Chapter 1

Background of the Problem

Pork barrel politics is defined as the practice of targeting expenditure to

particular districts, states or regions based on a clear set of political considerations

(Agnani & Aray, 2010).

A significance of pork barrel studies is explained by Nograles and

Lagman, (2010) in which they establish that understanding the workings of pork

barrel is crucial given that the projects implemented thru the use of these funds

complements and links the national development goals of a country down to the

grassroots level. This is essential especially in the workings of democratic

countries.

Madison as cited by Nograles and Lagman, (2010) stressed that it is just

necessary that the legislative branch of government should be held accountable to

be examined in the processes of utilization of pork barrel funds because the

legislative body has a more direct affinity given that the money comes from their

constituents. According to Hird, (1991) the social value and of most government

projects can be empirically tested through the monitoring and examining of the

utilization of the pork barrel funds.

The literature on pork barrel distribution has also gained popularity

through time especially in underdeveloped areas or countries. This is explained by

Kawanaka, (2007), he posits that pork barrels play a politically significant role in

less developed countries or areas given that legislators are able to buy off voters

for their re-election. This established relationship signifies that in order to acquire

1

position legislators being rational agents should secure enough pork barrel funds

and construct projects which are seen to be beneficial to their districts or areas

even if in some cases this may be inefficient in a national perspective (Hird,

1991).

In the case of the Philippines, according to Keefer and Khemani, (2008)

pork barrel politics may be viewed to have employed a negative image. The

reason behind such is due to the presence of weak institutions such as political

parties or agencies that could monitor the use of these pork barrel funds. The

increase of coalitions in the country may it be through the merging of political

parties or the increasing number of committees in Congress shows that Also given

the clientelist environment in which the government operates affects the use of the

pork barrel funds which is suppose to be a tool for the citizens to receive better

services from the government.

This research therefore aims to build on the studies explaining how

coalitions through the rural committees in Congress influence the distribution of

pork barrel funds. This will add on to the study of how the government as an

institution especially that of the legislative branch controls and monitors the use

of these funds which are known to be used for local development.

The researcher will be applying the theory on positive choice theory on

legislative coalitions by Shepsle and Weingast (1994) which states that

committees influence decision making process by employing certain strategies

such as bargaining, committee size and agenda setting strategy and in doing so

2

these committees are able to acquire a greater advantage and leverage towards the

distribution of funds or the pursuit of their electoral goals.

The researcher will use key informant interviews and document analysis

as the methods to gather all the relevant data to explain how the rural committees

influence the distribution of pork barrel funds in the country.

Research Question

This study will answer the following question:

How do coalitions (i.e. through formation of rural committees in

Congress) influence the distribution of pork barrel funds?

Definition of Terms

Term Definition

Coalitions An alliance of persons or groups with

varying individual interests but in the

pursuit of the same goal and the

membership to such could be

temporary, a matter of convenience or

for greater advantage (Agnani & Aray,

2010)

Rural Committees Committees in Congress which focuses

on local development projects (i.e.

roads, livelihood projects, trainings and

education, use of agricultural and

aquatic resources) (Nograles &

3

Lagman, 2008)

Influence the ability to affect decisions of policy

makers.

Pork Barrel Funds “a tool used by politicians to create

projects for social welfare and to extend

influence amongst its constituents”

(Hird, 1991).

Research Objectives

This study aims to:

Provide a clearer understanding on how coalition formation in

Congress takes place

Examine how the dynamics of coalition formation affect the

distribution of pork barrel funds

Clarify the importance of coalitions such as committees in

Congress to the distribution of pork barrel funds

Significance of the Research

This research will be able to contribute to the literature on coalitions and

pork barrel distribution and explain the dynamics and processes involved in the

distribution of such political resource. In theory its contribution is to focus on the

study of coalition formation which takes into consideration committees in

Congress. According to (Stein & Bickers, 1994) studies on committees as

coalitions affecting distributive policies such as pork barrel funded programs is

4

essential in both theories of coalition formation and pork barrel spending. Though

there is a growing literature during the 1980’s and 1990’s, most studies were done

in the United States. This study is significant by contributing to such literature

and by providing a clearer understanding on the dynamics of Congress as an

institution given the formation of these committees.

