River Crossing Doctrine

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: CPT P) Albert G. Marin ITitle of thesis: Command and Control of River Crossings:Does Current Doctrine Support Airland Battle DoctrineIntent?

Approved by:

- Thesis Committee ChairmanMAJ P) ~ e r a r d Hopkins, MSMember, Graduate Faculty

Member, Graduate Faculty

Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 5th day of June 992 by:

, Director, Graduate DegreePhilip J. Brookes, Ph D ProgramThe opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent theviews of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College orany other governmental agency. Reference to this studyshould include the foregoing statement.)


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ChapterI INTRODUCTION 1

ection I Objective of the Study 5ection I1 Limitations and Delimitations 6Section I11 Significance of the Study 8I1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 11

General 11River Crossing Doctrine 12Airland Battle Doctrine 4I11 METHODOLOGY 16IV THE DOCTRINES 8

Section I Airland Battle Doctrine 18Section I1 River Crossing Doctrine 24Section I11 Command and Control Doctrine 47COMPARISON OF THE DOCTRINES 59

Section I Airland Battle versus River Crossing 59Section I1 Cormand Control versus River Crossing 76Section I11 Conclusions Regarding Analysis 87

VI HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF RIVER CROSSINGS 93Remagen and the Ludendorff Bridge 9Rhine River Crossing at WeselRoer River Crossing at Julich i C 5Rapido River Crossing 111Egyptian Crossing of the Suez 122Israeli Crossing of the Suez 128Historical Conclusions 33

VII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS i 3 8Section I Doctrinal Shortcomings i4Section I1 Final Recommendations 156


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Modern combat vehicles of the land, sea and air makeincreased speeds possible. Chaos, intensity, highdestruction and speed necessitate a doctrine which supportsmission order tasking. The speed of modern warfare will notpermit time-consuming meetings after operations begin.Success can most readily be assured by commanders at alllevels understanding the intent of the higher commander.Subordinate commanders must possess the technical andtactical wherewithal to achieve an objective, once given themission and higher commander s intent. The intent includesthe purpose, all adjacent forces, intermediate objectives,and the desired end state. The intent must be clear andconcise. It is meant to communicate a superior commander sguidance to subo rdinates; however, it aliows subordinatesfreedom of action. Mission tasking, together with thecommunication of the commander s intent, is stated by FM100 5 to be the best means of achieving success. Missiontasking allows subordinate commanders to continue to operatewithout further orders.

Mission tasking also allows for seizing andmaintaining the initiative, should battlefield conditionspermit. It lends itself to centralized planning anddecentralized execution. In brief, mission tasking allowssubordinate commanders to act as necessary to exploitsuccess and to win.


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FM 100 5 is currently being rewritten. The purposefor the rewrite is to project the doctrine into the futureProjection into the future is mandated as technologiesimpacting warfighting capabilities change. The new manualwill continue to place great emphasis on initiative andmission order tasking. They are considered the pillars ofAiriand Battle doctrine.

Michael Howard, a prominent professor and militaryhistorian, explains doctrine in the following terms.Usually everybody starts even and everybody starts wrong.

he advantage goes to the side which can most ~ U ~ C K ~ Yadjust itself to the new and unfamiliar environment and

2learn from its mistakes. With this theory in mind.current AirLand Battie doctrine is solid.

It is in the context of Airiand Eattie doctrine thatriver crossing doctrine must be analyzed. This thesis wiiiexamine the command and control aspects of river crossings.Specifically, the command and control of river crossingdoctrine will be analyzed from two perspectives. The firstperspective is the degree to which the river crossingdoctrine supports, or differs from. AirLand Sattie doctrine.The second perspective is the degree to which river crossingrluctrine supports, or differs from. U.S. Army c ~m ma n a ndconrrol doctrine.


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The latter perspective is essential to a thoroughanalysis of the command and control aspect of river crossing

operations.

River crossings are an important military operation.An army maneuvering on the European continent will encounteron average a water obstacle at least one-hundred meters wideevery fourty-five kilometers. Water obstacles greater thanone-hundred meters wide can be expected every two-hundredkilometers. Rapid operations to maintain initiativecoupled with numerous rivers may require multiple waterobstacle crossings in a single day. The crossing of waterobstacles is a necessity to movement. M 100-5 stipulatesthat rapid crossing of water obstacles is essential to seizeand maintain initiative. Once the initiative is gained itmust never be relinquished to the opposing force. To doso would allow the enemy to recover from any initiativegained or shock imposed. and perhaps allow the initiative toshift to the opposing force. The preservation of speed isimperative.

Current river crossing doctrine is contained in FM90-13. River Crossins O~eraticns. There is only one chapterregarding command and controi in FM 90-13 unlike FM 100-5Ooerations which stresses conxiand and controi throughoutthe entire manual.


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Additionally, FM 90 13 does not stress initiative, speed,decentralized execution or exploitation of success amongmany other Airland Battle imperatives. In explaining thecommand and control process, FM 71-100 Division Operations,states, The goal of division tactical operations is to actmore rapidly than the enemy, keeping him off balance bychanging the situation so rapidly that his reactions areinappropriate and he remains at a disadvantage and thus canbe defeated. This concept of warfare, rapidity of action.can only be obtained through a responsive command andcontrol system that facilitates execution of the misslon.provides for standard language and symbols, protects the

5force, and has leaders who motivate soldiers to fight.

A detailed examination of existing river crossingdoctrine will be made later in the thesis. The examinationwill center on the Arm y' s ability, doctrinally, to carry outnumerous daily crossings while maintaining speed andinitiative.

Section I. Objectives of the Study

The purpose of this study is to determine if aprobiem exists in the U.S. Army river crcssing doctrine.


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The objective of the study is to determine thecompatability of the command and control of river crossingoperations doctrine with current AirLand Battle and U.S.Army command and control doctrines. Changes to the commandand control aspects of river crossing doctrine arerecommended. Recommendations are made on the basis oflessons learned and conclusions drawn from past major rivercrossing operations. Recommendations are also made based onsignificant differences found between Airiand Battle andcommand and control doctrines versus river crossingdoctrine.

Section 11. Limitations and DelimitationsLimitations

For the purposes of this study river crossingoperations will be analyzed using past performance data fromunits corps size and smaller. Emphasis will be placed onthe division. Historical rlver crossings planned andconducted by units larger than corps are intentionallyomitted.

As will be further explained in Chapter 2 themajority of historical data pertaining to river crossingoperations is from World War 11


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It is from this era which most of the historical examplesused in analysis shall come.

DelimitationsThree types of river crossings exist. They are hasty.

deliberate, and retrograde. Retrograde crossings are arearward movement of forces over terrain in the possessionof friendly forces. Retrograde crossings, due to theirinherent difference from hasty and deliberate crossings.w ll not be discussed in this thesis.

To limit the scope of the thesis. only key areas ofthe doctrine depicted below will be considered. AiriandBattle doctrine will be researched from the perspective oftwo of its tenets. They are initiative andsynchronization. It s felt that these two tenets willprovide an excellent perspective from which to compare thedoctrines. Both tenets are vitaliy important to the successof any operation. Tie limit is imposed simply to controlthe scope of the thesis. Tnis limitation s not consideredas a detriment in any way. A solid intent of AiriandBattle doctrine is definitely achievable using the tenets ofinitiative and synchronization.

Six historical river crossings have been selected foranalysis. There are hundreds of historical river crossingswhich just as easily ccuid have been selected.


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The six crossings chosen are representative of the good andbad cases of river crossings in a war environment, andprovide excellent insight as to what made the crossingseither a success or a failure.

The command and control aspects only of river crossingdoctrine will be researched. This limitation is for tworeasons. The first is to limit the scope of the thesis.The second, and more important. is that prior research inthe river crossing area has suggested that the command andcontrol of river crossing doctrine may be erred. This sameresearch impiies that the command and control doctrine ofriver crossing operations is too complex. Explanation ofthis prior research is provided in Chapter 2 Review ofLiterature. Further study is required to determine rivercrossing doctrine discrepencies and their extent, if such istrue.

Section 111 Siqnificance of the Study

The study is significant in that river crossingdoctrine must be mutually supporting and compatible withAiriand Battle doctrine. The command and control facets ofriver crossing operations must meet the intent of AirLandBattle. Confornity is a measure of compatibility with theArmy s operations capstone doctrine.


