Rule 65 *Digest)

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

XI.C MADRIGAL TRANSPORT V. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS CORP., G.R. NO. 156067, AUGUST 11, 2004 MATA

The special civil action for certiorari and appeal are two different remedies that are mutually exclusive; they are not alternative or successive. Where appeal is available,certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.

Certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.

Facts: On February 9, 1998, Petitioner Madrigal Transport,

Inc. (Madrigal) filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 49. Later, on February 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against Respondents Lapanday Holdings Corporation (Lapanday), Macondray and Company, Inc. (Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36.

In the latter action, Madrigal alleged that it had entered into a joint venture agreement with Lapanday for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc however, despite demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo had allegedly been unable to deliver those Del Monte charter hire contracts.

On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court (RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner insolvent.On March 30, 1998 and April 6, 1998, Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on the complaint for damages filed by the Petitioner.

On December 16, 1998, Branch 36 granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action. Applying Sections 32 and 33 of the Insolvency Law , the trial court opined that upon the filing by Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the latter lost the right to institute the Complaint for Damages. The RTC ruled that the exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed assignee.

On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration(MR), but was denied by the said court July 26, 1999. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the December 16, 1998(the one which granted the MD of the Complaint for damages) and the July 26, 1999( the one which denied the MR) Orders of the trial court.On January 10, 2000, the appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the instant case was purely legal, the Petition could be treated as one for review as an exception to the general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal was available. This was later on challenged by the Respondents via their MRs. The Court of Appeals dismissed Madrigals Petition for Certiorari. The CA opined that an order granting a motion to dismiss was final and thus the proper subject of an appeal, not certiorari. It averred that even if the Petition could be treated as an appeal, it would still have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the issues raised by petitioner involved pure questions of law that should be brought to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, the petition.

Issue:

Is the petition for certiorari proper?

Ruling:No.Supreme Court held thatwhen any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

Further, a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.

The following requisites must concur for certiorari to prosper: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. Whenan appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.

An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order.It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.

In this case, the RTC did not rendered a decision that is in in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no cause of action as per supported by the facts of the case. Since, it was the order of dismissal that was questioned, a certiorari is improper because it can be cured through an appeal. There are exceptional circumstances that the Supreme Court may grant certiorari despite the availability of appeal however, in this case, Petitioner did not show that the court, order constitutes a despotic, capricious, or whimsical exercise of power, but it availed certiorari because the 15-day period within which to file an appeal had already lapsed. Petition is denied.

Quick digest:

It’s not a PROVREM 2015 1


ABC Transport filed Petition for Voluntary Insolvencyin an insolvency court. Later on, it filed a complaint for damages against DEF Corporation for failure to comply the agreement in their contract in another court. The insolvency case was granted. DEF Corporation filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no cause of action because the complaint for damages must be filed at the insolvency court where ABC Transport filed its insolvency case as provided by the Insolvency Law. The RTC order dismissal to the Complaint for damages for lack of cause of action. ABC Transport then filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals over the order of dismissal of the RTC. As a judge, will you grant the petition for certiorari?

No.

Supreme Court held that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal, including petitions for review, and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.

The following requisites must concur for certiorari to prosper: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.

In this case, the order of dismissal rendered by the RTC is a final order in which it can avail appeal within its given period. However, ABC Transport failed to file an appeal within its required period. Neither had it appeared that there was an excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that was exercised by the RTC. Therefore, the petition for certiorari was improper.

Side Notes:

Discussion of the difference between appeal and certiorari.

As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. On the other hand, where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.

As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while

a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal bycertiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.

As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors.

XI.F TOPACIO V. ONG, G.R. NO. 179895, DECEMBER 18, 2008 CABUENAS CLEA

Principle:

The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by a quo warranto proceedings, and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer.

FACTS: Petitioner via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to prevent Justice Ong from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

In Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, the Court enjoined Ong from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.

Ong immediately filed with the RTC a Petition for the “amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of an entry in his Certificate of Birth. The RTC granted his petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen.



Petitioner implored respondent OSG to initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latter’s capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan because Ong failed to meet the citizenship requirement form the time of his appointment.

Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto.

2. Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner partakes of the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong.

HELD:1. No.

The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it. The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law.

