Seeing Patterns and Learning to Do Things and what that has to
do with language David Tuggy SIL-Mexico Slide 2 Is the language
faculty a black box? Is language something totally different from
the rest of what we do in our minds? Is language something totally
different from the rest of what we do in our minds? If not, how are
they connected? What does what we do mentally in general tell us
about language? If not, how are they connected? What does what we
do mentally in general tell us about language? (And what does
language tell us about our mental capacities and activities
generally?) (And what does language tell us about our mental
capacities and activities generally?) Slide 3 Cognitive Grammar
(CG) claims that much that we find in language dovetails with what
we know about other aspects of cognition. Cognitive Grammar (CG)
claims that much that we find in language dovetails with what we
know about other aspects of cognition. Language is amazing, but it
is not totally different from or unrelated to the rest of our
mental activities. Language is amazing, but it is not totally
different from or unrelated to the rest of our mental activities.
Non-linguistic cognition is pretty amazing too. Non-linguistic
cognition is pretty amazing too. Slide 4 Outline I plan to divide
this talk into two sections: I plan to divide this talk into two
sections: I.We have amazing abilities to Acquire complex and
flexible habits (learn to do things) Acquire complex and flexible
habits (learn to do things) Compare and categorize experiences (see
patterns and apply them in novel ways) Compare and categorize
experiences (see patterns and apply them in novel ways) II.
Understanding these abilities can clarify our understanding of what
language is and how it functions. In particular We should be
careful not to simplify by setting learning and the application of
patterns against each other as if they were mutually exclusive. We
should be careful not to simplify by setting learning and the
application of patterns against each other as if they were mutually
exclusive. Slide 5 We are good at learning to do things Think about
what is involved in driving a car. Think about what is involved in
driving a car. One way to assess it is to consider what it would
take to teach a robot to do the same. One way to assess it is to
consider what it would take to teach a robot to do the same. There
are a host of more-basic skills that must be mastered, that are
recruited into the skill of driving. There are a host of more-basic
skills that must be mastered, that are recruited into the skill of
driving. Slide 6 We are good at learning to do things For instance
(on the perception side of things): For instance (on the perception
side of things): Binocular visual perception: triangulation and
depth perception. Binocular visual perception: triangulation and
depth perception. Perception of 3-dimensional space and assessment
of your position in it. Perception of 3-dimensional space and
assessment of your position in it. Calculation of your, and your
cars, motion, rate of motion, direction of motion, etc. Calculation
of your, and your cars, motion, rate of motion, direction of
motion, etc. Calculation of other vehicles, and pedestrians, etc.
motion, rate, direction, etc. Calculation of other vehicles, and
pedestrians, etc. motion, rate, direction, etc. Slide 7 We are good
at learning to do things (still on the perception side of things):
(still on the perception side of things): Perception of where the
parts of your body are with respect to each other and to the
immediate surroundings (like the car seat, gear shift, steering
wheel.) Perception of where the parts of your body are with respect
to each other and to the immediate surroundings (like the car seat,
gear shift, steering wheel.) Hearing car sounds, horns, and road
noise, and evaluation of their significance. Hearing car sounds,
horns, and road noise, and evaluation of their significance. Seeing
and recognizing details like turn signals and brake lights. Seeing
and recognizing details like turn signals and brake lights. Knowing
where your mirrors are, and how to interpret what you see in them.
Knowing where your mirrors are, and how to interpret what you see
in them. Slide 8 We are good at learning to do things More on the
motor side of things: More on the motor side of things: Turning
your head and eyes for optimum seeing. Turning your head and eyes
for optimum seeing. Knowing how to move other body parts. Knowing
how to move other body parts. Knowing how to move (without
watching) to the controls of the car and then move the controls.
Knowing how to move (without watching) to the controls of the car
and then move the controls. Assessing what your motions will do.
Assessing what your motions will do. Assessing and controlling how
hard, fast and far the motions will/should carry. Assessing and
controlling how hard, fast and far the motions will/should carry.
Adjusting all of the above to the perceptions mentioned before, in
real time. Adjusting all of the above to the perceptions mentioned
before, in real time. Slide 9 We are good at learning to do things
These (and other) skills are combined and coordinated in various
sophisticated, highly flexible ways, into such higher-order skills
as: These (and other) skills are combined and coordinated in
various sophisticated, highly flexible ways, into such higher-order
skills as: Starting and accelerating Starting and accelerating
Steering to the right or to the left Steering to the right or to
the left Staying on the road and in your lane Staying on the road
and in your lane Shifting gears Shifting gears Slowing and
stopping, not running into cars ahead Slowing and stopping, not
running into cars ahead Changing lanes, passing other vehicles
Changing lanes, passing other vehicles Obeying traffic signals and
signs. Obeying traffic signals and signs. Slide 10 We are good at
learning to do things These in turn are likely to form part of such
ordinary activities as: These in turn are likely to form part of
such ordinary activities as: Going to work. Going to work. Running
an errand. Running an errand. Visiting your parents. Visiting your
parents. The whole package is so complex that it takes considerable
time to learn to do it well The whole package is so complex that it
takes considerable time to learn to do it well We continue to
upgrade and relearn these skills even after we have mastered them.
We continue to upgrade and relearn these skills even after we have
mastered them. Slide 11 We are good at learning to do things They
become so ordinary to us that we can do them on autopilot, as it
were, hardly paying any attention to what we are doing, much less
taking in the full complexity of it all. They become so ordinary to
us that we can do them on autopilot, as it were, hardly paying any
attention to what we are doing, much less taking in the full
complexity of it all. We adapt them with exquisite precision to new
situations. We adapt them with exquisite precision to new
situations. The consequences of doing them poorly are likely to be
lethal. The consequences of doing them poorly are likely to be
lethal. Yet we regularly and almost unthinkingly trust ourselves
and thousands of others to do them right (or at least well enough).
Yet we regularly and almost unthinkingly trust ourselves and
thousands of others to do them right (or at least well enough).
