Alawi vs. Alauya A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

Topics: Use of appellation attorney, practice of law.

Facts of the Case:

            Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of EB Villarosa & Partners, Co. Ltd. Of Davao City, while Ashari Alauya is an incumbent executive clerk of court of 4 th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City.

            Alawi and Alauya were classmates and friends.  Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the abovementioned firm.  Thereafter, a housing loan was granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).  On December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa and Co. advising the termination of contract with the company, on the ground that Alauya’s consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by sales agent which makes the contract void ab initio.

            Alauya also wrote to Vice President of Credit and Collection Group of National Home Mortgage Finance Corp. (NHMFC) repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co. and asking for a cancellation of his housing loan.

            Alauya also wrote to Ms. Corazon Ordonez, Head of Fiscal Management and Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division of Supreme Court to stop deductions from his salary.

            Alawi filed on SC a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996, to which she appended a copy of the letter and accused Alauya of:

• Imputation of libellous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith.

• Causing undue injury.• Unauthorized enjoyment of free postage.• Usurpation of the title “attorney” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may use.[if !supportLists]

Alauya thereafter claims that Alawi was only envious of him for being an Executive Clerk of Court but also a scion of a Royal Family.  He also claimed that Alawi falsified his signature. 

As with the use of the title attorney, he justified it by assertion that it is synonymous with Counsellors-at-Law.  He preferred to use attorney because counsellor is often mistaken for “councillor”.

Issue:

•     Whether or not Alauya is guilty of libellous charges without solid grounds through bad faith.

•      Whether or not Alauya is entitled to use the appellation attorney.[if !supportLists]

Court Ruling:

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713) enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.  Public officials and employees must at all times respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. 

The conduct of behaviour of every official and employee of an agency involved in administration of justice from presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with heavy burden of responsibility.

He must “act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith”.

As to Alauya’s usurpation of the title “attorney”, the Court has declared that persons who passed the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledge members of the Philippine bar.  His disinclination to use the title “counsellor” does not warrant his use of the title “attorney”.

            In In re Meling, the Court said that the title “attorney” is reserved only to those, who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing, and it is they who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 

In Re: Garcia

Facts:Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

Issue:Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?

Held:The court resolved to deny the petition.

Ratio Decidendi:The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the

practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:• Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.• Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.• Thereafter, until 1970, he went  abroad where he had a degree in economics and held

various positions in various foreign corporations.• In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local

corporations until 1986.• In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as  chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes practice of law?

HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases.  In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.

Banongan vs. Zerna

n 1926, a judgment favorable to Zerna was issued by a cadastral court. In 1957 or thirty one years later, Banogon filed a motion to amend the 1926 decisions. An opposition was filed by Zerna in the same year. Banogon’s counsel repeatedly failed to set for hearing and in 1971 or fourteen years later, Zerna filed for a motion to dismiss which was granted by reason of Banogon’s filing being out of time.ISSUE: Whether or not Banogon’s suit should prosper.HELD: No. He slept on his rights hence laches had set in. The Supreme Court also took time to remind lawyers to judiciously study facts and laws so as to avoid the filing of improper cases such as this case where the filing of motions and pleadings was way out of time. One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. Lawyers do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts. 

Ledesma vs. Climaco

Facts:  Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. 

On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. 

The respondent Judge not only denied the motion but also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. 

On November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. 

On November 6, Judge denied the motion. Hence, Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding. 

Issue: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Election Registrar. 

Held: The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. 

Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal. 

In People v. Holgado: “In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.” 

The present Constitution provides not only “that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel” but further provides that “Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.” This made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of the accused. 

Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever

timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

CUI VS CUI

FACTS: Jesus and Antonio are the legitimate children of Don Mariano Cui and Doña Antonia Perales who died intestate in 1939. Jesus alleged that during the marriage of Don Mariano and Dona Antonia, their parents acquired certain properties in the City of Cebu, namely, Lots Nos. 2312, 2313 and 2319. Upon the death of their mother, the properties were placed under the administration of their dad.

that while the latter was 84 years of age, Antonio by means of deceit, secured the transfer to themselves the said lots without any pecuniary consideration; that in the deed of sale executed on March 8, 1946, Rosario Cui appeared as one of the vendees, but on learning of this fact she subsequently renounced her rights under the sale and returned her portion to Don Mariano Cui by executing a deed of resale in his favor on October 11, 1946; that defendants, fraudulently and with the desire of enriching themselves unjustly at the expense of their father, Don Mariano Cui, and of their brothers and co-heirs, secured a loan of P130,000 from the Rehabilitation properties, and with the loan thus obtained, defendants constructed thereon an apartment building of strong materials consisting of 14 doors, valued at approximately P130,000 and another building on the same parcels of land, which buildings were leased to some Chinese commercial firms a monthly rental of P7,600, which defendants have collected and will continue to collect to the prejudice of the plaintiffs;

Jesus alleged that the sale should be invalidated so far as the portion of the property sold to Antonio Cui is concerned, for the reason that when that sale was effected, Antonio was then acting as the agent or administrator of the properties of Don Mariano Cui.

Jesus lays stress on the power of attorney Exhibit L which was executed by Don Mariano in favor of Antonio Cui on March 2, 1946, wherein the former has constituted the latter as his "true and lawful attorney" to perform in his name and that of the intestate heirs of Doña Antonia Perales.

ISSUE: WON the sale of the property to Antonio was valid.

HELD: YES.

While under article 1459 of the old Civil Code an agent or administrator is disqualified from purchasing property in his hands for sale or management, and, in this case, the property in question was sold to Antonio Cui while he was already the agent or administrator of the properties of Don Mariano Cui, we however believe that this question cannot now be raised or invoked.

The prohibition of the law is contained in article 1459 of the old Civil Code, but this prohibition has already been removed. Under the provisions of article 1491, section 2, of the new Civil Code, an agent may now buy property placed in his hands for sale or administration, provided that the principal gives his consent thereto. While the new Code came into effect only on August 30, 1950, however, since this is a right that is declared for the first time, the same may be given retroactive effect if no vested or acquired right is impaired (Article 2253, new Civil Code). During the lifetime Don Mariano, and particularly on March 8, 1946, the herein appellants could not claim any vested or acquired right in these properties, for, as heirs, the most they had was a mere expentancy. We may, therefore, invoke now this practical and liberal provision of our new Civil Code even if the sale had taken place before its effectivity.

MACARIOLA VS ASUNCION

FACTS: A complaint for partition was filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes against P Macariola concerning the properties left by their father, Francisco Reyes. Judge Asuncion ruled in favor of Sinforosa et. al.The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves, Judge Asuncion approved it.

One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184 which was subdivided into 5 lots. Lot 1184 was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon on July 31, 1964. On March 6, 1965, Dr. Galapon sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife. Subsequently, Sps Asuncion and Sps Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest to “The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." at the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion was one of its stockholder, with Judge Asuncion as the President and his wife as the secretary.

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint alleging R Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him

ISSUE: WON Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491(5) of the NCC

HELD:NO.

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another: xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. For the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property"

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.

While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.