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If existing river crossing doctrine s incompatible withAirLand Battle doctrine, chaos w ll result during combat.An army trains to its doctrine in peacetime as it intends tofight during war. It s imperative to get the doctrineright, or at least s correct as it can be, so that trainingconducted in peacetime can best prepare an Army for war.Since M 100-5 s the U S Army s capstone fightingaoctrinai manuai. doctrine at each ievel of appiicationsubordinate to FM 100-5 must be compatibie.


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CHAPTER

ENDNOTES1U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (1986). iMichael Howard, Military Science in an Age ofPeace, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute ForDefence Studies 119 (March 1984): 3-9.Paul G. Munch, The Combat Engineer Support to anOffensive Operation, Master of ~ilitary r t snd Science

Thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (1982):38.

U.S. Army, FM 71-100, Division O~erations 1990)3-1.


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CHAPTER TWOREVIEW OF LITERATURE

GeneralMuch was captured from river crossing operations of

World War 11. This information unfoids itself in the formof books, periodicals and most materiaiiy, after actionreports written by the units undertaking the rivercrossings.

There are several Xaster of Milicary Arcs and Science(MMAS) theses and Schooi of Advanced Miiitary Studies (SAW:monographs concerning river crossing operations. Some deaiwith a nistoricai outlook only. They detaii river crossing

operations from start to finish. Orhers i o o ~ t rlvercrossings in reiacion to the abiiity of heavy divisions ioundertake the crossings. One particularly userui ~ ~ A 9thesis is entitled iieavy Division Ziver Crosslng GperationsIn Support of AirLand Battle, -wrltcen by Bruce Hiagh. Thisthesis details the abiiity of the heavy division toundertake river crossing operations and keys in on engineerequipment avaiiability. SANS monograph enticiea US ArmyRlver Crossing Doctrine and AirLsnd Battle Future:Applicajie or Anacbronistic? . written Sy Gordon k-eiis,


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recommends that further study be given to river crossingdoctrine in relation to whether operations be centralized ordecentralized.

Periodicals and articles abound in the river crossingarena. Numerous articles in Enqineer, Military Enaineer,Military Rev-q. and Soviet Military Re* provide thebackbone of periodicals and articles used.

River Crossins DoctrineDoctrinal literature regarding river crossing

operations is also plentiful. The engineer operationscapstone manual is FM 5-100. Enaineer Combat Operations.This manual details command and control, as well as rivercrossing operations, from the engineer standpoint. FM5-71-100, Resimental Enaineer Combat Operations. covers bothareas, at the divisional level. FM 90-13, River Crossinqwerations, is the k y Army manual depicting the overalldoctrine for river crossing operations. M 90-13 discussesthe who, what, where, when and how of river crossings. T'nismanual will be the single most used reference regardingriver crossing doctrine.

Several iessons learned type format reports have beenwritten with respect to river crossing operations.

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They detail successes and failures. These lessons learnedprovide reason for success or failure in many cases.

Suggested changes to the era's doctrine and methods ofriver crossing operations are depicted in some of theafter-action reports.

An excellent example of a source of lessons learnedafter WWII s the United States Forces European TheatreGeneral Officer Board Study, Engineer Tactics . which was1written shortly aiter the war' s conclusion

Information is available from our a1 lies and from theSoviet Union. The Soviets conducted numerous rivercrossings in World War 11. Their existing river crossingdoctrine s based on lessons learned from World War iioperations. An informative article in Soviet MilitaryReview, written by I. Osipenko and entitled An AssaultCrossing , provides superb detail on the Soviet method ofriver crossings.

FM 100-2-3, The Soviet Army. provides excellent detailon Soviet river crossing capabilities.


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Airland attle Doctr-

Doctrinal literature concerning maneuver forces splentiful. The Army s capstone operations manual has beenexpanded upon with field manuals and circulars at most allechelons below Army level, down to and including battalions(task forces). These manuals depict operational doctrine,both planning and execution, at each level. Each successivemanual also contains a chapter dedicated to command andcontrol, as well as a chapter or section dedicated to rivercrossing operations. These manuals are: FM 100-15, CorpsOperations; FM 71-100, Division Operations; FM 71-3. Armorand Mechanized Infantry Briqade; and FM 71-2, The Tank andMechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.

The bibliography provides major literature sourcesanalyzed and used in this thesis.


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CHAPTER 2

ENDNOTES

1U.S. Army General Board. USFET Enqineer TacticalPolicies, Study 72,XV. Februdry 1347


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CHAPTER THREEMETHODOLOGY

In order to study the Airland Battle and rivercrossing doctrines, both the analytical and historicalresearch methods will be used.

The historical research method will be used to gatherthe data. Specifically. research will be conducted todetermine just what Airland Battle and river crossingdoctrines intend.

The historical research method wi ; also be used toexamine past river crossing operations. These operationswill be examined to determine reasons for rheir successesand failures. Reasons for successes and. iail~lres resuggested in many after-action reports. W3ere reason is notprovided, conclusions will be drawn if possible. In thislatter respect, the analytical research method will eapplied to draw logical conclusions.

In order to combine all of this information into ausable form from which to fulfil the purpose of thisthesis, the following method shall be used.

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Both Airland Battle doctrine from the tenets ofinitiative and synchronization) and command and controldoctrine w ll be compared to river crossing doctrine fromthe command and control aspect) to identify anydiscrepancies. Next. the conclusions drawn from past rivercrossings w ll be examined to determine what most led tosuccess or failure of the crossing. Last, discrepanciesbetween the doctrines w ll be compared against reasons forsuccess or failure of crossings past, to determine whetherdiscrepancies between doctrines are significant or not.Meaningless and insignificant discrepancies w ll be cited,and the issue closed. Significant discrepancies thosefound to be critical to the successful completion of anoperation) w ll be highlighted and changes to existing rlvercrossing doctrine w ll be recommended to rectify theproblem.


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CHAPTER FOURTHE DOCTRINES

Section I. AirLand Battle Doctrine

An a rm y s fundamental doctrine s thecondensed expression of its approach to fightingcampaigns. major operations, battles and engagements.Tactics, techniques, procedures, organizations.support structure, equipment and training must allderive from it. It must be rooted in time testedtheories and principies. yet forward iooking andadaptabie ro changing technologies, threats. andmissions. 1

GeneralAirLand Battle doctrine describes the Army s approach

to generating and appiying combat power at the operationalnd tactlcai ieveis. ~ n e octrine is based on four

renets. They are initiative. depth. syncix-onizntion andagiiiry. The doctrine s based on securing or retaining theinitiative and ex er c~ si ng t aggressiveiy to accomplish themission. Ail other components of the doctrine are basedon that sole premise. It s considersd :ha single mos:imporcant component of the AirLand Battle doctrine


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AirLand Battie doctrine prescribes throwing the enemyoff balance with a powerful biow from an unexpecteddirection, following up rapidly to prevent his recovery andcontinuing operations aggressively to achieve the higher

4commander's goals. The operations should not only berapid, but they should encompass surprise and violence.This enables che friendiy forces to keep the enemy offbalance. By striking rhe enemy first and fast. the enemy isinitially shocked. ay continuing the actions rapiaiy, theenemy is never abie to recover from tne initial blow. Theinitiative starts with friendiy forces and is neverrelinquished to the enemy

The coordinating of operations is .a part ofsyncnronization. The army fights as a combined arms team.Although combat arms possess the weapons to inflictcasualties on the enemy, combined arms possess the resourcesto make it ail pcssible. ynchronization of the combinedarms team is criticai to the overail success.Synchronization encompasses many things. They wili bediscussed below.

Initiative.N 100 5 describas initiative as foliows. Initiarlve

means setting or changlng the terms by action. It impliesan offensive sp.rit in the conduct of ali operations.

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Initiative is not something that just happens. Itmust be planned for, and requires continual effort tomaintain. Initiative applies to armies. corps, divisionsand so on down to the individual soldier. When applied tothe force as a whole, initiative ensures friendly freedom ofaction, while at the same time forcing the enemy to fightunder the terms and conditions set by friendly forces. Whenapplied to individuals, initiative requires technically andtactically sound risk-taking. It implies a willingness ofsoldiers at all levels to act without continual guidance. Acommander s intent, clearly stated and passed tosubordinates before an operation, sets the conditions forsubordinates to act independently.

Although pdone under centra

lanning for an operation is normally bestlized control. execution of an operation is

best decentralized. This goes hand in hand withinitiative. In the chaos of battle, it is prudent todecentralize decision authority to the lowest practicailevel. Over-centralization slows down action and ieads toinertia. If an operation is controlled at high levels.and the decision-making authority retained at that samelevel, vaiuable time may be lost in the pursuit of adecision. This time could better be spent taking timely,


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decisive action. Time spent waiting for a decision may maketaking an action impractical by the time the decision smade. The same conditions and opportunities may not stillbe present once the decision s received. Airland Battledoctrine stresses decentralization of decision--making orjust these reasons.

