interpretation which constructs the proper functional as

signment of such opinions and exaggerations as mere puffery.

What emerges from these initial observations is the existence of two levels

of linguistic competence, the first level involving the mastery of referential or

%

prepositional codes and the second level involving a shared metasemiotic stan-

''••„. dardjoxxule^nriterpretation: in contexts of commercial persuasion, predicative

exaggerations iudex the inflated opinion of seller rather than the qualities of the

object being referred to. The legal term "puffery" is, then, an officially re-

,-gimented qethnometapragmatlc jSSilverstein 1976) label, that is, a meta-level de-

-strfption örtne complex pragmatics of advertising astontextually understood

oommercial speech.

So for an utterance to be a puff it must provide, through a combination of

r)r jjipo«sed-eontext ("sajgjîï) and

fcreative

indexicality (/'exaggeration") a sec

ond-level message: "take this as a puff " Combined with a general skepticäiätti-

tude towarthsalespersons cïïârâcteristic of the

caveat emptor

era, this metames-

sage at least partially guarantees that consumers will properly disambiguate the

formal/functional skewing of acts of puffery. The legal recognition of this power

to disambiguate is documented, for example, in Berman v. Woods (33 Ark. 351

[ 1 8 8 1 ] ) , where the Court stated:

As for the glowing representations with regard to the merits of their [printing]

press, made by the plaintiffs in their [advertising] circulars, they are the usual

3T

^£^LSJ^^

T

P

r>

^

T

^~

C<

^PSS^}2I^^

ra

^

s e o r

exaggerated, they~are*tepre-

Tîensibl'e,

Tn strict morals, but the law "supposes that the prudent people should

estimate them at their usual worth. It is folly to rely upon them when made by

unknown dealers, and they do not amount to warranties of every sale which

they induce. Purchasers should either examine for themselves or seek the advice

of competent and reliable persons who may be indifferent.

Shortly after this decision a New York court stipulated that advertising

claims that have the status of warranties must mçet several conditions: (a) they

must not be merely expressions of opinions but clear and positive affirmations,

(b) they must be made for the purpose of assuring the buyer of the truth of the

fact affirmed, and (c) they must be received and relied upon by the buyers as to

induce them to make the purchase (League Cycle Co. v. Abrahams, 1 8 9 9 ) . As is

evident from these two late nineteenth-century decisions, the presumption was

that commercial speech was normatively opinionated puffery, unless contrary

metapragmatic signals were present and understood. "Puffery," thus, differs

from false representation in that the former involves "the mere exaggeration of

the qualities [an] article has," while the latter "assigns to the article qualities

which it does not possess" (United States v. New South Farm and Home Co.,

2 4 1 U.S. 64 [ 1 9 1 6 ] , cited in Grady and Feinman 1 9 8 3 : 4 0 6 ) .

When the history of puffery is traced into the contemporary period of the

"culture of consumption" we find a curious reversal in the relationship between

the legal regulations and corresponding interpretive standards shared by consum

ers and the actual formal structure of advertisements. I think that the increased

federal regulation of advertising and the transformed character of language use

in commercials have combined to destroy the metapragmatic consensus which

was, in an earlier period, the best protection from sales fraud. Essentially, what

happens is that legal institutions such as the Supreme Court, district courts, and

regulatory agencies create a new set of assumptions about commercial speech:

that it is at heart informational, ideally truthful, and subject to verification, and

that thelnstkutionalrzatton>pf these assumptions contributes to the construction

of

an\

ideology of reference

Which

not only irons out the multifunctionality of

advertising language but which also imposes a false set of interpretive standards

about advertising m-general. From a functional point of view, in contrast, adver

tising is persuasive speedji, that is, discourse designed to get the consumer to

change an attitude toward a product or to strengthen an awareness of a company

or brand label in the hope that purchasing behavior will be modified accordingly.

In other words, while the tradition of caveat emptor constitutes a general back

ground warning that commercial speech is basically persuasive, the modern reg

ulatory environment assumes, falsely, that commercial speech is primarily refer

ential, contributing valuable information essential to rational markets.

Unfortunately, in spite of this institutionalized shift in the surrounding ide

ology, the actual commercial function of ads has remained constant, namely, per

suasion. The role of puffery has correspondingly reversed: from being regarded

as the socially expected norm for commercial speech, puffs have come to be con-

146 I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes

The Semiotic Regimentation of Social Life I

14

7



sidered a smal l , forg ivable remnant from an ear l ier i r rat ional tradi t ion. In fact,

however , the frequency of puff cla ims remains h igh, and the

absence

o f i n f o r m a

t ional language becomes a notable feature of many types of ads, especia l ly as

visual imagés gradual ly replace the representat ion of language in mass media ad

ver t ising (Richards and Zakia

1 9 8 1 ) .

The ne t resu l t o f the fo rma l con t inu i ty o f pu f fs in adve rt i s ing and the g row

ing ideology of reference is an increased tendency for consumers to in terpret puffs

according to clues as to their preposit ional form rather than according to for

mer ly in terprétable indexical cues. TheVegulated referentia l i ty, assigned to a por

t ion of the ad is, then, transferred to expressions of puffery, attr ibuting to them

analogically the

actuality

previously d ismissed

by

all reasonable people.

"And

it

is ' tKis transference that provides the u l t imate haven for commercia l adver t isers,

since their cla ims conta ined under the guise of puffs are not subject to e i ther

prohib i t ion as misleading representat ion or the requirement of fa^tuaUj inSstanti -

at ion—and yet they are widely bel ieved to be informational: Rather than protect

consumers by foster ing an accurate understanding of the form and function of

adver t ising, the cour ts and regulatory agencies in fact contr ibute to the endemic

metapragmatic opacity essentia l for effect ive commercia l persuasion.

The recent h istory of legal consideration of commercia l adver t ising involves

two seemingly contradictory movements, f i rst, the increasingly vigorous regula

t ion of ads by the FTC and, second, the recognit ion by the Supreme Cour t of

First Amendment protect ion for commercia l speech. I say "seemingly contradic

tory" because, in the end, these two tendencies work together to promulgate the

ideology of reference noted above. The FTC's act ions between i ts inception in

1 9 1 4 an d 1 9 3 8 were confined to regulat ing ads which vio lated Section 5 o f the

FTC Act , w h ich s ta tes: "Un f a i r me thods o f com pe t i t ion in c ommerce a re he reby

dec la red un lawfu l . " Th is word ing , wh ich app l ies a lmost who l l y to the p rob lem

of anti trust vio lat ions, impl ies that misrepresentat ion in ads would h inder free

compe t i t ion , s ince fa lse in fo rma t ion rega rd ing one p roduct wou ld necessa r i l y

harm other products in the same class. The authors of the or ig inal b i l l establ ish

ing the FTC expl ici t ly identi f ied i ts function as paral le l to that of the Interstate

Commerce Commission and viewed the new regulatory agency as a means of

ove rcoming p rob lems in en fo rc ing the Sherman An t i t r us t Act . A l thoug h the o r ig

inal wording of the act d id not mention deceptive adver t ising, the f i rst cases to

come before the agency were cases involving deception of consumers: for exam

ple,

the label ing of goods conta in ing less than

1 0 %

wo o l as "w o o l e n " wa s r u le d

as deceptive and thus an act of unfa ir trade, since i t d iver ted business fro m f i rms

whose adver t ising d id not fa lsely represent their product.

The FTC orders were, however , subject to judicia l review. In

Ostermoor &

Company v. Federal Trade Commission ( 1 6

F i d

9 6 2 [ 1 9 2 7 ] ) ,

the U.S. Ci r cu i t

Cour t of Appeals annul led an FTC cease and desist order against a manufacturer

of mattresses, whose ads consti tu ted unfa ir competi t ion. The FTC had decided

that p ictor ia l representat ion of the increased th ickness of cotton f i l l ing freed of

restraint as

3 5

inches or more, when in fact the expansion was closer to

3

to

6

i nches ,

const i tu ted a v io la t ion o f Sect ion

5 ,

since i t impl ied "a resi l iency or e las

t i c i ty fa r beyond the fac t . " The Cour t ag reed wi th a d issen t ing FTC commis

sioner that "the sl ightest p ictor ia l exaggeration of the qual i t ies of an ar t icle

c a n

no t be deemed to be e i the r a misrep resen ta t ion o r an un fa i r me thod o f

compe t i t ion . " In fac t , the Cour t r u led tha t the exaggera t ion fe l l w i th in the

" t ime-honored custom o f a t least mere ly s l igh t pu f f ing " in tha t the v isua l r ep re

sentat ion was clear ly not in tended by the manufacturer to be l i tera l ly "descr ip

t i v e " b u t m e r el y " f a n c i f u l . "

This case is instruct ive for i t i l luminates two of the legal cr i ter ia for the puff-

e r y exempt io n , f i r s t , tha t i f the fanc i fu l exaggera tion i s d i rec ted a t som e 'qüa l i ty

o r p rope r ty then the qua l i ty o r p rope r ty must be someth ing wh ich the p roduct

does in fact have to some degree (here, having the tendency to expand when

released) and, second, there must be an absence of contrary signals with in the ad

itsel f which might suggest that the puff representat ion is to be interpreted as l i t

era l ly descr ipt ive (say, by the use of an accurate measur ing rod or the ci tat ion of

"sc ien t i f i c " tes t imony) . In o the r words, a leg i t ima te pu f f canno t c rea t ive ly p red

ica te a nonex is ten t qua l i ty to some p roduct and canno t commun ica te a fa lse

metapragmatic message that the puff is a factual cla im.

The puffery defense was not admitted in

Fairy oot Products Co. v. FTC

(80

F 2 d 6 8 4 [ 1 9 3 5 ] ) ,

a case in wh ic h th is second cr i te r ion o f be ing " no t ca lcu la ted

to deceive" was clear ly vio lated. Adver t isements for a bunion p laster cla imed that

the product d issolved bunions, stopped pain, and provided instant re l ie f, and then

created a

powerful

con text o tTäct io ty by men t ion ing the app rova l o f phys ic ians/^

and docto rs . The pe t i t ione r a rgued tha t the exaggerat ion in the ads was w i th in

the realm of puffery and, where not, the ads were "largely just i f ied by the facts

\i

B u t t h e C o u r t r u le d : ( Î

^ M ^

That the petitioner's plaster has virt ue may, for the purposes hereof, be con - '

ceded.

Indeed, it would be quite unreasonable to assume that one put tin g out , . , .

a purpor ted remedy for an aff l ict ion would not employ some ingredients or ^ t f f '

means calculated to benefit some cases at some stage. But this wou ld not justif y j

such sweeping claims as the condemned items of this advertising matter dis-

J

close,

wh ich were evidently intended to induce in the public mi nd the belief * Ô V -

that here was an absolute and unfailing panacea for bunions of all kinds and »

y

degrees. Just wh ere i i eym eï in r fc eTw êën^ wh ich i s no t un lawfu l and * »"

n

unwarranted, and misleading representations in advertising, is often very d i f f i -

cult of assertainment. But in our judgment this case does not present such em- '

-i

, , > A -

1

barrassment, since the advertising here condemned is well beyond any 1 ' , \ f \

" p u f f i n g "

indulgence. \ ùkp V

v 1

' ' '

? I * •

The add i t ion o f the ph rase "un fa i r o r decep t ive acts o r p ract i ces" in thé

Wheeler-Lee amendment of

1 9 3 8

made exp l i c i t the FTC's power to p ro tect in -

148 I


The Semiotic Regimentation of

Social

Life

I

149



dividual consumers to the same degree as its mandate to insure free competition

among commercial interests. In a sequence of cases after 1 9 3 8 puffery continued

to be be defined as "an expression of opinion not made as a representation of

fact" (Gulf Oil,

1 50

Fzd

10 6

[ 1 9 4 5 ] ) , whi ch " it is . . . hard to imagine anyone

reading it could have understood it as more than puffing"

(Moretrench,

1 27 F 2d

7 9 2 [ 1 9 4 2 ] ) . Excluded f rom this category were all direct false representations

that assign to products "benefits or v irtues they do not possess," or that are made

for theptupbse: of deceiving prospective purchasers

(Steelco,

187 F zd 693

[ i95 i ) ) T Ä c c e p t e d

were ads stating, for example, that a motor oil additive would

enable a car to operate an "amazing distance" without oil (Kidder,

1 1 7

F 2 d 8 9 2

[ 1 9 4 1 ] ) ,

or that a vitamin-candy was an "easy" method for weight reduction

(Carlay, 153 F2d 493

[ 1 9 4 6 ] ) ,

or that Ipana toothpaste will "beautify the smile

and brighten and whiten the teeth" (Bristol-Myers

Co.,

4 6 FTC 1 6 2 ) . In this last

case the FTC stated: " The Commission was of the opini on that the referencejtp

beautifiçation of the smile was mere puffery^ unli kely, because pf ^ gen eral it y/ '

and ^ jdel y v ariant meanTngsJf to deceive "anyone factually."

,h,f*

Although"

mo

^sTTiFtKese cases focused on the fine line between exaggerated

x

/o pi ni on and false factualjepr esentation, several hinged on the question of the

'

\ simult aneâ^metapragmatic

message

In

Pfiz

fizer

(81

FTC

23

[ 1 9 7 2 ] ) ,

for exam-

0 (jy ^kTfKe maferTof a sunburn crearn argued that their product claims (e.g. , "ac-

tually anesthetizes nerves" and "relieves pain fast"), while looking like factual,

even medical claims, were merely puffs\ since the metamess^ge included, among

other things, "me frivolous

Mûre

of the dialogue," "the"*use of a bikinied

model," and the\general "aura of sexiness." Together, the company insisted,

these consti tuted

a-Aotal

semng_ofjlje ad" which provided a clear interpretive

signal that statements in the linguistic form of verifiable medical claims should

be understood as mere puffery. The FTC,

on

the other hand, ruled that this c o n

text was counteracted by the use of "scieritmcovsrtones," implying that the pro

duct claims were substantiated by "well-controlled scientific studies" (the men

tion of " doct ors" and the adverb "actual ly" ) and that the ads were more than

"harmless hyperbole."

Cross-cutting the increasing regulatory activity of the FTC were two Su

preme Court rulings of 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 7 6 which transformed the constitutional

context of advertising regulation by extending limited First Amendment protec

tion to commercial speech. Previously, in 1 9 4 2 the Supreme Court held in Val

entine v. Chrestensen ( 3 1 6 U.S. 5 2 ) that an ordinance prohibiting the distribu

tion of handbills containing on one side commercial advertising and on the other

side noncommercial messages of political protest was not in violation of the First

Amendment. The constitutional protection of speech is based on the communi

cation of information and opinion necessary to the free flow of ideas in a democ

racy.

The political message on the handbill, the Court ruled, was added with the

intent to evade the prohibition of the city ordinance. The Court, citing no his

torical prededent, stated in conclusion:

This Court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the

exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opin

ion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate

the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or prescribe its

employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the

C o n

sti tuti on imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commer

cial advertising. (Cited in Rome and Roberts 1985:19)

Commercial speech, in this view, is a form of business activity whose jgoal is the

generation of profit rather than the exchange'of ideas.

InTt^7^TKowëi^'trîS"'

sharp differentiation between protected and unpro

tected speech was eradicated when the Court ruled in Bigelow

v.

Virginia ( 4 2 1

U.S. 8 0 9 ) that advertising geared to commercial interest "is not stripped of First

Amendment protection merely because it appears in that form." This case in

volved an advertisment in a Virginia newspaper for the Woman's Pavillion of

New York Cit y, an organization f or the placement of women desiring abortions.

Since abortions, though legal in New York, were illegal in Vi rg in ia, the Supreme

Court of Virginia ruled that the ad was in violation of state law. In overturning

the state's decision, the Supreme Court noted the handbill, though proposing a

commercial transaction, also contained "factual material of clear 'public inter

est.'" The Court did not, however, prohibit "reasonable regulation" of advertis

i ng ,

since commercial speech is after all a business acti vi ty and as such subject

to regulation that serves a legitimate public interest. Rather, the intent of the

Court was to recognize the comp kx ji atur ejr f corrjmejdaLspeech.

as

being simul

taneously the expression of a business interest and the communicati on ofyaluable

informati on. As Justice Blackmun put it : "Th e relationship of speech to the mar

ketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the^marketplace

of ideas."

Both the Supreme Court and the FTC, I think, contribute to the same ide

ology that stresses the informational or referential function of advertising. Now,

to be sure, both bodies well understand that advertising is a form of persuasive,

that is, biased, commjirùçatîoî), but the social effect of their decisions is to r e i n

force an interpretiv e standard according try which advertising, so far as the public

interest and constltütloTrat protection is concerned, iPinformational. This stan

dard is at the basis of the Supreme Court's extension of First Amendment pro

tection—since advertising is protected only to the degree that it is factual, that

is , non-deceptive, in a truth-functional sense—as well as the FTC's decisions—

since the agency's mandate is to be sure that consumers can rely on the informa

tion communicated in making market decisions.

i$o I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes

The Semiotic Regimentation of Social Life I

151



The next important step in this regimentation of the referential function of

language was the Supreme Court's ruling in 1976 in

Virginia

Stàie~~Éoard of

Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.

(425 U.S. 748)

that

purely

commercial advertisements enjoy some degree of constitutional protec

t i o n .

This case involved the advertising of prescription drug prices. At issue are

no cultural, political, or philosophical ideas, nor any "generalized observations

about commercial matters." Rather, the only "idea" these ads communicate is

the purely commercial " I wil l sell you the X prescription dr ug at the Y pri ce."

In justifying overturning the previous state decision, the Court stated clearly the

principle that "society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of com

mercial information." The decision then continues to make explicit the grounds

for this reification of information:

Moreover, there is another consideration that suggests that no line between

publicly " interesting" or "important" commercial advertising and the opposite

kind could ever be drawn. Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it some

times may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is pro

ducing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long

as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our

resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic

decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate,

be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial in

formation is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation

of resources in a free enterprise, it is also indispensable to the formation of

intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.

Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primari ly an in

strument to enlighten public decision making in a democracy, we could not say

that the free flow of information does not serve that goal. (Virginia, 4 2 5 U.S.

74 8

[1976] 765)

So First Amendment protection and FTC regulations work together to en

sure the free flow of information that can be useful to citizens in that

quintessentially rational forum, the marketplace, for the purpose of making avail

able to them a dominant embodiment of social value, namely, commodities. The

Court in

1 9 7 6

was actually legitimizing a widespread view of advertising's role

in a consumer-oriented society, a view which signals the end of the caveat emp

tor tradition's recognition of the rhetorical nature of advertising. As the FTC's

Commissioner stated as early as 1 9 7 3 :

My view of advertising is of course strongly influenced by my view of business

in general. Just as I think well of the man who has the sk i l l , energy, and imagi

nation to

produce

something needed and desired by his fellow human beings,

so I also think well of the one who has the sk i l l , energy, and imagination to

sell it for him. If production is useful and honorable, then distribution—in

cluding advertis ing—is entitled to the same honorable place in our esteem. The

purpose of advertising, as I understand it, is to provide

information

to potential

buyers—to tell consumers that a certain product exists, that it has certain pro

perties, that it sells for a certain price, that it can be bought at certain times

and places, and so forth. This information, in t u r n , has profound effects on

the workings of our economic system. (Thompson 82 FTC 76 [1973])

This understanding of advertisi ng was condensed into a metapragmatic formula

in 1 9 8 0 when the Supreme Court wrote: "First Amendment's concern for com

mercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising"

(Central

Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 5 5 7 ) . In

fact, in drawing a contrast between protected speech and speech proposing a

commercial transaction the Cour t reasoned that commercial speech was " more

easily verifiable" than political commentary (Schmidt and Burns 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 8 8 ) . In

other words, constitutional protection extends to commercial speech to the de

gree that it is verifiably truthful. That corporations can now find First Amend

ment protection in their efforts at commercial persuasion is surely one sign of the

dominance of corporate interests. But this has been interpreted, additionally, as

marking the culmination of a lengthy trend toward t he homologization of speech

and commodities, whereby speech is conceived of as not merely about the flow

of commercial goods but as itself an objectified value (Tushnet 1 9 8 2 ) .

I have sketched the development of an institutionalized ideology of commer

cial speech w h i c h _ C Q n t r i b j U £s _jojt^ standardT of consumers and

which channds me.praduction of ads themselves. I ron ica l lyTm t predictably, these

two effects operate in opposite directions: at the same time that consumers are

taught to rely on the informational function of advertising, the ads produced in

this regulatory atmosphere increasingly avoid factual claims of properties, price,

and availability. Taking advantage of the general referential ideology and faced

with new stringent requirements such as prior substantiation and affirmative dis

closure, ad agencies turn tp persuasion based on visuaJjmager^ emotional ap

r

" ;

peal , testimonials of the ricrTand famous, life-style S3s, and other sophisticated/

(and protected) forms of puffery (Schmidt and Burns 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 9 3 ) . And the con- ,

sumer, believing both that it is illegal to make false representations and that ads

in general communicate useful information, is caught with weakened metaprag-^

matic defenses based on "healthy skepticism" (Preston 1989:66) against these

new forms of advertising. Nothing, then, could guarantee a better climate for

advertising than the failure of regulation to touch puffery and almost all aspects

of visual communication coupled with the social acceptance of the interpretive

rule that advertising is informational.

