Salmon Stock Variability And The Political Economy Of The

Pacific Salmon TreatyContemporary Economic Policy

July 1996

Paper Author: Kathleen A. Miller Presentation By: Scott Fenters

IntroductionDespite long standing efforts to preserve and enhance West Coast salmon stocks and to forge workable international agreements governing harvests, the Pacific salmon fishery is in a state of crisis. Runs of many salmon stocks spawning in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and California rivers have declined precipitously in recent years. At the same time, Alaska's salmon harvests have experienced a remarkable sustained increase. These trends may have fueled disputes between the United States and Canada and between Alaska and other U.S. interests regarding harvest management under the Pacific Salmon Treaty.

Questions Paper Addressed

(1) What role have the recent trends in salmon populations played in the breakdown of U.S./Canadian cooperation under the Pacific Salmon Treaty?

(2) Is uncertainty as to the sources of variability an important part of the problem?

(3) Could the design of the Pacific Salmon Treaty be improved to make the agreement more resilient to the stresses created by natural variability in salmon populations?

Alaska VS Oregon, Washington, And California

Mill

ions

of

Fish

Why No Fish For Me?

• El Nino

• Hatcheries

• Alaska and Canada

• Fish look like Fish

• Absolutely Ridiculous Pacific Salmon Treaty Setup

• Traditional Overfishing

The Pacific Salmon Treaty

• Purpose: To prevent overfishing, to promote optimum production, and to provide that each party receives benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters. Also to reduce interceptions while avoiding undue disruption of existing fisheries and to take into account annual variations in abundance of the various stocks.

• Authority: to create" fishing regimes" to govern harvests in six distinct fisheries within the Commission's purview. (These are (i) salmon spawning in the transboundary rivers of British Columbia and the Alaskan panhandle, (ii) salmon from areas around the disputed maritime boundary between Alaska and British Columbia, (iii) Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon, (iv) Chinook, (v) Coho, and (vi) chum.)

How It Works

• Regimes set ceilings for fish and assign each group a certain amount.

• Hard to Measure Year to Year because of imperfect information.

• High Costs of Negotiating

Why it is Not Working

1. For a new fishing regime to take effect requires consensus among the three voting U.S. Commissioners who represent Alaska, Washington/Oregon, and 24 treaty tribes located in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. The U.S. and Canadian delegations also must reach consensus. Any of these parties thus has the power to veto a proposed fishing regime that it sees as contrary to the interests of its constituents

2. What are “benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters”

Game Theory Model

Table 1

This hypothetical example reflects some of the real problem's asymmetry. Alaska, for example, may have less to gain from cooperation than do the other parties because only a small part of Alaska's enormous salmon runs are subject to Canadian interception. On the other hand, Canada's salmon are vulnerable to fishing pressure from both the north and the south, and major portions of the Washington/ Oregon salmon stocks migrate through the waters of the other two jurisdictions.

Game Theory: Alaska Defect

Conclusion