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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................iii

Preface ............................................................................................................................v

Introduction: Russian Naval History: From the Kievan Rus’ to Today’s Russia ...................xiii

Chapter One: Strategy – Fullling National Missions ........................................................1

The Evolution of Naval Strategy .......................................................................................1

Soviet Navy Roles and Missions ......................................................................................2

Chapter Two: Russian Navy: Structure and Leadership .....................................................7

Organization ..................................................................................................................7

Admiral Viktor Chirkov ...................................................................................................9

Future Leadership ...........................................................................................................11

Chapter Three: Procurement: Shift to Quality Over Quantity ...........................................15

Procurement ....................................................................................................................15

Quality ............................................................................................................................15

The Future Fleet ..............................................................................................................17

Naval Aviation ................................................................................................................30

Chapter Four: Personnel – Movement Towards a Professional Force ................................39

Outlook ..........................................................................................................................43

Additional resources:

Posters of the Russian Navy Major Forces by Fleet, Russian Navy New Construction, and the Russian Federation Navy (map) are located

inside the back cover.


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This report contains copyrighted material. Copying and disseminating the contents are prohibited without the permission of the copyright owners. When feasible,

copyright permission has been sought for those pictures where copyright was known, and attribution to those sources, when known, has been given.

Published by theOfce of Naval IntelligenceDecember 2015

Cleared for public release by Defense Ofce of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR Case 16-S-0274)


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Executive Summary

This publication, The Russian Navy – AHistoric Transition, is intended to providethe reader with a basic introduction to theRussian Navy and an appreciation of current

developments that will shape Russia’s navyand its operations in the 21st century.

Because the U.S. Navy operates worldwideand the Russian Navy is an advanced, globallycapable force, its history, capabilities, missions,and role within the Russian state and armedforces should be clearly understood. Thenew technologically advanced Russian Navy,increasingly armed with the KALIBR family ofweapons, will be able to more capably defend

the maritime approaches to the RussianFederation and exert signicant inuence inadjacent seas. This multi-purpose force will bethe forward-layered defense of Russia and itsmaritime exclusive economic zone and will beable to promote Russian diplomatic interests,advance maritime science, combat piracy, andprovide humanitarian assistance.

It will also provide a exible platform forRussia to demonstrate offensive capability,threaten neighbors, project power regionally,and advance President Putin’s stated goal ofreturning Russia to clear great power status.

Over its 320-year history, the Russian Navyhas been instrumental in securing Russia’smaritime access to the world, periodically

battled to maintain that access, directlysupported Russia’s land forces in times ofimperial expansion and in the expulsion ofinvaders, been part of the strategic nuclear

deterrence triad, and demonstrated a globalpresence in the national interest. Political andmilitary strategy and the role and mission ofthe Navy evolved as the Russian state grew,faced challenges, was transformed into theSoviet Union by revolution, repelled invasion,and encountered disintegration.

Throughout, the navy retained, with someadjustment for the passing years andevents, many of the basic organizational,procedural, and personnel practices thatwere laid down by its founder, Peter I(the Great), at the beginning of the 18thcentury. As the years passed, Russia’s navalactivity and the shipbuilding and weapons

“The Russian Navy is being equipped with thenewest; including precision long-range strike

weapons, and has big nuclear power. Navalforces today are capable of operating for along time and with high combat readiness inoperationally important areas of the globalocean.”

- Admiral Viktor ChirkovCommander-in-Chief, Russian Navy


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production capabilities required to advanceit became ever more sophisticated andvaried. In addition to production for its ownneeds, foreign sales shifted from sellingmasts, caulking pitch, and rope to a varietyof highly capable ships, submarines, andrelated weapons systems today sold to or co-produced with a number of foreign states.

As Russia asserts itself on the world stage,it is giving priority of effort and funding torecapitalizing its navy, which is going througha major transition from the legacy Soviet Navyto a Russian Navy that should reect the latestachievements of Russian advances in scienceand technology.

On the basis of currently available data it isprojected that the Russian Navy will retain its

core missions. Although the national defensemission of the strategic and general purposenavy has remained, today’s scal realitiesrequire that the decreased number of majornaval platforms be multi-mission capableand armed with the latest capabilities inweapons; sensors; and command, control,communications, computer, intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)systems. Russia has begun, and over the next

decade will make large strides in elding a21st century navy capable of a dependablenational defense, an impressive but limitedpresence in more distant global areas of

interest, manned by a new generation of post-Soviet ofcers and enlisted personnel.

The research, technical development, andproduction enabling the achievement ofthese goals have and will continue to beaccompanied by a robust program of navalarms sales to other countries. The quantity

and quality of the ships, submarines, andarmaments sold will transform the currentcapabilities of recipient states and, in somecases, potentially enable them to improve thequality of indigenous arms production.

“Thanks to the bravery of sailors, the talentof shipbuilders, and the daring of explorers,

pioneers, and naval leaders our nation has

held fast as a great maritime power. Thisstatus is a huge responsibility for us as weface history, our ancestors who createdRussia’s maritime glory, and, of course, future generations to whom we must pass a modernand strong Navy.”

- Vladimir Putin, PresidentRussian Federation Navy Day, 26 July 2015

NOTE: The contents of this publication reect information gathered from a broad range of publicly availablesource material that is considered to be effectively accurate and authoritative.


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After the disintegration of the Soviet Union inDecember 1991, Russia inherited the majorityof the former Soviet Navy, including its aoatassets, naval bases, and an extensive networkof shore facilities.

The immediate post-Soviet period was fraughtwith major difculties as the Soviet Navy rstbecame the Commonwealth of IndependentStates (CIS) Navy and nally transitionedto the Russian Federation (Russian) Navy(RFN). These early years were marked by

organizational disarray and nancial neglect asthe Russian leadership focused on the prioritiesof national transformation from the frameworkof the totalitarian and socialist Soviet state intoa edgling democracy embracing a marketeconomy. During this “time of troubles,”most naval programs were either suspendedor halted altogether. Only efforts to improvecommand and control systems and less-expensive new design work continued to bepursued.

Preface

Admiral Kuznetzov at anchor Severomorsk


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Russia inherited virtually all of a huge legacySoviet Navy, however—largely because FleetAdmiral of the Soviet Union Sergey Gorshkov,Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy foralmost 30 years, wanted to keep what he hadbuilt—many of the Soviet Navy’s submarines,surface ships, and auxiliaries had long outlivedtheir usefulness, but were retained to maintain

impressive numbers. The post-Soviet navalleadership faced daunting decisions to triagethis legacy. Once assessments were madeand decisions taken, fully three-quarters tove-sixths of the Soviet-era inventory waswritten off. Even some submarines and surfaceships that were both combat-capable andhad service lives remaining were removed ifdeemed no longer cost-effective to maintain(about one-third had long expired servicelives; another third was composed of units

deemed no longer combat-effective undercurrent warfare conditions). Difcult decisions

were justied on the basis that it was better toconcentrate limited funds and effort and savesome of the best and most useful ships andsubmarines rather than attempt to save all andthereby save nothing.

Since 2000, as Russia’s governmental orderand economy have stabilized, there has been

a focused and funded effort to revitalizethe Russian military—including the Navy.Suspended construction programs arenow moving toward completion and newconstruction programs are beginning toprovide the Navy with 21st-century submarineand surface platforms.

Another issue, dividing the Black Sea portionof the Soviet Navy with newly independentUkraine, was settled only in 1997. As part of

this process, Russia concluded a base leaseagreement with Ukraine under which Russiaretained use of more than 100 naval facilitieson the Crimean Peninsula through 2017. Thelease agreement provided for the possibility ofbi-laterally agreed extensions, and in 2010, itwas mutually agreed to extend the agreementfor 25 years through 2042 with a possibleadditional ve years (through 2047) throughthe Russian-Ukrainian naval base for gas

agreement, or Kharkiv Pact.

In March 2014, Russian military actions ledto its annexation of Crimea, an act whichabrogated the lease agreement. The UnitedStates does not recognize Russia’s annexationof Crimea.Russian Naval Infantryman participating in an

amphibious landing


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Ministry of DefenseThe Russian Federation Ministry of Defensewebsite addresses the missions of the RussianArmed Forces. These have evolved due to thechanging foreign political situation of recentyears and new domestic priorities to ensurenational security. These missions are structuredalong four basic directions:•

Deterrence of military and military-political threats to the security or interestsof the Russian Federation

• Ensuring the economic and politicalinterests of the Russian Federation

• Conducting operations by armed forcesin peacetime

• Use of military force (wartime)

The peculiarity of the development of theworld military-political situation makes it

possible for the execution of one missionto grow into another, because the moreproblematic political situations—from Russia’spoint of view of its security—have a complexand multi-dimensional character.

One of the forms of resolving political,national-ethnic, regional, territorial, and otherconicts is using armed warfare when the state(or states) participating in military actions does

not transition to the particular condition calledwar. As a rule, the parties pursue individualmilitary-political goals in armed conict.

The Russian Armed Forces train for directparticipation in the following types of dened*military conicts:

Armed conict. An armed conict can havean international character (involving two ormore states) or an internal character (with theconduct of armed combat within the bordersof one state’s territory).