Decentralization of decision-making and conduct ofoperations s not without disadvantage. Decentralizationrisks some loss of precision in execution. The doctrinestates however, that The commander must constantly balancethese competing risks. recognizing that ioss of recision is

8usually preferable to inaction. Again. the importanceof the commander's intent becomes critical. If commandersdesire subordinates to exercise initiative withoutjeopardizing the success of an operatlon. they must alsoclearly state their intent for the operatlon. The intentmust include the what is to be dcne. and not necessariiy thehow to do it. Additionally, the intent must include thereasons for undertaking the operation, assumptions uponwhich the intent was built, and the desired end state of theoperation. These components, if clearly understood by asubordinate, allow him to pursue the operation withoutfurther guidance.


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They also allow the subordinate to exercise initiative,should a situation arise warranting it. FM 100-5 sums upthe subject as follows, ...the force commander mustencourage subordinates to focus their operation on theoverall mission, and give them the freedom andresponsibility to develop opportunities which the force as awhole can exploit to accomplish the mission moreeffectively. Once conditions have been set for theexploitation of a situation, through the using of initiativeby a subordinate, the superior commander must then quicklysynchronize his forces to take advantage of enemyvulnerabilities subordinates find or create.

Synchronization. 10Synchronization is both a process and a result.FM 100--5 efines synchronization as, ...the arrangement ofbattlefield activities in time. space and purpose to produce11maximum relative combat power at the decisive point.Synchronization encompasses many things. Not only combatpower is synchronized. All combined arms forces must besynchronized to better the chances of success. Mostimportantly, in an ofiensive operation. ail things aresynchronized wlth maneuver. Further, not only forces aresynchronized. Synchronization, as was defined above,includss space, time, and purpose.


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The coordination of space, time. and purpose better ensuressuccess in battle.

Synchronization s most important at the decisivepoint and time. Wnen decisive moments present themselves onthe battlefield. the coming together of combined arms forcesto exploit the situation s critical. Decisive points andtimes on the battlefield are few and far between. They must:be exploited while the opportunity exists. As wlthinitiative, the commander s intent is important tosynchronization. Successful synchronization need noc bespecifically coordinated (directed) as long as ail forces

2involved understand the intent of the commander.Combined arms training, rehearsed to ever increasingstandards, allows forces to synchronize themseives out ofhabit in response to a situation. This method ofsynchronization s preferred under the chaos of battle.Confusion. 1itt:le time, and possible lack of communicationsmake directed synchronization on the battlefieid extremelydifficult. Lack of synchronization can obviously make thedifference between winning and losing. The lesssynchronization depends on active communication, the less

3vulnerable it will be.

In summary, synchronization aliows for the timely use3


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of all resources where they will have the greatest impact onthe situation at hand. Synchronization provides for thesmallest misuse or waste of resources. To achieve propersynchronization requires a comprehensive understanding ofthe mission, purpose. and intent

Section 11 River Crossinq D o c m e

The purpose of any river crossing isto project combat power across a waterobstacle in order to accomplish amission. 14

FM 90-13, River Crossinq Operations, dated July 1990.is the U S Army s doctrinal manual for river crossings.The manual has been in revision since publication. Commentsfrom both the engineer community and maneuver commandersnecessitated the revision. Although not formal, the July1990 version of FM 90-13 is considered by the engineerschool to be an interim field manuai. until revision iscomplete and a new manual fielded. The structure of thecommand and control portion of FM 90-15 remains basicallyunchanged from the 1987 final version of the same15manua The July 1990 version of FM 90-13 will be usedto outline the command and control aspects of rivercrossings. Before discussing command and control of rivercrossings, some basic information regarding crossingsthemselves is appropriate.

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The challenge in a river crossing operation is tolimit the impact of the crossing on maneuver as much aspossible. The biggest impact s time. Time equates toinitiative and speed. If the initiative s with friendlyforces, a long drawn out river crossing can negate theinitiative. Depending on the situation. the initiativecould swing to the opposing force. River crossings canimpose great dangers on friendiy forces. Friendly forcesare canalized into the bridgehead in a river crossingoperation. The bridgehead s the area where the crossingw ll take place. It includes the near shore, and projectsacross the river to the far shore. The far shore s wherefriendly vehicles w ll exit the river after having crossed.Canalization occurs as forces approach the river towards theriver crossing means. Canalization, although not desirable.s unavoidable due to limited bridging assets. While forces

are massed, they are most vulnerable to enemy attack. It isimportant to reduce the vulnerability time to the absoluteminimum required. Speed and multiple crossings aiong abroad front are two ways of reducing the vulnerabilityzime. Because bridging assets are limited, multlpiecrossings along a broad front are difficult to do. S p e dthen, becomes the most logical means of reducingvulnerabi ity of friendly forces at the crossing site.


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'h?r.e wc two Ly[p: s o f ~ i e i i s i v eriver cro:;si~tgs. 'They arehasty and de1iberat.e. Hasty crossings are the preferredmethod.

The hasty river crossing, as the preferred method, is...a continuation of the attack across the river, with nointentional pause at the water to prepare, so there is no

17loss of monicnturn. The hasty crossing is conducted whenthreat resistance is weak and tho river. is r m t a severe

18obstacle. Deliberate crossings, according to FM 90 13....are conducted when a hasty crossing is not feasible,

when one has failed, or when renewing offensive operations16

along a river.

9FM 90 13 lists six river crossing fundamentals.

They are:1 Surprise normally gained through the use of

speed and deception.2. Extensive preparation using ail available

intelligence to situate the enemy, pick the crossing siteplan for deception, and plan friendly force course ofaction. This fundamental includes rehearsal of thecrossing.


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3 Flexible plan remaining adaptable to changingsituations good or bad. during the crossing. Havingalternate plans just in case the crossing goes astray.

4 Traffic control planning for the crossing ofunits at the location and in the sequence desired.

5 Organization organizing command and controlsupport and maneuver forces to best accomplish the crossing.

6 Speed minimizing crossing time. The ionger the2force takes to cross the iess likely it will succeed.

All six fundamentals apply to both hasty anddeliberate crossings. They are integrated into the plan asmuch as time permits. River crossings are dealt with as isany other type of operation. The maneuver commander isresponsible for the overall conduct of the crossing.Engineers are responsible for constructing the equipment tocross the force. They prepare the entrance and exit banksto the crossing site. They remove or reduce other obstaciesaround the crossing site which could impact the crossing.Engineers also advise the maneuver commander on the type ofcrossing to be undertaken the location of the crossing andthe assets availabie r undertake the crossing.


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\Tine command and control of river crossings s verycomplex. Control of units making a crossing s differentthan most any other type of operation. Command remainsbasically the same except that additional commanders aboveand beyond those needed for other type operations arecreated. description of the command and control processfollows. This process s that outlined by FM 90 13. for ~ Y

2tvDe river crossing operation.

Overall command responsibility of a river crossing isvested in the senior maneuver commander conducting thecrossing. This w ll normally be the division commander. andat times the brigade commander. For simplicity. only thedivision crossing will discussed. river crossingoperation is normally broken down into crossing areas. Eacharea is normally under the control of a brigade. Eachcrossing area has a crossing area commander. This commanderis responsible for the movement of all forces lnside thecrossing area. The crossing area commander is normally oneof the two assistant division commanders. This allcws thedlvision commander the freedom to continue command of all ofhis forces not just those in the crossing area.


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A1 thoughs appointed to

commander of an4brigade. The

not a commander a crossing force engineereach division. This person s normally theengineer group from the corps engineercrossing force engineer provides

additional planning and planners for the division5engineer.

Each crossing area is assigned a crossing areaengineer. There s normaliy one crossing area per maneuverbrigade to make the crossing. This person is responsible tothe brigade commander for crossing means and sites. Hekeeps the brigade commander abreast of the crossingsituation. This person is usually the commander of a combat

6~engineer battalion or bridge battalion from corps. Thecrossing area engineer commands those engineers who stay atthe river site and who are responsible for moving the forceacross the rlver.

Within a crossing area there may be as few as one oras many as three crossing sites. Crossing sites are thelocations in which actual rafting or bridging assets will beplaced. The number of crossing sites depends on manyvariables. Most importantly. the number of sites depends cnthe mission the number of forces to cross and the raftingand bridging assecs avaliabie.