Several contemporary researchers have provided experimental documenta

tion of the fact that consumers do interpret puff claims as if they were informa

tional claims relevant

to

making consumption decisions. In a sense, of course,

such empirical research is a redundant restating of the obvious, since if puffery

is not widely successful in influencing consumer decision making it would have

long ago ceased being part of the advertiser's rhetorical tool kit. In a study by

ijz I Comparative Perspectives

on

Complex Semiotic Processes




Rotfeld and Rotzoll

(1980)

the effects

of

five nationally distributed commercials

were examined through questionnaires designed to ascertain what claims were

communicated and whether claims independently judged to be puffs were

b e

lieved. These researchers found that on average

3 9 . 6 %

of puffery claims were

believed, and on average

1 1 . 4 %

o f claims implied b y puffs were also believed.

For example 4 3 %

o f

the survey respondents believed the puff that St. Joseph's

aspirin is "fast and gentle"; 6 2 % believed that Kaopectate is "a lot

of

relief";

and

6 9 %

beliëvëcTthat Head & C Shoulders shampoo "lathers nice." The conclu

sion drawn from this study was that the present legal definition of puffery as

advertising messages not stating any factual claims is contradicted b y empirical

research. Rotfeld and Rotzoll d o not argue, however, a s I d o here, that the c o n

sumer's contextually specific understanding is, in part, the result o f a h ideology

of'-commercial spiëécn"is'"Beïng, as a rule, referential.

A second study conducted

by

Shimp (1978) focused on "incomplete com-

« ^ . parative" statements, such a s " Mennen E goes on warmer and drier.'* A ithough

^ctffiFts have been stricter in ruling against such open-ended comparisons a s al-

lowable puffery, favoring to allow more obviously mflated claims in the superior

degree ("the best," "the freshest," etc.), many comparatives d o appear in com

mercials. Shimp found that consumers tend to believe that open-ended compar

atives make claims, since they filled in the missing term themselves, as, for

e x

ample, " Menn en E goes on warmer and drier than a lot of other spray

d e o d o r a n t s . "

In this survey, 60 % agreed

that the

ad claim

was

directly

s t a t e d ,

and

38 % believed

that

the claim

was

intended bu^joydirectly

s t a t e d .

This type

of language is especially effective since it engagMjheœnsumeF-^-theûnwitting

partner in propositional construction.

Other experiments support the general contention that puffs are interpreted

a s true statements. Surveys b y Bruskin Associates (cited in Rotfeld and Preston

1 9 8 1 ) found that people judged the statement in a n Alcoa

a d ,

"Today, aluminum

is something else," to be completely true ( 4 7 % ) , or partly true ( 3 6 % ) . Similarly,

the statement in a Hallmark

a d ,

"When you care to send the very best," was

rated

a s

completely true

b y

6 2 %

o f

those surveyed, and the Kodak a d , "Kodak

makes your pictures count," was judged completely true b y

6 0 % .

I n a n experi

ment conducted

by

Rotfeld and Rotzoll (1981) consumers were presented with

commercial advertisements containing factual claims ("helps control dandr uff " )

and puffs ("makes hair look terrific"), the distinction having been previously

d e -

Al*)termined b y a n independent group o f legally trained "labelers." The respondents

t H'^^f}^^

n o t t n a t t n e

^

a c t a n

^ fact-impli ed claims possessed greater credibi lit y

Vf&KX

t n a n

puffs and puff -impl ied claims. As these researchers conclude: "What

does emerge is that puffery does not possess a n inherent and distinct inability to

be believed" (Rotfeld and Rotzoll i 9 8 i : i o T ) r " —

Experiments have shown that ads containing puffs are more likely to catch

consumers' attention, that puffs which communicated little information d i d so

- J

with high levels of confidence, and that puffs contributed to an overall higher

evaluation of products in comparison with ads without puffs. Oliver ( 1979 : 14)

1

summarizes these and other empirical studies of the effects of puffery:

Specifically, the studies show that if ambiguous words or symbols of a super

lative or inflated nature are used to describe Tp7c^ rx ,-peopIereither perceive

«»—"""

the implied content to be accurate (thus increasing the "certainty of the be

liefs . . . ), demonstrate a" tendency to increase attribute levels or the evaluations

of these same attribute levels, infer a greater number of highly rated attributes •""

(inflating the favorable attribute set size), or rate the product higher than if an

accurate description had been used (so that one s overall att itude or subsequent

purchase intention is overrated).

These results suggest that advertisers can use puffs to cause a product to be over-

appraised relative to the objective qualities the product has. This, in t u r n , pro

vides a clue to the mechanism by which ads inculcate symbolic values not found

in products independent from their ads: that this creativity is largely accom- ' J 0 ,

pushed through' puffery. '

w

I have argued that three legal trends converge to destroy consumers' semiotic

acuity in interpreting ads: ( 1) the puffery exception in the

p o s t -caveat

emptor

period,

(2 )

the FTC's regulation of false and deceptive messages, and

(3 )

the Su

preme Court's extension of constitutional protection to commercial speech. Each

of these trends in its own way reinforces the notion that commercial speech is

informational, a notion shared by both sides of the debate over regulation. Voices

in favor of government regulation stress the need for scrutiny to keep the mes

sages tr uthf ul , while voices against regulation argue that regulations (such as a

ban on all cigarette ads) consti tute, in the words of an AC L U legal director, "pa

ternalistic manipulation of the individual through governmental control of infor

mation . . . covertly manipulating that choice by controlling the flow of informa

tion about it" (cited in Lowenstein 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 2 2 ) . What both sides of the debate

overlook is that advertising as efficacious language succeeds in part by misdirect

ing consumers' attention away from awareness of persuasion by postulation of

an ideology of reference and by constructing messages that appear to be propo

sitional, as "indicatives without sentences" (Baudrillard 1 9 9 0 : 9 4 ) .

There are two additional recent tendencies which must be noted briefly in

conclusion. The first involves attempts to expand the regulatory aura to non-

informational or "symbolic" dimensions of advertising. Some legal scholars have

concluded that courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies should reverse the

contemporary move toward recognizing First Amendment protection for com

mercial speech and increase the degree of consumer protection by looking into

not just factually false claims but the "symbolic" features of advertising as w e l l .

These critics realize that continued reliance on the assumption that advertising is

informational guarantees that only a small part of the total communicative range

of ads will be addressed. While the regulators at the FTC obviously view their

i $4

I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Sem iotic Processes

The Semiotic Regim entation of Social Life I I JJ



making an ad fo r i tse l f . A woman ca re fu l l y reads the labe l on a bo t t le o f Kra f t -

Free dressing and fervently aff i rms i ts truth value. Joe Isuzu makes repeated r i

d icu lous c la ims abou t the p r ice and qua l i ty o f h is ca rs , in ten t iona l l y generat ing

an image of the classic huckster whose puffery is never to be bel ieved. (As i f in

d ia logue wi th th is ad , Lee Iacocca warns tha t " i f Ch rys le r i sn ' t a pe r fo rmance

car , then I 'm Joe Isuzu.") Bo Jackson, dressed as a singer , walks off the stage

c la im ing " I 'm an a th le te , no t an acto r , " and then passes th rough the te lev is ion

screen showing the commerc ia l fo r Nike shoes. An ad fo r McDona lds " fas t - fo r

w a r d s "

i t se l f to "ge t to the good pa r t . " John Cleese in fo rms the v iewer tha t

"those smart people at Magnavox have asked me to te l l you about a l l these h ighly

inte l l igent [e lectronics] products in just f i f teen seconds." A car phone insta l led

inside the Lexus automobi le is set to automatical ly d ia l the Lexus sales off ice,

wh ich answers " thank you fo r ca l l ing Lexus. " Candace Bergen te l l s a coup le

watching her image on their te levision not to use the mute button of the remote.

In wha t m igh t be the u l t ima te non -ad , a fa rmer comes in to a sa lesroom to look

at John Deere tractors and leaves without buying a new tractor , though he is

wear ing a new cap wi th the company logo . S ince me ta -ads a re a l l t r u th fu l l y

"about" adver t ising ( in the sense that a l l metapragmatic utterances are inherently

semantic) , the viewer is led by th is posi t ive ly suppl ie i lset of in terprétants to over

look the persuasive function being accompl ished simultaneously. For as Boorst in

( 1 9 6 1 : 2 1 3 )

p rophe t ical l y wro te ove r th i r ty yea rs ago : " Adver t i s ing fogs ou r da i l y

l ives less from i ts pecul iar l ies than from i ts pecul iar truths."

regulatory act ivi ty as protect ing consumers from fa lse or deceptive adver t ise

ments,

thereby increasing confidence in the informational side of commercia l

speech,

they would surely re ject my c la im here that the regulat ive enviro nment

works to d isarm consumers through a fa lse\semiotic ideojpgy. In fact, the Com

mission demonstrated, in a

1 9 7 8

ru l ing , a real concern th at

"the

viewer 's cr i t ica l

facult ies of classi f icat ion and d i f ferentiat ion are drowned in patterns of imagery

and symbo ls" (c i ted in Richa rds and Zak ia

1 9 8 1 : 1 1 5 ;

see Zakia

1 9 8 6 ) .

The

impor tan t po in t to no te i s tha t th is conce rn wi th "c r i t i ca l facu l t ies" was vo iced

in the context of potentia l ly deceptive visual representat ions and not in the c o n

text of language-based "informational" messages. But br inging symbol ic images

under the purview of the FTC is only another way of putt ing the consumer in a

si tuation of fa lse confidence that, now, even visual symbols are being inspected

for accuracy. This, then, would paral le l the legal arguments made by corporate

interests that even "persuasion " in adver t ising is indirect ly in fo rmat ional , because

ads promote entry of super ior products in to the market, enhance competi t ion by

lower ing pr ices, or st imulate product innovation (Fred S. McChesney ci ted in

Lowenste in 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 3 z ) . Should consumers ever become persuaded that the sub

t le, symbol ic, or connotative meanings of commercia ls have been approved by

regulators, then an addit ional p iece of armor wi l l have d isappeared from their

a lready d imin ished interpret ive arsenal.

The second recent-xrend- istr rat some adver t isers are increasingly re ject ing

the rhetor ic of puffed exaggeration and the image-monger ing of symbol ic asso

ciat ion in favor of ad messages which refer d irect ly and expl ici t ly to adver t ising

as a commun ica t i ve fo rm and funct ion . The

1 9 9 0 s

may wel l be a new era in the

history of the metapragmatics of adver t ising. I f in the f i rst per iod consumers ex

pected the hard sel l o f puffery and protected themselves by caveat emptor, and

in the second per iod the assumption of referentia l i ty promoted by governmental

inst i tu t ions d isarmed consumers faced with extensive verbal and visual nonref-

erentia l i ty, the th ird per iod can be identi f ied as the age of the "meta-ad,"^that

is ,

ads about adver t ising. Meta-ads, I suggest, signal a renewed^frofrorr the par t

of adver t isers to posi t ive ly recapture their power to inst i tu te a general ized semi

ot ic regime for in terpret ing their ads.

6

Instead of passively assuming th af

c o n s u m

ers are metapragmatical ly naive, meta-ads bui ld in to their over t signals, for ex

ample, preference to previous ads for the same pr odu ct, the behaviora l

effect ivenësTof ads, the truth value (or deception) of ad messages, the formal or

poetic features of ads, the act of exper iencing ads, the the technical process of

broadcasting ads, and the inst i tu t ional h istory of adver t ising as an industry.

In an ad for the Amer ican Express card, a man taking a shower is robbed

whi le the te levision in the background shows Kar l Maiden warning viewers to

carry traveler 's checks. In an IBM ad, a por table movie screen shows commer

cia ls from the past ten years; a rose is tossed from the image on the screen into

the space of the present ad. An ad for the RCA camcorder shows the camcorder



P A R T

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Social Theory and Social Action

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I

Social Theory and Social Action

Comparison, Pragmatics,

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Interpretation I

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to t ic options, each with ser ious impl icat ions for emp i r i ca l wo rk in the compara

t ive vein.

Despite the apparent newness of much comparative d iscourse, it wo u l d be

an error to assume that comparison itself has no h istor ica l l ineage. In fact, some

fo rm of compara t i ve th ink ing can be located in a lmost any in te l lectual mi l ieu,

especially i f the assertion of noncomparabi l i ty is taken as a negative modal i ty of

compar ison. Today, forms of compar ison are typ ical ly d ist inguished by the ab

sence

or

presence

of

h istor ica l connectedness: simi lar p henomena that are remote

in space and t im e can be compared by a log ic of analogy or paral le l ism, whereas

phenomena that are k n o w n to share a developmental source or to have been in

contextual in ter re lat ionship can be analyzed genealogically or h is to ri ca l ly (Marc

Bloch 1 9 6 7 : 4 7 ; G o u l d 1 9 8 9 : 2 1 3 ) . This clear-cut d ist inct ion between analogy

and genealogy does not, h owever , fu l ly c haracter ize previous models of compar

ative discourse.

It is easy to forget that for m i l lenn ia the dominan t mode of cross-cul tura l

understanding, whether deal ing with re l ig ion or any o ther cul tura l phenomena,

was ethnocentr ism, that is, the view that other societ ies can be placed on a c o n

t i nuum of fami l ia r to strange, calculat ing out from one's immediate neighbors to

the most remote peoples. Herodotus, commenting on the customs of Persia, notes

that ethnocentrism frequently correlates with an assumption of moral super ior i ty:

Most of all they [Persians] ho ld in honor themselves, then those who dwell next

to themselves, and then those next to them, and so on, so that there is a pro

gression in honor in relation to the distance. They hold least in honor those

whose habitation is fur thest from their own . This is because they think them

selves to be the best of mank ind in everything and that others have a hold on

v i r tue in propor t ion to their nearness; those that live furthest away are the

most base. (Herodotus

1 9 8 7 : 9 6 )

Herodo tus h imse l f , on the o ther hand, was qu ick to locate the source of much

of Greek cul ture, especia l ly its r e l ig ion , i n " b a r b a r i a n " t r ad i t i on s of Persia and

Egyp t, proposing thereby

a

mode l

of

borrowing and d i f fusion that angered Greek

chauvin ists such as Plutarch, who comp la ined , "no t on ly is he [He rodo tus] anx

ious to establish an Egyp t ian and a Phoenician Herakles; he says that our own

Herakles was born after the other two, and he wants to remove him from Greece

and make a fore igner ou t of h i m " ( P lu t a rch ,

D e Herodoti Malignitate,

quoted in

Bernai

1 9 8 7 : 1 1 3 ) .

In medieval Arabic cul ture str ict ly l inear ethnocentr ism was mod i f ied by a

systematic ecological determinism according t o which societ ies were located in

zones star t ing just above the equator (Al-Azmeh

1 9 9 2 ) .

Those peoples enjoying

the temporate cl imes

of the

m idd le zones (Ch ina , Arab ia , Ind ia ,

etc.) are

most

favored, whi le those exist ing at the southern and nor thern extremes are v i c t ims

o f d is temper—le tha rgy for b lack-sk inned Af r i cans and indolence for pale-

sk inned S lavs. Acco rd ing to A l - A zm e h , the r i g o r of app l i ca t ion o f t h i s d e t e r m i n

ist ic model of c ross-cu l tu ra l typo logy was i tse l f cond i t ioned by the Arab eva lua

t i o n o f the societies to be unders tood :

It was a socia l judgement which u l t imately determined the degree to wh i ch

credence would be given to geographical determinism, and th is determinism

was applied mercilessly only in the construct ion of sheer barbar ism, w hich was

not merely a d istemper with varying degree of severity, but fu l ly a d isnature.

(Al-Azmeh 1992 :8)

The inherent d i f f icu l t ies of compara t i ve unders tand ing were we l l a r t i cu la ted

by Jean-Jacques Rous seau, wh o, despite Lévi-Strauss s

( 1 9 7 6 : 3 3 )

p ronouncemen t

of h is being the " founder of the science of m a n , " wa r n e d t h at the pe r iod of E u

ropean exp lo ra t ion wou ld not l i ke ly y ie ld re l iab le knowledge of o ther cul tures

because of the e thnocentr ic b l inders o f the observers:

I am persuaded that we have com e to kn o w no o ther men except Europeans;

moreover it appears from the r id icu lous pre judices, which have not died out

even among men of letters, that every author produces under the pompous

name of the study of man noth ing much more than a study of the men of his

own coun t r y .

. . . One

does

not

open

a

book

of

voyages without f inding

de

scriptions of characters and customs, but one is altogether amazed to f ind that

these authors who describe so many things tell us only what all of them knew

already, and have only learned how to see at the other end of the wor ld wha t

they wo uld have been able to see withou t leaving their ow n street, and that the

real features which distinguish nations, and which strike eyes made to see

them, have almost always escaped their notice. (Rousseau 1 9 8 4 : 1 5 9 )

Rousseau did not, however , g ive up on compar ison , for he though t tha t i t w o u l d

be possible to replace the b iased vis ion of these "sai lors, merchants, sold iers, and

missionar ies" (Rousseau

1 9 8 4 : 1 5 9 )

w i t h a true scienti f ic study of o the r cu l tu res

that would yie ld increased sel f-knowledge. His own ref lect ions on the o r ig ins of

i nequa l i ty , for instance, per formed a shocking inversion of the more usua l e thno

centr ism

by

arguing that the degree

of

human inequal i ty radical ly increases with

civi l izat ion and that individuals eager for the inst i tu t ional benefi ts of progress in

fact "all ran toward the i r cha ins be l iev ing tha t they were secu ring the i r l i be r ty "

(Rousseau 1 9 8 4 : 1 2 2 ; see J. E M a cCa n n e l l 1 9 8 1 ) .

W i t h the expansion of European colonia l ism and its suppor t ing ideo log ica l

m a t r i x of evolut ionism in the n ineteenth century, compar ison of cu l tu res f r e

quently involved the paradoxical pr incip les of d i f ferentia l development and ge

ne t ic exp lana t ion . Acco rd ing to the f i rst, societ ies pass through a sequence of

stages of evo lu tiona ry p rog ress ( "savagery ," "b a rba r ism ," and " c i v i l i za t i o n ," i n

the terms of several key wr i ters) culminating in the scienti f ic rat ion al ism of m o d

e rn European cu l tu re ; acco rd ing to the second, inexpl icable phenomena later in

t i m e are accounted for by uncover ing their rat ional or ig ins at an ear l ier poin t in

i6i I Social Theory and Social Action

Comparison, Pragmatics, and Interpretation I 163



1

9^7'-57

2

-) - C l yd e K l u ckh o h n ( 1 9 6 0 : 1 3 7 — 3 9 ) p rov ides a more soph is t i ca ted ac

coun t o f the typo log ica l s t ra tegy:

Such enquiry, exposing the pr incip les of cul tu ra l struc ture, wou ld take us some

distance toward ranging 'cul tures in an order ly way as to their respective simi

lar i t ies and d i f ferences. I t would a lso help us to iso late wherein rests the

distinctiveness of each particular culture at a given time level—the "without-

whic h-not" of that cul ture. . . . For typological models of structure and process

we need to abstract from immediate ly visib le "real i ty," d isengaging the

acc i

dental by including in the models only those aspects of the observable that are

relevant to the model being constructed.

Typo log ies can a lso be const ructed by spec i fy ing the imp l i ca t iona l r e la t ions

among a set of var iables, such that one var iable presupposes a second var iable

but not vice versa: for example,

do ut des

( "g ive in o rde r to rece ive ") r i tua l i sm

and macrocosm-microcosm cosmo logy (He imann 1 9 5 7 ) o r "dena tu ra l i zed"

p h i l

osophical d iscourse and the asser t ion of universal truth cla ims (Gr i f f i ths

1 9 9 0 : 8 0 ) .

A l l emp i r i ca l cases a re cons is ten t wi th the d i rec t ion o f the imp l i ca t ion

but the posi ted universal regular i ty does not predict the presence of the var iables

in spec if i c cases. A t h i rd k ind o f typo logy , in add i t ion to those based on d icho t -

omiza t ion and imp l ica t iona l r e la t ions, i s semio t i c typo logy , wh ic h o rgan izes

c u l

tu ra l da ta in te rms o f some "maste r t r ope , " such as me tonomy o r me taphor ,

textual i ty or ru les, prescr ipt ive or per formative, and signi f ier or signi f ied (Jame

so n 1 9 7 9 : 6 8 ) . The logical danger here is that the analyst must locate the com

parative enterpr ise i tse l f in one of the hypothesized typological spaces, which

imp l ies tha t c ompar ison is jus t ano the r t r ope (Rochberg -Ha l ton i 9 8 5 : 4 i o ) .

4

The most famous exponen t o f the compara t i ve me thod o f r econst ruct ion in

re l ig ious s tud ies i s Georges Dumézi l . W i thou t underest ima t ing the s i tua t iona l

crea t iv i ty and in te rcu l tu ra l bo r rowings f ro m ou ts ide the Indo -European he r i tage ,

Dum ézi l postu la tes the pers is tence o f "co mm on und er ly ing s t ruc tu res" (L i t t le ton

1 9 7 4 : 1 7 3 )

th roughou t the Indo -European wor ld , f r om Ved ic Ind ia to Ce l t i c I r e

l a n d ,

par t icu lar ly the representat ion in cosmology and h istory of dei t ies, powers,

and soc ia l fo rma t ions be long ing to th ree d is t inc t funct ions, "mag ica l sove r -

e in ty , " "war r io r power , " and "peace fu l fecund i ty" (Dumézi l

1 9 8 8 : 1 2 1 ) .

D u

mézil asserts that

the comparative study of the most ancient documents from India,

I ran ,

Rome,

Scandinavia, and Ireland has allowed us to give [Indo-European civilization] a

content and to recognize a great number of facts about civilization, and espe

cially religion, which were common to these diverse societies or at least to sev

eral of them. ... It seems hardly imaginable that chance should have twice

created this vast structure, especially in view of the fact that other Indo-Eu

ropean peoples have homologous accounts. The simplest and humblest expla

nation is to admit that the Romans, as well as the Scandinavians, received this

scenario from a common earl ier tradi t ion and that they simply modernized i ts

t ime.