Slide 12 We are good at learning to do things Besides the
perceptual and motor-related skills are more autonomous ones;
Besides the perceptual and motor-related skills are more autonomous
ones; E.g. evaluation of other cars motions and inferences about
their drivers intentions, reading signs, judgment of the passage of
time, calculation of odds, calculations about what speed to take a
corner or a speed bump at, and comparison of the result with the
anticipated situation, etc. etc. E.g. evaluation of other cars
motions and inferences about their drivers intentions, reading
signs, judgment of the passage of time, calculation of odds,
calculations about what speed to take a corner or a speed bump at,
and comparison of the result with the anticipated situation, etc.
etc. Slide 13 We are good at learning to do things Language is a
set of skills of this sort. Language is a set of skills of this
sort. It involves coordinating hugely complex muscular, perceptual,
and autonomous cognitive skills. It involves coordinating hugely
complex muscular, perceptual, and autonomous cognitive skills.
Slide 14 We are good at learning to do things Many levels of such
skills are recruited as parts of other, higher-level skills. Many
levels of such skills are recruited as parts of other, higher-level
skills. We can say I wouldnt have believed that she would have said
anything of the sort and understand it in context while hardly
paying any attention to it, certainly without consciously realizing
its enormous complexity. We can say I wouldnt have believed that
she would have said anything of the sort and understand it in
context while hardly paying any attention to it, certainly without
consciously realizing its enormous complexity. Slide 15 We are good
at learning to do things CG recognizes this, defining a language as
a structured inventory of conventionalized linguistic units. CG
recognizes this, defining a language as a structured inventory of
conventionalized linguistic units. A unit is a skill we have
mastered, a cognitive routine we can run through without having to
put constructive effort into it. A unit is a skill we have
mastered, a cognitive routine we can run through without having to
put constructive effort into it. There are hierarchies upon
hierarchies of such skills involved in our use of language. There
are hierarchies upon hierarchies of such skills involved in our use
of language. Slide 16 What is it that we learn to do? An important
point is that though we learn these skills (linguistic or
otherwise) from our experiences, they cannot be equated with
particular actual experiences. An important point is that though we
learn these skills (linguistic or otherwise) from our experiences,
they cannot be equated with particular actual experiences. Not
every neuron that fired will fire again in exactly the same way the
next time we implement the skill (e.g. of perceiving a car braking
on the road ahead, or of saying she wouldntve said it). Not every
neuron that fired will fire again in exactly the same way the next
time we implement the skill (e.g. of perceiving a car braking on
the road ahead, or of saying she wouldntve said it). Slide 17 What
is it that we learn to do? Rather these are patterns of activation.
Rather these are patterns of activation. They permit a certain
amount of slop or leeway. They permit a certain amount of slop or
leeway. This slop or leeway is extremely important. This slop or
leeway is extremely important. It is what permits us to recognize a
new situation as one of a kind weve seen before. It is what permits
us to recognize a new situation as one of a kind weve seen before.
It also permits us to act in a new way that is nevertheless one of
a kind we have done before. It also permits us to act in a new way
that is nevertheless one of a kind we have done before. Slide 18
Extracting patterns CG talks about this in terms of all the units
being schematic to one degree or another. CG talks about this in
terms of all the units being schematic to one degree or another.
Think Schema = Pattern. Think Schema = Pattern. There are
higher-level (more abstract) and lower-level (more specific)
patterns, and patterns of many kinds There are higher-level (more
abstract) and lower-level (more specific) patterns, and patterns of
many kinds It is patterns all the way down, as far as language is
concerned. It is patterns all the way down, as far as language is
concerned. Slide 19 Extracting patterns Schemas arise as
experiences are compared and commonalities noted. Schemas arise as
experiences are compared and commonalities noted. A schema embodies
the commonalities of its subcases. A schema embodies the
commonalities of its subcases. Consider the (already schematic yet
still rather specific) concept of a pencil. Consider the (already
schematic yet still rather specific) concept of a pencil. Slide 20
Extracting patterns As this concept is compared to the similar
concept of a ballpoint pen, there are notable similarities. As this
concept is compared to the similar concept of a ballpoint pen,
there are notable similarities. Slide 21 Extracting patterns These
similarities together constitute a schema (pattern) we can call
writing instrument. These similarities together constitute a schema
(pattern) we can call writing instrument. Slide 22 Extracting
patterns This kind of relationship is traditionally represented in
CG by an arrow from schema to subcase: A B means A is schematic for
B; B is a subcase of A. This kind of relationship is traditionally
represented in CG by an arrow from schema to subcase: A B means A
is schematic for B; B is a subcase of A. Slide 23 Extracting
patterns This relationship is by nature asymmetrical. This
relationship is by nature asymmetrical. Every specification of the
schema (pattern) holds true of the subcases; Every specification of
the schema (pattern) holds true of the subcases; Not vice versa.
Not vice versa. Slide 24 Extracting patterns There is an
interesting sense in which either the subcase(s) or the pattern can
be seen as basic to the other. There is an interesting sense in
which either the subcase(s) or the pattern can be seen as basic to
the other. Slide 25 Extracting patterns (1) The schema is extracted
from, and comes into being because of, the subcases. In this sense
the system is built bottom-up (1) The schema is extracted from, and
comes into being because of, the subcases. In this sense the system
is built bottom-up (2) Once it is estab-lished (learned), the
schema legitimizes (sanctions) its subcases in top-down fashion.
(2) Once it is estab-lished (learned), the schema legitimizes
(sanctions) its subcases in top-down fashion. Slide 26 Applying
patterns productively Particularly, a well-established schema can
sanction novel structures. Particularly, a well-established schema
can sanction novel structures. This includes partial sanction,
where the subcase contradicts some of the schemas specifications.
This includes partial sanction, where the subcase contradicts some
of the schemas specifications. Slide 27 Extracting and applying
patterns This is the way linguistic rules work under CG. This is
the way linguistic rules work under CG. Rules are simply schemas.
Applying a rule is letting the rule sanction a more specific
subcase. Rules are simply schemas. Applying a rule is letting the
rule sanction a more specific subcase. If the subcase is a new one,
the rule is applied productively. If the subcase is a new one, the
rule is applied productively. Like any other linguistic structures,
rules are part of the language to the extent that they are learned
conventionally (thus known and known to be known by all in the
relevant group.) Like any other linguistic structures, rules are
part of the language to the extent that they are learned
conventionally (thus known and known to be known by all in the
relevant group.) Once learned, they can sanction novel structures.
