Sharing Power? Prospects for a U.S. Concert-Balance Strategy

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The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within theArmy to address strategic and other issues in support of Armyparticipation in national security policy formulation.


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Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

SHARING POWER?PROSPECTS FOR A U.S. CONCERT-BALANCE

STRATEGY

Patrick Porter

April 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the author anddo not necessarily re ect the of cial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S.Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full aca-demic freedom, provided they do not disclose classi ed informa -tion, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent of cial U.S.policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new andsometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of further-ing debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release;distribution is unlimited.

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FOREWORD

Grand strategy is an important subject. It is aboutthe dialectical relationship between power and com-mitments, ends, and means. Grand strategy concernsnot only the alignment of resources with goals, buthow to conceive those goals in the rst place. At root,it is about the identity of the security community.What kind of country does it want to be, and whatkind of country does it have the power to be?

Debating U.S. grand strategy is a dif cult subjectin the public domain. First, it is often a reductionistdebate. The author of this monograph contends thatthe overwhelming consensus among the two politicalparties is that Americans should focus on how to pre-serve Americas liberal hegemony, in which the worldis ordered under American leadership and domi-

nance in order to secure its institutions and values athome. Dissent from that agenda, the author argues,is often dismissed too quickly as narrow isolationism.He observes that America does not have to choosebetween dominating the world and hiding from it.Instead, he asks how can Washington best remain aheavyweight among other heavyweights? He raisesa Second important point: critics of Americas liberalhegemony need to think harder about how alterna-tives should be designed and implemented, and whattrade-offs, costs, risks, and dilemmas they wouldgenerate. He worries that too much collaboration andpullback could lead to a dangerous vacuum occa-sioned by regional rivalries and spirals of insecurity.Finally, he concludes that too much competition could

lead to avoidable clashes between America and statesbidding for regional dominance. Like Goldilockssbears, it might be time to think about getting the mixjust right.


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This monograph is a small but important step inthat direction. It does not offer a single blueprint, but

constructively suggests a logic through which a newstrategy could be hammered out, and some concreteways in which new problems could be mitigated.The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer thismonograph as a contribution to the national securitydebate on this important subject.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PATRICK PORTER is Reader in Strategic Studies atthe University of Reading. His research interests arediplomatic and strategic history, U.S. and UnitedKingdom grand strategy, and the history of strategicthought. He is a fellow of the UK Chief of the DefenceStaffs Strategic Forum, and a contributing editor toIn nity, a new online strategy journal. Dr. Porter isthe author of Military Orientalism: Eastern War throughWestern Eyes(Columbia University Press and Hurst,2009) and The Global Village Myth: Distance, Strategyand Modern War (Georgetown University Press, forth-coming). He authored articles in International Affairs,War in History, Diplomacy and Statecraft,the Journal of Strategic Studies, War and Society, Historical Research,Security Dialogue, Parameters,and the RUSI Journal,and has written op-eds for Le Monde Diplomatique, The Guardian, The Age, and The Sydney Morning Herald. Dr.Porter graduated from the University of Melbourneand holds a doctorate from the University of Oxford.


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SUMMARY

The Pax Americanaand the grand strategy ofhegemony (or Primacy) that underpins it may bebecoming unsustainable. Particularly in the wake ofexhausting wars, the Global Financial Crisis, and theshift of wealth from West to East, it may no longerbe possible or prudent for the United States to actas the unipolar sheriff or guardian of a world order.But how viable are the alternatives, and what dif-

culties will these alternatives entail in their designand execution? This analysis offers a sympathetic butcritical analysis of alternative U.S. National SecurityStrategies of retrenchment that critics of Americandiplomacy offer. In these strategies, the United Stateswould anticipate the coming of a more multipolarworld and organize its behavior around the dual prin-

ciples of concert and balance, seeking a collabora-tive relationship with other great powers, while beingprepared to counterbalance any hostile aggressor thatthreatens world order. The proponents of such strat-egies argue that by scaling back its global militarypresence and its commitments, the United States cantrade prestige for security, shift burdens, and attaina more free hand. To support this theory, they oftenlook to the 19th-century concert of Europe as a modelof a successful security regime and to general theoriesabout the natural balancing behavior of states. Thismonograph examines this precedent and measuresits usefulness for contemporary statecraft to identifyhow great power concerts are sustained and how theybreak down. The project also applies competing theo-

ries to how states might behave if world politics are intransition: Will they balance, bandwagon, or hedge?This demonstrates the multiple possible futures thatcould shape and be shaped by a new strategy.


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A new strategy based on an acceptance of multipo-larity and the limits of power is prudent. There is scope

for such a shift. The convergence of several trendsincluding transnational problems needing collabora-tive efforts, the military advantages of defenders, thereluctance of states to engage in unbridled competi-tion, and hegemony fatigue among the Americanpeoplemeans that an opportunity exists interna-tionally and at home for a shift to a new strategy.But a Concert-Balance strategy will still need to dealwith several potential dilemmas. These include thedif culty of reconciling competitive balancing withcooperative concerts, the limits of balancing withouta forward-reaching onshore military capability, pos-sible unanticipated consequences such as a rise inregional power competition or the emergence of blocs(such as a Chinese East Asia or an Iranian Gulf), and

the challenge of sustaining domestic political supportfor a strategy that voluntarily abdicates world leader-ship. These dif culties can be mitigated, but they mustbe met with pragmatic and gradual implementationas well as elegant theorizing and the need to avoidswapping one ironclad, doctrinaire grand strategyfor another.


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SHARING POWER?PROSPECTS FOR A U.S. CONCERT-BALANCE

STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

Americas time as the undisputed hegemon ofthe world might be coming to an end. For better orworse, the United States has been the unipolar super-power presiding over a world system it, in large part,designed. Thanks to a range of interlocking prob-lems, a growing number of observers now argue thatthe security environment of the early-21st century isbecoming inhospitable to the kind of dominance thatAmericans were used to. Nothing is certain, and pre-vious similar prophecies have turned out to be prema-ture. Nevertheless, the decline of Americas relative

power and the end of unipolarity is now a suf cientlypossible scenario as to warrant a serious debate aboutalternative grand strategies and an alternative role inthe world.

In turn, this has serious policy implications forAmericas Landpower, its amphibious forces andtheir forward deployment abroad. Americas landforces have been used to deter and respond to hos-tile states, and as a constabulary of sorts in pacifyingcountries against subversive guerrillas. These respon-sibilities have played a role in shaping the identity ofAmericas land forces. To debate U.S. grand strategyis to debate what the country should do with its Armyand Marines, how large and expensive they should be,and indeed what they are even for.