2. Yes. While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo warranto" aspect of the petition.

Being a collateral attack on a public officer's title, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed. The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista Party v. de Vera, the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer.

. . . [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto , the title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature

prohibition is an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an office.

Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition is, just the same, dismissible.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.

Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor, reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, that for a quo warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.

In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that he was never entitled to assume the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.

The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial functions, cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor, or by any other, except in the form especially provided by law. To uphold such action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machine.

Petition dismissed.

SHORT DIGEST:

X filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Justice Y from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

X contends that Ong should immediately desist from holding the position of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the basis of citizenship. (Y alleged to be a Chinese citizen).

ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner partakes of the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong.

HELD: Yes. While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the



Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo warranto" aspect of the petition.

Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition is, just the same, dismissible.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.

XI.G MORABE V. BROWN, G.R. NO. L-6018, MAY 31, 1954 CANETE FRANCIS

PRINCIPLE:

“The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction but one of mandamus, because it seeks the performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional in character.”

FACTS:Respondent William Brown had dismissed his

employee, Pablo S. Afuang, because he was one of the complainants in an investigation conducted by the petitioner Emiliano Morabe, Acting Chief, Wage Administration Service,of charges against the respondent that the latter paid his employees beyond the time fixed in Republic Act No. 602.

An original petition filed by the petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying that the respondent be ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang, and that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue for his reinstatement.The court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

The respondent presented a petition asking for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Pablo S. Afuang had presented a letter asking excuse or apology from the respondent for having taken his case to court. However, his motion was not acted upon and the case was heard and the parties presented their evidence.

The CFI rendered judgment finding that the dismissal from the service of Pablo S. Afuang is unlawful and violates section 13 of the Minimum Wage Law, because the fact that he testified at the investigation is not a valid ground for his dismissal from the service. The court, however, refused to grant an order for the reinstatement of said Pablo S. Afuang on the ground that this remedy, which it considers as an injunction, is available only against acts about to be committed or actually being committed, and not against past acts;

ISSUE: WON the CFI erred in not ordering the respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang in the service.

HELD:YES.

It is evident that the court a quo erred in considering that mandatory injunction is preventive in nature, and may not be granted by the Court of First Instance once the act complained of has been carried out.The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction but one of mandamus, because it seeks the performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary mandatory injunction is also amandamus, though merely provisional in character.

In the case at bar, Pablo S. Afuang was entitled to continue in the service of respondent, because his act is expressly provided to be no ground or reason for an employee's dismissal. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 602 states that "it shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act. Pablo S. Afuang was, therefore, unlawfully deprived of his right or privilege to continue in the service of the respondent, because his dismissal was unlawful or illegal. Having been deprived of such right or privilege, it is within the competence of courts to compel the respondent to admit him back to his service.

In Manila Electric Co. vs. Del Rosario and Jose,the lower court ordered the Manila Electric Co. to furnish electric current to Jose, the electric company having cut the current to Jose's house because it suspected him of stealing electricity by the use of a jumper. This Court held that the action was not one of injunction but of mandamus, as it compelled the electric company to furnish Jose with electric service. In the case at bar, the court can also order the respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang. Were we to hold that Afuang may not be reinstated because he has already been dismissed; there would not be any remedy against the injustice done him, or for him to return to the position or employment from which he was unlawfully discharged.

The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the respondent William Brown is hereby ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang to the position he held prior to his dismissal.

QUICK DIGEST:

FACTS:

Petitioner Morabe filed the original petitionin the CFI of Manila praying that the respondent be ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue for his reinstatement. The latter was dismissed by the respondent on the ground that he was one of the complainants in an investigation conducted by the petitionerof charges against the respondent that the latter paid his employees beyond the time fixed in Republic Act No. 602.

The CFI rendered judgment finding that the dismissal from the service of Pablo S. Afuang is unlawful and violates section 13 of the Minimum Wage Law. The court, however, refused to grant an order for the reinstatement of said Pablo S. Afuang on the ground that this remedy, which it considers as an injunction, is available only against acts about to be committed or actually being committed, and not against past acts.

ISSUE:WON the CFI erred in not ordering the respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang in the service.



