Security, Sovereignty and Economics: Armaments Limitation in Asia

Security, Sovereignty and Economics: Armaments Limitation in Asia

David Winterford

Military Enhancement in Asia

A burgeoning literature expresses considerable concern over what appears as rapid growth of military expenditures, and swift expansion of military establishments, in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.’ The inspiration for this concern stems mainly from the spread of military or military- dominated governments and the growth of military expenditures and arms transfers that they allegedly entail. Often, links to foreign suppliers (typically in the West) are used to imply international collusion aimed at solidifying dependency and en- trenching repressive, reactionary regimes.*

For most of these observers3 there is a genuine belief the

Paper prepared for “Security and Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific Region,” Asian Political Scientists Group, American Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., August 1986.

1. See for example, Mary Kaldor, “The Military in Development,” World Development, Vol. 4. No. 6 (June 1976), 459-482; Absjorn Eide and Marck Thee, eds., Problems of Contemporary Militarism (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1980); Robin Luckham, ”Armaments, Underdevelopment, and Demilitarization in Africa”, Alternatives Vol. 6. No. 3 (September 1983), 179-295. 2. Mary Kaldor and Absjorn Eide, eds., The World Military Order: The Impact of Military Technology in The Third World (New York: Praeger, 1979). pp. 2-3. 3. However, some critics are simply part of a continuing ideological campaign against the West. For one illustration see R. Faramazyan, Disarmament and the Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981). This book, which alleges “the consistent struggle of the USSR and other socialist countries, of all prograssive forces, for stopping the arms race and for disarmament,” does not even mention the amount of Soviet arms transfers to the developing world.

Pacific Focus, Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring 1987),135-164. 0 1987 by the Center for International Studies, lnha University

7 35

136 / Pacific Focus

money spent on arms i s a fundamental misallocation when “basic needs” frequently remain unmet in developing count r ie~ .~ These commentators feel that provision of arms by developed countries to the developing world, instead of allocating scarce resources to depleted development assistance programs, is simply further testimony to wildly misplaced priorities. The essence of this perspective is neatly captured in the relevant chapter title from the Brandt Report on North- South relations-”Disarmament and Development.” To attain their goal of a New International Economic Order, such critics typically conclude that global redistribution of assets can only be accomplished by using funds released through some type of global disarmament.

This two-pronged argument-”militarism in rampant” and “development through disarmament”- is both intuitively plausible and policy-relevant. It seems to conform to casual observation of the international system, it is constantly r e invigorated by the on-going debates in the United States concerning possible national choices between ”social” programs and enhanced defense capabilities, and it is highly suggestive of the action-oriented programs being sought to accelerate develop ment across the troubling economic landscape of much of the Third World.

However, this comprehensive explanation-cum-action program may be questioned on several counts. Some skeptics are likely to feel that it is inherently biased against the West and in favor of Soviet foreign policy goals. Others may well wonder if militarism is indeed rampant. As measured by coups detat, for example, the military seems increasingly reluctant to take on the demanding tasks of managing political and economic systems.’ Nor do discernable aggregate differences emerge between the

4. See for example, the Brandt Report, North-South: A Program for Survival (London: Pan, 1980). 5. Kenneth Fidel, ed., Militarism in Development Countries (Rutgers: Transaction Books, 1975). One observer recently pointed out the ambiguous nature of the decline in military coups-does this relative stability herald “political institu- tionalization” or more capable repression? See ”Decline in Coups Around The World is a Mixed Blessing,” Christian Science Monitor, January 10, 1985.

Security, Sovereignty and Economics / 137

economic accomplishments (or failures) of civilian and military regimes6 and disaggregating the data often reveals no significant increase in military expenditures by military go~ernments.~

These concerns indicate a deed to distinguish between “militarism” and ”militarization”. Militarism of interstate relations in the developing world may well be occuring and perhaps finds expression in the host of cross-border military conflicts in southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, East, Southeast and South Asia. Indeed, regional tensions, strategic concerns and rising national military expenditures are not strangers. What is problematic is whether these phenomena define Third World ”arms races.”

Similar concerns also exist with the “disarmament and development” thesis. It is not at all evident that every defense expenditure occurs at the expense of-or incurs an opportunity cost in-development projects. This posited zero-sum rationale makes the added heroic assumption that managers of development projects and programs are inherently more capable (and less ‘wasteful’) than managers of defense projects and programs. It i s in any event most unlikely that funds freed from “armaments” would be happily and willingly allocated to “development.” Nor is it apparent that such a shift would enhance Third world sovereignty given the prevailing preference among First World donors for “conditionality” or quid pro quos in the disbursement of both grants and loans in their foreign aid programs. Whether global disarmament i s even desirable is secondary to the palpable disinterest of both developed and developing countries in sacrificing national decision-making to some type of global arbitration board.

While military establishments in both groups of countries are tasked with addressing security issues, the nature of the issues confronting developing countries is of a fundamentally dif- ferent order. While decision-makers in developed countries seldom question the durability of the structural foundations of the state, military and political managers throughout the Third

7. See below, data and analysis in sections ”Trends in Asian Armaments,” and “The Economic Factor.”

138 I Pacific Focus

World can rarely make such an easy calculation. These decision- makers cannot assume the nation’s laws will be honored nor can they assume social conflict will be effectively contained within state institutions, nor can they confidently treat the prevailing distribution of privilege, power and wealth as enjoying sufficient support. The ”no military” option is unlikely to find much appeal among these national policy-makers. Instead, military- building is seen as part of nation-building: enhancing the capacity of civil and military institutions to be flexible, adaptive, innovative and most importantly, effective.

It is through broad-based capacity-enhancement that the military may acquire the requisite abilities to discharge the four vital tasks most often assigned to it in the pursuit of national security: being a symbol of national sovereignty; protecting the nation’s external security; contributing to internal security; engaging in “civic action’’ and developmental activities.’ Whether it is desirable that military establishments undertake all of these tasks is debatable; that they do undertake any of them means that national funds will be allocated to defense establishments.

This paper seeks to address popular conceptions about un- controlled militarization in Asia and alleged squandering of national resources on armaments rather than development p r e grams. Instead of finding a Hobbesian abyss, there i s a basis for optimism along with some distress. Empirical evidence indicates that most Asian countries are neither fighting with neighboring states, nor in an arms race; indeed, there emerges a pattern of military restraint, of moderate military enhancement. Serious conflict is obviously present in Asia. Over a score of independent and semi-independent developing states are not likely to co-exist without disputes, and this is jointly compounded by enduring antagonistic ideological cleavages and territorially- aggressive states. However, rapid growth in armaments and mili-

8. Stephanie Neuman and Robert Harkavy, eds., Defense Planning in Less Developed Countries (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1983); see also, Stephen L. Cohen, ”Toward a Great State in Asia?” in 0. Marwah and J. D. Pollack, eds., Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, lapan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).


tary establishments is confined to a few notable countries; for the rest, arms restraint is the watchword.