But if not American hegemony . . . what? Short ofeither coming home or holding on to hegemony, isthere a viable grand strategy to be found somewhere


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in the middle? Can the United States prudently carveout a role between an overreaching primacy and the

insularity of a waters edge policy? Just as impor-tant, how should the policy be pursued? If the circum-stances today make it prudent to begin retrenchmentof Americas commitments, on what theoretical basisshould it be pursued? This monograph addressesthese questions.

If we are seeing the coming of a more multipolarworld, Americas most realistic aspiration is to steerits way to becoming a primus inter paresamong otherrising states. This analysis weighs the prospects of analternative strategy based on the logic of sharing pow-er. It is written from the perspective of an Australianwho is both reassured by and uneasy with the BarackObama administrations reaf rmation of its alliancewith Canberra, signaled most visibly by the arrival of

U.S. Marines in Darwin. For Australias sake as wellas Americas, it would be wise for the great powersto avoid two grave scenarios. The rst would be anescalating Sino-American rivalry and even a clashthat would place Australia in the cross re betweenthe countrys main security provider and its main eco-nomic partner. The second would also be dangerousa complete U.S. withdrawal followed by an escalatingrivalry between states such as China, Japan, and India,which would make for a poorer and more dangerousneighborhood.

If tomorrows world will bring a redistribu-tion of power internationally, then the only prudentpath is to examine how the great powers could learnto live together and keep the peace, while retaining

the capacity to thwart any would-be aggressor. Thatwould mean the United States making a way to someextent to accommodate and allow for the rise of other


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states with a different grand strategy. That strategywould involve some combination of offshore balanc-

ing and great power concert, a mixture of cooperationand hedging that accepts renewed multipolarity as afact of international life and looks to shape rather thancontrol world politics. As argued here, both strategichistory and a survey of future possible scenarios sug-gest that this may be dif cult. But a dif cult course inwhich America hopes for the best and prepares for theworst is better at least than an impossible one (hold-ing on to the Pax Americana) or an irresponsible one(withdrawal and isolation).

The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I laysthe competing grand strategies on the table, describ-ing the critiques of current U.S. strategy and thearguments and theoretical underpinnings of pro-posed alternatives. It argues that multiple crises have

exposed the serious imbalance between the resourcesand goals of current strategy. This section suggeststhat for all its adjustments, the Obama administra-tion is working within the overarching grand strategyit inherited.

Part II introduces an under-recognized problem,namely, that even if U.S. primacy is no longer sustain-able or prudent, other strategies may also entail seri-ous dilemmas that have not been fully appreciated.These include the problem of unintended geopoliti-cal consequences, the dangers of both balancing andbandwagoning behavior, the military presence prob-lem, and the domestic politics problem. This sectionexamines the historical precedents for collaborativesecurity regimes, such as the 19th-century concert of

Europe, arguing that while such strategies can succeed,they also are nite and must cope with the inherentdif culties of balancing competition and cooperation


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and sustaining international and domestic consent.Four converging trends are proposed to make pos-

sible a sober reappraisal of Americas position and ashift to a new Concert-Balance role: the undesirabil-ity of unbridled competition, the military advantagesheld by defenders, transnational problems requiringcollaborative efforts from the great powers, and hege-mony fatigue among the American people.

Part III suggests how a new strategy could dealpractically with the problems of design and imple-mentation. It shows the different models of Concert-Balance and what they would entail, many of whichare highly territorial in their emphasis. Each of thesemodels would directly affect Americas land forces,whether reducing and pulling them back entirely, orredeploying them within vital regions. As argued, itwould probably be most prudent to balance the ben-

e ts of a partial withdrawal for the sake of concedingstrategic space to rising states, with the bene ts of aregional presence (including land forces in reserve)for the sake of retaining the capacity to deter andcheck any power that is not interested in sharing. Landforces conceivably would be part of this strategy. Theability to capture and hold territory would remain apart of deterrence and defense, even if new weaponstechnology profoundly raises the costs of doing so.Importantly, the author also proposes that a more col-laborative grand strategy could be built partly on thebasis of nonterritorial measures. It is not just a case ofdrawing geographic lines and arguing where to placeforces, but a matter of managing interstate relation-ships in their entiretyfor example, through arms

control, measures to reduce the chances of accidentand misperception, a refocusing on areas on which thestates agree (such as energy security), and stepped-up


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diplomacy. I argue that for the strategy to have lon-gevity and consent, elegant theorizing is less impor-

tant than compromise, gradual pacing, and the patientbuilding of domestic support. While this monographwill not prescribe any single blueprint, it identi es thetrade-offs that a pragmatic shift in strategy will haveto negotiate.

PART I: THE STATE OF STRATEGY

This monograph presents an argument about U.S.grand strategy. The subject of grand strategywhatit is and to what ideas and historical models Americacan turnis getting renewed attention from the aca-demic and policy communities. 1 Grand strategy is theorchestration of ends, ways, and means in a contextof actual or possible armed con ict, in the long haul

and between peace and war. It is a theory of howto pursue national security and ensure a way of lifeby aligning power with interests. 2 Grand strategy isthe management of a chain of relationships amongmeans and ends on many levels, an elusive effort tolink these disparate things together. Strategy is thusdistinct from both policy (the desired outcome) andoperations (the exercise or use of the tools or the rela-tionship between ways and means, such as the con-duct of military campaigns). It is best conceived notas an identi able actor or thing, but as the bridgethat fuses or relates them all together. 3 Grand strat-egy represents the highest political realm in whichthese relationships are conceived. It aims at shapingan external environment in which the communitys

political institutions and values, its territorial integ-rity, and its way of life can be secure. It is for the longhaul, eyeing the experience of security communities


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across generations. Within this big picture, con ict isseen not simply as a matter of victory and defeat, but

judged according to proportional cost and long-termconsequences. To strategize is to relativize. Throughthe lens of grand strategy, what seems like a badmilitary failure or withdrawal can be a prudent cut-ting of losses. An expensive diversion of resourcesby one generation can be a valuable investment forthe next.

