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Safety Culture improvement: from multimodality to synergy
TECHNICAL MEETING on Safety Culture during Pre-Operational Phases — Practical Working Methods to Increase Safety IAEA, Cape Town, South Africa 26 – 30 November 2012
Eduard Volkov Central Institute for Continuing Education and Training Science Research Center “Prognoz”, director
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Introduction
Safety culture is a representative set of individual and
organizational variables encoded in such a way that safety is an overriding goal, background and
outcome for each cultural realization
Personal definition of SC
3
Introduction
SC is a representative set of individual and organizational variables encoded in such a way that safety is an overriding goal,
background and outcome for each cultural realization
Representative means that the culture produces ideas, meanings and values which are valid under authority of factual acceptance among organization (society) members.
4
Introduction
SC is a representative set of individual and organizational variables encoded in such a way that safety is an overriding goal,
background and outcome for each cultural realization
Individual variables: motives, system of values, attitudes, behavior patterns, ideas, individual traits, cognitive processes realization, knowledge, skills
Organizational variables: system of values, organizational behavior patterns, myths, symbols, organizational factors
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Introduction
SC is a representative set of individual and organizational variables encoded in such a way that safety is an overriding goal,
background and outcome for each cultural realization
Encoded means that a sense of the concept of Safety has been translated and interiorized by individuals.
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National culture
Organization culture
Group culture
Individual culture
Visible behaviour
Espoused Values
Basic assump-
tions
Culture matrix
Result of cultural encoding
Goals
Cultural transmission
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Safety Culture
necessity possibility reality
Has those modality categories
80% 15% 5%
40% 45% 15%
15% 60% 25%
5% 10% 85% Synergy
Mode 1
Mode 2
S - Mode
Mode N
From multimodality to synergy
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Org Culture
Safety
state of ergatic system (NPP, for example)
external factors
HF Org F
Politic situation
Economic situation
Regulator
Contractors
depends on impact of
is
Espoused Values
Visible Behavior
Attitudes
Knowledge
Skills
are
are
has
Performance
influence
Management
Processes
Climate
Basic assumptions
Organization behavior
based on
are
establishs and shares
Org Knowledge
influence
“Safety – Org Culture” interface
Safety is a state of ergatic system when influence of internal and external factors impact does not lead to its operation deterioration or stoppage
is
is
are elements of
Safety Culture
Suppliers
Stockholders
HRM
KM
Operation
SCM
Others
are
K
managed by
managed by
depends on impact of
Regulator
R&D
Operator
Internal factors
Is different for
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Safety Culture
SC Improvement
S is clearly recognized value
managed by
characteristics
has
Leadership Accountability for S S integrated in all activities Learning driven
are
result of
Selection, training, other HRM processes
Operation Experience Social security monitoring SC monitoring
Reactive Proactive
has operating processes
Root Cause Analysis
is are
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Support SC management processes with knowledge about human being
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Job post
Psychogram
Individual competences profile
Professional competence profile
Main tasks
Main actions
NPP compartment
NPP
Work effectiveness criteria
Motivation potential
Work environment
Design of job post
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
cognitivem
otivation
achievement
motivation
allegiance toorganization
decision making
responsibility
discipline,diligence
potential ofadoptation
self-control
teamw
ork
leadership
organizing skills
comm
ucativeness
analyticity
criticism
reproductivethinking
notionm
anipulation
attentionselectivity
attention stability
procedurem
emory
operative mem
ory
visual perception
Psychogramm for job post Shift Manager of Reactor Division
Design of job posts
13
Competence profile for job post Shift Manager of Reactor Division
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
PIDIRDILEQCDOCINFATHTWAPORSPEKNDMSIOPROOROSFSD
Competencies
Degree
Abridgements Competence title Abridgements Competence title
PI Interpersonal interaction APO Activity planning and organization
DIR Directiveness and control RSP Responsibility
DIL Diligence EKN Equipment knowledge
EQC Equipment control DM Decision making
DOC Work with documentation SI Information searching
INF Informing OPR Operability
ATH Analytical thinking OOR Orientation on result
TW Teamwork OSF Orientation on safety
SD Self-discipline
Design of job posts
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Happiness Health High job results Family Home Material welfare Interesting job Children; Safety; Comfortable work environment; Favourable climate; Career
Psychological attitudes:
Social attitude
Situation attitude
Aim attitude
Executive attitude Act
Motives
HUMAN VALUES
Sense attitude Attitude to Safety
Social attitude – civic duty; world-view; human values system; understanding what is good, what is bad; what is honestly, what is corruptly and so on.