In the empirical level, this study will be able to explain the dynamics of

the multitude of actors involve in the legislative body which forms coalitions in

order to influence the distribution of pork barrel funds. By looking into rural

committees which targets local development the researcher will then be able to

shed light if there is indeed a significant relationship on the formation of such

coalitions and if it affects the distribution of pork barrel funds in the country.

Scope and Limitations

It is important to note that in writing this project the researcher focuses on

coalitions through rural committees in Congress. The study differentiates rural

committees from other committees due to the fact that the objective of such

committees is to form local development projects and these committees are target

specific given that they already have certain aspects where to focus on, example

would be the Committees on Roads and Highways, which targets the creation,

maintenance and other related matters on road. This then could shed light on the

influence of these committees in the distribution of pork barrel funds given that

these coalitions are target specific. On the other hand the limitation of the study is

its focus on analyzing a specific type of committee in Congress, also another

limitation of the study is that given the varying factors that could influence the

5

distribution of pork barrel funds, one cannot completely generalize that the rural

committees are the only ones which influence the distribution of these pork barrel

funds.

6

Chapter 2

Review of Related Literature

In order to understand how coalitions influence legislative policies and

decisions, it is helpful to look at different studies and cases. The first part of this

chapter will look into empirical researches on various types of coalitions and their

influence. The second part will look into the different theories employed by

different authors in understanding the relationship between coalitions and their

level of influence on distributive policies.

In understanding the mechanisms of coalitions and how it influence

distributive policies, it can be noted that the literature is strong in theory, but lacks

in cases this is because most cases center on political party coalitions however

several authors such as Weingast, (1979), Cox and Mcubbins (1988), Schofield

and Laver, (1985) and Collie, (1988) mentioned that there is a need to explore

other coalitions in the legislature environment and other areas in government.

They highlighted the role of committees in Congress, local government coalitions

and majority blocs as important to understand and expand the various theories on

coalition formation and explain how actors interact and cooperate in pursuit of

their own objectives and acquire payoffs. Though there are existing cases on

coalitions in Congress through committees, it is limited because empirical

researches were mostly done in United States.

Cases on Coalition Formation and its Influence

Coalitions play a central role in legislatures, cabinet formation in

parliamentary governments, international agreements and many political and

7

collective action settings. However the discussion in this study focuses on the

literature on coalitions regarding cooperative game theory which explains that the

formation of these coalitions is seen as a cooperative strategy to have a stronger

influence in policy or decision making which leads to a greater allocation of

incentive mechanisms or benefits amongst the members.

In line with this statements, (Baron, 1989 p.1049) defines coalition as an

important feature of a legislative structure which is viewed to be composed of a

set of members in which during the legislative process at which proposals are

made, these members finds at their best interest to coordinate with other members

in order to advance their electoral goals and ensure allocation of benefits. Baron,

(1989) highlights coalitions in the legislative structure because it is in this

institutional setting wherein one can really see how influential coalitions are. An

example given was how the members of coalitions in Congress may propose a

project which allocates benefits among their districts but on the other hand it can

also be the case that a member may propose a project that allocates more on his or

her district than to the districts of other coalition members. This then posits that

the strategy employed in coalition formations in Congress is a cooperative one

due to the pursuit of individual electoral objectives of legislators (Baron, 1989).

Government coalitions are mostly a common feature in presidential

democracies during the last wave of democratization. This is according to Aleman

and Saiegh, (2007) wherein they study different types of coalition formation in

Chile. They classify coalitions under three categories, one is under coalitions in

the form of legislative committees, and the second is coalitions formed by

8

political parties and lastly coalitions of the majority bloc in the legislature (p.

257).

The study of these authors looked into comparing which among the three

categories of government coalitions are influential and centers not just on

electoral objectives but also on policy based alliances. The results highlighted that

political parties serves as the most influential among other forms of coalitions.

This is due to the following reasons, the structure of parties in Chile is

characterized by five main political parties, and these parties are only allowed to

present two candidates per district. The allocation of seat in Congress is only

given to the two candidates per district if they can acquire votes which are

doubled than their opponents. Therefore, electoral pacts are already observed

during the campaign of these parties, with 60 districts, all of these five political

parties ensure that they are able to establish enough number of votes to give them

assurance of seats in Congress (Aleman & Saiegh , 2007, pp.264-265).

