Shaping the European Advertising Scene

7/27/2019 Shaping the European Advertising Scene

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Armand MattelartMichael Palmer

Shaping the European Advertising Scene. Commercial free

speech in search of legitimacyIn: Rseaux, 1993, volume 1 n1. pp. 9-26.

Abstract

Summary: Ever since American advertisers first banded together early this century to deflect criticism with a code of conduct

based on 'truth' and fair competition, the industry has been seeking legitimacy by creating first national, then multinational and

finally worldwide associations to defend its activities and influence the environment in which it operates. Now marketing

standards have penetrated widely diverse fields of activity and the economy as a whole. The forces underlying the new,

pervasive advertising are helping to transform an area of culture which is already transcending national boundaries.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Mattelart Armand, Palmer Michael. Shaping the European Advertising Scene. Commercial free speech in search of legitimacy.

In: Rseaux, 1993, volume 1 n1. pp. 9-26.

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reso_0969-9864_1993_num_1_1_3268
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/author/auteur_reso_195http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/author/auteur_reso_39http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reso_0969-9864_1993_num_1_1_3268http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reso_0969-9864_1993_num_1_1_3268http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/author/auteur_reso_39http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/author/auteur_reso_195


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SHAPING THE EUROPEANADVERTISING SCENECommercial free speech in search oflegitimacy

Armand MATTELART and Michael PALMER

Summary: Ever since American advertisers first banded togetherearly this century to deflect criticism with a code of conduct basedon 'truth' andfair competition, the industry has been seekinglegitimacy by creating first national, then multinational andfinally worldwide associations to defend its activities andinfluence the environment in which it operates. Now marketingstandards have penetrated widely diverse fields of activity and theeconomy as a whole. The forces underlying the new, pervasiveadvertising are helping to transform an area of culture which isalready transcending national boundaries.


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SHAPING THE EUROPEAN ADVERTISING SCENE

1 SHAPING THEEUROPEAN

ADVERTISING

SCENE

Commercial free speech inearch of legitimacy

Armand MATTELART andMichael PALMER

European advertisers must defendtheir industry ... Given the factthat the nature of such attacks ispolitical and not professional -one generally is forced into political dialogue , invariably in defence of the freedomfor the manufacturer to market and advertise his products - it is not hard to seewhy creative advertising minds usuallyhave little interest in and even less timeto marshal a defence' (Rijkens, 1979).These statements were made in 1979 byR. Rijkens of the Netherlands, who at thetime was a member of the internationalboard of the American advertising agencyLintas, a former chairman of the European Association of Advertising Agencies(EAAA) and European area director of theInternational Advertising Association(IAA).

During the 1980s this expert's wisheswere largely fulfilled. A joint Europeanawareness was forged in response to the'attacks' and its strategic follow-throughwas the formation or strengthening of(inter)professional organizations (agencies, dvertisers and media) on an international scale. In all forums of debate ordecision-making concerning the futureshape of transnational audiovisual systems these cohesive corporate networkshave come to the defence of the commoninterests of those involved in the advertisingndustry and have promoted theirconcept of the new communications landscape and their particular world view.The ideological function - to call a spadea spade - has been performed by theindustry's spokesmen in a context inwhich one of the main challenges hasturned out to be the redistribution ofpower between the state and commercialcompanies, between the standard of publicervice and the public interest and thatof private interests, between the state andthe market, between the nation-state andthe international community. It is a context in which a new balance is beingsought between rules laid down by thepublic authorities and self-regulation. Itis precisely within this frame of referencethat the representative bodies of the advertis ing industry have produced a response to what they saw as the 'regulatorythreat'.The increasingly evident political role ofprivate players has been highlighted in aperiod of tension and confrontation. Anindication of this is the repeated claim bylobbyists for the advertising industry that'commercial free speech' falls within theremit of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 19 ofthe Universal Declaration of HumanRights and Article 19 of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights. Inshort, the industry is seeking the samerights for 'commercial free speech' as forany other: 'Commercial speech is no less 11


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Armand MATTELARTandMichael PALMER

free speech than Journalistic speech orpolitical speech (Clark, 1988). This perversion of the original purpose of thestruggle for free speech has occasionallyprovoked resistance - in the Netherlandsin 1981, for instance. Yet the industry's'redefinition' of the term is increasinglyaccepted.The codeThe bedrock of self-regulation in anybranch of industry or commerce is theestablishment of a set of rules or code ofconduct which its members agree to observe. Any infringement is punished by aninternal disciplinary tribunal.The advertising industry, as spokesmanfo r the commercial sector, was sooncaught in a crossfire of controversy. Theestablishment of the first codes of conduct became bound up with the searchfor a legitimacy that would enable advertising to dispel the tenacious image ofcharlatanism. The industry's first stepstowards self-regulation were also the firststeps towards professional standards.The initial attempt at self-regulation wasmade in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century. Worried by criticism ofthe posters for many touring theatricaltroupes and fearful of parliamentary interference, billboard companies set up acensorship committee. The debate centred on 'bad taste', morality, social conventions and religious beliefs. In Americathese questions were discussed between1900 and 1917 by the advertising industry's irst national organization, the Associated Advertising Clubs of America. Theprofession's first code of conduct emergedin 1914. It was concerned mainly with'truth' and fair competition. The profession claimed symbolic legitimation ofits practices by reference to its responsibilityo the public, even assuming theimage of a 'public service* (Schultze,1981).12