HELD: YES.It is evident that the court a quo erred in considering

that mandatory injunction is preventive in nature, and may not be granted by the Court of First Instance once the act complained of has been carried out. The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction but one of mandamus, because it seeks the performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional in character.

XI.K HERRERA V. BARRETTO, 25 PHIL. 245 TRIXIE SEE XI.P

Jurisdiction Exercise of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —

the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made.

The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.

Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

Facts:

The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari by the petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly acting without jurisdiction on the case involving the cockpit license permit of Constancio Joaquin which the petitioner, in his capacity of the Caloocan Municipal President revoked to operate. Respondent judge apparently issued a provisional license upon the filing of Joaquin for a mandatory injunction without notice to the petitioner. The petitioner now files a motion for certiorari before the higher court against the respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for issuing the mandatory injunction of provisional license.

Issue: WON a writ of certiorari the proper action on the case at bar.

Ruling:

No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is established whether or not the court to which it is directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Once the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in a case all decisions exercised within its jurisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The court held that the CFI has the jurisdiction over the present case to resolve all matters arising in question.Court held that

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.

Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court no matter how irregular or erroneous it is.

XI.L MICROSOFT CORP. V. BEST DEAL COMPUTER CENTER CORP., G.R. NO. 148029, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 LAMBAN

PRINCIPLE:

Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

The distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.

FACTS:

- The case involves MICROSOFT CORPORATION fighting to protect its intellectual property rights through filing a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and the Provisional Measure of Preservation of Evidence against Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, Perfect Deal Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen doing business as Perfect Byte Computer Center alleging that defendants without authority or license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed and/or loaded software programs owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by them to their customers. Furthermore, it prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants from illegally



reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software programs and also applied for the issuance of an ex parte order for the seizure and impounding of relevant evidence that can be or may be found at defendants' business premises.

-The Las Pinas trial court set petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order for hearing but at the same time denied its application for an ex parte order ratiocinating that the Intellectual Property Code does not expressly allow its issuance and that, in any case, the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) AGREEMENT cannot prevail over it, and that petitioner's application partook of a search and seizure order available only in criminal cases.

-In the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court petitioner submits that the court a quo gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of infringing evidence. It maintains that Sec. 216.2, Part IV, of RA 8293 authorizes such order. It concedes though that while RA 8293 does not expressly mention the provisional and ex parte nature of the remedy, nonetheless, Art. 50 of the TRIPS Agreement amply supplies the deficiency. It allegedly resorted to the instant recourse because it had no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It automatically invoked the jurisdiction of this Court supposedly because of the importance of the issue involved. It bypassed the Court of Appeals on the premise that it would be useless to first seek recourse thereat as the party aggrieved by the appellate court's ruling would nonetheless elevate the matter to this Court. By then, petitioner surmised, the level of intellectual piracy would have worsened. Likewise, petitioner presumes that direct resort to this Court is justified as the petition involves a pure question of law.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Petition for Certiorari can be exercised to correct public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.

2. Whether acts complained of by the petitioner constitutes error of judgement or error of jurisdiction.

Held:

1. Negative.

- Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

-The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include correction of public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon.

-The petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

2. Acts complained of constitutes error of judgement

-Section 19, par. (8), BP Blg. 129, as amended, provides that Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds P200,000.00. In the complaint filed before the court a quo, petitioner averred that it incurred no less thanP750,000.00 in attorney's fees, investigation and litigation expenses and another P2,000,000.00 by way of moral damages. Clearly, the above amounts fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Also, the complaint was properly lodged in the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias considering that one of the principal defendants was residing thereat.

-Petitioner asserts that respondent trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying its application for the issuance of an ex parte order. However, other than this bare allegation, petitioner failed to point out specific instances where grave abuse of discretion was allegedly committed. It was never shown how respondent tribunal supposedly exercised its power in a despotic, capricious or whimsical manner. There being no hint of grave abuse of discretion that can be attributed to the lower court, hence, it could be safely held that the assailed orders were rendered in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.

-Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. The distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

Quick Digest of Facts:



- The case involves MICROSOFT CORPORATION fighting to protect its intellectual property rights through filing a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and the Provisional Measure of Preservation of Evidence against Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, Perfect Deal Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen doing business as Perfect Byte Computer Center alleging that defendants without authority or license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed and/or loaded software programs owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by them to their customers with prayer of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants from illegally reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software programs and an application for the issuance of an ex parte order for the seizure and impounding of relevant evidence that can be or may be found at defendants' business premises. But the trial court denied its application for an ex parte order.