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Crossing sites each have their own commander. Thisperson is doctrinally the engineer company commander for thebridging unit constructing bridging at that site. Thisperson also commands and controls all Call Forward Areas andEngineer Regulating Points along the route to his particularcrossing site. Call Forward Areas and Engineer RegulatingPoints will be discussed later in this chapter under thecontrol of river crossing operations. Each crossing sitecommander is subordinate to the crossing area commander.Lastly, the crossing site commander has the responsibilityto determine and take immediate action necessary to keep rhe

7route to his crossing site open. A graphic portrayai ofthe command structure for river crossing operations is atFigure 1

There is one more person in the command structure ofriver crossing operations. Each battalion sized or separateunit to cross the river appoints a unit movement controlofficer. This person coordinates the unit s crossil:g of therjver with the staff planners for the operationCoordination includes number and type of vehiclesparticipating in the river crossing.


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Maneuver Commander Division Commander)

Crossing Force Engineer

Crossing Area Commander :...Cr ossing Area Commander

:..Movement Control Officers

Crossing Area Engineer Crossing Area Engineer

Crossing Site Commanders Crossing Site Commanders

FigureRiver Crossing Command Structure


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l l f o u r u thes quasi-command positions crossingarea commander, crossing area engineer, crossing forcecommander and crossing site commander) are created just forthe river crossing operation. They do not exist in the

8normal Table of Organization and Equipment of any unitThey are taken out of the existing personnel structure. Thecrossing force engineer, the crossing area engineer and thecrossing site commander are normally all dual hatted duringriver crossing operations. In addition to their duties ofthe river crossing, each also commands an engineer unit. Attimes, depending on the scope of the river crossing to beundertaken, they must relinquish temporary command of theirunits to their executive ozficers. This is the only waythey can devote their full attention to the river crossing

9operation.

Command aspects of a river crossing operation arevery complex. The comnanders described above are inaddition to the normal unit commanders for each and everycombat, combat service, and combat service support unitoperating in the area of operations. Some of the commandersare also dual hatted. performing two or more functionssimultaneously. This adds to the complexity. Doctrinalcontrol measures for river crossing operations are just ascomplex. Tney will 3e discussed next.


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FM 90-13 River Crossins Operations describes fourphases in a river crossing operation. They are advance tothe river assault build-up and consolidation and attackout of the bridgehead. The four phases are shown in Figure2. The control measures that have been establishedcompliment these four phases.

As was stated previously the maneuver unitundertaking the river crossing operation is responsible forits command. Command and control of the crossing includesthe planning. The main command post at division or brigadelevel prepares the river crossing plan. Plans include thecoordinated schedules locations and times for subordinateunits to make the river crossing. To coordinate suchmovement requires numerous control measures and features.The major control measures are outlined belcw. A graphicportrayal of these control measures is provided at Figure 3.

Traffic regulating iines assist movement control anddelineate areas of responsibility for traffic regulation

3between different headquarters. They are usuallyemplaced along easily identified terrain features such asroads small streams and hilltops. Traffic reguiating linesare also called release lines when estabiished between twodifferent units controlling diffgrent crossing areas.


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Advance to >> Assault >> Build-up and >> Attack out ofthe river. Consolidation the brideshead

Eliminate Direct Eliminate Observed Secure Accomplishindirect fire on bridgehead thesites the crossing sites against missiongroundattack

/ Assault Stage--------/

/--------Haft Stage---/

Bridge Stage >

SOURCE: M 30-13 aver Crossing OperationsU.S. P.rmy. July 1990: 4-1.Figure 2River Crossing Phases


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Release Line(RL)Holding AreaGREEN 34

Site GREEN 3 Site GREEN 2(swim)y

RIVER enter1 ines I RIVER~ e st Center ~ a s t I

Call forwardarea GREEN 21

i / TO site

Re ieaseline (RL)

GREEN 31 E= KPci= TCP

SOURCE: FM 90-13 River Crossing OperationsU.S. Army, July i990: 3 2 .Figure 3 e w e siver Crossing Control Plea-


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Crossing areas are controlled access areas that helpcontrol the amount of traffic in any one given area aiongthe river to be crossed. Tiney are set up to spread out thenumber of vehicles crossing the river on a given crossingasset. The total number of vehicles to be crossed togetherwith the crossing assets available. leads to thedetermination on the number of crossing areas to beestablished. There is normaily one crcssing area createdper maneuver brigade to be crossed in the lead echelon ofmaneuver forces. Crossing areas normally extend two tothree kilometers on both sides of the river. The two tothree kilometer distance is the average maxlmum effec~iverange of most threat direct fire weapons. This is thereason for the crossing area being sized two to threekilometers on both sides of the river. The exact depth ofcrossing areas also depends on ths terrain and may beextended to allow for placement aiong an easily identifiedpiece of terrain. Enemy forces deiending the river. andtheir disposition. are aiso a contributing factor inestabiishing the depth of the crossing area.

Waiting areas are set up along the routes O theriver. They can be set up from two to three kilometers backfrom the river.


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Some depending on the force to cross the river in the leadechelon may be as far back as ten to fifteen kilometersfrom the river. There are three types of waiting areas.The first is a staging area. It is a battalion sized area.The staging area is the furthest away from the river. It islocated out of the boundary of the crossing area. Thestaging area allows battalion sized forces to get off of theroad while they wait to enter the crossing area. Allfollow-on forces not detailed for immediate crossing of theriver wait in staging areas. The staging area is also usedto give briefings to the unit regarding vehicle speedvehicle interval and vehicle order of march to be used inapproaching and crossing the bridge. Vehicle operators alsoprepare their vehicles for making the crossing in thestaging area. Staging areas are far enough back fromthe rlver to allow for rerouting units to other routes tothe river. or to alternate crossing sites. should the nee5for the same arlse. Staging areas must provide forconcealment of the vehicles to avoid detection frcm the airas much as possible. The organic commander of the unit in astaging area retains command and control of his unit whilein a staging area. since it is outside of tlie cross~ng rea.

The second type of waiting area is the call-forwardarea. CaLi-forward areas are company sized w ai ti ~g reasinside of the crossing area. Novement and operatignai

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control of units in a call-forward area passes to thecrossing area commander. At a minimum each crossingsite has its own call-forward area. More may be establishedas s deemed necessary. Final vehicle preparations are madein the call-forward area.

The last type of waiting area is the holding area.The holding area s the closest waiting area to the river.Holding areas may also be created on the opposite side ofthe river the far shore. The purpose for a holding area sto provide an area. off of the route to the crossing siteinto which vehicles can deploy should traffic at thecrossing site become congested or backed up. Holding areason the near shore of the river are normally company sized.This allows company size units coming out of thecall-forward area to easily pull into a holding area if needbe. Holding areas on the far shore if established arenormally battalion sized. If traffic s flowing smoothlyacross the river. there s no need for units to deploy intoa holding area. Units simply bypass the holding area andproceed to the crossing site. Nilitary ~ o l i c e reresponsible for the movement of traffic in through. and outof the crossing area. The military police advise thecrossing area commander on the traffic situation. Thecrossing area commander makes the determination on whether

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or not the holding area is to be used based on trafficreports from che military police. Holding areas need34possess the following characteristics.

1. Are located to support the crossing plan.2 Are easily accessible from routes.3 Have sufficient area for dispersion.4. Provide cover and concealment.5 Are defensible.6 Maximize traffic flow with minimum control

Engineer equipment parks are areas a short distanceaway from the river used for engineer purposes. They areused to preassemble bridge and raft parts that can bepreassernbled. Empty bridge trucks also park in the engineer35equipment parks. Spare bridge and raft parts aremaintained here. The locatlon selection of the engineerequipment park is an important decision. It must be closeenough to the crosslng site so that equipment can readily betransferred. It must provide some cover and concealment andenable equipment to be dispersed within its limits. Mostimportantly the englneer equipment park must be locatedalong routes to the crossing site other than those routes tobe used by all other vehicles. f the englneer vehicles areforced to use the same routes to and from the crossing site

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as other vehicles. serious road congestion will result. Onmany occasions engineer vehicles must drive from the nearshore away from the river not towards it as do most allother vehicles. Two-way traffic on single routes can leadto traffic congestion. This is especially true consideringthe large military vehicles such as M tanks that mustcross the river.

Traffic control points are yet another controlmeasure used during river crossings. The traffic controlpoints are established by the river crossing planners andmanned by the military police. Traffic regulations areenforced from these points. Traffic control points are alsoused to relay information back to the crossing area engineerregarding the status of units moving to the river. Trafficcontrol points are set-up on both sides of the river tensure traffic is kept moving. Traffic control points areusually iocated at critical road junctioris adjacent tostaging areas holding areas. and engineer regulatingpoints.