After its emergence as a superpower in the middleof the 20th century, the United States pursued a grandstrategy of Primacy, or Hegemony. It is still debatedprecisely when this grand strategy was conceivedand settled. Some strategists point to the thinkingand calculations made during World War II, predat-ing Americas Cold War with the Soviet Union (1947-89). Its main principles were laid down in a Brookings

Institution study of 1945, endorsed by the Joint Chiefsof Staff. 4 This study argued for the prevention of anyhostile powers or coalitions dominating the Eurasianlandmass. Others argue that Americas grand strategyunder its new President, Harry Truman, was initially

uid, but between 1945-53 it solidi ed into an overarch -ing project, with the Korean War acting as a catalyst. 5 Others yet argue that even after the Cold War intensi-

ed, the Dwight Eisenhower administration still heldout hopes for the recrudescence of Europe as a thirdforce and nuclearized counterweight to the SovietUniona Europe onto which the United States couldshift some of the burdenand that it was only with the John Kennedy administration that America nally set -tled on uncontested primacy as its preferred status in

the world. 6 Whenever historically it was established, the pre-

dominant strategy was as follows: Often described asthe Pax Americana, or euphemistically as leadership,


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this strategy was the pursuit of unchallengeable pri-macy by a nation that sees itself as the guardian of

world order. It aims well beyond overcoming adver-saries. It seeks to secure the United States and its wayof life by spreading a democratic and market ideologythat remakes the world in Americas image. By becom-ing the anchor of world security, the United Statesattempted to forestall the re-emergence of a multipo-lar world of competitive power politics. By preventingany one power from dominating vital regions in West-ern Europe or East Asia, the United States could pro-tect its interests throughout the world. Consequently,the United States looked to break the cycle of destruc-tive power politics of the Old World, by harnessing itsraw material power and exercising it through a newworld order based on an architecture of internationalinstitutions designed by Americans. America looked

to deter or overmatch enemies, reassure friends andpotential rivals, and remain the sole benevolentsuperpower, with its domestic liberalism secure in aliberal globe.

This strategy has, as its interlocking parts: dissua-sion, (to prevent potential rivals from challenging it);reassurance (to act as guarantor, underwriting thesecurity of allies and partners to persuade them notto pursue military self-reliance that could create rivalpower centers); coercive nonproliferation (to preventthe spread of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction[WMD] capability); and especially with the [GeorgeW.] Bush Doctrine, anticipatory war and musculardemocracy promotion. This strategy implements thisthrough a global military presence organized through

a chain of bases; a network of permanent alliancesand client states; and a pervasive spying and surveil-lance systemall underwritten by the Bretton-Woods


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nancial order and the dollar as the worlds reservecurrency. More than interventionist in the world

beyond its waters edge, it amounts to an enduringintrusion. 7 This grand strategy was not unbroken andcontinuous. In the interlude under President RichardNixon (1968-74), America attempted to transition to amore balance-of-power system, with burdens shiftedto allies and regional clients (like the Shahs Iran). ButPrimacy eventually reasserted itself. 8

The Pax Americanawas both a grand strategy andan American self-image. It lived on beyond the ColdWar and the demise of Americas principal adversary,the Soviet Union. After that struggle, the United Statesreaf rmed its grand strategy of Primacy. This was laiddown in the Pentagons leaked Defense Planning Guid-ancedraft in 1992, 9 and reaf rmed in successive of -cial National Security Strategies.

Makers of American strategy may disagree on themethods and temperament of statecraft, but mostlyagree on the ends. Across both major political parties,it is a consensus that America should strive to remainthe unchallengeable hegemon securing itself byextending market-democracy globally, with the debatefocusing on how this is best done. Should Americabe consensually multilateralist or more unabashedlyunilateralist, to what extent should it legitimize itspower through international institutions or retain afree hand, and how much and where should it use itsmilitary power? These are not trivial questions, butthey are mostly questions of technique, which are con-tested within a fundamentally shared grand strategicoutlook. Successive administrations may believe that

they are making a fundamental departure from theirpredecessors, but objectively may still be followingthe same broad assumptions. The Bill Clinton admin-


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istration of 1993-2001, for example, purported to shiftAmerica from Containment to Enlargement

while President Clinton privately doubted whethergrand strategy was even useful or desirablebut itobjectively continued the project of former presiden-cies in a new, post-Cold War context, namely preserv-ing and extending American hegemony by expandingthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), wag-ing two wars in the Balkans, and at one point militar-ily confronting China over Taiwan. 10

What now? The age of American-centric uni-polarity may be giving way to a more multipolarworld order. Here I do not seek to assert or refutethe notion of American decline. There is already avast literature on that contested subject. 11 Instead,this analysis proceeds on the assumption that anontrivial, major shift in power and wealth may be

underway from West to East.12

In particular, we maybe seeing through the rise of both India and Chinathe realization of a geopolitical prophecy stretchingback to Halford Mackinder and rearticulated nowby Robert Kaplan. That prophecy is the coming ofthe Greater Indian Ocean eraor more accurately,the Greater Indian-Paci c erabecoming the pivotalarena of global politics because of its abundance ofnatural resources, its linkage of increasingly wealthyand growing states, and its critical position astridesea lanes. 13

The change that may be underway does not neces-sarily mean that America is destined to fall but thatthe distribution of power and wealth in the world maybring an end to the era of the Pax Americana.That is,the shift of economic and then strategic weight to Asiamay constrain Americas capacity to dominate theinternational system and shape global events as it did


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since the fall of its major adversary in 1989-91. Thisshift is not absolute; it could be reversible and nonlin-

ear. The United States, for its sheer size and resources,its sophistication in science and technology, its cul-tural appeal, and its battle-hardened military power,is likely to remain a strategic heavyweight for gen-erations to come at least. Pound for pound for combatpower, for example, in the area of naval aviation, theUnited States is without peer and will be for decadesat least. Nothing is guaranteed, prophecies of declinehave been wrong before, and we should not rule outa renaissance in Americas global position. 14 Poten-tial challengers could also implode, and in the eldsof natural resources, internal politics, and economics,China has its own profound internal fractures, vulner-abilities, and tensions. Americas rivals cannot affordthe United States to wane too much, given the reliance

of export-oriented economies on the appetite of Amer-icas import market as the consumer-in-chief, andgiven Chinas own reserves of U.S. Treasury Bonds.That said, all world orders come to an end eventually.It would be foolish to dismiss the prospect of a powershift now because predictions were wrong in the past.Such a power shift is suf ciently possible to cause adeeper debate about what kind of alternative strate-gies would be most prudent. Soberly to imagine andprepare for a future in which America may no longerbe the only superpower is simply to be realistic.