In 1924, during the Great Empire Exhibitionn London, the American advertisingclubs held their first international meeting, organized by their British affiliate.Several resolutions were adopted oncodes of professional ethics and a yearlater the British club transformed itselfinto theAdvertisingAssociation, groupingagencies, advertisers and media. TheUnited States was at this time in thethroes of the adoption of Taylorian mass-production and management methods,which has been well analysed by the historian Stuart Ewen (1983). This was theperiod when consumption was emergingas 'the natural experience of democracy',and when monitoring began, with thechecking of the flow of goods, then of salestargets. The inter-War period also saw thedevelopment of the first international advertis ing networks, mainly set up byAmerican and British agencies. In 1937the International Chamber of Commercepromulgated its first code of advertisingpractice: such codes stressed broad principles rather than detailed guidelines. Butfor the profession the merit of the ICCcode lay in its function as a point ofreference for the national codes that werebeing drafted at this time.In the period when the consumer movement was at its most radical, the Britishadvertising industry occupied a centralrole in mobilizing resistance. In 1961 itrevamped its self-regulatory and disciplinaryystem from top to bottom (for mediaother than radio and television: commercialroadcasters were accountable to anindependent public authority). This system was to serve as a model. The UnitedStates followed suit ten years later. In the1960s and early 1970s a wide range ofcountries adopted advertising codes ormodified existing regulations.The history of self-regulation clearlyvaries, within each separate context, according to the tradition of greater or lesserstate control and the advertising industry's differing relationships with the


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various components of society - the commun ity of citizen-consumers. One reasonfor the pride of place occupied by theself-regulatory standard in Britain is thatcountry's long tradition of common law asthe source of legal authority. It is evident,on the other hand, that the strong influence of an interventionist Jacobin statein France has rather stifled the full operation of this principle. As French consumer affairs minister ChristianeScrivener (1979) observed in her official1978 report on advertising regulation:The notion of self-discipline is still all toooften foreign to the thought patterns ofFrench industry and commerce, wherethe job of regulation and supervision hasbeen carried out by the state until recently'.At the end of the 1970s the notion ofself-regulatory codes of conduct began tospread from the advertising industry toother sectors and the experience of advertising in this field was held up as anexample for others. Witness this statement by the director of the French ofllcefor monitoring advertising (BVP) during aconference in 1986: 'At a time when awidespread wave of public opinion isbuilding up on themes such as 'Governments too big', Tes to deregulation' and'Free the economy', the BVP (groupingadvertisers, agencies and various media)thinks it would be advisable to seek theopinions of other social and economicbodies on the question of self-regulationand whether it would be desirable at thepresent time to give it a bigger role in oursociety' (Bouis, 1986).But well before then self-regulation wasalready being discussed throughout theworld.The global challenge'A global challenge needs a global response' declared the International Advertising Association in a white paper, The

Global Challenge to Advertising, publishedn 1973. This was the first manifestolaying down the broad outlines of astrategy to counter criticism from governments and consumer movements. TheIAA, founded in 1938, is the only association ringing together the leaders of advertising, marketing and the media atworld level. Its headquarters are in NewYork but three-quarters of its members,from 76 countries, are not American.At the beginning of the decade discussions at UNESCO in Paris and atUnited Nations headquarters in New Yorkconsidered the need to regulate directbroadcasting satellite transmissions (andthe transmissions of remote sensing satellites). These questions were put on theagenda by the Third World countries andthe Soviet delegation. They were pursuedat UNESCO under the banner of the 'NewWorld Information and CommunicationOrder' (NWICO) until political disagreements n the subject prompted theUnited States and Britain to leave theorganization.Various explanations have been given forthe advertising industry's decision tothrow its hat into the ring. Many observers think the advertisers reacted tothe campaigns by non-governmental organizations against the marketingstrategies used by agribusiness companies such as Nestl to sell their powdered-milk baby food in Third Worldcountries, and that the last strawwas thedecision by the World Health OrganizationWHO) to lay down codes of conductfor these firms. This interpretation isprobably the most plausible and is corroborated by statements of top officiais ofthe IAA. WHO support in 1980 of consumer groups' disquiet about the marketingf breast-milk substitutes was awatershed. After their success against infant formula-food, the consumer movements turned their attention topharmaceutical products and junk food.An IAA official reacted: The consumer 13


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groups are organizing. These people arethe most rabid of consumers. Now they'retalking about 'junk' food. Who is going tosay what is 'junk' food? But they want towrite codes. They are crazy.'* The agribusiness advertisers' reply to these attacks was to counter the internationalcommunity's codes by quickly cobblingtogether their own professional code ofethics; these were less restrictive than thecode adopted by the WHO - with onedissenting vote, that of the United States.But the process was also accelerated bydevelopments in Europe.August 1978 saw the first victory of thenascent ad industry alliance in connectionith a European Community initiative. The embryonic interprofessionalgrouping included the European Association f Advertising Agencies (EAAA), theInternational Union of Advertisers Associations (IUAA), the various Europeanmembers of the International Federationof Newspaper Publishers, the International ederation of the Periodical Pressand the European Group for TelevisionAdvertising. These bodies managed to ensure that the following paragraph wasincluded in the preamble to the Explanatoryemorandum of the EC's philosophyon advertising and marketing: 'Advertisings an integral part of the system ofmass production and distribution servingthe general public. Manufacturers ofgoods and providers of services need theopportunity to inform and remind thepublic of what they have to offer. Such asystem of information is useful to theeconomics of production. Consumersneed information on goods and servicesso that they can make their choice between the many alternatives. Advertisinghas the additional effect of stabilizingemployment by ensuring the steady disposalof production; it provides the basis forcompetition in the marketplace and encourages product development and

vation and the provision of low-cost goodsand services previously regarded as tooexpensive for the market. In addition,advertising makes a vital contribution towards the cost of media.' (More than oneadvertising economist would be startledby the peremptory tone of many of theseassertions, given the uncertainty thathangs over knowledge in this field (Henry,1988). But this is not the issue here.)It took more than three years to reach thisdefinition of a sector that was hardly ingood odour in Brussels. This small paragraph had only one purpose: to legitimizethe industry. To gauge its importance itshould be pointed out that in the latesixties and early seventies the Community authorities shared the views of theconsumer movements. Alongside the EC'sactions, the Council of Europe includedthe question of consumer protection in its1967/68 programme and promulgated aconsumer charter in 1973. Two yearslater the EC competition directorate(DG3) was ordered to draw up a directiveon misleading and unfair advertising aspart of the Community's consumerdefence policy launched in the late sixties.The economic role of advertising was recognized in the framing of this policy.This draft directive set out a detailed listof the products and services for which theEC intended to harmonize Communitylegislation. What set the cat among thepigeons were two items concerning misleading and unfair advertising. One proposed giving individuals or associationsaffected by such illicit practices 'rapid andeffective means of taking legal action*. Theother defined 'associations of legitimateinterest', to which the Community gave apriority right of remedy at law. The advertising industry representatives objectedthat in practice this meant giving preferential treatment to consumer associations which, they claimed, did notalways represent the attitudes and inter-