Engineer regulating points are the last of the rivercrossing only controi measures. Engineer regulating pointsare co-located with traffic control points where possible.They are manned by engineers.

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They are used to check all vehicles crossing the river.Items to be checked are the load balance of the vehicle, tomake sure it is not excessive on one side or the other, andthe military load classification, to ensure that it does not

7exceed the bridging or rafting assets capability.

As was the case with command positions establishedfor river crossings, ail of the control measures above areused solely for river crossing operations. They are inaddition to all other control measures used to controloperations and conduct maneuver. Control measures are but aportion of the control used for river crossing operations.Crosslng control and movement control are two other aspectsof river crossing control as outlined by FM 90 13.discussion of each follows.

Crossing control fcr a river crossing operationbegins after the third phase of river crossing op er a~ io ns .The first two phases, advance to the river and assault, areusually under the maneuver commander s control. Advance tothe river is the main body s movement to the river. Thismovement is conducted tactically. Initiaily, only forces toconduct the assault: across the river, their overwatchingforces, and any necessary support farces proceed all the wayto the river.


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The remainder of the force, regardless of its size, remainssome distance back from the river. This distance is

8determined using METT-T. Depending on the river to becrossed and the disposition of the enemy, the type ofassault to be used is selected. The assault may be

9initiated with the use of RB-15s. The assault may alsobe only mounted in infantry fighting vehicles, armored

4personnel carriers or cavalry fighting vehicles. Theassault may further be conducted using an air assault acrosstyhe river. A combination of RB-15s. mounted vehicles andair assault is also possible. Regardless of the typeassault, the purpose is to rapidly seize a foothold on thefar shore and to expand the bridgehead. Once a foothold issecure on the far shore, the brigade commander activates thecrossing area. At this point, crossing control shifts tothe crossing area commander.

With activation of the crossing area. crossingcontrol begins. Thereafter, all units move through thecrossing area under the crossing area commander s controlThe crossing area commander, through the crossing areaengineer, orders bridging and or rafting equipment to theriver. Depending on the river and the elements of METT 7rafting operations msy proceed bridging operations. Theymay also occur simultaneously.


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The first objective is to project fire power acrossthe river. Tanks and supporting artillery receive initialpriority. During the rafting stage the crossing flow isfrom the staging area. through the call-forward area to thecrossing site and into a far shore holding area. Vehiclesthen proceed out of the crossing area and resume normaloperations. Figure depicts crossing flow during therafting stage. During the bridging scage the crossing flowis from the staging area through the crossing site andthen out of the crossing area. Figure depicts crossingflow during the bridging stage. The reason for thedifference is that by the time bridging is underway boththe near and far shores are normally secure. Only trafficproblems would normally necessitate use of the call-forwardand holding areas.

Once enough combat power has crossed the river andadequate depth has been achieved on the far shore. the rivercrossing operation is no longer considered the close battleof the force making the crossing. At this time. the crossingarea commander turns control of the crossing over to eitherthe crossing area engineer or to the follow-on maneuverunit crossing area commander. Tne crossing site then becomessimply an engineering and traffic control problem for ailother forces to cross.

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RL) RL)-Holding Area

RIVER I RIVERi

~ I CSite GREEN 3 Site GREEN 2raft) swim)

Call forward Call Forwardarea GREEN 33 area GREEN 21

RL) RL)

Staging area

SOURCE: Y 90-13 River Crossing Operations,U S Army. July 1990: 3-8.

Figure 4Crossing Flow During Rafting Stages


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R I V E R R I V E R

s t e R G R E E f ~ t GREEN

FigureCrossing Flow During Bridging Stages


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lhe thir d a?pi. ;t o c o t ~ t r o iitivolving river cross ingoperations is movement control. Proper sequencing ofvehicles is important to the maneuver commander. Movementcontrol ensures that this sequence is prepared for andfollowed. Movement control is exercised through the trafficcontrol points. Movement control officers provide trafficinformation to the river crossing planning cell. Thisinformation is then rolled into the crossing forces crossingplan, and priorities estdblished for crossing. Tie plan ispublished using a road movement table and overlay. in theoperations order. Units move out of the staging area in theproper order. It is important that they consider vehicleorder when occupying a staging area. so that proper vehicleorder is achievable upon leaving the staging area. Trafficcontrol points check for compliance. If need be, changes tovehicle order can be made in the call-forward or holdingarea.

Another large part of controlling a river crossingoperation is communications. The area is far too complex tobe discussed in this thesis, and is omitted.

Control of a river crossing is a complex business.There are control measures and functions unique to only ariver crossing operation.

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FM 90-13 River Crossing Operations, does not delineatedifferent control, nor different command features, for hastyversus deliberate river crossing operations. For bothoperations, the command and control remains doctrinally thesame. The only difference, according to FM 90-13 is theamount of planning that is conducted prior to the rivercrossing itself.

Section I11 Command and Control Doctrine

It is important to understand the function of commandand control to river crossings. To do this. anunderstanding of the U S Army's command and controldoctrine is essentiai. This section outlines currentcommand and control doctrine. Critical aspects will be usedin Chapter 5 to provide a framework against which to measureriver crosslng Coctrine.

Command and control is an area that has receivedconsiderable attention in recent years. With changes intechnology have come changes in the definition of commandand control. Army and joint references describe c om an d andcontroi as ...the exercise of authority and direction by aproperly designated commander over assigned forces in theacccmplishme:~t of a mission. Commanders perform corrmalxi andcontrol by orchestrating personnel, equipment,

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communications. facilities, and procedures to plan, direct.4coordinate and control the battle. FM 22-103,

leaders hi^ and Command at Senior Levels, further definescommand as ...the primary means

4imparted to the organization.unit commander. M 22-103 listscharacteristics of command.

whereby the vision isThe vision is that of thethe following

well informed vision and clearly communicatedintent.

clearly understood goals and objectives.quality. low volume communications throughout the

commandconcept expression of tasks.emphasis on success and rewards.focus on the future.timely involvement to ensure results.

To command is to accept risk. h well known axiomthroughout the military is that the commander is responsiblefor ali that his command does or fails to do. Perhaps thereascn that command and control is so hard to piace an exactdefinition on is that different people comnand and controiupits differently. However, current Airlana aattle doctrine


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suggests that effective command must facilitate freedom tooperate and delegation of authority. This freedom tooperate is accomplished through mission orders that specifywhat must be done without prescribing how it must be

5done. M 100 5 doctrine is postulated on a delegationof authority, freedom to operate environment. Only throughthe use of this style of command can the tenets of AirlandBattle be achieved. Of most importance. initiative can notbe realized without a freedom to operate environment. If aunit commander has no freedom to operate, or fearsretribution from above every time he makes a decision. theenvironment will not be conducive to subordinate commandersexercising initiative. Such an environment would allow manydecisive moments on the battlefield to pass. withoutexploitation. For all of these reasons. Airland Battledoctrine says command ...should estrict tne operations ofsubordinates as little as possible.

7Control is inversely proportional to command.Control is the process used to establish restrictions and toprovlde structure to the system. As with anything else,some amount of control is essential. This is particularlytrue with military operations. Control provides fororganization during uncertain situations. Without it. c h o smay result.

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Control s a means of checks and balances over

command. Where command s strong and competent control snormally less restrictive. Where command s weak andsuspect control s normally more restrictive. The latters the worst possible situation. Excessive control can lead

to tension between levels of command centralization of alldecision making and power and confusion. The following are

8characteristics of the control process.

high volume. routine communications.coordination activities between elements internal

and external to a unit having related responsibilities.structure which limits uncertainty.emphasis on efficiency as a goal.

Control can take the shape of many forms. The mostcornrnor form of control s the mission itself. Oependlng onhow a mission s written the mission statement in itselfcan exert a tremendous amount of control over subordinateunits. Another general form of control s U.S. rmydoctrine. All soldiers learn doctrine from their initiaientry training in the army.


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Doctrine s continually learned throughout a career.Doctrine controls the way one is trained to react andoperate. It is a form of control. Operation orders withsupporting annexes and graphics are another form ofcontrol. They state specifics that are to be carried out.Normally, these specifics include the time and place inwhich an operation is to be conducted. Still yet, anotherform of concrol is through the verbal process verbalcommunications. Control varies from commander to commander.and from situation to situation. Some commanders desire toexercise a large degree of control via their operationsorders. Oppositely, some commanders desire to exerciselittle control via the operations order, and a lot ofcontrol through communications on the battlefield, as thesituation develops. Still yet, other commanders desire tolet their subordinates exercise the majority of controi.These type commanders emphasize little control in either theoperations order or through communicat-ions. The amount ofcontrol a commander exercises s basically personalitydependent.

