8/8/2019 Secession and Precedent in Sudan and Africa
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Unitd Stats Institut of Pac www.usip.og Tl. 202.457.1700 Fax.
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UNITED STaTES INSTITUTE of pEacE
USIP 2010 All rights reserved.
[T]hr is not a lot ofvidn that othr sssionmovmnts would sud
in following suit. To argu
that th braku of Sudan
would b followd by othr
sssions, thr must b
othr sssion movmnts
ositiond to do so. But today
thr ar no othr movmnts
in Afria with th history, loal
following and intrnational
suort omarabl to that
of Southrn Sudan.
November 17, 2010
Secession and Precedent in Sudan
and Africa
SummaryArican leaders have recently expressed concern that the
possible division o Sudan may lead
to a domino eect o other secessions on the continentbut closer
analysis questions how
likely this may be.
Aricas borders are largely accepted; it is only a distinct ew
cases (including Sudan) in which
they could be reconsidered.
While there are many secession movements in Arica, most are weak
and ew stand a real
chance o success, or have the international support they would
need to advance their
cause. This minimizes the likelihood o a wave o ollow-on
secessions i Southern Sudan
chooses to secede.
IntroductionA yes vote couldstimulate ethnic secessionist
movements from Cairo to Cape Townthe impact of theirnew status may
be catastrophic elsewhere on the continent, where secessionist
tendencies have hitherto beeheld back by the international
communitys refusal to recognize new nations1
independence will encourage secessionists in other African
countries. Angola, Cameroon, Senegal andSouth Africa all face
potential splits.2
I these words were written today, one would assume they were
about Sudan and the prospe
that Southern Sudanese will vote to secede in the coming January
reerendum. But they were
written in 1993, and the subject was the pending secession o
Eritrea rom Ethiopia.
Back then, politicians and commentators eared that the
internationally sanctioned creation o
new state in Arica would set a dangerous precedent and encourage
other secession movement
Today, similar ears are heard concerning the possible division o
Sudan. What is happening inSudan could become a contagious disease
that aects the whole o Arica,3 Libyan leader Col.
Muammar Gadda recently warned. On another occasion, he predicted
the beginning o the cr
in Aricas map.4 Algerias oreign minister added this partitioning
will have atal repercussions
the Arican continent.5 Chadian President Idriss Deby cautioned,
we all have a north and south
we accept the breakup o Sudan, the domino eect will be
inevitable and it would be a disaster
the continent.6
But will it? Predictions o disaster ollowing Eritreas secession
were overstatedthe Ethiop
Eritrea war that ollowed was catastrophic, but there was no
subsequent surge in secessionist
eorts elsewhere in Arica. Is there likely to be such a surge i
Southern Sudanese vote to secede
Jon Temin
E-mail: [email protected]
Phone: 202.429.4726
peAceBrIeF68
8/8/2019 Secession and Precedent in Sudan and Africa
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USIP 2010 All rights rese
Secession and Precedent in Sudan and Africa
page 2 PB 68 November 17, 2
Norms and BordersAny secession in Arica challenges the long-held
norm o accepting borders drawn by colonial
powers, illogical as some o them may be. This principle outi
possidetis (Latin or as you possess
was enshrined by participants in a meeting o the Organization o
Arican Unity in 1964, whose
nal declaration solemly declares that all Member States pledge
themselves to respect the
borders existing on their achievement o national independence.7
In the 1960s this made sense
Arican states were brand new, weak and looking to ensure their
very existence. When Biara (in
Nigeria) and Katanga (in the Democratic Republic o Congo) tried
to break away rom their moth
states in the 1960s, it was prudent to discourage their
secession given the weakness o those sta
and the conusion that could have resulted rom their secession
given that other Arican states
were only then coming into existence. At the time, it was
important to establish the principle tha
colonial borders would stand.
But 50 years later, the context is dierent. Most Arican states
are well-established and their
borders are accepted. By and large, the map o Arica is settled.
The borders governing just a ew
states, however, are persistently problematic, none more so than
Sudan.
I Southern Sudanese vote to secede and gain their independence,
it will be the most signica
redrawing o Arican borders since decolonization. Eritrea, though
strategically located given its
access to the Red Sea, is small and somewhat peripheral to the
rest o the continent. Sudan, on t
contrary, is the largest physical country on the continent and
borders nine other states. Dividing
in two would be a seismic cartographic shit.
Even so, there is not a lot o evidence that other secession
movements would succeed in
ollowing suit. To argue that the breakup o Sudan would be
ollowed by other secessions, the
must be other secession movements positioned to do so. But today
there are no other move-
ments in Arica with the history, local ollowing and
international support comparable to that
Southern Sudan.
Standards for SecessionSecession movements elsewhere in Arica
exist today in Casamance (Senegal), Cabinda (Angola)
Zanzibar (Tanzania), Somaliland (Somalia) and Western Sahara
(the disputed territory bordering
Morocco). They are the same movements that were cited as
potentially next to secede when
Eritrea gained independence. With the exception o Somaliland,
none o these movements are
stronger now than they were in the 1990s. In act, many are
weaker; secession movements in
Casamance, Cabinda and Zanzibar have been relatively inactive in
recent years.
With the exception o Western Sahara, the people and rebels o
these other secessionist regio
have not been through what those in Southern Sudan and Eritrea
have endured. Sudans North-
South civil wars lasted roughly 40 yearsalmost their entire
post-colonial historyand resultedin approximately two million
deaths. Eritrean rebels ought or 30 years. While people in
other
secessionist regions have no doubt suered immensely and have
legitimate grievances, they ha
not put in the time or paid a price that puts them on par with
Southern Sudan (again with the
exception o Western Sahara). This history matters, because it
demonstrates the intractability o t
confict, and suggests that partition may be a necessary option.
The determination and sacrice
o secession movements elsewhere should not be casually
questioned, but there should be a
threshold at which secession movements are considered to be
credible, and the support and com
mitment demonstrated by the movement should be key actors in
meeting that threshold. Beyo
Sudan, ew i any movements in Arica can show that requisite level
o support and commitment