Sense attitude. It defines personal sense of work for worker.
Situation attitude. It is formed when environment is estimated. Often to happen when social and sense attitudes are changed by estimation of situation.
Aim attitude appears when aim is formed, when worker knows what to do .
SC in depth
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Competence “Orientation to Safety”
Definition:
Worker performs work in accordance with safety priority. Worker aims, has intention to improve work environment, documentation, equipment.
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А.-2 Has inadequate orientation (attitude) for safe work implementation: knows safety requirements but breaks it with bad intention со злым умыслом нарушает их.
А.-1 Has no orientation (attitude) for safe work implementation: consciously ignores and\or does not know safety requirements.
А.0 Knows safety requirements and do not break them evidently.
А.1 Has an intention to work safely and\or supports others work safety during a work day.
А.2 Follows safe requirements when job preparation and implementation; notices timely beginning of declining situation. In accordance with job duties informs and control others supporting proper safety level.
А.3 Acts in accordance with safety priority. If situation with lack of absence or not enough operative information acts taking into account risks of the safety decreasing.
А.4 Proposes ideas on SC enhancement and ways how to realize.
А.5 Undertakes efforts to improve safety. Upholds a necessity to follow the safety requirements. When event situation makes arrangements to prevent the situation aggravation.
А.6 Involves others into SC enhancement process.
А.7
If necessary, risks own health and life to provide safety.
Competency “Orientation to Safety” Scale - Intensity and completeness of activity addressed to safety
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Nuclear facility Psychological Support Lab
Selection. Adaptation. Shift manning. Psycho-physiological monitoring of NPP personnel state. Participation in an event investigation team. Participation in Safety Culture improvement process. Psycho-pedagogic support in training. Social-psychological monitoring. Support for managers. Psychological support for NPP personnel Psychological rehabilitation for NPP personnel.
MAIN TASKS
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• Conducting lessons and trainings to form, enhance job relevant traits; • Development recommendations on the individual approach to training; • Psychological support to simulator training for response to
emergencies ; • Consulting to the training centre instructors; • Operative shift manning on base of psychological compatibility.
Psychological support in training
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Pay
men
t
Psy
chol
ogic
alcl
imat
e
Lodg
ing
Pre
stig
e of
the
job
Med
ical
serv
ice
Incr
ease
of
qual
ifica
tion
leve
lS
afet
y cu
lture
prio
rity
form
ing
Man
agem
ent
impr
ovem
ent
Job
disc
iplin
e
Dev
elop
men
tof
leis
ure
sphe
re
Pub
lictr
ansp
ort
Saf
ety
rule
san
d jo
bpr
otec
tion
Pub
licca
terin
gsp
here
Dev
elop
men
tof
dem
ocra
cy
Job
rout
ine
Labo
r flu
idity
Pro
visi
on o
fch
ildre
ned
ucat
iona
l
2001 г.2003 г.
Proactive approach : Social security monitoring
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Unconscious Conscious (violation)
Mistake (Professional competence)
slip task
simplification (short cut)
Full ignorance of safety rules
task “rationalization”
Human errors
21,8
4,5
3,8
3,8
26,3
5,1
8,4
9,6
16,7
мотивация
ПВЛК
психофизиол.качествафункцион.состояниепроф.компетентностьорг. факторы
соц.-психол.ситуацияэргон. р. места
эргон. документ.
Motivation
Job relevant traits
Work place ergonomics
Social politic situation
Document ergonomics
Professional competence Organizational factors
Physiologic characteristics Fitness to duty, health Human factor specialist
take part in root cause analysis team and used method “Psychological root cause analysis of wrong performance”.
SRC “Prognoz” carries out providing and updates the database as subsystem of the corporation information system based on the results of the human errors psychological analysis and prepares analytical reports for managers and Inspection division of JSC “Concern Rosenergoatom”.