Current Airland Battle doctrine. from U.S. Army leveldown to battalion task force leve , all agree on the overallcontext of the command and control process. An excerpt fromthe doctrinal manuals of each level is provided to show thecontinuity.


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From M 100-5 Operations:

The need for flexibility in command andcontrol is greater for the committed maneuverunit commander than for anyone else. Hecannot depend on constant direction but mustfight independently even when he cannotcommunicate outside his own zone or sector.He must know the intention of the commandertwo levels above him understand the conceptof operation of his immediate commander. andknow the responsibilities of the units on hisflanks and in support of his operations. Ifhe understands these things. the committedcommander can conduct his operationsconfidently. anticipate events. and actfreely and boldly to accomplish his missionwithout further orders. 9

From FM 100-7 The Army in Theatre Operations:Command allows army leaders to impart theirvision to subordinates. fix responsibilitiesand empower subordinates with freedom ofaction. Commanders use control to establishlimits focus effort and provide structure.Senior leaders must balance their level ofcommand versus control such that theirsubordinates can exploit opportunities andavoid the vulnerabilities and uncertaintiesof dynamic combat or other militaryoperations. 50

From FM 100-15 Corps Operations:The corps commander provides direction bydeveloping subordinate leaders who can helpprepare the corps for war sustain it andsuccsssfully apply our warfighting doctrine.e comunicates his intent so that othersunderstand what must be done and then letscompetent subordinates he has developeddecide how to accomplish missions. 51

From Y 71-100. Division Operations:The division commander must deal with theuncerrcinty and friction of war through adecentralized command and control systemcons:sting of m i s s ~ o n riented orders.


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By accepting the uncertainty and rapidlychanging nature of the battlefield as afundamental element of war, only thecommander on the spot is in a position todetermine the most effective methods andmeans to accomplish an assigned mission. 52

From FM 71-3 Armored and Mechanized InfantryBrisadeDecentralized execution and coordinationare the norm. 53

From FM 71-2 The Tank and Mechanized Infantry-Battalion Task Force: 54Key command and control considerations forthe battalion/task force commander include-

making maximum use of time.planning for and maintaining fiexibilltydecentralizing execution.providing clear. concise missions.

As can be seen from the above excerpts, the commandand control doctrine for the U S Army stressesdecentralized execution and flexibility. Theseconsiderations are imperative to achieving the hirland3attle tenecs of agility and inxtiaeive. :Tommanders mustmaintain enough control to supervise che situation. while acthe same time maintaining a conunand climate which fostersfreedom of action. This balance between command and controlis deemed imperative by FM 100-5 to win the next war.General Schultz, a commander of the 48ch Panzer Corps inWorld War summed up the importance n this balance in tiefollowing statement. The riaht moment alone. correctlyjudged. exploited wlth lightning spee? and prompt action canproduce victory and despite the fact these victories may


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not at times correspond to the exact ideas and wishes of thehigher commander, this must be accepted in silence. Victory5is the only thing that matters.


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CHAPTER FOURENDNOTES

U S Army FM 100-5. Operations 1986). 62Ibid., 14.3 Ibid., i i4Ibid., 14.Ibid., 15.

6Ibid.7Ibid.8Ibid.9Ibid.10Ibid., 17.11 Ibid.12Ibid.13

Ibid., 18.;U. S. Army, FM 90-13. River Crossin s cjperat i~ns[lS90), i-1.5The 1967 version of FM 90-13 was Fieid Circuiar90-13, dated March 1987.

16FM 90-13. 1-2.17Ibid., 1-1.18Ibid.19 Ibld., 1-2.Ibld.. 1-3.


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21FM 90-13 does not delineate different command andcontrol procedures for hasty versus deliberate rivercrossings.These are the only two levels that FM 90-13

stipulates command and control of river crossings for.23In a division or brigade level crossing, only aportion of the force may be in the crossing area at a giventime. The remainder of the unit may be approaching, oralready beyond the crossing area.24FM 90-13 3-3.2 Ibid., 3-4.26Ibid.7The crossing site commander normally works throughthe military police to enforce route clearance.The Table of Organization and Equipment TOE) is alisting of personnel and equipment authorized and requireda unit in order to perform its wartime mission.

29The unit itself may be far detached from thecommander, especially during the planning stages of a rivercrossing. The unit is not part of the brigade or divisionundertaking the river crossing operation.33 Vehicle preparation includes balancing loads toprevent unnecessary tilting, as weli as checking totalweight.3 Control of the unit only. not command. Any vehicleinside of the crossing area, once active. comes under thecontrol of the crossing area commander.33Final preparations include organizing vehicles intoraft loads for rafting operations. ensuring order of march.and preparation for swimming if required.34FM 90-13 3-1.


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35Bridge transport trucks carry most all tacticalbridging in the U.S. Army s inventory. Without modification.there is little else for the vehicles to do after droppingbridge bays. The trucks normally wait in the engineerequipment park until the tactical bridging is replaced withmore permanent type bridging.

6. Military load classification is a numeric weightdesignation equivalent to the gross tonnage of the vehicle.38METI -T is the U.S. Army s acronym standing formission, enemy forces. cerrain, troops available and time.3 An RB-15 is an inflatable rubber boat owned by theengineers. It can carry up to fifteen people, three of whichare engineers.40These are the existing infantry and cavalry fightingvehicles with a swim capability.FM 90-13. 1-2.42U.S. Army, Combined Arms Combat DevelopmentsActivity, Army Command and Control Master Plan ExecutiveSummary (19901, 1.43U.S. Army. FM 22-103, Leadership and Command atSenior Levels (June 1987 . 41.

44 Ibid.45FM 100-5, 21.46M 100-5. 21.47Army Command and Control Master Plan ExecutiveSummary, 5.

8

U.S. Army, M 100-7, The Army in Thear.-re (3.perar.-(Draft.) (July 1990). 2-22.11J.S. Army. M Coros Operations (Ssptembel-i989). 4-0.


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.J U.S. Army, FM 71-100, Division Operations June1990). 3-2.5 U.S. Army, FM 71-3, Armored and Mechanized Briqade

May 1988). 2-3.54U.S. Armv. FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized InfantryBattalion ask Force September 1988) 2-10.


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CHAPTERCOMPARISON OF THE DOCTRINES

Chapter Four detailed Airland Battle doctrine. Thetenets of initiative and synchronization in particular werehighlighted. Chapter Four also detailed cormand and controland river crossina doctrines. The command and controlfunction of river crossing operarions was highlighted.Section I of this chapter will compare those criticalaspects of Airland Battle doctrine to river crossingdoctrine. The critical aspects of initiative andsynchronization from Airland Battle doctrine will be usedfor comparison. Section I1 of this chapter will compare thecritical aspects of command and control doctrine to rivercrossing doctrine. A concluding chart depicting thehighlights of discussion in sections I and I1 of thischapter is presented in Section 111. Concluding remarksregarding thls analysls are also provlded in Sectlon 111.

Section I Comoarison sf Airiand Battle Doctrineto giver Crossinq Doctrine

The foilowing criticai major parts of initiative andsynchronization tenets i Airiana Battle are those from

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which comparison to river crossing doctrine w ll be made.Initiative

rapid execution.allows friendly freedom of action.forces enemy to fight under terms andconditions set by friendly forces.requires technically and tactically soundrisk taking.centralized controi.decentralized execution.

Synchronizationsynchronizes combined arms with maneuver.consoiidates purpose of mission.minimizes, yet coordinates time and space.relies on habitual not directed)synchronization.conserves resources.

InitiativeR a ~ i d xecution

Tie command and controi of river crossing ogerationsdoes not support rapid execution. In tha command area. thecreation of the crossing area commander, crossing forcecommander. cr ssing area commancier and crossing site


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commander take time. Time must e spent bringing togetherthese personnel. Even prior planning can not eliminate thistime. Additional time must be spent coordinating theactions of these personnel coordinating commandrelationships amongst them and between other commanders andcertainly establishing some form of command post from whichthese personnel w ll work. Granted. the coordination timelessens each time these personnel are brought together. Tiemore that they work with one another and the more that theywork with the divisional staff the easier the whole processbecomes. However any time a new command post is set upsome amount of coordination s required. Coordination inturn. takes time.