Once learned, they can sanction novel structures. Slide 28 Learning
and using patterns E.g. a kid may learn the words sugary and salty,
and by comparing them, extract a schema FOOD-y. E.g. a kid may
learn the words sugary and salty, and by comparing them, extract a
schema FOOD-y. FOOD-y is a nascent rule, and the child may use it
to invent new words like vinegary or orangey. FOOD-y is a nascent
rule, and the child may use it to invent new words like vinegary or
orangey. Slide 29 Learning & Patterns From all of this it
should be clear that learning things (establishing units) and
extracting schemas (making generalizations) and applying them are
not mutually-exclusive activities. From all of this it should be
clear that learning things (establishing units) and extracting
schemas (making generalizations) and applying them are not
mutually-exclusive activities. Slide 30 Learning & Patterns
Everything we have learned (e.g. all the established structures in
the diagram below) are generalizations (schemas, patterns).
Everything we have learned (e.g. all the established structures in
the diagram below) are generalizations (schemas, patterns). Slide
31 Learning & Patterns The schemas arent much good to us until
we have learned them (mastered them as units). The schemas arent
much good to us until we have learned them (mastered them as
units). Once we have done so, we can use them to come up with new
subcases, which may in turn be learnt. Once we have done so, we can
use them to come up with new subcases, which may in turn be learnt.
Slide 32 Learning & Patterns Different people can learn
slightly different units, as long as their system is close enough
to somebody elses that they can talk. Different people can learn
slightly different units, as long as their system is close enough
to somebody elses that they can talk. Vinegary or orangey may be
learned, but if not, they are still understandable because they are
sanctioned by the schema (rule) FOOD-y. Vinegary or orangey may be
learned, but if not, they are still understandable because they are
sanctioned by the schema (rule) FOOD-y. Slide 33 Learning &
Patterns Knowing (having mastered) a schema and knowing (having
mastered) a subcase are not mutually-exclusive propositions.
Knowing (having mastered) a schema and knowing (having mastered) a
subcase are not mutually-exclusive propositions. To the contrary,
knowing the subcases helps extract the schema, and knowing the
schema reinforces the subcases. To the contrary, knowing the
subcases helps extract the schema, and knowing the schema
reinforces the subcases. Slide 34 The traditional contrast between
Regularity and Irregularity (Shifting gears downshifting??)
(Shifting gears downshifting??) In most linguistics of the last 100
years, the contrast between what is regular and what is irregular
is given enormous importance. In most linguistics of the last 100
years, the contrast between what is regular and what is irregular
is given enormous importance. (Regular = according to rule, i.e. it
fits a schema) (Regular = according to rule, i.e. it fits a schema)
Slide 35 The traditional contrast between Regularity and
Irregularity It is often considered important to maximize the
regular and minimize the irregular in our models of language (so as
to be scientific). It is often considered important to maximize the
regular and minimize the irregular in our models of language (so as
to be scientific). The problem is it has been assumed that only
irregular things are learned. The problem is it has been assumed
that only irregular things are learned. Slide 36 The traditional
contrast between Regularity and Irregularity It is assumed that:
Regular = systematic = predictable = produced by rule. It is
assumed that: Regular = systematic = predictable = produced by
rule. Irregular = idiosyncratic = arbitrary = learned Irregular =
idiosyncratic = arbitrary = learned There is assumed to be a
dichotomy between these two categories. There is assumed to be a
dichotomy between these two categories. Slide 37 The traditional
contrast between Regularity and Irregularity This difference is
typically made into part of the architecture of linguistics. The
regular/predictable is the province of grammar, the irregular is
the province of the lexicon. This difference is typically made into
part of the architecture of linguistics. The regular/predictable is
the province of grammar, the irregular is the province of the
lexicon. Slide 38 The traditional contrast between Regularity and
Irregularity The system assumes nice neat modules. The system
assumes nice neat modules. It is therefore considered important to
establish if a particular kind of structure is to be accounted for
in the grammar or in the lexicon. It is therefore considered
important to establish if a particular kind of structure is to be
accounted for in the grammar or in the lexicon. Slide 39 The
traditional contrast between Regularity and Irregularity Structures
are taken to be of fundamentally different sorts, and are processed
in very different ways, if they are in the grammar, than if they
are in the lexicon. Structures are taken to be of fundamentally
different sorts, and are processed in very different ways, if they
are in the grammar, than if they are in the lexicon. Slide 40 The
traditional contrast between Regularity and Irregularity So, if a
word like sugary, or a phrase like over the top, could be produced
by rule, the presumption is that in fact it is produced by rule.
So, if a word like sugary, or a phrase like over the top, could be
produced by rule, the presumption is that in fact it is produced by
rule. Slide 41 The traditional contrast between Regularity and
Irregularity The schema is real, the subcases are epiphenomenal.
The schema is real, the subcases are epiphenomenal. In effect, if
you first learned the specific structure, as soon as you learn how
to produce it by rule, you forget it and remember only the rule. In
effect, if you first learned the specific structure, as soon as you
learn how to produce it by rule, you forget it and remember only
the rule. Slide 42 The traditional contrast between Regularity and
Irregularity All members of the category alike are produced by the
rule rather than learned. All members of the category alike are
produced by the rule rather than learned. This is justified because
it makes the model simpler and more predictive. (Science is all
about prediction, right?) This is justified because it makes the
model simpler and more predictive. (Science is all about
prediction, right?) Slide 43 The traditional contrast between
Regularity and Irregularity Now this was so obviously wrong for
many words that the model was modified: morphology (word-
formation) was distinguished from syntax (real grammar), Now this
was so obviously wrong for many words that the model was modified:
morphology (word- formation) was distinguished from syntax (real
grammar), because (oversimplifying) so often many examples of a
morphological rule had clearly been learned. because
(oversimplifying) so often many examples of a morphological rule
had clearly been learned. Slide 44 The traditional contrast between
Regularity and Irregularity As a result, morphological structures
and rules were taken to be different in kind from syntactic
structures and rules; they were taken care of in a different
module. As a result, morphological structures and rules were taken
to be different in kind from syntactic structures and rules; they
were taken care of in a different module. Slide 45 The CG view For
CG, the dimensions of the predictability distinction are gradual,
and though they tend to line up, they are not exactly parallel. For
CG, the dimensions of the predictability distinction are gradual,
and though they tend to line up, they are not exactly parallel.
Slide 46 The CG view The distinction between what is produced by
rule and what is learned is of especial interest to CG. The
distinction between what is produced by rule and what is learned is
of especial interest to CG. It is the only one of these four that
is directly cognitive (dealing with how the system processes the
structure). It is the only one of these four that is directly
cognitive (dealing with how the system processes the structure).