The status quo of the Pax Americanais unsustain-able, at least in its current form. A mounting debt (atpresent it has reached $16 trillion), record de cits, andcompeting demands on dwindling resources present

a brute reality: that the United States probably cannotgo on as the sole guardian of world order in the wayin which it has been accustomed. 15 Indeed, the pres-


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sure on public nances in itself constitutes a threat tothe security of Americans way of life. The Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identi ed record debt asthe greatest threat to national security; the Director ofNational Intelligence warns that the economic crisisis Americas gravest security peril; and former Secre-tary of Defense Robert Gates warned that the UnitedStates could become what President Eisenhowerfeared, militarily strong, but economically stagnantand strategically insolvent. 16 Dauntingly, Washing-ton is faced with the need to restore its nancial sol -vency, protect the dollars reserve status, and meet itsgrowing debt and interest payments, while also meet-ing growing obligations to a retiring population. Thismeans it must make dif cult guns or butter choic -es about cutting spending, especially discretionaryspending, on defense. 17 This would force the United

States to choose between hollowing out its existingmilitary or scaling back its commitments and mis-sions for a reduced force to accomplish. These prob-lems have grown over decades, but could metastasizequickly. 18 America faces a Lippmann Gap, in whichits commitments exceed its power. 19 The self-defeatingbehavior of scal indiscipline, accelerated by the warsin Iraq and Afghanistan, has saddled the nation witha range of domestic and international commitmentsthat it struggles to uphold. 20

Under these circumstances, holding onto the exist-ing strategyPrimacywould be unwise. It forces astate to defend a vast and brittle Perimeter. 21 In addi-tion to making Americas commitments exceed itsresources, Primacy carries the free rider problem,

of some allies and partners over-relying on Washing-ton to shoulder the burden of their defense (such assome European NATO allies have long done). It car-


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ries the moral hazard problem of unintentionallyunderwriting the risky behavior of others by guaran-

teeing their protection. It potentially places the UnitedStates on a fatal collision course with other emergingpowers, plunging both sides into a security dilemmawhereby the measures they take to enhance their ownsecurity undermine other actors positions and makethem feel insecure, both then entering a spiral of dis-trust, competition, and arms buildup. Primacy canpresent the temptation of preventive war. An attemptto forestall the power shift through direct competi-tion with emerging powers, even through preventivewar, would be dangerous. Not only would it placethe United States in con ict with states on whom itdepends economically, but historically, preventivewars are launched to keep other states down, whetherby Wilhelmine Germany or Imperial Japan, and tend

to accelerate the very power shift they aspire to pre-vent. 22 These wars can drive economies backward andturn regions into antagonistic camps. One signi cantcost of American primacy is entanglement in the poli-tics of the Gulf, which played a nontrivial role in galva-nizing the al-Qaeda terrorist network and its war withAmerica as the far enemy for its role in sponsoringthe hated apostate regimes. 23 In times of abundance,these problems possibly are manageable as an accept-able cost of a grand strategy. But Americas strengthis now strained to the point that it lacks the surplusreserve of power to respond to the contingent emer-gencies that its current course may produce.

The case for retrenchment of Americas commit-ments, therefore, is compelling. Retrenchment is the

retraction of grand strategic commitments in responseto a decline in relative power, reducing the costs offoreign policy by redirecting resources away from


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peripheral to core commitments. 24 It would involvesome combination of the following: rede ning inter -

ests and more strictly ranking core versus periph-eral ones in order to reduce commitments; shiftingburdens to allies and raising their contributions totheir security interests; cutting military expenditures;avoiding militarized disputes and peripheral warsand reducing threats to interests through diplomacy;and devising cheaper and more effective forms ofpower and strategies for their use. A new grand strat-egy, however, would require more than making evenmajor adjustments. It would be premised on a changein an underlying ethos from the accumulation ofpower and dominance of the international system topower-sharing, balance, and watchful accommodationwithin it.

Power shifts make new con icts possible, but not

inevitable. Con ict is not a law in periods of powertransition, as some more pessimistic realists seem tothink. Power transitions can be managed peacefully,as in the case of the Dutch Republic giving way toBritain in the 1700s. As we will see, historically fromtime to time, states have willingly formed concerts orregimes, agreeing to limit competition and co-existwarily. There is scope for discretion and choice assome states rise and others fall, passing each other onthe way. 25

If con ict during major power transitions is not alaw, it is still a tendency.26 If history is a rough guide,as rising states like China become more wealthy andpowerful, we should expect them to become moreassertive in pressing their interests. Status quo powers

(such as the United States) may well feel threatened,and are tempted to ex their muscles to tame theirworld back into equilibrium. We may already see the


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evidence for the propensity to increasing confronta-tion, for example, in the harder line states that are

taking on maritime territorial claims in the South andEast China Seas; in Washingtons embrace of Indiaas a strategic partner; and in Chinas development ofa blue-water naval capability, its development of ananti-access and area denial shield, and its moderniza-tion of its nuclear weapons system and developmentof submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. Atthe time of this writing, Beijing has publicly launchedits rst aircraft carrier amidst simmering territorialdisputes with Japan, over the Senkaku (or Diaoyu)Islands in the East China Sea and with the Philippinesand Vietnam over resource-rich parts of the South Chi-na Sea. 27 In addition to the contest for relative materialpower, prestige is part of the issue. China appears tobe a dissatis ed state in the sense that its power is not

yet suf ciently expressed internationally; its historichumiliations by foreigners have not yet been expi-ated; and its true status is not yet re ected through itshistoric frontiers in Taiwan, India-Tibet, or the SouthChina Sea. 28

In a different context, with its main neighboringadversary, Saddam Hussein, taken off the board, anincreasingly in uential Iran regards itself as a naturalgreat power in the Gulf. It is not as obvious a candi-date as China to be a revisionist challenger, as it doesnot have the engine of a powerful economic expan-sion to underpin its bid for power and lend legitimacyto its regime. Nevertheless, the Gulf, like East Asia,is a region open to the effects of power transition.We are already seeing signs of renewed balancing

against Iran, with the Arab Spring adding a potentrevolutionary dimension to competition as Saudi Ara-bia and Iran compete in a Cold War contest in whichpopular protest and sectarian con ict endanger their


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client regimes and in which both throw their military-nancial weight into contested areas like Bahrain

and Syria.In this possibly deteriorating environment, howcould alternative grand strategies be designed andimplemented? The most prudent course would beto identify a middle-ground strategy somewherebetween the poles of Primacy and Isolation. In terms ofits rst-order interests, the United States is essentiallya materially secure state due to its distance, the pow-er it can project to repel aggressors, its large nuclearstockpile, and the costs in the present era of wagingoffensive war and attempting conquest. The securityof the United States need not depend on remakingthe world in its image. But the United States still hasnontrivial second-order interests in the security of theworlds energy supply, the sea lanes and chokepoints

such as the Straits of Malacca or the Straits of Hor-muz, and in shaping the balance of power in criticalregions, such as the Persian Gulf and in East Asia. Asthe U.S. maritime services argue, interests in the secu-rity of the global commons mean that it needs to havecredible combat power in critical areas of the Indianand Paci c Oceans. 29 The United States still exertsin uence and helps set the agenda partly by virtueof its presence beyond its own shores. These interestsand in uences may not be strictly existential. But theyare still serious.