* Quoted by Clark, 1988, p. 142.14


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ests of real-life consumers but those attitudes and interests that the associationsconsidered consumers 'ought to' have(Rijkens & Miracle, 1986). Another disputed point was the definition of 'misleadingnd unfair advertising' as 'that whichomits material information'.The EAAA had this comment on theabout-turn by Brussels: This change ofattitudes went against the grain. But ithappened. Gradually, the Commissioncame to the conclusion that a positivedialogue with the industry might help itscause. Does this mean that everything inthe garden is lovely? Far from it. There isstill a ong list of items in the draft proposaln misleading and unfair advertisingthat act against our interests' (Rijkens,1978). (In the event, the advertising directivewas approved by the Council of Ministers only in September 1984).In 1979 the International AdvertisingAssociation (IAA) got involved in the machineryf the European Community. Thetrade press noted that another sign of thegrowing role of the IAA was its appointments an official consultative body bythe EC Commission services charged withdrafting marketing and advertising legislation {Advertising Age, 1979). In thesame year the IAA organized a conferencein Brussels on public service advertising.(It staged a similar event in 1983 and wasinvited by the EC to give advice on itspublic communications policy!).In 1980 the different sectors of the European advertising industry drew the lessonfrom this first trial of strength with theCommunity authorities and founded theEuropean Advertising Tripartite (EAT).Players on the self-regulationsceneThere were tw o driving forces behind thesetting up of the EAT: the agencies,through the European Association of

vertising Agencies (EAAA), and the advertisers, represented by the InternationalUnion of Advertisers Associations (IUAA),which was later renamed the WorldFederation of Advertisers (WFA). The officials of these two organizations - bothbased in Brussels - were the first to joinforces in criticism of the draft directive onmisleading and unfair advertising. Theidea of a united front was encouraged bythe Commission itself which, from 1975,let the various trade bodies know that itwould prefer to deal with one organizationrather than with a great variety of representatives of sectional interests. The earlysuccesses of this team attracted a thirdmember: the associations representingthe advertising interests of the massmedia.So from the start the WFA was joined bythe Community of Associations of ECNewspaper Publishers (CAEJ) - itself partof a wider federation, the FIEJ - publishingtotal of 66 million copies and employing50,000 workers; the Federation ofAssociations of EC Periodical Publishers(FIPP); the European Group of TelevisionAdvertising (EGTA); and the AdvertisingInformation Group (AIG). AIG acts as aliaison between the representatives of thedifferent EC and non-EC national advertising bodies; unofficially it groups thetripartite national authorities and thoseresponsible for seeing that the principlesof self-regulation and internal disciplineare applied. Other partners later joinedthe EAT: the European Federation of Outdoor Advertising (FEPE) in 1983 and, twoyears later, the European Direct Marketingssociation (EDMA). In 1984 the IAAacquired observer status.Bolstered by its motto and publicity slogan 'An alliance for action', the EAT setout from the start to be the sole spokesmanor all advertising interests on theEuropean level. It was to act to defend theindustry's common interests in the European institutions. The IAA, by contrast,shouldered the worldwide burden. The 15


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EAT stated that it would represent thecommon interests of the advertising business at the European level, keep its members informed about developmentsrelevant to the advertising communityarising from the European institutions,contribute to European debate on advertising matters, support the developmentof better practices for advertising in Europe, and ensure that European advertisingnterests were taken intoconsideration by those bodies which affect advertising and industry at the globallevel (for example at the United Nations).There is no doubt that it was the bodiesrepresenting advertising agencies thatwere the first to understand the need forthe tripartite alliance and were the quickest to take steps to assemble it. Whichis not to detract from the importance ofthe work undertaken by the advertisersthemselves.As its name indicates, the WFA has aworldwide mission, which it has stressedsince 1984. Previously it defined itselfmainly as a collection of national associations. It was set up in 1953 by advertisers in Belgium, France, Italy andSweden. Current membership is drawnfrom more than 50 countries. All majoradvertisers belong to the federation,whose various committees and commissions include representatives fromNestl, Bristol-Myers, Unilever, L'Oral,Renault, Philips, etc. Its worldwide scopemeans that Europe is only one of its fieldsof action. In recent years this has led theWFA to be extremely active not only in theEuropean institutions but also in suchdiverse countries as Brazil, Costa Rica,Singapore, New Zealand and Canada -where it backed advertisers in their fightto prevent passage of a bill to ban tobaccoand alcohol advertising - plus providinglogistical support in Italy and the UnitedStates to block taxation on advertising,among other things. Its strike force: 'aworldwide network representing morethan 170 billion dollars of annual adver-16

