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    SpecialIssue

    TheManyFatesofLegalPositivism

    SevenRoleModelsofLegalScholars

    ByAndrsJakab*

    A. Introduction

    InthefollowingArticleIwilldevelopsevenidealtypicalrolemodelsfor(orcaricaturesof)legalscholars: theOracleScientist,theProphet,theLawReformer,theHumbleClerk,theWisePragmatist, theSelfReflective,and theMediaStar.

    1 Ten featureswillbeused to

    characterizethe idealforeachmodel: primaryaudience,idealfunction,pervertedform,influenceonthe law,prestige,measureofsuccess,timescale,useofnonlegal(moralor

    social/economic) arguments, precondition of existence, typical countries, and famouslawyers (representing themselvesor at leastproposing toother legal scholars to followthatspecificrolemodel).

    2

    Thelistofrolemodelsisnotmeanttobeexhaustive,astherearepossiblyotheroneswithwhichwecouldsophisticatethepictureendlessly. Therolemodelsthemselvesarealsonotmeanttobeexclusive;itispossiblethatonesinglescholarbearsfeaturesofdifferentrolemodels,orwritesapaperinoneroleandanotherpaperinanotherrole. Probablynolegal scholarwould fully fit into any of the rolemodels, but these as ideal types (in a

    Weberian sense) still seem tohave someexplanatory forceabouthowweperceiveourtask. Thescopeoftheexplanationisconsciouslylimited: Theconstructionoftheseidealtypes had the purpose of explaining rolemodels of legal scholars only in the GermanspeakingEuropeancountries(andtosomeextent,inothercivillawcountriessuchasSpainand Italy), Hungary (as a postsocialist country), the United Kingdom, and the UnitedStates. The rolemodels are thus not analytical constructionswhich show all logicallypossibleconstellationsofthedifferentcharacterizing features;onlythosewhichseemedtobeable toexplainexisting legal scholarlymentalitiesand selfperceptions in thenamed

    *AssociateProfessor,PzmnyPterCatholicUniversityBudapest,email: [email protected].

    1TheArticleisalsoacommentonAlexanderSomeksTheSpiritofLegalPositivismpublishedinthisvolumeoftheGERMANLAWJOURNAL. ForusefulremarksandcriticalobservationsIamgratefultoMtysBdig,LisaGiles,TamsGyrfi,GborHamza,BlaPokol,andAlexanderSomek;furthertotheparticipantsoftheresearchseminarheldat the Pzmny Pter Catholic University Budapest on the 4

    thof October 2010 especially to Pter Cserne and

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    [Vol.12No.02758 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lcountrieshavebeen constructed. Though thecategoriesof thepresent studymightbebroadenedtoincludefurthercountries,thishasnotbeentriedortestedhere.

    Thedevelopmentof idealtypicalrolemodelsalsoconteststhenotionofhavingageneralidea of the legal scholarship or legal science. Long but fruitless debates have beenconducted on thequestionofwhether legal scholarship is scholarshipor science at all.

    Thosewhowere skepticalabout itannoyedorprovoked the legalacademia3and those

    whoconfirmed itwitha looseconceptofscholarshiporsciencewerepopular.4 Butasa

    matteroffact,whatlegalscholarsaredoingundertheheadingoflegalscholarshipisjustverydifferentwith seemingly no common thread. Whetherwe label itwith the noblewordscienceorscholarshipissecondary;whatreallymattersisthekindofpresuppositionsbehindthedifferentwaysofconducting legalscholarship(andunderwhatcircumstancestheycanbeaccepted),andwhyintheirgenresomeoftheworkswillbeconsideredbetterorworseby theiracademiccommunity. Thus,deducinggood legal scholarship fromanabstract idea of the legal science is rather hopeless; what we can rather do is to

    understandourownapproach,whatthemostmeaningfulwayofundertakingitcouldbe,andwhat pitfallswithin thatwe should avoid. Consequently, I do not have a precisedefinitionofthe"legalscholar"either: Everybodywillbeconsideredassuch,ifheorsheconsidershimselforherselfassuch.

    B. TellingJudgesWhattheLawIs: TheOracleScientist

    The Oracle Scientists primary audience is fellow academics, his secondary audience,

    judges.

    He

    knows

    best

    what

    the

    law

    is,

    even

    better

    than

    judges.

    As

    a

    matter

    of

    fact,

    judges relyontheopinionoftheOracleScientist(s) tosolvecases. Itcanhappeneitherdirectly by sending the file to themsee the Middle Ages German institution ofAktenversendung which meant that courts sent the files of a case to universities fordecision

    5orbytheirconsulting ofacademic literature. Thereasonforcitingacademic

    literaturebypractitionerscanalsobefoundinpositiveprocedurallaw: DuringtheMiddle

    3 Seegenerally JULIUS VON KIRCHMANN,DIEWERTHLOSIGKEIT DER JURISPRUDENZ ALSWISSENSCHAFT (1848), availableathttp://fama2.us.es/fde/ocr/2006/werthlosigkeitDerJurisprudenz.pdf; ANDRS SAJ, KRITIKAI RTEKEZS A

    JOGTUDOMNYRL(1983).4 See generally Ulfrid Neumann, Wissenschaftstheorie der Rechtswissenschaft, in EINFHRUNG IN DIERECHTSPHILOSOPHIE DERGEGENWART 385400 (Arthur Kaufmann et al. eds., 2004) (providing an overview of theliterature).

    5SeeHAROLD J.BERMAN,LAWANDREVOLUTION II: THE IMPACTOFTHEPROTESTANTREFORMATIONSONTHEWESTERNLEGALTRADITION143(2003)(includingfurtherreferencestospecificprovisionsofcontemporaryproceduralnorms);seealso GERHARD KBLER, DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 156 (1996). Similar practice existed in ancient Roman law, when

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    2011] 759RoleModelsofLegalScholars

    Ages in certain parts of Europe, itwas in some courts obligatory for advocates to citerelevant literature (cf. "chi non ha Azzo non vada in palazzo"; "Quidquid non agnoscitglossanecagnoscit forum"),andwhile judges couldbeheldpersonally liable forwrongdecisions, they avoided such liability if they followed the communis opinio (majority ofauthoritativewriters). To fall intothe lattercategory,theyquotedasmuch literatureastheycould.

    6 Buteveninmoderntimes,insomelegalorderspositivelawlookstothethe

    commonandconstantopinionoflearnedpersons(CodeofCanonLawof1983,Canon19:"communi constantique doctorum sentential"), to the approved legal doctrine (SwissCivil Code, art. 1.3: "bewhrte Lehre"), or to the the teachings of themost highlyqualifiedpublicistsofthevariousnations(StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,art.38(1))forthesolutionofcases.

    OracleScientistswhohaveneverworkedbefore in lowerjudicialofficesareoften invitedto the highest judicial positions.

    7 Her influence is thus considerable on the law, even

    though shedoesnotbear responsibilityina legal senseforwhat she isdoing.8 Her

    prestige ishigh,herwordor at least thewordof themajorityof theOrderofOracleScientists,

    9 i.e.theherrschendeLehreor thedoctrinedominanteshouldbe followedby

    judges. IfthelegislatorisafraidthatitslawwillbemodifiedbytheOracleScientistsawellfoundedfearinsomecasesthenithastoprohibittheirwork.

    10

    TheOracleScientist isnotsimplyascientistexpert,he ismore than that. Hehassomeesotericknowledge,sohecantellwhatthelawstatesaboutaproblem,eveniflaypersonsdonotseeany legalprovisiononthe issue. He isanoraclewhocanseethesigns fromwhichhe reads the law. Buthis job isdifferent from religiousoracles in that it canbe

    6WilliamTwiningetal.,TheRoleofAcademicsintheLegalSystem,inTHEOXFORDHANDBOOKOFLEGALSTUDIES938(PeterCane&MarkTushneteds.,2003).

    7Id.at940.

    8 For the legitimacy problem of influencing the content of law, seeMATTHIAS JESTAEDT,DASMAG IN DER THEORIERICHTIGSEIN...8385(2006).

    9You canbecome amemberof theOrderofOracle Scientists if you get accepted in a long ritualby currentmembers. Theritualincludesthedefenseofadoctoraldissertation,thesubmissionofaHabilitationsschrift,andfinallytheappointmentasfullprofessor. Withouthavingfulfilledthesestepsoftheritual,whateveryousaywillcountlessindependentlyfromthecontentofwhatyousaythanwhattheverylastmemberoftheOrdersays.

    10Inthe6thcenturyAD,Justinianmadeitobligatorytofollowtheopinionsofsome(mostlythendead)scholars

    bycodifyingthembasicallyhemadeobligatorytofollowhisowncodewhichhappenedtobebasedpartlyonscholarly opinionsbut forbade any new commentaries on it: We command that our complete work, which is to

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    [Vol.12No.02760 Ge rman L aw J ou rna llearned likeascience,through longyearsof trainingandpractice intheOrderofOracleScientists.

    Theyuseaspeciallanguageandlogic,thatoftheRechtsdogmatik. Ifyouwanttoexpressargumentsofefficiencyand justice inthe languageofRechtsdogmatik,thenyouhavetotranslatethemintolegalarguments(unlawful).

    11 Argumentsofeffectiveness,etcetera,

    arenotnecessarilyirrelevanttolaw,buttheycannotbedeployeddirectly(naked),12

    weneedtheallknowingtranslatortodothatforus(e.g.,withthehelpofGeneralklauseln).

    But the Oracle Scientist is a very peculiar translator, because you cannot ask him totranslate justanything. He isbuildinga legal conceptual systemonhisownwhichalsoincludeswishes forabettersocietyeven thoughhenever talksaboutsuchpolicy issuesdirectly(thatwouldbeimproper). Butsomehow,thesystemhebuildsuphelpstorealizemeaningfulpolicyissues. TheOracleScientistseemstoknowallourwishesandquestionsabouthowtoapplythelawevenbeforeweexpressthem. Hemustthinkintwotiers: the

    legallanguagehespeaks,andthereallife(socialormoral)issueshenevertalksabout.13

    Her aim is to build up a conceptual system (doctrine, Rechtsdogmatik) by eliminatingcontingenciesandapparentgapsorcontradictions.