The concept of rapid execution s further violated inthe control of river crossings. The establishment ofcrossing areas traffic regulating lines and control pointswaiting areas. equipment parks and engineer reguiatingpoints s extremely tlme consuming. Even with detailedprior planning. crossing area creation consumes vast amountsof time. By creating crossing areas under the control ofother than a maneuver commander necessitates additionaltime. This time is spent coordinating requirementsregarding terrain responsibilities and management. All ofthese additional time requirements are unique to rivercrossing operations.

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The doctrinal procedures for establishing command andcontrol of river crossing operations do not lend themselvesto rapid execution of operations. If these command andcontrol aspects are necessary, as the river crossingdoctrine stipulates they are, rapidity of execution ssacrificed for their establishment.

Allows friendly freedom of action.The command and control of river crossing operations

does not support friendly freedom of action. If a force isproceeding to a river, the majority of that force exceptingthe assault force) must halt some distance back from theriver to wait for the establishment of the crossing area.

The command portion of river crossing doctrine doesnot provide a battalion sized unit the capability to cross ariver on its own. Tke smallest sized unit, according todoctrine, that can command a river crossing is the brigade.A battalion wculd have to wait for its brigade headquartersto establish the crossing area before proceeding across theriver. Doctrinaily. this holds true for both deliberate andhasty type river crossings. Friendly freedom of action shindered in this respect.

Controi of river crossings also impedes freedom ofaction.


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This holds true for the same reasons mentioned under rapidexecution above. Friendly freedom of actlon is aisoseriously hampered by the availability of bridging assetsaridging assets are not the focal point of this thesis,however. A table of bridging assets available to maneuverunits is provided at Annex A solely for the interest of thereader. The recent impiementation of the EngineerRestructure Initiative (ERI) compounds the problem. UnderERI, maneuver divisions no ionger have a ribbon bridgecompany organic to the division.

Forces enemy to fiqht under friendiy force termsand conditions.

River crossing command and control doctrine does notsupport friendiy force freedom of action. Because friendiyforces are not able to maintain freedom of action, they cannot compietely force the enemy to fight under their termsanc conditions. halt or deiay at the rlver iine gives theenemy time to prepare a defense along the far shore. T neestablishment of a crossing area and its menities tips theenemy where friendly forces intend to cross the river.Initiative gained couid easily be icst with the halt inmaneuver. Initiative may swing to the enemy at :his point.Zven if it does not, the enemy is no longer being forced tofight under friendly terms.


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A river s a formidable obstacle when it must becrossed with an enemy force defending the far shore. Anymeans to prevent enemy buildup on the far shore lessens theformidability of the obstacle. A delay crossing the rivers time for the enemy to prepare a defense recoup

reorganize rearm and provide reinforcement. Without acontinual pressure on the enemy. he is able to set the termsand conditions of the battle himself. way around thislapse in rapid action s to continue to strike the enemywith violent air strikes or indirect fires. This alone maynot be enough. The enemy owns the terrain on the far shoreat this point. Assuming defensive pos t ons have beenprepared along the far shore. air strikes may not beeffective. Friendly forces can pick the time and locationwith which they w ll cross. Once the crossing is startedhowever friendly forces can not force the enemy to fightunder friendly terms and conditions. The enemy s able tomass forces aiong suspeccea friendly crossing areas. Bydoing so. the enemy can set the terms of battle until suchtime he s driven from the terrain and a bridgeheadestablished and secured.

Requires technically and tacticailv sound risk taking.The command and control doctrine of river crossing

operations does not support risk taking at the tacticallevel

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battalion sized force halting at a river is not taking arisk in trying to forge a hasty crossing of the river. Tinesame holds true for a brigade sized force. Doctrinally theestablishment of a river crossing area precludes such risktaking. These tactical forces are trained to halt at theriver line. During the halt overwatch forces are broughtforward. Air defense and indirect fire weapons systems arealso brought forward. Combat engineers then move forwardtogether with maneuver forces. co try and forge a crossingof the river. Once the far shore s achieved. and afoothold gained the crossing area is activated. Tinisoperation in itself is risky. Tnis type of risk is not thatintended under the initiative tenet of Airiand aattledoctrine. Risk under initiative s taking a chance. Riskunder crossing a river to establish a bridgehead s notchance. it is inherent. The problem with existing rivercrossing command and control doctrlne s that it does notprovide for any risk taking at the tactlcal levei. Theintent s not to force a river crossing in the face of astiff enemy resistance. To do so would be an unnecessaryrisk. However if a battalion or brigade slze force sees anopportunity to assault across the river and secure abridgehead. and the risk merits taking the chance doctrineshouid permit rhe undertaking.


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Technical and tacticai risk taking at the operationallevel is provided for in river crossing doctrine.Establishing deception plans and alternate crossing sitesencompasses risk. The risk is taken to lure the enemy awayfrom the main river crossing site. It is hoped that theenemy will mass forces at the wrong crossing site. makingthe main site iess defended. Some amount of risk is aisobeing taken at the operational ievel. This risk is thatassociated with the ability of the enemy to prepare adefense on the far shore. and conversely the ability offriendly forces O avoid or break the enemy defense inmaking a crossing.

Overall technically and tactically sound risk takingis neither supported nor unsupported by command and controlriver crossing doctrine.

Centraiized controi.Tne command and control doctrine of river crossing

operations strongly supporrs centraiized consroi. Aliplanning is done at dlvision level. Elridging assets arealso controlled by she division. Tha tempo. location andsite of crosslng are aii conrrolled y division or brigade.Crossing area commanders work directiy for the divisionccmmander and report oniy tc him


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Crossing force engineers work directly for the crossing areacommander. Subordinate units receive an operations ordertelling them exactly who s to cross the river. where andwhen. The entire operation is commanded and controlled bythe division commander responsible for the crossing. Theres little to no decentralized control in river crossing

operations.

Decentralized ex ec u~ io n.For all the same reasons given in centralized control

above, river crossing operations doctrine does not supportdecentralized execution. Not only s the entire operationconrrolled by the division. it is entirely executed by them.Subordinate units have ilttle to no execution responsibilityin river crossing operations. They only respond to theoperations order for the crossing and move into the crossingarea when directed to do so. Command and controi s carriedout using the t k e e command posts of the division. Thetactical command post (TAC CP) controls the bridgeheadforce s attack across the river. This is considered theclose battle. The TAC CP crosses the river shortly afterfoothold on the far shore s gained. The TAC CP thencontrols the fight to secure the bridgehead. At this point.the main co.mnand post (Main CP) assumes controi of theremainder of rhe river crossing.

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The Main CP prepares the river crossing plan and coordinatesthe crossing on activation of crossing areas. The MainCP also directs the deep battle against enemy forces on thefar shore of the river. The deep battle tries to interdictenemy reinforcements from entering the battle, and tries todestroy enemy forces defending the bridgehead from capture.

The rear command post (Rear CP) sustains the5effort. FM 90 13 says, "As a guide, the Main CP displaces

across the river after the division reserve. Once the NainCP displaces across the river, the crossing becomes a rearoperation controlled by the Rear CP."

Doctrinally, the entire command and control ofexecuting a river crossing operation lies with the divisionresponsible for the crossing.

Synchronization

Svnchronizes combined arms with maneuver.River crossing doctrine provides for synchr niz

of the combined arms with maneuver. The detaiied commandand .control structure of river crossing doctrlne ensures allcombined arms are involved in the crossing. Air defensesystems are given high priority in the doctrine. Indirectfire systems are also considered essentla . "The crossing

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plan is integrated throughout the division and is as7detailed as time permits." ll combat service and combat

service support units are involved as necessary.

possible flaw in the river crossing doctrine is whodoctrine holds responsible for writing the river crossingplan. As doctrine currently suggests. the division engineeris ultimately responsible for the crossing plan. Thisdelineation of responsibility is supported by the followingstatement from FM 90-13. "The division receives support froma CFE (crossing force engineer), who provides additionaistaff planners for the divlsion engineer sectlon at the main

8CP." Further leading one to believe that the rivercrossing plan is not written by the division plans andoperations section, but by the division engineer section. isanother statement out of FM 90-13 as follows. "The crossingplan is integrated throughout the division operation

9order . . . 5 the divislon operations section wereresponsible for writing the crossing plan, an integrationinto the division operation order would not be necessary.If river crossing doctrlne intends for the division engineersection at the main CP to write the crossing plan, and thento "integrate" it through the dlvislon, the best possiblesynchronizatior of combined arms is not provided for. Thereis no way tnat a division engineer section, even withassistance frox che crossing force engineer, can equai the

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combined arms integration effort of the division operationsG-3) staff.