Trends in Asian Armaments

Since the major wave of decolonization Asian countries have of course expanded their armed forces from often quite small local security forces attached to colonial governments (or resist- ing colonial rule) into independent national security forces. Expanding armed forces perforce entail increasing armaments. Some of the misperceptions concerning the magnitude of Asian armaments may therefore arise from statistical data which do not distinguish between “start-up” and ongoing rates of change.

Of the several reliable sources on Asian armaments now a~ailable,~ one especially useful course is Sivards World Military and Social Expenditures, 7985.1° The data in this publication covers armaments activity since 1960, permitting analysis of trends for well over two decades.

Some caveats are necessary, however, when evaluating statistical data for this period. Tables 1 and 2, adapted from Sivard’s data, suggest a dramatic growth in the level of military activity among developing countries including those in Asia. While the gross national products (GNPs) of developing countries rose a very impressive 224 percent in constant (real) dollars from 1960 to 1983, military expenditures (ME) during the same period grew nearly 400 percent. By contrast, military expenditures in developed countries rose only 79 percent during the same period. This data might well support those who argue “militarism is rampant” in the developing world-just as it suggests marked military restraint among developed countries. Neverthe less, it must be recalled that many developing countries in Asia and Africa were achieving independence in the 1950s and early

9. See for example, the United Nations, Statistical Yearbook; the various publications of the International Institute for Strategic Studies: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; and, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 10. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1985 (Washing- ton, D.C.: World Priorities, 1985.)

Tabl

e 7.

Glo

bal S

ocio

-Eco

nom

ic T

rend

s, 7

960-

1983

Popu

latio

n G

NP

G

NP

/per

cap

ita

Fore

ign

Eco

nom

ic A

id

(mill

ions

) (c

onst

ant

$ bi

llion

s)

[con

stan

t $1

(c

onst

ant

$ b

illio

ns)

~ ~~

Perc

ent

Per

cent

P

erce

nt

Per

cent

19

60

1983

In

crea

se

1960

19

83

Incr

ease

19

60

1983

In

crea

se

1960

19

83

Incr

ease

Wor

ld

3,04

6 4,

667

53

5,30

8 13

,044

14

6 1,

743

2,79

5 60

5.2

361

594

Dev

elop

ed

Dev

elop

ing

Cou

ntrie

s 87

6 1,

078

23

4,40

5 10

,120

13

0 5,

030

9,38

5 87

5.

0 30

.4

508

Cou

ntrie

s 2,

170

3,58

9 65

90

3 2,

924

224

416

815

96

0.2

5 7

2,75

0

Not

e: A

ll do

llar

figur

es a

re in

U.S

. 198

2 co

nsta

nt d

olla

rs.

Sou

rce:

Ada

pted

from

dat

a in

Rut

h Le

ger

Siv

ard,

Wor

ld M

ilita

ry a

nd S

ocia

l Exp

endi

ture

s, 7

985

(Was

hing

ton,

D.C

.: W

orld

Prio

ritie

s, 1985),

p. 3

4.

~~

Tabl

e 2.

Glo

bal M

ikta

ry T

rend

s, 1960-1983

Mili

tary

Exp

endi

ture

s A

rmed

For

ces

Arm

s E

xpor

ts

Arm

s Im

port

s (c

onst

ant $

bill

ions

) (c

onst

ant 0

bill

ions

) (c

onst

ant

$ bi

llion

s)

(con

stan

t $ b

illio

ns)

Per

cent

19

60

1983

In

crea

se

1960

19

83

Incr

ease

19

60

1983

In

crea

se

1960

19

83

Incr

ease

P

erce

nt

Per

cent

P

erce

nt

Wor

ld

339

709

109

18,5

50

26,3

97

42

2.6

37.3

1,

325

3.8

36.6

86

3

Dev

elop

ed

Cou

ntrie

s 30

6 54

7 79

9,

851

10,1

02

2 2.

5 33

.5

1,24

0 1.

7 8.

4 39

4

Dev

elop

ing

Cou

ntrie

s 33

16

2 39

1 8,

699

16,2

95

87

0.1

3.8

3,70

0 2.

1 28

.2

1,24

3

Not

e: A

ll do

llar

figur

es a

re i

n U

S. 1

982

cons

tant

dol

lars

. So

urce

: A

dapt

ed f

rom

dat

a in

Rut

h Le

ger

Siva

rd, W

orld

Mili

tary

and

Soc

ial E

xpen

ditu

res,

798

5 (W

ashi

ngto

n, D

.C.:

Wor

ld P

rior

itks,

198

5),

p. 3

4.

Q 3 4

m

n

142 I Pacific Focus

1960s thus establishing national armed forces for the first time during this period. Starting from a low base at independence, even modest growth in military activity would therefore produce a sizeable percentage increase. On the other hand, for developed countries even large absolute increases in military expenditures appear relatively modest as a percentage increase given the substantially larger initial base. This type of distortion reflects the familiar problem comparing rates of change when major differences exist between the bases.

This problem can also be seen when examining arms sales. Most Asian countries (and other developing countries) do not possess major armaments industries and therefore rely on arms purchased from abroad. Prior to independence, arms acquisi- tions reflected internal transfers between the metropole and i t s overseas possession. Thus, purchases made after independence would register as a dramatic increase in arms imports: as Table 2 indicates, arms imports by developing countries apparently surged 1,243 percent between 1960 and 1985. The data also confirm an emerging. arms export industry in the developing world reflected in a 3,700 percent increase in arms exports. This is, however, from a negligible base in 1960.

Asian countries, in common with newly independent African countries and Latin American nations (Tables 2 and 3) increased the size of their armed forces at a rate substantially higher than population growth (87 percent vs. 65 percent). Yet once again, this is not especially surprising given the large number of newly independent developing countries creating armed forces for the first time. In contrast, the developed countries reduced the size of their armed forces relative to the population and registered a very small (2 percent) actual increase in their military forces. The data also reveal an impressive growth in the size of the GNPs among the developing countries although much of this gain in production was eroded by population growth (GNPs increased by 224 percent while GNP per capita grew at a much more modest 96 percent over the period covered).

As Table 3 indicates, constant dollar military expenditures have increased globally ranging from a relatively modest 28 percent in Europe through the period 1973-83 to a substantial 21 5 percent increase in OPEC. Although comparative military

Tabl

e 3.

Glo

bal a

nd R

egio

nal

Mili

tary

Exp

endi

ture

s [M

E): 1

983

Act

ual

Dat

a an

d Pe

rcen

tage

Cha

nge

1973

-198

3

ME

M El

A

rmed

C

onst

ant

Per

cent

P

erce

nt

Per

cent

C

apit

a P

erce

nt

Forc

es

Per

cent

R

egio

n 19

82 $

C

hang

e M

E/G

NP

C

hang

e M

E/C

GE

C

hang

e C

onst

ant

Cha

nge

per

lo00

C

hang

e B

illio

ns

1982

$

Peo

ple

1983

19

73-8

3 %

19

73-8

3 %

19

73-8

3 19

83

1973

-83

1983

19

73-8

3

Glo

bal

778.