Also the existence of the clear set of ideologies of these political parties

gives them a more influential role in policy decisions. According to Aleman and

Saiegh, (2007) three of these political parties are leftist and centers on economic

policies and distributional policies. This clear ideology makes them form alliances

and coalitions especially in formulating policies and in voting for who should be

the representatives of the different districts during elections (p. 266).

On the other hand an interesting note in this study is the coalition of the

majority bloc especially in policy proposals, members of the majority always

stand close to each other in policy proposals which makes it easier for these

9

proposals to reach the final vote in Congress. Also there exists an implicit

agreement on what matters should not be discussed in the floor of the Congress.

This then posits that the majority bloc has agenda control and is always

cooperative (p. 257).

Another study which supports political parties as the most influential form

of coalitions was done by Dhillon, (2003) by comparing the pre and post

formation of coalitions among political parties in United Kingdom. The author

was able to identify those political parties which are smaller in size enters

coalitions before and after elections which leads to greater gains because of the

leverage they get whether through monetary resources or other support incentives.

However the bigger parties which usually comprised majority of these coalitions

form coalitions or enter into coalitions before elections this is due to the reduction

of uncertainty factors, in which the author defines that given that bigger parties

would not want to lose their position in office, they would encourage participation

amongst smaller parties to ensure that they are able to get perfect information on

the their status in various areas especially during elections (pp. 14-15).

However it is also important to note that after the formation of coalitions

and during the policy making process these coalitions of political parties are not

solely for the pursuit of electoral objectives and incentives. According to Dhillon,

(2003) an instance wherein the parliamentary was passing two important bills and

had offer concessionaries for the losing coalition, instead of accepting, the

coalition still pursued and petitioned for the adoption of these bills which were

focusing on reforms on labor policies.

10

This idea of coalitions influencing policy outcomes and decision making

through an agreement on the distribution of resources and binding commitments

was also strengthened by Karume, (2003) when he studied the functions of

political coalitions in the South African context. According to Karume, (2003)

there are three notable functions of coalitions firstly coalitions are viewed to be

power alliances wherein two or more parties join together to be able to form a

majority in the government. Secondly, coalitions are structured for strengthening

opposition; in the case of South Africa there is a need for an opposition coalition

to consolidate democracy. Through this opposition there will always be system of

checks and balances which would target the ruling majority. Lastly, coalitions are

considered to act as mediators in times of political or civil conflicts (p.7).

The author cites the following examples regarding party coalitions during

the 1999 elections, three parties namely the NNP, DP and Federal Alliance

formed the Democratic Coalition in order to prevent the dominance of then

majority party ANC. Such is needed given that the formation of an opposition

coalition will serve as a gateway for an even distribution of resources in terms of

financial and media support. Another reason for the establishment of such

coalition is to establish a strong legislative alliance in order for these opposition

parties to acquire seats in the Kwazutu Natal legislature (pp. 7-8).

Though most literature on coalition formation centers on parliamentary

regimes and political parties, there are some studies which also tested coalition

formation theories on multi party presidential democracies, such is seen in the

case of Uruguay.

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Altman, (2000) highlights the role of coalitions in presidential democratic

systems because these coalitions increases the ability of the executive to get its

program through the legislature and at the same time coalitions may it be in the

form of political parties, committees or majority blocs has a better chance of

forming policy proposals or providing solutions to pressing national problems

(pp. 259-260). However an interesting part of this study is the incentive

mechanisms highlighted in forming coalitions under a presidential system.

The author posits the case of Uruguay as an interesting case to study given

that there are pre-electoral and post electoral coalitions and there is the emergence

of increase in committees in Congress through time (Altman, 2000 pp. 262).

“Uruguay is a country with a highly fractionalized party system, which was very

evident after the re-democratization in 1985 which paved way for the emergence

of different types of coalitions in the government” (p.263). However the author

before testing his theory on Uruguay already clarified that though there are a lot

of existing theories and literature on coalition formation, there are not enough

studies focusing on presidential democracies which also serve as a significance of

his research.