Mission PurDose.River crossing doctrine is compatible with the

Airland Battle tenet of synchronization in consolidatingmission purpose. Tne entire division has a sole purposeto cross the river. All combat. combat service and combatservice support units play a part in the river crossing. Atypical example. by battlefield operating system is givenbelow.

ManeuverA divisional river crossing would consist or three

brigades attacking abreast unless attack aiong a broadfront was not possible. In the latter case. an attackacross a narrow front would be executed. An attack aiong anarrow front would most likely nave three brigades acrackingin cclumn. The brigades wouia be broken down i n ~ o hreeforces. The leading force s caiied rne 3rldgehea2 force.The bridgehead force s that force which assaults across theriver and is primariiy responsible for securing terrain onthe rar shore. The second force s the support force. Tnesupport force follows closely behind che bridgehead forceani provlees suppression obscuration and the crossingmeans. The third force is the breakour force. 3 e breakour.force cresses the river only after the bridgehead force hass.-c~~redh far shore anc: when adequate crossing means h ve

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been installed. The breakout force continues the attack onthe far shore of the river to a tactical objective. Allmaneuver forces then. are involved in the river crossing.They are broken down into the bridgehead force, the supportforce, and the breakout force.

IntelligenceIntelligence plays a critical role in a river

crossing. First and foremost. the intelligence is used todefine enemy strengths and dispositions in the entire areaof interest. Intelligence also portrays likely enemycourses of action in response to the friendly force rivercrossing. Based on the most likely enemy course of action.a friendly course of action to cross the rlver s chosen.Each course of action includes branches and sequels toconsider the what if situations. Intelligence scontinually updated. This allows the friendly force toremain abreast of the enemy situation, and to react asnecessary to continue the operation successfuily.

Fire supportFire support assets are continually involved in the

river crossing. They are used to provide preparatory firesIn advance of the bridgehead force's attack across theriver. They are also used to provide obscuration fires toconceal the friendly force crossing. Fire support assetsprovide advancing fires in front of the advancing force tolimit enemy capabilities, as weli as providing counter-fire

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to negate enemy fire support fires. The fire support assetsare critical assets. Fire support weapons are included inthe early elements to cross the river so as to providecontinuous fire support as the friendly force advances.

Mobility countermobility survivabilityEngineers obviously play the key role in a river

crossing operation. Ergincer.3 dre part of the bridgeheadforce. These engineers assist the maneuver force withmobility. They reduce obstacles in the path of friendlyadvance. Separate from these engineers are the engineerswho provide the initial crossing means. These engineersalso provide mobility. The mobility may be provided withrafts boats expedient bridging means. or a combination othe three. Engineers also are included in the supportforce. These engineers are those with the river crossingmeans i.e. the bridges. Engineers are also part of thebracket force to provide mobility. Engineers also maintainroads leading up to the river crossing site eo ensuretraffic flow is maintained as best as can be with availableassets.

ir defense artilleryAir defense artillery assets are brought as far

forward as possible before the river crossing commences..lney are responsibie prqtecting the crossing site from enemyair strikes while the crossing is being forged. Approachesand crosslng sites along the river are the hlghest priority

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1for air defense during the crossing. Air defense assetsare then projected to the far shore of the crossing site toprovide a continuous air umbrella protection over thecrossing site and the bridging assets. Air defense alsoprovides protection over critical command posts. materialstockage sites, and the like to better ensure the success ofthe crossing.

Command and controlCommand and control is paramount to the rlver

crossing. The division command posts, brlgade commandposts, crossing forces command posts, etc., are ailintricately involved in the river crossing.

Combat service supportCombat service support provides continuous resuppiy

of all classes of supply to rhe division before. during andafter the crossing. Class I fuel) and class Vammunition) are prestocked as cioae to the near shore or

.the river as possibie before the crossing commences. ~ n i sprovides for immediate resupply ro forward units as needed.Combat service support assets are also contained withbridgehead force, the support force. and the bracket force.These combat service support units are normally as austereas possible, but iarge enough to sustain the maneuver forcein its mission. The combat service support assets aretailored to support the mission as required.

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Mission purpose, as s seen from the above, sclearly provided for in existing command and control forriver crossing doctrine. Each element of the division scritical to the success of the crossing, and each supportsthe overall mission.

Minimizes, yet coordinates time and space.River crossing doctrine coordinates time and space

well; but, it does not minimize time and space. Thecoordination of time and space is a by-product of missionpurpose. All battlefield operating systems are consideredin the mission planning, as was detailed above. Theirintegration into the overall division river crossing plan isprovided for in FM 90 13. River Crossins Operations. Thephased employment of the battlefield operating systems tosupport the division crossing pian s a coordination oftime. The establishment of crossing areas in depth on bothsides of the river does not minimize space; as compared toother operations such as breaching a minefield etc.. Themassing of forces co assault across a river on a broadfront, and the continued massing of forces on the far shorerequires time, as does the establishment of the crossingarea compiete with the command and control features outlinedin Chapter Four. Crossing requires depth in area on bothshores of the river, in crossing resources, and in time


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Neither time or space are minimized to the extent they couldbe. The final analysis then, is that river crossingdoctrine is neither supportive or ur~suppor'tive fminimizing, yet coordinating time and space.

Relies on habitual synchronization.FM 90 13 states, (River crossing) assault and

support forces must carefully synchronize all actions toensure the crossing force produces adequate combat power atthe decisive point and time. This synchronization requirescareful calculation during planning and attention during

12execution. The ciose attention that must be given tosynchronizing forces. time and space during a river crosslngoperation, given current command and control doctrine forriver crossing operations, necessitates directed, nothabitual synchronization. The crossing area commandert jnt 01s a1 1 tactical movements within the cr-cssing sin s

Units are directed when and where to move. hc Srldgeheadforce is the force most able to use habitualsynchronization. Support and bracket forces entireoperation is directed by the division. as is there mcveacross the river. For these reasons, the comnana and,ntrol of river crossings does not support hakituaisynchronization. On the contrary, dlrected sy~chron;aatlonis th norm. not the exception.


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Conserves resources.Vast amounts of resources are required to conduct a

river crossing operation. Men equipment time ammunitionstaff planning. assault crossing assets bridge assetsnumerous control measures and large command structures allconsume resources. Granted. any tactical military operationconsumes resources. The resources demanded by current rivercrossing doctrine are severalfoid more than other tacticaloperations however. Current river crossing doctrinenecessitates the division receiving additionai resou. c e ~from corps or above. to successfuily carry out a crossing.Very few resources are conserved in a river crossingoperation. It can not be said that command and control ofriver crossings doctrinally supports the Airiand Battletenet of synchronization in conserving resources.

Section TI. Co m~ar ison f S S Army Conunand andControl Docwine to River Crossznq

Doctrine

The foiiowing critical. major parts of U S Armycommand and control doctrine are those from whlch comparisonto river crossing doctrine will 3e made.

Commandwell informed vision ciear intentqua;ity low voiume ccmunicatioris.

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concept expression of tasks.focus on future.accept risk.

- facilitates freedom to operate.provides rapid response.

Controlcoordinates activities between lower, hlgherand adjacent units.

- provides structure. limits uncertainty.- hign volume, routine communications.

emphasizes efficiency.adaptable.

COMMANDWell informed vision, clear intentTine command and control of river crossing ogerailon:?

pu-ovldes lor the division commander s vision and inrent.The vision and intent are components of a consolidaiedmission purpose discussed earlier under synchronization.Current river crossing doctrine stipulates the earlyplanning of the rlver crossing at the division level.Before the pianning commences. the aivislon comnancierprovides the ti and Crossing Force Engineer his vision fcrthe operation. The vision includes the deslred et?d stlie.-Iile v slon portrays the rlver crossing operation f r m start


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to finish. The division commander also provides inforlnat ion~ lgdrding is intent. The intent includes what thecommander wants done, and not necessarily how to accomplishthe operation. With this information in hand, the crossingforce engineer and division engineer staff planners commenceplanning the river crossing operation.

When the river crossing plan s compiete, it isforwarded from division to concerned, subordinate units.The river crossing plan s normally part of a larger.division operations order. The operations order, perrequired format, includes the commander s vision and intent.

Quality, low volume communications.River crossing doctrine does a poor job at supporting

this aspect of command and control doctrine. Communicationsfor a river crossing operation are too compiex and lengthlyto detail in this thesis. A brief iook at thecommunications s provided as supporting evidence to thefact that river crossing doctrine does not support iowvolume communications.

There are up to seven communications ners that areacrivated for both

Documents

River Crossing Doctrine