    14 Thesystemhebuildsalwaysgives

    theone single legally right answer. TheOracle Scientist likes to representhimselfas aneutral, professional, and objective scientist,

    15 but as amatter of fact his job is very

    creativeandheisbuildinghisownimpliedvaluesintohissystem.16

    Thesystemlooksasitsveryownemanation,whichexpands itselftheOracleScientistbeingonlythemouthpieceoftheautonomousRechtsdogmatik.

    11PHILIPPEA.MASTRONARDI,JURISTISCHESDENKEN26476(2001).

    12 Markus Pcker, Unaufgelste Spannungen und blockierte Vernderungsmglichkeiten im Selbstbild der

    juristischenDogmatik,37RECHTSTHEORIE15760(2006).

    13SeeAndrsJakab,WhatMakesaGoodLawyer?,62ZEITSCHRIFTFRFFENTLICHESRECHT27587(2007)(discussing

    twolevelthinking).14Contradictionshavetobeeliminatedbywayofinterpretation,otherwiseonecannotcontributetothesolution

    offutureproblems. Ifcontradictionsaremerelyhighlighted,thoseapplyingthelawwillstarepuzzledatthetwopassages, then decide by tossing a coin. TheOracle Scientists task is to help avoiding this, thusmaking acalculable functioning of the system possible. Eike von Savigny, Die Rolle der DogmatikWissenschaftstheoretischGesehen, in JURISTISCHEDOGMATIKUNDWISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE104 (UlfridNeumannetal.eds.,1976).

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    ThepervertedformoftheOracleScientististhelegalscholar,whodoesnotcareaboutthepracticalapplicabilityandusefulnessofhisconceptualsystem. RudolfvonJhering,oneofthe greatest Oracle Scientists of all times, described the perverted and exaggeratedapproach in his classic (self)ironic essay on the juristic conceptual heaven (ImjuristischenBegriffshimmel)thefollowingway:

    Conceptsdonot tolerate any connection to the realworld.... Intheworldofconcepts,thatyoucanseehere,thereisnolifeinthesenseyouknowit,itistheempireofabstractthoughtsandconcepts,thatfollowlogically...fromeachotherwhichforthatreasonshyawayfromeverytouchoftheearthlyworld.

    Here rules only pure science, legal logic, and thepreconditionoftheirruleanddignityisexactly...that

    theydonothavetodoanythingwithlife.... Life...issynonymouswiththedeathofscience.

    The lawyer calculates with his concepts, just like amathematician works with his numbers; if the endresultislogicallycorrect,thenthere isnothingelsetobeworriedaboutanymore.

    The concepts you can see here exist, and with this

    everythinghasbeensaid. Theyareabsolutetruths,theyalwayshavebeen theyalwayswillbe. Toaskabout theirnature and justification is nothingbetterthantoaskwhyistwotimestwofour. Itisjustfour.With this is has everything been said, there is nojustificationforit. Itisexactlythesamewithconcepts,theyarebasedasabsolutetruthsinthemselves,thereisnoa justification forthem. Theonlythingwhichathinkercandoisto immerseoneself inthemwithfulldevotionandwithoutanyrestraint, inordertorevealthe amplitude of their content . . . . What he canrevealthiswayistruth,andeverytruthhasaclaimtobeuniversallyvalid.

    [J]ust likeanaturalscientistwhotriestodiscoverthe

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    [Vol.12No.02762 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lthe legalworld, to reveal the fineveins in the logicalorganismofthelaw.

    17

    IfyoudaretoquestiontheOracleScientistbysayingthathe isdoingBegriffsjurisprudenzasdescribedbyJhering,thenheranswerwillprobablybethatthisisherjob

    18andthatshe

    does not have the legitimacy to domorelike considering policy issuesand that she

    serveslegalcertaintythiswaythebest.MaybehewouldalsonotethatheisactuallydoingaspecialtypeofBegriffsjurisprudenz,thesocalledInteressenjurisprudenz,whichisamoresophisticatedversionandnottheoppositeoftheformerandthatwiththelatterhecanavoidabsurdities.

    19 Hemightalsoaddthatthistypeofcriticismisveryold,

    20andgettinga

    bitboringnow. Hewoulddefinitelypointout that the critiques come and go,but theOrderoftheOracleScientistsstays.

    21 Ifsomeonewantstocriticizethemmeaningfullyso

    theOracleScientistthenconcretemistakesshouldbepointedout,22butthejobassuch

    shouldnotbedoubted.

    Heisasecretlawmaker: Hepretendsnottomakelaw,asnobodyempoweredhimtodoso,butinfacthedoesso,atleastinalimitedway. Inordertoconcealhislawmaking,heis telling us that he is just explaining the conceptual system of law and drawingconsequencesfromit. Butthissystemisactuallypartlytheresultofhisscientificwork.

    23

    ButifweaskanotherfelloworconspiratorOracleScientist,thenheisalsogoingtoconfirmthatnoneofthemisactuallymakinganylaw.

    17RUDOLFVONJHERING,SCHERZUNDERNSTINDERJURISPRUDENZ25253,258,274,287,288(1884).

    18Lawyersnecessarilyworkwithabstractconcepts. EugenBucher,WasistBegriffsjurisprudenz?,inTHEORIEUND

    TECHNIKDERBEGRIFFSJURISPRUDENZ389(WernerKrawietzed.,1976).

    19ThisiswellshownbythefactthatthefourtraditionalmethodsofSavigny(grammatical,logical,systemic,and

    historical)arenotreplacedbytheteleological(orpurposive)interpretationofwhichJheringisthoughttobetheinventor;rather,itisaddedtothemasafifthmethod. TheoppositeofBegriffsjurisprudenzis theSchoolofFreeLaw(Freirechtsschule). Id.at37273.

    20SeePhilippHeck,Was IstDieBegriffsjurisprudenz,DieWirBekmpfen?,14DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG145661

    (1909).

    21 It does so openly and explicitly in the tradition of Begriffsjurisprudenz today. ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER

    GRUNDRECHTE38(2001). Whilerejectingmerelogicalinference,Alexystillthinkstheelaborationoftheconceptualsystem to be the primary goal of jurisprudence, and in this aspect he explicitly sideswith the tradition ofBegriffsjurisprudenz. Anotherremarkablecontemporaryadvocateofthisapproach isArminvonBogdandy,ThePastandPromiseofDoctrinalConstructivism,7INT'LJ.CONST.L.364400(2009).

    22Only concrete logical faultshave tobe shown,but conceptualism as such shouldnotbe criticized. Bucher,

    supra note 18 at 388; HorstEberhard Henke Wie tot ist die Begriffsjurisprudenz? in THEORIE UND TECHNIK DER

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    His system covers all the possible problems24

    without gaps25

    or contradictions.26 The

    structureof the systemhas tobebuiltup,even if it isachaoticuncodified system. Orrather, it isevenmore important inthesesituations

    27asthemost important featureof

    legalscholarshipisitssystematicnature.28

    Legalscholarshipdoesnotsimplydescribethelaw,itrepresentsthelaw.29 Consequently,

    agoodpractitionerhas toknow thoroughly theacademic literature (nemo

    bonus

    iurista

    nisibartolista).30 SoifthepractitionerdoesnotreadtheOracleScientist,itisnotafailure

    oftheOracleScientist,itisafailureofthepractitioner. WedonotmeasurethesuccessoftheOracleScientistthroughhisorherinfluenceonthelegalpractice. Ifthelegalpracticedoesnotlistentowhatheorsheissaying,thatistheir(intellectual)problem. TheOracleScientistisbuildinghissystemforitsperfectness(i.e.,full,detailedandnoncontradictory)andbeauty;practicability is important (this is theofficial functionof the system),

    31but

    onlysecondary. Evenpositivelawcancomeandgo,buttheconceptualsystemremains,ithasbeenbuiltforeternity.

    32 Changingsocialcircumstancesalsodonotreallyinfluenceit.

    24BuildingaconceptualsysteminsteadofreproductivityisadvocatedalsobyHenke,supranote22,at414.

    25TheidealofgaplessnessischaracteristicnotonlyofBegriffsjurisprudenz,butalsooftherationalistnaturallawtradition. GUSTAVBOEHMER,GRUNDLAGENDERBRGERLICHENRECHTSORDNUNG2.1: DOGMENGESCHICHTLICHEGRUNDLAGENDES BRGERLICHENRECHTES63 (1951). For reference toCHRISTIANWOLFF, seeBegriffsjurisprudenz, inTHEORIEUNDTECHNIK DER BEGRIFFSJURISPRUDENZ 43237 (Werner Krawietz ed., 1976), especially page 436. The beginnings ofconceptualsystembuildinginlawaretracedbacktoscholasticsoritsreflectionsintheworksoftheglossatorsandcommentatorsbyBerman. HaroldJ.Berman,TheOriginsofWesternLegalScience,inTHEWESTERNIDEAOFLAW,399413(1983).Specialnoteshouldbetakenofpages401and405.

    26EvenauthorsoutsideoftheBegriffsjurisprudenztraditionoftenassumenoncontradictioninthecaseofalegalsystem. J.W.HARRIS: LAWANDLEGALSCIENCE,ANINQUIRYINTOTHECONCEPTSLEGALRULEANDLEGALSYSTEM11,8183(1979).

    27Twiningetal.,supranote6,at937.

    28Rechtswissenschaftistsystematischodersieistnicht(Legalscholarshipiseithersystematic,oritisnotlegalscholarship). Lepsius,supranote15,at16.

    29 Rechtswissenschaft scheint das Recht nicht nur zu beschreiben, sondern auch zu vertreten. Christoph

    Mllers,Vorberlegungen zu einerWissenschaftstheorie des ffentlichenRechts, inRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE

    167

    (Matthias

    Jestaedt

    &

    Oliver

    Lepsius

    eds.,

    2008).

    30RenownedGermanlawfirmsexpecttheirapplicantstoholdadoctorate.

    31 In lack of potential practicability, theOracle Scientist does not build grand theories, but onlymiddlelevel

    theoriesforexample,thetheoryonproportionalitywhichcanbeusedtosophisticatetheconceptualsystemdesignedtosolvecases. Lepsius,supranote15,at26.