9 38

6.

1 7

19.2

-2

0 16

6 15

6.

1 -6

Dev

elop

ing

Cou

ntrie

s 16

2.6

71

5.8

7 18

.5

-18

45

29

4.9

-6

Nor

th A

mer

ica

214.

5 36

6.

2 10

23

.8

-16

827

21

8.9

-10

Oce

ania

5.

0 39

2.

7 17

9.

0 -1

3 22

2 6

4.1

-16

Latin

Am

eric

a 10

.5

31

1.5

-6

4.9

-39

27

4 4.

5 13

M

iddl

e Ea

st

60.9

15

6 15

.7

11

26.9

-2

5 4-1

8 90

14

.5

22

OP

EC

57

.0

215

9.5

70

22.2

10

15

3 13

5 5.

1 -8

So

uth

Asi

a'

8.8

ao

3.7

16

18.4

-1

3 9

50

2.2

-27

East

Asi

a2

64.6

38

3.

5 -1

3 16

.2

-28

40

21

5.3

-9

Afr

ica

16.2

11

9 4.

5 67

14

.9

27

34

55

3.3

18

Dev

elop

ed C

ount

ries

616.

3 31

6.

2 7

19.4

-2

1 55

7 22

9.

8 -4

Euro

pe

398.

4 28

7.

2 4

19.0

-2

2 49

1 19

12

.3

-2

Not

e: 1

. "S

outh

Asi

a" i

nclu

des

Afg

hani

stan

, B

angl

ades

h, I

ndia

, N

epal

, P

akis

tan

and

Sri

Lank

a.

2. "

East

Asi

a" i

nclu

des

Ase

an (e

xcep

t Bru

nei),

Bur

ma,

Chi

na, J

apan

, Kam

puch

ea, L

aos,

Mon

golia

, Nor

th K

orea

, Sou

th K

orea

, Tai

wan

Sour

ce:

Ada

pted

fro

m U

.S. A

rms

Con

trol

and

Dis

arm

amen

t A

genc

y, W

orld

Mili

tary

Exp

endi

ture

s an

d A

rms

Tran

sfer

s, 1

985

(Was

hing

ton,

an

d V

ietn

am.

D.C

.: A

ugus

t 19

85).

pp. 4

7-51

.

rn 3

Q

m

n

0 3

0 2.

z

144 I Pacific Focus

expenditures (military expenditures as a proportion of GNP and military expenditure per capita) increased, both military expenditures as a proportion of central government expenditures (ME/ CCE) and comparative manpower levels (armed forces per thousand) have declined. The six percent increase in global military expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product is due partly to the sluggish constant dollar growth (29 percent) of global GNP from 1973 to 1983, which lagged the increase (38 percent) in global military expenditures. Indeed, in 1982 global GNP actually contracted in constant dollar terms- a contraction entirely accounted for by the recession in developed countries (developing countries’ CNP echoed this contraction one year later). Similarly, a growth in global population of 19 percent rather than a decline in military manpower levels accounts for the six percent decrease in global armed forces per lo00 persons. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that population growth of 19 percent in developing countries stands in striking contrast to the decline of six percent in armed forces per 1000 persons.

As Table 3 reveals, the sharpest increases in military spending have occurred in OPEC and Middle Eastern countries, followed by Africa and South Asia, then East Asia and Latin America. The East Asian and Pacific countries have virtually the lowest increase in absolute military expenditures while registering actual declines in several indicators of military growth (military expenditure/GNP fell 13 percent from 1973 to 1983 while military expenditures/central government expenditures declined 28 percent and armed forces per 1,OOO persons dropped 9 percent). Similarly, in South Asia actual military expenditures rose at a substantially lower rate than in OPEC, Middle Eastern or African countries while South Asia armed forces per lo00 declined more than four times the global average thereby distinguishing South Asia as having the steepest percentage decline of any region. Nevertheless, South Asian military expenditures did increase 80 percent, an amount certainly more than the 56 percent growth in constant dollar CNP. GNP also grew about 57 percent in East Asian countries, but this was much higher than the 38 percent increase in military expenditure resulting in the substantial decline of 13 percent in East Asian military expenditures as a proportion of CNP over the period 1973-83. This decline was


neither matched nor exceeded by any other region. The actual data indicate notable restraint in South Asia as well; South Asian countries s t i l l remain near the bottom in terms of military expenditures per capita and armed forces p’er lo00 persons. Similarly, average military expenditures for East Asian countries remain well below comparable averages for the developing world as a whole. Once again, percentage rates of change may well be misleading. One means of investigating trends is to break the Asian data down by country.

Table 4 provides comprehensive data on trends in militarization for twenty-two Asian countries through the period 1973-1983. The Table specifies five indicators of militarization: military expenditures (ME); military expenditures as a proportion of gross national product (ME/CNP); military expenditures as a proportion of central government expenditures (ME/CGE); military expenditures per capita (ME/Capita); and, armed forces p,er 1000 persons. The picture which emerges indicates that twenty- one of the twenty-two countries (95 percent) have experienced no growth or declines in one or more measures of militarization. Only the Philippines did not experience a decline in at least one indicator of militarization. Simultaneously deleting four communist countries for which data is not adequate (Kampuchea, Lacs, Mongolia and Vietnam) and increasing the threshold to declines in at least two indicators of militarization, leaves eleven Asian countries out of a total of eighteen (over 60 percent) whose military systems in 1983 remained approximately at or below levels of a decade earlier: Burma, China,. India, Indone- sia, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, South Korea, Srin Lanka and Taiwan. Of interest, for six of these countries, representing onethird of the total (Burma, Indonesia, Paki,stan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and Taiwan) three or more indicators of militarization show a drop from a decade earlier.

The seven countries which have increased their military systems in terms of at least three of the dimensions compared here reflect the external invasions, internal conflicts, civil and border wars which have occurred in Asia during the past decade. Signi- ficantly however, only three of these seven countries (Malaysia, North Korea and Singapore) maintain military forces exceeding the global average. Indeed, specifically examining the relative

Tabl

e 4.