An armed conict can be the consequenceof the growth of an armed incident, a border

conict, armed actions, and other armedcollisions of limited scale, in which means ofarmed combat are used to resolve the conict.

Local war. A war between two or more states,limited in political goals, in which militaryactions are conducted, as a rule, withinthe boundaries of the belligerent states anddominantly touch only the interests of thesestates (territorial, economic, political, etc.).

A local war can be conducted by groups oftroops deployed in the conict region, withpossible reinforcement by the deployment ofsupplementary forces from other axes andwith the conduct of a partial mobilization.Under certain conditions, local wars can growinto a regional or large-scale war.

Regional war. A war with the participationof two or more states (groups of states) or aregion with national or coalition armed forces,using both conventional and nuclear meansof attack on a territory dened by the boundsof one region and its adjacent maritimeor oceanic waters, air, and outer space, inthe course of which the parties will pursueimportant military-political goals.

*these are Russian denitions


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The full deployment of the armed forces,economy, and the great intensity of all of theforces of the participating states are necessaryfor the conduct of regional war. In case states ortheir allies having nuclear weapons participate,a regional war is characterized by the threat oftransitioning to the use of nuclear weapons.

Large-scale war. A war between coalitions ofstates or major states of the world communitythat can be the result of the escalation ofarmed conict or a local or regional war bythe involvement of a signicant number ofstates from various regions of the world. In alarge-scale war, parties pursue radical military-political goals, and the mobilization of allavailable material resources and spiritual forcesof the participating states is required.

Russian Military PlanningContemporary Russian military planning isbased on a realistic understanding of thecurrent resources and capabilities of theRussian Federation. It assumes that the RussianArmed Forces, together with other troops,must be ready—together with the strategicdeterrent forces and the maneuver of thepermanent ready forces—to:• repulse an attack and to attack the

aggressor,• conduct active operations (defensive as

well as offensive) under any variant ofthe unleashing and conduct of war andarmed conict with the enemy, massivelyusing current and future means of attack,including all types of weapons of massdestruction.

In doing the above, the Russian Armed Forcesmust be able to:• In peacetime and in emergency

situations, while preserving the potential

for strategic deterrence and fullling themissions of maintaining combat readinessby permanent ready troops withoutconducting supplementary mobilizationactivity, successfully execute missionsin two armed conicts of any type, andalso conduct peacekeeping operationsboth independently and as part of amultinational coalition.

• Were the military-political and military-

strategic situation to become more acute,ensure the strategic deployment of theRussian Armed Forces and deter anescalation of the situation.

• In wartime, use available forces to repulsean enemy aero-space attack, and after afull-scale strategic deployment, executemissions in two local wars simultaneously.

Russian Naval Midshipmen in parade formation


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The Armed ForcesThe Armed Forces structurally comprise threeservices:• Ground Forces• Air and Air Defense Forces• Navyand three branches:• Strategic Missile Troops (Strategic Rocket

Forces)• Aerospace Defense Troops (Space Troops)• Airborne Troops

NavyThe Navy is the Russian Armed Forces’ servicewhose mission is the armed protection ofRussia’s interests and the conduct of combatoperations in maritime and oceanic theatersof military operations. The Navy is capableof delivering nuclear and conventional strikes

against an enemy’s land facilities, destroyingenemy naval formations at sea and in base,interdicting enemy maritime and oceanic sealines of communication while protecting itsown shipping, cooperating with ground forcesin continental theaters of military operations,making amphibious landings, repelling enemylandings, and fullling other missions. The Russian Navy is composed of

interconnected components, spanning thegamut from combat forces to all elements ofsupporting infrastructure:• Command staff • Submarine forces• Surface forces• Naval auxiliaries• Naval aviation

• Naval Infantry and Coastal Missile andArtillery Troops

• Naval shore establishment (headquarters,communications, intelligence, maintenanceand repair, education and training, etc.)

The Navy’s peacetime missions are:• Deter. Maintain strategic nuclear deterrent

forces—strategic nuclear-powered ballisticmissile submarines (SSBNs)—in permanentready status, able to deliver a timelyretaliatory strike or deploy in times ofgrowing tension to deter an attack againstRussia.

• Defend. Maintain and deploy constantready general-purpose naval forces toprotect and defend Russia’s nationalinterests both in adjacent seas as well as inmore distant waters.

• Demonstrate. Use the select deploymentof general-purpose forces as an“instrument of state” to support Russianforeign policy.

In times of increased tension and war, theNavy’s priority missions are:• Protect. Protect the sea-based strategic

deterrent force.• Interdict. Interdict or blunt an aero-space

attack against Russia from the maritimedirections.

Strategic DeterrenceThe Russian Navy contributes to Russia’sstrategic nuclear deterrent forces bymaintaining nuclear-powered ballisticmissile-armed submarines (SSBNs) carrying


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intercontinental rangeballistic missiles.These missiles can belaunched while theSSBNs are surfacedand moored at theirhomeports, whilethey are on patrol in

protected waters inseas adjacent to Russia,or after surfacingthrough the ice whenpatrolling under the Arctic ice pack.

Strategic “Bastions”SSBN patrol areas in adjacent seas, generallyreferred to as “bastions,” are protected againstenemy forces by a combination of xedsensor installations, and anti-submarine forces

composed of submarines, surface ships, andaircraft.

Layered DefenseThe Navy is Russia’s only armed forces servicecapable of providing for an extended layereddefense of Russian territory. This approach ispredicated on engaging potential enemy forcesas soon as their long-range weapons canthreaten and be brought to bear on Russian

territory. For the purposes of illustration, suchthreat weapons could be long range landattack cruise missiles.

Forward defense. In order to provide forforward defense, the Russian Navy coulddeploy anti-ship and anti-submarine missile-armed nuclear-powered submarines, major

surface ships, andaircraft out to about1,000nm fromRussia’s frontier,with the intentionof eliminating orblunting the effectsof such long range

land attack cruisemissiles by attackingtheir launchingplatforms (surface

ships, submarines, and aircraft). These forward-deployed forces could be protected by theirown self-defense means as well as by ghteraircraft deployed on an aircraft carrier.

Intermediate/close-in defense. Were enemynaval forces to more closely approach Russian

territory, they would encounter smaller surfacecombatants and diesel submarines armed withanti-ship and anti-submarine cruise missilesand torpedoes. The immediate approacheswould be defended by coastal defense anti-ship cruise missiles and mine elds. Directassaults on coastal territory would encounterNaval Infantry and Ground Forces.

Legal Basis

Russian military and naval activity andorganization are dened by a series offundamental documents at the national level.They are:• Russian Federation Constitution, 12

December 1993• Russian Federation law “On Security,” 15

December 2010

SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy at sunset


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• Russian Federation law “On the StateDefense Order,” 29 December 2012

• Russian Federation law “On Defense,” 31May 1996 (as amended)o Section IV. Russian Federation Armed

Forces, other Troops, and militaryformations and organizations

o Article 10. Russian Federation Armed

Forces and their purpose, Para 2. Thepurpose of the Russian FederationArmed Forces is to repulse aggressiondirected against the Russian Federation,the armed protection of the integrityand inviolability of Russian Federationterritory, and the conduct of missions inaccordance with federal constitutionallaws and the Russian Federation’sinternational treaties.

• Military Doctrine, Presidential decree of 5

February 2010, as updated December 2014• Russian Federation Maritime Doctrine

through 2020, Presidential decree of 27 July2001, updated through July 2015

• Regulation “On the Ministry of Defense,”Presidential decree of 16 August 2004, asamended through 27 June 2007

• Russian Federation National SecurityStrategy through 2020, Presidential decreeof 12 May 2009 (superceded National

Security Concepts of 1997 and 2000)


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“Any ruler that has but ground troops

has one hand, but one that has also a

navy has both.” - Peter the Great


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Today, the Russian Federation (Russia), thoughsmaller than at any time since Catherine theGreat in the 18th century—contemporane-

ous with Colonial America—is still the largestcountry by area in the world. A little noted factis that its coastline is more than 2.5 times aslong as its land frontiers.

Although Russia has one centrally managedNavy, due to Russia’s geography, it shouldbe viewed as functionally four and one halfnavies: the Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, BlackSea Fleet, the Pacic Fleet, and the CaspianFlotilla. In October 2016, the Russia Navy will

celebrate the 320th anniversary of its foundingby Peter I (the Great) in 1696.

Early DaysRussian seafaring goes back to Kievan Rus’ inthe 9th century when medieval commercewas active along the north-south riverine traderoute “from the Varangians (Vikings) to theGreeks” connecting the Baltic and the BlackSeas. In the south, direct access to the Black

Sea carried trade to Constantinople (Istanbul).From the 12th century on, coastal residents ofthe north voyaged to Novaya Zemlya and towhat is today called Spitsbergen. The Mongolinvasions of the 12th century displaced KievanRus’ and unrestricted commercial access tothe Black Sea was lost. As the Rus’ battled theMongols, tenuous access to the Baltic was lost

to the Teutonic Knights and the Swedes. The

center of power shifted from Kiev to Moscow.