The reason for such is due to the established notions under presidential

democracies and party coalitions. First is that the president is most likely to be the

one who has more influence in the citizens in terms of evaluating government

performance, may it be positive or negative. Thus under a presidential system

there are less incentives to join or form a coalition given that the credit on good

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governance is not usually attributed to the party coalition of the president

(Altman, 2000 p. 268)

Another is the assumption that these party coalitions attempts to maximize

votes in the next elections and the vote outcomes are determined by the voter’s

evaluation of government performance. Consequently the president’s approval

rating has a powerful effect on parties’ decisions to associate themselves or to

distance themselves in the government. Thus this affects the incentive

mechanisms available to these coalitions given that in order to ensure re-election,

these coalitions or the members of these coalitions should ensure that they align

themselves with the president (Altman, 2000 p.269).

In the findings of his study, the author was able to conclude that though

there are established notions that the president most often than not has a greater

influence in how coalitions will be sustained and formed, Altman, (2000) was

able to test that in the case of Uruguay this is not the case. Also in terms of

ideological affinity which is viewed to be crucial in party coalitions, in the case of

Uruguay, this has no significant relationship into how parties will more likely to

be influential. Rather the incentives which are the distribution of payoffs to these

coalitions are seen to be the important and crucial factor for coalitions to be

influential to their constituents (p. 275-276). With this the author recommends

that further studies on coalitions on multi party presidential democracies should

be done in cross country basis. Also Altman, (2000) mentioned that coalition

studies should not only focus on party system coalitions but on other types of

political coalitions (p.276). We then identify this as a gap of the studies on

13

coalitions which previous authors mentioned also identifies and seek to further

explore.

Likewise, a study done by Sened, (1996) on the influence of coalitions in

the legislature looked into the committees in the legislature. The author posits that

it is more likely that legislators will acquire the policy and office pursuits which

they seek due to the establishment of these committees. Also, ideological beliefs

and affinities to the majority speaker or president may not be the most reliable

measure of the extent of influence of these coalitions because the financial

incentives which are labeled as pork barrel funds is more significant due to the

fact that distributions and use of these funds require a solid and feasible projects

which the constituencies would likely benefit from (p 351). Therefore this could

translate for a better image in the part of the legislators leading to re-election or a

better performance in the government.

The author used regression analysis to measure the degree of influence of

these committees and the results showed that there exists a significant relationship

on how these committees are able to lobby their interest and pursue their policies

in order to achieve a greater distribution of pork barrel funds (Sened, 1996 p.368).

The findings relate to Caplow (1959) study on further development of political

coalitions, in which he identified that legislators can form coalitions and distribute

funds to their constituents via two ways. First is by a proportional tax on labor

income and the other is through borrowing in capital markets. These public

revenues are used to finance provision of public goods in which all citizens

14

benefit from and to provide for targeted district specific transfers which is

interpreted as pork barrel spending.

Theories on Coalition and Distributive Policies

In order to understand the link between coalitions and distributive policies

it is important to understand the literature examining and linking these two

concepts.

The studies on coalitions have been seen to be everywhere but most often

than not it is associated to a political nature. According to Kelley, (1968) there are

four subjects that most theories revolve in studying coalitions; one is the study of

coalition formation, bargaining in coalitions, the payoffs receive in coalitions and

the last one is the maintenance of these coalitions (p.62). The author further

defined coalitions as a group of individuals who are most likely than not in the

pursuit of the same goal, is able to pool their resources to the attainment of such

goal, is likely to communicate often in order to achieve that goal and has an

agreement on the distribution of payoffs and benefits received when achieving the

goal (p.62-63).

Browne & Rice (1979) cited Kelley, (1968) and explained that in the

process of forming coalitions there is the notion of the law of situation under

which these coalitions will operate. The authors mentioned three; the first is the

continuous situations wherein these coalitions attempt to secure control over

rewards which are always present and associated to them. Examples of such are

power and prestige which coalitions pursue in order to acquire to gain more

influence. Power in this sense is not just measured in terms of position but also in

15

the acquisition and distribution of resources. Second is the episodic situations in

which parties or coalitions try to win over rewards in competition, example of

such is in the case of control in policy outputs in a multi party setup. Lastly

terminal situations in which only one coalition is formed or moves given that

there is only one reward available (p.67-68).