A

sian

Mili

tary

Exp

endi

ture

s [M

E):

1983

and

Per

cent

age

Cha

nge

1973

-198

3

ME

ME/

Arm

ed

Mill

ions

Pe

rcen

t Pe

rcen

t P

erce

nt

Cap

ita

Per

cent

Fo

rces

P

erce

nt

Cou

ntry

C

onst

ant

Cha

nge

ME

/CN

P

Cha

nge

ME

/CG

E

Cha

nge

Con

stan

t C

hang

e pe

r lo

00

Cha

nge

1982

$

1982

$

Peo

ple

1983

19

73-8

3 %

19

73-8

3 %

19

73-8

3 19

83

1973

-83

1983

19

73-8

3

Afg

hani

stan

B

angl

ades

h B

urm

a C

hina

In

dia

Indo

nesi

a Ja

pan

Kam

puch

ea

Laos

M

alay

sia

Mon

golia

N

epal

N

orth

Kor

ea

Paki

stan

Pa

pua

New

G

uine

a2

190

278

200

33,0

99

6,28

0 2,

542

11,0

34

-

1,37

3 26

3,45

3 1,

903 29

273

5.0

163

35.7

80

13

22

5 5.

3 0.

8 85

9 2.

3 47

5 12

.9

345

2 -1

0 3.

3 -4

8 19

.5

-37

5 - 28

5.

9 16

8.

6 -3

5 30

.8

-27

32

3 4.

0 82

3.

5 21

17

.6

-13

8 60

1.

6l

66

2.8

-10

13.7

-2

1 15

36

1.

7 74

1 .o

25

5.

5 -1

4 92

59

2.

0

-

-

152

100 63

45

-9

-

-

-

-

5.2

30

11.8

1 .I

57

5.5

16.7

-1

1 29

.7l

5.4

-18

27.9

1.

2 -2

0 3.

0

-

-

-

-

- 27

- 20

16

l -1

6 - 35

-

-

91 1

179 20 9 -

-

3.3

12.8

98

7.

0 21

.I

0 1.

5 28

40

.8

11

6.2

-18

0.9

-

-

-

- 25

-

27

-13 11

-4

11

- 29

-5

- 86

- 42

19

-

24

-40 31

-5

-1

03

F

2, n

Tabl

e 4.

[co

nt'd

) Asi

an M

ilita

ry E

xpen

ditu

res

[ME

): 7

983

and

Perc

enta

ge C

hang

e 79

73-7

983

ME

M El

A

rmed

M

illio

ns

Perc

ent

Perc

ent

Perc

ent

Cap

ita

Perc

ent

Forc

es

Perc

ent

Cou

ntry

C

onst

ant

Cha

nge

ME

/GN

P

Cha

nge

ME

/CG

E

Cha

nge

Con

stan

t C

hang

e pe

r lo

00

Cha

nge

1982

B 19

82 $

P

eopl

e 19

83

1973

-83

%

1973

-83

%

1973

-83

1983

19

73-8

3 19

83

1973

-83

(1 1

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(1 0)

Ph

ilipp

ines

74

0 80

1.

9 12

15

.1

29

13

30

2.9

93

Sing

apor

e 91

6 14

2 5.

8 14

17

.1

-23

366

113

24.0

12

0 So

uth

Kor

ea

4,52

5 21

2 5.

8 53

27

.9

-1

1 09

16

6 14

.5

-20

Sri L

anka

73

55

1.

5 -6

3.

9 -3

6 4

33

1.2

-14

Taiw

an

3,76

5 87

7.

5 -7

40

.2

-8

200

54

24.1

-2

6 Th

aila

nd

1,47

6 15

8 3.

9 39

19

.9

12

29

107

4.9

-6

-

-

-

-

20.8

-2

3 V

ietn

am

-

-

-

-

Ave

rage

s $

East

Asi

a4

64.6

38

3.

5 -1

3 16

.2

-27

40

21

5.3

-9

? 9. 9

Ase

an6

1.4

105

3.9

3 15

.5

-9

103

104

8.1

53

Y

Dev

elop

ing

162.

6 71

5.

8 7

18.5

-1

8 45

29

4.

9 -6

nl

Cou

ntrie

s 9

m

Glo

bal

778.

7 38

6.

1 7

19.2

-2

0 16

6 15

6.

1 -6

n

0 0" 3 3. 7

Sout

h A

sia5

8.

8 80

3.

7 16

18

.4

-13

9 50

2.

2 -2

7 .-+ 3

Not

es:

1.

Ref

ers

to 1

982

2. D

ata

cove

rs 1

976-

1983

3.

D

ata

cove

rs 1

977-

1983

4.

"E

ast

Asi

a"

incl

udes

Ase

an (

exce

pt B

rune

i), B

urm

a, C

hina

, Ja

pan,

Kam

puch

ea,

Laos

, M

ongo

lia,

Nor

th K

orea

, S

outh

Kor

ea,

5. "

Sou

th A

sia"

inc

lude

s A

fgha

nist

an,

Ban

glad

esh,

Indi

a, N

epal

, Pak

ista

n, a

nd S

ri La

nka.

6.

Doe

s no

t inc

lude

Bru

nei.

--.

4

Taiw

an a

nd V

ietn

am.

Lata

is in

com

plet

e fo

r K

ampu

chea

, La

os, M

ongo

lia,

and

Vie

tnam

. A

Y

Sou

rce:

Ada

pted

fro

m US.

Arm

s C

ontr

ol a

nd D

isar

mam

ent A

genc

y, W

orld

Mili

tary

€xp

endi

ture

s an

d A

rms

Tran

sier

s, 7985

(Was

hing

ton,

D

.C.:

1985

). pp

. 47-

88.

148 / Pacific Focus

size of the armed forces (Table 4, ninth column) only nine of the twenty-two countries (Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam) exceed the global average of 6.1 soldiers per 1000 population. Interest- ingly, these countries are the front-line states defining the ideological divide of Asia. In terms of other indicators of militarization, the data on ME/GNP (fourth column) indicate that all but three Asian countries (India, North Korea and Taiwan) are either at or below the global average (6.1 percent) and developing country average (5.8 percent). in terms of ME/Capita (eighth column), only three Asian countries (North Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) exceed the global average of $166 per capita while only two Asian developing countries (Malaysia and South Korea) exceed the developing country average of $45 per capita.”

Other useful indicators of militarization include the growth and size of manpower in the armed forces. The Asian data reveal that in terms of raw military power as measured by manpower and equipment, only four countries have accomplished significant (that is, over 50 percent) growth in the size of their forces during the decade of 1973-1983: North Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam.12 Putting these increases into perspective, North Korea and Vietnam have repsectively-at a mini- mum-ten times the armed forces of Singapore and the Philip- pines.”

Indeed as Table 5 indicates, North Korea and Vietnam are among the very few Asian states which have armed forces which would be considered large by international standards. Only five Asian countries- North Korea, South Korea, China, India and Vietnam - have military establishments numbering in excess of 500,000 with China, India and Vietnam having over one million in their armed forces. In terms of per capita military strength, however, only Vietnam of the top three stands out with i t s 20.8

11. japan is excluded in this comparison given its advanced industrial economy. 12. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 7985-7986 (London: 1985), 111-137. 13. US. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 7985 (Washington, D.C.: 19851, 52-88.