    32 InthissenseRechtsdogmatik isconservative.Id.at19. Similarly,seetheHungarianconceptoftheinvisible

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    [Vol.12No.02764 Ge rman L aw J ou rna l

    Even thoughwedonotmeasure thesuccessof theOracleScientistbyher receptionorinfluenceamongstpractitioners,youdoneedalegalculturewherethistypeofbehaviorisaccepted. Youneedademandamongst legalpractitioners fortheopinionoftheOracleScientist. Iflegalpractitioners(especiallyjudges)donotparticularlyrespectlegalscholars,thenthescholarlyattempttoscientificallyandconceptuallysystematizelawwillmiserably

    fail(cf.thecasesofWesleyHohfeld33

    andChristopherColumbusLangdell34

    ).There isjustnodemandfortheworkoftheOracleScientistinsomelegalcultures.

    35

    OracleScientistsacceptthattheremightbeothertypesoflegalscholars,buttheyconsiderthemselvesasthemost importantbodyof legalscholars,andconsidertheirapproachastheheartoflegalscholarship.

    36

    Incivil lawcountrieswherejudgesreceivetheirpositionsmoreor lessstraightaftertheirlawdegree,

    37 thechancesofsuchanapproachare typicallyhigher than incommon law

    countrieswhere themost prestigious legal job is the one of the judge. In the lattercountries the scholar either has to be either aHumble Clerk of judges,

    38 or a Prophet

    leadingsuperhuman (Herculean) judges,oraWisePragmatistadvising them toconsidernonlegal (economic,social)aspects,oraSelfReflectivewhodoesnotcareabout judgesbutwritesonly toother fellow academics. But a common law scholarusingonly legal(nonmoral and nonsocial) arguments telling judges about what the law is is hardly

    situation. TheOracleScientistthusstruggles,ifthe legislatorortheconstituentpoweraretooactive. Mllers,supranote29,at165;Vorwort, inDASPROPRIUMDERRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTXI (ChristophEngel&WolfgangSchn

    eds.,2007).

    33WesleyNewcombHohfeld,SomeFundamentalLegalConceptionsasAppliedinLegalReasoning,23YALEL.J.16

    (1913).

    34OnLangdellsvisionoflaw,seeJohnChipmanGray,LangdellsOrthodoxy,45U.PITTL.REV.1(1983). Onlyhis

    teachingmethod(casemethod)survived,butnothisapproachtolegalscholarship. WILLIAMP.LAPIANA,LOGICANDEXPERIENCE: THEORIGINOFMODERNLEGALEDUCATION14870(1994);ROBERTSTEVENS,LAWSCHOOL: LEGALEDUCATIONINAMERICAFROMTHE1850STOTHE1980S3572(1983).

    35AsSomekpointsout: Thecommon lawtraditionremainsatoddswiththeconstructive legalscholarship. A

    newcasechangeseverything.36 For Dogmatik as the core discipline of legal scholarship (Kerndisziplin der Rechtswissenschaft), see RalfDreier, Rechtstheorie und Rechtsgeschichte, in 2 RECHTSTAATVERNUNFT: STUDIEN ZUR RECHTSTHEORIE 217 (RalfDreiered.,1991).

    37Judgesarethusyoung,inexperienced,andreceiveonlyamodestsalary. Theirsocialstandingisalsomodest. In

    mostcases,theycannotsubmitdissentingopinions,sotheycannotmakenamesandtheyremainunknowninthelegal community Twining et al supra note 6 at 939

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    conceivable.However, incivil lawcountries (especially intheGermanic legal family) it isusual practice.

    39 The relationship iswell expressed byMerryman: The scholar is the

    scientist,andthejudge,atbest,merelytheengineer. Thescholarprovidesthesystematic,scientific legal structure that the judgeaccepts andapplies. Theworkof the scholar iscreativeandexalted;thatofthejudgeis,althoughimportant,onalowerplane.

    40

    The reasonwhyconceptualdoctrinal legal thought (Rechtsdogmatik)

    reached itshighestlevelthoughatthetimestillfragmentedinGermany inthenineteenthcentury isthatononehandlawwasinprinciplequiterigidastheyusedtheancientandhighlyesteemed,consequentlyunquestionable, law,that isRoman law,or itsmodernizedversion,theiusromanum hodiernum (heutiges rmisches Recht). On the other hand, they enshrinedconceptual elaboration into a conscious program (as an alternative to the Frenchrevolutionary invaders codification).

    41 This combination is unique in history, and even

    todaysGermanlegalscholarshipowesitsconceptualsophisticationtoit.42

    C. TellingJudgesWhattheRightThingIstoDecide: TheProphet

    TheProphet isprimarilytalkingtojudges;hissecondaryaudience is legalscholars.43

    ButhedoesnotconsiderhisprofessionasanOrder(oraguild)liketheOracleScientistdid. Heseeshimselfratherastheleaderofachurch,

    44whosemembersarenotonlyandnoteven

    primarily legalscholars,but judges. Legalscholarship isabout judges,45

    it isalsowrittenfor judges. TheProphetknows themoral foundationsofour societyandhewill tellus(especially judges) what to do. He knows the right way, he has the vision, he issuperhuman. He is Hercules, and if we follow him, we can become like him.

    46

    39 See generally Armin von Bogdandy, Prinzipien der Rechtsfortbildung im Europischen Rechtsraum:

    berlegungenzumLissabonUrteildesBVerfG,NEUEJURISTISCHEWOCHENSCHRIFT1(2010).

    40JohnHenryMerryman,TheItalianStyleIII: Interpretation,18STAN.L.R.583,586(1966).

    41SeeFRIEDRICHCARLVONSAVIGNY,VOMBERUFUNSERERZEITFRGESETZGEBUNGUNDRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT(1814).

    42 Italian legalscholarshipwith itsabstractconceptualismseemssimilar inmanyrespectstotheGermanone

    thoughwithoutSavignysconsciousandexplicitprogram. JohnHenryMerryman,TheItalianStyleI: Doctrine,18

    STAN.L.R.39,4548(1965).

    43 See RICHARDA. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICSOFMORAL AND LEGAL THEORY IX (2002) (using the expression moralentrepreneursforthese(partlylegal)scholars). However,IpreferthewordProphetasitratherexpressestheneedforfollowers.

    44 Thosewho do not like this approachmight consider the Prophet as a religious fanatic. For example, the

    descriptionofDworkinastheTalibanoftheWesternlegalthought.... RichardA.Posner,TheProblematicsofM l d L l Th 111 HARV L REV 1637 1695 (1998)

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    [Vol.12No.02766 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lUnfortunately, society is notmature enough yet and they donot see his truth. TheProphetistryingtoexplaintothemthatiftheydonotagreewithhim,theyarejustwrong.Butitisnotalwayssuccessful,soitisbettertotalktoamoreelevatedsectionofsociety,totheintellectualsandamongthemespeciallyjudges.

    OracleScientistsmightconsiderthetruthtobewhatthemajorityoftheirOrderthinks

    (herrschende

    Meinung). ButtheProphetdoesnotneedthemajorityofanyOrderorbody.TheProphetcan see the truthonhisown,withoutanyhelp fromothers. TheProphetthinksthatOracleScientistsandalsotheWisePragmatistsaredishonest,manipulative,pharisaic, and conspirative legal scholars who pretend not to move along their ownpoliticalmoralagendaandtobeneutraleventhoughtheyactuallydohaveaconsciouspoliticalagendabehindthefacadeofneutrality.

    47

    On thebaseof theConstitution (consideredas somekindofcodifiednatural lawof thegiven political community), theProphet can find out theOne SingleRightMoralVision

    (OSRMV)of thegiven society.48 TheConstitution isactuallybasedon theOSRMV,onlythatmostpeopledonotsee it. Asamatteroffact,onlytheProphetcansee it,ashe issuperhuman. Judgesare theavantgarde,theyhaveto leadsocialchange implementingtheOSRMV;especiallyjudgesfromthehighest(constitutionalorsupreme)courthavethistask. If they do not do it, they are heretics and betrayers.

    49 Democracy is of course

    (morally) good, but only if the people elect politicianswhowant tomake laws exactlyconformingtotheideasoftheProphet. Butifitisnothappening(asitisnothappening,asthe people have not yet recognized fully the Prophets truth), then judges have toimplement theOSRMV (relyingon theConstitution) insteadofpoliticians. TheProphet

    purportsthathehasbeenenlightenedabouttheOSRMV fromtheConstitution itself,sothere isnothingarbitrary inhismethod. Constitutionalcourt judgesandsupremecourtjudgesoftenfindhisideasappealingasthesehelpthemtoexpandtheirpowerandatthesametimetobuildupamoralimage.

    His critics doubt, however, whether the Constitution supports only one moral vision;instead,theysaythatseveralmoralvisionsfittotheConstitution.

    50 Thecriticssaythese

    thingsonlybecausetheydonotentirelyyetunderstandtheProphet. Withtime,thiswill

    47RONALDDWORKIN,LIFESDOMINION329,11847(1993).

    48SeeDWORKIN,supranote45,at22528,25458(basinglawasintegrityonacoherentmoralvision).

    49Cf.Dworkin,supranote38. SomeOracleScientistsfollowing aWeberianviewofscienceplainlydespisethe

    Prophetasunscientific. Cf.MAXWEBER,WISSENSCHAFTALSBERUF25(1996)(weilderProphetundderDemagogenichtaufdenKathedereinesHrsaalsgehren.)(becausetheprophetandthedemagoguedonotbelongtothelectern of a lecture hall ) Weber himself rather belongs to the SelfReflective category but his quoted text

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    definitely change, the more advanced teachings of the Prophet will prevail and theoutdated concurrentopinionswillall fail. TheProphets teachings are for eternity,butthesearesometimesaboutveryconcreteissues,soifanewcasecomesup,itisbettertoaskhimagain,sohecanteachussomethingnewandwise.

    TheProphetcanworkonly inacountrywhere the judiciary isprestigiousenough tobe

    braveenough tousehisOSRMV. In countrieswhere judgeshave legitimacy issues, theProphetsnotstrictlylegalconsiderationscanhaveonly limitedsuccess,asjudgesdonotdare touse such arguments. If judgespower stems from the legislator, then they areshyertotalkaboutmoralvisions,andtheyratherasktheOracleScientistaboutwhattodo.