So on what logic should a middle-ground strat-egy be based? U.S. grand strategy has attracted manyoverlapping efforts at categorization. It is dif cult inall this taxonomy to identify and distinguish what

really differentiates one from another. 30 The debate ongrand strategy is also mixed up in debate over makingstrategy in discrete con icts, such as the Cold War orthe Global War on Terror. 31


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For our purposes here, I identify three broad logicsthat could inform future strategy, those of Primacy,

Isolation, and Concert-Balance.32

If we could plotalternative grand strategies on a spectrum, a Concert-Balance type would lie somewhere in the middle,between the poles of continued global dominationand abandoning power politics and coming home.It would relinquish hegemony as gracefully as pos-sible, but remain engaged as a heavyweight willing toassert itself.

What exactly is a Concert-Balance Strategy, and howdoes it differ from other strategies? A Concert-Balancestrategy would concede strategic space and spheres ofin uence to other states, reduce Americas peripheralcommitments, contract the defensive perimeter andthe military footprint, and perhaps exchange formalpermanent alliances for informal temporary ones

while asking other states to show reciprocal restraintand to contribute more to maintaining regional stabil-ity and security. The proponents of this strategy haveformulated it in different ways. Michael Lind, HughWhite, and Stephen Van Evera lean more toward theconcert side of the equation, proposing that the UnitedStates arrange a negotiated coexistence with emerg-ing powers, while remaining present to some extentin vital neighborhoods such as East Asia or the Gulf. 33 In what could be the next pivotal geopolitical regionof the world, some propose (with varying con dence)a concert of Asia. 34

Alternatively, offshore balancing theorists (such asChristopher Layne, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble,and Stephen Walt) 35 place more stress on the infor-

mal process of burden shifting and pulling back fromAmericas forward commitments, and look to regionalpowers to check and balance against each other, withthe United States as the balancing security guaran-


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tor of last resort. Only if one state were to achieve apreponderance of power and dominate its neighbors

would the balancer fully intervene. In the words ofLayne, offshore balancing would de ne U.S. interestsnarrowly in terms of defending the United States territo-rial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian hege-mon in an increasingly multipolar world. 36 These theo-rists are probably more pessimistic about the chancesof successfully building a concert, seeing internationallife as overwhelmingly competitive. In their view, theUnited States can live with continual power struggles,so long as they do not produce dangerous concentra-tions of power.

The premise of these alternatives is that Americasmost prudent course is to accept and accommodatewhat the writers see as a fact of political life, the returnof multipolarity. The underlying logic of Concert-Bal-

ance grand strategies is that of watchfully sharing power with other major states, as a more sustainable wayof securing Americas way of life. As Michael Lindargues for the marriage of both principles of concertand balance:

The Concert-Balance strategy represents the bestnational security strategy for the United States in an

era of emerging multipolarity and domestic budgetconstraints. It abandons the exorbitantly expensiveand ultimately doomed attempt to forever forestallthe emergence of other great powers by means of dis-suasion of potential foes and reassurance of friends,in order to realistically prepare for the U.S. role as aleader of concerts and alliances in a multipolar world.It draws both on American idealismthe dream ofcollective security shared by Woodrow Wilson andFranklin Roosevelt with millions of people around theworldand on American pragmatismthe successfulexperience of the United States during the World Warsand Cold War as a leading member of great-power


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alliances rather than a solitary superpower. Since theend of the Cold War, the United States has lacked acredible vision capable of guiding American nationalsecurity policy in the multipolar world of tomorrowwithout bankrupting the economy or exhausting pub-lic support. The Concert-Balance strategy provides thatmissing vision. 37

Pulling back and limiting U.S. liability would per-suade other states to shoulder a greater burden of

counter-hegemonic balancing. As America does less,others would have to do more. At the same time, theUnited States can disengage from formal Eurasiancommitments and make signi cant budget cuts with -out compromising national security.

However, in addition to attempting to negotiate acoexistence with other major powers, America withthis strategy would also seek to cover its bets in caseother states turn out to be bad sharers. It would thushusband its military-strategic capabilities and accu-mulate surplus power to counterbalance against anywould-be aggressor, and act as a security provider oflast resort. Taking Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheelerstriptych of transcender , mitigator,and fatalistvisions ofworld politics, a Concert-Balance strategy falls prey

neither to the hopes of utopians who seek to transformthe world, nor to those fatalists who see internationallife as an inherently con ictual, predatory, and zero-sum game. It holds that insecurity can be amelioratedfor a time and that con ict can be limited and local -ized, but that the mischief of the anarchic world cannever be nally eliminated. 38

This strategy does not rule out intervention or theuse of force, but remains at heart a watching and reac-tive strategy, not . . . a precautionary and preventiveone. 39 Its ultimate goal is not to prevent war outright,


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but to ensure that any con ict minimizes costs andmaximizes gains for U.S. relative power. Strategists

who take the above positions do have their differ-ences. Where they implicitly or explicitly differ is howthis new strategy should be operationalized, whatbargains would need to be struck to make a concertwork, and what moving offshore means in practice.The nal chapter of this work will identify and weighthese differences.

What historical models would inform this kind ofgrand strategy? There are cases in international his-tory that can give a rough guide to what collaborativeregimes and power balancing look like, even whilethey are imperfect analogies. 40 Crucially, each casehas its drawbacks. The record suggests that effectiveretrenchment and the adoption of a new grand strat-egy is possible, but that in practice active balancing is

hard to pull off without entanglement and unintend-ed consequences. For their part, security regimes areimpermanent, they rely on a level of power equalitythat does not always exist, and their very success con-tains the seeds of their failure.

From U.S. history, there are some ruthless exam-ples of balancing behavior. By limiting and delayingits intervention in the European war of 1939-41, theUnited States was able to help keep Britain and theSoviet Union in the war while the two continentalgiantsGermany and the Soviet Unionwere worndown, preventing both from becoming masters of Eur-asia. As a result, America emerged as a nuclear super-power and the only state that directly materially ben-e ted from the most destructive war in history. The

change in power relativities as a result of World WarII left Americas might arti cially high in 1945. 41 TheUnited States experienced unprecedented industrialexpansion. It reached the highest per capita produc-


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tivity in the world, the highest standard of living, anddomination of the world's gold reserves. The United

States also became the largest creditor and exporter.Its capacity to project power globally with long-rangebombers and carrier task forces was unparalleled,leaving formerly great powers such as Britain (whoseempire it helped dismantle) and France in securitydependency on Washington. We must note, howev-er, that this is still a violence-based example. Such astrategy still led to full-scale mobilization and a vastmilitary effort, a precedent that some nd discour -aging as a model for future grand strategy making.Similarly, one precedent for offshore balancing is thebacking of Saddam Husseins Iraq as a counterweightto revolutionary Iran, a bloody strategy that hadmixed resultscontaining a potential regional hege-mon and preserving a power balance in the Gulf, but

entangling the United States in an ongoing forwarddeployed presence and a decade of containment. Thisstrategy also taunted the United States with complic-ity in one of the most catastrophic wars in the regionin modern times. This is again a precedent that willcause disquiet for some observers.