Table 5. Size of Asian Armed Forces

Under 50,000

Afghanistan Brunei Kampuchea Mongolia Nepal Papua New

Cuinea Sri Lanka

5 0 , W 100,OOO- 250,000 500,000 Over 100,000 250,000 500,000 1 Million 1 Million

Bangladesh Burma Indonesia North Korea China Laos I a w n Pakistan South Korea India Singapore Malaysia Taiwan Vietnam

Philippines Thailand

Note: This date refers to regular armed forces. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1985-86

(London: 19851, pp. 113-115, 118-137.

soldiers per thousand people. China and India, by contrast, are well below the average for developing countries (Table 4). Of the other Asian countries, seven have fewer than 50,000 in their armed forces with three other Asian states having between 50,000-100,000 in their military. These smaller military establishments are unlikely to possess the capability to move into neighboring countries to conduct longer term military operations with a requisite logistical support system.

Through their relatively large size (in terms of population, military and economic power) the top five major military powers (North Korea, South Korea, China, India and Vietnam) distort the Asian indicators of militarization. For example, China, North Korea and South Korea are well above the Asian average for ME/CNP. (Available data do not permit ranking of Vietnam although informed observers feel Vietnam devotes a substantial proportion of i t s CNP to i t s armed forces). Indeed, North Korea and China exceed the Asian, developing country and global averages for ME/CNP. Similarly, North Korea and South Korea exceed the average Asian and developing country MEKapita with North Korea even topping the global ME/Capita. Three of these five countries, North Korea, South Korea and Vietnam also easily surpass the Asian, developing country and global averages for armed forces per thousand population. Putting it

150 / Pacific Focus

another way, for three of the top four more heavily armed Asian countries (again, Vietnam must be excluded for lack of comparable data), both the rate of increase in military expenditures as a percentage of GNP and the rate of increase of military expenditures per capita have been among the fastest in Asia, substantially exceeding the Asian, developing country and global averages (see Table 4).

It is these same countries which are the primary importers of armaments into Asia (Tables 6 and 7). Vietnam alone imported onefifth of the $27,580 million in arms transferred to Asia in the period 1979-1983. A total of seven countries (Afghanistan, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam) imported $20,750 mill ion in armaments; 1979-1983, representing 75

Table 6. Arms Transfers to Asia 1979-1983

Under $250 $25@500 $500 Million- $1 Billion- Over $2 Million Million $1 Billion $2 Billion Billion

Bangladesh Philippines China Afghanistan India Burma Singapore Malaysia Indonesia Japan Kampuchea Laos Nepal

Mongolia Pakistan South Korea North Korea Thailand Taiwan

Vietnam Sri Lanka

Arms Suppliers

Developing Asia All Asia (Asia Excluding Japan)

~

Soviet Union United States United Kingdom France China West Germany Italy Romania/Czechoslovakia Others

42.7% 30.9%

5.1 % 4.0% 2.6% 1.9% 1.5% 1.3%

10.1 %

47.0% 24.0%

5.5%

2.9% 2.0% 1.7% 1.4%

11.1%

.4.4%

Total Arms Transfers, Cumulative 19791983 in Current Dollars= $27,580 million

Source. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: 1985).


Table 7. Value of Total Arms Transfers and Percentage Distribution by Superpower Source, Cumulative 1979-1 983

Total Arms Received from Received from Transfer USSR USA

Millions Current $ Percent Percent

Afghanistan Bangladesh Burma China India Indonesia Japan Kampuchea Laos Malaysia Mongolia Nepal Pakistan North Korea Philippines Singapore South Korea Sri Lanka Taiwan Thailand Vietnam

1,830 165 135 520

4,695 1,360 2,560

190 190 750 625 10

1,830 840 270 445

2,010 10

2,525 1,320 5,300

98 18

25 72

-

-

89 95

100

1 25

-

-

-

- 3 7 1 1

20 98

74 67 95

67 64

-

Source: US. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 7985 (Washington, D.C.: August 1985), pp. 132-134.

percent of the total. Four other states imported nearly two-thirds of the balance. Thus only about onehalf of all Asian countries imported over 90 percent of all armaments, 1979-1983. The Soviet Union remains the number one supplier of arms to Asia, and with i ts Warsaw Pact allies, accounts for one-half of all arms transferred to the developing Asian countries.

It is noteworthy that Asian nations imported only 14 percent of the global arms trade in 1983, down substantially from 35 percent of the total in 1973. In that earlier year South Vietnam alone accounted for over 50 percent of Asia’s arms imports. The cessation of US. involvement with Vietnam thus eliminated one major source of arms transfers to Southeast Asia thereby contri-

152 I Pacific Focus

buting in part to Asia’s lower import profile. It might also be argued that over the last decade Asian countries have acquired substantial armaments industries of their own permitting not only displacement of some imported weapons but also equip ping Asia to export arms. Asian arms exports have indeed risen substantially from 8490 million in 1973 (two percent of the global total) to $2,604 million (nine percent of global arms exports) in 1983. However this factor is not as important as it might seem. First, most Asian countries st i l l possess no significant armaments industry capable of supplying domestic or export requirements. Second, although aggregate Asian arms exports have increased in constant dollar terms since 1973, only three countries (China, North Korea and South Korea) have significant arms export capacity, and these three account for 80 percent of Asian arms exports. Indeed, in 1983 China alone provided well over one-half of Asia’s arms ex~or ts : ’~

Excluding China and Japan, productive capacity of Asian defense industries remains fairly limited. Thus arms imports can be used as a proxy measure of capital investments in national military establishment^.'^ The data in Table 8 suggest that routine expenditures [rather than weapons acquisition) absorb most of the national defense budgets. Deleting the aberrant case of Afghanistan, on average arms imports account for only about 12 percent of military expenditures. The data do reveal substantial variation in capital intensity among Asian countries and within notable regional organizations such as ASEAN. For example, Malaysia and Singapore exceed the ASEAN average of $9600 by 36 percent and 59 percent respectively while the Philippines is 51 percent below the ASEAN average. The extent to which this variation in the data partly reflects national differences is pay and maintenance rather than force structures cannot be determined using these sources.

14. U.S. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 7985. 15. This is suggested by Guy T. Pauker, “Security and Economics: The Military Expenditures of the ASEAN States.” [Santa Monica: Rand, May 1983).