Only during the reigns of Ivan III (the Great)and Ivan IV (the Terrible) in the 16th centurydid Russia begin seriously to roll back theinvaders and take steps to regain maritimeaccess to the south. By this time, Russia wasalready engaged in international maritimetrade with Europe through the port ofArkhangelsk on the White Sea. This port had

access to the Barents and Norwegian Seas andbeyond but was seasonally blocked by ice.

In the early years of the Romanov dynastyin the mid-17th century, Russia reached theSea of Okhotsk and the Pacic, eventuallyacquiring Alaska, establishing a colonial capitalat Novo-arkhangelsk (“New Arkhangelsk”),

Introduction:

Russian Naval History

From the Kievan Rus’ to Today’s Russia . . .Three Centuries Toward a Modern Navy

Painting depicting Peter the Great as a naval leader


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now Sitka, Alaska, and a coastal provisioningoutpost at Fort Ross just 65 miles north of SanFrancisco, California.

The Imperial Navy EstablishedThe foundation of today’s Russian access tothe western seas and the Russian Navy waslaid by Peter I (the Great) when he ordered the

establishment of a regular navy in 1696. In theearly 18th century, Russia gained permanentaccess to the Baltic Sea by defeating Sweden,then the preeminent Baltic Sea power, inthe Great Northern War. The Russian BalticFleet was established in 1703. Peter theGreat also personally drew up the rst NavalRegulations, the form and design of the Navy’sSt. Andrew’s ag, ensign, signal ags, signalcode, and established the Admiralty Board.Even the focal point of the urban design of

St. Petersburg, Russia’s imperial capital and“window to the West,” was and remains theAdmiralty, the headquarters of the RussianNavy, built on Peter’s order.

In the late 18th century under Catherine II(the Great), Russia nally gained a permanentfoothold on the Black Sea and access to theMediterranean through the Turkish Straits. Therst Russian naval squadron to operate in the

Mediterranean was formed from the BalticFleet and fought victoriously against the Turks,sinking the Ottoman eet at Chesme in 1770.In 1783, the city of Sevastopol was foundedand the Black Sea Fleet came into existence.

The 19th century saw the Russian Navytransition from the “Age of Sail” to the “Age

of Steam.” It also witnessed three more warswith Turkey to ensure the Black Sea Fleetaccess to the Mediterranean. The rst was in

1806–1812, when Russia dispatched a navalsquadron to the Mediterranean composedof Baltic Fleet ships under the commandof F.F. Ushakov. The Crimean War camein 1853–56 and saw both the world’s lastnaval battle under sail at the Battle of Sinopeand then the rst between steam-poweredships. In the end, Russia was out-gunned

The Admiralty in St. Petersburg


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and out-maneuvered by an allied force ofdominantly steam-driven ships. The thirdwar, in 1877–78, saw the rst use of whatcan be considered the forerunner of moderntorpedoes. There were also two wars withPersia in 1803–1813 and 1826–1827 inwhich the Caspian Flotilla participated andgained a secure foothold along the northern

Caspian Sea.

The Russian naval advances and achievementsin the 1800s were brought to an end at thebeginning of the 20th century by the Battleof Tsushima Straits in the Russo-Japanese Warof 1904–1905. The Russian Pacic Fleet wasunprepared for the developed might of the

Japanese Navy. In an early engagement thecruiser Varyag perished in an uneven battle atChemulpo (Incheon). To reinforce the Pacic

Fleet, a late decision was made to send asizable portion of the Baltic Fleet, Russia’slargest, around Africa and through the IndianOcean to attempt to turn the tide of battle. Bythe time the eet neared Japan, it was wearyand worn from the 220-day transit. The

Japanese Navy made short work of the prideof the Russian Navy.

Plans were made to rebuild the Navy. In 1913,the lead unit of the NOVIK Class destroyerswas delivered, capable of an impressive 37.7knots.

The navy that was lost at Tsushima was barelybeginning to be replaced when the next blowfell—the Russian Revolution of 1917.

The Soviet NavyWhen the Bolsheviks nally establishedcontrol over all of Russia after the RussianCivil War that followed the Revolution, thenaval forces were tattered and scattered. Asignicant portion of the remainder that hadsurvived Tsushima and World War I haded the country, carrying refugees to various

Western countries. A large part of the ImperialBlack Sea Fleet found is last anchorage inBizerte, Algeria.

The institutions of the Navy carried on, ledby ofcers who considered themselvesapolitical and wished to remain to serve theircountry. The new order accepted them, butwith conditions. They were never fully trustedand “political ofcers” were assigned to watchover their actions and decisions, which had

to be countersigned by the political ofcers inorder to be valid. The nal chapter for manyof them was written by bullets in blood whenthe purges (“repressions”) of the 1930s sweptaway the loyal and experienced vestiges ofthe past. Under Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin),the forced fulllment of ambitious plans formassive industrialization was undertaken.These plans included the recapitalization ofshipyards, including the large shipyards in

Leningrad (St. Petersburg) and Nikolayev, andthe construction of an entirely new shipyardat Severodvinsk (originally called Sudostroy,then Molotovsk) on the White Sea. Likewise,designs were drawn up for new warships,both surface and submarines. Once again, theconstruction of a new navy had begun.


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The Great Patriotic WarAnd, once again, catastrophe intervened.On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany invadedthe Soviet Union: Operation Barbarossa hadbegun. Though there had been indications ofeastward German troop movements, the onlyformation of the Soviet Armed Forces that wasfully combat-ready that day was the Baltic

Fleet. Navy Commander-in-Chief AdmiralN.G. Kuznetsov had taken upon himself theresponsibility for issuing the readiness orderwithout waiting for the normal functioning ofthe military bureaucracy.

The German forces laid siege to Leningradfor 900 days and advanced to the outskirts ofMoscow. Many Baltic Fleet ships managedto retreat to Leningrad where they continuedto function as slightly mobile long-range

artillery and anti-aircraft batteries. Whilethe German Navy dominantly succeeded in

“bottling up” the eet in the Gulf of Finlandusing thousands of mines as “corks,” someSoviet diesel submarine crews managed tothread the mineelds and inict considerabledamage on German shipping in the Baltic.Many of the eet’s sailors and ofcers and allof the Naval Infantry joined the ranks of theground forces to stop the invader and pushed

him back.

German advances in the north effectivelycontained counterattack operations by theNorthern Fleet operating out of the Kola Gulfand the White Sea. And here also, submarinecrews were able to slip out and inictdamage.

The southern front saw the Germansoverwhelm Crimea. The forces of the BlackSea Fleet retreated to Novorossiysk andfrom there assisted the counter-offensive thateventually repelled and ejected the invader. Itwas in these actions that then Rear AdmiralS.G. Gorshkov, in charge of the naval forces,came in close contact with N.S. Khrushchev

and L.I. Brezhnev, both of whom were politicalofcers in this sector of the war.

To illustrate the extent of the Germaninvasion of the Soviet Union and itsconsequences in terms more familiar toa U.S. audience, envision the following:Nazi Germany geographically abuttingthe United States’ eastern seaboard withno intervening land or water. In the early

morning of 22 June 1941, the invading forceswould have simultaneously advanced on afront stretching from Boston, Massachusettsto Savannah, Georgia. The United Stateswould be forced to move all of its east coastheavy industries to the Rocky Mountains.The farthest point of German penetrationwould be Des Moines, Iowa, and the greattank Battle of Kursk would take place inCincinnati, Ohio. Instead of the WWII U.S.military death toll of some 400,000, therewould be upward of at least 12 million (25+million by others), counting both servicemenand civilians, with most of their blood shedinto their own soil. This traumatic eventwas seared into the consciousness of everySoviet citizen and all would continue tosacrifice much to ensure that war wouldnot come again.


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Once Germany was defeated, the wartimealliance between the U.S., U.K., and theSoviet Union evaporated and the chill of theCold War soon set in. Interpreting the Sovietadvance into Eastern Europe and the retentionof control there differently, both East and Westwarily eyed each other.

The development and use of the atom bombcast the long shadow of its mushroom cloudover all military calculations. The world didnot yet know all of the consequences andafter-effects of radiation exposure and manyconsidered the development of nucleararsenals to be yet another step in futurewarghting.

On the naval side, the Soviet Union onceagain developed programs to rebuild.

The acquisition of German technology,documentation, and scientists allowed boththe USSR and the West to advance their navalcapabilities. The war had shown the utility oflonger-range weapons: the German V-1 “yingbomb” cruise missiles and the V-2 ballisticmissiles became the starting points for thedevelopment of whole families of ground- andsea-launched weapons. The launch of the USSNautilus ushered in the age of naval nuclearpower and true submarines—warships thatcould dive and operate submerged, limitedonly by the endurance of their human crew.When cruise and ballistic missiles wereadded to submarines, the capability to holdan adversary at risk or the ability to launch asurprise attack was greatly increased.

When cruise missiles were added to surfaceships in the 1950s, the age of long-range navalartillery duels was a thing of the past. Ofcourse, every advance in a capability to attackcalled forth efforts to provide for an effectivedefense. Extensive efforts were focused ondeveloping anti-submarine warfare (ASW)capabilities by using submarines, surface ships,

helicopters, long-range aviation, and xedsensor systems.