Crucial to both works of these authors mentioned above is Riker (1962),

work on the Theory of Political Coalitions. According to this theory, there are

three crucial elements in understanding coalitions. First is the n-person games

model that is the “size principle” that is the tendency of winning coalitions toward

the minimal winning size. Second important feature is the strategic principle

wherein participants move into the minimal winning coalition and lastly the

disequilibrium principle which is the selective elimination of participants in the

coalition.

In discussing his theory, Riker mentioned that given the rationality of

man, forming coalitions is just enough to ensure winning and not to make it

larger, given that payoffs are limited and it should be maximized by the right size

of coalition. However, Riker admits that the limitation of the first principle in

reality is that not everyone has full information on who belongs to the coalition or

worst that who remains loyal to their coalitions. Therefore he explains his strategy

principle wherein coalitions engage in different strategies by using policy

proposals, bargaining, tactics and resources to have leverage in pursuing their

electoral objectives and for greater benefits to be spread out in all members of the

coalition (pp. 32-33).

16

Hence, Budge and Laver, (1986) in their study on Office Seeking and

Coalition Theory further explained this strategy principle wherein parties may not

share a common perception of a policy space, however given that there are

incentives available once they are able to acquire position, bargaining can be one

of the strategies these parties would engage into when they enter coalitions. The

authors posited that being rational actors, though having different policy

preferences, entering into coalitions would enable them to resolve conflicts

because bargaining strategies can be employed and in the long run they may be

able to forward their own preferences (pp.500-501).

In addition, Hird, (1991) cited Budge and Laver’s work in their study of

the political economy of pork and explained that though it is important to

highlight the role of bargaining strategies for coalitions to advance their

objectives and have a greater distribution of incentives such as pork barrel funds,

the empirical researches on such subject matter varies across time periods and

countries, therefore there is a need to further explore and research on the said

matter.

To further understand the development of such theories on coalition we

now look into the distributive policies which is mentioned as the pay offs that

these coalitions seek to pursue. According to Lancaster, (1986) legislators and

constituents will always have that “electoral connection.” This connection is

established by looking into these legislators as rational actors and in the other side

the constituents demand constituency services. This constituency service is also

known as a distributive policy and an example of such is pork barrel funds. The

17

rationale according to Lowi, (1964) as cited by Lancaster, (1986) a distributive

policy stems from a political decision that concentrates benefits to constituencies.

The author further discussed this by explaining that characteristics of pork barrel

funded projects is that benefits are geographically targeted whereas the costs are

dispersed through general taxation.

Furthermore, Weingast, (1994) developed a criteria which gives thorough

and clear understanding on these distributive policies. These policies contain the

following, divisibility, whereas projects are local and can vary in size and scope.

Second is expenditure, main task of these policies is the allocation of a given

amount of fund and lastly scope in which funds are generally distributed and

targeted to certain legislative constituencies or areas defined as districts.

In recent studies done by Evans, (2004) she discusses that though pork

barrel and distributive policies are mentioned in previous studies in different

aspects, some sees it as synonymous others see it as pork barrel being a subset of

distributive policies there has to be a clear distinction that both is proper to say.

Pork barrel may be a subset of distributive policies if its economic implications

would be considered, such as the efficiency or inefficiency of the outputs or

projects wherein these funds where put into use. On the other hand, if political

uses will be highlighted rather than the economic benefits, then it can be seen that

distributive policies is interchangeable with pork barrel given that the discussion

centers on the incentive mechanisms in understanding the relationship of the

legislators and its constituencies.

18

In addition, Cox and Mccubbins, (1986) put forward a model on why

coalitions pay importance to these distribution policies. Given that legislators are

rational actors, the formation of alliances may serve three types of groups which

should help them ensure re-election. First are their supporters, next is the

opposition or the groups that have constantly opposed them and lastly the swing

groups or those who have not expressed support or has been hostile to them.