tising investment' (World Federation ofAdvertisers, 1989).An appeal for freedom ofspeech and choiceThe EAAA (European Association of Advertising Agencies) is on the other handconcerned only with Europe. It wasfounded in Oslo in 1959 on the initiativeof the Scandinavian, French, German andBritish ad agencies. Ten years later itsstructure had changed. It included bothrepresentatives of the multinational agencies grouped in Munare (multinationalagency representation) and delegates ofthe national agencies in the Nore (national organization representation)grouping. Among the transnational members were Publicis, Havas, Saatchi &Saatchi, J. Walter Thompson, Young &Rubicam, etc. - the cream of the ad networks interlacing Europe. About 1 5 countries were represented at the level ofnational agencies. When the EATwas setup in 1980 the EAAA housed its secretariatnd became one of its most activelobbyists. In its own words, the EAAAdraws its legitimacy from the fact that itsmember agencies - 1500 out of 7000 -account for more than half the Europeanadvertising market.Officially recognized by the EC andgranted the status of non-governmentalorganization by the Council of Europe,the EAAA offers its observations on allsubjects concerning advertising and formulates amendments before parliamentaryebate. A 1986 internal bulletindescribed its lobbying activities in thisway: 4At the meeting of health ministersin 1981, advertising was one of the fewindustries to be present. The result hasbeen, and continues to be, to avoid or limitthe impact of legislation. We do not thinkit wise to boast about our lobbying work,since this could compromise future success by embarrassing our friends. Moles


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are a protected species. But a couple ofexamples show that the EAAA's lobbyingwork has been and continues to be timely,accurate and effective/ One such casewas a proposal before the Council of Europe to ban 'all' advertising for 'all' tobaccoand 'all' alcohol products. It was softened- 'thanks to vigorous action by EAA' - toa motion referring to limitation only. Similarmendments were achieved for advert-ising of pharmaceutical and foodproducts and advertising targeted atchildren.The association's guiding principle is thedefence of commercial free speech. 'EATand EAAA are continuously involved inthe defence of freedom of expression andfreedom of choice, working to counteractthe effects of UNESCO's McBride report,for example, and working to ensure recognition by governments that manufacturershall be free to sell their productsto consumers who are free to choose'(European Association of AdvertisingAgents, 1986). This declaration of faith isrepeated unfailingly in all documentspublished by the organizations. Similarly,the World Federation of Advertisers (WFA)repeats this refrain in its annual reports:'We must keep proclaiming that commercialree speech and the freedom to advertiseonstitute advertisers' rights, just asconsumers have the right to choose whatthey buy'.The EAAA, an organization that militatesfor self-regulation, produces hard-hittingsales pitches to counter those whocriticize the role played by advertising insociety. The following is taken from itsbulletins fo r members: 'Some of ourweaker brethren feel that they have toapologize for advertising; for its role in theeconomy and in society. This is not ourattitude. We recognize that there arepowerful forces at work that would destroy our market economies by placingthe supply of goods and services understate control. Attacks on free enterprisemay be blatantly Marxist, or they may be

more subtle; insidiously exploiting the genuine concerns of consumer movements,addressing highly emotive subjects likeadvertising to children in order to stab atthe soft underbelly of our market economy. Whatever its form, an attack on freeenterprise is an attack on freedom ofspeech and freedom of choice. The loss ofa battle can cost us a whole market.Consider for a moment that the advertisingarket for alcoholic beverages in Germany lastyear was worth DM500 million.'The leitmotiv, opposition to any measureintended to restrict advertising markets,media and earnings. There is no reasonwhy a product that can be sold legallyshould not be advertised. Such bans are'too often a hypocritical subterfuge to satisfy activist groups without jeopardizingsubstantial tax revenues. Restrictions onwhat can be said, and requirementsabout what must be said in advertising,encroach on its ability to sell.' Anotherline of argument is an attack on the regulator, who is seen as having too strong atendency to act in this way to controlgeneric advertising - advertising that promotes whole classes of products, goodsand services such as food, tobacco,banks, alcohol, toys or Pharmaceuticals,or is aimed at a specific audience, suchas children. 'At EAA we do everythingpossible to advocate and promote freeenterprise, freedom of speech and freedom of choice. Widening the choices available to the consumer. Providingadvertisers with new ways of reaching agiven target public. Helping to containmedia costs by encouraging competition.We support and encourage advertising,by government, by municipalities, by retailers, by the professions. It all helps toenlarge the cake which is being nibbled atby Marxist mice.'In this witch-hunt of anything thatmoves, politicians are also hauled overthe coals: "We have come a long way sincethe times of the mountebank and huckster hose aims were trickery and fraud. 17


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We can claim today to be far more disciplined as a profession, exercising fargreater respect for the public's intelligence than many politicians in thisworld, who certainly do not always advertisen a way that is decent, honest andtruthful (as laid down in the code of conduct of the International Chamber ofCommerce).'The EAAA also assails the prejudiceswhich, it claims, prevent dialogue and acorrect perception of its image: 'Advertisingeflects rather than conditions society. But there is a tendency in the hallsof the Council of Europe to view advertisings a manipulator of culture. Withrising unemployment and falling productionn Europe, it is less plausible now toargue against the economic role of advertising; it is becoming fashionable, instead,to accuse advertising of polluting the souLWe must try to correct this error/Another confusion pointed out by theEAAA consists in thinking of advertisingas an information service aimed at educating consumers. There is obviouslywidespread misunderstanding of whatadvertising is and does. We know thatconsumers do not make artificial divisions between needs and wants, betweenrational and emotional satisfactions. Weknow that successful advertising appealsboth to the head and to the heart and thatconsumers are concerned with the totalmessage: with that mixture of attributesthat makes one brand more appropriatethan another. They are concerned withresults: with benefits, not things. Butthere are thousands of influential peopleout there who have no such perception ofadvertising. They muddle advertising withother forms of communication: information,ntertainment and instruction.Curiously enough, though they recognizethat entertainment does not have to bepacked with information, and thoughthey defend editorial information fromcommercial encroachments, they fail tosee that advertising is salesmanship, not