Slide 47 The CG view It is closely tied to the two abilities we
have been discussing. It is closely tied to the two abilities we
have been discussing. Producing something by rule is using a schema
to sanction it, especially if it itself is not (yet) learnt.
Producing something by rule is using a schema to sanction it,
especially if it itself is not (yet) learnt. Learning is (of
course) learning, routinizing a skill, making a sequence of
cognitive activations into a unit, then recalling that unit, as
needed, from cognitive storage (memory). Learning is (of course)
learning, routinizing a skill, making a sequence of cognitive
activations into a unit, then recalling that unit, as needed, from
cognitive storage (memory). Slide 48 The computer analogy A
standard (and largely useful) to talk about these issues is on the
analogy of a computer. A standard (and largely useful) to talk
about these issues is on the analogy of a computer. Learned
information is analogous to what is stored on the hard drive, and
information produced by rule is analogous to information produced
by a program and not stored. Learned information is analogous to
what is stored on the hard drive, and information produced by rule
is analogous to information produced by a program and not stored.
Slide 49 The computer analogy This makes it less than immediately
obvious that the distinction is one of degree. This makes it less
than immediately obvious that the distinction is one of degree.
What degree is there between information that is on the hard disk
and information that is not? What degree is there between
information that is on the hard disk and information that is not?
In a sense, none. In a sense, none. Slide 50 The computer analogy
But thats like saying there is an absolute, binary, modular
difference between the word giraffe written here on the screen and
giraffe here, or in a book. But thats like saying there is an
absolute, binary, modular difference between the word giraffe
written here on the screen and giraffe here, or in a book. Its true
in a sense, but for most purposes its much more important to see
that its the same word (pattern = schema) either place. Its true in
a sense, but for most purposes its much more important to see that
its the same word (pattern = schema) either place. Slide 51 The
computer analogy For information from a program or from the hard
disk to be useful, it has to be brought to working memory (RAM).
For information from a program or from the hard disk to be useful,
it has to be brought to working memory (RAM). Once its there, it
doesnt much matter where it came from. Once its there, it doesnt
much matter where it came from. The same information (pattern =
schema) can be in both places at once, and transferred back and
forth. The same information (pattern = schema) can be in both
places at once, and transferred back and forth. Slide 52 The
computer analogy There is not a dichotomic difference between kinds
of information that are on the hard drive and those that are
produced by computation. There is not a dichotomic difference
between kinds of information that are on the hard drive and those
that are produced by computation. Once its in working memory, you
cant necessarily tell, from the kind of information it is, where it
came from. Once its in working memory, you cant necessarily tell,
from the kind of information it is, where it came from. Slide 53
The computer analogy The original information, the program that
massages it, and the resulting computed data can all be together on
the hard drive, or all together in the working memory, or in both,
at the same time, and still be accessible. The original
information, the program that massages it, and the resulting
computed data can all be together on the hard drive, or all
together in the working memory, or in both, at the same time, and
still be accessible. Slide 54 Non-linguistic cognition again Whats
9 x 8? Whats 9 x 8? How did you figure it? How did you figure it?
10 x 8 = 80, -8 = 72 10 x 8 = 80, -8 = 72 10 x 9 = 90, -(9 x 2 =
18), = 72 10 x 9 = 90, -(9 x 2 = 18), = 72 8 x 8 = 64, +8 = 72 8 x
8 = 64, +8 = 72 Or just, oh yeah, 9 x 8 = 72. Or just, oh yeah, 9 x
8 = 72. You can figure (compute it, produce it by rule) in any of a
number of different ways, or just remember it. You can figure
(compute it, produce it by rule) in any of a number of different
ways, or just remember it. Different ones can retrieve a date (say
your fathers birthday) in different ways. Different ones can
retrieve a date (say your fathers birthday) in different ways. For
most practical purposes, how you get it doesnt matter at all, as
long as you get it right. For most practical purposes, how you get
it doesnt matter at all, as long as you get it right. Slide 55
Humans arent computers anyway Two important differences between
computers and humans cognition are (1) salience and (2) how storage
works. Two important differences between computers and humans
cognition are (1) salience and (2) how storage works. Slide 56
Humans arent computers anyway Patterns in humans minds differ in
salience (cognitive prominence). Non-salient patterns are less
clearly there. Salient patterns stand out and attract attention.
Patterns in humans minds differ in salience (cognitive prominence).
Non-salient patterns are less clearly there. Salient patterns stand
out and attract attention. Slide 57 Humans arent computers anyway
The result is that categories are not homogenous. Some members may
be novel, produced by rule, others, while sanctioned by the rule,
are also learned in their own right. The result is that categories
are not homogenous. Some members may be novel, produced by rule,
others, while sanctioned by the rule, are also learned in their own
right. Slide 58 Humans arent computers anyway And the cases which
have been learned differ in their salience according to their
usage. And the cases which have been learned differ in their
salience according to their usage. Slide 59 Humans arent computers
anyway Repetition increases salience; all else being equal,
often-repeated structures are entrenched with ever-greater
salience. Repetition increases salience; all else being equal,
often-repeated structures are entrenched with ever-greater
salience. This may give a better picture of the general way a
category might develop : This may give a better picture of the
general way a category might develop : And so forth. And so forth.
Slide 60 Humans arent computers anyway (To repeat :) (To repeat :)
Repetition increases salience; all else being equal often-repeated
structures are entrenched with ever-greater salience. Repetition
increases salience; all else being equal often-repeated structures
are entrenched with ever-greater salience. (Repetition isnt the
only thing that enhances salience, but we wont go into the others
here.) (Repetition isnt the only thing that enhances salience, but
we wont go into the others here.) frequency counts correlate highly
with salience. Common structures are especially important.
frequency counts correlate highly with salience. Common structures
are especially important. Slide 61 Humans arent computers anyway
Humans start storing experiences automatically, but need repetition
to learn. Humans start storing experiences automatically, but need
repetition to learn. (Computers store on command, and only need one
command.) (Computers store on command, and only need one command.)