By the late 1960s, under the able andvisionary leadership of Fleet Admiral of theSoviet Union S.G. Gorshkov and his closepersonal connections with the leadershipof the Communist Party and Government,the USSR had built and was continuing toconstruct an impressive navy. In response tothe mention of the huge numbers of hastily

built platforms with a tone that questionedtheir quality, a Soviet naval ofcer reportedlysaid, “Quantity has a quality of its own.” The1974 rst edition of the U.S. Department of theNavy publication “Understanding Soviet NavalDevelopments” noted the general-purposeSoviet Navy as having 245 active nuclear-powered and diesel-electric submarines and222 major surface warships. In addition, therewere 61 nuclear-powered and diesel-electricballistic missile submarines.

By the 1970s, the leadership of both the U.S.and the USSR decided that the arms racecould not go on unchecked. Negotiations ledto treaties limiting strategic nuclear arms, rstSALT and then START. Other negotiationsled to a bilateral agreement aimed at making


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close encounters at sea more safe and lesshazardous—the 1972 Agreement for thePrevention of Incidents On and Over theHigh Seas (INCSEA)—which continues tofunction today.

Disintegration of the USSRWith the passing of the WW-II generationfrom the leadership of the Soviet Union, newthinking and new opportunities arose. When

the middle-aged M.S. Gorbachev succeededthe quickly dying geriatric parade of Brezhnev,Andropov, and Chernenko, a time of changecame to the USSR. For the rst time sincethe Revolution, things could be describedas they really were, rather than as the Partyideology insisted they be. Growing globalcommunications capabilities broke down the

barriers of radio jamming and press censorship.The massive but fragile Soviet edice beganto show cracks, and on Christmas Day, 25December 1991, it disintegrated.

A wave of information and change swept awaythe fossilized dogmas of the past. Both sidesrealized that, absent the Communist ideologythat had preached an inevitable clash andeven a nuclear war between the U.S. andthe USSR, a mortal confrontation was not

inevitable and a nuclear war was unwinnable.Greater transparency showed that neitherside wished to attack or invade the other. Thisspecically led to the realization that there wasmuch to be done to rebuild and renew Russiaafter some 70 years of isolation. The ArmedForces could be downsized and refocused onessential defensive missions and on providingstability for internal development.

New Russia and Its NavyThe historical transition from communism tocapitalism, and the end of the CommunistParty at the end of the 20th century, turnedout to be extremely painful and borderingon the chaotic. The Russian ship of state wassailing into stormy, unknown waters with anexperienced captain (Boris Yeltsin) at the helm,

Fleet Admiral of the Soviet UnionS.G. Gorshkov


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but one unfamiliar with this class of ship andlacking accurate charts. Its crew was new, theiruniforms were tattered, and its threadbarepockets were almost empty. Everybody wasthrown into a crash course of survival and on-the-job-training as Russia turned yet another

momentous page of its history.

Sailing into uncharted waters, the Navy couldnot avoid the shoals and shallows. With thenow-acceptable ability to see and speak thetruth, it was obvious that much of AdmiralGorshkov’s once-impressive Navy wasinoperative, obsolete, or in need of moreattention than the results would merit. In thecourse of some 10 years, from 1995–2005,naval leadership made painful triage decisions.The choices were stark: try to save most andlose all, or try to maintain the most capableand invest in the future. The latter was thewise choice. As a result, the Russian Navytoday is about one-sixth to one-quarter thesize of the Soviet Navy in its heyday. Thefallow years of the 1990s were used to

develop new, more modern and capabledesigns and systems.

The organization and scal stability achievedsince 2005 has permitted budgeting forand nancing of critically needed newconstruction. The Russian Navy still retainsthe essential missions of its Soviet predecessor,

all geared toward the defense of the territorialintegrity and sovereignty of the Russian stateand the protection and promotion of itsinterests. Today’s global realities may allowit to accomplish these missions with fewermeans and lesser cost, which would beadvantageous, because navies are expensiveand each generation of armaments takes morethan a decade to develop, design, and build.

Today, the Russian Navy once again stands

at a point of transition and renewal, as it hasat various times in the preceding centuries ofits history. The 21st century is beginning withdifferent challenges and opportunities, andRussia envisions its new 21st-century Navyto be built and manned to effectively facethose challenges and fulll its missions whilecarrying on the best traditions of its illustriousbut often rocky and painful past.

Russian Navy Honor Guard in Norfolk, VA


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Over three centuries, Russian naval strategyhas transitioned from developing approaches

and capabilities to acquire access forcommerce to open seas in the west todeveloping effective and credible anti-accessapproaches and capabilities to deter or defendagainst long-range aerospace capabilities toattack Russia from the sea in the west, north,and east. However, even today, Russia’sneed for access to open seas remains a vitalconcern in the Baltic and Black Seas.

Russia’s early requirement for a regular Navyduring the reign of Peter I (the Great) in theearly 18th century was occasioned by the needto break out of its riverine constraints and tosecure access to the open sea. To do so, Russianeeded a eet that could both support theactions of the army and effectively confrontenemy ships at sea. The focus of Russian Navyactions at this time was to defeat Turkish forcesblocking access to the Black Sea via the Sea ofAzov and Swedish forces preventing access to

the Baltic through the Volkhov and Neva Rivers.Russia’s approach was to build numerousrelatively small but easily-maneuverable oaredsail-augmented galleys and watercraft mountingcannon. The use of such craft gave Russiaan asymmetrical advantage over the largersail men-of-war of its adversaries, permittingRussian naval victories in both theaters.

Russia’s early expansion to the north withmaritime access to the White and Barents

Seas and to the east with access to the Sea ofOkhotsk and the North Pacic Ocean beyondwas not met with opposition and did notnecessitate the development of any seriouseither offensive or defensive naval capabilityin those directions.

In the 19th century, Russia continued to workto secure access to open seas in the face ofthe developing European naval capabilitiesoften arrayed against it. The only strategyavailable was to develop better ships andweapons and to train and educate its navalleaders and ship’s crews to ght better.Because the essence of Russian military powerlay in its ground forces, it was the success ofthose forces that backed the diplomacy andnaval actions that eventually secured accessto the open seas. That access from the BalticSea and the Black Sea is still more dependenton the combination of diplomacy and the

existence of military power than on themassive demonstration of it.

Due to Russia’s internal economic andpolitical situation at the beginning of the20th century and into World War I, theRussian Navy had not received sufcientgovernmental support and was not in a

Chapter One:

Strategy –Fullling National Missions

The Evolution of Naval Strategy


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position to signicantly contribute to theoperations of a weak Russian army in thecontext of a ground war in Europe. In the FarEast, the limited capabilities of the Pacic Fleetand the basing of a portion of it in China atthe leasehold of Port Arthur did not permitmounting an adequate defense against attackby a more capable and numerically larger

Japanese Navy. The geographic reality ofRussia’s widely separated maritime frontagedid not in 1904 and still does not todaysupport the strategic utility of sending shipsfrom one eet to support another in theirdefensive missions.

Each eet and the Caspian Flotilla mustbe effectively self-sufcient to perform itsmissions in its region of responsibility inconjunction with whatever other armed forces

branches are directly available.

Soviet Navy Roles and MissionsThe early Soviet Period saw the virtualdisappearance of the Navy with most of itsships either sunk or scuttled during World WarI or removed to foreign ports by departingcontingents of forces opposing the BolshevikRevolutions and Communist rule. Prior toWorld War II, the Soviet Union worked

steadily to rebuild its navy and the navy’smission together with that of the Red Armywas limited to protecting the gains of theRevolution.

World War II - the Great Patriotic War. Theonset of World War II found the Soviet Navyin a defensive posture at its bases. The rapid

advance of the German Army in its surpriseattack on the USSR (Operation Barbarossa)supported by the German Navy effectivelybottled up the Baltic Fleet once it withdrewto bases in and near Leningrad in the Gulfof Finland. Even the fact that the Sovieteet was put on war readiness just beforethe start of the offensive was not enough to

stall the German advance in the Baltic. TheSoviet Northern Fleet, which was just beingdeveloped in the 1930s, was also forcedinto a defensive posture. The same fate befellthe Black Sea Fleet, which was signicantlydiminished with the capture of Sevastopol.Most naval personnel ended up ghtingashore alongside the army as the entirenation fought to expel the invader.

By the end of the war, resistance and exploits

by a handful of submarine crews in the Balticand North and the construction of numeroussmall craft in the Black Sea allowed the SovietNavy to support the Red Army in rolling backthe invader. In the Pacic, the modest forcesof the Pacic Fleet entered the war close tothe last moment in order to join in the spoilsof victory. This overall experience left anindelible imprint on the Soviet political andmilitary establishment, and for many years, theNavy’s role remained the support of the Army.In fact, Soviet military theoreticians assertedthat because of the nature of the Soviet Navy,there could not be a “naval strategy” asdistinct from “military strategy.”

Post-war Soviet Navy. After the war, the SovietUnion once again embarked on building a


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navy; however, the pace was slow and theNavy’s mission remained ill-dened.