History also offers some less violent diplomaticprecedents in which overstretched states have foundeffective diplomatic ways of reducing threats, shiftingburdens, and realigning with former adversaries, all toclose the gap between their power and their commit-ments. One is Edwardian Britain at the turn of the 20thcentury. In the wake of the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902, Britain found itself overextended and facingthe rise of Imperial Germany as an economic power-

house building a large navy and a revisionist state thatposed a challenge to the Pax Britannica.Furthermore,Germany's rising power coincided with that of othermaritime nations such as Japan and the United States.


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To adapt to this inhospitable environment, Britainconceded strategic space to the United States over its

own hemisphere in the Americas and the Caribbean,allied itself with Japan as a counterweight to Germanyand Russian expansion in Asia, and conciliated withFrance and Russia. 42 This grand strategy on its ownterms was a pattern of effective strategic adjustment.It fell short, however, of overhauling the deep eco-nomic issues linked to the problem, and it was mostlyunstated and fragmented. Moreover, by accommodat-ing or settling with its main imperial rivals, Britainhelped the encirclement of its most feared continentalrival, thereby stimulating further antagonism and thebreakdown of European order.

American diplomatic history also offers a con-structive case. Over three presidencies between 1968and 1980, Washington opened the way to full diplo-

matic relations with China, reducing potential threatsto its interests in Asia; it negotiated the Camp DavidAccords and realigned itself with Egypt; resolvedthe Panama question; achieved modest successes inpersuading allies from NATO to Japan to increasetheir defense budgets; and achieved arms controlagreements with the Soviet Union on ballistic missiledefenses and strategic offensive weapons. As SamuelHuntington noted, Consider how different the worldwould look and what the demands would be on U.S.resources if China were threatening aggression againstAmerican interests in Asia, if Egypt were a Sovietally and military base, and if the Panama Canal wereunder intermittent attack by guerrilla-terrorists. 43 Asa result in large measure of the U.S.-China dtente,

America emerged from the Vietnam War with noneof its allies straying or its adversaries falling out, andwith its overall strategic position in Asia bolsteredrather than weakened.


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The great historical model for a security regime orconcert is that of 19th-century Europe, formed in 1815

at the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napo-leonic France and its bid for continental hegemony.Europes concert was a security regime, or geo-strategic cartel, of a set of relationships and practicesdesigned to build cooperation between the victoriousstates. 44 It did not always achieve consensus, or elimi-nate disagreements or even occasional armed con-

icts. But its members did cooperate to manage crisesand prevent a generalized, major international con ictbetween them. It was an impermanent solution. His-torians dispute the causal relationships that producedthe stability and relative peace associated with theconcert, and they dispute the timing and causes of itsdemise. They probably were united around the gainsfrom cooperation and the costs for defection, were

impelled by sheer exhaustion from the Napoleonicwars to avoid another major con ict, and may havebeen culturally bonded by shared aristocratic valuesand a sense of an international European communityof common security interests.

The 20th century has also seen the recrudescenceof the idea: The United Nations Security Council(UNSC) was formed to embed a concert of majorpowers, or in the earlier words of President WoodrowWilson, a community of power. Moreover, there areechoes of an informal concert in todays managementof international order by the leading statesthoughthe concert principle re ected in this architecture wasovershadowed by the dyadic Cold War competitionbetween two of its leading members, and ever since

has been overshadowed by Americas unprecedentedlevel of unipolar dominance. 45

In de ning Concert-Balance strategies, it is impor -tant to clear up three areas of conceptual confusion.


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First, offshore balancing is not the same as isolation-ism. While isolationists might be drawn to some of

the policy implications of offshore balancing, the twoapproaches are distinct: Both involve abstention fromforeign military commitments to a greater or lesserdegree, but balancing strategies in principle allow formore of an over the horizon presence in the region,remain concerned about the balance of power abroad,and are not strictly committed as isolationists areto neutrality.

Second, offshore balancing is a grand strategy, butis sometimes treated as a matter of tactical/operation-al military posture and style, an aversion to forwarddeployed land forces or ground military expeditionsin favor of the standoff ability to punish/interdictthrough naval air strikes. Taken literally, in this con-text offshore balancing means removing garrisons in

various regions, and parking the U.S. Navy over thehorizon to intervene only occasionally. For RobertPape, it entails the use of air and naval assets ratherthan direct occupation. 46 For John Mearsheimer, itmeans minimizing Americas military footprint in theregion while ensuring that no single power dominatesit, reducing incentives for anti-American terrorism. 47 These proposals in themselves do follow the logic ofextricating the United States from costly ground com-mitments, but could just as easily stand as discretemeasures in maintaining a grand strategy of Primacybased on raiding and punitive strikes. Ultimately,an offshore balancing strategy must go beyond tak-ing steps to minimize terrorist blowback and is reallyintended to refocus the United States on what political

realists regard as the central question of its relationswith other major states.

Third, contrary to the claims of some, the currentgrand strategy remains one of Primacy. 48 The Obama


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administration has recalibrated U.S. statecraft in somesigni cant ways, most notably in the pivot toward

Asia as its priority, the downgrading of Americascommitment to European security, a de-emphasis oncounterinsurgency and nation-building, and reshap-ing the military to make it more standoff in itsposture and its missions. Obama is already takingsome steps at retrenchment as laid out in the DefenseStrategic Guidanceand shifts in its military posture. 49 But in words and deeds, the Obama administrationis still trying to hold on to American hegemony andin particular, primacy in Asia, by bolstering its ownpresence while restraining Chinas rise in the Paci c.The Defense Strategic Guidanceleaves much scope forinterventionism, even while it has abandoned expe-ditionary land adventures to pacify and rebuild thirdworld countries. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

declared a new American moment and reaf rmedAmericas commitment to global leadership, 50 though in a subsequent speech she emphasized U.S.-Chinese partnership. 51 President Obamas speech tothe Australian Parliament in November 2011 rededi-cated the United States to being a Paci c power withan enhanced presence in the regionunderwritingits security and seeking a cooperative relationshipwith Beijing but inviting it into an American-centricorder. 52 In its behavior, the United States augmentsits naval-air presence in Asia and reinforces strategicties with allies in the shape of Marines deployed tonorthern Australia and military assistance to statespotentially in Chinas shadow. The United States hasalso recently consolidated its strategic partnership

with India, which is probably partly a hedge againstChinas rise. 53 In practice, there is already in the cur-rent strategy an effort to spread costs by encour-aging burden sharing, especially in East Asia. But