The paradox arises because instances of failed progress, whether in spatially

d istant "pr imit ive" societ ies or in local i r rat ional superst i t ions or residual socia l

inequa li t ies , a re p rob lematic "su rv iva ls" o r " rem nan ts" o f m odern i ty ' s h is to r i ca l

tra jectory. Our knowledge of the past, thus, depends on the contemporary per

sistence of societ ies and customs that once had coherent meaning (Stocking

1 9 8 7 : 2 3 0 ) .

Whereas in the la te e igh teen th cen tu ry Johann Go t t f r ied Herde r

( 1 9 8 8 : 7 5 )

cou ld a rgue tha t " remnan ts o f the o ld , t r ue fo lk poe t r y" o f Eu rope

ought to be col lected before they vanish with the "dai ly advance of our so-cal led

culture," n ineteenth-century evolut ionists were more l ike ly to urge that such sur

vivals should, in the spir i t o f enl ightened rat ion al ism, be e i ther reform ed or erad

icated.

Appl ied as a general pr incip le of compar ison, then, the doctr ine of sur

vivals st ipulates that

the fragmentary and d isjo inted nature of cer ta in custom s—their poor in tegra

tion into a people's way of life, and the nonsensical nature of people's ratio

nales for them—is itself one of the telltale signs that they are a survival from

earlier times when they formed a more nearly seamless part of the web of life.

In the West, it is this same fragmentary nature of certain customs that is taken

as justifying the comparativist in arranging them serially across cultures: the

less a custom appears to be integrated into life, that is, the less intelligible it isper

se

(or to those who now practice i t) , the more legi t imate becomes the w r i t

er's assimilation of it into a list of similar customs practiced around the world.

(Campany

1 9 9 0 : 1 6 )

I have mentioned l inear ethnocentr ism, sel f-cr i t ica l ref lexivi ty, and evolu

t ionary survivals as three models for compar ison that permeate cross-cul tura l un

derstanding with moral evaluations. In much contemporary d iscourse, in

c o n

trast, such b latant evaluative stances are out of favor , as comparativists attempt

to ground their work in more pr incip led research strategies, perhaps ref lect ing

the fact that scholarship takes p lace in a (post)modern wor ld character ized more

by the co l lage o f wha t Cl i f fo rd Geertz ( 1 9 8 6 : 1 1 4 ) ca l ls "clashing sensib i l i t ies in

inevadable contact" than by automomous cul tura l iso lates. Al though I wi l l not

attempt to g ive a comprehensive l ist ing here, several prom inent strateg ies—ty pol

ogy, reconstruct ion, hermeneutics, and reductionism—need to be br ief ly charac

te r i zed.

3

Compar ison by typology involves generating a set of analyt ica l parameters,

the values of wh ich enable the analyst to locate d i f ferent cul t ura l systems on one

or more continua of d i f ference. As comparative work proceeds both the values

and the parameters are modif ied, ref ined, and expanded as addit ional data are

gathered.

An th ropo log is ts a re pa r t i cu la r l y p rone to d icho tomize the soc ie t ies

they study into poles such as hot and cold, classi f icatory and instrumental , egal

i ta r ian and h ie ra rch ica l , Ar is to te l ian and H erac l i tean , and g roup and g r id ;

s im

i lar ly, comparative phi losophers st i l l struggle with the simpl ist ic opposit ion de

veloped by Hegel of Western subject ivism and Or ienta l universal ism (Hegel

164 I Social Theory and Social Action

Comparison, Pragma tics, and Interpretation

I

16$



details, adapting them to their own "geography," "h istory," and customs and

introdu cing the names of countries, peoples, and heroes suggested by actuality .

(Dumézil 19 70 , 1:63—73)

According to th is method, compar ison is made possib le by the recognit ion of

simi lar i t ies among tradi t ions known to have been genetica l ly re lated. The specif

ics of local var iat ion from the reconstructed prototype cannot, however , be ex

p la ined without invoking addit ional arguments of a socio logical or h istor ica l

na tu re (L inco ln

1 9 9 1 : 1 2 3 ) .

In clever hands, of

course,

s im i la r it ies to an impu ted

prototype can be used to hypothesize h istor ica l connection, as in Car lo Ginz-

burg 's attempt to trace, fo l lowing the pr incip le that " isomorphism establ ishes

i d e n t i t y "

( 1 9 9 1 : 1 8 ) ,

ear ly modern ecstat ic bel ie fs and practices to an or ig in in

the nomadic shamanism of Scandinavian and Siber ian paleol i th ic peoples.

Reflect ive hermeneutics, especia l ly as defined and practiced by the phi loso

pher Paul Ricoeur , is an impor tant recent development in comparative scholar

ship in the humanit ies and socia l sciences. By modifying the classic "hermeneu-

t i ca l c i r c le " f r om be ing a pa r t - to -who le re la t ionsh ip

within

the doma in o f

understanding to the reciprocal d ia lect ic between tex tua l exp lana t ion ( i .e . , l i n

guist ics) and textual understanding, Ricoeur 's method of in terpretat ion appro

pr iates the texts of temporal ly d is tant cul tures in the service of s el f-understanding

(Ricoeur 19 7 6 , i 9 9 i : n 8 ) .

s

Through interpretat ion, people l iving in a scienti f ic

wor ldview are able to recapture a lost d imension of human understanding, the

myth ico -symbo l ic wor ld o f a r chaic cu l tu res (Ricoeur 1 9 6 7 : 3 5 0 — 5 2 ) :

No interpreter in fact will ever come close to what his text says if he does not

live in the aura of the m eaning that

is

sought. An d yet i t is only by understand

ing th at we can believe. The second immediacy, the second naïveté that we are

after, is accessible only in hermeneutics; we can believe only by interpreting.

This is the "m odern" modal i ty of bel ief in symbols; expression of moderni ty's

distress and cure for this distress. . . . But thanks to this hermeneutic circle, I

can today stil l communicate with the Sacred by explicating the preunderstand-

ing which animates the interpretat ion. Hermeneutics, chi ld of "m oderni ty," is

one of the ways in w hich th is "m oderni ty" overcomes i ts own forgetfu lness ofthe Sacred. (Ricoeur

1 9 7 4 3 : 2 9 8 )

Of cou rse , the modern e f fo r t to th ink th rough p r imord ia l symbo ls , me taphors ,

and a l legor ies enta i ls a demythologization in which cr i t ica l object ivi ty resists an

equal d ia logue with the "a l ien" text, since th is ear l ier text conta ins only a pre-

theoretica l level of in terpretat ion. This kind of comparative enterpr ise can easi ly

become self-serving, especia l ly i f the myths of other cul tures are studied not with

the in ten t o f g rasp ing the i r mean ing and funct ion in the i r o r ig ina l con text bu t

rather for personal needs of acquir ing pear ls of ancient wisdom (O'Flaher ty

1 9 8 6 : 2 2 6 ) .

Var ious works of compar ison, f inal ly, are based on kinds of reductionism,

that is, on the f inding of extra-systematic factors that account for the under lying

pa t te rns o f s im i la r i ty o f cu l tu ra l phenomena . These fac to rs can be loca ted , fo r

example, in ecological var iables, b io logical constra ints, sociobio logical adapta

t i o n s ,

impu ted fac ts o f human na tu re , o r the s t ruc tu re o f the human mind , bu t

a l l o f these a rgumen ts sha re the l im i ta t ion o f t r ea t ing va r ia t ion as bo th random

and epiphenomenal.

Comparative Philosophy of Religion as a Discipline

This account of three ear ly patterns and four more recent strategies of com

par ison p rov ides a me thodo log ica l backd rop fo r examin ing the po ten t ia ls and

prob lems o f the newly const i tu ted d isc ip l ine o f the compara t i ve ph i losophy o f

re l i g ion .

The papers presented in the conference ser ies offer three d i f ferentia l ly

weighted ways that th is new discip l ine can be operational ized. For some, the d is

cip l ine is the comparative philosophy o f r e l ig ions, tha t i s , the s t r i c t l y ph i losoph

ical study, grounded in a comparative perspective, of the phenomena of re l ig ion.

Whi le th is perspective takes a re lat ive ly narrow view of the analyt ica l d iscourse

r e q u i r e d ,

i t a l lows a broad acceptance of the range of phenomena to be consid

e red " re l ig ion . " And , acco rd ing to th is pe rspect ive , the mo t ive fo r compar ison

l ies p r imar i l y wi th the ph i losoph ica l l y o r ien ted ana lys t , r a the r than wi th in the

realm of re l ig ion. For others, the d iscip l ine is the comparative [s tudy o f ] ph i los

oph ies o f r e l ig ions; th is imp l ies a we l l - de l im i ted ob ject o f the invest iga t ion ,

namely, texts (or d iscourses, in the case of nonl i terate cul tures) created by

p h i

losophers of re l ig ion ( including esoter ic specia l ists and r i tual e lders) , yet a l lows

for considerable f lexib i l i ty in the analyt ica l methods used, including h istory,

e t h

nography, and phi lo logy. Final ly, for several par t icipants the d iscip l ine can be

character ized as the comparative phi losophies

of religions,

tha t i s , the s tudy o f

the expl ici t doctr ines or impl ici t stances of var ious phi losophers, re l ig ious th ink

ers,

and re l ig ious t rad i t ions toward o the r c u l tu ra l t r ad i t ions (T racy

1 9 9 0 : 1 5 ) .

In

contrast to the other two approaches, th is view impl ies that the comparative im

pu lse comes f rom the re l ig ious th inke rs o r commun i t ies under s tudy. Much o f

the debate that made the Chicago conferences so l ive ly was caused by fu ndam en

ta l d isagreements as to how to accent the very name of the d iscip l ine being

c o n

s t ruc ted.

Bu t , more impor tan t l y , the r i ch cross-d isc ip l ina ry fe r t i l i za t ion tha t i s

revealed in the f inal papers results from a taci t agreement that these three per

spectives should be held in "essentia l tension" (Kuhn 1 9 7 7 ) , a col lect ive decision

tha t a l lows fo r a "p reven t ive p lu ra li s t i c me thodo logy" (Z i lbe rman 1 9 9 1 : 3 0 0 ) in

which h istor ians, phi losophers, ethnographers, and theologians are a l l welcome.

A cr i t ica l consequence of th is debate over the defin i t ion of the d iscip l ine is

the v i ta l impor tance o f the un i fy ing recogn i t ion tha t the mo t ive fo r compar ison

and construct ion of comparative d iscourse belong

both

to the work o f ana ly t i ca l

scholarship and to the wor ld of phi losophical and re l ig ious tradi t ions being stud

i ed.

At the obvious level, i f we set out to compare the phi losophy of re l ig ion

i66 I Social Theory and Social Action

Comparison, Pragmatics, and Interpretation I 16 '7



in e i ther formal shape or declared purpose the status of being an abstract, com

ple te ,

or true account of compar ison, th is d iscourse fa i ls to achieve cr i t ica l se l f-

awareness of i ts own pragmatic features.

So compara t i ve ana ly t ics and compar isons w i th i n t r ad i t ion s b o th have prag

matic d imens ions tha t need to be cr i t i ca l l y iden t i f ied . As a f i r s t app rox ima t ion ,

seve ra l th ings migh t be inc luded in an accoun t o f the p ragmat ics o f any d is

cou rse : the pe rsona l mo t ives o r ins t i tu t iona l in te rests beh ind the p roduct ion o f

t e x t s ;

the con textua l l y g rounded p resuppos i t ions and imp l ica t ions o f tex ts ; the

st rateg ic des ign o r rhe to r ica l o rgan iza t ion o f tex ts tha t con t r ibu tes to the i r func

t ion o r e f f i cacy; the soc ia l d ispers ion o f tex ts wi t h in a cu l tu re , such as the eva l

ua t ive oppos i t ion be tween h igh and low cu l tu re , o f f i c ial and ca rn iva lesque (Bak-

h t i n

1 9 6 8 : 9 - 1 0 ) ,

or scholar ly and popular (Gurevich 1 9 8 3 ) ; exp l i c i t tex t - in te rna l

metapragmatic devices, such as per formatives and verba dicendi, a n d i m p l i c i t

me tap ragmat ic fo rms g round ed in a d iscou rse's tex tua l p rope r t ies , bo th o f w h ich

p rov ide a comm enta ry on the funct ion o f the d iscou rse in con tex t ;

6

the rea l - t ime

dynamics of in terpret ive acts as socia l ly real ized practices; and the inter textual

re la t ionsh ip among tex ts in a cu l tu re , inc lud ing the cha in o f commenta r ies on

texts (Don ige r

1 9 9 2 : 3 9 - 4 1 ) .

In sum, the pragmatics of d iscourse comprehends

almost every kind of meaningfu lness

other than

the decon textua l i zed , d is tan t i -

ated,

semantic meaning that Ricoeur

( 1 9 8 4 )

l abe ls the "sa id " o f the tex t .

Desp i te the fac t tha t many ph i losoph ica l tex ts a t tempt to c la im tha t they a re

decontextual ized d iscourses asser t ing universal truths, just as many re l ig ious tra

d i t ions cla im unique access to the "real ly

rea l , "

one of the jobs for analysts is to

discover the pragmatics of these d iscourses or cla ims. But the analyst 's d iscourse

is no t f r ee f r om p ragmat ics One o f the g reat dangers o f mod ern scho la rsh ip—

and the d isc ip l ine o f the compara t i ve ph i losophy o f r e l ig ion i s no excep t ion—is

to assume that our own inte l lectual models, research techniques, and academic

wr i t ings are not themselves subject to pragmatic considerations.

7

The u l t ima te

irony of the posi t ion advocated here is that, a l though our scholar ly acts of com

par ison can be fundamental ly homologous to the comparative doctr ines, stances,

and encounters revealed in cross-cul tura l study, there is no reason in pr incip le to

model our comparative analyt ics on the specific comparative maneuvers we ob

serve in re l ig ious o r ph i losoph ica l t r ad i t ions. Wh i le the ub iq u i ty o f compara t i ve

discourse and cross- tradi t ion inter face can lead us to the universal set of prag

mat ic cond i t ions and imp l ica t ions o f compar ison , ou r comprehens ion , though i t

se l f an act of compar ison, is not compel led by any par t icu lar d iscoverable model.

Comparison and Interpretation as Practical Reason

At f i rst g lance, the appl icat ion of the notion of "practica l reason" to the f ie ld

of re l ig ion seems to be an uneasy juxtaposit ion of opposites, since the d ivision

between re l ig ious practice and phi losophical or theological d iscourse can corre l-

ar t icu lated by, say, Hume and Hegel, i t wi l l be impor tant to grasp the ro le of

conclusions about comparative understanding found

in

the i r ph i losoph ical tex ts ;

at the less obvious level, i f we are to compare the impl ici t phi losophies of, say,

medieval Islam and medieval Chr ist iani ty, par t of the task wi l l be to d iscover the

stances toward other re l ig ions embodied

in

these re l ig ious tradi t ions.

This is not to say, of course, that our scholar ly compar ison wi l l be identica l ,

in in te l lectual motive or wr i t ten d iscourse, to the comparative motives or d is

courses under study. Whi le phi losophers and re l ig ious tradi t ions may provide

modern scholars with usefu l tools for comparative analysis—the notions of anal

ogy (Yearley

1 9 9 0 ) ,

metaphor (Poole

1 9 8 6 b ;

Schweiker

1 9 9 2 : 2 7 1 ) ,

and "super -

impos i t ion " (Clooney n .d . :ch . 5 ) , for example, have proven par t icu lar ly help

fu l—I do no t th ink tha t we can s imp ly bo r row their models of understanding as

our models of understanding. To the degree that research increasingly reveals the

r ichness of the interpret ive, comparative, metapractica l (Kasul is 1 9 9 2 ) , o r me ta

pragmatic (Si lverste in 1 9 9 3 ) resources of phi losophical texts and re l ig ious tradi

t i o n s , th is str icture becomes increasingly d i f f icu l t to obey. Three options seem to

be open to those who confront th is d i lemma: to appropr iate local in terpret ive,

comparative, and metapragmatic models as our analyt ica l tools (e.g., u s i n g T h o -

mist ic analogy to understand Menc ius ) ; to take these local d iscourses under study

as equal d ia logic par tners with reference to our analyt ica l d iscourses (e.g., c o m

par ing their metaphors with our metaphors) , ideal ly leading simultaneously to the

"pr eservation" of the other 's d iscourse (as Hal l isey

[ 1 9 9 4 ]

argues) and the sharp

ening of our conceptual tools; and to f ind in these local d iscourses necessary

l imitat ions and b iases which in pr incip le exclude them from shar ing in the task

of analysis yet which expand the range of th ings the analyst is forced to compre

hend (Taylor

1 9 8 5 ) .

Why is i t so dangerous to d ign i fy loca l " theo r ies" o f compar ison wi th the

status of explanatory models? First, these kinds of local theor ies are often rat io

nal izat ions, just i f icat ions, or secondary e laborations th at must themselves be

pen

etrated in the act of analysis. Second, they often lack t ime perspective and thus

cannot begin to account for changes in e i ther h istor ica l si tuations or ideological

assumpt ions. Th i rd , they tend to be decon textua l i zed abst ract ions tha t " i r on

out" the contextual or indexical d imensions of exper ience, ignor ing precisely

those pragmatic aspects of phi losophical reasoning and re l ig ious action that are

subject to only l imited sel f-awareness (Si lverste in 1 9 8 1 a ) . Fou r th , they o f ten fo

cus on semantic, proposit ional, or referentia l d imensions of d iscourse and miss

the meaningfu lness of rhetor ica l , organizational, and structura l d imensions of

texts and actions. Final ly, they are inherently posi t ional with in society, whether

the product of e l i tes, radicals, or wor ld renouncers, and need to be l inked to

al ternative, competing, or contradictory theor ies from elsewhere in the hetero-

g lossic socia l order . Taken to gether , a l l these conclusions p oint to the same gen

eral pr incip le: to the degree that a phi losophical or re l ig ious d iscourse approaches

i68 I Social Theory

and

Social Action

Comparison, Pragmatics,

and

Interpretation I

169



a te wi th the d ist inct ion between effect ive act ion and d iscursive reasoning. In

o the r words, the f ie ld of religion seems to have pragmatics in the f ie ld of r i tua l

and reason in the realm of doct r ine or phi losophical argumentation, thus leaving

l i t t le room for a un i f ied no t ion of pract ica l reason. Fur thermore, what is p r a c t i

cal , name ly , r i tua l ac t ion , is not par t icu lar ly subject to e f f i c ien t a r t i cu la t ion or

phi losophical scrut iny. Also, both r i t u a l , w i t h its tendency tow ard decon textua l -

ized semiotic form (see Chapter 6) and re l ig ious d iscourse, with its a t ten t ion to

transcendent real i t ies, often p lace re l ig ion

at the

opposite pole from

the

u t i l i ta r

ia n or functional concerns o f everyday l i fe , which can be taken to be the locus

of practica l rat ional i ty (Maur ice Bloch 1 9 7 4 : 7 8 ) .

On closer inspection, however , practica l reason does p lay a c r i t i ca l r o le i n

re l ig ious tradi t ions. Cross-cul tura l ly, re l ig ious phenomena that could be l isted un

der the rubr ic of pract ica l reason include: the embodim ents of d i v i n i t y i n mater ia l

tokens such as sacraments, amu lets, icons, and masks; re l ig ious practices of so

c ia l i za t ion , indoct r in a t ion , in i t ia t ion , and d isc ip l ine ; r i tua l ac ts wi t h e f fec t i ve or

even per form ative f orce, such as b lessing, anathem atization, an d heal ing; rhetor

ical devices in r e l ig ious c ommu n ica t ion , p reach ing , and conve rs ion ; the n o r m a

t i ve , e th ical d imension of re l ig ious l i fe and r e l ig ious th ink ing ; and the exp l i c i t

phi losophical expression

of the

rel ig ious val id i ty

of

pract ica l reason

as an

a l ter

native to theoretical reason in no t ions such as myst ica l pa r t i c ipa t ion , coincidentia

oppositorum, an d the absurdi ty of bel ie f.

8

To th is rather obvious l ist of dimensions of pract ica l reason in religion needs

t o be added

comparison,

seen both as the h istor ica l in ter face of r e l ig ious t rad i

t ions and as a topic for phi losophical and theological d iscourse about re l ig ion. In

fac t , if there is a tendency for the d iscip l ine of the comparative phi losophy of

re l ig ion t o f ission between the study of the cu l tu ra l -h is to r i ca l d imens ion o f

re l i

gious tradi t ions and the study of phi losophical d iscourses about re l ig ion, carefu l

attention to the impor tance of compar ison can be a use fu l expe r imen t in self-

cr i t ic a l d ia logu e, since there appears to be a complex d ia lect ic or reciprocal feed

back between histor ica l circumstances and phi losophical ref lect ions: on the one

h a n d ,

the h istor ica l encounter between re l ig ious tradi t ions can compel phi losoph

ical and theological theor izing about compar ison; on the o ther hand , ph i losoph

ical posi t ions and theological doctr ines can p lay powerfu l ro les in p rest ruc tu r ing

the exper ience of re l ig ious inter face.

In comment ing on her e thnographic f ie ldwork in New Guinea, where smal l-

scaled societies live i n c lose p rox im i ty wi t h in te r lock ing exchange re lat ionsh ips,

Mead

( 1 9 6 4 : 2 8 1 )

generalized:

I t can, I believe, be demonstrated that contiguity and close interrelationship

between groups with differing communicational styles increase awareness that

various aspects of the communicational system are learned, can be taught, and

are transmissible to others who are not bo rn wi th them.