    51 TheProphetsteaching isalsodifficult touse inpractice, if the respectivecountry

    does not have a written constitution, because it is even more difficult to claim theexistenceofOSRMVifithastofitachaoticancientprecedentsystem. TheProphetisthusmostlikelytosucceedincommonlawcountrieswithawrittenConstitution,andtoalesserextent,incivillawcountrieswithastrongconstitutionalcourtwhereprestigiousjudgesare

    sitting.52

    Italsohelpshisworkiftherearestrongnaturallawtraditionsinhiscountry.53

    TheProphetwantstoinfluencethelawthroughjudicialdecisions,eventhoughheisnotajudgehimselfasheismuchmorethanthat. Ifjudgesdonotfollowhim,hecanbesaidtohavefailed. AProphetwithoutfollowersisnoonebutanarrogantlunatic.

    D. AdvisingtheLegislatorWhattheLawShouldBe: TheLawReformer

    The Law Reformer does not reallywant to talk to judges. Shewants to convince thelegislator. Eitherbecausehedoesnottrustjudges,intellectuallyormorally,orbecausehethinksitismoredemocraticandtransparenttochangethelawbythelegislator. TheLawReformerdoesnotoften like judgemade lawatall. With the famouswordsofoneofthem:

    51Cf.PierreLegrand,EuropeanLegalSystemsarenotConverging,42INT'L&COMP.L.Q.52,7475(1996)(covering

    thedifferencebetweencommonlawandcivillawcountries). Heexplainsthatinthecommonlawperceptionthecourtspowerisoriginalitstemsfromthecommonlawandnotfromstatutesasopposedtocivillawcountrieswhereitstemsfromthelegislator. SeealsoStephenSedley,HumanRights: aTwentyFirstCenturyAgenda,PUB.L.386(1995)(discussingbipolarsovereigntyoftheCrowninParliamentandtheCrowninitscourts).

    52Unfortunately(fortheProphet),theconstitutionalcourtjudgesincivillawcountriesareoftenmembersofthe

    Order ofOracle Scientists, and they are not particularly impressed by the emotional parvenu Prophet. Theyprefer to follow their centuries old traditions of (seemingly) valueneutral scientific approach to law

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    [Vol.12No.02768 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lItisthejudges...thatmakethecommonlaw. Doyouknowhowtheymakeit? Justasamanmakeslawsforhisdog. When yourdogdoesanything youwant tobreakhimof,youwaituntilhedoes it,andthenyoubeathimforit. Thisisthewayyoumakelawsforyourdog: andthisisthewayjudgesmakelawforyouand

    me.54

    TheLawReformerhasplansforsociety,howtoimproveit,andhowtoadvanceit. Inorderto convince the legislator, he has to use policyarguments combined with moralconsiderations.

    Thistypeoflegalscholardominatedthelandscapeinsocialistcountries,wheretheofficialdoctrineofsocialistnormativismtriedtoturn judges into lawapplyingmachines,usingrather literal interpretation, and the official lawmaking power only lay with the

    Parliament. TheParliamentfollowedthescientificandmodernsocialistviewsinordertotransformsociety intosocialismand later intocommunism. Forthebigreformplantheyneeded advisors on how to use law as an instrument of social transformation. Theseadvisorswerelegalscholarspresentingdelegeferendaworksofferedtothelegislatorforfurther use.

    55 If the legislator is legally omnipotent (i.e., there are no constitutional

    constraints),56

    thenwedonothavetodealwithintricatedoctrinalquestionsatallandwecanconcentrateonthe instrumentalcharacterof law. Law isameanstochangesociety,andwe need lawyerswho can use this instrument. Themost important lawyer is thestatutedrafterorcodifier: theLawReformer. And if legalscholarswanttobeusefulto

    society(andnotjusttheorizefornoreason),thentheyshouldprepareproposalsfornewlaws.

    57 They have to use the results of social sciences within the frames of orders

    developedbypoliticians.

    If judgeshappen todevelopsomenew ideas then thescholarhas topresentaproposalhow tocodify it,as judgemade law isuncertain in thisparadigm (as theycouldchangetheir practice and their decisions aremore difficult to access than statutes): Only thelegislatormakes real law.

    58 Aworkwritten in thisstyle is relevantas longas the social

    54JeremyBentham,TruthVersusAsshurst,in5THEWORKSOFJEREMYBENTHAM23337,235(W.Taited.,1843).

    55SeeAndrsJakab,SurvivingSocialistLegalConceptsandMethods,inTHETRANSFORMATIONOFTHEHUNGARIANLEGAL

    ORDER1985200560619(AndrsJakabetal.eds.,2007).

    56Atthispoint,theWestminstersystemandthesocialistcountrieswereverysimilar.

    57The real task of legal scholarship is preparing proposals for new laws; otherwise legal scholarship is just useless

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    problemtobesolvedisstillthereand/orthelawfordealingwithithasbeenmade. Afterthis,thescholarlyworkcanbethrownaway.

    TheLawReformer issuccessful ifpoliticiansaccepthisorherproposals,and if inpracticethesenewlawswork. Thisapproachcanandsporadicallydoesexisteverywhere,butitissurprisingly strong in somepostsocialist countries,where (despite anew constitutional

    system) such oldmentalities based on the unlimited central legislator and on a nonautonomousjudiciarysurvived.59

    Itisgettingweaker,butprobablyforseveraldecadesitstraceswillremainstronginthesecountries.

    E. Explaining to Attorneys and Law Students What Judges or Legislators Did: The

    HumbleClerk

    TheHumbleClerksimplyrepeatswhatjudgesorlegislatorsdecided. Hisprimaryaudienceisattorneysand lawstudents. TheHumbleClerk isneverconsideredanauthority. Themorepreciseheisinrepeatingwhatjudgesandlegislatorssaid,thebetterclerkheis.

    TheHumbleClerkcanbeconsideredastheothertypeofblack letterscholarshipbesidestheOracleScientist. Also theHumbleClerk claimsneutrality; thedifference is that theHumbleClerk is actuallyneutral, ashe isnotdoing any creativework. He just repeats(copypastes),summarizes(thiscanbedangerouslycreativeandimprecise)anddescribes(neverprescribes). Thus, hedoes nothave touse any extralegal (moral or economic)argumentseither;thereisnothinginterdisciplinaryinwhatheisdoing.

    IftheHumbleClerkistryingtobecreativelyacademic,itgoesmiserablywrong. Heisjustnottrainedforsuchintellectualexercises. AnappositedescriptionoftheproblemisgivenbyDicey:

    Ourbestworks,suchasSmithsLeadingCases,areatbottom amere accumulation of notes on detachedpoints of curious, rather thanuseful, learning. Theyaredeficient inallgeneralconceptions, inallgraspof

    principles, in all idea of method. . . . Turn, forexample, to awriter whose bookwas twenty yearsagothestudentsguidetothelawofcontract. MrJWSmithopenshistreatisewithachapterontheNatureand Classification of Contracts. Of the nature ofcontractshe tellshis readernothing. Whathedoes

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    [Vol.12No.02770 Ge rman L aw J ou rna ltell them is that agreements consist of contracts ofrecord,contractsundersealandsimplecontracts. Hefirstsubstitutesdivisionfordefinition,andthengivesadivisionwhich,forabsoluteuninstructiveness,maybecomparedtoanattempttoclassifyanimalsbydividingthem intododos, lionsandallanimalswhicharenot

    dodosorlions.

    60

    TheprestigeoftheHumbleClerk is low. HestayedattheuniversitybecausehedidnotmakeittotheBar;heisaloserwhodoesnotdaretogooutintoreallife. Heisnotgoodenoughforthat,hecanonlybecomeaclerk. Orheisjustlazy,doesnotlikelongworkinghoursinlawfirms,andwantstoenjoythelongsummerholidaysatuniversities.

    Inacountrywherethemostprestigiousjobistheoneofthejudges,soifthejudgeistheliving oracle of the law,

    61 then the legal scholar cannot be anymore the oracle. If a

    HumbleClerkwritesacasenote,hecannotdaretoexpresscriticismonwhatthe judgessaid.

    62 Evenifsomethingisobviouslywrong,hecanonlydocumentwhatthejudgessaid,

    hecannottrytocorrectitortodissentfromit.63

    Dissentandcorrectionareforjudgesandlegislators.

    IfheseestheworkoftheOracleScientists,heispartlyimpressed,partlycriticalaboutitsartificialsystembuildinganddoubtswhether it isactuallythe lawasjudgeshavenotyetconfirmed it.

    64 HumbleClerkshavetobe impressedhowsmartthe judgesare,andthey

    have to note and repeat the words of those wise men and women as precisely as

    possible.65 Ifjudgesseeminglycontradictthemselvesoreachotheratrulyembarrassing

    60ALBERTVENNDICEY,CANENGLISHLAWBETAUGHTATTHEUNIVERSITIES?INAUGURALLECTURE,21APRIL188313(1883). As

    amatteroffact,arealOracleScientistwouldconsiderDiceysworks(forexample,ANINTRODUCTIONTOTHESTUDYOFTHECONSTITUTION(1959))exactlyasprimitiveandunsystematicashedoeshiscontractlawyercolleaguesbook.

    61WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,1COMMENTARIESONTHELAWSOFENGLAND69(1765).

    62Twiningetal.,supranote6,at937.

    63 Seegenerally John Smith,AnAcademic Lawyerand LawReform [PresidentialAddress,The SocietyofPublicTeachersofLaw],1LEGALSTUD.119(1981)(providinganecdotes).

    64SeeMichelleEverson,Isitjustme,oristhereanElephantintheRoom?,13EUR.L.J.136,138(2007)(criticizing

    theOracleScientists (here,PRINCIPLESOFEUROPEANCONSTITUTIONALLAW (JrgenBast&ArminvonBogdandyeds.,2006)) for seeing a systematic law where it actually does not exist; against the Germanic obsession ofsystematic and elitist authoritative legal doctrine). Everson also considers the object of her criticism thetheoryor doctrinebuilt up by German scholars most of whom however would probably not consider

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    situationforaclerkthentheHumbleClerkhastolookagain: Judgescannothavemadeamistake,somehowallthedecisionshavetoberight,andtheyjustmustbeunderstoodtherightway. Inhiseyes,all judicialdecisionsareright,unlessanother judicialdecisionorastatutetellsyoulaterthatthosewerewrong.

