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Sco$ D. Sagan Stanford University
Atoms for Peace or Atoms for War? The Future of Nuclear Energy and
Nuclear Weapons
Stanford Graduate School of Business March 27, 2014
Nuclear Power: Expansion vs. Spread Post-‐Fukushima 2013
Americas Western Europe Eastern Europe Central and South Asia
East Asia/ Oceania Middle East Africa
States with Nuclear Power Programs
ArgenHna Brazil Canada United States Mexico
Germany Switzerland Belgium Finland France Netherlands Spain Sweden United Kingdom
Armenia Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia Romania Russia Slovenia Ukraine
India Pakistan
Japan China South Korea Taiwan
Iran
South Africa
Aspiring Nuclear Power States
Peru Venezuela Uruguay Dominican Republic HaiH Bolivia Chile Jamaica El Salvador
Italy Belarus Poland Lithuania CroaHa Latvia Albania Estonia Greece
Bangladesh Kazakhstan Sri Lanka Mongolia Georgia
Thailand Singapore Myanmar Indonesia Malaysia Vietnam North Korea Philippines
Israel Egypt Jordan Turkey UAE Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia Bahrain Oman Syria Yemen
Senegal Nigeria Tanzania Tunisia Libya Kenya Algeria Namibia Niger Uganda Ghana Morocco Sudan
Red = Canceling plans Green = ConHnuing with plans Black = No evidence Yellow = Ongoing debates that have produced a delay or uncertainty about plans
Sources: World Bank, World Governance Indicators, 2011, info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index/asp; Polity IV Project, Poli6cal Regime Characteris6cs and Transi6ons, 1800-‐2007, www.systemicpeace.org/inscr.htm; NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index, h$p://www.nHindex.org/. * Measurement for Democracy/Autocracy Score is mean Polity IV 20-‐point score on a 100-‐point scale. Scores above 50 represent democracy; below 50 implies non-‐democracy.
Figure © Sco$ D. Sagan 2013
Governance, CorrupLon, and Regime Type 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
PoliLcal Stability Government EffecLveness
Regulatory Quality
Control of CorrupLon
Democracy Score NTI Security RaLng
States with Nuclear Power Aspiring Nuclear Power States
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Source: Adam Bernstein (2009). The Produc6on of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from h$p://www.lanl.gov/orgs/ndo/n4/documents/02.prod_fissile_mat_nuc_weap_nuc_power.pdf
States with Nuclear Weapons
States that Explored or Pursued Nuclear Weapons
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Syria
Romania
Iran (1) + (2)
Algeria
Iraq
Libya
South Africa
Taiwan (1) + (2)
North Korea
Egypt
South Korea
(West) Germany
Italy
Australia (1) + (2)
Sweden
Yugoslavia (1) + (2)
Brazil
Switzerland
: Autocracy (-‐10 – 0) : Semi-‐Democracy (1 – 6) : Democracy (7 – 10) : TransiHon Period
: RaHfied NPT : RaHfied NPT as ROC : RaHfied NPT, Withdrew in 2003
Start and End of Nuclear Weapons AcLvity and NPT RaLficaLon
Five Cracked “Pillars” of the NPT ArLcle I: “Each Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer
to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices… not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.”
ArLcle II: “Each non nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices…not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.”
ArLcle IV: “Nothing in this treaty shall interfere with the inalienable right of all the ParHes to the Treaty to develop research, producHon and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discriminaHon and in conformity with ArHcle I and II of this treaty.”
ArLcle VI: “Each of the parHes of the treaty undertakes to pursue negoHaHons in good faith on effecHve measures relaHng to cessaHon of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”
ArLcle X: “Each Party shall in exercising its naHonal sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty… It shall give noHce of such withdrawal… three months in advance.”
ArLcle I:
“Each Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices… not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any non nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons.”
ArLcle II:
“Each non nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices…not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons.”
ArLcle IV:
“Nothing in this treaty shall interfere with the inalienable right of all the ParHes to the Treaty to develop research, producHon and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discriminaHon and in conformity with ArHcle I
and II of this treaty.”
ArLcle VI:
“Each of the parHes of the treaty undertakes to pursue negoHaHons in good faith on effecHve measures relaHng to cessaHon of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament.”
ArLcle X:
“Each Party shall in exercising its naHonal Sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty… It shall give noHce of such withdrawal… three months in advance.”
Iran’s Nuclear Program
Evidence on Iran’s Bomb Program • InstrucHons for making uranium metal hemispheres
• Tests of implosion-‐type detonaHon systems
• Missile RV engineering work
• CommunicaHon and links between nuclear and missile programs
• Failure to cooperate fully with IAEA
Iran: A Security-‐Driven Program? “If anyone in the neighborhood has [the bomb], we must be ready to have it.”
-‐Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, 1973
“The moral teachings of the world are not very effecHve when war reaches a serious stage…We should fully equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons.”
-‐Hashemi Akbar Rafsanjani, 1988
“The commander has said we can have no victory for another five years, and even by then we need to have 350 infantry brigades, 2500 tanks, 300 fighter planes... [Iran would need] a considerable number of laser and nuclear weapons to confront the a$acks.”
-‐Ayatollah Khomeini, 1988
Iran’s Security Concerns • 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review
• January 22, 2002: “Axis of Evil” Speech
• 2003: Tehran should “take a number”
• 2006: “How can a side that wants to topple the regime also a$empt to negoHate?”
Ali Larijani, Iran’s top nuclear nego6ator August 2005 -‐ October 2007
Iran: DomesLc PoliLcs • Broad support for nuclear power
• Split on nuclear weapons?
• Reformers and industry want internaHonal trade
• IRGC and weapons interest
Iran: The Norms Model
• Fatwa Against Chemical and Nuclear Weapons
• Islam and the Nuclear Taboo
• Membership in the “Nuclear Power Club”
November 2013 Iran Nuclear Deal • Interim deal between P5+1 and Iran reached on November 24th in Geneva
• Adds Hme to an Iranian nuclear “breakout” in exchange for limited sancHons relief – Suspension of work on Arak – No enrichment above 5%
– Dilute or convert 20% – Improved IAEA safeguards
Recent Developments on Iran Nuclear Deal
Nego6ators Wait for Start of Closed-‐Door Nego6a6ons in March 2014
Ensuring a Safer Nuclear Future
NSG Export Guidelines IAEA AddiLonal Protocol
Regional Repositories InternaLonal Fuel Bank
2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit • Pledge by 35 countries to turn nuclear security guidelines into naHonal law and undergo external reviews of nuclear security procedures – Russia, China, India, and Pakistan not part of group endorsing these measures
• New nuclear materials reducHon commitments by Japan, Italy, and Belgium