T h u s , the phi losopher and the religious leader are b rough t in to a h ierarchical

re lat ionship, since Ar istot le and M u h a m m a d can only enter in to a non l ingu is t i c

This heightened sensib i l i ty to the co nven t iona l i ty of cu l tu ra l sys tems as a r esu l t

of h istor ica l encounter presents cer ta in d i f f icu l t ies for re l ig ious and ph i losoph ica l

t r ad i t ions, bo th o f w h i c h , in many cases at least, try to m a ke a c l a i m o f u n i q u e

ness and abso luteness. Thus , when re lig ious t rad i t ions come in to h is to r i ca l c o n

tac t the encounter often becomes par t of b roader po l i t i ca l and economic power

re lat ions put i n to p lay , though it is a m is take to analyze these si tuations sole ly

f r o m the p o i n t of v iew of the agency of the domin an t fo r ce in the i n te r face . The

range

of

h is to r i ca l s tances runs f rom fana t ica l exc lus iv ism 's d ic ta t ing

the

re jec

t i o n and condemna t ion o f the O the r so that no co m m u n i ca t io n is deemed po ss i

b le (Ti l l ich 1 9 6 3 : 3 1 ) ; to the zealous proselyt izing of missions to conve r t the

O t h e r ; to r espect fu l jux tapos i t ion fac i l ita ted by a tho roughgo ing a l lego r iz ing o f

the O the r ' s tex ts and doct r ines in an e f fo r t to make the fo reign seem " the sam e"

(J . Z. Smi th

1 9 8 7 : 1 0 1 ) ;

to creative form s of syncre t i sm, b lend ing , and h ie rach i -

cal layer ing; to e ffor ts at mu l t i cu l tu ra l d ia logue p red icated e i the r on the r e la t i v is t

assumption of the formal equivalence o f dei t ies, cosmologies, or r i tua l p ract i ces

o r on the inclusivist assumption of the construct ive benefi t of m o d i f y i n g the

" r e a d i n g "

of the l oca l t r ad i t ion th rough the perspective of an a l ien t r ad i t ion

(Clooney

1 9 8 9 : 5 4 7 ; 1 9 9 0 ) .

Walker 's

( 1 9 9 4 )

analysis

of

a l-Farabi,

a

ten th -cen tu ry Is lamic ph i losopher ,

il lustrates a par t icu lar ly clear case o f compar ison by h ie ra rch ica l syn thes is .

9

In

the con f ron ta t ion—rea l or hypo the t ica l—be tween Greek ph i losophy, pe rson i f ied

by Ar is to t le , and Islamic re l ig ion, epi tomized by its fo u n d er M u h a m m a d , a l - F a

rabi mainta ins the formal identi ty of the great phi losopher and the great re l ig ious

founder , but only on the condit ion that each of t he two ro les operates according

to the guidel ines of "theoretica l" reason, the pr incip les of wh ich were d iscovered

by Ar istot le . Theoretica l reason leads to un ive rsal , log ica l ly demonst ra ted k no wl

edge,

whi le practica l reason depends on the l inguist ic expressions, representa

t iona l fo rms, and rhetor ica l techniques of pa r t i cu la r cu l tu res. A I -Fa rab i wr i tes :

There are two ways of mak ing a th ing comprehensib le: f i rst, by causing its

essence

to be

perceived

by the

intellect,

and

second,

by

causing

it to be

imag

ined through the simi l i tude that imitates i t . . . . Now when one acquires know l

edge of the beings or receives instruction in them, if he perceives their ideas

themselves with his intellect, and his assent to them is by means of cer ta in

demonstration, then the science that comprises these cognitions is philosophy.

Bu t if they are kn o wn by imagin ing them through simi l i tudes that imitate

them,

and assent to what

is

imagined of them is caused by persuasive method s,

then the ancients call what comprises these cognitions religion. . . . In every

thing demonstrated by philosophy, religion employs persuasion. (al-Farabi

1 9 6 2 : 4 4 - 4 5 )

iyo I Social Theory and Social Action

Comparison, Pragmatics, and Interpretation I i j i



dia logue, that is, a k i n d of transparent communication anchored in universal

knowledge. Several centuries later the vector of h is h ierarchy was severely chal

lenged by Ibn K h a l d û n , who argued that phi losophers such as a l-Farabi and Avi-

cenna, in pu t t ing p r imacy on in te l lectual knowledge of corporeal existents,

completely overlook "spiritual essences"

( 1 9 6 7 : 4 0 2 ) .

Rather, argues Ibn Khaldûn,

when Muhammad guides us toward some perception, we must prefer that to

ou r

own

perceptions.

We

must have more confidence

in it

than

in

them.

We

must not seek to prove its correctness rationally, even if (rational intelligence)

contradicts it. We must believe and know what we have been com manded (to

believe and to kno w). We must be si lent with regard to things of th is sor t that

we do not un derstand. We must leave them to Muhamm ad and keep the in te l

lect out of it. (Khaldûn 1967 :390)

In contrast to th is theoretica l encompassment of Greek and Is lamic t r ad i

t i ons ,

Bandy 's

( 1 9 9 4 )

account of the loose synthesis of Buddh ism and C o n f u

cianism in sixteenth-century China suggests that practica l reason can also be a

mode l for "conversation" across re l ig ious or phi losophical systems. At the level

of off icia l doctr ine, Buddhism's stress on monast ic w or ld - re jec t ion and its l oca

t ion

of the

o r ig in

of

suffer ing

in

human des i re c lea r ly con t rast wi th Con fuc i

anism's focus on the wo r ld -a f f i rm ing r i tua l con d i t ion ing for publ ic l i fe and its

valor izat ion of desire as a posi t ive par t of human na tu re . Th e synthesis of these

two t rad i t ions a t ta ined in cer ta in neo-Confucian schools of the M i n g p e r i o d ,

however , largely avoided theoretica l d ispute by fo rmu la t ing a response in terms

of everyday socia l l i fe , popular fo lklo re, and l i terary fo rms . This uneasy synthesis

comb ined a creative notio n of desire

as

means fo r sp i r i tua l l i be ra t ion wi t h a c la im

that sagehood cannot be restr icted to the ru l ing class. In th is case, then, it is the

concrete h istor ica l exper ience of Chinese Buddhism that provides a usefu l model

fo r the "adven t i t ious" qua l i ty of cross-cul tura l d ia logue.

Several essays in th is th i r d vo lume exp lo re a second dimension of the opera

t i o n o f pract ica l reason in the phi losophy of re l ig ion, namely, the dynamic p ro

cess

of

interpretation.

In

some cases, th is dynamism involves

the

h is to r ica l t r a

jec to ry of the " w o r k " of hermeneutical practices; i n other cases, the dynamism

lies in the cu l tu ra l a t t itudes toward h is to ry , t ime , and change entailed by ph i lo

sophical posi t ions or re l ig ious doctr ines. What is r emarkab le, thoug h , is that in

terpret ive praxis is frequently a creative and s truc tur in g response to the compar

at ive encounter , e i ther with other re l ig ious tradi t ions or w i t h an ear l ier moment

o f the same t rad i t ion .

10

Poole 's account of the h istory of the B imin -Kuskusmin ' s con f ron ta t ion wi th

the West deta i ls the po werfu l ly conservative interpret ive practices of r i tual e lders

p r io r to the events of the "g rea t dest ruct ion " of t h e 1 9 4 0 s (Poole 1 9 8 6 a ; 1 9 9 2 ) .

The elders were able to provide satisfying explanations of var ious exper ienced

anomalies by re lying on the r ich metaphor ical resources of t h ei r "m y t h i c i m a g i -

n a t i o n " :

a strange phenomenon or th rea ten ing even t tha t canno t be mode led by

on e of several exist i ng p lan t metaphors

(e.g.,

r oo t as sou rce, in te r twin ing as in te r -

t e x t u a l i t y , and h u sk / co r e as sha l low/deep mean ing ) is defined away as not

c u l

tu ra l l y s ign i f i can t , tha t is, not leaving a " s ca r " on the cu l tu re ' s r i tua l "c en te r

place. " T h i s s i t u a t i o n of i n te rp re t i ve adequacy changed d ramat ica l l y a f te r a

group of r i tua l in i t ia tes bu rned to death in a f i re at Telefo l ip and after t he r e g i o n

exper ienced unusual sheet l ightn ing. No longer able to ma in ta in the pos i t ion tha t

anomalies

do not

scar

the

cen ter , T rum eng ,

a

p rominen t r i tua l e lde r , c rea ted

a

new mode of re l ig ious interpretat ion as a m i d d l e way between hermetic denia l

and cul tura l se l f-destruct ion (Poole 1 9 9 4 ) . 1° con t rast to the p rev ious he rm eneu-

ti c of ho l i sm, T rumeng advoca ted a new i n te rp re t i ve me thod g rounded in the

assertion of the analogy of anoma ly ; tha t is, T rumeng found in the co rpus of

m yt h s a d imens ion of h is to r i ca l p rax is ( inc lud ing t ransfo rma t ions, co r rup t ions,

and the progressive weakening of sp i r i t ) tha t was no t p rev ious ly focused on . The

cr isis si tuation of cu l tu ra l encoun te r cou ld n ow be modeled, since an anchored

homo logy (or " index ica l i con " [S i l ve rs te in 1 9 8 1 b ] ; see Chapter 4) can be estab

l ished between the i n te rp re ta t ion of p rax is (the d yn a m i sm i n the m y t h s ) and the

prax is of in terpretat ion ( the hermeneutical act ions of the r i tual e lders) . In e ffect,

Trumen g reasser ted at a h igher log ical level the encompassment of h is to ry by the

center place

in his

r ecogn i t ion tha t change

is an

essential feature

of both

t r a d i

t iona l myth and cu r ren t expe r ience , yet s t i l l w i thou t admi t t ing the poss ib i l i t y of

the O the r ' s power to forever scar the sacred center .

11

In terestingly, th is strongly pragmatic encompassment of h is to ry launched the

Bimin -Kuskusmin e lde rs on an in terpret ive path leading in the oppos i te d i rec

t ion—both geograph ica l l y and semio t i ca l l y . Now that th e sacred si te at Telefo l ip

to the west had been tarn ished, they worked to protect their own sacred site by

sever ing t ies with the w ide r in te rp re t i ve comm un i ty (by s topp ing the exchange

of sacra and r i tual personnel) and by e laborating an i n wa r d - l o o k i n g , i n t e n t i o n

a l ly re f lex ive in te rp ret i ve p rog ram. Th i s , too , can be seen as an i con of t h e co m

parat i ve s i tua t ion , for the B im in -Kuskusm in responded to the next h is to r i ca l in

cu rs ion

of

m iss iona ries wi th "ph i losop h ica l " r a ther than r i tua l d iscou rse .

In con t rast to th is ana log ica l app l i ca t ion of myth ic me taphors , Pa t ton ' s

( 1 9 9 4 )

d iscussion o f the h istory of commentar ies on Veda 9 . 1 1 2 as a "p ract i ce

o f r e a d i n g " w i t h i n the Indian tradi t ion i l lustrates a p rocess invo lv ing bo th the

making exp l i c i t of what was in i t ia l ly textual ly presupposed in the Vedic text and

the recon textua l i zat ion o f the locus of tex tua l pe r fo rma t iv i ty . Th e chant sets out

mult ip le occupational ro les (carpenter , physician, smith, mi l ler , pr iest ly poet) that

str ive with d iverse means for the same ul t imate goal, namely, gold or ma te r ia l

w e a l t h .

Despite the over t paral lel ism and consequent equ al i ty of these paths to

wa r d we a l t h , the chant impl ies a fundamental h ierarchy, since the u tterance o f

this mantra

in a sacr i f icia l context (e.g., the pound ing of Soma) is the p e r f o r m

ative means by w h i c h the pr iest ly group gains its wea l th and asserts its socia l



ij4 I Social Theory and Social Action



come c learer about it s m etho d o lo gy of c o m par iso n , a lo ng at least three axes: mo

dality, scope, and g r o u n d . By modality I refer to the status of the t e rm s of c o m

par i so n , whether im pu ted by the analyst , as in S c h r e m p p ' s ( 1 9 9 0 ) c o m p a r i s o n of

Mao ri c o sm o lo gy and Kant ia n phi lo so phy , Y ear ley ' s ( 1 9 9 0 ) c o m p ar iso n of M e n -

c ius and Aqu inas , and Pat to n ' s c o m par iso n of B enj am in ' s read ing of Parisian

arcades and Indian interp retations of V ed ic m antras , or m o t ivated by historical

l inkages ,

as is the

case

in the

artic les

by

Po o le , B ant ly , A l -Azm eh,

and

Stout

( 1 9 9 4 ) .

Th e

analyst must take ex tra care

in

m aking expl ic i t

the

m o t ivat io n

for

creating

the

artif ic ial juxtaposi tion. Imputed com pariso n across cultura l levels

( I n d i a / P a r i s , M a o r i / K a n t )

and

c o m par iso n b etween we l l -ar t ic u la ted sys tem s

( P l a t o / K ü k a i , M e n c i u s / A q u i n a s)

are

particu larly difficult .

By

sc o pe

I

m ean

the

range

of the

units

of

c o m p a r i s o n :

are the

u nit s ent i re phi lo so phic a l sys tem s ,

key

interpret ive m ec hanism s ( ana lo gy , typo lo gy , m etapho r) ,

or

spec ific religious doc

trines

or

philosoph ical princ iples (good actio n, mirac les)? Given that philos oph

ical discourse tends toward systematic formulation, comparison operating

at a

lesser scope requires vigilance against atomization

or

f ragm entat io n . F ina l ly ,

by

g r o u n d

I

m e a n

the

m etr ic , c r i te r ia ,

or

reaso n u po n whic h

the

c o m p a r i s o n

is

based . Whereas so m e au tho rs take

the

g ro u nd f ro m

one of the

units

to be

c o m

pared (usually from

the

Western o ne) , others a t tem pt c o m parat ive ana lys i s wi th

out realizing,

as the

present c o m m entary

has

insisted, that their scholarly activit

ies have deep historical roots and f ind echoes

in the

traditions u nder study.

8

Naturalization of Convention

To become aware that one is following a tradition and is dependent on it can

have

a

disturbing effect

on

persons

w ho

thought that they were free from

it.

Intellectual

and

literary traditions have much

in

common with substantive

traditions. Reason,

life, and

naturalness appear differently when their

proponents become conscious that these too are borne by

tradition.

Just as the

argument that one's unquestioned beliefs were particular

t o

one's

own

time

and culture unsettled those

w ho

espoused them

as

universally valid,

so the

perception that

t he

practice

o f

reason

and

naturalness

of

conduct

are

traditional

has a

similar unsettling effect.

—Edward Shils ( 1 9 8 1 : 3 0 9 )

Arbitrariness

an d

Motivation

THE CONTRIBUTION OF

rec e ived anthro po lo g ic a l wisd o m to the s tu d y of c o n

v e n t i o n a l i t y — w i s d o m I pro po se to c ha l lenge here—c an be s u m m a r i z e d as fo l

lo ws . F ro m the ex terna l perspec t ive of ana ly t ic a l re f lec t io n ( phi lo so phic a l ,

sc ientific , l inguistic , or e thno graphic ) so c ia l c o nvent io n appears a rb i t ra ry in s t i p

u la t ing a no n-natu ra l , so c ia l ly d er ived

retattonship^betweeria^regurative

or c o n

stitutive princ iple and its c o rrespo nd ing appro pr ia te c o n text ( d i f fe rent nat io ns

presc r ibe d r iv ing on d ifferent sides of the ro ad ) or be tween an express ive s ign

a n d its s ignified mean ing [arbor and kerrekar m e a n " t r e e " in d ifferent lan-*"

gu ages) . B ut f ro m the internal perspeciiv£jQlsc«JaLaçtors these sam e c o nvent io ns

appear nec essary :

if I

d r ive

on the

left side

of

the ro ad

in

th i s c o u ntry

I

wil l either

be arrested or c au se an ac c id ent ; if I w a n t to talk about trees in the B e lau an

langu age of M i c r o n e s i a I m u st use the pho net ic shape kerrekar. I nd eed , bec au se

i t wo u ld never o c c u r to me to c o ns id er the po ss ib i l i ty of an a l te rnat ive prac t ic e ,

I do not im agine m yse l f as fo l lo wing a rule at all as I d r ive or s p e a k . As Ben-

v e n i s t e ( 1 9 7 1 : 4 4 - 4 6 ) p o i n t s

out in his

c r i t iqu e

of

the Sau ssu rean d o c t r ine

of the

l inguistic sign, there

is no

real contradiction here, since

the

ex terna l o bse rver has

'1

the benefit

of

c o m parat iveSm o wled ge-o f d i f fe rent so c ie t ies , whi le " the ac t ive par

t ic ipant

is

o r iented to ward ac hiev ing im m ed iate c o m m u hT c af iönäT o r prag m at ic /

go a l s . Arb i t rar iness in

"these'"examples

refers

to the

lack

of

natu ra l

or

e x t e r n a l

m o t i v a t i o n b e t w e e n r u l e a n d c o n t e x t

or

be tween s igni f ier

and

s ign i f ied

and

not^

o f c o u r s e ,

to the

r a n d o m

or

f ree c ho ic e

of

ind iv id u a ls

(cf.

H o l b w k a

1 9 8 1 ) . ' In

1

7 5

ij6 I Social Theory and Social Action

Naturalization of Convention I 17 7



fact, absence of m otivati on implies the complete responsibility o f the co mmuni ty

as the sole authority for acknowledging—or, as Kripke

( 1982:89)

would say,

applying justification conditions to—one of several possible alternative relation

ships (Barthes

19883: 155—56).

A paradoxical consequence of this maximal social constraint for maximally

arbitrary rules is that individuals acting within a system have a tendency to re

gard conventions as naturally motivated, that is, as being

objective

rather than

V

socially constitu ted,

invariant

rather than malleable,

autonomous

rather than de

pendent,

eternal

rather than historical,

universal

rather than relative, and

neces

sary

rather than cont ingent. This sense of convention as second nature focuses,

thus , on the presuppo sed (Silverstein

1 9 7 9 : 2 0 3 ) ,

habitual (Whorf 1 9 5 6 ) ,

and automatized

Tr

(Havranek*t

^4

^9Tcharacter of socially legitimized rules.

Furthermore, the intensity of this sense of naturalness is often proportional to

the degree of systematicity of the convention in q uestion. Rules that fit into elab

orate^ coordinated systems reinforce each other through mutual implication and

s

*5

have the

poSSräTtö appear,

like nature, as

aK

autonomous,{Iniversal reality. In

addition to language, ritual (Bell

1 992 : 20 7) ,

the cô mm53ity-form (Lukâcs

1 9 7 1 ; Marx 1 9 7 6 : 1 6 3 - 7 7 ; Simmel 1 9 7 8 : 1 2 8 - 3 0 ; Habermas 1 9 8 3 : 3 5 8 ;

Bau

drillard 1 9 8 1 : 9 3 ) , law (Baibus

1 9 7 7 ;

Gabel 1 9 8 2 ) , and naturalism in art (Krie

ger

1 9 9 0 )

are cited in this regard, since each combines an extensive range of

relevance with a high level of interlocking coherence and thus appears as a total

i zed, reified entity.

This tendency for naturalization is not without important consequences for

the manipulation of power in society, for instituted conventions that enforce asym

metries of any sort—between chiefs and commoners, lords and peasants, older

and younger, men and women—will continue to be reproduced (and thus to re

produce the asymmetry) if taken as natural. On the other hand, widespread

awareness of the historical contingency of conventions and of the possibility of

alternative in stituti onal arrangements can lead to revolutio nary challenges to the

status

quo.

Bourdieu

( 1 9 7 7 : 1 6 4 - 6 7 )

discusses this relationship among natural

i za t ion ,

systems of symbolic classification, and social power as follows:

Every established order tends to produce .. . the naturalization of its o wn ar

bitrariness. Of all the mechanisms tending t o produce this effect, the most im

portant and the best concealed is undoubtedly the dialectic of the objective

chances and the agents' aspirations, out of which arises the

sense of limits,

commonly called the sense of reality, i.e. the correspondence between the ob

jective classes and the internalized classes, social structures and mental struc

tures,

which is the basis of the most ineradicable adherence to the established

order. Systems of classification which reproduce, in their own specific logic,

the objective classes, i.e. the divisions by sex, age, or position in the relations

of production, make their specific contribution to the reproduction of the

power relations of which they are the product, by securing the misrecognition,

and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on which they are based: in the

extreme case, that is to say, when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence be

tween the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (as in

ancient societies) the natural and social world appears as self-evident. This ex

perience we shall call

doxa,

so as to distinguish it from an orthodox or hetero

dox belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or

antagonistic beliefs. Schemes of thought and perceptions can produce the ob

jectivity that they do produce only by producing misrecognition of the limits

of the cognition that they make possible, thereby founding immediate adher

ence,

in the doxic mode, to the world of tradi tion experienced as a natural

w o r l d " and taken for granted. . . . The self-evidence of the world is redupli

cated by the instituted discourses about the world in which the whole group's

adherence to that self-evidence is affirmed. The specific potency of the explicit

statement that brings subjective experiences into the reassuring unanimity of a

socially approved and collectively attested sense imposes itself wi th the

author

ity

and

necessity

of a collective position adopted on data intrinsically amend

able to many other structurations.