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Obamas statecraft is still highly interventionist, andits overall goal is unchallengeable primacy through

permanent presence.Under Obama, the United States attempts to pur-sue the existing inherited grand strategic goal (thepreservation of American primacy) while adjustingthe ever-shifting mix of military supremacy, deter-rence, reassurance, and democracy promotion in anapparently increasingly important part of the worldwhere economic weight and political ambition aremoving. The overriding message is that of sustainingan American-centric order with little room for strate-gic parity. In other words, Washington invites Chinato cooperate harmoniously as a stakeholder, from anunequal position. This is some distance from a pow-er-sharing agreement or security regime. Obamasadjustments do not yet represent a fundamental shift

in Americas grand strategic aims or its underlyingrationale. Importantly, this is how China perceivesU.S. strategy, that Washington wants cooperationon its own terms, seeks to deter Beijing from devel-oping a military capability to defend its interests,and intends to promote change in the character of theChinese regime. 54

PART II: NO FREE LUNCHES: DILEMMAS,TRADE-OFFS, AND OPPORTUNITIES

In grand strategy, as in life, there are no free lunch-es. An unbending commitment to Primacy may well beunaffordable and imprudent. But retrenchment and anew strategic role are likely to entail serious costs and

risks. Here in Part II, I survey the main critical objec-tions that have been made against Concert-Balancestrategies. 55 These critiques in part are overblown, as I


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argue. But other aspects of them stick. The more astutecriticisms should inform and temper how a different

strategy is conceived, designed, and executed. At thesame time, the uncertain international environment isalso throwing up opportunities and trends that couldwork in favor of a change in American statecraft.

The debate about moving the United States into amore modest, withdrawn role boils down to a ques-tion of chaos: How much would its retrenchment orwithdrawal unleash, and how much chaos can theUnited States affordably live with? It is worth recall-ing that offshore balancers do not claim to offer a solu-tion to international insecurity. After all, the strategysmain advocates are pessimistic realists. They regardcompetition and insecurity as hard-wired into theanarchic world in which we live. Rather, they seek tokeep the United States away from the eye of geopo-

litical storms and transfer con ict to others, leavingcrisis management in the rst instance to local states.They resist the widespread assumption that interna-tional security must rest upon the adult supervision ofa singular superpower, reminding us that for Americato retrench and burden-shift is not the same as mak-ing other states defenseless. That is the dif cultywith Aaron Friedbergs accusation that retrenchmentwould betray Americas long history of coming tothe aid of fellow democracies, a decision that couldbe construed as abandoning some of them to theirfates. 56 Apart from its selectively rose-tinted view ofAmerican diplomatic traditions, this argument under-estimates the capacity of other countries to take ona greater burden of balancing and counterbalancing

themselves. That would be an obstacle to his dark sce-nario, in which an unchecked Chinese domination ofEast Asia could give it preferred access to, if not full


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command over, the regions vast industrial, nancial,natural, and technological resources, and a base for

further power projection. Besides, by reducing thechances of a security dilemma, an accommodationof Chinas growth (within limits) that prevented all-out competition could enhance rather than threatenthe security of the democracies that Friedberg caresabout. At the same time, a Concert-Balance strategywould reckon that the chances of China slowly politi-cally liberalizing would be greater if its leaders couldnot easily rally nationalism by claiming that their statewas being encircled and threatened.

According to more optimistic appraisals, an Amer-ican retreat from hegemony would lead to a manage-able level of strife that would bene t U.S. securityinterests. The withdrawal of Americas military super-vision would see the re-emergence of natural checks

against predatory behaviornamely a return to thelogic of balancing and equilibrium, should any statethreaten its neighbors. In addition, any competitionwould be limited and bounded by todays militarytechnology. Nuclear weapons have made conquestby other states virtually impossible and prohibitivelycostly. They generally dampen security competitionamong major powers. As cooperation is imperativeand competition increasingly costly, never beforehave there been such strong incentives for interstatepeace, stability, and cooperation. In this new space, anew security regime of collaboration could be forged,hammered out, and negotiated with emerging powerssuch as India and China. There are new, transnationalthreats that require joint response and could form the

basis for a concert. Just as the 19th-century concert wasbound together by a common fear of mass revolutionand the wars that attended it, so too could the majorpowers of the 21st century organize and collaborate


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around the unifying force of common threats suchas catastrophic terrorism, WMD proliferation, and

threats to the global commons such as climate change.Against this optimistic reckoning, there are darkerpossibilities. A return to a stable multipolar balanceof power is not necessarily guaranteed. Neither nucle-ar weapons nor new global threats might suf ce toprevent the resumption of competition and securitydilemmas. Even if nuclear weapons do have an over-all restraining effect and preclude the kind of conquestand expansionism that traditional balance-of-powerstrategy fears, states might still engage in securitycompetition of other kinds, such as proxy wars, armsand alliance races, and high-stakes confrontations.Without the worlds sheriff as security guarantor,there could be an alarming cycle of distrust, militarybuildup, regional arms races, escalating competition,

and war in key regional centers such as the Gulf orAsia-Paci c. Furthermore, it is not clear that balancingwill be the dominant response to Americas withdraw-al. States deprived of American security guaranteesmight bandwagon rather than balance, aligningthemselves with regional hegemons rather than coun-terbalancing them, leading to a Chinese East Asia or anIranian Gulf. These would form the kinds of regionalblocs that have traditionally been unwelcome to U.S.strategists. Even if Concert-Balance theorists are rightand balancing does prevail over bandwagoning, theUnited States would have to be prepared either to livewith, or to mitigate, the effects that could ow fromthe withdrawal of Americas reassuring and dissuad-ing presence.