    Unfortunately, judgesdonotcareaboutwhatthe loserclerkssay,theyhardlyquoteany

    scholars.

    66

    Judgesevenopenlydespiselegalscholarshipandtalkaboutthedangers,wellperceivedbyourpredecessorsbut tending tobeneglected inmodern times,ofplacingrelianceontextbookauthorityforananalysisofjudicialdecisions.

    67 Judgesinsuchalegal

    ordermightevenregarditascomplimentarytobetoldthattheyaresuspectedofhavinglittleinterestintheoryoranacademicapproachtolegalissues.

    68

    Ifanacademicwantstodosomethingintellectuallychallenginginsuchalegalculture,thenhe isdoing research about lawwith nonlegal (sociological,political science, economic)methods (sociolegal studies), or he is writing about very abstract theoretical issues

    (jurisprudence,constitutionaltheory). ThusshehastobecomeaSelfReflective.

    TousetheexpressionsbyAlexanderSomek,theHumbleClerkclaimsandaimsdescriptiveaccuracy about lawand what is the same for him, judicial decisionsbut lacks thecriticaledge. WhereastheOracleScientistalsoclaimsdescriptiveaccuracyofthelaw,but in the name of this descriptive accuracy he has the critical edge against judicialdecisions. According to Somek,we can see a change inmentality, the critical edge isfading. Iseethesituationslightlydifferently. Itistruethatsuchmentalitieschangeovertime,but Iseethedifferencesrathergeographically. Incontinentalcountries,theOracle

    Scientististhetypicalblackletterlegalscholar;intheU.K.,theHumbleClerk;traditionallyin the U.S., it is rather what I call later theWise Pragmatist and nowadays the SelfReflective. Thedifferencesdescribedbyhimarethuslessaquestionofthehistoryoflegaltheorybutratherofcomparativelaw.

    Traditionally the Humble Clerk is the typical English law school memberlacking thescholarlyambitionoftheOracleScientistasWilliamTwiningdescribedthesituationwiththefollowingfictitiouspicture:

    66Cf.HeinKtz,ScholarshipandtheCourts:AComparativeStudy, inCOMPARATIVEANDPRIVATEINTERNATIONALLAW:

    ESSAYSINHONOUROFJOHNH. MERRYMANONHISSEVENTIETHBIRTHDAY183195(D.S.Clarksed.,1990)(showingthatas opposed to thirteen secondary authority per judgment inGermany,where the academia is dominated byOracleScientistsinEngland,dominatedbyHumbleClerks,youfindonly0,77inaverage).

    67Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 395 per Lord Wilberforce (House of Lords)

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    [Vol.12No.02772 Ge rman L aw J ou rna l[A]caseexhibitingasampleofrecentpublicationsbytheFaculty, fourslimmonographs,aboutadozen fatbooks addressed to the student market (three ofwhich arepast their thirdeditions)andanumberofoffprintswithobscure titles,which somemight thinkareselfaddressed. Noroomcouldbefoundherefor

    rathermore lucrative publications, such as nutshells(or other student aids), contributions to looseleafpractitioners services, and occasional journalism.First impressions suggest that this is primarily ateaching institution, which is quite a vocationallyoriented,butwhich is trying tobuilduphis researchprofile.

    69

    InEngland,asopposedtotheContinentortheU.S.,evenformajorscholarlytasksneeded

    bythegovernment,judgesseemrathertobetherightcandidates.70

    Ifthereisaneedforanimportantreportaboutthelegalsystem,thenratherjudgesseemtohavethenecessaryintellectual andmoral qualification for it.

    71 Legal scholars can quote them later and

    disseminatethejudgesprofoundideas.

    Incountries,whereinsteadofthejudge(andthejudgemadelaw)theemphasisison(theliteralmeaningof)codified law, theHumbleClerknotesand repeatswhat the legislatorsaid. If the legislatorchanges the law,all the formerworksof theClerkcanbe thrownaway.

    72 In thisperception, it ispossible to runa legal systemwithoutanykindof legal

    scholarship.73 Legalscholarshipisthusnotanintellectuallyvaluablework,eventhoughitmightbeusefultodothesecretarialpartofrunningthelegalsystemasthelegalmaterialisjustbigtooverviewit.

    74

    69WILLAMTWINING,BLACKSTONESTOWER: THEENGLISHLAWSCHOOL69(1994).

    70ATIYAH&SUMMERS,supranote53,at38687.

    71SeeGlidewellReport(TheReviewoftheCrownProsecutionService,1998),WoolfReport(ReportonAccessto

    CivilJustice,1996),AuldReport(ReviewoftheCriminalCourtsofEnglandandWales,2001). Even ifacademics

    writesometimessuchofficialreports,itisnotobviousfortheEnglishasopposedtothecontinentalortheUSperceptionthatacademicsshouldbetheprimaryauthorsinsuchcases.

    72 See KIRCHMANN, supranote 3, at 17 ([D]rei berichtigendeWorte desGesetzgebers und ganzeBibliotheken

    werden zuMakulatur.) (Three correctingwordsof the legislatorandwhole librariesbecomewastepaper.).ThatisthereasonwhyOracleScientistsoftenopposelawreforms: itwouldruintheiroeuvre. Cf.id.at11. ForapowerfulresponsebyKarlLarenz,seeKarlLarenz,UberdieUnentbehrlichkeitderJurisprudenzalsWissenschaft,JURISTISCHENGESELLSCHAFT BERLIN (2006) availale at http://www juristischegesellschaft de/schriften/26 pdf

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    F. AdvisingJudgesAboutSociallyBestDecisions: TheWisePragmatist

    TheWisePragmatistiswritingforjudges;heisadvisingthemaboutsociallybestdecisions.In doing so, law in a strict sense is only one factor for him besides common sense,sociologyoreconomy;heisusingthuspolicyargumentsveryoften.

    Ingeneral,hetakesthenormativityoflaw lessseriously. Toformulate itinacynicalandprovocative way: The prophecies of what courts will do in fact, and nothing morepretentious, are what Imean by the law,

    75 or [g]eneral propositions do not decide

    concrete cases.76

    His doubt in the normativity of law makes him characteristicallydifferentfromtheOracleScientist,theHumbleClerk,andtheProphet. Healso lackstheintellectuality of the Oracle Scientist and the moralism of the Prophet. He is ratherinstrumentalistandutilitarian.

    AsopposedtotheLawReformer,hedoesnotdistrustjudges. Itisrathertheopposite: aprecondition of the existence of the Wise Pragmatisttype legal scholar is exactly aprestigious and trusted judiciarywhich dares to use not strictly legal argumentsin asocietywherejudgesareratherconsideredtobestatebureaucratsofthemouthpieceofthelawtypethisapproachisunlikelytosucceed. AlsoasopposedtotheLawReformer,thedifference between legal and nonlegal arguments is less sharp for him. TheWisePragmatistdoesnot take seriously thedifferencebetweenwhat the law is andwhat itshould be,whereas the LawReformerwants to see a sharp line.

    77 The LawReformer

    protects

    his

    own

    competence

    for

    changing

    the

    lawor

    at

    least

    advising

    the

    legislator

    about itin this way, whereas the Wise Pragmatist is helping to expand judgespossibilitiesbyblurringthefrontier. Inthissense,theWisePragmatist is inherentlyantipositivistor at least, asHolmes, an antiformalist positivistand the Law Reformer ispositivistandformalist.

    Another precondition for the existence of Wise Pragmatists is the inefficiency oflegislation. IntheU.K.therearenosuchproblems(cf.parliamentarysovereigntymeaninginpracticethesovereigntyoftheHouseofCommonsinwhichnormallyonlyonepartyisin

    Reformers,theywerejustclerksofcommunistpoliticiansrepeatingpartyresolutions,notproposinglawreform.Itwas (existentially) risky topropose anythingnew, as communist leadersmighthavedisagreed, so the legalscholar could lose his job or even more. See MICHAEL STOLLEIS, SOZIALISTISCHE GESETZLICHKEIT: STAATSUNDVERWALTUNGSRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTINDERDDR(2009)(providingadditionaldetailsandstories).

    75OliverWendellHolmes,LawinScienceandScienceinLaw,12HARV.L.REV.443(1899).

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    [Vol.12No.02774 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lgovernment,and thispartys internaldiscipline is strong),and this typeof legal scholarcouldnotemerge.

    78 In theU.S.,however,where the separationofpowers in the law

    making power (possessed by three politically distinct and powerful organs together:Senate, House of Representatives, and President), the lack of party discipline in theCongress (and consequently the numerous unexpected amendments proposed bymembers of the Congress),

    79 the rather low quality of legislative drafting,

    80 the

    constitutional

    limits

    (as

    interpreted

    by

    the

    Supreme

    Court),

    and

    the

    higher

    speed

    of

    changing social circumstances81

    all contribute to the eminent need for judicial lawmaking.

    82 Judges seem to be able tomake law in theU.S.more speedily

    83 andmore

    cheaply84

    than the legislator. It alsomeans that judges in theU.S.have to look at thefuture(solutionsforsocialchallenges)ratherthanatthepast(caselaw).

    85 Consequently,

    judgesadhere lesstothedoctrineofstaredecisis,anddeviate frompastdecisionsmoreoften.

    86 Buttheyaregratefulforadviceasto inwhichdirectiontheyshoulddoso. This

    advice isveryoftennot legal(istic)atall,butuseseconomicorsocialarguments (e.g., intheformofaBrandeisBrief).

    87

    Judges in theU.S. are also often ratherpoliticians (state judges are sometimesdirectlyelectedby the localpopulation for a limited term, federal judgesareappointedmostlyexactlybecauseofpartymembershipand loyalty,sotheiraudienceismuchlessthe legal

    78SeeATIYAH&SUMMERS,supranote53,at141,149(explainingthatLegalchangeintheUKisratherintroducedby

    legislation,whichispreparedbyhighlyeducatedcivilservantsandnotbylegalscholars).

    79Id.at 314.

    80Id.at37,334.

    81Id.at134.

    82Seeid.at270([T]herecanbelittledoubtthatoneoftheprincipalreasonsthatAmericancourtsmakesomuch

    lawisthat[bycomparisonwithBritishParliament]Americanlegislaturesmakesolittle.).

    83MauriceRosenberg,AnythingLegislaturesCanDo,CourtsCanDoBetter?,62A.B.A.J.587(1976).