Humans cant very well avoid learning what they experience over and
over. Again, frequency counts are a useful index of likelihood of
being established. Humans cant very well avoid learning what they
experience over and over. Again, frequency counts are a useful
index of likelihood of being established. Whether or not a
structure is (ir)regular or (un)predictable is a much less useful
indicator. Whether or not a structure is (ir)regular or
(un)predictable is a much less useful indicator. Slide 62 What
difference does all this make? So what? What does all this have to
do with linguistics? So what? What does all this have to do with
linguistics? I would like to suggest 6 maxims having to do with
this difference between learning a pattern and calculating it
(producing it by rule). They contradict much of the received wisdom
of traditional linguistics. I would like to suggest 6 maxims having
to do with this difference between learning a pattern and
calculating it (producing it by rule). They contradict much of the
received wisdom of traditional linguistics. They bear especially on
the modular architecture of many models. They bear especially on
the modular architecture of many models. They affect phonology,
semantics, lexicon, and grammar alike. They affect phonology,
semantics, lexicon, and grammar alike. Slide 63 Background for the
maxims The maxims generally take the form: You cant assume 100%
computation and 0% storage, or verce visa. It is an empirical
question how much of each. The maxims generally take the form: You
cant assume 100% computation and 0% storage, or verce visa. It is
an empirical question how much of each. I wont question that what
is unpredictable yet known must have been learned. I wont question
that what is unpredictable yet known must have been learned. But I
do question the assumption that what is predictable or can be
produced by rule therefore is not learned. But I do question the
assumption that what is predictable or can be produced by rule
therefore is not learned. Slide 64 Background for the maxims Many
cognitive scientists have concluded that humans (in comparison with
current digital computers) vastly maximize storage (with
sophisticated retrieval) and minimize computation. Many cognitive
scientists have concluded that humans (in comparison with current
digital computers) vastly maximize storage (with sophisticated
retrieval) and minimize computation. I.e., generally, we learn more
than we need to, not less. Experts are those that have learned
more, not that can figure things faster. I.e., generally, we learn
more than we need to, not less. Experts are those that have learned
more, not that can figure things faster. Our cognitive system has
lots of redundancy. Our cognitive system has lots of redundancy. So
(surprise surprise) does language. So (surprise surprise) does
language. Slide 65 Maxim #1 Frequently linguists have argued that
some member(s) of Category X are computed (=predictable=produced by
rule), or, as the case might be, irregular (=unpredictable
=learned=in the lexicon). Frequently linguists have argued that
some member(s) of Category X are computed (=predictable=produced by
rule), or, as the case might be, irregular (=unpredictable
=learned=in the lexicon). They then conclude that all members of
Category X are treated the same way. They then conclude that all
members of Category X are treated the same way. Slide 66 Maxim #1
E.g. Chomsky (1967 Lexicalist Hypothesis): E.g. Chomsky (1967
Lexicalist Hypothesis): Derived nominals are IRREGULAR. (cites
exx.) A lexical treatment of DNs is the natural way to capture this
irregular behavior. Derived nominals are IRREGULAR. (cites exx.) A
lexical treatment of DNs is the natural way to capture this
irregular behavior. Crucial assumption: if some DNs (the exx.
cited) are lexical, all are. Crucial assumption: if some DNs (the
exx. cited) are lexical, all are. Slide 67 Maxim #1 CG denies this
gratuitous assumption. Rather CG denies this gratuitous assumption.
Rather Showing that one member of a class is learned or computed
does not show that all members of the class are treated the same
way. Showing that one member of a class is learned or computed does
not show that all members of the class are treated the same way.
I.e. I.e. What happens to one form doesnt have to happen to all of
them. Slide 68 Maxim #1 What happens to one form doesnt have to
happen to all of them. Think of er nominalizations. Are they
lexical? Novel ones like flinger or gulper are presumably produced
by rule. Others are clearly learned. Think of er nominalizations.
Are they lexical? Novel ones like flinger or gulper are presumably
produced by rule. Others are clearly learned. flinger < screamer
< swimmer < reader < computer < propeller < rocker
< ruler < drawer flinger < screamer < swimmer <
reader < computer < propeller < rocker < ruler <
drawer So, are er nominalizations learned, or produced by rule?
Answer: It depends. So, are er nominalizations learned, or produced
by rule? Answer: It depends. Slide 69 Maxim #1 What happens to one
form doesnt have to happen to all of them. flinger < screamer
< swimmer < reader < computer < propeller < rocker
< ruler < drawer flinger < screamer < swimmer <
reader < computer < propeller < rocker < ruler <
drawer Some forms are well-learnt and well-established, others may
be novel and only allowed because sanctioned by the rule. This is a
more realistic model. Some forms are well-learnt and
well-established, others may be novel and only allowed because
sanctioned by the rule. This is a more realistic model. Slide 70
Maxim #1 What happens to one form doesnt have to happen to all of
them. Some forms are computed, some are learned and retrieved from
memory. You will have to check each case: it is an empirical issue.
Some forms are computed, some are learned and retrieved from
memory. You will have to check each case: it is an empirical issue.
Objection: This is redundant: it violates simplicity. Why should we
posit that people learn things when theres a perfectly good way to
figure them? Objection: This is redundant: it violates simplicity.
Why should we posit that people learn things when theres a
perfectly good way to figure them? Answer: It is good that the
model is redun- dant that is true to the cognitive reality. Answer:
It is good that the model is redun- dant that is true to the
cognitive reality. Slide 71 Maxim #1 What happens to one form
doesnt have to happen to all of them. Arguing otherwise is like
arguing that a computer cant have on its hard disk information that
could be calculated by a program, because that would be redundant.
Arguing otherwise is like arguing that a computer cant have on its
hard disk information that could be calculated by a program,
because that would be redundant. Whether or not its redundant, it
happens. Whether or not its redundant, it happens. Restating:
Restating: It is ultimately an empirical issue whether a particular
linguistic form is stored in language speakers minds or whether it
is computed from other information. It is ultimately an empirical
issue whether a particular linguistic form is stored in language
speakers minds or whether it is computed from other information.
Slide 72 Maxim #1 What happens to one form doesnt have to happen to
all of them. Saying that it is an empirical issue doesnt mean there
is necessarily any easy empirical test to let you know. Saying that
it is an empirical issue doesnt mean there is necessarily any easy
empirical test to let you know. It does mean that in principle it
could be either way, and you must examine relevant data to settle
the question in a given case. It does mean that in principle it
could be either way, and you must examine relevant data to settle
the question in a given case. Slide 73 Maxim #2 Chomsky 1965 (and
almost everybody else): Linguistic theory is concerned primarily
with an ideal speaker- listener, in a completely homogenous
speech-community, who knows its language perfectly, and is
unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and
errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the
language in actual performance. Linguistic theory is concerned
primarily with an ideal speaker- listener, in a completely
homogenous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly, and
is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and
errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the
language in actual performance. Primarily = in practice, only;
grammatically irrelevant begs important questions. Primarily = in
practice, only; grammatically irrelevant begs important questions.