Table 8. Capital Intensity and Capital Investments in Asian Military Forces, 1973-1983 Cumulative and 1983

Total Imports Defense Total (Cumulati\;e) as % Expenditures

(Cumulative) Arms Imports of per Armed ME (Million (Million Military Forces

Constant Constant Expenditure (Constant 1982 $) 1982 $) 1982 9)

Countrv 1973-83 1973-83 1973-83 1983

Afghanistan Bangladesh Burma China India Indonesia japan Kam puchea Laos Malaysia Mongolia Nepal North. Korea Pakistan Papua New

Guinea2 Philippines Singapore South Korea Sri Lanka Taiwan Thailand Vietnam

1 ,I 87 1,752 1,909

355,049 51.21 4 25,658 92,613 - -

10,394

201 27,645 15,851

263 8,160 6,520

35,179 598

28,631 11,364

-

-

2,679 358 186

1,598 8,188 2,012 3,775 1,668

91 0 1,331

843 35

2,179 3,462

181 71 8 873

4,947 51

4,338 2,336 7,186

225.7 20.4 9.7 0.5

15.9 7.8 4.1 - -

12.8

17.4 7.9

21.8

68.8 8.8

13.4 14.1

15.2 20.6

-

8.5

-

2,533 3,432

952 8,073 5,053’ 9,079

45,784 - -

13,076

1,040 4,404 3,257

9,667 4,713

15,267 7,517 3,842 8,293 5,904

-

-

Asia Average - - 12.4 - ASEAN Average - - 12.6 -

Notes: 1. Refers to 1982;

Source: US. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and 2. Covers period 1976 to 1983.

Arms Transfers, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: August 1985).

754 [Pacif ic focus

The Economic Factor

Economic factors resist the development of armaments, including the prodigious costs of manpower and equipment. For many Asian nations economic progress is seen as the key component of national security and the best guarantor of sovereignty rather than relying on excessive and often idle military establishments. This perspective has not, however, found expression in a “no defense” option.

Unable to treat sovereignty cavalierly yet pressed to accele rate economic change, the policy-result is most often reflected in restrained military enhancement. In this view, national security includes two elements: first, protecting the territory and i ts population; and second, recognizing the importance of the economic base which underlies the nation, thus making that defense possible and worthy. Many Asian governments thus appear to agree with Adam Smith that “defense.. . is of much more importance than opulence.. .”16 interpreting this dictum as mandating “security-for-economic development.”

The effects of military spending on economic performance- in particular, whether increased military spending in the 1970s and early 1980s has contributed to the economic slowdown affecting much of the region in the past few years- is extremely diff icult to determine.” Cursory reading of the evidence presented in Table 9, covering sixteen Asian countries for which comparable data exists on trends in per capita income, gross domestic product and military expenditures, suggests that military expenditures have, if anything, risen faster in upper middle income and high growth countries and that they have risen more slowly or actually declined in poorer, lower growth economies. Particularly striking is the rapid increase in military expenditures in the freer market export-oriented economies of southeast and

16. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Vol. 2, 429. 17. For conflicting views on the “costs” of defense expenditures for economic development see, for example, Emile Benoit, Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1973). and Nicole Ball, ”Defense and Development,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 31, No. 3 (April 1983), 507-524.


east Asia, countries considered front-line states in communist/ non-communist Asia. Since these economies are also the wealthiest, the heavier burden of a more rapid military enhancement program (ME more than 5 percent of GNP) is presumably much easier to bear. Similarly, high growth in low-income China coupled with only moderate increases in military expenditures mitigates the heavy military burden on China’s economy. Pakistan is somewhat more worrisome given i t s medium growth rate and heavy military burden. These concerns are vividly underlined in Afghanistan with i t s unique constellation of low income, low growth, rapid increase in military expenditures and heavy military burden. Even massive Soviet arms transfers and troop deployments (see Table 7) cannot mask the seriously eroding Afghan economy and i t s deteriorating ability to make even a minimal contribution to the costs of permanent conflict. On the other hand, Papua New Guinea, also a low-income, low- growth country, is unique with i t s declining trend is military expenditures.

No obvious correlations emerge in the data presented in Table 9 between growth rates, defense expenditures and the role of the military in government. For example, Malaysia, Singa- pore, South Korea and Taiwan are all characterized by high economic growth, rapid increases in military expenditures and heavy defense burdens. Yet Malaysia and Singapore are firmly ruled by civilian politicians while in South Korea the military has a dominant role in government and in Taiwan authoritarian leaders have governed with the help of a powerful military establishment. It can also be argued that military managers are quite capable of restraint in military expenditures. For example, the data in Table 9 reveal that Indonesia’s military decision- makers have refrained from allocating OPEC windfall revenues to excessive acquisition of major weapons systems.

Indeed looking at ASEAN for example, those countries continue to show restraint in terms of the proportion of the GNP allocated to the military. The ASEAN average of 3.9 percent ME/CNP is neither excessively high nor low: of the 121 countries for which the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has provided comparable data, seventy-five countries spent less than 3.9 percent of GNP on the military and forty-six countries allo-

Tabl

e 9.

Tre

nds

in M

ilit

ary

Exp

endi

ture

an

d E

cono

mic

Gro

wth

of

Asi

an C

ount

ries,

79

73-1

983

Inco

me

per

capi

ta'

and

GD

P tr

end3

Upp

er

Mid

dle

Mid

dle

Inco

me

Cou

ntrie

s In

com

e Lo

w I

ncom

e C

ount

ries

Mili

tary

Tren

d'

Gro

wth

G

row

th

Gro

wth

G

row

th

Gro

wth

G

row

th

Gro

wth

E

xpen

ditu

res

Hig

h H

igh

Med

ium

Lo

w

Hig

h M

ediu

m

Low

Rap

id

Ma l

a ysi

a Th

aila

nd

Incr

ease

S

inga

pore

S

outh

Kor

ea

Taiw

an

Ban

glad

esh

Afg

hani

stan

N

epal

Incr

ease

In

done

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Chi

na

Indi

a P

akis

tan

Sri

Lank

a

Dec

line

Bur

ma

Pap

ua

New

G

uine

a

Not

es:

1. M

ilita

ry e

xpen

ditu

re t

rend

cov

ers

the

perio

d 19

73-1

983.

"Rap

id"

incr

ease

s ar

e re

cord

ed fo

r th

ose

coun

trie

s in

whi

ch e

xpen

ditu

ces

mor

e th

an d

oubl

ed in

real

term

s C

ount

ries

with

"he

avy"

m

ilita

ry b

urde

ns in

198

3 (m

ilita

ry e

xpen

ditu

res

mor

e th

an 5

% o

f C

NP

) ar

e ita

licis

ed.

2. U

pper

-mid

dlei

ncom

e, m

iddl

einc

ome

and

low

-inco

me

coun

trie

s as

def

ined

by

the

Wor

ld B

ank,

in

Wor

ld D

evei

opm

ent

Rep

ort

1985

(New

Yor

k: O

xfor

d U

nive

rsity

Pre

ss 1

985)

. All

uppe

r m

iddl

e in

com

e co

untr

ies

are

also

"hi

gh g

row

th."

3.

GD

P tr

end

cove

rs th

e pe

riod

1973

-198

3. A

nnua

l rea

l gro

wth

rate

s of

6 p

erce

nt a

re c

lass

ified

as

high

; 30

5.9

as

med

ium

; and

132

.9

perc

ent

as l

ow.