    84RICHARDNEELY,HOWCOURTSGOVERNAMERICA30,71(1981).

    85 SeeROSCOEPOUND,AN INTRODUCTION TO THEPHILOSOPHYOF LAW47 (1922) (discussing the conceptof Judgesas

    socialengineers).

    86ATIYAH&SUMMERS,supranote53,at11827. IntheUK,highercourtsbindthemselves(withsomeexceptions);

    intheU.S.theycanoverruletheirownpastdecisions. IntheU.S.,evenalowercourtcanoverruleapastdecisionofahighercourtifitexpectsthehighercourttooverrule it(anticipatoryoverruling). Thedeviationfromthestaredecisis ispartlycausedby thesizeoftheU.S.; thereare just toomany judicialdecisions tohaveastrictstaredecisis. Oncethestaredecisisisloosenedup,thereisalsomoreroomtofollowacademicopinions. Id.at32 12830 148

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    profession than theelectingpeopleor theappointingpoliticians), sononlegal (political,social, policy, moral) arguments are much more acceptable for them than in othercountries.

    88

    Asthelawisdifficulttochangebylegislation,itisbetternottohavedescriptiveaccuracyabout law, because itwouldmean thatwemight discover the need for (cumbersome)

    legislation.

    Rather,

    problems

    can

    be

    solved

    in

    a

    practical

    manner

    if

    we

    consider

    law

    as

    aimingformeaningfulsocialpurposesand interpret it inthecourts liberally. Tofindoutthesepurposes,academic literaturecanbeofgreathelp. TheOracleScientistcouldalsogivesuchadvice,butintheU.S.nobodyreallybelievesthatthelawisinfactassystematicas allOracles Scientists profess. Law seems rather to be a practical device tomanagesociety. The technical language of advice by the Oracle Scientist does not give anysubstantivereasonseitherwhythefinaldecisionshouldbeaccepted(bythepeopleorbythepoliticians).

    89 Andalso importantly,exceptforsomeEuropean immigrantsthereare

    just no Oracle Scientists in the U.S., and even if theywrite about a question in their

    legalisticstyle,anAmericanjudge justdoesnotgetthemastheirscholarly languageandstyleareoutof touchwithherneedsand interests. If somebody tries tobeanOracleScientistinsuchalegalculture(likeLangdelldid),hewillbedismissedasaformalistandhewillfail.

    90

    Because of the nonprofessional factors in the selection of judges, sometimes thenecessary intellectual capacity is also missing to be able to understand the OracleScientists: Itisamazinghowmanyjudgesespecially,butnotexclusively,statejudgeslackthebasicintelligencetounderstandamoderatelycomplexlegalargument. Someare

    just plain stupid; others lack the necessary legal education; still others are lazy andimpatient.

    91

    Forthosejudgeswholackthedoctrinaltechnicallegalknowledge,itisjusteasiertodecidethecaseon its substantivemerits.

    92 Tocounter thementionedunfavorable intellectual

    88ATIYAH&SUMMERS,supranote53,at342,344,35051,379. ThisisverydifferentfrombothcivillawcountriesandEngland. Forthelatter,seeLordScarmaninMcLoughlinv.OBrian[1983]1ACat340aboutthenecessaryabstinenceofEnglishjudgesfrompolicy.

    89Inanonelitistculture,thereasonshavetobeunderstandableandacceptablealsoforthegeneralpublic. But

    seeATIYAH&SUMMERS,supranote53,at38,225,232(contrastingwiththeU.K.).

    90 I am afraid that Professor Somek fightswithin the sameenvironment as Professor Langdell didmore than

    hundredyearsago,andhisambitionthatthecriticaledgeoflegalscholarshipshouldbeusedinaconstructive(rather than clerkwise)manner is similarlydoomed to fail. Professor Somekwants toproclaim thepowerofOracle Scientists in a countrywhere there is hardly anybodywith such an ambition andwhere the general( titi j di i l) t lit i l d t ll it

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    [Vol.12No.02776 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lphenomena, sometimes prestigious Wise Pragmatist professors are appointed to thehighest judicial positions without any previous practical experience (but with wellidentifiablepoliticalsympathies),wheretheyoftenbring intheirsociologicaloreconomicapproaches.

    93

    AsAmericanlegislationissporadic,andthelawmakingpowerisinamuchlargerextentin

    the

    hands

    of

    judges

    than

    in

    other

    countries,

    and

    as

    the

    stare

    decisis

    is

    less

    adhered

    to,

    the

    dangerof legaluncertainty ismore imminent. The legislatorcannotencounterthis legaluncertaintybecause of its inefficiency, the judges cannot do itbecauseof the (casebycase) nature of judicial law making either. So, legal scholars (Wise Pragmatists,cooperatingwith judgesandpractitioners)havetodo it, in the formofRestatementsoftheLaw.

    94 TheRestatement ismorecreativethan theHumbleClerkswork,but itdoes

    nothavethescientificambitionoftheOracleScientistswritingseither.95

    Itjustwantstohelp judges, like theWisePragmatistalwaysdoes. But italsogives theopportunity for(some) lawreforms: Thecase law issochaotic,contradictoryandhugethatyoucanuse

    yourownpolicyideastochoosetherightones.

    Even if the legislatordidnotagreewith theway judicialcase law isevolving (under theinfluenceoftheWisePragmatists),itcannotcounteritsoeasilybecauseofitsmentionedefficiency problems and because of the constitutional constraints.

    96 The constitutional

    constraints themselvesare in thehandsof judgesTheConstitution iswhat the judgessayitis

    97andtheConstitutionispracticallyunamendable.

    ThebalancebetweenthelegislatorandthejudgeisverydifferentintheU.K.andtheU.S.

    Consequentlyand notably contradicting to some rough continental Europeanprejudicestheroleandprestigeof legalscholars isalsoverydifferent(prestigiousWisePragmatistvs.nobodyHumbleClerk):

    93Id.at340,345.

    94Similarly,seetheworkoftheAmericanLawInstitute,availableathttp://www.ali.org/. Intheirselfdescription,[t]heAmericanLaw Institute is the leading independentorganization in theUnitedStatesproducingscholarlyworktoclarify,modernize,andotherwise improvethe law. TheRestatementsofLawdonothaveanyformalvalidity,butareneverthelessveryinfluentialwithastrongpersuasiveforce.

    95Ininternationallaw,awellknownexampleoftheWisePragmatistapproachistheNewHavenSchool. MICHAEL

    REISMAN, THE VIEW FROM THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARYPERSPECTIVE(1992). ThisapproachneverhadanysuccessintheOracleScientistdominatedGermaninternationall l h l hi

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    Perhaps nothing illustrates the gulf which stillseparatesEnglishandAmericanlawschoolsmorethantheyway inwhichEnglandspremier law journal,TheLaw Quarterly Review, has been taken over by thepractisingprofession,beingeditedfromchambers inLondonbyaCircuitjudge. Wedoubtifanythingshort

    of

    a

    constitutional

    amendment

    could

    shift

    the

    control

    of theHarvard Law Review to aWall Street firm ofattorneys!

    98

    Another factor helping the influence of theWise Pragmatist is that American federaljudges have law clerks. They are fresh law school graduateswhowere often studenteditors of law reviews and are keen to use that knowledge or their interdisciplinaryeducation.

    99 Theirinterdisciplinaryorientationisduepartlytothefactthatlawisasecond

    degreeintheU.S.,sotheyhavetohaveafirstdegreeinsomethingnonlegal,andpartlyto

    thefactthatAmericanlegaleducationingeneraltendstobemoreinterdisciplinary(maybealsobecauseoftheabovedescribedneedforinterdisciplinarity)thanothercountrieslegaleducation.

    G. Theorizing About Law and Legal Scholarship for Other Legal Scholars: The Self

    Reflective

    TheSelfReflectivewritesforfellowacademics;shedoesnoteventrytobeusefulforlegalpractitioners.

    100 Most legaltheoristsat leastwhodonotwanttomakeadirect impact

    on how the legal order is runbelong to this category of legal scholars.101 But alsorepresentativesoflawandmovementsorcomparative lawyerswouldmostlycounttothisgroup,unlesstheygivepracticaladviceeitherforthelegislatororforthejudges,whatwouldmakethembelongtooneoftheformerlymentionedrolemodels.

    98ATIYAH&SUMMERS,supranote53,at388n.5.

    99 Ronald A. Cass & Jack M. Beerman, Throwing Stones at the Mudbank: The Impact of Scholarship on

    Administrative Law,45ADMIN.L.REV.1,89(1993). Lawclerksremainonlyoneyearatthecourt,ensuringthatnewintakealwaysbringsfreshacademicairtothecourt.

    100Also,academicsbelongingtoothergroupssometimesthemselveswriteSelfReflectiveworks(e.g.,thequoted

    writings of Jhering), but they do not consider it the primary task of legal scholars. For them, it is rather amethodological pre or metawork And on the other hand SelfReflectives might make short excursions into

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    [Vol.12No.02778 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lAsopposedtotheformermodels inwhichthere isahierarchy inprestigebetween legalscholarsandpractitioners(theOracleScientist,theWisePragmatist,theProphetandtheLawReformerarehigherthanthepractitioner,theHumbleClerkislower),herethereisnohierarchy. TheSelfReflectiveissimplyplayinginadifferentfield. Sheisnotimpressedbypractitioners,andshedoesnotwanttoimpresspractitioners. Shewantstostayfulltimeintheivorytower,shedoesnotreallycarewhatisgoingonoutsideintherealworld. Her

    audience

    are

    either

    other

    Self

    Reflectives,

    or

    the

    Oracle

    Scientists,

    the

    Wise

    Pragmatists,

    theProphets,orLawReformers. Sheissuccessful ifshecan influencewhatheraudiencethinksorwrites,andcanbemeasuredbythenumberofquotationshegetsorbythefactthatshepublishes in renownedandpopularscholarly forums (e.g. inpeer reviewed lawreviews). Maybeshedoesnotevenwanttoinfluencetheseotheracademics,butshejustwantstoprovokethem.

    102

    As shedoesnot considerherselfaspartof the legal (practical)discourse,but ratherasleadingametadiscourseaboutthe legaldiscourse,she isnot limitedto legalarguments.