journalism. It is absurd to criticize advertising for not doing what it is not supposed to do!''Breaks' versus 'Blocks'The most important confrontations overthe future of European advertising camein the 1980s in the debating chambersand corridors of the EC and the Councilof Europe. The EC proposed to issue adirective, the Council of Europe to draft aconvention: both were intended to lay thefoundations of a European audiovisualarea through regulation of 'cross-bordertelevision'. Advertising was one of threechapter-headings in these projects,alongside programme quotas and copyright/neighbouring rights. The mainareas for regulation of advertising weredefined as: separation of advertising andprogrammes; sponsorship; targeting theaudience in the receiving country; advertising quotas; advertising of certain products (tobacco, alcohol, medicines) andthose aimed at certain target groups(children and youth).Both the directive and the conventionwent through many versions. In Francethe battle over imposing a quota for European programmes - in the name of protecting cultural identity - hit theheadlines. Less attention was paid, inFrance, to another clash, known to British dvertisers as breaks versus blocks.The matter at issue was that some countries restrict advertising spots to specifictimes during the day, outside the programmes, and others allow television advertis ing in the natural breaks that occurduring the programmes as well as between them. Advertisers do not like thesystem of block advertising: it crampstheir room for manoeuvre, distorts thetelevision ad market and reduces the impact of the spots. For example, in theNetherlands until 1989 an advertiser wasallowed a maximum of only two spots aweek; a television campaign was therefore


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limited to between 50 and 100 spots ayear. And the ads were all grouped beforeor after the news bulletins. Advertiserscould not choose when their messagewould be delivered and had to accept theirallotted screening time.The profession was particularly annoyedby Article 14 of the draft convention oncross-border television, covering advertisingreaks. The article provided for onebreak per feature film, one break every 45minutes in made-for-television films, serials and documentaries of more than 45minutes' duration, current-affairs magazines, religious programmes and children's programmes of less than 30minutes. The profession was worriedabout a possible 'domino effect' given theclose link between these discussions, apparently concerning only transnationaltelevision, and measures that might betaken by national authorities relying onthe precedent set by a supranationalauthority.The British made the first move in thesummer of 1986, when work was startedon drawing up the convention. Workingwith the EAT, Britain's Advertising Association - which since the founding of theTripartite has lent it many experts - contacted the Independent Television Association (ITVA) grouping the country'scommercial TV and radio companies. Thethree partners decided to give the Londonoffice of the American agency Young &Rubicam the job of co-ordinating theircampaign against Article 14. Britain wasthen the biggest advertising market (including television) in Europe and the thirdin the world after the United States andJapan. It represented about 24 per centof European advertising investment,against 20 per cent for the former WestGermany, 16 per cent for France, 15 percent for Italy and 1 1 per cent for Spain.Moreover, London is home to the headquarters of the biggest companies - satellite elevision networks, advertisers andagencies - capable of creating pan- and

trans-European advertising spots. TheBritish were therefore worried about theeffect such regulation could have on boththeir national television system and the'continental' industry. A symbolic programme was the half-hour News at Ten,interrupted by a mid-programme breakcommanding some of the highest ad ratesin commercial television. Article 1 4 wouldhave meant simply putting an end to thisad slot.The drafting of the article favoured thosecountries with block advertising, such asWest Germany, which allowed only 20minutes a day of adverts on its publicchannel, and even they had to bescreened before 8 p.m. The clause wasproposed by West Germany, backed byBelgium, Greece, Portugal and theNetherlands; France and Italy abstainedfrom the drafting. Those who wanted thearticle to be completely rewritten therefore ad to convince European authoritiesand representatives of the harmful natureof the proposed regulation: instead ofshort but relatively frequent breaks (lasting etween 2Vfc and 3 minutes), accountingor up to 20 per cent of screen timeand averaging 15 per cent, the threathanging over all advertisers was achangeover to less frequent and longer'tunnels' of 10 to 12 minutes.So the EAT, the Advertising Associationand the IPA (Institute of Practitioners inAdvertising, which groups British advertising agencies) bent their research skillsto the task of constructing a sales pitchthat could win over their adversaries.Simulations were run: if the article wereenacted, TF1, the main French commercialhannel, would lose 22.4 per cent ofits revenues, Britain's ITV and ChannelFour 17.4 per cent, and so on. Theyquoted the case of a multinational company advertising heavily on television inseveral European countries that wouldsell 43 per cent less in a country withblock advertising than in one with naturalbreaks. British commercial television 19


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would lose 5 per cent of its advertisingtime and 6 per cent of its audience, risingto 1 2 per cent and 1 8 per cent respectivelyat peak viewing times.As autumn 1988 drew near - the date ofthe Council of Europe's Stockholm meeting t which the convention was to beready for signature - the lobbyistsstepped up their campaign of persuasion.In July 1 988 they haunted the antechambersf the Home Office (Britain's interiorministry), which was responsible for television and radio, hammering home theimperative need to persuade the Councilto vote for a clause modelled on the Britishadvertising regulations. At that time onlyIreland, Luxembourg and Spain openlysupported the British position. It wasthen that the leaders of the EAT, the WFAand the EAAA decided to increase theirpressure on the advertisers and televisionnetworks to induce them in turn to lobbytheir countries' ministers for trade orbroadcasting, or their equivalents.Attention was still centred on Article 14,which by dint of amendments had becomeArticle 15. At the end of August 1988 theAdvertising Association and the EATreached a conclusion: The followingshows the national voting pattern as currently indicated and demonstrates theneed to infuence floating voters at thisfinal stage,' they wrote in a documentreviewing friends and foes: this was circulated to big advertisers such as Colgate-Palmolive, Mars, Kelloggs, UnitedDistillers and Unilever. It contained thefollowing lists: staunch supporters of theconvention - Austria, Belgium, Liechtenstein,etherlands, Switzerland and WestGermany; open backers of a compromise- Cyprus, France, Portugal and Turkey;neutral - Denmark, Greece, Iceland andNorway; outright opponents of the draft:Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Spainand the United Kingdom. In September1988 Mars, Kelloggs and Heinz commissioned he American consultants Booz,Allen & Hamilton - which Britain's Prime20