Post Cuban Missile Crisis. When the SovietUnion was embarrassed over the 1962 CubanMissile Crisis, it provided Admiral Gorshkov,Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navyfor almost 30 years, with the opportunity

and justication to promote equipping theNavy with capabilities signicantly beyondthose required for the direct support ofthe Army. Gorshkov postulated that theNavy, acting relatively alone, could achievedecisive strategic goals in Oceanic Theatersof Military Operations (Oceanic TMOs; inRussian: Oceanic TVD). Pursuing his visionand using his close wartime connections withthe Soviet political leadership, he was ableto push through robust weapons and sensor

development as well as shipbuilding programs.

These programs gave the Soviet Navy a rolein strategic defense by creating more capablenuclear-powered ballistic missile submarinesthat could threaten the United States andits NATO allies with nuclear weapons. Theconstruction of a large number of general-purpose conventional and nuclear-poweredsubmarines together with numerous surfacecombatants—all armed with cruise missiles—further threatened U.S. and Allied navalforces deployed in the Atlantic, Indian, andPacic Oceans, and the Mediterranean Sea.The Soviet posture took on very offensivedimensions as the temperature of the ColdWar rose.

Strategic Deterrence. The development ofthe ballistic missile submarine changed thestrategic playing eld. The adversary couldnow be threatened with assured destructionfrom invisible platforms lurking in the offshoreocean depths. At rst, Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles were of relativelyshort range, necessitating long transits to get

within target range. They also made noisySoviet submarines vulnerable to detectionand prosecution by xed acoustic sensorsystems, shore-based maritime patrol aircraft,and attack submarines and surface ships. Thedevelopment of longer-range ballistic missilesallowed the submarines that carried them topatrol closer to their home bases where theycould be protected by various general-purposeforces and even reach their targets from theirhome piers or after surfacing through the

Arctic icecap.

Conventional Forces. Robust, general-purposeforces were developed and built to supportthe layered defense of the homeland. Smallcombatants and minesweepers protectedadjacent home waters and were tasked toensure that naval forces could not be bottledup in their bases. Larger, more seaworthyforces with greater endurance were deployedbeyond adjacent seas to guard againstincursions into the outer approaches tothe Soviet Union. At the height of the ColdWar, the Soviet Navy deployed submarineand surface forces globally to confront andmonitor U.S. and Allied naval forces inorder to preclude a surprise attack againstthe USSR. This constant shadowing posture


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was characterized as “the battle for the rstsalvo.” Due to an objective regard for Westerncapabilities, the Soviet sailors who mannedthe forward-deployed submarines and shipswere under no illusion that they would survivethe initial stages of a war, but their mission was

to preempt or blunt the expected attack, toattempt to “kill the archer” and thereby lessenthe number of incoming “arrows” aimed attheir homeland that would have to be dealtwith by other defending forces.

Local Conicts and Proxy Wars. Because theconfrontation between East and West had not

only a military but also an ideological andpolitical component, each side embraceda “zero sum” calculus whereby any win byone was automatically seen as a loss by theother. The USSR chose to support variousanti-colonial or anti-Western movements in

the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, andSoutheast Asia. This East-West contest ofwills played out in “proxy wars” where thewarring sides were openly or clandestinelysupported and equipped either by theSoviet Union or the United States. In manycases, Soviet advisors accompanied theequipment to provide training, and in some

1000nm range rings – Perceived TLAM threat to Russian homeland

Layered Defense. Havingacquired the means tostrike targets at long rangesusing ballistic missileslaunched from nuclear-powered submarines, itwas now possible todirectly protect themand the country against

attacks from the sea. Toaccomplish this, the Navydeveloped a layereddefense strategy. Today,the outer limit of thislayered defense can begenerally dened asabout 1,000 nauticalmiles (TOMAHAWK landattack cruise missile range)from the Russian frontieror from Moscow. Forwestern Russia, this outer


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cases, to actually operate weapons systemsin wartime conditions. This activity providedopportunities to slough off excess or outdatedequipment, test new battleeld weaponsor applications, and gain intelligence on theequipment and tactics of the opposing side.

Today. Russia’s wartime naval strategy remainsfocused on nuclear deterrence and layereddefense as described above. Russia is payingspecic attention to peripheral defense,particularly in the Arctic where it assesses theeffects of global climate change will potentiallyincrease foreign maritime presence and where

it has led a claim to extended continentalshelf rights in accordance with United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)mandated procedures. Russia is taking stepsto enhance its ability to protect its exclusiveeconomic zone (EEZ), monitor and control the

use of the Northern Sea Route within that EEZ,and improve its ability to affect search andrescue (SAR) operations in the Russian Arctic.

1000nm range rings – Perceived TLAM threat to Russian homeland (Pacic)

bound runs through theGreenland-Iceland-UnitedKingdom gap separatingthe North Atlantic fromthe Norwegian Sea. Inthe Mediterranean, theline runs roughly north-south at the boot of Italydening the eastern and

western Mediterranean.In the Pacic, there areno easily identiablegeographic bounds at the1,000 nm range (distancesfrom three points providegeneral orientation). Thedisintegration of the USSRdid more to change Russia’sstrategic defense depth onland (a loss of about 300miles) but had negligibleeffect on seaward concerns


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The Russian Navy is composed ofinterconnected components, spanning the

gamut from combat forces to all elements ofsupporting infrastructure:

• Command staff • Submarine forces• Surface forces• Naval auxiliaries• Naval aviation• Naval Infantry and Coastal Missile

and Artillery Troops• Naval shore establishment

(headquarters, communications,

intelligence, maintenance and repair,education and training, etc.)

The headquarters of the Russian Navy wasrecently relocated from Moscow to itshistorical home in the Admiralty building inSt. Petersburg. The move is complete and thenew Navy Command Center is functioning.Operations are directed and administrativeorders and actions taken emanate from

St. Petersburg. The Commander-in-Chief(CINC) of the Russian Navy, Admiral ViktorViktorovich Chirkov, ofcially runs the Navyfrom the new headquarters, but will alwaysshare time between the seat of governmentin Moscow and St. Petersburg. Like his U.S.counterpart, Admiral Chirkov oversees andis ultimately responsible for all new weapons

acquisitions of strategic importance, i.e. theSEVERODVINSK and the DOLGORUKIY

submarine projects. This will includemanagement of the Russian aircraft carrierproject as well.

Historically, the CINC Navy exercisescommand authority over and providesadministrative direction to the Navy. In thisrespect, this position somewhat combinesthe historical functions of the U.S. Chief ofNaval Operations and the Secretary of theNavy.

The Chief of Staff/First Deputy CINC is thesecond in command and is responsible forall operational issues and direct support. Hisorganization includes the Main OperationalDirectorate and the Navy’s Main CommandPost, as well as direct support elements suchas communications and intelligence.

The Deputy CINC, the third person at the

top, oversees on a day-to-day basis all of theadministrative elements such as personnel,education, shipbuilding and armaments,logistics, and engineering and billeting.He has command authority over navaloperations only when functioning as theActing CINC.

Chapter Two:

Russian Navy: Structure and Leadership

Organization


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The CINC Navy and the Main Navy Staff,responding to orders from the NationalCommand Authority and in accordancewith procedures and guidelines issued bythe General Staff, and likely in coordinationwith the appropriate new Joint StrategicCommands, issue commands and directivesto the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and

Pacic Fleets as well as the Caspian Flotilla.

The command structures of the individualeets and the Caspian Flotilla parallel thoseof the headquarters organization.

The practice of the commander having twodeputies extends down to all major eet

combatants. Aboard rst line ships andsubmarines, the Commanding Ofcer hasboth a Senior Assistant (Executive Ofcer)and another Assistant.

Within the eet order of battle, individualships and submarines are classied as 1st,2nd, and 3rd rank. The rank of commanding

ofcers (Captains 1st – O-6, 2nd – O-5, and3rd – O-4 Rank) nominally corresponds tothe rank of ship commanded.• 1st Rank – SSBNs, SSGNs, newest SSNs,

CV, CGNs, CGs.• 2nd Rank – older SSNs, SSs, DDGs, DDs,

FFGs, FFs, LSTs.• 3rd Rank – PGs, PGGs, etc.


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Admiral Chirkov, appointed Commander-in-Chiefof the Russian Navy in May 2012, is a lifelongsurface ofcer with extensive experience in thePacic and Baltic Fleets. He replaced AdmiralVysotskiy at a time when the chiefs of all threeservices—Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Navy—were apparently losing their direct commandfunctions to the Main Operational Directorate

of the General Staff. In the case of the Navy, thisoccurred in November 2011. In the new ArmedForces structure, the focus of the Main Navy Staffis concentrated on man, train, and equip issues.However, imprecise press reports indicate thatthe specic command functions of the serviceCINCs remain unresolved. This senior personneltransition also came as the Navy’s Main Staffmoved from Moscow to its historic home at theAdmiralty building in St. Petersburg, located onPalace Square across from the headquarters ofthe recently established Joint Strategic CommandWest/Western Military District housed in thebuilding of the former Imperial General Staff.