Sou

rces

: W

orld

Ban

k, W

orld

Dev

elop

men

t R

epor

t (N

ewY

ork:

Oxf

ord

Uni

vers

ity P

ress

, 198

5); U

.S. A

rms

Con

trol

and

Dis

arm

amen

t Age

ncy,

W

orld

Mili

tary

Exp

endi

ture

s an

d A

rms

Tran

sfer

s 1985 (W

ashi

ngto

n, D

.C.:

Aug

ust

1985

).

4

crr

m \


cated more than 3.9 percent. The two extreme values were 47.2 percent for Iraq and 0.7 percent shared jointly by Brazil and Costa Rica. As Pauker has stated, the share of GNP devoted to military expenditures varies considerably within ASEAN, sug- gesting the lack of coordinated defense policies.’” Malaysia and Singapore, where the military has a very small role in politics, allocated considerably more to the military than the ASEAN average while Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, despite politically influential military establishments, allocated less than the ASEAN average (see Table 4).

Between 1982 and 1983 overall military expenditures declined in ASEAN, however, this aggregate decline reflected substantial drops in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The economic downturn and deflation in primary product and energy prices seems to have curtailed defense spending in these countries. Singapore and Thailand, in contrast, each increased their de fense expenditures in 1983 and 1984. As lower growth (indeed negative growth in Singapore) has now spread throughout ASEAN, it is expected that all five original members will further curtail defense spending in the 1985-1987 period (excluding the purchase of F16A aircraft by Thailand).

Two events over the last decade indicate the nature of the threat to an economically-imposed restraint on military enhancement: the willingness of the Soviet Union to use its vast military capability in aggressive pursuit of foreign policy goals in the region, as in the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; and, Soviet willingness to provide sophisticated armaments to client states and potential surrogates such as VietnamTq (see Table 7). Most of the largest armies listed in Table 5 received the preponderance of their heavy military equipment from the Soviet Union and i t s Warsaw Pact allies.20 When one nation is equipped with large amounts of armaments it does of course provide a powerful incentive for neighboring states to acquire a similar capability, thus igniting a arms race. Indeed the Asian

18. Pauker, ”Security and Economics,” 8-9. 19. Rose E.Gottemoeller, “Transforming Clients into Surrogates: The Soviet Experience” (Santa Monica: Rand, July 1985). 20. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 7985-7986 (London: 1985), 111-137.

158 / Pacific Focus

states which have engaged in arms escalation in recent years are primarily on the Korean peninsula, Indo-Pakistan region and Soviet-sponsored governments and client states.

Overall, for most Asian governments the evidence in Tables 5 and 9 reveal notable restraint and an unwillingness to allocate limited national resources to excessive military enhancement in view of strong preferences for economic development. This moderation often evaporates, however, following sustained transborder aggression.

U.S. Security Assistance

Part of the economic cost of military expenditures may be transferred to foreign suppliers, especially if armaments are acquired on a grant basis or with concessionary financing. Although calculating trade-offs between economic benefits and political costs (costs which may exist for both suppliers and recipients) lies beyond the scope of this paper, suppliers and recipients often feel enhanced political influence is, or ought to be, concommitant with military assistance programs.

Concerning the United States, American security assistance programs have four components: Foreign Military Sales (FMS); Economic Support Fund (ESF); Military Assistance Program (MAP); and, International Military Education and Training (IMET). Table 10, detailing the Reagan Administration’s Con- gressional Presentation for Fiscal Year 1986, provides a comprehensive overview of what was proposed as total U.S. security assistance for Asia. This security assistance data is broken down by program component. As indicated, the Administration proposed some type of security assistance program between the United States and thirteen Asian countries. The data reveal, however, the very modest and concentrated nature of most of these programs. Of the proposed $1.2 billion in security assistance, over 70 percent is devoted to just two countries, Pakistan and South Korea. Six of the thirteen Asian countries have nothing other then moderate education and training defining their “security assistance program” with the United States.

American assistance for military procurements is provided


Table 10. FY 86 US. Security Assistance Programs in Asia (Thousands 8 )

International Foreign Military Military Economic Military Education

Sales Support Assistance and Training Country (FMS) Fund (ESF) Program (MAP) (IMET)

Bangladesh Burma India Indonesia Malaysia Nepal Pakistan Papua New

Guinea Philippines Singapore South Korea Sri Lanka Thailand

0 0 0

34,700 5,000

0 325.000

0 50,000

0 228,000

0 97,000

0 1,000

0 0 0 0

294.000

0 95,000

0 0 0

5,000

0 1 .ooo

0 0 0 0 0

0 50,000

0 0 0

5,000

300 300 350

2,800 1 ,I 50

110 1,200

75 2,250

75 2,200

1 60 2,500

Source: U S . Defense Security Assistance Agency. Congressional Presentation. Security Assistance Programs FY 1986 (Washington, D.C.: mimeo).

through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing program. This program is not [conceptually] grant-based but rather provides credits at both Treasury and concessionary interest rates. The total proposed by the Reagan Administration for Asia in FY86 is $740 million, an amount which is less than four percent of the total defense expenditures of $20 billion for the countries listed in the Table. Alternately, FMS sales amount to no more than six percent of the $7.7 billion in defense outlays of the countries involved in the program. It is difficult to argue that the military enhancement which is taking place in Asia is fueled by U.S.- government-to-Asian-government incentive financing.

Most of the FMS program is focussed on South Korea and Pakistan. Thus Korea is expected to purchase several major weapons systems with FMS financing including the Stinger air defense missile system, combat engineer vehicles and armored vehicle launched bridges. It i s also expected that South Korea will make FMS cash and commercial purchases such as 500MD

160 I Pacific Focus

Scout helicopters (co-production), the XK-1 tank (licensed production), C-12 aircraft and electronic equipment to supplement that obtained through FMS financing. These purchases reflect the continuing effort to modernize and upgrade South Korean defense forces in light of North Korea’s aggressive defense buildup. Concerning Pakistan, i t s need to provide a credible deterrent against assaults from communist forces in Afghanistan require creating a mobile well-coordinated force. Consequently, Pakistan will likely use FMS financing to acquire aircraft, light helicopters and armored vehicles.

For FY 1986 only Burma, Philippines and Thailand were prc- posed recipients of Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds, amounting to $56 million. The MAP provides U.S. grants for military purchases. For Burma, the principal U.S. objective remains suppressing narcotics production and trafficking there fore MAP grants are likely to be used to acquire light arms and equipment that would enhance the mobility of the armed forces. MAP assistance to the Philippines is particularly notable as that country confronts the fiscal dilemma posed by continuing internal insurgencies during a period of severe budgetary constraints. Enhancing force mobility is again the likely objective of MAP-acquired equipment. For Thailand, the provision of MAP grants is directly related to that country’s continued exposure to Vietnamese violations of Thai territory along the Kampuchean border.