    Shecanusemoral,economicorphilosophical (philosophyofscience,etc.)arguments.103

    Asher ideasarebound to thechanging law,butareverygeneral,sheaims towrite foreternity,andherchances tobe readable long termareactuallybetter, than the similarambitionsoftheOracleScientistoroftheProphet.

    You can find such legal scholars (they do not necessarily consider themselves as legaltheorists) inmost lawschools,butthe likelihoodoftheirexistence ishigher, ifthere isaregular bureaucratized scholarship assessment. In the latter case, legal academicswillevaluate thework of legal academics and theyobviously appreciatemoreworkswhich

    havebeenaddressedexplicitlytothem. Thus,academicswillwanttoimpressonlyfellowacademicswhodecideabouttheirtenureanddonotcareatallaboutpracticability.

    The phenomenon is wellknown in the U.S., where they talk about the growing gapbetween legalacademia, including legaleducation,andthe legalprofession.

    104 The legal

    scholarship is rarely quoted by courts and not respected by legal academics, and therespectedworks are absolutelyuseless for practitionersuse.

    105 Statistically, there is a

    102Thisprovocationmight consistofdestroyingorat leastpointingout the selfdeceptionofOracleScientists

    abouttheirneutralityandobjectivity. COWNIE,supranote65,at5153(discussingCriticalLegalStudiesfromthisperspective).

    103 Interdisciplinaryandmultidisciplinaryapproachesarealsoused. GUNNARFOLKESCHUPPERT,STAATSWISSENSCHAFT

    (2003);GUNNARFOLKESCHUPPERT,VERWALTUNGSWISSENSCHAFT(2000).

    104HarryT.Edwards,TheGrowingDisjunctionbetweenLegalEducationandtheLegalProfession,91MICH.L.REV.

    34,3478(1992);Twiningetal.,supranote6,at931. AnotherreasonforthegapintheU.S.isthatlawschools

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    2011] 779RoleModelsofLegalScholars

    cleardecline in judicialquotesofscholarlyworks,106

    whichcanalsobeexplainedby thepopulartopicschosenbynewergenerationsoflegalacademics.

    IntheU.K.,whereforalongtimesuchmechanismsdidnotexist,thisgapwasunknown,107

    but the RAE (Research Assessment Exercise)108

    is pushing legal scholarship in thisdirection.

    109 Theunfavorablesideeffectofsuchchanges isthat lesstalentedpeoplewill

    workasOracleScientists,asHumbleClerks,orasWisePragmatists,thusthattypeofblackletterlegalresearchisfading.

    110

    Anotherproblemisthattheselfperpetuating,selfreferential,andcloseddiscourseoftheSelfReflectiveswillbegintoliveitsownlife. Youaresuccessfulinthediscourseifyouaresuccessful inthediscourse. Thistautologicalwayofmeasuringsuccessresultsintryhardoriginality, sexy titles (which catch the eyes), provocative quotes, and counterintuitivetheses. Suchpaperswillprobablyneverbe readby anyone. The latter seems tobeafailure for the SelfReflective (and to a certain extent it is), but in a bureaucratized

    scholarshipassessmentsystem itcanbecomesecondary: once theoutput is there (inagood lawreview), itscontentor influence(which ismoredifficulttomeasure)countless.So themainpoint inpublicationswillbe to look like somethingveryoriginal,paradigmshiftingandbrilliant inorder tobeaccepted forpublication.

    111 In theU.S.,where such

    behaviorisflourishing,[a]lawprofessorwithnoformalqualificationsinphilosophymightundertakeaprojectofremarkablephilosophicalambitionandpublishitinajournaleditedbyindividualswhonotonlyareequallyunlikelytohaveanyphilosophicalqualificationsbutwhohaveyettobecomequalifiedinlaw.

    112 Asamatteroffact,youjusthavetolooklike

    adeep thinker,youhave to sellyourproductonce,youdontgiveanyguarantees,and

    then you can go to the next law review.113

    The best ones can aim for a successful

    106LouisJ.SiricoJr,TheCitingofLawReviewsbytheSupremeCourt: 197199,75IND.L.J.1009(2000).

    107Twiningetal.,supranote6,at940.

    108Since1986,approximatelyeveryfiveyears,thequalityofresearchatUKhighereducationinstitutionswillbe

    evaluated on behalf of the higher education funding councils. The core of the evaluation is that fulltimemembersof thehighereducation institutionssubmita limitednumberofwritingswhichwillbe readbyotherlegalacademicsandevaluatedaccordingly. Formore informationseehttp://www.rae.ac.uk/. Thenameofthesystem is changing, but its relevant content (as to the topic of this paper) remains the same, seehttp://www.hefce.ac.uk/Research/ref/.

    109COWNIE,supranote65,at136;Twiningetal.,supranote6,at925.

    110Twiningetal.,supranote6,at932.

    111DanielA. Farber,TheCaseAgainstBrilliance,70MINN.L.REV.917(1986).

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    [Vol.12No.02780 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lprovocationinthedebate(andnotthesolutionofanyproblem),butthediscourseisjustsobig,thatyourvoiceseemshopelessly low intheloudcrowd. Itlookslikeyouworkforeternity,butyoujustworkforyournextpublication,becausethisisexpectedfromyouattheuniversity. From theambitionedeternal truth, sowillbeanunreadableamountofmediocreinterdisciplinary(lawand)scholarshipwithonlyafewqualityexceptions.

    114

    Ifyoualsomeasureinfluencebythenumberofcites,thenthepicturelooksabitdifferent.Thecitecountingmethodhasbeenheavilycriticizedas itdoesnotgivearealpictureofthequalityof legalscholarshiponeproduces.

    115 Sometimesyougetcitedseveraltimes,

    becauseeverybodywants to showhowwrongyouwere. Sometimesyougetcitesonlybecausetheotherscholarwantstofillupfootnotes. Oftentreatisesarequoted,whichjustsummarize the law, butwhich do not offer any new ideas. And if an article becomeswidelyaccepted,thenthedistortioncanworkinbothways: eitheryouwillbequotedbyeverybody,

    116oryouwillnotbequotedbecauseyouropinionissowidelyacceptedthatit

    isnotanymoreconnectedtoyoupersonally.117

    Even a kind of partly ironic selfhelp literature has evolved to analyze the nature ofcitationsandtogiveadviceonhowtowincites. Theadviceisthefollowing:

    Maxim One: (Make sure that you have already)Attend(ed)Harvard,Yale,ortheUniversityofChicagoLaw Schools. . . . Maxim Two: Publish all of yourarticles in the Harvard Law Review, the Yale LawJournal,ortheUniversityofChicagoLawReview. . . .MaximThree: Takea jobasanassistantprofessorat

    the Harvard, Yale, or University of Chicago LawSchool.

    118

    Ifthethreemaximsarefollowed,thenyourarticlesaremuchmorelikelytogetcitesthanotherwise. Asamatteroffact,youdonotgetpositionsatgooduniversitiesbecauseyour

    portionofU.S. lawreviewscontainbasicallyeitherSelfReflectivepapers,whichareaSelbstzweckwithnonoteven a pretendusefulness for the world outside academia. The rest of the papers fit Professor Someksdescription,andheisrightinthesensethatthemajorityofpapersfallsintohiscategory.

    114Fora similarview, seeEdwards, supranote104,at36;Kenneth Lason,ScholarshipAmok: Excesses in the

    PursuitofTruthandTenure,103HARV.L.REV.926(1990).

    115Cass&Beerman,supranote99,at23.

    116J.M.Balkin&SanfordLevinson,HowtoWinCitesandInfluencePeople,71CHI.KENTL.REV.843,845(1996)(By

    gaininganincreasingpresenceinthat[discourse]space,thecanonicalworkmaycreateanincreasinglyhospitablei t f it d ti i th i d f f t d i )

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    2011] 781RoleModelsofLegalScholars

    articlesareoftenquoted,butrather,theotherwayaround: Yougetquotedbecauseyouhaveapositionataprestigiousuniversity. Studentsoryoungscholarsaimingfortenurewillquoteyou,becausetheycannotjudgetheactualqualityofarticles,sotheygofortheproxies (i.e.,who published it and inwhich journal).

    119 After they get a tenure, their

    productivitywillnormallydecline so the realmarket forcites isnot theoneof tenuredprofessors (forwhomveryoften studentsdo the researchanyway),but rather studentsandassistantprofessors.

    Youshouldalsoforgetaboutwhat is important fortherealworld;youshouldratheraskyourselfwhatcanbequoted: Ifwehaveonebasicpieceofadviceabouttopicselection,its this: Neverconfusewhats important in theworldoutside law schoolswithwhat isimportantinlawreviews.

    120

    Even if selfcites do not count inmost systems, it is still useful to advertise your ownwritings wherever it is possible, so you should not shy away from that. Thus for a

    consciousandsuccessfulimpressionmanagementyouneedsomeshamelessness:

    (1)Citeyourself,earlyandoften. (2)Getyourfriendstociteyouwheneveryoucan. . . . Werealizethat ittakes abitof chutzpah to shamelessly selfcite. Butafterawhile,youllgetoverit. Believeus,manyotherpeopleinthelegalacademyalreadyhave.... Friendsareusuallymore thanhappy tociteyou,especially ifyouoffertocitetheminreturn. Sometimes,however,

    theyneedabitofcajolingdoingtherightthing. Makeyour friends feelguilty if theydontciteyou inalloftheir articles. Tell themhowhurt you are that theyare neglecting you and your ideas. If all else fails,accuse them of insensitivity, plagiarism, or worse.Sure itmaystrainthefriendship,butarenttheextracitesworthit?

    121

    Andfinally,theactualcontentofthearticlecountsevenless,thanweliketoadmitit. The

    article rather needs new keywords, or it has to be able to symbolize amovement, anapproachorapoliticalstance,i.e.ithastobecomeanicon. Ifyoumanagetocatchthisrole,thanyourarticlewillbecomecanonicalandgetcitedagainandagainoftenwithout

    119Id t 860

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    [Vol.12No.02782 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lbeing read.

    122 So,whenyouchoose topicorkeywords,you shouldbear this featureof

    legalscholarlydiscourseinmind.