-A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed submitting that the court a quo gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of infringing evidence.

XI.M CAMPOS V. WISLIZENUS, 35 PHIL. 373 FERNANDEZ

PRINCIPLE:

The general rule is that, where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of facts, and the court judicially considers and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and decides that the fact exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is conclusive and cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding.

FACTS:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to be directed to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cebu requiring it to forward to this court the proceedings had in a certain election contest between the petitioner Nemesio Campos and the respondent Teodoro Aldanse, to the end that such proceeding may be revised by this court and certain steps taken therein annulled on the ground that, in taking them, the court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

Upon the proclamation by the municipal board of inspectors of the municipality of Sibonga, Province of Cebu, declaring the respondent Teodoro Aldanese elected to the position of municipal president of said municipality, the petitioner filed a protest against the election. After the filing of the protest copies were duly made for service on the various persons receiving votes for the office of the municipal president. The service of the notice of protest upon the respondent Teodoro Aldanese was made by delivering a copy thereof to one Isidoro Aldanese, a brother of the respondent Teodoro Aldanese, and who, it is claimed by the petitioner, was living in the house of the

respondent Teodoro Aldanese at the time. Isidoro Aldanese acknowledged in writing on the back of the original notice of protest the fact that he had received it. A copy of the certificate of service was attached to the petition and made a part of it as Exhibit. Thereafter, a motion was made to the court in which the election contest was pending for the dismissal of the proceedings on the ground that not all of the persons receiving votes for the office of municipal president were notified as required by law and therefore the court acquired no jurisdiction of the proceedings. The court, after hearing the parties with regard to the service of the notice of protest on the respondent Teodoro Aldanese, held that, under the facts submitted, no service of the protest had been made on the respondent Teodoro Aldanese in the manner requires by law and that, therefore, the court acquired no jurisdiction of the proceedings and accordingly dismissed the protest.

The petitioner contends that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the proceedings and that its action should be annulled and set aside and that the court should be ordered to proceed with the contest.

The respondent filed a demurrer to the petition on the ground, among others, that it did not state facts sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ, and the question before us arises on that demurrer.

The court said: No proof whatever as to who is "I. Aldanese" has been presented. It does not appear who was the person who signed and under what authority he signed, not even whether he resides in the house of the respondent. The court, in the absence of proof, finds that the notice was insufficient. Furthermore, said notice was not made within the period fixed by law.

While the petition has annexed to it as an exhibit an affidavit of service of the notice of protest on the respondent Teodoro Aldanese which shows that the notice was served in the manner required by law, that affidavit of service was not made or presented to the court until after the order had been made dismissing the proceedings. It was first presented to the court as a part of the moving papers on the motion for a reconsideration of the order dismissing the proceedings. The order of dismissal was made on the 19th of July, 1916, at which time the only evidence before the court as to the service of the notice was that stated in the order of the court above-quoted. The affidavit of service was made on the 20th of July on which date the motion for reconsideration was presented.

ISSUE:

Whether the court’s finding as to jurisdiction is conclusive and cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding..

SC RULING:

Yes.




The rule applies to a case where the proper service of notice on the candidates voted for was challenged and the court determined upon the facts presented, after hearing the allegations of the parties and their arguments based thereon, that service had not been made as required by law. Such a determination involves a mixed question of law and fact; and it is a rule, as stated in the case cited, that, where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the determination of a question of fact and that question has been determined by the court after a hearing, that determination is conclusive and cannot be attacked collaterally. In the case before us evidence as to the fact of service was introduced by the petitioner and the sufficiency of that evidence was challenged by the respondent. The petitioner did not take advantage of the opportunity given him by the challenge to present other and further evidence in relation to the service but stood squarely upon the facts already presented and accepted a decision of the court thereon. Under such circumstances there was nothing left for the court to do except to decide the question upon the facts as they were. The court did so; and although to say so is unnecessary to a decision of this case, we are of the opinion that its finding on the facts as they existed of record at the time was well founded.