However most studies agree on the notion that these legislature coalitions would

distribute pork barrel to those who have supported them and remained loyal to

them, on the other hand Portillo, (2011) cited Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) in his

study on the case of pork barrel politics in the case of Honduras that legislature

coalitions still value the importance of these swing voters because the rational

way to do is to acquire as much votes needed to acquire seat and that would

happen if they don’t just serve their electoral constituencies, therefore greater

distribution of pork barrel funds is needed for them to be able to create projects

valuable to these swing voters as well.

This then leads us to see how coalitions value these distributive policies

and this can be seen in institutions such as the Congress. Stein and Bickers,

(1994) pointed out that electoral structures can therefore be seen as necessary but

not entirely sufficient for the existence of pork barrel activity. Other structures

may be seen to affect or alter the relationship between electoral systems and pork

barrel distribution. An example provided is the legislative committees present in

Congress.

19

Bickers and Stein, (1994) cited the United States as a country with an

institutional facilitator of distributive allocations and that is through the

committees and sub committees in the legislative body. The reason for such is that

committees being considered as coalitions may act and specialize in certain policy

areas which could provide specialization to these legislators to craft policy

proposals where there is a higher chance of funds distribution. As a result there is

also an increase in the chance of opportunity for re-election (p.74).

In line with this, Collie, (1988) mentioned that legislators who enter into

committees may reflect a preference political and public in nature. These

legislators can be still occupied with re election goals however given that they are

able to satisfy their constituencies they may opt to pursue national programs

which guarantee efficiency and equity as well and not just dwell on individual

policy or office pursuits (p. 450).

Another study done by Evans, (1994) investigated the role of committees

in getting a hold on distributive benefits. The study showed that the strength of

how committees are able to acquire greater benefits lie on the leadership of the

committee leader. The leader is able to use certain strategies such as bargaining,

enforcement mechanism and for some cases these committees may be able to

accept side payments especially from those groups who would want the bill or

law be passed immediately (p. 899).

In line with this Peabody, (1974) already highlighted the role of the

committee leader in a previous study and identified the connection between the

committee leaders and the party leaders in Congress. The author’s findings stated

20

that the advantage of the committee is that it can be a combination of different

actors coming from different parties united to attain a certain goal and whoever

becomes the committee leader has the greater advantage given that he has the

control over the power and the party leader from where he originally belong can

still lobby for their own interest (pp.145-146).

A study by Oppenheimer, (1983) supported the role of committees and

mentioned that most studies on committees were developed during the 1960’s and

there was recognition that these committees are essential given that they can

shape policies and budgets. But on the other side, there was a lack of evidence

and pursuance of this study in the years after that which led to major gaps on the

literature.

Although that was the case Battaglini and Coate, (2008) cited works of

several authors such as Ferno, (1973), Westefield, (1978) and Manley, (1979)

which all focused on studying the committee on appropriations which is

considered to be important in the distribution of funds amongst the various

committees and legislators in Congress. However, the studies centered on the

norms, behavior and policy of this committee alone which can be seen as limited

given that it may be the case that the influence does not come to such committee

alone but also from the other committees as well.

Another significant contribution made was done by Eulau, (1984) wherein

the study he made center on the strategies employed by these committees in order

to achieve greater payoffs or benefits and at the same time allowing for the

passage of their said policy proposals. The strategies are as follows the committee

21

size, the rules and norms observed in their committees, the policy beliefs and their

motivational resources such as ideological commitment which gives them greater

influence in the environment they are in.

22

Chapter 3

Framework

Theoretical Framework

To explain how the coalitions through the form of rural committees

influence the distribution of pork barrel funds this study will use the positive

choice theory on legislative coalitions by Shepsle & Weingast, (1994).

According to the authors, the theory highlights the strategies employed by

coalitions to advance their interests in order to acquire their goals. The theory

targets the coalitions formed in the legislative arena. Shepsle & Weingast, (1994)

mentioned three strategies done by coalitions to influence decision making or

policy outcomes. These strategies are done in a collective manner and are labeled

as collective strategies. These three strategies are agenda setting, bargaining and

the size of the coalitions (p. 157).

The agenda setting strategy is measured in different degrees and levels.

Depending on the type of coalitions, this can be seen in how coalitions propose

certain policies and proposals in favor of a bigger payoff or return for them. By

aligning their proposals to a specific project or target these coalitions are able to

influence the passage of their proposals easily and are able to get a greater

distribution of incentives may it be in the form of financial assistance or other

means (pp. 158-159).