Chirkov came to the helm as the Navy embarkedon a very ambitious shipbuilding, infrastructure,and personnel development program to createa new, modern, 21st-century Russian Navy.Upon his appointment, Chirkov said, “The mostimportant thing for Russia is to build the eet with

support of the president and like-minded persons.My experience of commanding the eet on thecountry’s western maritime frontier will allow meto assess the full importance and responsibilityof this appointment.” He gave his assurance thatwithin the framework of the underway reform,the Navy will continue to defend and ensure thecountry’s security along all of its maritime frontiers.

Continued executive support and reliable fundingare critical to the fulllment of Russia’s nationalplans for renewing and developing its naval might.

Because of the longstanding process by whichsenior ofcers are groomed for high commandas well as the procedures and traditions of theRussian Armed Forces, no signicant changes

of focus or policy were expected in the changefrom Vysotskiy to Chirkov and none have beenobserved. Political policy is developed, set, andpromulgated by the Presidential executive. Militarypolicy also ows from the Russian president and isdeveloped and executed in conjunction with theMinister of Defense and the General Staff.

In the course of his career, Chirkov gained at-seaoperational experience as a junior ofcer in thePacic Fleet (PACFLT). Continuing to serve in thePacic, he rose to command of an UDALOY Idestroyer, higher to group command, and thento combined force command in charge of allRussian forces—submarine, surface-, air-, andland-based on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Withhis posting to the Baltic Fleet, he gained broaderinsight and exposure to the European theaterand visited most of the Baltic countries whilealso hosting many visitors to the Baltic Fleet at itsmain base in Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast, and to

St. Petersburg. Prior to his appointment as CINCRussian Navy, there were rumors that he wouldreturn to Vladivostok and be posted to commandthe Pacic Fleet, but clearly higher commanddecided otherwise and appointed him to head theRussian Navy.

(Chronology next page)

Admiral Viktor ChirkovCommander-in-ChiefRussian Navy


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ADMIRAL VIKTOR CHIRKOVCHRONOLOGY

08 Sep 1959 Born in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan SSR

1979–1982 Attended and graduated from S.O. Makarov Higher Naval School, Vladivostok,USSR

Commissioned as Lieutenant (U.S. O-1 equivalent) Commander of Mine-Torpedo Department, Patrol Ship, Pacic Fleet Assistant to CO of PACFLT patrol ship Executive ofcer, KOTLIN DD VOZBUZHDENNYY , Pacic Fleet

1986 Attended Advanced Special Ofcers’ Classes, Leningrad (U.S. SWOS and PXO/PCO courses equivalent)

1987–1990 Commanding Ofcer, KRIVAK I FF STOROZHEVOY , Pacic Fleet

1990–1993 Commanding Ofcer, UDALOY I DD ADMIRAL SPIRIDONOV , PACFLT

1993–1998 Deputy Chief of Staff, ASW ship formation, Pacic Fleet Deputy Commander, ASW ship formation, Pacic Fleet

Commander, 44th Brigade of ASW ships, Vladivostok, Pacic Fleet

1997 Graduated N.G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy, St. Petersburg (by correspondence) (U.S. Naval War College equivalent)

1998–2000 Attended and graduated from General Staff Academy, Moscow (requirement for senior ag positions at eet and national level)

2000–Jun 2005 Chief of Staff/1st Deputy Commander, Northeast Group of Troops and Forces,Pacic Fleet

Jun 2005–Feb 2007 Commander, Primorsk Combined Forces Flotilla, Vladivostok, Pacic Fleet

Feb 2007–Sep 2009 Chief of Staff / 1st Deputy Commander, Baltic Fleet

Sep 2009–May 2012 Commander, Baltic Fleet

6 May 2012–present Appointed Commander-in-Chief, Russian Federation Navy

Decorations:Order “For Service to the Nation in the Armed Forces”, 3rd DegreeOrder “For Military Achievement”Order “For Naval Achievement”


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The Russian military leadership structure isthe product of many decades of history andtradition. Due to the enormity of the Russianland, and for the most part, the difcultyand expense of moving and nding suitablehousing, most of the Russian ofcer corps,Navy as well as Ground Forces, have tendedto remain relatively geographically stationary.

Service schools are the predominant pathto service as an ofcer and a young manaspiring to a naval career normally choosesto attend one of ve naval commissioningschools, usually the one near his home. Thecurricula of these schools reect the political,ethical, and moral expectations Russia sets forfuture ofcers through a rigid set of trainingrequirements. The exception to a near homechoice would be choosing to attend the St.

Petersburg Naval Institute Peter the GreatCorps (established in 1701), the premier schoolof the naval service, with an eye on a futurehigh leadership position. Once commissioned,he will be assigned to serve in a unit locatedwithin the immediate or adjacent geographicregion. Once settled in, he has the potentialto progress in rank through Captain 1st Rank(O-6 equivalent) within the same overallmilitary unit, possibly on the same ship.

Promotions in rank through Captain 3rd Rank(O-4) are dominantly within the purview of theimmediate commanding ofcer. Promotion tohigher ranks involves decisions by formationand eet commanders. Flag ranks are thecombined purview of the Navy Commandand the Ministry of Defense.

The only alternate path to service as an

ofcer is through what are called “militaryfaculties” of a very limited number of civilianuniversity level educational institutions. Theseare rough equivalents of the U.S. ReserveOfcer Training Corps (ROTC) units. There isno Ofcer Candidate School (OCS) path in theRussian military.

Only when an ofcer is identied as havingthe potential to rise to higher ag rank and

assume senior command is it likely that hemay be rotated to a different geographic area.At this rank, some of the difculties otherwiseinherent in making permanent change ofstation changes are overcome by seniority anddeference to command position. Even so, largegeographic shifts are still rare for the majorityof the Russian ofcer cadre.

Future Leadership

Russian sailors on the bridge of USS Fort McHenry(LSD 43)


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Career LaddersThe Russian Armed Forces, and specicallythe Navy, have fairly rigid careers ladders. TheRussian military system does not train andeducate “generalists”; the focus is on “mastersof their craft.” Newly commissioned ofcersare screened and selected for commandpossibilities early. This selection is dominantly

made by commanding ofcers at the Captain2nd Rank (O-5) and Captain 1st Rank (O-6)level, since these same ofcers are responsiblefor awarding the early promotions in rank.As noted previously, only once reachingthe Captain 2nd Rank level are promotionconsiderations usually made by seniororganizational staff and senior commanders. Ayoung, newly commissioned ofcer comingto his rst ship or submarine places his careerfate in the hands of his commanding ofcer.

The military educational system focuses onqualifying ofcers for their initial assignmentsin specic specialties. A eet/unit assignmentchoice preference is given to those graduatingat the top of their class (gold medalist/reddiploma). This qualication also plays asignicant role in the perception of selectingcommanding ofcers.

Career paths are set early. Young ofcers with

specialties in navigation and weapons havethe best chance for advancement to commandpositions. Ofcers with specialties in engineer-ing, communications, and so on, dominantlywill only have career paths in those special-ties and will not qualify for command. In thisregard, the Russian Navy functions similarly tomany European navies.

Path to CommandThe classic path to command, both at sea andat the higher leadership levels of the Navy,is through the navigation specialty—withweapons as a close second. Navigation andweapons specialists are always “where theaction is.” They constantly work in closeproximity to, in coordination with, and under

the direct command of their commandingofcers. Under such working conditions, theyhave the opportunity to closely observe theworkings and practice of the art of command,and conversely, they are constantly under thewatchful eyes of their seniors.

A typical path is to rise from commander of aspecic team to division and department head.From there, the decision is made whether apromising ofcer is deemed t for command,

at which point he would be considered for theposition as assistant to the Executive Ofcerof that ship, or effectively, third in Command.This position is typically held for three to veyears, and then the transition to ExecutiveOfcer is made; this position is held for fourto ve years. With a background of success,he will then move on to be CommandingOfcer. Command may be aboard that vesselor transition to another ship to serve as the

Commander. It is not at all the exception thatthis entire portion of a naval career can bespent on a single ship or submarine or thoseof the same class. There are, of course, somebreaks for en route courses; however, thereare no ship-shore rotations. The only timesof relatively prolonged “shore” periods iswhen the assigned ship or submarine is


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down for maintenance or overhaul. In thisway, the rst twenty years of a naval careerbecomes the “ship” rotation. Only whenan ofcer is assigned to a group staff doesa “shore” rotation truly begin. However,even as a member of a group staff, thereare still extended periods spent at seaoverseeing training, exercises, certications, or

deployments.

With all of this as prologue, the path to thevery top of the naval leadership pyramid isa combination of many early pre-selections.Many early-made decisions precludeoptions to rise to the top. When reviewingcandidates for senior formation and eetcommand, only those ofcers who are thetop performing commanders at lower levelsare in the running. Again, the only path to

high command is for those rmly entrenchedin the “command” line.

Once an ofcer reaches one of the two seniordeputy positions at the formation or eetlevel, usually the Chief of Staff has been theone who will succeed to the Commander’schair. There have been exceptions where theDeputy Commander has gone on to be theCommander, but those are rare.

When a senior vacancy is rumored or arises,one should look at the pool of the immediatelysubordinate commanders, rst locally, andthen perhaps more widely aeld. The widerlook obviously mostly applies to appointmentsto the senior three positions at the overall navyand eet levels. All ag ofcer appointments

are scrutinized at the Navy Main Staff andDefense Ministry levels, but those to eetcommand positions also are reviewed atthe presidential level. These are executivedecisions; no legislative review or approval isrequired.