Speech communities are not homogenous, however: far from it. And
this fact is relevant. Speech communities are not homogenous,
however: far from it. And this fact is relevant. Slide 74 Maxim #2
Some speakers computing or learning a form doesnt necessarily mean
all speakers do it. Some speakers computing or learning a form
doesnt necessarily mean all speakers do it. Your doing it doesnt
mean everybody else has to. Slide 75 Maxim #2 Your doing it doesnt
mean everybody else has to. Shifting from second to third gear may
be perfectly automatic for one person, and require considerable
thought and calculation for another. Shifting from second to third
gear may be perfectly automatic for one person, and require
considerable thought and calculation for another. For a friend that
was all she wrote was a clichd, dead metaphor he pulled off the
shelf. For me it was brand new, made me laugh out loud. For a
friend that was all she wrote was a clichd, dead metaphor he pulled
off the shelf. For me it was brand new, made me laugh out loud.
Slide 76 Maxim #2 Your doing it doesnt mean everybody else has to.
Relatedly, one type of computation by one speaker doesnt guarantee
the same computation by another: Relatedly, one type of computation
by one speaker doesnt guarantee the same computation by another:
Un[[believabl]y] vs. un[[believe]ably] vs. [unbelief]able]y], vs.
[unbelievable]y, etc. Un[[believabl]y] vs. un[[believe]ably] vs.
[unbelief]able]y], vs. [unbelievable]y, etc. hangman = V + O (guy
who hangs a man) or V + S (man who hangs people) hangman = V + O
(guy who hangs a man) or V + S (man who hangs people) Like
calculating 8 x 9 in different ways: who cares how you did it? The
result is the same (near enough). Like calculating 8 x 9 in
different ways: who cares how you did it? The result is the same
(near enough). Slide 77 Maxim #2 Your doing it doesnt mean
everybody else has to. Restating: Restating: It is ultimately an
empirical issue whether a particular form is learned by a
particular individual speaker, or whether he (or she) computes it
in one way or another. It is ultimately an empirical issue whether
a particular form is learned by a particular individual speaker, or
whether he (or she) computes it in one way or another. Slide 78
Maxim #3 Most of us have had the experience of tumbling to an
analysis of something that had previously been monomorphemic to us.
Most of us have had the experience of tumbling to an analysis of
something that had previously been monomorphemic to us. E.g. rue +
th = ruth(less) vile + th = filth like true + th = truth heal + th
= health E.g. rue + th = ruth(less) vile + th = filth like true +
th = truth heal + th = health Similarly, derivedness can fade.
Awesome used to be more saliently awe + some for me. Similarly,
derivedness can fade. Awesome used to be more saliently awe + some
for me. Moral: what has been exclusively accessed from memory or
exclusively computed can start to be processed the other way too.
Moral: what has been exclusively accessed from memory or
exclusively computed can start to be processed the other way too.
Slide 79 Maxim #3 You can change the way you do it. Restating:
Restating: It is ultimately an empirical issue whether a particular
form thats always been processed in one way by a particular
speaker, will be processed exclusively in that way in the future.
It is ultimately an empirical issue whether a particular form thats
always been processed in one way by a particular speaker, will be
processed exclusively in that way in the future. Slide 80 Maxim #4
Maxim #4 is in a way the same thing as #3: it just recognizes that
you can make such changes as #3 repeatedly. Maxim #4 is in a way
the same thing as #3: it just recognizes that you can make such
changes as #3 repeatedly. Having computed ru-th or fil-th one time,
you very likely wont bother to run through the computation the next
time. Having computed ru-th or fil-th one time, you very likely
wont bother to run through the computation the next time. But you
might the time after that. But you might the time after that. Slide
81 Maxim #4 You dont have to do next time what you did this time.
Restating: Restating: It is ultimately an empirical issue how a
particular form is processed by a particular speaker on a
particular occasion. It is ultimately an empirical issue how a
particular form is processed by a particular speaker on a
particular occasion. Slide 82 Maxim #5 Nothing stops you from
bringing a form up from memory, then checking it by computation.
Nothing stops you from bringing a form up from memory, then
checking it by computation. Or computing it, then thinking Yes,
thats right, I remember that. Or computing it, then thinking Yes,
thats right, I remember that. Our minds have enough parallel
processing capacity to do both simultaneously. Our minds have
enough parallel processing capacity to do both simultaneously.
Slide 83 Maxim #5 You can do both at the same time. Restating:
Restating: It is ultimately an empirical issue for a particular
form, on a particular occasion, whether a particular speaker
exclusively calculates it, exclusively retrieves it from storage,
or does both in some degree, either sequentially or simultaneously.
It is ultimately an empirical issue for a particular form, on a
particular occasion, whether a particular speaker exclusively
calculates it, exclusively retrieves it from storage, or does both
in some degree, either sequentially or simultaneously. Slide 84
Maxim #6 These considerations apply to polysemy as well. These
considerations apply to polysemy as well. Some have claimed that
certain meanings are always derived from certain others, e.g. that
Shakespeare w The literary work(s) written by Shakespeare, is
necessarily accessed via Shakespeare p the person William
Shakespeare. Some have claimed that certain meanings are always
derived from certain others, e.g. that Shakespeare w The literary
work(s) written by Shakespeare, is necessarily accessed via
Shakespeare p the person William Shakespeare. Slide 85 Maxim #6
This fits a rule (schema) for naming literary works by their
authors. This fits a rule (schema) for naming literary works by
their authors. Slide 86 Maxim #6 The same rule can be used
productively to let you use a name such as Harry Smith to refer to
what Harry Smith wrote. The same rule can be used productively to
let you use a name such as Harry Smith to refer to what Harry Smith
wrote. Slide 87 Maxim #6 You might say that Shakespeare (as opposed
to Harry Smith) is lexically marked to undergo this particular kind
of metonymic extension; You might say that Shakespeare (as opposed
to Harry Smith) is lexically marked to undergo this particular kind
of metonymic extension; The extended meaning Shakespeare w then
need not itself be learned, and listed in the lexicon. The extended
meaning Shakespeare w then need not itself be learned, and listed
in the lexicon. Slide 88 Maxim #6 CGs position on this should, by
now, be no surprise. You can do it either way. CGs position on this
should, by now, be no surprise. You can do it either way. You can
access Shakespeare w through Shakespeare p. You can access
Shakespeare w through Shakespeare p. Slide 89 Maxim #6 However,
Shakespeare w can also become established in its own right and so
linked that you can also access it directly. However, Shakespeare w
can also become established in its own right and so linked that you
can also access it directly. So what if its redundant; it happens.