The court acquires no jurisdiction of an election protest unless the protestant shows to the court that a notice of protest has been served in the manner required by law upon all the candidates receiving votes for the office concerning which the protest was filled and who were candidates for that office. The absence of such proof is fatal to the petitioner when the motion is dismissed on that ground. There is no doubt that the court would receive an affidavit of service or other evidence showing that the service referred to was made in accordance with law if such evidence were offered at any time before the motion was made and, probably, even after the motion was made but before the order of dismissal was entered. In this case, however, no evidence was offered establishing the fact of proper service until after the order dismissing the proceedings was entered, except the evidence referred to in the order of dismissal and the order denying the motion for a rehearing. The evidence referred to in such orders was insufficient to establish the service. In the absence of provisions in the Election Law stating how such service should be made the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to that matter control.

It may be added that the determination of a question of fact on which its jurisdiction depends does not of itself affect the court's jurisdiction. It has power to resolve the question of fact; and its decision is within its powers whichever was it may go. Such a finding cannot be attacked by certiorari

The demurrer is sustained and the complaint will be dismissed on the merits, unless the petitioner within ten days files an amended complaint stating facts sufficient to warrant the issuance of the remedy.

QUICK DIGEST:

FACTS:

TA was proclaimed as the municipal president of Sibonga, Cebu. C filed a protest against TA. Notice was served to TA through his brother IA in the house. TA prayed for the dismissal of the petition since service was not properly done, thus the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The court, after hearing the parties with regard to the service of the notice of protest on the TA no service of the protest had been made on TA in the manner required by law therefore, the court acquired no jurisdiction of the proceedings and accordingly dismissed the protest.

ISSUE:

Whether the court’s finding as to jurisdiction is conclusive and cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding..

Yes.


The rule applies to a case where the proper service of notice on the candidates voted for was challenged and the court determined upon the facts presented, after hearing the allegations of the parties and their arguments based thereon, that service had not been made as required by law. Such a determination involves a mixed question of law and fact; and it is a rule, as stated in the case cited, that, where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the determination of a question of fact and that question has been determined by the court after a hearing, that determination is conclusive and cannot be attacked collaterally. In the case before us evidence as to the fact of service was introduced by the petitioner and the sufficiency of that evidence was challenged by the respondent. The petitioner did not take advantage of the opportunity given him by the challenge to present other and further evidence in relation to the service but stood squarely upon the facts already presented and accepted a decision of the court thereon. Under such circumstances there was nothing left for the court to do except to decide the question upon the facts as they were. The court did so; and although to say so is unnecessary to a decision of this case, we are of the opinion that its finding on the facts as they existed of record at the time was well founded.

The determination of a question of fact on which its jurisdiction depends does not of itself affect the court's jurisdiction. It has power to resolve the question of fact; and its decision is within its



powers whichever was it may go. Such a finding cannot be attacked by certiorari

XI.O ABAD SANTOS V. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, 67 PHIL. 480 DY

1. CERTIORARI; CONTROL OF COURT OVER JUDGMENT THAT HAS NOT BECOME FINAL; JUDGMENT UPON A COMPROMISE. — It is not claimed that the judgment in question has become final. In fact, it cannot be so claimed because the fiscal's motion for reconsideration thereof was presented five days after its rendition. Not having become final, the lower court has plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and justice require. (Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil., 267; De Fiesta vs. Llorente and Manila Railroad Co., 25 Phil., 554, 561.) And the fact that the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no greater validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. It stands on the same footing as that of an ordinary judgment which may be opened or vacated on adequate grounds, such as fraud, mistake or absence of 'real consent. (15 R. C. L., 646, 646; sec. 113, Act No. 190; Yboleon vs. Sison 59 Phil., 281.)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTIONAL, QUESTION; MEANING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Whether or not the grounds alleged by the provincial fiscal in his motion for reconsideration seeking relief from the effects of the compromise and from the judgment rendered thereon are or are not sufficient, is not a question of jurisdiction but one of judgment which we do not decide here. No abuse of discretion is shown by the petitioners, and by abuse of discretion we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Long Digest

Facts:

The Province of Tarlac instituted action for the condemnation of certain parcels of land for the construction of the Capas-Murcia Diversion road against herein petitioners Abad. A compromise agreement was entered into between said province and the petitioners for the payment to the latter of the agreed value of their lands. The respondent judge approved the compromise in a partial decision rendered by himand ordered the parties to comply with the conditions therein set forth.