According to standing legislation, the age

limit for service in the rank of admiral is 60.This can be extended “at the pleasure of thePresident” in one-year increments.

Current information regarding Russian Navyleadership is available on the pullout inside theback cover.


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Chapter Three

Procurement:Shift to Quality Over Quantity

Udaloy II DD and Kuznetsov CV at anchor Severomorsk

ProcurementNaval procurement is a multi-stageprocess. The navy assesses and developsits requirements for platforms and their

characteristics in light of its assigned missionsto support and fulll the ofcially promulgatedRussian Federation security and defensepolicies and doctrine. These requirementsare developed in close coordination with theMinistry of Defense and, when approved, areincluded in the multi-year State ArmamentsPlan. The State Defense Order is the vehiclewhich puts specic requirements intodevelopment and production. This entireprocess involves close coordination between

the Defense Ministry and major scientic andindustrial organizations belonging to otherministries.

At the national level, defense related armsproduction is managed both for domesticuse and for foreign sale. The proceeds fromforeign arms are used both as a general sourceof federal revenue and to defray or subsidizethe cost of domestic weapons developmentand production. In the naval arena, Russia,as the Soviet Union before it, offers a widevariety of military products for sale. In recentyears Russia has sold KILO Class submarinesto Algeria and Vietnam, GEPARD Classfrigates to Vietnam, TALWAR II Class frigatesand a modied KIEV Class aircraft carrier toIndia. High performance missile systems of

the CLUB weapons family (export versionof the domestic KALIBR family) have beensold and heavily advertised for sale for overa decade. The BRAHMOS anti-ship missile,closely related to the S-N-26 STROBILE, was a

joint Russia-India development program. Themarketing showcases for these and other navalarms merchandise have included the biennialInternational Maritime Defense Show (IMDS)held in St. Petersburg and various other majorarms shows held both in Russia and aroundthe world.

We have multiple reections in the intelligencerecord of state-of-the-art weapons systems,

Russian technical assistance, and relatedarms trafc from Russia to many non-peerforeign actors. This proliferation of high gradeweapons is one of the most troubling aspectsof Russian Federation adventurism worldwide.

QualityIn the post-Soviet era, the Russian governmenthas taken a more cost effective approach tomilitary procurement in an attempt to ndand cut waste, fraud, and embezzlementof procurement funds. Signicant stepshave been taken to ensure that the defenseprocurement ruble results in a “ruble’s worth”of equipment. The management of the StateDefense Order, the government’s militarypurchase plan, is overseen by a Ministry ofDefense department.


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For naval platform purchases, the emphasishas been—with the sole exception of strategicsystems—on multipurpose platforms designedwith sufcient capability and margin for futuremodernization in order to maximize the use ofthe basic hull and propulsion systems.

Renewal ImperativeIn late 1991, when the Russian Navy inheritedits current order of battle of Soviet legacy shipsand submarines, these platforms had alreadyseen years of service.

The waning years of the USSR and theformative decade of post-Soviet Russia were

marked by drastically cutmilitary budgets. The resultwas the further degradation ofa eet already badly in needof maintenance and repair.

The charts (see foldouts)depicting the Russian Navy’s

current major combatantorder of battle (OOB) clearlyshow that the average ageof most of the ships andsubmarines is more than 20years. A nominal servicelife for most Soviet shipsand submarines when builtwas considered to be 25years. With diligent care andappropriate maintenance,

the service lives of the larger,more robustly built unitscan be extended by ve to

ten years—possibly fteen. These eet OOBcharts depict such selected extended servicelives and also clearly illustrate the current ageof Russia’s Soviet legacy eet.

Overall, these charts, a more accurate anddetailed version of which undoubtedly graces

a wall in the Russian Navy’s shipbuildingand repair directorate, clearly shows that theRussian Navy faces the imperative of newconstruction in order to avoid disappearingin the 2020 timeframe. An additional chartdepicts the staus of new constructionprograms.

Russian Navy Strategic and General Purpose ForcesOrder of Battle (OOB) 2015

North-ern Fleet

BalticFleet

BlackSea Fleet

CaspianFlotilla

PacicFleet

Totals

SSBN 7 5 12

SSGN/SSN 17 9 26

SS 6 2 4 8 18

Submarine totals 56

CV 1 1

CGN 2 2

CG 1 1 1 3

DD 4 4 8

DDG 1 2 1 2 6

FFG 1 1

FF 6 2 2 10

Major Surface totals 31

FFL 6 6 9 21

PGG 6 11 9 4 15 45

PG 7 4 11

LST 4 4 7 4 19

LCU 2 1 3

Minor Surface totals 99


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Russia’s national leadership has recognized future naval needs, and has approved and fundeda broad shipbuilding program that will result in a new 21st-century Russian Navy. The Navy’smajor combatants will dominantly comprise multipurpose submarines and surface ships capableof conducting aerospace defense, anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare unlike their mostly singlemission Soviet predecessors. The following briey describes both the major programs underway

and several that are expected to be pursued in the future. (See the chart, similar in format to thatshowing the current major combatant order of battle, depicting the status of new construction.)

The Future Fleet

“The nuclear submarine eet is the priority in theNavy shipbuilding program.” - Admiral Viktor Chirkov,

Commander-in-Chief, Russian Navy6 July 2015

Submarines are the capital ships of the RussianNavy. This is dictated by Russia’s geography—constrained direct access to major oceanareas everywhere but in the Pacic makessurface ship operations vulnerable to potentialenemy action. The inherent covert natureof submarines enhances their survivabilitywhether operating locally or when transitinginto more open sea areas.

Placing a priority on strategic deterrenceand defense, Russia’s recapitalization of itssubmarine forces began with its strategicballistic missile submarines. Construction ofgeneral purpose nuclear and non-nuclearsubmarines was second in importance.

DOLGORUKIY Class SSBN(in series construction)

The Yuriy Dolgorukiy , rst unit of theDOLGORUKIY nuclear-powered ballisticsubmarine (SSBN) Class, also known as theBorey or Design 955, was designed by theRubin Design Bureau in St. Petersburg andlaid down in late 1996, initially to complementand eventually to replace the DELTA III ClassSSBNs. The class, with each submarineequipped with 16 launchers for launchedballistic missiles (SLBM), will form the core

of Russia’s naval strategic nuclear forces formost of the 21st century. (Note: SLBMs can belaunched from a submarine moored at a pier,i.e., not submerged.) The DOLGORUKIY Classis equipped with the SS-N-32 Bulava SLBM, aninter-continental, sea-based ballistic missile witha reported range of 8,500 km. The missile testprogram encountered many difculties, delayingthe submarine’s expected 2009 acceptanceinto the Navy. The missile’s shortfalls were saidto have been caused by technical malfunctionsand quality control issues in nal assembly;however, testing continued and the aws wereinvestigated and eliminated.

Submarines

DOLGORUKIY ClassBasic Characteristics:

Type SSBN

(Russian) Borey

Design # 995/995M

Length 170 meters

Displacement (full) 24,000 tons

Propulsion Nuclear

Speed 29 knots

Crew 107

Main Armament 16x SS-N-32 BULAVA


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The Yuriy Dolgorukiy was nally accepted intothe Russian Fleet on 10 January 2013, sev-eral years later than originally expected. Thesecond unit, Aleksandr Nevskiy , was deliveredin late December 2013 and the third—Vladi-

mir Monomakh—is completing sea trials. Twomore units, Knyaz Vladimir and Knyaz Oleg ,are under construction in Severodvinsk, Russia.It has been publicly announced that construc-tion program is to deliver eight units by theend of 2020.

SEVERODVINSK SSGN(in series construction)

The SEVERODVINSK SSGN, also known asthe Yasen and Design 885, is a 4th generation

submarine designed as a multi-purposenuclear attack submarine. The lead submarine,Severodvinsk , designed by the MalakhitBureau in St. Petersburg, was laid down atSevmash Shipyard on 21 December 1993.

The specic missions of SEVERODVINSKSSGN include anti-submarine warfare (ASW),anti-surface warfare (ASuW), as well as landattack missions. This submarine class will bearmed with a wide range of advanced cruise

missiles to destroy enemy ships and targetsashore. The lead unit was launched on 15 June 2010 and commissioned for trial serviceon 17 January 2014, some ten years afterconstruction began. Eight are planned to bebuilt through 2020.

The construction of the lead submarine hastaken an extensive period of time, suggestingthere has been considerable scope for re-design, technical upgrades, and the use of

modern design techniques and the inclusionof up-to-date materials and systems.