In analyzing the bargaining strategy, this can be further studied by looking

into the negotiations done especially during committee meeting reports and

documents which pertains to how these coalitions will be able to come up with

23

more support. Basically this can be seen in campaigns, advocacies and the outside

source in which these coalitions engaged with so as to further advance their

influence especially during the open interrogation of their proposed bills and

policies wherein technical experts, civil society groups will be invited to engaged

in.

Lastly the size of coalitions can be seen as a strategy to gain greater

influence especially if through time these coalitions had been growing or have

been increasing.

Thesis

The ability of coalitions to influence decisions or control policy outcomes

depends on the strategies it uses during the policy making process i.e. if these

coalitions are able to exercise control through bargaining, agenda setting and

committee size.

Definition of Terms

Terms Conceptual Definition

Coalitions An alliance of groups or a set of individuals with the same goal or objective and holds on a common pool of resources in order to gain leverage to pursue these goals (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994)

Influence The ability to alter decisions or control outcomes (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994 p. 156)

Pork Barrel

Considered as a distributive policy which is targeted to a specific district or constituencies of legislators and is essential to create projects which may help in the pursuit of reelection (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994)

24

Diagram

Operational Framework

In this study the coalitions is indicated by the rural committees in

Congress and by using the different indicators of the collective strategies, the

researcher will be able to examine if indeed these coalitions have a greater

influence in how pork barrel is distributed to them. By examining the documents

regarding the proposed projects and implemented programs or projects by these

rural committees one can see how they are able to set the agenda and by looking

into the reports the researcher will be able to find out the bargaining strategies

adopted by these committees. Lastly the increase in the size of committees and the

number of committees in Congress will also further give us a better understanding

if there is indeed a significant relationship between the rural committees and how

pork barrel funds are distributed given that they use this strategies. Also it should

be clear that the researcher only focuses on the distributive policies in the theory

given that it is the one that can easily be measured through the use of pork barrel

fund distribution and spending. Also it is more applicable in the Philippines given

those coalitions formed in the country are for temporary purposes or is for the

25

Coalitions Collective Strategies

Electoral Objectives

Economies of scale

Reduce uncertainty outcomes

Distributive Policies

advancement of certain interests and also a leverage to acquire pork barrel funds

based from several studies done regarding the pork barrel politics in the country.

Thesis

Rural Committees in Congress employ certain collective strategies such as

agenda setting which can be seen in the policies they propose, bargaining that is

their mobilization on how they are able to push forth their interest and the size of

committee which can influence the votes on how policies such as pork barrel

funds should be distributed to them.

Definition of Terms

Terms Operational Definition

Coalitions In this study the coalitions would be the rural committees in Congress such as the Committees on Agriculture and Food, Fisheries, Public Works and Highways, Technical and Higher Education and Rural Development.

Influence In this study influence refers to the ability to control or distribute electoral objectives such that of the distribution of pork barrel funds.

Pork Barrel

In this study pork barrel is the funds used for country development and is measured through the Philippine Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).

Diagram

26

Rural Committees

Policy proposals, mobilizing

resources, size of the

committee

Electoral objective

Acquiring a greater Distribution of pork barrel funds

Chapter IV

Design and Methods

Conceptualization and Measurement

As explained earlier, the purpose of the study is to shed light on how

coalitions through the form of rural committees influence the distribution of pork

barrel funds. In particular, the study focuses on examining the Committees on

Agriculture and Food, Fisheries, Public Works and Highways, Technical and

Higher Education and Rural Development because these committees targets local

development which pork barrel funded programs focused on.

By using the theory of legislative coalitions by Shepsle & Weingast,

(1994) the researcher is able to explain how coalitions through the form of rural

committees in Congress, influence the distribution of the pork barrel funds. The

theory posits that legislators are rational actors who have individual electoral

objectives and moves in a competitive environment; therefore in order to achieve

these objectives and lessen their environmental constraints, there is a need for

cooperation amongst these legislators which is done through the formation of

coalitions. By forming such coalitions these legislators may gain leverage in

acquiring more pork barrel funds which is said to be one of the electoral

objectives which they seek to achieve once they are in position.