So what if its redundant; it happens. Slide 90 Maxim #6 You can go
the long way to get to a meaning or go to it directly. Restating:
Restating: It is ultimately an empirical issue whether a meaning is
activated only as a result of a computational process starting with
another meaning, or activated directly, or both. It is ultimately
an empirical issue whether a meaning is activated only as a result
of a computational process starting with another meaning, or
activated directly, or both. (for a particular meaning in the mind
of a particular speaker on a particular occasion) (for a particular
meaning in the mind of a particular speaker on a particular
occasion) Slide 91 The import of the Maxims These Maxims have
obvious applications to the way the lexicon is conceived, but also
to phonology, syntax, and semantics. These Maxims have obvious
applications to the way the lexicon is conceived, but also to
phonology, syntax, and semantics. If CG is right on these points,
the architecture of language must look rather different than what
many other theories have portrayed it to be. If CG is right on
these points, the architecture of language must look rather
different than what many other theories have portrayed it to be. We
will zip past a few ways it affects things. We will zip past a few
ways it affects things. Slide 92 The import of the Maxims: the
Lexicon-Grammar distinction Obviously, it is not going to be
possible to simply state, of many classes of structures or of many
particular structures, These are part of the lexicon, not part of
the grammar, and act as if that ended the matter. Obviously, it is
not going to be possible to simply state, of many classes of
structures or of many particular structures, These are part of the
lexicon, not part of the grammar, and act as if that ended the
matter. By the same token, you wont be able to say These are always
produced by the grammar, and not learned. By the same token, you
wont be able to say These are always produced by the grammar, and
not learned. Lots of structures will be in-between, or oscillating
between, in various ways. Lots of structures will be in-between, or
oscillating between, in various ways. Slide 93 The import of the
Maxims: the Lexicon-Grammar distinction You will be a lot better
off if your theory doesnt make that mean that they are drastically
changing their nature and functions each time they cross from one
category to the other. You will be a lot better off if your theory
doesnt make that mean that they are drastically changing their
nature and functions each time they cross from one category to the
other. Slide 94 The import of the Maxims: the Lexicon-Grammar
distinction You will be a lot better off if your theory doesnt make
that mean that they are drastically changing their nature and
functions each time they cross from one category to the other. You
will be a lot better off if your theory doesnt make that mean that
they are drastically changing their nature and functions each time
they cross from one category to the other. Slide 95 The import of
the Maxims: the Lexicon-Grammar distinction This assumes, of
course, that Lexicon is defined as the repository of what is
learned & not produced by rule. It is also true under all other
definitions of the lexicon I know. This assumes, of course, that
Lexicon is defined as the repository of what is learned & not
produced by rule. It is also true under all other definitions of
the lexicon I know. For me, the lexicon is most usefully viewed as
the set of structures clearly learned in fully detailed form (at
least with all their phonemes specified.) For me, the lexicon is
most usefully viewed as the set of structures clearly learned in
fully detailed form (at least with all their phonemes specified.)
You may (if you wish) add relatively simple in their morphemic
structure. You may (if you wish) add relatively simple in their
morphemic structure. Slide 96 The import of the Maxims: the
Lexicon-Grammar distinction All these parameters (learnedness,
schematicity, complexity) are matters of degree. All these
parameters (learnedness, schematicity, complexity) are matters of
degree. In this way, the lexicon differs only in degree from the
grammar, and from what is not (yet) part of the language. In this
way, the lexicon differs only in degree from the grammar, and from
what is not (yet) part of the language. Slide 97 The import of the
Maxims: the Lexicon-Grammar distinction Like this: Like this: Slide
98 The import of the Maxims: the Lexicon-Grammar distinction Salty
would be clearly lexical for most English speakers, vinegary is
less so because it is not as thoroughly learnt, may be learnt by
some but not others, etc. Salty would be clearly lexical for most
English speakers, vinegary is less so because it is not as
thoroughly learnt, may be learnt by some but not others, etc.
FOOD-y would be less lexical because part of it is too schematic
(its phonemes are not specified.) FOOD-y would be less lexical
because part of it is too schematic (its phonemes are not
specified.) N-Adjr would be even less so, and more clearly part of
the grammar. N-Adjr would be even less so, and more clearly part of
the grammar. But they should all be basically the same sort of
structure. (CG describes them so.) But they should all be basically
the same sort of structure. (CG describes them so.) Slide 99 The
import of the Maxims: Conventional expressions (Langacker 1987)
(Langacker 1987) This dichotomous perspective [of syntax vs.
lexicon] made it inevitable that a large body of data belonging to
neither category would be mostly ignored. I refer here to the huge
set of stock phrases, familiar collocations, formulaic expressions,
and standard usages that can be found in any language and
thoroughly permeate its use. This dichotomous perspective [of
syntax vs. lexicon] made it inevitable that a large body of data
belonging to neither category would be mostly ignored. I refer here
to the huge set of stock phrases, familiar collocations, formulaic
expressions, and standard usages that can be found in any language
and thoroughly permeate its use. Slide 100 The import of the
Maxims: Conventional expressions This is why a seemingly perfect
knowledge of the grammar of a language (in the narrow sense) does
not guarantee fluency in it; learning its full complement of
conventional expressions is probably by far the largest task
involved in mastering it. This is why a seemingly perfect knowledge
of the grammar of a language (in the narrow sense) does not
guarantee fluency in it; learning its full complement of
conventional expressions is probably by far the largest task
involved in mastering it. Slide 101 The import of the Maxims: the
Lexicon-Grammar distinction Yet conventional expressions have
received so little attention that I found it necessary to invent
this term for the class as a whole. The grammar [i.e. the
linguistic description] of a language is responsible for listing
its full set of conventional expressions (such as go for a walk,
absolutely incredible, have a good time, cheap imitation, the
seconds are ticking away, and so on, and so on). To furnish such a
list would obviously be a vast undertaking, for there are many
thousands of such expressions, and new ones are always forming. Yet
conventional expressions have received so little attention that I
found it necessary to invent this term for the class as a whole.