Fifth Generation SSN/SSGNNuclear General Purpose Submarine(projected, not in construction)

In early 2006, then Russian NavyCommander-in-Chief Admiral VladimirMasorin discussed the future compositionof the Russian submarine force. As part of

this force, he noted that a nuclear submarineof an unknown type was currently underdevelopment. Speaking later, Rear AdmiralShlemov in charge of naval shipbuildingexpanded on this, highlighting that this newtype submarine would have a displacementof 5,000–6,000 tons. This new, smallersubmarine’s main mission would be theprotection of the DOLGORUKIY Class SSBN,allowing the multi-mission SEVERODVINSKto perform other navy missions. As of 2006,

both the Rubin Design Bureau and MalakhitDesign Bureau were said to be interested inundertaking the design of this submarine. Thegeneral designer of the Rubin Bureau hasreiterated the requirement of future Russiansubmarines to be smaller in displacement.However, there has been no further publicdiscussion of the design or announcement that

SEVERODVINSK ClassBasic Characteristics:

Type SSGN

(Russian) Yasen

Design # 885/885M

Length 120 meters

Displacement (full) 11,800–13,800 tons

Propulsion Nuclear

Speed 31 knots

Crew ~80

Main Armament 32x VLS KALIBR


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PETERSBURG ClassBasic Characteristics:

Type SS

(Russian) Lada

Design # 677

Length ~67 meters

Displacement (full) ~1,800 tons

Propulsion Diesel-electric

Speed ~20 knots

Crew ~35

a nal design has been approved. Based ontypical timelines for submarine development, alaunch prior to 2020 is unlikely.

PETERSBURG Class SS(limited series construction uncertain)The PETERSBURG SS, also known as Ladaand Design 677, is a diesel-electric submarineintended to be a technological advance onthe KILO Design 636, specically with regardto propulsion, sonar, and combat informationsupport. The class is the product of the RubinCentral Marine Equipment Design Bureau andwas built by the Admiralty Shipyard, both arein St. Petersburg. The lead hull Sankt Peterburg,

laid down in 1997 and commissioned in2010 for trial operation, is now located in theNorthern Fleet. During initial trials problemswere encountered with the electric propulsionsystem, the main sonar, and combatinformation system. It has been reported thatthese issues have been resolved and work hasrestarted on hull two Kronshtadt, laid down

in 2005. The future of hull three, laid down in2006, remains uncertain.

Advanced Non-Nuclear General Purpose

Submarine(projected, not in construction)Work on a future non-nuclear submarine,design covername Kalina, has beenannounced with work underway at the RubinDesign Bureau. It is expected to have an air-independent propulsion plant (AIP). Laydownof the lead unit is projected soon after 2020.

Unlike the case with submarines, the Navyapproached the recapitalization of its surface

eet starting with smaller sized units andprogressively building larger ones.

KILO ClassBasic Characteristics:

Type SS

(Russian) Varshavyanka

Design # 636.3

Length 73.8 meters


Propulsion Diesel-electric

Speed 20 knots

Crew 52

Main Armament KALIBR from torpedo tubes


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MINOR COMBATANTS

ASTRAKHAN Class PGPatrol CombatantThe Astrakhan is the lead ship of the Buyanor Project 21630 PG designed by ZelenodolskProject Design Bureau and built by the AlmazShipyard in St. Petersburg. The lead unit waslaid down 30 January 2004, was launched 10September 2005, and was commissioned 13September 2006. This class is dominantly be-

ing deployed in the Caspian Sea.

The Astrakhan was rst displayed duringthe annual Navy Day parade on the NevaRiver in St. Petersburg before delivering itto the Russian Navy’s Caspian Flotilla on 1September 2006. Two more units, Volgodonsk (originally Kaspiysk) and Makhachkala were

delivered to the Russian Navy 29 June and 4

Dec 2012, respectively. The engineer of Astrakhan, Guard Capt 3rd-Rank Sergey Parfeyev, stated the PG’s twodiesel engines drive a reversible water jetsteering unit for high maneuverability.

SVIYAZHSK PGG Guided Missile Patrol Ship(in series construction)

The Buyan design was modied to theincreased displacement Buyan-M Design

21631 to include an eight-cell vertical launchsystem (VLS) capable of ring the KALIBRfamily of missiles as well as the YAKHONTanti-ship missile (see missile section). GradSviyazhsk in the Caspian is the lead unit of thisdesign with additional units in constructionfor both the Caspian Flotilla and the Black SeaFleet. The export variant of these designs iscalled Tornado.

Surface Combatants

ASTRAKHAN Class

Basic Characteristics:Type PG

(Russian) Buyan

Design # 21630

Length 62 meters

Displacement (full) ~500 tons

Propulsion Diesel

Speed 26 knots

Crew 30–35

Main Armament 1x 100mm gun

SVIYAZHSK ClassBasic Characteristics:

Type PGG

(Russian) Buyan-M

Design # 21631

Length 74 meters

Displacement (full) ~950 tons

Propulsion Diesel

Speed 25 knots

Crew 30–35

Main Armament 8x VLS KALIBR


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MAJOR COMBATANTS

BYKOV Class FFLG Guided Missile Corvette(in series construction)

The Design 22160 BYKOV Class was

designed by the Severnoye (Northern) DesignBureau in St. Petersburg and is being built atZelenodolsk Shipyard. At about 1,500 tonsdisplacement and armed with KALIBR familyand Yakhont missiles, these corvettes willperform adjacent water patrol duties likely inthe Black and Baltic Seas. Two units, VasiliyBykov and Dmitriy Rogachev , were laid downin 2014, with the rst to be commissioned asearly as 2016.

STEREGUSHCHIY Class FF Frigate/FFGGuided Missile Frigate(in series construction)

The Design 20380 STEREGUSHCHIY Classwas designed by the Almaz Central NavalDesign Bureau in St. Petersburg and isbeing built by the (Severnaya Verf) NorthernShipyard in the same city. Constructionof additional units is also underway in the

Far East at the Amur Shipyard in the city ofKomsomolsk on the Amur River.

The warship is designed for operations inadjacent maritime zones, ghting enemy

surface ships and submarines, as well as toprovide naval gunre support for amphibiouslandings. It is also a replacement for theGRISHA Class frigates (FFL). The ship has ahelicopter landing pad and hangar (for 1x Ka-27) and is equipped with the latest electronicequipment and communications systems.

Steregushchiy , the lead hull, was laid downin December 2001, launched in May 2006,and began initial sea trials in November

2006; it required 15 months of trials andequipment testing before commissioning inlate February 2008. As of August 2015, fourhulls (Steregushchiy , Soobrazitelnyy, Boykiy ,and Stoykiy ) have been launched andcommissioned in St. Petersburg. Beginningwith Boykiy , the design included a VLS cellfor the REDUT/POLIMENT (SA-NX-28) airdefense missile system; this changed the typedesignation from FF to FFG. At the Far East

Amur Shipyard, workers laid the keel for theirrst STEREGUSHCHIY hull, the Sovershennyy ,in late June 2006 with an estimated deliverydate of 2011. It was nally launched inMay 2015. A second unit, Gromkiy , wasreported laid down on 17 February 2012.The STEREGUSHCHIY design has an exportversion, Design 20382 Tigr.

Modied STEREGUSHCHIY Class FFGGuided Missile Frigate

(in series construction)The Design 20385 Gremyashchiy is amodication of the original 20380 design withthe installation of improved radar system anda VLS cell capable of launching the KALIBRfamily of missiles and the YAKHONT anti-shipcruise missile. Due to problems arising fromeconomic sanctions against Russia related to

STEREGUSHCHIY Classbasic characteristics:

Type FF

Design # 20380

Length 104.5 meters


Propulsion Diesel

Speed ~27 knots

Crew ~100


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Ukraine, the inability to acquire German dieselpropulsion systems will likely limit this designto two ships, Gremyashchiy and Provornyy.

There have been reports of work on anotherimproved 20386 design.

GRIGOROVICH Class FFGSGuided Missile Frigate(in series construction)

The GRIGOROVICH Class, Design 11356,was designed by the Severnoye (Northern)Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, and built bythe Yantar Shipyard in Kaliningrad. It is thelatest variation of the long-produced KRIVAK

FFG and in some respects could be called aKRIVAK V design. (KRIVAK I and II – SovietNavy; KRIVAK III – Soviet Border Guards;KRIVAK IV – the TALWAR Class for India.)The lead unit, Admiral Grigorovich, is in seatrials and the second unit, Admiral Essen, waslaunched on 7 November 2014. It was to befollowed by four additional units: AdmiralMakarov , Admiral Butakov , Admiral Istomin, and Admiral Kornilov . Admiral Makarov willbe completed but the last three have been

cancelled because of Russia’s inability toacquire marine gas turbines from Ukraine dueto imposed sanctions.

Due to delays in constructing the new designGORSHKOV Class frigates and a critical needto replace the aging inventory of the Black SeaFleet, the decision was made to order six unitsof this proven design. An additional benetwas the fact that the Yantar Shipyard already

had proven assembly experience with thisdesign, having built a series for India. All sixGRIGOROVICH units were expected to be inthe Black Sea by 2020.

GORSHKOV Class FFGGuided Missile Frigate(in series construction)

The GORSHKOV Class, Project 22350, alsoknown as the “Admiral Class”, was designedby the Severnoye (Northern) Design Bureau in

St. Petersburg. The lead hull, Fleet Admiral of the SovietUnion Gorshkov , was laid down in February2006 at St. Petersburg’s Northern Shipyard.Then Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanovstated that hull 1 would be laun

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