There is, however, another side to this issue which Bourdieu does not fully

consider here, although he does address it in detail in his more recent work on

I

'd^stinction (Bourdieu

1 9 8 4 ) ,

namely, that conventions explicitly recognized by

hïêmbers of a society

as constituted

by the established ord er can serve as po

tent social indexes of the hierarchical distribution of power. In other words,

within a given community there can be a continuum of conventionality such that

those groups which execute rules with maximal delicacy or which are able to

impose normative judgments upon the performance of others thereby reinforce

their position of author ity. Rather than contrive to perpetuate the doxi c mod e

of unreflective, internalized acceptance, those in power celebrate their ty pi fy

i n g "

power by constructing conventional rules which are exaggerated in com

plexity (e.g. , poetry and ritual) or subject to rapid stylistic change (e.g. , manners

and fashion).

Furthermore, if social conventions do not always appear necessary from the

,actor's poinf~of view, they are also not always regarded as arbitrary by outside,

scientific 1

j r j p i i

Tu

fn I.

there is an-important,, if no t domi nant, trend i n West

ern social theory to deny the historic al, collective, and relative character of c o n

ventions by discovering various elements of motivation in these cultural c o n

structs. This theoretical .naturalization of convention involves (as wi ll be detailed

in the next section), for example, showing the deductive .necessity of instituted

rules, uncovering concealed practical rationality behind historically transmitted

customsôr positing adaptive mechanisms as the real

explanation

oHïguïâr so

cial practices. Far f rom transform ing the advantage of a comparative perspective,

what Benveniste

( 1 97 1 : 4 4 )

calls the impassive viewp oint of Sirius, into a vi -

ij8 I Social Theory and Social Action Naturalization of Convention I 179



sion of h istor ica l and cul tura l var iabi l i ty, these theor ies struggle to re introduce

universal explanatory pr incip les in order to argue that exist ing conventions are

the only possib le arrangements.

These pre l iminary observations about the l imitat ions of the received wisdom

about conventional i ty are suff icient to point out the need to reopen the question

of the re lat ionship between nature and convention as a dynamic process in both

socia l theory and socia l real i ty.

Naturalization in Social Theory

Economists have a singular method of procedure. There are only two kinds of

institutions for them, artificial and natural. The institutions of feudalism are

artificial institutions, those of the bourgeoisie are natural institutions. In this

they resemble the theologians, wh o likewise establish two kinds of religion.

,Ëvery religion which is not theirs is an invention of men, while their own is an

/ emanation from God. When the economists say that present-day relations —the

\ f

relations of bourgeois prod uctio n—a re natural, they imply that these are the

relations in which wealth is created and productive forces developed in

conformity with the laws of nature. These relations therefore are themselves

natural laws independent of the influence of time. They are eternal laws which

must always govern society. Thus there has been history, but there is no longer

any.

— K a r l M a r x ,

1 8 4 7 ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 1 0 — 1 1 )

A centra l dynamic in modern Western cul ture involves, on the one hand, the

.

insistence on the abi l i ty of individuals working together to rat ional ly establ ish the

conventions, ru les, or laws which are the foundation of socia l order and, on the

other hand, the attempt to ground these,constructed pr incip les in some supra-

his tor i ca l ,

transcendent, or natura l real i ty. That is, the socia l order is deemed

rational when i t is found to be the result of uncoerced, coordinated agreement

of atomic individuals whose decisions are subject to no external constra ints, but

then the socia l order so consti tu ted is legi t imized by appeal to eternal, immutable

postu lates. To put i t simply: the inst i tu t ions of society are as they are because we

agree to make them tha t way ( the "conven t iona l " moment) and at the same time

our system of socia l practices could not possib ly be other than i t is ( the "natura l"

moment) .

This seemingly paradoxical dynamic corresponds to a paradoxical att i tude

toward the concept of conventional i ty i tse l f . From one perspective, conventions

are posi t ive ly valued insofar as they register decision-making processes in which

the on ly reason beh ind the ag reed-upon ru le i s con t r ibu ted by th e pa r t i c ipan ts

i nvo lved.

This ideal of presupposit ionless agreement through the "marketp lace

of ideas" (Bosmaj ian 1 9 8 4 ) repudiates a l l external or imposed restr ict ions and

assumes that par t icipants br ing to negotiat ions identica l rat ional equipment. In

the words o f Kan t

( 1 9 7 0 : 5 5 ) ,

en l igh tenmen t cons is ts o f " the f r eedom to make

public use

o f one 's reason in a l l ma t te rs . " Thu s, ac t ions regu la ted by conven t ions

wi l l f u l l y and ra t iona l l y under taken a re no t seen as const ra ined , and those estab

l ished conventions whose or ig in does not l ie in expl ici t agreement persist only

because of continued mutual consent (see, e.g., Lewis

1 9 7 5 : 2 6 ) .

F rom a second

perspective, however , conventions are negative ly valued insofar as they appear to

be h is to r ica ll y t r ansmi t ted fo rmu las wh ic h con f ron t ra t iona l ac to rs as an oppres

s ive bu rden f ro m the past. Conven t ions in th is sense channe l th in k in g acco rd in g

to reasons

no t

suppl ied freely by those in the present. Again Kant

( 1 9 7 0 : 5 4 — 5 5 ) :

"Do gmas and fo rmu las, these mechan ica l ins t rumen ts fo r r a t iona l use (o r ra the r

misuse ) o f h is na tu ra l endowments , a re the ba l l and cha in o f h is pe rmanen t im

m a t u r i t y . "

No w the t roub le lies in the obv ious fac t tha t conven tions in the f i r s t "ag ree

ment" sense are destined to become conventions in the second "formula" sense,

g iven the un ive rsal cha racte r o f cu l tu res to t r ans mi t symbo l ic const ruc ts , inc lu d

i n g ,

for example, iso lated semiotic types, patterns for act ion, ar t ist ic genres, and

en t i r e wor ldv iew s, ra ther than a lways inven t them a f resh .

2

The re i s , then , a

t e n

dency fo r pos i t i v i s t i c modes o f d iscou rse to appea l to "na tu re " ( in a number o f

senses) in order to just i fy inher i ted conventions as being, after a l l , in per fect har

mony with some invar iable, object ive standard rather than as the result of coer

c ive ,

u n q u e s t i o n e d , a n d b i n d i n g " t r a d i t i o n " ( A c t o n

1 9 5 2 — 5 3 : 5 ;

Weber

1 9 7 8 : 3 2 6 ) .

Accordingly, the category "nature" receives paral le l a l ternative valu

a t i o n .

Nature is negative ly valued i f i t is viewed as an external constra int on the

exercise of individual rat ional i ty, and yet nature is posi t ive ly valued as the source

of val idation that inst i tu ted conventions are the only ones possib le.

To summar ize: conventions as present agreements are seen as whol ly a rb i - "

t r a r y const ructs , bu t conven t ions as h is to r ica l l y t r ansmi t ted fo rmu las a re taken

as na tu ra l i zed t ru ths . . —

The oppos i t ion be tween conven t ion and na tu re in Weste rn soc ial theo ry pa r

a l le ls the classical phi losophical speculat ion on the character of language. The

terms of these debates as establ ished in Greek thought need only a br ief review

here.

Using the then-standard contrast between the state of affa irs in the natura l

wor ld as i t is as a matter of fact

(physei)

and the conven t iona l ins t i tu t ions o r

op in ions resu l t ing f r om ag reemen t , custom, o r s t ipu la t ion

(thesei),

Plato c o n

structs the debate in the

Cratylus

between r iva l Heracl i tean and Eleatic views,

the fo rmer ins is t ing tha t language has a bu i l t - in ha rmony wi th na tu re indepen

dent of human intervention and the latter arguing that words are appropr iate for

their meanings only by customary choice. Socrates, the mediat ing character in

th is d ispute, shows how the re lat ionship between var ious phonetic real izat ions

and the co r respond ing " ideal name" i s indeed conven t ional and a rb i t r a r y , wh i le

the re la t ionsh ip be tween the " idea l name" and the immutab le wor ld o f fo rm is

natura l and universal .

i8o I Social Theory and Social Ac tion

Naturalization of Convention I 181



mensions: opacity (objects named do not d isplay their natures in their names) ,

mu tab i l i ty (new names a re bo rn da i l y ) , r e la t i v i ty (d i f fe ren t words a re in use in

d i f fe ren t na t ions) , and non icon ic i ty ( there i s no phys ical s im i la r i ty be tween n ame

and th ing ) . And ye t that we so invent words is a matter of necessi ty, due to the

na tu ra l l im i ta t ion o f human memory and the phys ical separa t ion be tween mind s.

As Hobbes ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 9 5 ) argues: "Therefore, i t is necessary for the acquisi t ion of

ph i losophy tha t the re shou ld be some s igns by wh ic h w ha t has been con t r i ved by

some migh t be d isc losed and made known to o the rs . " Aware o f the obv ious

p rob lem tha t faces any theo ry o f the conven t iona l o r ig in o f names, tha t " i t i s

incredib le that men once came together to take counsel to consti tu te by decree

wha t a l l wo rds and a l l connex ions o f words wou ld s ign i fy" (Hobbes

1 9 7 8 : 3 8 ) ,

Hobbes hypothesizes that the f i rst individuals agree on names of only a few ob

jects pointed out by God and then pass these names down through an ever-ex

pand ing t rad i t ion o f naming conven t ions. Wha t beg ins as a conven t iona l i s t ap

proach to meaning ends up as a causal, mechanist ic model of the development of

language . Fo r Hobbes, then , the a r t i f i c ia l i ty o f covenants and the conven t iona l i ty

of words are both anchored in necessi ty, since both are regimented by the

f u n

damen ta l no t ion tha t " reason is the law o f n a tu re " (Hobbes

1 9 2 8 : 1 5 0 ;

see also

Habermas

1 9 7 3 : 6 2 - 6 4 ) .

But as Sahl ins

( 1 9 7 6 ^ 9 6 )

notes, Hobbes reproduces

the h is to r ica l spec i f i c i ty o f marke t compe t i t ion as the image o f na tu re : "S ince

Hobbes, at least, the competi t ive and acquisi t ive character ist ics of Western man

have been con founded wi t h N a tu re , and the Na tu re thus fash ioned in the hum an

image has been in tu rn reapp l ied to the exp lana t ion o f Weste rn ma n ."

This tendency to locate a h istor ica l ly specif ic form of socia l re lat ions in the

state of nature character izes the pol i t ica l phi losophy of Locke as

we l l .

Locke de

fends an emergent bourgeois society against absolut ist, noble, and feudal powers

by arguing that state power 's pr imary responsib i l i ty is to protect and legi t imize

those fea tu res o f "c iv i l soc ie ty" wh ich de r ive no t f r om a r t i f i c ia l , con t ractua l

causes but from aspects of the natura l state. In par t icu lar , Locke attr ibutes to

th is s ta te o f na tu re bo th the r igh t to p r iva te p roper ty p roduced th rough

i n d i

v idua l labo r and the r igh t to un l im i ted accumu la t ion made poss ib le th rough

money. Civi l society thus appears to i tse l f as a natura l state, as a sel f- regulat ing,

au tonomous system requ i r ing no a rb i t r a r y const ructs to b r ing i t in to ex is tence .

The funct ion o f con t racts becomes, then , no t to const i tu te bu t ra the r to recog

nize a lready developing proper ty re lat ions (Rohbeck 1 9 8 4 : 7 4 ) .

A c en t ral opponen t o f th is k ind o f con t ractua l theo ry in the mid -n ine teen th

century was Henry Maine, who chal lenged the basic premise that the transi t ion

f rom the s ta te o f na tu re to c iv i l soc ie ty was accomp l ished th rough con t ractua l

agreements by point ing out that i t is precisely th is abi l i ty to make contracts that

has to be expla ined h istor ica l ly. As Maine ( 1 8 8 9 : 1 1 0 — 1 1 ) p u t s i t : "A u t h o r i t y ,

C u s t o m ,

or Chance are in fact the great source of law in pr imit ive communit ies

as we know them, no t Con t ract . " Equa l l y fo r ce fu l , however , i s Ma ine 's repud i -

The poles of th is debate about language mir ror the d ist inct ion in classical

pol i t ica l theory between inevi table "ru les which are innate in nature" and adven

t i t ious " ru les o f the laws . . . c reated by c ovenan t" (An t ipho n in Gough

1 9 3 6 : 1 0 ) . That there is a constant in terp lay between the two terms is evident,

for example, in hypothetica l arguments about the way individuals, faced with

competi t ion and confl ict in the state of nature pr ior to the establ ishment of law,

covenant together to curb these natura l tendencies. Society is, thus, an antinatu

ra l construct ion generated by the necessi t ies of the natura l order . As Plato

( 1 9 6 1 : 6 0 6 ) synthesizes one such contractual theory:

By nature, they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil,

but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good

in doing wro ng, so that when men do w rong and are wronged by one another

and taste of both, those who lack the power to avoid the one and take the

other determine that i t is for their prof i t t o m ake a compact with one another

neither to commit nor to suffer in just ice, and that th is is the beginning of

leg

islation and of covenants between men.

This notion that legislat ive covenants protect individuals from the brute ex

ercise of power is, of course, par t of the char ter myth of modern contractual

theor ies of society, a myth which persists in recent phi losophical theor ies of c o n

vention as coordinated agreement. Contractual theor ies of socia l or ig in often go

hand in hand with conventional theor ies of language. Hobbes, for example, sees

an analogy between the process by which individuals compact together in a com

monw ea l th and the wi l l fu l s t ipu la t ion o f the re lat ionsh ip be tween words and de

noted real i ty. Society and language are both "ar t i f icia l" constructs in contrast,

respective ly, to the state of nature and animal cr ies, which operate according to

natura l laws and do not involve conventional agreements of any sor t. Whi le bees

and an ts may fo rm rud imen ta ry soc ie t ies , they do no t const i tu te a common

wealth or speak a language, for they lack conventional i ty: "The agreements of

these creatures is natura l ; that of men, is by covenant only, which is ar t i f icia l"

(Hobbes

1 9 6 2 : 1 3 1 ) .

And ye t fo r Hobbes bo th soc ie ty and language a re

grounded in necessi ty. In the case of the commonwealth, individuals in the state

of nature are compel led by d ictates of reason to agree to g ive up their natura l

r ight to everyth ing in order to protect their own interests. The or ig inal covenant

wh ich results in the submission of a l l to the sovereign does not presuppose some

pr ior col lect ive understanding; rather , i t is the logical ground for a l l la ter socia

b i l i ty (Cassirer 1 9 5 1 : 2 5 7 ) . Whi le the specif ic content of the contracts, covenants,

and promises establ ished by individuals in society var ies widely, the inevi tabi l i ty

o f mak ing them fo l lows deduct ive ly f r om Hobbes 's f i r s t p r inc ip les abou t hedo

n is t i c de te rmin ism.

S imi la r l y in language , words wh ich we emp loy as mnemon ic "marks" and

commun ica t i ve "s igns" a re , acco rd ing to Hobbes, conven t iona l a long fou r d i -

i8z

I Social Theory

and

Social Action




a t ion of natura l- law theor ies which assumed that h istor ica l ly developed ru les

were "supposed t o have been evolved from the unassisted c ontem plation of the

conception of Na t u r e " ( M a i n e

1 9 7 2 : 5 9 ) .

Rather , for Ma ine , the momentous in

vention that made state- level society ( that is, based on ter r i tory rather than

k i n

ship) possible is " legal f ict ion," the a r t i f i c ia l and conventional st ipulat ion that a

state of a ffa irs exists when in fact it does not. Ear ly states, for example, were

based on the usefu l f ict io n that im mig rant groups were genealogical ly re lated to

the local popu la t ion (M a ine

1 8 7 5 : 6 9 ) .

Legal f ict ions are more complex versions

of f ict ions which create "defin i te socia l forms" such as the fami ly , the t r i b e , and

the v i ll age comm un i ty ou t of "b roken hordes, mere miscel lanies of m e n " ( M a i n e

1 8 8 6 : 2 8 5 ) . Once th is convention was acknowledged and consecrated through

common sacr i f ices, the " pe rmanence and so l i d i t y " of the socia l order was as

sured. Thus, " the composi t ion of the state, uni form ly assumed to be natura l , was

never theless known to be in g rea t measure a r t i f i c ia l " (Ma ine 1 9 7 2 : 7 7 ) . T h i s

g r o w t h o f legal f ict ions was the mode l for a const i tu t i ve openness wh ic h Ma ine

sees as the d ist inguishing feature of modern society. Whereas i n p r im i t i ve soc ie

ties a person's socia l posi t ion is natura l ly f ixed by the irreversable assignment of

status at b ir th, civi l izat ion developed the mechanism o f con t ractua l l aw th rough

wh i ch a person could a l ter th is natura l state of a ffa irs and "create it by h imself

by convention" (Maine

1 9 7 2 : 1 8 3 ) .

Whethe r in Hobbes 's anchor ing of the hypo the t ica l o r ig ina l con t ract in nat

ura l law or in Ma ine 's pos i t ive va lua t ion of customary or legal conventions as

d iacr i t i c of c i v i l i za t ion , c iv i l soc ie ty is at one remove from bondage in nature,

wh i ch is viewed either as the perpetual state of war or as the f ixi ty of status. In

other evolut ionary theor ies, however , these terms are i nve r ted , so that ear l ier

states of society are expla ined by standards der ived from the natura l or pract ica l

logic of contemporary l i fe . Maine's observation that advances i n modes of legal

reasoning are g rounded in f i c t i t i ous customs s t ruck many n ine teen th -cen tu ry

th inkers as a call for pos i t iv i s t i c re fo rm . The apparent i r rat ional i ty of many cus

t o ms ,

tha t i s , the evident lack of means-ends appropr iateness, should not be g lo

r i f ied

but

ove rcome,

so

that socia l conventions perpetuated through force

o f

habit, whi le perhaps serving as "wa y - m a r ks f u l l of mean ing" (Ty lo r 1 8 7 1 : 1 6 )

fo r the expanding enterpr ise of developmental reconstruct ion, must in the end

fa l l to the necessary logic of modern science. In place of Ma ine 's recogn i t ion of

the pos i ti ve con t r ibu t ion of f ict ions, evolut ionists such as E. B. Tylor and Lewis

Henry Morgan endeavored to weed ou t unnecessary and i r r a t iona l "su rv iva ls , "

that is, customs which have outl ived their contextual appropr iateness and prac

t i ca l mo t iva t ion .

M o r g a n ,

for examp le, d iscovered an unexpected consistency i n consanguin-

eal k in terms of var ious Amer ican Indian societ ies. At f i r s t Morgan though t tha t

these instances of the "classi f icatory system of r e la t ionsh ip , " tha t is, systems

wh i ch l u m p u n d e r one l ingu is t i c label r e la t ions w h ich our own system o f t e r m i

nology d ist inguishes (e.g., b ro the r and ma le cous in ) , we re , in the wo r d s of his

f r iend and colleague the Rev. J. S. M c l l va i n e , " i n ve n t ed and wh o l l y a r t i f i c i a l "

( M o r g a n in Kuper

1 9 8 5 : 1 2 ) .

In con t rast , the " d e sc r i p t i ve sys t e m s" f o u n d in

what Morgan and h is con tempora r ies ca l led "c iv i l i zed " soc ie ty "ev iden t ly fo l low

the f low of b l o o d " in supposed ly p rov id ing a na tu ra l or ob jec t i ve ma tch -up be

tween biological and linguistic facts. Thanks to suggestive comments fro m Mc l lv a in e,

Morgan soon postu la ted

a

na tu ra l exp lana t ion

for

what he had ear l ier considered

en t i r e ly a r t i f i c ia l : the pract ice o f b ro the rs ' hav ing wives in co m m o n m e a n t t h a t

no man cou ld in p r inc ip le d is t ingu ish his own f r o m his b ro the rs ' ch i ld ren , so

tha t the result ing classi f icatory pattern ref lects a set of n a t u r a l — t h o u g h p e cu

l i a r — f a c t s . W h e n J . F. McLennan , ano the r impor tan t evo lu t iona ry theo r is t , at

tacked Morgan 's exp lana t ion of classi f icatory kinship systems on the g rounds

that the evidence presented, n amely, the extensive lists of k i n sh i p t e r m s M o r g a n

co l lec ted f ro m all over the wor ld, were ephemeral conventions of add ress, Mor

gan repl ied that the classificatory system is not at all "conven t iona l , " s ince i t is

based on "ac tu a l fac ts of soc ia l cond i t ion " and since it appears "identica l in mi

nute deta i ls over immense sections of t he e a r t h " ( M o r g a n 1 9 7 4 : 5 3 1 ) .

Morgan assumed that the cul tura l practices

of

h is own society are the result

of logical , practica l ref lect ion on ob jec t i ve cond i t ions of l ife (Sahlins

1 9 7 6 3 : 6 0 ) .

This state of se l f-evident object ivi ty then becomes the standard to render expl ic

able d iverse cul tura l practices at other stages on the evo lu t iona ry ladder . Mor e

ove r , Morgan is a paradigmatic case of the pa radox ica l a t t i tude toward conven

t ion no ted above. On the one hand , as we have just seen, he reduced ar t i f icia l or

customary c lass i f i ca t ions to the i r na tu ra l p ract i ca l i ty . On the o the r hand , he

thought that societ ies were enti t ies constructed by the w i l l fu l assoc iat ion of in

d iv idua ls , whe the r in the League of the Iroquois he made famous or in the less

we l l - kn o wn G r a n d O r d e r of the I r oquo is , a fraternal order of gen t lemen f rom

western New York he helped foun d . For M o r g a n ( 1 9 6 2 : 7 ) the confederacy was

a clear h istor ica l example of convention by agreement: "Iroquois chiefs assem

bled

in

general congress,

to

agree upon

the

terms and pr incip les

of

the compact ,

by which their fu ture destin ies were to be l inked together ." In

1 8 4 5 ,

m

fact,

M o r g a n and his brothers from the order were eyewitnesses t o a ceremony reaf

f i r m i n g the char ter of the I r oquo is con federacy du r ing wh ich an O n o n d a g a

leader solemnly repeated, as one of the brothers repor ts, "the regulat ions adopted

by the or ig inators of the Confederacy, to render it stable and last ing" ( Isaac Hurd

in Bieder

1 9 8 0 : 3 5 4 ) .