Subsequently, the provincial fiscal, in behalf of the Province of Tarlac, moved for the reconsideration of the decision on the ground that in giving his assent to the compromise, he acted under the mistaken belief that the prices fixed therein had been approved by the appraisal committee of the provincial government, and that the Province of Tarlac, at the time of the compromise, had no longer any authority to expropriate the lands, because by virtue of Executive Order No. 71, the Capas-Murcia Diversion road was declared a national highway under the authority of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The respondent judge acceded to this motion and, setting aside its decision, ordered the reopening of the case and authorized the substitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the Province of Tarlac as party plaintiff, in

accordance with the petition of the Solicitor-General to that effect. Hence, this petition.

The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the respondent judge was without power to set aside his partial decision which was founded upon a compromise duly approved by him. It is not claimed that the judgment in question has become final.

Issue:WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of

discretion when he set aside his partial decision based on the compromise agreement entered into by the parties?

Ruling:NO.

Not having become final, the lower court has plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and justice require. And the fact that the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no greater validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. It stands on the same footing as that of an ordinary judgment which may be opened or vacated on adequate grounds, such as fraud, mistake or absence of real consent.

No abuse of discretion is shown by the petitioners, and by abuse of discretion we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Short Digest:

Facts:Tarlac Province and the Abads entered into a

compromise agreement from which Judge Locsin’s partial decision was based. The provincial fiscal moved for a reconsideration on the ground that the compromise was entered into under a mistaken belief, and by virtue of EO No. 71, wherein it removed the province’s authority to expropriate the questioned property.

The motion was granted by respondent Judge. Hence this case, as the petitioners argued that the former lost his authority to set aside his decision because it has already been promulgated.

Issue:WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of

discretion when he set aside his partial decision based on the compromise agreement entered into by the parties?

Ruling:No. Not having become final, the lower court has

plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and justice require. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

1. XI.P • LEUNG BEN V. O’BRIEN, 38 PHIL 182 VALENCIA

2. HERRERA (SUPRA) TRIXIE

3. XI.R. NAPA V. WEISSENHAGEN, 29 PHIL. 182 VILLAGANAS

PRINCIPLE:



The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected no longer exists. Its place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains jurisdiction, its errors can be corrected only by that method (APPEAL).

FACTS:

An action for the summary recovery of the possession of land was filed by Julian Larong and HermenegildoBayla against Agapito Napa.

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff (respondent herein) and ordered delivery of possession.The decision was rendered on the 14th of April, 1913, and appeal was taken therefrom on the 29th of the same month.

The cause having arrived in the Court of First Instance for determination on the appeal, a motion was made by the appellee to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had not been perfected within the time required by law. The court entertained this motion, granted it, and dismissed the appeal.

The purpose of this proceeding is to obtain a writ of certiorari for the revision of the record of the court below, the revocation of the judgment entered upon the order granting the motion to dismiss the appeal, and to set aside the whole proceeding to the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal.

ISSUE:

WON certiorari is proper in this case.

RULING:

NO.

It is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to consider a motion to dismiss the appeal and the exercise of that jurisdiction did not result in its loss, it having been exercised in accordance with the established forms and methods of procedure prescribed by the practice of the country. We have held in numerous case that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in performing the acts complained of. We have also held that if a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decision upon all question pertinent to the cause are decisions which its jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal taken to it from a judgment of a justice's court and, therefore, had jurisdiction to decide every question pertaining thereto. This being the case, the consideration of the motion and the dismissal of the appeal as a consequence thereof are not acts in excess of jurisdiction. It may be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court of one of the fundamental question before it does not, except perhaps in cases involving a constitutional question, deprive it of jurisdiction whichever way it may decide.

The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected no longer

exists. Its place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains jurisdiction, its errors can be corrected only by that method. The writ in this country has been confined to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose. (Id.)

If the judgment of the justice's court was void, it was nevertheless appealable, although the losing party might have been able to rid himself of it by other means. Having been appealed, it stands upon substantially the same footing in the appellate court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned, as any other judgment of a justice's court and the jurisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is as full and complete as it is in any other.


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Rule 65 *Digest)