The grammar [i.e. the linguistic description] of a language is
responsible for listing its full set of conventional expressions
(such as go for a walk, absolutely incredible, have a good time,
cheap imitation, the seconds are ticking away, and so on, and so
on). To furnish such a list would obviously be a vast undertaking,
for there are many thousands of such expressions, and new ones are
always forming. Slide 102 The import of the Maxims: the
Lexicon-Grammar distinction The issue of whether conventional
expressions should be included in a grammar is factual rather than
methodological in a framework taking seriously the goal of
psychological reality in linguistic description. If a speaker does
in fact learn a large set of conventional expressions as fixed
units, it is incumbent on the grammar to represent this fact by
providing an inventory of these expressions. The issue of whether
conventional expressions should be included in a grammar is factual
rather than methodological in a framework taking seriously the goal
of psychological reality in linguistic description. If a speaker
does in fact learn a large set of conventional expressions as fixed
units, it is incumbent on the grammar to represent this fact by
providing an inventory of these expressions. Slide 103 The import
of the Maxims: the Lexicon-Grammar distinction The simplest
description that accurately accommodates all the data must by
definition include such a list.* Langacker 1987:35-36, 41 The
simplest description that accurately accommodates all the data must
by definition include such a list.* Langacker 1987:35-36, 41
[*Footnote*: With apologies to Sapir, we can say that not only do
all grammars leak, they also list (massively).] [*Footnote*: With
apologies to Sapir, we can say that not only do all grammars leak,
they also list (massively).] Slide 104 The import of the Maxims:
Phonology An obvious application to phonology is that all common
rule-governed forms will tend to be learned (stored). An obvious
application to phonology is that all common rule-governed forms
will tend to be learned (stored). A rule may tell you that the v of
liv leaf devoices word-final. This does not mean that you dont
learn livz leaves, livd leaved, and lif leaf, in their own right. A
rule may tell you that the v of liv leaf devoices word-final. This
does not mean that you dont learn livz leaves, livd leaved, and lif
leaf, in their own right. Slide 105 The import of the Maxims:
Phonology Suppletion thus overlaps massively with rule-governed
phonology, and often proves decisive in language change. Suppletion
thus overlaps massively with rule-governed phonology, and often
proves decisive in language change. E.g. people might (and in fact
some do) start saying lifs leaves, or lift leaved using the salient
singular form as basic and recomputing the others, directly
contradicting the rule. E.g. people might (and in fact some do)
start saying lifs leaves, or lift leaved using the salient singular
form as basic and recomputing the others, directly contradicting
the rule. (Phonological systems empirically dont always change the
ways the rules would lead you to expect. This is one reason why.)
(Phonological systems empirically dont always change the ways the
rules would lead you to expect. This is one reason why.) Slide 106
The import of the Maxims: Semantics vs. Pragmatics One of the major
criteria linguists seem to use to decide what is pragmatic as
opposed to semantic is whether something is (in some degree)
predictable (especially predictable from the context.) One of the
major criteria linguists seem to use to decide what is pragmatic as
opposed to semantic is whether something is (in some degree)
predictable (especially predictable from the context.) Slide 107
The import of the Maxims: Semantics vs. Pragmatics E.g. the meaning
Shakespeare w Shakespeares works, is a pragmatic extension (because
its predictable) of the real meaning Shakespeare p the person
William Shakespeare. E.g. the meaning Shakespeare w Shakespeares
works, is a pragmatic extension (because its predictable) of the
real meaning Shakespeare p the person William Shakespeare. Slide
108 The import of the Maxims: Semantics vs. Pragmatics As already
argued, nothing stops both meanings being learned, conventionally
associated with the phonological form ejkspir, and thus real
meanings. As already argued, nothing stops both meanings being
learned, conventionally associated with the phonological form
ejkspir, and thus real meanings. Slide 109 The import of the
Maxims: Semantics vs. Pragmatics Semantics is conventionalized
pragmatics. Semantics is conventionalized pragmatics. A lot more
gets conventionalized (learned and known to have been learned by
all the relevant speakers) than might seem strictly necessary. A
lot more gets conventionalized (learned and known to have been
learned by all the relevant speakers) than might seem strictly
necessary. A lot of what is presented as pragmatics is in fact
semantic. A lot of what is presented as pragmatics is in fact
semantic. Slide 110 Summary It has traditionally been assumed in
linguistics that what is regular, systematic and predictable is not
learned but rather produced by rule, while what is irregular,
idiosyncratic and arbitrary is learned. It has traditionally been
assumed in linguistics that what is regular, systematic and
predictable is not learned but rather produced by rule, while what
is irregular, idiosyncratic and arbitrary is learned. Slide 111
Summary It is normally assumed as well that these distinctions are
binary and coincide with each other so exactly as to be practically
equivalent. It is normally assumed as well that these distinctions
are binary and coincide with each other so exactly as to be
practically equivalent. Important aspects of the architecture of
many theoretical models depend on these assumptions, notably the
modular distinction between lexicon (where the irregular,
idiosyncratic, arbitrary and learned structures reside) and grammar
(the domain of rules for producing the unlearned, regular,
systematic, and predictable phenomena of language). Important
aspects of the architecture of many theoretical models depend on
these assumptions, notably the modular distinction between lexicon
(where the irregular, idiosyncratic, arbitrary and learned
structures reside) and grammar (the domain of rules for producing
the unlearned, regular, systematic, and predictable phenomena of
language). Slide 112 Summary CG maintains, on the contrary, that
the distinctions are all gradual rather than binary, and that they
do not coincide exactly. In particular, much that is regular,
systematic and in some degree predictable may nevertheless be
learned. CG maintains, on the contrary, that the distinctions are
all gradual rather than binary, and that they do not coincide
exactly. In particular, much that is regular, systematic and in
some degree predictable may nevertheless be learned. This has
important implications for the structure of the CG framework,
notably for the ways lexicon and other aspects of grammar grade
into each other. This has important implications for the structure
of the CG framework, notably for the ways lexicon and other aspects
of grammar grade into each other. Slide 113 Summary If CG is right
on these points, the architecture of language must look rather
different than what many other theories have portrayed it to be. If
CG is right on these points, the architecture of language must look
rather different than what many other theories have portrayed it to
be. Slide 114 Power Point available at www.sil.org/~tuggyd