A popu la r modern va r ian t on Hobbes 's reduct ion to mechanist ic pr incip les

and Morgan 's reduct ion to pract ica l rat ional i ty is the sociobio logical explanation

of socia l behavior . Not con ten t wi th d ismiss ing the un ique ly cu l tu ra l con ten t of

inst i tu t ions such as war fare, re l ig ion, and kinship, sociobio logy's aim is to show





the genetic basis for the general human abi l i ty to make conventions. The oppo

si t ion between nature and convention, between genetic determination and

c u l

tura l determination, is thus transcended. As Robin Fox ( 1 9 8 0 : 1 8 5 - 8 6 ) pu ts i t :

If we can analyze society itself as a natural product of natural selection, then

the categories arising f rom it are themselves p roducts of the same process, de

r i v ing , cer ta in ly, not fro m "individual exper ience" but from the col lect ive ge

netic experience of the group—its gene pool. They are thus at once both

"soc ia l "

and "innate." . . . Culture and society are natural phenomena, and

concepts and categories, rules and em otions , have all developed together as in

terconnected responses t o recognizable selection pressures. Conceptual thou ght

and language, inhibitions by obedience to rules, emo tional responses to objects

of social and environmental classification, all developed together.

Since the tendency to fo l low socia l customs is i tse l f genetica l ly specif ied, conven

t ions are rendered epiphenomenal, as merely l inguist ic labels for patterns of be

havior regulated by noncultura l factors.

In

The Red Lamp of Incest ( 1 9 8 0 )

Fox se ts ou t to exp la in , among o the r

th ings ,

one of the ur-conventions of anthropological d iscourse, namely, prescr ip

t ive marr iage ru les st ipulat ing that individuals must f ind mates outside their own

kin group yet from a specif ica l ly defined other group. At least since Morgan's

t i me ,

noth ing—language excepted—has more chal lenged our abi l i ty to construct

universal ist ic explanations than the var iety and complexi ty of documented pat

terns of marr iage a l l iance, with corresponding systems of l ineage organization

and kin- term typologies. Fox argues that our ear ly hominid ancestors faced an

increasingly d i f f icu l t t ime reconci l ing two needs, the need to maximize genetic

rep l i ca t ion th rough inb reed ing and the need to maximize gene t ic s t reng th

th rough ou tb reed ing . The so lu t ion to th is d i lemma w as fo rced upon more deve l

oped

homo sapiens

when they began hun t ing fo r mea t . W i th the males ou t h un t

ing and the females out gather ing, the sexes began t o re ly on each other not jus t

for procreation but as exchange par tners, so that rather than f ight over women,

men exchange near-kin among themselves, thereby establ ish ing the category of

"marr iageable kin." In other words, a man does not marry h is sister but rather

is guaranteed the sexual services of a second or th ird cousin. Whereas hominid

males had a "tendency to accumulate females" for breeding purposes, pr imit ive

hun t ing and ga the r ing peop les maximized sexua l cap i ta l th rough the " invest

men t" in mar r iage . The pa ral le l to the t r ans i t ion f r om mercan t i li s t accumu la t ion

of wealth to capita l ist investment is remarkable. Fox even phrases th is develop

men t in te rms o f the swi tch f r om women as "use -va lues" to women as "ex

change-values" Instead of keeping females for themselves, dom inant males in

some groups began to exchange sisters; the perpetuation of th is ar rangement,

cal led cross-cousin marr iage, ensured the constant circulat ion of the most valued

co m m o d i t y , wo m e n .

Bu t wha t happened to the no t ion o f a mar r iage rule, i f eve ry th ing i s de te r

mined in the end by the select ive pressure? Fox's

( 1 9 7 9 : 1 3 3 - 3 4 )

answer is, as

h e ad m i t s , " t e d i o u s " :

Our uniqueness l ies not in having, recognizing, and behaving d i f ferentia l ly to

di f ferent kin ( th is happens throughout nature) , i t l ies in g iving th is process

names and ru les of naming; in the classi f icat ion not the kinship. . . . Kinship

grouping and kin-der ived behavior do not make us unique: the naming of kin

does.

In each case a universal, hence biological, feature is associated with a

"cul tura l practice." But by the same logic, the cul tura l practice—rul ing and

naming,

i.e., classification—if universal, must also be biological. Hence one set

of b io logical features—the propensity to classi fy and regulate—comes into

conjunction with two others: the propensity to outbreed and to behave d i f fer

ential ly tow ard k in. Al l th is is possib le through the m ediat ion of language. The

latter, however, being universal, is also biological, and hence the unifying fea

ture of the other two b io logical features is i tse l f b io logical . Ergo, there is no

nature-cul ture d ist inct ion, everyth ing is natura l-b io logical . Hence the argu

ment that we cannot use analyses developed for nature to interpret culture fails

since by i ts own logic the supposedly unique cul tura l features turn out to be

natural .

Fox's just-so attack on conventional i ty is double-edged: the abi l i ty to make

c o n

ventions, that is, to impose l inguist ic classi f icat ion upon patterns of act ion, is

merely the inconsequentia l label ing of a lready establ ished practices. And because

rules for kinship and marr iage are found universal ly in human society they must

be products of the same bio logical forces which determine the behavior they

name.

That is, conventions are e i ther point less or natura l .

3

Natural i zat ion and Convent ional i zat ion in Socia l Real i ty

Lastly we should realize that dancing in a partner's arms is a product of

modern European civilization. Which shows you that things we find natural

are historical. Moreover, they horrify everyone in the world but ourselves.

— M a r c e l M a u s s ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 1 6 )

Thus, the concept of conventionality has in principle a relative, rather than

absolute meaning: it is impossible to say that a given form is more

conventional and another less conventional without taking into account how

these forms function in the LANGUAGE under consideration, whether it is a

natural language or a language of art.

—Boris Uspensky

( 1 9 7 6 : 8 z ,

n.

3 4 )

We have seen that several strands of posi t ivist ic d iscourse, namely, H obbes 's

deductive mechanics, Morgan's practica l rat ional i ty, and Fox's sociobio logical

reductionism, posi t the theoretica l natura lness of socia l convention. Moreover , in





th is type of scienti f ic metalanguage the codes and ru les of socia l l i fe are repre

sented by an explanatory language which destroys the cul tura l speci f ici ty of i ts

represented object. Conventions that could not be otherwise or which obey the

requirements of some higher logic are, of course, no longer con ventional. But th is

natura l izat ion of convention can be observed in many p laces other than in the

posit ivist ic (mis) apprehension of cul tu ra l phenom ena, namely, in the op eration

of societ ies themselves wh ich regular ly represent th eir conv entions as necessary,

immutable, or motivated constructs. I f i t can be documented that the natura l iza

t ion of convention is i tse l f a pervasive socia l phenomenon, then the theoretica l

arguments sketched above can be shown to be not only in pr incip le incapable of

(accounting for th is data but a lso understandable as merely another , unpr ivi leged

example of a widespread occurrence.

The crucia l d i f ference, however , between the natura l izat ion of convention as

par t of a theoretica l metalanguage and that as par t of the data of socia l l i fe is

that only in the latter do the poles of nature and convention remain in a dynamic

tens ion:

in society, natura l izat ion in fact perpetuates conventions by imputing

power fu l m o t iva t ion to a rb i t r a r y const ructs . My own cross-cu l tu ral r ead ing and

exper ience suggest that the socia l construct ion and function of the re lat ionship

between nature and convention can be as d iverse as the d i f ferent kinds of cus

toms and ru les often ci ted to prove the re lat ivi ty of cul tures. In order to move

beyond the purely anecdotal I wi l l present four ethnographic cases in order of

increasingly expl ici t conventional i ty, that is, from examples where socia l conven

t ions are re lat ive ly natura l ized from the perspective of actors with in the system

to those where socia l ru les confront actors as h ighly ar t i f icia l , i f not arb i trary,

const ructs .

Conven t ions, espec ia l l y those dea l ing wi th no rms o f ac t ion , can opera te

hegemonical ly in a society by drawing into their scope groups which not only

have no ro le in their construct ion but a lso become impl icated in perpetuating

their own subordination. Rebel l ion against d isfranchisement is made di f f icu l t e i

ther because antinormative sentiments only inci te strengthened author i tat ive

pressure or because challenges presuppose the very conventions in dispute. In the

case of the Baruya of New Guinea,

as

descr ibed by Godel ier

( 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 8 6 ) ,

fo rms

of domination of men over women are perpetuated by inst i tu t ions and ideologies

in wh ich women become the p r inc ipa l agen ts o f the i r own domina t ion . To men

are reserved the ownership of land, the knowledge of magic, the practice of war

fa re , the manipulat ion of sacred objects, and the contro l over aff inal exchange.

These object ive manifestat ions of dominance are coupled with a d i f ference in

or ientat ion of men and women, according to which men see their in terests in

terms of the tr ibe as a whole, whi le women, whose l i fe course takes them from

their fa thers' houses to their husbands' , view their sphere of act ivi ty as restr icted

to domestic space.

In contrast to the ten-year , in tensive in i t ia t ion process required for young

boys , g i r l s undergo b r ie f , secre t in i t ia t ion las t ing on ly two weeks, wh ich neve r

the less estab l i shes power fu l l y the leg i t imacy o f r u les and concep ts suppor t ing

mascu l ine domina t ion . Dur ing the i r in i t ia t ion g i r l s a re ins t ruc ted by fema le e l

ders to obey cer ta in behaviora l conventions as necessary e lements of the socia l

order : for example, never resist your husband's sexual advances or cry out dur ing

intercourse, never cut your husband's sugarcane without h is permission unless to

serve h is guests, never have sexual re lat ions with visi tors, and—this one to pro

tect fragi le male egos—never laugh i f you catch sight of your husband's acc i -

den t ia ll y exposed gen i ta ls . A f te r receiv ing these admon i t ions, the in i t ia tes r i tua l l y

chew sugarcane, a crop p lan ted on ly by men and symbo l ic o f the pen is , and w h ip

themse lves wi th s t ing ing ne t t les (Gode l ie r

1 9 8 6 : 4 5 - 4 6 ) .

Ha v i n g i n t e r n a l i ze d

these ru les and exper ienced these hardships, the young gir ls are then taught that

the i r subord ina te pos i t ion i s no t mere ly a ma t te r o f conven t ion bu t i s roo ted in

the "natura l" d i f ferences between their bodies and sexual processes and those of

men.

As Gode l ie r

( 1 9 7 6 : 2 8 4 )

conc ludes: " In a soc ie ty wi thou t c lasses, the domi

nant ideas are the ideas of the dominant sex and the greatest force of domination

is the consen t o f the domina ted to the i r subo rd ina t ion . " W i th ou t an independen t

se t o f concep ts wi th wh ich to con f ron t the i r cond i t ion , the women a re fo r ced to

use the symbol ic language of the domin ant males; and so as long as th is c ond it io n

p reva i ls the men need on ly m ake min im a l use o f ex te rna l fo rms o f coe rc ion (c f .

Genovese

1 9 8 2 ) .

The hegemonic function of socia l conventions has been ci ted

frequently in recent d iscussion of the way l inguist ic categor ies perpetuate gender

asymmetr ies . As Go ldsmi th ( 1 9 8 0 : 1 8 2 ) r e m a r ks : "T h e r e f o r e , wh e n m a r g i n a l

peop le tu rn to the conven t ional language in an e f fo r t to in te rp re t the i r su f fe r ing

and devise val id means for a l ter ing their l ives, at best they confront confusion

a n d , a t wors t , they mee t the i r own fa i lu re . "

Rather than enforce oppressive conventions through the ruse of imputed nat

u ra lness, the Be lauan cu l tu re o f M icrones ia—i f I may tu rn b r ie f l y to my own

e thnograph ic f ie ldwork—goes to no t roub le to h ide the fac t tha t con t ro l ove r

soc ia l conven t ions rests p r imar i l y in the hands o f members o f h igh - rank ing o r

chief ly houses. In Belau conventions are cal led "paths," a term much l ike the

La t in

via,

which refers not only to roads and sea lanes but to prescr ipt ive chan

nels of socia l re lat ionships (e.g., the "path" between al l ied chief ly houses) and

recognized strategies of pol i t ica l act ion (e.g., the "pa th o f f i r e, " a rhe to r ical tech

nique involving heated threats) . Al though these re lat ionships and strategies are

widely known and active ly d iscussed, the abi l i ty to have one's act ions typi f ied or

categor ized as being a token of a type and, more impor tantly, the power to create

new "paths" which wi l l be subsequently presupposed by others are guarded pre

rogatives of h igh rank. In the absence of wr i t ing (at least in tradi t ional Belau)

188 I Social Theory and Social A ction




ru les of customary behavior are codif ied only in ora l tradi t ions, including myths,

h istor ica l narrat ives, and proverbs, and even then conventions are represented by

exempl i f icat ion rather than by a regimenting metalanguage. Taken together these

tradi t ions, cal led l i tera l ly "words/deeds from ancient t imes," provide the most

frequently ci ted reason for the existence of conventions. Interestingly, the or ig i

nation of customs is a lmost invar iably the act of mythological or heroic charac

ters act ing a lone, in contrast to the myth of col lect ive agreement in our own

cu l tu re .

As an island society which existed in re lat ive iso lat ion for at least a mi l len

n i u m ,

Belau developed a strong sense of the coherence and self-sufficiency of its

own cul ture. And Belau 's exper ience as the object of powerfu l yet passing colo

n ia l regimes (Spanish, Germ an, Japanese, and Am er ican) only served to in tensi fy

i ts sense of h istor ica l continui ty, stabi l i ty, and uniqueness. Al though possessing

the qual i t ies of tota l i ty, consistency, and permanence, the category of cul ture in

Belau is not in terpreted in terms of a category of nature. In fact, the or ig in myth

descr ibes the transi t ion from the amorphous depth of the sea to a land-based

social existence

as

the crea t ion o f "p a ths" o f m ig ra t ion (Pa rmen t ie r

1 9 8 7 3 : 1 2 7 -

3 7 ) .

Bekus n t r sd i t io n i s , thus, in to ta l accord wi th Lév i -S t rauss ' s

( 1 9 6 9 : 8 )

d ic

t u m :

" The absence of tu les seems to provide the surest cr i ter ion fo r d ist ingu ish

ing a na tu ra l f r om a cu l tu ra l p rocess. " Second , a pe rvas ive dynamic o f

fact ional ism at a l l levels of socia l organization a lso contr ibutes to the continued

commitment to conventional behavior , since competi t ion between r iva l segments

normally presupposes rather than challenges social rules and understandings (Par

mentier

1 9 8 5 c ) .

Third, the systems of h ierarchical ly ranked inst i tu t ions inter lock

in such a fash ion —wi t h h igh - rank ing t i t l eho lders head ing h igh - rank ing houses

and these houses consti tu t ing h igh-ranking vi l lages which in turn head pol i t ica l

federations—that the exercise of typ i fying power constantly re inforces the inst i

tu t iona l s t ruc tu re makin g i t poss ible.

Act ing acco rd ing to conven t iona l no rms can s igna l to o the rs one 's knowl

edge of the convention, possession of a requisi te level of ski l l for manipulat ing

complex ru les, and a posi t ive valuation of the standard in question. But, in socia l

contexts w here there is a signi f icant asymm etry in the power to establish conven

t ions or in the avai labi l i ty of tra in ing to master them, conventional behavior can

also index one's posi t ion in th is inst i tu t ional ized h ierarchy. Dist inct ion or d i f fer

entiat ion in terms of conventions is one way that dominant groups can exercise

wha t Bourd ieu

( 1 9 7 9 )

has te rmed "symbo l ic power , " the ab i l i ty to man ipu la te

the arb i trar iness of convention to set themselves apar t from the general popula

t i o n ,

whose everyday behavior seems in contrast in f lexib le, rust ic, and "natura l ."

An excel lent example of th is socia l- indexical function of convention is the

French cour t of Louis XIV as descr ibed by El ias

( 1 9 8 2 , 1 9 8 3 ) .

As El ias points

out, the f lorescence of ar istocrat ic cour t l i fe corresponded to the r ise of a middle

class, or bourgeoisie, so that the f ine gradations of rank found at cour t not only

const i tu ted a c lass- in te rna l h ie ra rchy bu t a lso d is t ingu ished cou r t l y c iv i l i t y as a

who le f r om lower s t rata o f soc ie ty . The co u r t l y a r i s tocracy i s so much m ore sen

s i t i ve to lower -c lass gestu res than was the war r io r nob i l i ty o f the Midd le Ages

tha t i t s t r i c t l y and empha t ica l l y exc ludes eve ry th ing "vu lga r " f r om i ts sphere o f

l i fe.

Final ly, th is permanently smoulder ing socia l fear a lso consti tu tes one of the

most power fu l d r i v ing fo r ces o f the soc ia l con t ro l tha t members o f th is cou r t l y

upper class exer t over themselves and other people in their circle. I t is expressed

in the in tense v ig i lance wi th wh ich they obse rve and po l i sh eve ry th ing tha t d is

t ingu ishes them f rom peop le o f lower rank : no t on ly the exte rna l s igns o f s ta tus,

but a lso their speech, their gestures, their socia l amusements and manners. The

constant pressure from below and the fear i t induces above are, in a word, one

o f the s t rongest d r i v ing fo r ces—though no t the on ly one—of tha t spec i f i ca l l y

civi l ized ref inement which d ist inguishes the people of th is upper class from others

and f inal ly becomes second nature to them (El ias

1 9 8 2 : 3 0 4 ) .

The re i s , in fac t a

con t rast be tween the no rms o f s ince r i ty , ha rd work , ind iv idua l i sm, en r ichmen t

th rough educa t ion , in sho r t , the idea l iza t ion o f " na tu ra l " behav io r fo r the m idd le

class, and the ar istocrat ic pattern of ar t i f icia l ly exaggerated manners, theatr ica l

ce remon ial i sm, and ca lcu lated con t ro l o f a f fec t i ve impu lses.

4

Cour t conven t ions

concern ing in te rpe rsonal e t ique t te , d ress, and speech wh ic h migh t appear t r i v ia l ,

oppressive, or absurd to us consti tu te for those involved a coherent guide for es

tab l ish ing re la t iona l iden t i ty , as is shown in the fo l low ing co n tempora ry sa t i r i ca l

passage cited by Elias:

You require a doublet made of four or f ive layers of d i f ferent taffetas; stock ing

such as you see, fr ieze and scarlet, accounting, I assure you, for eight ells of

cloth at least; then you need boots, the flesh-side outermost, the heel very high,

and spur-sl ippers also very h igh . . . the spurs must be g i lded Wh en, thus

at t i red ,

you have arr ived in the Louvre cour tyard,—one al ights between the

guards, you understand—you begin to laugh at the f i rst person you m eet, you

salute one, say a word to anothet: "Brother how you b loom, gorgeous as a

rose.

Your mistress treats you we l l ; that cruel rebel has no arms against this

f ine brow, th is wel l -cur led moustache. An d then th is charming r iver-bank, one

could d ie of admirat ion." This must be said whi le f l ing ing the arms, agi tat ing

the head, moving from one foot to the othet, paint ing with the hand now the

moustache, now the hair. (Agrippa d'Aubigne in Elias

i 9 8 3 : 2 3 o )

5

Glossing th is tex t , E l ias no tes a co mb ina t ion o f f luc tua t ing conven t ion and the

par t i c ipan ts ' h igh degree o f com mi tm en t to the i r necess i ty :

To keep one's place in the intense competition for importance at court, to avoid

being exposed to scorn, contempt, loss of prestige, one must subordinate one's

appearance and gestures, in short oneself, to the fluctuating norms of court

society that increasingly emphasize the difference, the distinction of the people

belonging to i t . One must wear certain materials and certain shoes. One must

lyo I Social Theory and Social Action




move in certain ways characreristic of people belonging to court society. (Elias

1 9 8 3 : 2 3 1 - 3 2 )

And since the king and the palace at Versai l les were the focal point of the enti re

sys tem,

proper behavior of those at the lower reaches of the cour t h ierarchy was

rendered meaningfu l by being or iented toward the same point as was the behav

ior of their super iors.

A f ina l examp le o f the ins t i tu t iona l bas is o f conven t iona l i ty comes f rom

L o t m a n ' s

( 1 9 8 5 )

analysis of Russian cul tu re in the e ighteenth c entury, a case in

which the nobi l i ty went to extremes to h ighl ight the hyper-conventional i ty of

their behavior . Lotman begins by locating the natura l /conventional d ist inct ion

in two levels of behavior , everyday norms considered by members of society as

o rd ina ry , ins t rumen ta l and "na tu ra l , " on the one hand , and ce remon ia l , r i tua l ,

and nonpragmatic " poe t ic " behav io r rega rded as b r ing ing to con texts o f ac t ion

an independent signi f icat ion, on the other hand. Whi le both levels are, from the

point of view of an outside observer , fu l ly conventional, the semiotic character

of the former level vanishes from the actors' point of view, or so Lotman cla ims:

Wh en a language is first recorded and studied, descriptions o f everyday speech

are generally oriented toward rhe external observer. This correlation is not co

inciden tal; like language, everyday behavior belongs to the sort of semiotic sys

tem that " native speakers" view as natura l , a par t of Nature and not Cult ure.