Minister Margaret Thatcher had alreadyused to justify her TV deregulation bill -to produce a study on the impact of theproposed new European legislation onadvertising, and in particular its effect onthe programme production industry. InStrasbourg the British ambassador, ColinMcLean, was briefed by the AdvertisingAssociation. The two senior British ministers handling the subject paid visits inSeptember to their colleagues from theNetherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium,West Germany, France and Switzerland.At the Stockholm meeting in Novemberthe British broadcasting minister, Timothy Renton, succeeded in imposing hisviews and those of the British ad agencies,advertisers and commercial televisionnetworks. The British cleverly inducedthe Germans to agree to a surpriseamendment. To compensate for ceilingson advertising time (15 per cent averagedover total screen time and 20 per centmaximum in any one hour), which werestrenuously denounced by the EAT andits allies, the British proposal authorizedincreasing the number of breaks, especially in films and television films (threebreaks in a full-length feature film of 1 10minutes).In the March/April 1989 issue of its magazine International Advertiser, launchedin 1988, the IAA listed the bodies that hadcontributed to the success of this lobbyingffort: the EAAA, the EAT, the EGTA,the IAA, the WFA, with a special mentionfor the AA and ITVA of Britain and therepresentative of the West German adagencies, Werbeagenturen. It concluded:This has shown the economic importanceof advertising. Success was achieved because the end-result was a compromisefavourable to the industry.'The favourable compromisesThe convention was approved in March1989 by 16 votes in favour, 4 abstentions


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(Belgium, Denmark, France and Turkey)and 2 not present (Malta and Iceland). InOctober of that year the European Community approved its directive which, despite much discussion and amendmentsby the European Parliament in 1988, ineffect adopted the terms of the convention.nly Belgium and Denmark votedagainst. What are the compromises thatthe representatives of the advertising industry regarded as 'favourable'? Le t uslook at the assessment made by the WFAin October 1989, after approval of thedirective (World Federation ofAdvertisers,1989).As regards principles, the directive refersto freedom of speech 'as laid down inArticle 10 , paragraph 1 of the Conventionon Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. ' The receiving member state monitors ut may not impose; it is thereforethe principle of the country from whichthe programme is broadcast which prevails. Concerning quotas for programmesof European origin, the WFA took theposition that there should be none. Theformula adopted by Brussels does not laydown a precise percentage but speaks ofa 'majority proportion' of European productions 'whenever possible*. On sponsorship, the WFA said it was completelysatisfied: 'the directive is in line with ourproposals.'Concerning advertising as such, the balance sheet, while positive overall, wasmore qualified: the system of naturalbreaks won the day, but where the WFAdemanded breaks every 40 minutes, thegap was set at 45 minutes; the WFAsought no restrictions at all on cigaretteand tobacco advertising, but the EC didnot give way; for alcohol, the WFA proposed 'guidelines' and not rules, but obtained 'criteria' because 'guidelines' wasthought difficult to translate into otherlanguages; although the WFA wanted theterms *youth' and 'children' removed theywere retained, but the directive adoptedthe term 'minors' and the term 'rules' was

replaced by guidelines'. The WFA wantedno reference to times or days when advertising could be broadcast and won itscase, as this section was cut from theversion on which the vote was taken. Asto the volume of advertising allowed, theWFA opposed any quota, but the directiveplumped for the formula of 15-20%.The WFA Annual Report for 1989 mentioned another positive aspect of the directive: it would influence developmentsin other parts of the world (World Federation fAdvertisers ,1990).Another proof,if one were needed, of the position thatEurope has achieved as a full-scale laboratory for building the big free-trade zonesof the next decade and beyond.The struggle continues now on other battlefields. In February 1990 the EAT saidit was prepared to go to the EuropeanCourt of Justice if a draft directive wereapproved tightening the regulations onpress or poster advertising for tobacco -television and radio ads were alreadycovered by the cross-border directive. Aspart of its severe anti-cancer campaignthe European Parliament wanted a totalban on tobacco advertising throughoutEurope and also proposed banning indirect advertising, on cigarette lighters ormatches for example, plus sponsorship ofsporting events including Formula Onemotor racing. Once again the leaders ofthe Tripartite claimed that this measurewould mean 'the end of free speech*.Going one step further - and showing towhat an extent this catch-all argumenthas been embraced by many admen -Jacques Sguela appealed in the press forall those who saw the tobacco advertisingban as an 'attack on free speech' to maketheir views known to the Strasbourg Parliament. Tomorrow, in Europe, certainproducts will perhaps lose the freedom tocommunicate.Tomorrow, in Europe, consumers will perhaps lose freedom ofchoice. Every prohibition is a wound forfreedom,' the adman declared. The claimdrew a stinging reply from public health 21


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Armand MATTELART nd Michael PALMER

experts in a report for the French healthministry on alcohol and tobacco consumption: 'Ad men use the technique ofunwarranted association of ideas, confounding the tool and its use, going so faras to say that laying a finger on advertisings tantamount to attacking freedom ofspeech, and is a scenario that leads toNazism. It is not endangering advertisingto ask it to keep out of an exceptionallyserious social problem' (Nau, 1990).Be that as it may, the crusaders for commercial freedom of speech have lost noneof their pugnacity. The upheavals in EasternEurope lent them wings, as is evidenced by remarks in the December 1989of the World Federation of Advertisingnewsletter, reflecting the thinking of itspresident: 'During the last few weeks oneword, more than any other, has dominated TV screens, the front pages of thepress and radio news programmesthroughout the world. That word is 'Freedom' ... It is indeed this basic freedom thathas motivated the popular uprisings thathave changed, almost overnight, thewhole political framework of Eastern Europe... But there is, in the minds of somepeople, one freedom that is not sacred -namely, the freedom to advertise ... Tosingle out the freedom to advertise a specific product is to strike at the very coreof accepted human rights and freedomssince it denies people ... the right "to holdopinions without interference and to seek,receive and impart information and ideasthrough any media regardless of frontiers" (Article 19 of the Universal Declarationf Human Rights) ... This kind ofcensorship and restriction is just whatthe people of Eastern Europe have beenseeking, successfully, to escape from.Thus, if advertisers do not wish to seetheir rights eroded, they - like the peopleof Eastern Europe - must beat on thewalls of bureaucracy and insist uponbeing accorded the same democratic free-