Reactive approach: ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
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SC improvement regular process
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SC methodology
SC model
Working groups with NPP personnel
IAEA, WANO, OECD meetings, working
groups SC monitoring
results JSC “Rosenergoatom” activity results in
SC domain
IAEA documents on SC
Inspections, root cause
investigations results
WANO, IAEA missions outcomes
SC improvement regular process
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Organization of operating
Safety is a clear recognized value
Commitment to Safety Culture
Clear responsibility contribution
Learning organization
HR management Leadership
SC improvement regular process
Developing SC model, tools to improve you should use IAEA recommendations, take into account features of national culture, national production
relations
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Stra
tegy
leve
l Ad
min
istr
ativ
e le
vel
JSC “Rosenergoatom” policy and strategy in SC improvement
Regulation on SC monitoring
SC enhancement process regulation
Regulation on SC group
activity
Regulation on SC summarized
day
Regulation on interaction with methodological support organization
Organization Ethic Code
SC improvement regular process
25
SC self-assessment method SC self-assessment guide SC self-assessment software SC forming and development method for both an
individual and organizational level Corporate knowledge portal on SC
Tools:
Ope
ratio
nal l
evel
Actions on SC enhancement regular process introduction
Adm
inis
trat
ive
leve
l SC improvement regular process
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Corporate knowledge portal on Safety Culture
Regular SC improvement process
SC Knowledge portal
Organizational structure
Operation organization head office
NPP
SC group
Psy Lab
Processes
SC monitoring
SC self-assessment
SC assessment
Training
Operation Experience
ToolsRegulations
Policy and Strategy
Regulations on government, regulatory body organizational levels
Methodological directions, recommendations
Science support
organizations
External sources
IAEA
WANO
ROSATOM
SRC «Prognoz»
SCICET
Methodology
Training materials
Training methodsSelf-assessment
tools
Assessment tools Software
Publications
Reviews
Workshops, conferences
Internet
EDF
British Energy
INPO
Contacts
Projects
Researches
Missions
Experts
Thesaurus
Publications
Projects
Services
Products
Others
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SC Integration in Rosatom management system Principle 3: Leadership and management for safety 3.12. “…Safety has to be achieved and maintained by means of an effective management system. This system has to integrate all elements of management so that requirements for safety are established and applied coherently with other requirements, including those for human performance, quality and security, an that safety is not compromised by other requirement or demands. The management system also has to ensure the promotion of a strong safety culture…” 3.13. “A safety culture that governs the
attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety of all organizations and individuals concerned must be integrated in the management system.
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SC Integration in Rosatom management system
Radiation safety
management
Labor safety management
Nuclear safety
management
Physical protection
management
Industrial safety
management
Fire safety management
Environmental safety
management
SC Improvement
Process group “Safety
Management”
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Two cultures meeting on a field of nuclear energy use
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Stage 1. Health Check. Group interaction assessment process
Two cultures meeting: Busher NPP
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Stage 1. Health Check. Results of the group interaction assessment
2.5
2.83
3.21
2
2.92
2.45
3.4
3.5
2.2
3.3
2.48
3.09
3.34
2.09
3.09
Способность к командной работе
Создание микроклимата в команде
Коммуникабельность Управление конфликтами
Межэтническая толерантность
Персонал ДАТЭК Персонал BNPP Весь персонал смены А
Conflict management
Team work
Cross-cultural tolerance
Group culture
Sociability
Russian personnel
Iranian personnel Average
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The Code defines united ethics values and behavior standards for Busher NPP workers which provide the NPP safety and efficiency.
If we will follow these standards we will reach high reputation and earn society’s and government’s respect.
The Code contains behavior standards obligatory for all Busher NPP workers
Stage2. Ethics Code for Busher NPP personnel
From top management appeal:
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Honesty
Stage 2. Ethics Code: Basic values for Busher NPP personnel
34
Stage 3. Training of cross-cultural interaction
The training is addressed to the Russian and foreign managers and specialists who take part in nuclear
facilities construction and operation
and
has a goal to harmonize cross-cultural contacts on both intergroup and interpersonal levels, to prevent
conflicts by means of cross-cultural tolerance forming.
35
Stage 3. Training of cross-cultural interaction
MAIN TASKS:
• to decrease level of preconception to other ethnic group representatives; • to develop ethno-cultural sensitiveness; • to enhance level of ethno-cultural competence; • to enhance level of empathy; • to enhance positiveness level of ethnic and other kinds of social identity; • to develop readiness to interact with people from another ethnic group in various social situations.
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Lessons learned from Russian experience
1. SC concept and improvement must be integrated in all stages of nuclear facility life cycle
2. Developing SC model, tools to improve you should use IAEA recommendations, take into account features of national culture, national production relations
3. Take into account not only human being values and behavior, but organizational ones.
4. Support organizational processes with knowledge about human factor
5. Leadership – main factor of success in SC improvement 6. Use of human factor specialists (psychologists) makes human
factor reliability support more effective. 7. Use special tools to train adult people 8. SC: manage, not operate 9. SC: continuing improvement is in focus, not an appraisal 10.Have a patience – culture is a long term changing phenomenon
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2nd International Summer School on Safety Culture
Russian Federation, Saint-Petersburg, 1 - 5 July 2013
More Information: www.scicet.ru
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Thank you for
the attention!