Its semiotic and conventional character is apparent only to the external ob

server. (Lotman 1 9 8 5 : 6 8 )

As the data Lotman presents reveal, however , th is "external" perspective is not

reserved for the theoretica l observer but c an character ize the perceptions o f soc ia l

g roups who exper ience some s ign i f i can t "o the r " as p roo f o f the re la t i v i ty o f

cus tom.

From the per iod of Peter the Great, Lotman documents a process in which

the nob i l i ty increas ing ly adop ted , even f laun ted , behav io r pa t te rns bo r rowed

from the European middle class, to the degree that they acted l ike fore igners in

their own country. The motive for th is seems to be that these nobles ensured that

their conventional behavior could resist being natura l ized through repeti t ion pre

cisely because i t appeared fore ign, thereby demanding—in a per fect reversal of

Benveniste 's argument—an att i tude of external i ty. The result ing need for in ten

sive instruct ion of chi ldren, the publ icat ion of manuals of pol i te conduct, and the

value p laced on learning fore ign languages fur ther d i f ferentiated nobi l i ty and

peasants.

Th is "semio t i za t ion o f eve ryday behav io r " took many fo rms, f r om the

heightened theatr ica l i ty of costume to the r i tual izat ion of what had previously

been "na tu ra l " ac t i v i ty . Wha t a l l these "poe t ic" fo rms o f behav io r had in com

mon was the avai labi l i ty of a l ternative norms or styles, again contrast ing with

peasant behavior regulated by the invar iable boundar ies of the agr ic ul tu ra l cycle.

(Cur ious ly , bu t p red ic tab ly , Pe te r h imse l f inve r ted th is inve rs ion by d isp lay ing

st r i k ing ly una f fec ted , "na tu ra l " behav io r in ce remon ia l con texts . ) The ext remes

to wh ich th is hyper - conven t iona l i ty cou ld run i s i l l us t ra ted by the case o f one

Vasi l i i Vasi l 'evich Golovin, a learned gentleman whose dai ly schedule was a cross

be tween a thea t ri ca l pe r fo rmance and l i tu rg ica l r i te :

If anything prevented the master from falling asleep right away, he did not stay

in bed and was restless for the entire night. In this case, he would either beginreading aloud his favorire book,

Th e

Life

of

Alexander the Great

by Qu in tus

Curt iu s, or he would si t in a large armchair . . . and intone the fo l low ing

words ,

now ra ising and now lower ing h is voice: " Satan, get thee to the barren

places,

to the th ick woods and to the crevices of the ear th, where the l ight of

God's countenance shineth not. Satan, Enemy of Mankind, unhand me, get

thee to the dark places, to the bottomless seas, to the shelterless uninhabited

mountains of the wi lderness where the l ight of God's countenance shineth not .

Cursed wretch, be off to the Tar tars Be off, cursed wretc h, to the inferno, to

the eternal f i re and appear to me no m ore. Thr icedamned, thr iceheathen and

thr icecursed I b low on you and spit on you " After f in ish in g these exorcisms,

he would r ise from his chair and begin walking back and for th through al l

seven of his rooms shaking a rattle. These strange habits naturally provoked

curiosity, and many of the servants peeked through the cracks to see what the

master was doing. But th is too w as taken into account. The housemaids wou ld

begin shouting, employing var ious witt icisms and proverbs, and pour cold

water on the eavesdroppers from an upper window. The master approved all

these actions, saying, "It serves the culprits r ight. Suffering means nothing to

t h e m,

thr icedamned, thr iceheathen and thr icecursed, unto r tured, untormented

and unpunished " Stamping his feet, he would repeat the same thing over and

over again. (Quoted in Lotman 1 9 8 5 : 7 9 — 8 0 )

Lo t man observes tha t th is ca rn iva l i za t ion o f da i l y l i fe imp l ied no t on ly t ha t i n d i

viduals p layed theatr ica l ro les but a lso that l i fe i tsel f was viewed as a textual p lo t,

often intentional ly patterned after l i terary heroes (see a lso Lotman 1 9 7 6 ) .

C o n c lu s i o n

Philosophy commences when this immediate synthesis [of ethos and

worldview] falls apart, w hen p h y s i s and n o m o s become distinguished and their

relation is transfor med into a p r o b l e m . Its history is that of constant attempts

both to reformulate this distinction and to construct a relation between the

conce pts distinguished. Its end is present when the relations betw een natur e

and convention, objects and values, facts and norms, science and morality, etc.

are no longer seen as a meaningful problem.

— Gy ö rg y M a rk u s ( 1 9 8 0 : 2 4 )

The theoretica l and ethnographic examples in the preceding sections are in

tended to chal lenge the simple idea that socia l conventions a lways appear

a r b i -



194 I Notes to pages 36-48

5.

For the definition of the s ym b o l see, e.g. , CP

2 . 2 . 2 1 , 1 9 0 3 ;

CP

2 . 2 4 9 ,

r

9 ° 3 ;

CP

Notes to pages 50—6z I 195



2 . 1 7 4 , 1 9 0 2 ;

CP

1 . 1 9 5 , 1 8 9 3 ;

CP

1 . 1 9 7 - 3 0 1 , 1 8 9 5 ,

CP

1 . 3 0 7 , 1 9 0 1 ;

CP

3 . 3 6 0 , 1 8 8 5 ;

C P

4 . 5 7 , 1 8 9 3 ;

CP

4 . 5 0 0 , 1 9 0 3 ;

C P

8 . 1 0 9 ,

1

9 ° 3

N E M

3 . 4 0 7 , 1 9 0 3 ;

N E M

3 . 8 8 7 , 1 9 0 8 ;

N E M

4 . 1 4 3 , 1 9 0 4 ;

SS

3 3 , 1 9 0 6 ;

SS

7 9 , 1 9 0 8 ;

MS

7 . 7 ;

M S

1 9 8 . 1 3 , 1 9 0 5 .

6.

The shape of the inverted Y figure is borrowed from illustrations Peirce himself uses

to illustrate his manuscripts; see MS

7 . 1 3 ,

CP

4 . 3 1 0 , 1 9 0 1 ,

in which Peirce notes: All that

spring from theA—an emblem of fertility in comparison to which the holy phallus of religion's

youth is a poor stick indeed.

7. The use of the term reas on in the first sentence of this quotation meaning acc ord

ing to a principle or following a rule is an important index of Peirce's gradually shifting

perspective. In

1 8 8 5

Peirce used the word reas on to describe the relationship between sign

and thing signified in the case of iconic signs, that is, as meaning a possible quality. In

1 8 9 5

reason is equated with thought as genuine tr iplicity and as m ediating third (MS

1 3 ) .

8.

There is a tendency, especially in Peirce's letters to Lady Welby, for confusion betwee n

marked and unmarked senses of the term sig n. In the marked sense, sign refers to the re-

presentamen or sign vehicle, that is, to the expressive and perceptible aspects of some object

functioning semiotically; in the unmarked sense, sign refers to the complete sign relation taken

as the irreducible triadic system of representamen, object, and interprétant.

9.

On the dialogic nature of thought see CP

4 . 7 ,

c

. 1 9 0 6 ;

N E M

3 . 8 3 5 , 1 9 0 5 ;

N E M

3 . 8 6 6 ;

N E M

3 . 4 0 7 , 1 9 0 3 ;

M S

1 9 7 . 7 ;

M S

1 9 6 . 1 1 ;

M S

6 3 7 . 1 8 :

M S

8 0 3 . 3 .

10 .

The doctrine of medium of commun ication is discussed additionally in SS

1 9 6 ,

1 9 0 6 ;

M S

1 8 3 . 1 0 5 ^ 1 9 0 5 - 1 9 0 6 .

In a review of Baldwin's T h o u g h t a n d T h i n g s Peirce notes

that a sign is the medium between tw o minds or between an objec t and an idea ( 1 9 0 7 : 1 0 4 ) .

1 1 .

The same metaphor is used in another manusc ript: Thou ght is nothing but a tissue

of signs. The objects concerning which thought is occupied are signs. To try to strip off the

signs and get down to the very meaning itself is like trying to peel an onion and get dow n to

the very onion itself (MS

1 3 3 4 , 1 9 0 5 ) .

1 1 .

The etymology of m ediat ion, mid dle, is not, however, linked to the verb to

m ean (Pelc

1 9 8 1 : 7 ) .

1 3 .

Peirce's enterprise reverses the Saussurean concept of proportionality o f expression

and sense. As Peirce noted: Gram matica l forms and logical forms are entirely different. The

gramm atical form depends on the expression; the logical form depends on the sense (W

1 . 1 5 4 ,

1 8 6 5 ) .

3 .

T ransact iona l Symbo lism in Be lauan Mor tu a ry Ri tes

I .

I adopt the convention of putting into quotation m arks the initial occurrence o f En

glish words and phrases selected to gloss Belauan expressions. AH subsequent uses of the En

glish forms should be understood to stand for the Belauan words. Kinship terms, such as

brother and sister, son and daughter, are to be taken in the Belauan sense and should not be

thought to indicate a necessary biological link. Quotations from villagers are marked F and M

for female and male. The ethnographic present is

1 9 7 8 — 8 0 .

1 .

Witho ut broaching the complex question of wh ether to describe Belauan kinship in

terms of matrilineages or according to the indigenous notion of hou ses (see Parmentier

1 9 8 4 ) , it is sufficient to note that there is a clear ranking of kinship ties among offspring of

w o m e n ( o che l l ) over ties among offspring of me n ( u l e che l l ) .

3.

The ethnographic descriptions which follow are based on my ow n attendance at tw o

funerals in Koror and six funerals in Ngeremlengui (located on the western coast of Babeldaob

island) in

1 9 7 8 — 8 0 .

Additional information on Belauan mortuary rites can be found in the

ethnographic record covering the past two hundred years. The most important of these sources

are:

Keate

1 7 8 8 : 1 6 3 - 6 4

(based on M r. Sharp's attend ance at the funeral of the son o f

Rechucher of Koror in

1 7 8 3 ) ;

Barnard

1 9 8 0 : 2 9

(based on his attendance at a funeral in Nge-

biul in

1 8 3 2 ) ;

Sem per

1 9 8 1 : 8 7 - 9 1

(based on his attend ance at the funeral for Ma d's sister in

N gebuked,

1 8 6 1 ) , 1 7 5 - 7 6

(based on his observatio n of preparations for the funeral of Re klai

Okerangel in Melekeok in

1 8 6 1 ,

which he did not him self attend); Kubary

1 8 7 3 : 1 8 8 , 1 3 0 — 3 1 ,

1 8 8 5 : 5 7 - 5 8 , 1 9 0 0 a

(based on his participation in many funerals in Koror and Melekeok in

1 8 7 1 - 7 1 ,

during a devastating influenza epidemic, and in

1 8 8 2 - 8 3 ) ;

K r a m e r

1 9 1 7 - 2 9 ,

3 : 3 5 0 - 5 9

(based on his attendance at the funeral of Adelbai, a low-ranking titleholder from

N gerem id, in 1 9 0 9 ) ; Barnett 1 9 4 9 : 1 3 5 - 4 9 (based on his attendan ce at the funeral of a ten-

year-old boy from Chelab in

1 9 4 8 ) ;

and DeV. R. Smith

1 9 8 3 : 2 7 7 — 3 0 0

(based on her partici

pation in five funerals in Melekeok in

1 9 7 2 - 7 3 ) .

4 .

Close male friends of this eldest child often put out the announc ement on b ehalf of

one of us . I wa s particularly struck by one such message issued by the surviving husband of

a deceased woman, which made no direct mention of her death; rather, the message stated that

the husband had capsized.

5.

Also, pulverized turme ric is used as a strength-inducing ano intmen t for bodies of w ar

riors (see Parmentier

1 9 8 7 8 : 2 8 1 — 8 3 )

as well as for young women during post-childbirth cele

brations (see DeV. R. Smith

1 9 8 3 : 1 7 1 ) .

6.

Force and Force

( 1 9 7 1 : 1 0 8 )

describe an unusual situation they heard about in

Ngchesar district, where a rival faction within a house interrupted the burial rite by violating

the imposed silence; the disruption ended only when a titleholder from the other faction paid

a male valuable to the rowdy group.

7. I saw these two w ords, along w ith the names of the givers, scribbled on food pack ages

stacked in the cooking areas of mourning houses. It is not the case that all spouses of men bring

ngeliokl,

since the wives of the husband's brothers and the wives of his sons all contribute c he l u nge l .

8.

This procedu re is labeled m e r a sm a b l d o k l , after the word r a sm thatching needle .

9.

Because of the extrem e sacredness

{ m e a n g )

of this platform, it is never used tw ice b ut

is taken to the mangrove channel, broken into pieces, and discarded.

10 .

Called the Tet (Handbag) of Olsecheluib, this stone coffin rests today n ext to the

Belau Museum in Koror.

1 1 .

There is understandable confusion in the ethnographic literature because this wo rd,

which is simply the term for boat or ship, resembles

d i a l ,

the third-person-singular possessive

of

dm

t i t l e .

1 1 .

I never heard this w ord, k e k u r , yet I was told that it referred to a spoon made out of

turtleshell.

1 3 .

For a remarkable photograph of the seating arrangemen t of a funeral in

1 9 0 9

see

Kräm er 1 9 1 7 — 1 9 , 3 : p late 2 0.

1 4 .

Cf. Kräm er

1 9 1 7 - 2 9 , 3 : 3 54 .

Th e m u r - i e a st and ora«-valuable are allusions to tw o

transactions in which a woman becomes the conduit of money from her husband to her broth

ers or mother's brother. A woman's social standing is, in part, measured by the value of these

affinal contributions.

1 5.

The symbolism here is comple x. A male chiefly title is know n as d m , which is the

word for coconu t frond, the idea being that a high-ranking man carrie s the title ( m e l u c h e l

a d u i ) on his head. In this portion of the rite, the coconut frond is wrapped in a wild taro leaf

( d udek e l b i se ch ) ,

since this is the same word for the white-tailed tropic bird

( d u d e k ) ,

k n o w n

to be a particularly strong flier. The connection between the bird and the title is made in a

well-known story of a contest to seize the coconut frond title.

16 .

At one funeral I attended, the female children of the deceased woman also collected

cash and contributed it as a lump sum to the total collected by the men.

1 7 .

Kubary adds that the spirit which caused the death carries off the sis plant.

196 I

Notes to pages

63-J35

Notes

to pages 140—70

I

197



1 8 . Neither of these patterns is referred to as

omerodel

adoption.

19 . Barnett

(1949:137)

states that the term

badek

is extended to cover the funeral goods

given to the spouses of men. I never heard this usage in Ngeremlengui.

20 .

These expressions of kinship solidarity contrast sharply with the extre me division

between affinal sides described for the Dobuans (Fortune

1 9 3 2 : 1 0 - 1 1 ) .

1 1 . See, e.g., Barton

1 946 : 1 69 -202;

Blackwood

1 9 3 5 : 4 8 7 - 5 0 2 ;

Counts

1 9 7 6 - 7 7 ;

Fortune

1 9 3 2 : 1 0 - 1 6 ;

Furness

1 9 1 0 ;

Hudson

1966;

Kaeppler

1978;

Keesing

1 9 8 2 : 1 4 3 - 6 7 ;

Metcalf

1982;

Poole

1984;

Traube i 9 8 6 ' : 2 O 0 - 2 3 5 ; Volkman

1 9 8 5 : 1 4 2 - 5 2 ;

Weiner

1 9 7 6 : 6 1 -

1 2 0 .

4. The Political Function of Reported Speech

I . For comparative ethnographic data , see the papers collected in Bloch

1 975 ;

Brenneis

and Myers

1984;

and Paine

1981.

5 . Tropical Semiotics

1.

J . F. MacCannell

(1981:296),

writing about early modern Europe, notes that this

process may have a third phase, the revol ution that reinstates as arbitrary the fixed or nat

uralized metaphors of a society.

2. weiner does not relate his analysis to the proposal by Schwimmer

( 1 974 :21 7 )

that

there is an important difference between metaphoric and métonymie exchange objects.

3. T his concentration on moral stories rather than charter myth s might account for

Weiner's failure to articulate his argument with recent work in the semiotics of myth. For ex

amples of studies of myth with a semiotic focus see Barthes

1 982;

Casalis

1 976 ;

Drummond

1 9 8 1 ;

Greimas

1987;

Ivanov and Toporov

1976;

Liszka

1983, 1989;

Lotman and Uspensky

1 9 7 8 ; Ogibenin

1968;

Schwimmer

1986;

Semeka-Pankratov

1979;

Shapiro and Shapiro

1988;

Toporov

1974;

Urban

1986;

Zilberman

1984.

4.

It is not clear whether to classify The Hornbill Husband as a moral story or as a

serious myth. Williams points out that the Kutubu Foi version he collected suppresses the

names of the characters and that the narrative serves as a charter for the foundat ion clan;

Weiner, on the other hand, treats the Hegeso Foi version he recorded as a moral story without

cultic relevance and without an associated magical spell.

5.

Wagner has argued for one additional context , namely, the historical unfolding of

epochal stages in the symbolism of a single cultural tradition. His analysis

( 1 9 8 6 ^ 9 6 - 1 2 5 )

of

the transition from medieval to Reformation Christianity in terms of eucharistie ritual argues

for the temporal development of the Western core symbol as a process of tropic expansion

and obviation.

6. Gurevich

(1988:178—80)

provides a brilliant critique of Bakhtin in suggesting that

the medieval grotesque stands as a constant countertheme at both popular and high cultural

levels rather than as a differentiating sign of that division.

6 . The Semiotic Regimentation of Social Life

1.

The argument here about hyperstruct ure is an extension of the aesthetic theory of

Jan Mukafovsky and Roman Jakobson.

2. My research has more recently expanded to include Old Sturbridge Village, Ha ncock

Shaker Village, Old Deerfield, and Mystic Seaport, all constructed along the model of historical

restoration pioneered at Colonial Williamsburg (Ainslie

1 984 : 1 63) .

For the purpose of illus

trating how a specific contextual

arrangement

of interprétants regiments tourists' experience

in ways that actually run counter to assorted textual forms of metasemiotic intent I will confine

the discussion here to Colonial Williamsburg.

3 .

In the late

1980s,

when officials of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation realized

that the black experience needed to be given more explicit attention, a grant from AT &T

provided funds for tours and entertainment focused on Black History. And, conveniently, re

newed excavation yielded additional artifacts to reflect the life of slaves.

4.

Not content with the re-c reation of the past, the Rockefellers were also the force be

hind the Museum of Modern Art in New York, which promote d an image of glamorous m o

dernity and liberalism that contrasted sharply with older types of museums and their

nineteenth-century ideologies (Duncan and Wallach

1 978: 33) .

And, as these authors demon

strate,

the spatial organization of this museum regiments the visitor' experience of the en

shrined objects.

5.

See Fjellman's

(1992:400)

comments on commodity fetishism at Walt Disney World.

6. My ar gument here can be taken as an indirect critic ism of Olson's

(1987)

more gen

eral discussion of meta- tele vision. Olson contends that television programming

about

televi

sion serves to undermine the conventions of natural ness as an arbit rary artif ice. I would

suggest, in contrast, that meta-television, like meta-advertising, reinforces the dominant rules

of interpretation by including representations of them in the content of media messages.

7.

C o m p a r i s o n ,

Pragmat ics , and Interpretation

1.

As the final presentation in the multiyear confere nce series, my discussant's t ask was

to provide a general summary perspe ctive on the issues of comparison and interpret ation that

would link the papers presented at this and at earlier conferences.

2. Taylor

(1990:47)

notes that the presence in the West of rational discourse about the

equal value of other traditions seems to be an argument for the West's claim to cultural supe

riority, since this spirit of equality is missing in many other cultures.

3. For a record of penetrating discussions of the typology of comparison see Bantly

1 9 9 0 : 3 - 2 1

(summary by Robert F. Campany),

1 2 3 - 4 4

(summary by Laurie L. Patton).

4.

J. Z. Smith

(1982:22)

even postulates a typology of comparative thinking, in which

various writers on religion are positioned relative to four types: ethnographic, encyclopedic,

morphological, and evolutionary.

5.

Cf. Gadamer' s notion of aliena tion, in Schweiker

1990:42.

6. This distinction comes from Silverstein's many lectures and papers on pragmatics and

metapragmatics; see especially Silverstein

1993.

7.

Two excellent recent demonstrations of the pragmat ic background to comparative an

alytic work are J. Z. Smith

1990

and Eilberg-Schwartz

1990.

8.

Several scholars have noted that comparison at the level of practical reason might help

avoid the generalization that the more developed a philosophical theory is the more remote the

chance of finding suitable comparative parallels in other theories (Kasulis

1982:403;

Yearley

1990:179).

9.

In the discussion of the conference paper in this and the following paragraphs I am

primarily interested in drawing out material relevant to the joint theme of compa rison and

interpretation, which in several cases misses the authors' central concerns. Also, space restric

tion precludes dealing fully with all the conference papers here.

10 . The argument proposed by Maclntyre

(1988:357)

that traditions are rational to the

degree that they engage in historically layered self-criticism overlooks the important role of

cross-cultural engagement.

i?8

I Notes to pages 171-89

1 1 .

The Bimin-Kuskusmin case is fruitfully compared to the myth of Hainuwele from



Ceram analyzed by J. Z . Smith

( 1 9 7 8 :3 0 4 ; 1 9 8 2 : 9 6 - 1 0 1 ) ,

where the incongruity of the en

counter with Europeans and foreign goods is coded by indigenous motifs in mythological nar

ratives.

1 2 .

On this performative function see Clooney

1 9 8 7 : 6 7 2 .

8 .

Na tu ra l i za t ion o f Conven t ion

1. The Saussurean theory that the relationship of significat ion in language is radically

arbitr ary and that relative motiva tion enters only along the axis of systemic valu e has

received much recent criticism; for a summary see Friedrich

1 9 7 9 .