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doms as everyone else in today's society'(de Win, 1989).But the fine unanimity which wasflaunted when stigmatizing the enemiesof freedom and offering mutual congratulationsver favourable compromises, wasno longer so evident in settling the internal ffairs of the interprofessional alliances. In 1989 the World Federation ofAdvertisers complained that the representat ives of the agencies had gained toomuch influence in the EAT. It thereforeproposed a new structure for the Tripartiteo as to ensure its 'full legal, financialand logistic independence'. It called forthe EAAA and the EAT to establish separate eadquarters. In December of thatyear the WFA succeeded for the first timein having a representative of the advertisers - from Procter & Gamble, theworld's biggest agency - named presidentof the EAT. All of this suggests that although the industry's interests oin forcesto fight off the 'regulatory threat', they gotheir separate ways on many other questions.The missing linkDo the debates over the past decade in thesupranational European bodies indicatenew forms (or areas) of intervention? Havenew counter- strategies appeared, newplayers emerged?The first part of the reply is as follows. Inorder to answer these questions satisfactorily,t has first to be acknowledged thatwithin the Community there is realunder-representation of the so-called tertiary sector - of non-governmental bodiesrepresenting users, consumers, andcitizens' rights activists. Indeed, in 1989a crisis revealed the need to diversify therepresentation of such European associations. Moreover, those bodies representing the public which already have fullaccreditation have been keeping a ratherlow profile.


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SHAPING THE EUROPEANADVERTISING SCENE

As far as advertising is concerned, thingsgot off to a very bad start. The representatives of consumer associations, inthe early 1960s, had the wind in theirsails and were backed by Communityauthorities. They set up the EuropeanBureau of Consumer Unions (BEUC) in1962 with the avowed aim of representingand defending the interests of consumersin discussions with the Commission. Butthey were quickly overtaken by eventswhen discussion of the directive on misleading and unfair advertising led intodiscussion of the directive on cross-borderelevision. The sheer scale of thestakes involved went far beyond a Magi-not Line centred on the 'truthfulness' ofadvertisements. The functional concept ofadvertising as information - which wassuch an effective prop for the consumermovements in Britain and the UnitedStates in the early stages - together withthe absence of serious consideration ofthe commercial logic that characterizesmodern advertising and marketing, delayed realization of the Hydra-headednature of the beast. This universality wassoon perceived and appropriated by theadvertising industry and its representatives, and led to their corporativereorganization on an international scale.Compared with the thorough Job done bythe advertising lobbyists, the slim filesproduced by the BEUC carried littleweight - especially as the consumersoften used the same consultants as theiropponents to explain their points.This imbalance is all the more strikinggiven that In the past 15 years the international area of public concern has grownto Include new agents and forms of socialInteraction which take as their starting-point a questioning of models of consumer behaviour (de Aguilera & Carreno,1990). This is illustrated by the strategiesadopted by the International Organizationf Consumer Unions (IOCU) and thecreation of networks linking NGOs thatstarted in the first halfof the 1 960s during

the protests against Nestl. It should alsobe said that most of the operations undertaken by these networks of NGOs chieflytargeted the misdeeds in the Third Worldof multinational companies, particularlyin the chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, tobacco and food sectors. This was the waythey chose to contest a mode of globaldevelopment and growth and its consumption models. The originality of theforms of organization and action adoptedby these networks - whose contacts haveproliferated in both North and South - hasbeen recognized by the representatives ofthe world advertising industry.Indeed, the J. Walter Thompson agency'svice-president for Britain, an official of theEAT, had no hesitation in telling his colleagues: 'I propose to look at who is pressinghe regulators with global questions(and proposing several answers of theirown); and to suggest that communicationsxperts have something to learnfrom them ... Their motto might be said tobe: Think globally, act locally' . What arethe characteristics of activist groups?Dedication. Professionalism from committed amateurs. Close national and international links and very fastinformation exchange. Good media relations. Popular and newsworthy causes.Good organization. Increasingly betterfinance. Growing respect. Last but notleast, they are committed to training: toworkshops, handbooks and action packsso ideas and deeds can travel fast andefficiently' (Mann, 1987). This experienceof critical networks in action also providesfood for thought for those who, tired ofniggling, procedure-ridden - in fact chauvinistic - debate on the future of advertisingn Europe, suspect that nowadays itis hardly possible to discuss the relationshipetween advertising and societywithout taking into account the logic ofsocial exclusion inherent in the newworldeconomic order.That logic is dismissed bythe strategists of globalization' of marketsand ad campaigns, who are used to view-