    H. TellingthePublicWhattheLawIs: TheMediaStar

    Ineverycountryweknowdifferent legalscholarsturninguponTVorbeing interviewed

    regularly in newspapers. Some of them do have an otherwise respected scholarlyactivityAlan Dershowitz as aWise Pragmatist;123others just do notthe latter ones

    shouldremainunnamedoutofcourtesy.

    TheMediaStarhastobeunderstandable,evenat thecostofbeingprecise, incasesheevenhastobefunny. Hehastounderstandwhatthepeopleactuallydonotunderstand.Hehas an important function inbringing law closer to thepublic, thusmaking itmoretransparent or even democratic in an epistemological sense. It helps to run the legalsystemeitherbymakingaddresseesawareofthelaworbymakingthembelievethatthe

    lawmakessenseandthatitisnotasecretandintrinsicknowledge. HeisnotrunningthelegalsystemfrominsideasaMediaStar,butisonlyhelpingoutsidersunderstandwhatishappeninginside.

    Unfortunately, theircolleaguesdonotreally respecthimorat leastnot forhisbeingamediastar,butforhisotherscholarlyactivitiesmaybe becausehisaudiencearenotevenlawyers and because he consequently has to be imprecise in order to remainunderstandabletolaypersons. Itisalsoadangerousfunctioninthesensethatthepromptopinionsrequiredbythemediadonotleaveenoughtimetothinkaboutthemthoroughly,

    soeventhebestscholarsmakemistakesmoreeasilyanddamagethustheirownscholarlyreputation.

    TheMediaStarmightevenexpresshisor thegeneralpublicswishestochangethe law,anditmightevenhaveaneffect,ifpoliticiansthinkthatleavingunchangedthelawwouldoutragethepublic. AsopposedtotheLawReformerhedoesnotgivehisadviceinpersontopoliticiansaboutsuchchanges,heratherproclaimsinthemediawhatthepeoplewant.He can be considered as successful if he can influence publicdebates and if hismediacoverage ishigh. Hisviewsareaimedatthemoment;nobodyexpectsthemtobeuseful

    longterm.

    If the Media Star proposes to change the law, then she is usually using nonlegalarguments. If,however,shesimplyexplainswhatthelawis,thensheremainswithinthestrictlimitsoflegalreasoning. TheMediaStarcanexistincountrieswherethepressisfree

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    2011] 783RoleModelsofLegalScholars

    andwhere the public is interested, but also in dictatorships if the regime decides thatpopulationneedssomelegaleducationthroughTV,etc.

    TheMediaStarhasnowherenearafulltimejob;there isnocountrywherehewouldbedominantamongst legalacademics. Even ifsomebody isfulfillingthisfunctionasa legalscholar,heorshefulfilsoneoftheotherrolemodelsasmentionedabove. Ifnot,thensheor he is usually not even considered as a legal scholar, only as a media figure. Bydefinition,thereareonlyafewMediaStar legalscholars ineverycountry. HeisaMediaStarexactlybecausethemediacoveragepossibilitiesarelimitedandhemanagedtocatchaconsiderablepartofit.

    I. WhichOneIstheIdealLegalScholar?

    Askingwhichof the above rolemodels is the ideal is similar to askingwhich footballplayeristheidealone: thegoalkeeper,thedefender,themidfielderortheforward. They

    dodifferent jobs,but theycouldall contribute toa better common result. Ina legalsystem,theroleoflegalscholarscouldbeperceivedassimilarlymanifold,butjustlikeinafootballteamyouhavetobecarefulaboutroleproportions. Ateamconsistingoftengoalkeepers isunlikely towin. Anda legalorder fullofProphets isunlikely to functionproperly. Sothequestionshouldbe:Whatistheidealproportionofrolemodels?

    Butaswehaveseen,itisnotevenaboutuniversalproportions,asmuchdependsontheinstitutional contextandon thepotentialaudienceof the respectivecountrywhere thelegal scholar isworking. Some rolemodels are just not needed at all in certain legal

    cultures,whileotherrolemodelsareneededabitlessorabitmore.124Therealtaskoflegalscholarsisthusonlypartlyanissueoflegaltheory;itisinanevenbiggerpartratheraproblemofcomparativelaw. IncontinentalEuropeancountriestheOracleScientistseemstobethetypicalandmostlyneeded legalscholar;intheU.K.,theHumbleServant; intheU.S., theWisePragmatist;and inmoderatedictatorshipsorpostdictatorial regimes theLawReformer;thoughinverysmallnumbers,wecandiscoveralmostevery(butnotevery)rolemodelinthenamedcountries.

    TheSelfReflectiveseems tobe themost international roleofallashedoesnot try tohelptoruna legalsystemwhich isdifferentfromhisoriginal legalculturesothis istherole one can take up themost easilywhen changing country as a legal scholar. SelfReflectivescansimplygivenew insights intogeneralquestionsof lawor theycancoachotherlegalscholars.

    125 Ifsheis inheroriginallegalculture,thenthesecondseemslikea

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    [Vol.12No.02784 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lmoreoftenneededtask. Butnobodycanexpecta trulyEuropeanscholar in theU.S. totrainWise Pragmatists, not because he could not, but because itwould contradict hiswholearspoetica. Andontheotherhand,wedonotinviteAmericanscholarstoEuropeto coach us aboutmethodological problems of Rechtsdogmatik. We do it becausewewant to exercise our brainsby seeing somethingwhich is verydifferent fromwhatwebelieve in,andbesidessatisfyingthepurecuriosityaboutAmerican law,wealsohopetounderstandourveryowndifferingroleperceptionasalegalscholaralittlebitbetter.

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    Annex

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    Audience Ideal

    Function

    Perversion Aimed

    Influence

    onthe

    Law

    Prestigein

    theGeneral

    Legal

    Community

    and

    Amongst

    Other

    Scholars

    Measureof

    Success

    Timescale NonLegal

    (Moralor

    Policy)

    Arguments

    Preconditionof

    Existence

    Typical

    Countriesand

    Lawyers

    Oracle

    Scientist

    academics,

    judges

    furthering

    legal

    certaintyby

    buildinga

    conceptual

    system

    forcingartificial

    conceptual

    absurditieson

    reallife,losing

    practical

    relevance

    high high perfectness

    ofthe

    system

    aimedfor

    eternity,

    butin

    practice

    medium

    term

    verylimited,

    disguised,

    rather

    through

    vaguelegal

    concepts

    doctrinallywell

    trainedjudiciary

    German

    (Austrian,

    Swiss,Italian,

    andSpanish)

    law

    professors,

    Langdell,

    Hohfeld

    Prophet judges,

    academics

    community

    buildingina

    moralsense

    hijackinglawby

    ownpreferences

    behindthemask

    ofmoraldignity

    high ratherhigh influence

    onjudges

    aimedfor

    eternity,

    butin

    practice

    medium

    term

    substantial

    (moral

    arguments)

    prestigious

    judiciarywhich

    darestouse

    alsonotstrictly

    legal

    considerations;

    constitutional

    limitsonthe

    legislature

    Dworkin,

    humanrights

    litigator

    professors

    Law

    Reformer

    politicians

    (legislators)

    promoting

    social

    development

    orreform

    extreme

    instrumentalism,

    serving

    dictatorships

    high medium influence

    on

    politicians

    (legislator)

    andreallife

    successof

    the

    proposed

    law

    medium

    (untilthe

    social

    problem

    hasbeen

    solved)

    substantial central

    legislatorwhich

    isableand

    willingtomake

    newlaws

    Bentham,

    (post)socialist

    countries

    Humble

    Clerk

    attorneys,

    law

    students

    documenting

    whatthelaw

    is(andnot

    whatitought

    tobe)

    mindless

    repetitionof

    whatjudgesor

    legislatorssaid

    nearto

    zero

    low how

    precisely

    s/henotes

    andrepeats

    thelaw

    (typically

    judicial

    decision)

    rather

    short,until

    thenext

    relevant

    judicial

    decision

    zero growing

    amountoflaw,

    andthe

    followingneed

    todocumentit

    Kirchmann,

    Englishblack

    letter

    scholarship

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    Audience IdealFunction Perversion Aimed

    Influence

    onthe

    Law

    Prestigeinthe

    GeneralLegal

    Communityand

    AmongstOther

    Scholars

    Measureof

    Success

    Timescale NonLegal

    (Moralor

    Policy)

    Arguments

    Preconditionof

    Existence

    Typical

    Countries

    andLawyers

    Wise

    Pragmatist

    judges advising

    judgesabout

    sociallybest

    decisions

    armchair

    sociologistora

    Prophet

    disguisedas

    social

    scientist;cynic

    aboutthe

    normativityof

    law

    high high influence

    onjudges

    medium substantial

    (policy

    arguments)

    prestigious

    judiciarywhich

    darestouse

    alsonotstrictly

    legal

    considerations;

    efficiency

    problemswith

    thelegislature

    Posner,

    traditionalUS

    legal

    scholarship

    (legal

    realists),law

    &economics

    Self

    Reflective

    fellow

    academics

    understanding

    bettergeneral

    questionsof

    law;coaching

    othertypesof

    legalscholars

    self

    perpetuating

    community

    withoutany

    practicaluse

    forthelegal

    system

    zero,or

    collateral

    influence

    ratherhigh(if

    understandable)

    publications

    in

    esteemed

    (e.g.,peer

    reviewed)

    forums,

    influence

    on

    academic

    discourse

    (quotations)

    aimedfor

    eternity,

    butin

    practice

    mostly

    rather

    medium

    term

    substantial nospecific

    preconditions,

    but

    bureaucratized

    scholarship

    assessment

    inducesit

    Kelsen(inhis

    theoretical

    writings),

    Somek,

    Jakab,major

    partof

    modernlegal

    scholarshipat

    topUS

    universities

    Media

    Star

    general

    public

    explainingthe

    peoplewhat

    thelawis,so

    helpingthem

    toacceptand

    followit

    puremedia

    figurewithout

    relevant

    scholarlywork

    andwithout

    real

    knowledge

    medium low media

    coverage,

    influence

    onpublic

    political

    debates

    veryshort itdepends technical

    development;

    eitherfree

    pressand

    interested

    public,ora

    dictatorial

    regimedeciding

    forgeneral

    legaleducation

    throughTV

    Alan

    Dershowitz;

    nowhere

    dominant,

    onlyasa

    parttimejob;

    parallelwork

    inanyofthe

    above

    categories