2. As Summers

( 1 9 8 1 : 1 1 9 )

notes w ith respect to artistic convention : Arbitr ariness im

plies choice and judgment. But the choice of the builder or builders of the first fence is not the

same as the choice of builders who come afterward. The potentially endlessly variable charac

teristics of the initial choice are magnified to the point of being qualitatively different from

choices that com e afterw ard;

t h i s i s b ec a u s e t h e f i r s t f o r m u l a t i o n d e f i n e s t h e co n c e p t o f a

f e n ce . "

Cf. Frye

1 9 6 6 : 1 4 0 .

3. For a mild critique of these ideas see Fortes

1 9 8 3 ;

for a stinging attack see Sahlins

1 9 7 6 b .

4.

Elias

( 1 9 8 3 : 2 3 0 )

notes, however, that a yearning for rural, natural life began to per

meate the artistic conventions of the court, as evidenced in the development of landscape

painting.

5. The gradation of court behavior echoes the linkage between social rank and re a l

ization of consumption in ancient Hawaii: The consu mption of this meat is never strictly

profane but is ritualized to different degrees. Moreover, there is a complementarity between

these degrees. In other words, it is precisely the extreme ritualization of the consumption of

pork (as well as all other foods) by the ali' i [chiefs] that makes possible the lesser ritualization

of its consumption by those of inferior rank. Thus the meals of the people of different rank

form an ideal series: closer to the gods, an ali' i of high rank takes the first step in the process

of approaching them, and this step makes all the others possible, whether they are directly

associated (but in a subordinate position) wi th the ali' i's meal or are separate from i t (Valeri

1 9 8 5 : 1 2 6 ) .

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Index

I

Z 2 J

Diachrony,

6 7 , 6 9 , 1 7 2

Heteroglossia,

7 0 , 1 2 3 , 1 5 9



Index

Advertising: pragmatic function,

1 4 1 , 1 4 3 , 1 4 5 ,

1 5 3 ;

agencies,

1 4 3 , 1 5 1 ;

language

of, 1 4 3 ,

1 4 5 , 1 4 8 , 1 5 3 ;

deceptive,

1 4 4 , 1 4 6 , 1 4 7 ,

1 4 8 , 1 5 3 , 1 5 4 ;

formal structure,

1 4 5 ;

ide

ology

of 1 4 5 , 1 4 9 ;

regulation

of

1 4 6 - 5 5

passim.

See a lso

Meta-ads; Visual images

Aesthetic function,

1 3 1

Analogy, 1 1 2 , 1 6 0 , 1 6 6 , 1 7 1 ,

1 7 2

Arbitrariness:

of

convention,

1 0 7 , 1 7 3 , 1 8 8 ; of

the sign,

1 6 9 , 1 9 7 , 1 6 , 1 9 8 , 1 , 1 7 , 2

Archaeology, historical, 1 4 1

Aristotle,

3 , 4 2

Authoritative speech,

7 0 - 7 2 , 7 9 , 9 2

Awareness,

III 1 4 5 , 1 6 6 , 1 6 7 , 1 7 7

Ayer,

A. J.

1 9 3 , 1 4

Bakhtin, Mikhail

M., 7 0 , 7 1 , 9 2 , 1 2 3 , 1 5 9 ,

1 9 6 « 6

Baldwin, James M.,

1 9 4 x 1 0

Barthes, Roland,

1 4 1

Baruya, 1 3 0 , 1 3 2 , 1 8 6 , 1 8 7

Belau: funerals,

4 7 — 6 9

passim,

1 9 4 / 1 3 , 1 9 5 ^ 6 ;

burial practices,

4 9 - 5 0 ,

5 4 , 5 6 ;

social orga

nization,

4 9 , 6 3 , 1 8 7 ;

titles,

4 9 , 5 0 , 5 6 , 6 0 ,

7 7 , 1 9 5 , 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 5 ;

rank, 56

1 8 7 , 1 8 8 ;

reli

gion,

5 6 , 7 5 , 7 7 , 9 5 ;

kinship,

6 3 ,

6 9 , 1 9 4 , 1 2 ;

ethnographic background,

7 3 - 7 8 ;

history,

7 3 ,

7 4 ,

1 8 8 ;

political factions, 7 4 ,

1 8 8 ,

1 9 5 , 1 6 ;

language,

7 6 , 1 9 4 m ;

political rheto

ric, 7 8 ;

rules

of

speaking,

8 7 , 9 0 , 9 4 , 9 6

Benveniste, Emile,

1 7 5 , 1 7 7 , 1 9 0

Bimin-Kuskusmin,

1 7 0 , 1 7 1 , 1 7 3 , 1 9 8 , 1 1 1

Boon, James,

1 2 3

Bourdieu, Pierre,

1 2 3 , 1 7 6 , 1 7 7 , 1 8 8

Bourgeois society, 1 8 1 ,

1 8 8

Buddhism,

1 7 0 , 1 7 3

Carter's Grove Plantation,

1 3 8 , 1 3 9

Ca v ea t em p t o r tradition,

1 4 3 , 1 4 4 , 1 4 5 , 1 5 0 ,

' 5 3

Classification: symbolic,

1 7 6 ;

kinship,

1 8 2 ,

1 8 3 ,

1 8 5 ;

linguistic,

1 8 4

Code, cultural, xiii, xiv,

I Z I 1 2 2 , 1 2 6 , 1 2 7

Collectivizing symbolization,

1 0 5 , 1 0 9 .

See a lso

Symbolic obviation

Colonial Williamsburg,

1 3 5 - 4 2 , 1 9 6 , 1 z

Commercial speech,

1 4 3 , 1 4 5 ,

1 4 8 - 5 3

Commodity: magical spells

as, I Z I

; historical

reproductions,

1 4 1 , 1 4 z , 1 4 3 ;

embodiment of

social value,

1 5 0 , 1 8 4 ;

form,

1 7 6 ;

fetishism,

1 9 2 ,

1 9 7 , 1 5

Communication,

by

signs,

3

Comparison:

as

metalanguage,

1 5 9 , 1 6 0 ,

1 7 1 ;

genetic,

1 6 0 , 1 6 1 , 1 6 3 ;

historical stances,

1 6 0 , 1 6 6 , 1 6 9 , 1 7 3 ;

cross-cultural,

1 6 1 , 1 6 2 ,

1 9 7 , 1 4 ;

methodology,

1 6 3 , 1 7 4 , 1 9 7 , 1 7 ;

local

models,

1 6 6 , 1 6 7 ;

pragmatics of

1 6 7 ;

ty-

pology

of

1 9 7 , 1 4

Connotation,

3 0 , 3 1 , 1 0 5 , 1 5 4

Confucianism,

1 7 0

Consumption, culture

o f,

1 4 z , 1 4 5

Context :

and

indexicality,

xv; of

performance,

xvi, 9 6 , 1 0 1 , 1 2 8 , IZ9

entailment,

9 6 , 1 2 2

Contextualization: of ritual,

6 8 ;

of sign systems,

1 2 5 ;

institutional,

1 2 6

Contract, social theory

of,

1 8 0 ,

1 8 2

Conventionality,

1 9 , 1 3 3 , 1 6 9 , 1 7 7 , 1 7 8 , 1 8 5

Conventions: normative,

1 0 7 , 1 1 8 ;

Peircean,

1 0 7 ;

social,

1 7 1 , 1 7 2 , 1 7 5 , 1 7 6 , 1 8 7 , 1 8 9 ;

agreement,

1 7 5 , 1 7 9 ;

and arbitrariness,

1 7 5 ;

artistic,

1 7 6 , 1 9 8 , 1 z ;

relativity,

1 8 6 ;

of natu

ralness, 1 9 7 , 1 6

Cosmogony,

1 3 4

Creativity, semiotic,

1 4 , 7 z , 1Z3

Cultural semiotics, xiv, 1 0 8 , 1 0 9

Decontextualization, xvii,

1 0 3 , 1 3 0 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 z

Decontextualized discourse, xvi, 1 6 6 , 1 6 7 ,

1 7 3

Degeneracy, in sign relation,

3 5 - 3 8

Demythologization,

1 6 4

Dialogicality 2 3 , 4 1 7 0 , 1 9 4 1 9 , 1 9 6 , 1 6

Dialogue, cross-cultural,

1 5 9 , 1 6 4 , 1 6 6 , 1 6 9

Differentiating symbolization,

1 0 4 , 1 0 5 , 1 0 6 .

See a lso

Symbolic obviation

Discourse.

See

Authoritative speech; Decon

textualized discourse; Metapragmatic dis

course; Novelistic discourse; Reported speech

Distinction. See Social distinction

Dobu,

196 120

Dumézil, Georges,

1 6 3

Dürkheim, Emile,

1 0 5 , 1 3 3

Eliade, Mircea,

1 3 3

Ethnocentrism,

1 6 0

Ethnometapragmatics,

1 4 4

Evolutionism,

1 6 1 , 1 8 z , 1 8 3

Exchange: valuables,

xv 5

z, 65

1 9 6 , 1 z ,

1 9 8 , 1 1 1 ; affinal, 4 8 , 6 5 , 6 7 ,

ioz,

1 1 0 , 1 8 4 ;

gift-giving,

4 8 ;

modalities

of, 4 8 , 6 8 ;

food,

5 3 ;

obviational,

n o , n z ; of

texts,

1 Z 7

Exchange-value,

1 8 4

al-Farabi,

1 6 9 ,

1 7 0

Federal Trade Commission,

1 4 6 - 5 4

passim

Fetishism, of commodities,

1 9 7 , 1 3 '

Fieldwork, anthropological,

xii, xiv

First Amendment,

1 4 8 , 1 4 9 , 1 5 3

Fisch , Max ,

1 9 3 , 1 3 '

Foi,

i o i - z z p a s s i m

Fox, Robin,

1 8 4 , 1 8 5

Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1 9 7 , 1 5

Geertz, Clifford,

1 6 2

Gender:

of

exchange valuables,

6 6 ;

differentia

tion,

6 7 , 1 8 4 ;

complementarity,

no ; and

domination,

1 8 6 , 1 8 7

Genres, 7 2

Ginzburg, Carlo,

1 6 4

Godelier, M aurice,

1 8 6 , 1 8 7

Greek thought,

1 6 0 , 1 7 0 , 1 7 9 , 1 8 0

Ground: semiotic,

3 , 6 , 9 , 2 7 , 3 2 , ioz; of

comparison,

1 7 z , 1 7 4

Gurevich, Aaron

I.

1 9 6 , 1 6

Gurulogomi,

1 7 3

Hawaii,

1 3 1 , 1 3 2 , 1 9 8 , 1 5

Hegel,

G. F.,

1 6 2 ,

1 7 3

Herder, Johann Gottfried,

1 6 2

Hermeneutical circle,

i n , 1 6 4

Hermeneutics,

1 2 6 , 1 6 4 , 1 7 0

Herodotus,

1 6 0

Hierarchy, social,

6 9 , 1 2 3 , 1 3 7 , 1 3 8

History, signs

of , 1 3 5 , 1 4 0 , 1 4 1 .

See a lso Inter

pretation, historical

Hobbes, Thomas,

1 8 0 , 1 8 1 , 1 8 2

Hyper-conventionality, 1 3 4 ,

1 9 0

Hyperstructure,

IZ9-33

passim

Hypostatic abstraction,

z 8 , Z9

Iconicity,

4 , 7 z , 1 7 2

Iconic signs, 6 , 1 9 4 , 1 7

Ideology:

of

texts ,

1 1 3 ; of

history,

1 4 2 ;

gender,

1 8 6 ;

of

museums,

1 9 7 , 1 4 ;

mentioned,

1 2 6 ,

3 7 .

r

7 3 - See l so

Advertising, ideology

of;

Reference, ideology

of;

Semiotic ideology

Incest,

1 8 4

Indexical function,

1 Z 7 , 1 8 8

Indexical icon, xv ii,

9 4 , 9 7 , 1 7 1

Indexicality,

xv, 1 Z 5 , 1 3 z , 1 4 4

Indexical sign,

6 , 1 4 4

Indo-European culture,

1 6 3

Information,

3 0 , 1 5 0

Interprétant, 5 , 7 ,

1 0 , 1 3 , 1 8 , Z5 9 1 , i z 8

Interpretation:

as

dynamic process,

1 8 , 1 7 0 ;

in

digenous models, i n

1 2 3 , 1 6 6 ;

historical,

1 3 5 . 1 3 7 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 1 ;

rule

of 1 4 4 , 1 5 1 ,

1 9 7 , 1 6 ;

standards of,

1 4 9

Interrextuality,

1 2 6 , 1 2 7 , 1 2 8 , 1 7 2

Iroquois,

1 8 3

Islamic tradition,

1 6 9 , 1 7 0 , 1 7 2 , 1 7 3 , 1 7 7

Jakobson, Roman, 1 2 7 , 1 2 9 , 1 9 6 , 1 1

Kant, Immanuel,

3 0 , 3 3 , 3 4 , 1 7 4 , 1 7 9

Khaldûn, Ibn,

1 7 0

Kinship, 1 8 4 ,

1 8 5

Kluckhohn, Clyde,

1 6 3

Koran, 1 7 2

Kubary,

J. S., 4 9 , 5 8 , 6 6

Language: as communication,

6 ;

forms,

7 ;

semi

otic character,

1 1 ,

1 2 ,

1 3 , 1 5 ,

1 0 3 , 1 0 8 ;

and

logic,

1 5 , 1 6 , 4 2 , 4 3 ;

philosophy of

1 7 9 ,

1 8 0 ;

development of,

1 8 4 .

See also Authorita

tive speech; Commercial speech

Law: as contract,

z i, 1 8 0 ;

as Third,

4 0 ;

Islamic,

1 7 z .

See also Advertising, regulation

Legal fictions,

i 8 z

Legisign,

8 , 9

Leone, Mark,

1 3 5 , 1 4 1

Lévi-Strauss, Claude,

1 6 1

Linguistic ideology,

1 4 2

220

2 2 2

I

Index

Living museums,

137

Natural symbol, 120

Index

I 22 3

Replica,

8, 18, 133, 171

Symbol: definition,

3, 5, 6, 7, 27, 30,

1 9 4 1 1 5 ;



Locke, John,

109,

no ,

181

Logical form, 1 2, 13, 42, 194«/ ?

Logic of relations, 24, 37, 43

Lotman, Juri,

126, 190, 191

MacCannell, Dean, 135

MacCannell, Juliet Flower,

196m

Maclntyre, Alasdair,

197H10

Magical spells, 113, 120, 121, 196 14

Maine, Henry,

181, 182

Mambi, 133

Mantras, 171, 172

Marriage: ritual, 133; exchange, 184. See also

Exchange, affinal

Marx, Karl, 178

Mead, Margaret, 168

Mediation. See Semiotic mediation

Medieval.

See

Middle Ages

Medium of communication, 16, 30, 40-44 pas

sim,

1 9 4 R 1 0

Meta-ads, 154-55, 197(16.

See also

Advertising

Metalanguage, 70, 126, 185, 19314

Metaphor: reflexive quality,

103, 105;

and in

novation,

104, 106;

in myth,

171 ;

men

tioned, 196(15

Metapragmatic discourse: function of, xvi, 93;

explicit,

90, 91, 173;

signals,

145, 154;

im

plicit, 173; mentioned, 79, 87, 128, 151,

155, 166

Metapragmatics,

70, 101, 146

Metasemantics,

70, 126, 128, 135

Metasemiotics, xvi, 18

Middle Ages,

123, 125, 166, 189, 19611115,6

Morgan, Louis Henry, 182, 183

Motivation: relative,

19, 198m;

of sign rela

tion, 102, 103; natural, 106, 176; and con

vention,

175, 176

Mukafovsky, Jan, 119, 131, 196m

Museum of Modern Art, 197*14

Myth: obviational sequence, i n , 1 13, 1 14; as

narrative, 1 21 ; semiotic approaches, 196(13;

motifs,

198ml

Mythic imagination,

164, 170

Names: ideal, 179; origin of, 181

Neomaterialism, 125

Novelistic discourse,

70, 71, 71

Object, semiotic,

3, 10, 21.

See also Exchange,

valuables

Obviation.

See

Symbolic obviation

Olson, Scott R.,

197(16

Parallelism, 119, 171

Peirce,

C

S.: and Saussure, xii, xiv ; on science,

xiv, 19, 20, 21, 37; semiotic theory, 3 -22 ,

193(11; on language, 11-16, 42, 43, 193(16,

1941115;

on semiotic mediation,

23—44

pas

sim; logical graphs, 42, 43

Performative function, 95, 1981112

Performativity, xv,

96, 127, 132, 133, 134,

171, 172

Peter the Great, 190, 191

Philosophy of religion,

165-67, 173, 174

Plato, 179, 180, 192

Poetry, structure of,

112, 129

Power: semiotic, 126, 127, 128; symbolic, 123,

1 8 8 ;

political,

131, 176, 177. See

also Au

thoritative speech

Practical reason: comparison as, 167, 168,

1 9 7 1 1 * ;

in religious traditions, 170; in social

theory,

183

Pragmatics: of discourse,

12, 167;

of social ac

tion, 127; dimensions of comparison, 167.

also Indexicality

Proportionality, Saussurean,

1 9 4 1 1 1 3

Propositional form, 12, 13, 37, 42, 146, 152,

166

Propp, Vladimir,

114

Proverbs, 92, 93

Pseudo-performativity, 95

Puffery,

1 4 3 - 5 5

passim

Rappaport, Roy,

119

Reality effect, 141

Reciprocal delimitation, 43, 103

Recontextualization, 171

Reference, ideology of, 125, 142, 145, 146,

151, 152

Referential function, 144, 150

Reported speech, 70, 71, 92 , 93, 19611J

Representamen, 14, 25, 19411S

Representation,

4, 5, 26, 30, 32, 19411*

Ricoeur, Paul, 102, 164, 167

Ritual: performativity,

101 , 128-34

passim;

duplex character, 129, 130; efficacy, 129,

1 3 0 ,

1 33 ; performance, 129, 131; repetition,

129, 133, 173; self-referentiality, 132; lan

guage,

1 7 1 ;

initiation,

187;

eucharistie,

196115; consumption, 198115; mentioned,

1 6 8 ,

176.

See also

Belau, funerals

Ritualization, 190, 198115

Rockefeller, John D.,

136, 140, 196114

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 161

Russian culture, 190-91

Sacrifice, 132, 133, 171

Sahlins, Marshall,

181

Saussure, Ferdinand de, xii, xiv, xv, 3, 43, 103,

127, 175,

I 9 4 « r 3 ,

198111

Schwimmer, Erik, 104, 196112

Scientific rationality, 20, 13

Secondary elaboration,

166

Semantic meaning, xiii,

117, 166, 167

Semiosis, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 23-25, 27, 126,

193114

Semiosphere, 126

Semiotic analysis, as social action, 125

Semiotic ideology,

126, 142, 154

Semioticization, of behavior, 190

Semiotic mediation, 3, 23-44 passim, 1 27 , 1 4 1 ,

1941112

Semiotics: intellectual heritage, xiii; classical

foundation, 3, 108, 193112; social, 125

Shamanism, 164

Sign: definition,

3, 4, 14, I93"2 , i94

n

*i

correlates of, 30, 31; triadic, 39, 40, 193114;

classes of, 193115

Signification, 102, 103, 127

Silverstein, Michael, xvi, 70, 101, 127, 128,

197116

Sinsign, 7, 8

Smith, Jonathan Z., 173, 197114

Social distinction,

137, 140, 141, 176, 188

Sociobiology, 165, 183-84

triadic, 5, 10, 28, 29, 35; and sign, 9, 10,

1 0 6 ;

cultural, 19 ; and modernity, 164

Symbolic meaning, 48, 65, 67, 68, 195115

Symbolic obviation: method of, io i, i n— 17,

1 9 6 1 1 5 ; evaluation of method,

117, 118

Symbolic power.

See

Power, symbolic

Tambiah, Stanley,

128, 129, 131, 133

Taylor, Charles,

126,

1 9 7 1 1 2

Television, 1 9 7 1 1 6

Texts, as semiotic forms, 127, 137

Textual authority,

172

Textuality: defined, xv,

93, 101;

in ritual,

127,

1 2 8 ,

129, 134

Textual meaning,

126

Theoretical reason, 169

Thirdness, 33 -40 passim

Tourist experience,

1 3 5 - 4 2 ,

1 9 6 1 1 2

Tradition,

175, 179, 188

Translation, 43, 93

Transparency: semiotic, xiv, 42, 43, 134;

scientific,

136, 141;

historical,

1 4 1 ;

and com

munication,

170

Tropes, xvi,

102, 104, 163,

1 9 6 1 1 5 . See also

Metaphor

Turner, Victor, 123

Type-token relation, 18, 125, 131, 133, 187

Typology: semiotic, xiv, xvi,

163, 192;

of signs,

4 3 ; global, 109, n o , 1 22 ; genealogical, 162,

1 7 2 ;

implicational, 163; of religion, 1 73 ; of

comparison,

1 9 7 1 1 4

Use-value, 184

Valuables. See Exchange, valuables

Value: Saussurean, xiii, xiv, 103; linguistic, 164

Vedic texts,

130, 171, 174

Visual images, 135, 143, 146, 147, 151

Volosinov, V. N.,

71

Wagner, Roy, xvi, 101, 105, 118, 123, 1 9 6 1 1 5

Walt Disney World,

1 9 7 1 1 5

Watergate hearings, 131

Weiner, James F., xvi, 101, 105, 123,

19 6 1 1 1 12 ,3

Welby, Lady Victoria, 19 4 1 1Ä

Documents

[Richard J. Parmentier] Signs in Society Studies