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Ing the world only through the diminishingeopolitical and intellectual lens thatencompasses four-fifths of the world'spurchasing power and no more than one-fifth of the world's population.Now for the second part of the reply to theoriginal question. It is evident that manyplayers were called upon to take up aposition on the directive and the conventionithout necessarily having any representative status with the Communityauthorities. One thinks, for example, ofthe European Federation of AudiovisualDirectors, which took up arms over thesubjects of European programme quotas,advertising breaks and copyright. Theysought to attract the support of intellectualsnd creative people in other fields,inviting them to Delphi to sign a 'EuropeanAuthors' Charter*. Another exampleof unofficial pressure groups is the Cultural States General organized in Francein 1987 and its protests to the EuropeanParliament in 1989 (Etats Gnraux de laCulture, 1987). (This formula of 'StatesGeneral', gathering together creators andresearchers to discuss audiovisual questions, has spread to other Europeancountries and to Latin America.) There isalso the emergence, and in some countries the strengthening, of media users'associations that, even though they wereoften spurred into action by upheavals inthe audiovisual landscape of individualcountries, have nevertheless followed thedebates in Strasbourg and Brussels withkeen interest. They too have realized thefundamental importance of the need forinternational links. In France indeed, oneeffect of the reorganization of its audiovisualector was to prompt movements representing the general public (such asviewers' associations) to come to the fore,just as in other areas of national life.These new forms of participation areemerging in a space where, traditionally,major organizations such as political parties and trade unions were none too active. These institutions have rarely

produced explicit and non-general analyses and position papers on the subjectof advertising. Documents like the GreenPaper on Advertisingproduced in 1 972 bythe British Labour Party remain all-too-rare exceptions. Indeed, at the time, thisreport caused quite a stir in Americanadvertising circles.Initiatives by such movements in the1980s were admittedly very modest, butthey have the merit of showing thatanswers are being sought by a public stillin a state of shock caused by the speed ofchanges in the rules governing the audiovisual sector. Quite simply, they demonstrate hat not all citizens accept that themeans of communication may be managed only by self-regulation and the reasoning of the marketplace. Some rejectthe panacea of the 'principle of consumersovereignty', which leaves the consumer-viewer alone in front of his screen, tryingto make sense out of everything he seesand hears through an endless series ofmediations. But they also show that somepeople think that bringing about thedemocratic imperative in a mediatizedand mediated society also requires collectiveorms of expression and organization.Lastly, these efforts show that it ispossible to think about self-regulation' interms other than the scenario presentedin the increasingly stentorian platitudesof different professional bodies. Instead of'Less State/More Market' they speakabout 'Less State/More Public Participation',nd not only about more professional ethics but about more ethics. Thisis probably one way of stopping the industryrom using professionalism as anauthoritarian argument to prevent outsiders getting a glimpse of what goes onbehind the scenes. In any case it is theonly way of preventing the debate on'human rights' from being reduced to thelevel of the bargain basement.The implications of the debate are all themore crucial because the process of political emancipation of private agents, as


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seen in their militant action within international bodies, cannot be dissociatedfrom the new central role acquired byadvertising in the reshaping of audiovisualules in a Europe in the grip of privatization and deregulation. Advertising, thetouchstone of financial packaging, hasincreasingly close links with productionand programming, at the same time as itsroles of consultant/adviser and prospector/forecaster are growing in importancein a context of increased overlapping ofconsumption and production. This overlap equires ever more efficient 'trackingstations' to gather and correlate complexinformation on the flows of programmes,audiences and goods. In a more generalway, the 'advertising paradigm' draws itsvitality from the industry's new status.

There has been a transfer of marketingstandards into the most diverse fields andthe 'managerial approach' - and the communication strategies derived from it -has permeated the methods of managementf society and of the economy (Mat-telart, 1991).These forces that underpin the new advertising configuration mustbe taken intoaccount in any attempt to understandand evaluate the changes that are reshapingublic life. This new understanding ofpublic life is poised to spill over the borders of the welfare-nation-state in linewith the seemingly inexorable advance ofmarketing, commercial logic and their inherent aspiration to become the dominantuniversal mode.

ReferencesAdvertising Age (1979): Europe supplement,26 March 1979.de AGUILERA, M. & CARRENO, O. (1990):'Comunicacion y calidad de la vida. ElPunto de vista de los consumidores', inTelos, Madrid, December 1989-February 1990.BOUIS, L. (1986): 'Drglementation et autodiscipline interprofessionnelle. Le rledu BVP, in Revue Franaise du Marketing,o. 5. Paris.CLARKE, E. (1988): The Want-Makers, Hod-der & Stoughton, London.Etats Gnraux de la Culture (1987): La culture franaise se porte bien pourvu qu'onla sauve, Messidor, Paris.European Association of Advertising Agencies 1986): Internal newsletter,Brussels.EWEN, S. (1983): Captains of Consciousness:Advertising and the Social Roots of theConsumer Culture. McGraw-Hill, NewYork, 1976. French translation: Consciences sous influence. Publicit etgense de la socit de consommation,Aubier-Montaigne, Paris.HENRY, H. (1988): Towards a Better

standing of the Economics of TelevisionAdvertising, YTV, London.MANN, P. (1987): Workshop on the theme'Regulatory Intervention Calls for a GlobalAnswer', World Council of the International Advertising Association.MATTELART, A. (1991): L'internationale publicitaire. La Dcouverte. Paris, 1989.English translation: Advertising International he Privatization of Public Space,M. Chanan, trans., Routledge, Londonand New York, 1991. See also 'European media lobbying' in TUNSTALL, J.

& PALMER M., Media Moguls, Rout-ledge, London and New York.NAU, J.Y. (1990): 'Intrts et dommages", inLe Monde, 16 March 1990.RIJKENS, R (1979): 'Europe admen must defend their industry', in Advertising Age(International), 11 June 1979.RIJKENS, R & MIRACLE, G.E. (1986): European Regulation ofAdvertising: Supranationalegulation of Advertising in theEEC, Elsevier, Amsterdam.RIJKENS, R (1987): 'Ad forces rally to repeltheir critics', in Advertising Age, 14 August 1978.

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SCHULTZE. Q.J. (1981): 'Professionalism Inadvertising; The origin of ethical codes',in Journal of Communication, Spring1981.SCRIVENER, (1979): Rle, responsabuitet avenir de la publicit. La Documentationranaise, Paris.

de WIN, P. (1989): Editorial in WFA News Report, November-December 1989.World Federation of Advertisers (1989): 1988;

Report & Review, Brussels.World Federation of Advertisers (1989): Briefingaper, 5 October 1989.World Federation of Advertisers (1990). 1989Report & Review, Brussels.

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