Although Economic Support Funds (ESF) are included in U.S. security assistance programs, they are not allocated for military expenditures. Rather, these are resources available for civilian development projects proposed by the military and typically the funds are administered by the civilian U.S. AID in-country director. ESF provides economic assistance on a grant or loan basis to countries selected for their specific political and security interest to the United States. The Administration proposed ESF assistance for four countries: Burma, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. The bulk of ESF assistance for Asia would go to Pakistan for providing that country with assistance in narcotics suppression efforts (especially in the cri- tical Northwest Frontier province), rural development and direct balance of payments support. The requested $95 million for the


Philippines (subsequently increased after the Marcos departure) would be used to fund various development projects while the $5 million requested for Thailand would be used primarily to fund programs assisting Thai citizens advedely affected by hostilities and refugee flows along Thai borders with Kampuchea and Laos.

Each of the thirteen Asian countries in Table 10 has an Inter- national Military Education and Training Program (IMET) with the United States. The Administration proposed that in FY 86 over $13 million be allocated for IMET grants. These funds help bring Asian military personnel to the United States for various types of professional training.

Despite recent media attention given to China-United States military cooperation, China is not included among these countries for i t s security assistance program during FY 86 includes only government-tc-government cash sales. The overwhelming amount of China’s military pruchases from the United States have been through commercial channels with, until this year, only one major purchase being in 1984 when China bought twenty-four high-altitude Sikorsky helicopters. In 1985, under the first government military sales agreement between the two countries, China purchased U.S. technology worth $98 million for manufacturing high-explosive artillery shells. In April 1986 the Administration notified Congress of i t s intent to sell a much more substantial $550 million of advanced avionics, including radar, navigation and computer equipment, to upgrade fifty Chinesebuilt F-8 interceptor aircraft. Although this large sale has met with some domestic and foreign opposition, it is viewed as part of a broad U.S. perspective seeing China as a potential military counterweight to Soviet expansion in Asia. In this instance, China reportedly deploys i t s F-8 fighters against Soviet forces along the northern border. This sale is also a likely prech- sor of other sales with negotiations in progress on the sale of the LM-2500 turbine engine to power Chinese Navy destroyers as well as sales of torpedoes and sonar equipment.**

Military sales to China are constrained in part by China’s deci-

21. Wall Street lournal, May 5 , 1986. 22. Christian Science Monitor, April 25, 1986.

162 f Pacific FOCUS

sion to conserve increasingly scarce foreign exchange for other imports. While FMS financing might help to resolve this problem, it is felt China would make use of this option only sparingly, if at all. Nevertheless, a close U.S.-China military relationship, to include enhancing China’s military capability and more numerous coordinated U.S.-China naval maneuvers similar to those which occurred in 1986, must be expected if China is to become a military counterweight to the Soviet Union. China already possesses some weapons associated with great power status, for example, three nuclear-powered, missilefiring submarines and over one hundred land-based missiles of medium and intermediate range with one-half dozen more capable of hitting targets 5,000 to 8,000 miles away. How- ever, China’s armed forces are largely equipped with aging weapons copied from Soviet arms supplied in the1950s. Notable gaps include ground forces short of tanks and anti-tank weapons; the Navy lagging in torpedo technology, radar for fire control and navigation, sonar and minesweepers; and the air- force’s shortfall on bombers let alone the lack of modern avionics for i t s fighter-interceptors. Against this capability, the Soviet Union has deployed some fifty divisions along the Chinese border, heavily backed by missiles and fighter and bomber squadrons. As is well-known, the Soviet Navy has expanded over the last two decades from a coastal defense force into a massive bluewater Pacific fleet. With Soviet bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam, the Soviet fleet has in effect became an imposing force with Soviet power projection capability along the entire arc of Asia from the Sea of japan to India.

Overall, the U.S. Security Assistance Programs to Asia confirm that American policy remains informed by a concern, first, for those countries on or near borders of threatening Soviet allies and proxies (for example, Pakistan, Thailand, South Korea); second, for countries providing major U.S. military basing facilities (Philippines, South Korea); third, for Southeast Asian .countries located astride strategically vital sea lanes of communication (for example, Indonesia, Malaysia); fourth, for countries which provide essential raw material or energy sup pliers (for example, Indonesia) and, fifth, for countries which


might share the U.S. concern with controlling narcotics trafficking (for example, Burma, Pakistan). The data also confirms that for East and Southeast Asia, an important U.S. strategic objective is deterring major Soviet entry into the Soclth Pacific. Con- sequently, approximately 92 percent of FY 86 East Asian regional security assistance funds will be provided to three countries- South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.

The data also reveal the determination of many Asian countries to prevent their sovereignty in domestic and foreign affairs from being unduly compromised by superpower military assist- a n ~ e . ~ ~ First, of the countries listed in Table 10 with which the US. has a security assistance program, only India receives sizeable military assistance from the Soviet Union. Eleven of these thirteen countries receive no armaments from the Soviet Union (Table 7). Second, although they may not receive armaments from the Soviet Union, most of the countries are also restrained and circumspect in terms of U.S. security assistance. Total U.S. MAP grants amount to only $56 million, of which $50 million was proposed for the Philippines as an expression of U.S. concern over that country’s internal security and economic conditions. Foreign military sales credits-which typically, at best, provide concessionary. interest rates- are a minor component of Asian military and security expenditures. Instead for most of the countries for which data has been provided here (this includes virtually all of non-communist Asia), the costs of military and security forces are met primarily through local resources. The apparent preference for national funding of the military helps, first, to ensure sovereign control of defense forces by drastically curtailing foreign leverage; and, second, to restrain military enhancement programs to the nation’s ability to

Pay.

Conclusion

The evidence presented here suggests that the perception of Asian countries fiercely engaged in an arms race, or of Asia

23. Again, Afghanistan, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam are excluded from these remarks.

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seeking to develop through militarizing the economy, are essen- tially myths, although activities in several countries are worrisome. While Asian countries are developing, enhancing and titilizing military power, the data indicate that very few Asian states have engaged in significant arms escalation. Indeed nearly two-thirds of Asian countries are content with the military status quo, a status quo which frequently involves a very modest military establishment. In general, much of Asia is in reality among the more lightly armed regions of the world. Rather than enhancing force projection capability, national decision-makers most often pragmatically strive to provide the security-shield requisite for economic development. The policy dictum frequently seems to be ”security-for-development-to enhance- national sovereignty.”

Restraint in military enhancement in Asia cannot continue without the cooperation of the major powers. Territorial invasions by great powers and attempted transformation of aggressive clients into surrogates will surely result in escalating Asian armaments. Similarly, unrestricted arms transfers will power an arms race. However, to call for “no arms transfers to Asia”-when militarism is not in fact generally rampant-or “no Asian military’’-when it is not in fact a choice between disarmament and development- is unrealistic. Provocative arms transfers will, however, drive out prudent military enhancement.

Documents

Security, Sovereignty and Economics: Armaments Limitation in Asia