It is important to note that coalitions in Congress can be measured

through studying Congress committees (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994). The

27

researcher will be looking into the projects proposed and implemented by the

Committees on Agriculture and Food, Fisheries, Public Works and Highways,

Technical and Higher Education and Rural Development which are all classified

to be rural committees; these committees centers on local development through

the creation of soft and hard infrastructures in which pork barrel funds are mostly

distributed.

The researcher will use the mixed method which is a combination of

qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. The reason for such is because a

study by Kawanaka, (2007) already used the quantitative analysis of pork barrel

distribution in the Philippines and one of the hypothesis tested was that those who

are members of rural committees receives larger amounts of pork barrel funds

than those who are non-members. The result showed a significant relationship

which means that those who are members of such committees receive greater

distributions of pork barrel funds however the author recommended that more

rural committees should be tested to justify that committees really play an

influential role in the distribution of pork barrel funds in the country because he

only compared two committees which are the Agriculture and Food and Fisheries.

By using the same formula and regression analysis used by the Kawanaka,

(2007) the researcher will be able to test and strengthen the case. Also by using

qualitative analysis, the researcher will be able to justify if these rural committees

are said to be influential through examining the documents pertaining to the

projects proposed and implemented by these committees and looking into how

many were passed and the amount of funds allocated in the creation of these

28

projects may it be soft or hard infrastructures. Also by conducting an interview

among members of these rural committees, the researcher will be able to solidify

the hypothesis of the study.

Table

Term Conceptual Operational Indicator

Coalitions An alliance of groups

or a set of individuals

with the same goal or

objective and holds

on a common pool of

resources in order to

gain leverage to

pursue these goals

(Shepsle & Weingast,

1994)

In this study the

coalitions would

be the rural

committees in

Congress such as

the Committees

on Agriculture

and Food,

Fisheries, Public

Works and

Highways,

Technical and

Higher Education

and Rural

Development.

Influence The ability to alter

decisions or control

outcomes (Shepsle &

In this study

influence refers to

the ability to

-programs

proposed by

these

29

Weingast, 1994 p.

156)

control or

distribute

electoral

objectives such

that of the

distribution of

pork barrel funds.

committees; i.e.

the proposals

passed and

implemented,

funds allocated

to such projects;

the size of the

committees

through time; if

it increases or

decreases, the

bargaining

strategies which

can be seen in

the committee

meetings

documents

Pork Barrel Funds Considered as a

distributive policy

which is targeted to a

specific district or

constituencies of

legislators and is

In this study pork

barrel is the funds

used for country

development and

is measured

through the

30

essential to create

projects which may

help in the pursuit of

reelection (Shepsle &

Weingast, 1994)

Philippine

Development

Assistance Fund

(PDAF).

Case Study Design

The study on the coalitions through the form of rural committees in

Congress and how it influences the distribution of pork barrel funds is a typical

case. This is because it only confirms the existing literature that these coalitions in

the form of committees influence the distribution of pork barrel funds.

Data Requirements and Method of Data Collection

For this study, two methods will be used in gathering which are

documentary analysis and interview.

The interviews to be conducted will include those persons who were

directly involved in the case and have sufficient knowledge on the programs or

projects constructed by these committees. Therefore it is just necessary to focus

on the chairpersons of the committees, however the researcher will still interview

other members of the committees especially those who have proposed the most

number of bills per committee which were passed and implemented.

Public Officials

1. Rep. Wilfredo Mark M. Enverga (Chaiperson, Committee on Rural

Development)

31

2. Rep. Benhur L. Salimbangon (Chairperson, Committee on Aquaculture

and Fisheries Resources)

3. Rep. Mark Llandro L. Mendoza (Chairperson, Committee on Agriculture

and Food

4. Rep. Juan Edgardo M. Angara (Chairperson, Committee on Higher and

Technical Education)

5. Rep. Ronald M. Casalan (Chaiperson, Committee on Public Works and

Highways)

Also official documents on the distribution of PDAF, its allocation on the

projects of the committees as well as the evaluation reports of DBM is

necessary in order to see the influence of these rural committees in the

distribution of pork barrel funds.

32

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