What should we make of the objection that shar-ing power to burden shift will in turn invite securitydilemmas, as emerging powers re-arm, expand their


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ambitions, and enter a new era of confrontation? Crit-ics may be astute to point out that con dence in the

natural balancing dynamic can overlook the destabi-lizing effects of creating power vacuums that wouldnot necessarily directly threaten the United States, butstill be bad for its interests. As they point out, if theUnited States does less, states may be less con dentthat Washington has their back. To switch meta-phors, if the American cork is then removed from theGulf and Asian bottles, those regions may be in fornew and dangerous waves of saber rattling and insta-bility. As two observers put it:

Forward-postured forces also reassure allies of theUnited States commitment to their security. On theKorean Peninsula, for example, the presence of some28,000 U.S. personnel reminds Seoul that the UnitedStates stands ready to defend South Korea againstNorth Korean aggression. Further south, U.S. naval andair forces engaged in Australia, the Philippines, Singa-pore, and Thailand give allies in Southeast Asia greatercon dence that the United States will not abandon theregion at a time of great change and uncertainty. 57

But even with the United States still in a forward-leaning role and Obamas pivot toward Asia, a risein competition owing from a sense of insecurity isalready happening to some extent. The evidence for itlies in the pattern of rising defense investment, territo-rial disputes, and are-ups. Asian states are alreadyspending much more on their defense as they feartheir security environment deteriorates. According tolatest ndings of the International Institute of Strate -

gic Studies (IISS), Australia, South Korea, Japan, India,Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore all raisedtheir defense spending signi cantly over the past few


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years. 58 Apart from the effects of in ation, this canbe explained as the result of several converging fac-

tors, including uncertainty over the implications ofChinas rise, doubts over the credibility of U.S. secu-rity guarantees, and economic growth in East Asia.In response, U.S. strategy already contains a mixtureof security provision and burden sharing. Regionalstates are not waiting for a shift in U.S. grand strategyto feel insecure and are actively taking measures tohelp themselves. A dangerous multipolarity may beon the horizon, whether America welcomes it or not.The strategic choice for the United States is whether toresist this developmentplacing greater strain on itsoverstretched resources and putting it on a collisioncourse with other powersor adjust to and managethis change as gracefully as possible.

There are also practical, logistical, and domestic-

political problems entailed in a Concert-Balance strat-egy. How is the United States to act as an offshorepower, intervening selectively to protect the equi-librium of world order, without the architecture ofa forward military presence, a basing network, or anonshore military capability? Would prudent balanc-ing from a distance still entail a withdrawal to its ownhemisphere, or would the United States need to retaina basing presence and ability to secure the globalcommons on which it depends by projecting powerover potential ash points or maritime choke pointssuch as the Spratley Islands, Taiwan Straits, Straitsof Hormuz, or the Malacca Straits? Intervening mili-tarily as a balancer may also be made more dif cultby innovations such as nuclear weapons, interconti-

nental missiles, and information technologies, all ofwhich enable regional defenders to place high costs ona would-be offensive interloper. If the strengtheningof access/area denial makes direct intervention too


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expensive or too escalatory, other problematic formsof competition would have to be considered, such as

bankrolling temporary allies or proxy wars.The greatest practical problem with offshore strat-egies is the concrete need any balancer would have formilitary bases abroad. It is not the case that technolog-ical sophistication and long-range weapons systemsremove Americas need for an onshore military capa-bility. Indeed, ever-more-sophisticated technology insome ways is more demanding of physical supportthan its antecedents. Jet ghters, tanks, and helicop -ters need constant maintenance, fuel, and logisticalbackup. Ship crews need food and harbors. To wagewar against Iraq in 1991, a relatively weak opponentcompared to the U.S.-led coalition, the United Statesstill had to amass a gigantic quantity of supplies inSaudi Arabia. 59 Effective military power, especially at

long range, lies not only in doctrines of force employ-ment or the volume of repower, but in the capacityto sustain operations. Therefore, any effort to reduceAmericas security footprint should take into accountthe need to leave regional states con dent enough inAmericas will to act as a balancer that they are willingto offer access to bases.

Balancing from abroad may be more violent,more intense, and more entangling than sometimesassumed. The major historical example of an offshorebalancer, 18th-century Great Britain, worked hard tostay aloof from continental commitments, but balanc-ing still led it into a range of European wars includingthat of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), the AustrianSuccession (1740-48), the Seven Years War (1756-63),

and the War of the First Coalition (1793-97), as well asthe war against France in the American Revolution-ary War (1775-83). Then there were proxy struggles in


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colonial India and in the Vendee uprising, among oth-ers. For the present, Michael Lind argues that, in the

absence of unlikely major interstate wars, balancingwould entail not only the training of indigenous forc-es or emergency relief, but also proxy wars reminis-cent of the Cold War. 60 This would place in jeopardyone of the main imperatives of a new grand strategy,which should be to involve an overstretched super-power in fewer con icts, especially costly peripheralones that do not directly threaten it.

Another dif culty is the problem of bandwagon -ing. As Krepinevich argues, a reduced U.S. strategicpresence may open the way not to balancing, butto Chinas strategy of Finlandization, if Beijingsgoal is:

not to establish its pre-eminence in the region by ght -

ing a war. Rather, the Chinese want to do so by win-ning a bloodless victory, by convincing Seoul, Taipei,and Tokyo that, given the altered military balance inEast Asia, they should accommodate Chinese interestsand reduce ties with the United States. 61

The risk of a region-wide bandwagoning, histori-cally speaking, is low, but not remote. 62 As we will see,

Taiwan in fact is consciously Finlandizing. But whatof India, Japan, or South Korea? For bandwagoning tooccur, a number of conditions normally are needed.States that behave in this way are normally relativelyweak; they see the dominant state as an appeasablethreat, and they lack available or potential allies. The

rst criterion may apply to Taiwan, given its proxim -ity to a powerful neighbor, but the other two apply farless to India or Japan. South Korea may be a candidatefor a partial drift toward Beijing in the event of a U.S.withdrawal, but outright bandwagoning would be


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made less likely by the role of its historic adversary,North Korea, also Chinas client. In the Gulf, there are

few regional states powerful enough to predominateto the extent that others would be tempted to band-wagon. Irans resurgent in uence would still prob -ably be countered by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt.In the event of a U.S. withdrawal from formal secu-rity commitments in Eastern Europe, it is not clearthat states like Poland or the Czech Republic wouldregard Moscow as an appeasable threat. Equally, wecould reasonably expect a reassertion of Russias geo-political in uence nearer its frontiers, with states suchas Georgia and the Ukraine less con dent that theUnited States, through NATO, would have their back.Realistically, a power-sharing relationship with Rus-sia would probably have to concede Moscow strategicspace in its own backyard. Thus, overall, there may

be bandwagoning to an extent for more vulnerablestates that are physically closer to China and Russia,but not for a bandwagoning cascade to the extent thatsome fear.

This raises an important point about the role ofallies and fellow democracies in American grandstrategy. Effective strategy requires the recogni-tion of limits, the limits of both power and commit-ments. To embrace an open-ended commitment to thecause of democratic liberty is to abandon limits. Eventhe defense of Western democracy has historicallyinvolved bargaining and collaborating with authori-tarian allies, both with Stalinism in World War II andwith a range of dictatorships in Europe, the MiddleEast, South America, Africa, and Asia during the Cold

War. Consider, for example, the question of NATOexpansion and the charge that America might abandonits democratic allies to Russia. Russia has an orbit that


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it will jealously protect, just as America does. Insteadof irting with the notion that NATO will draw in

states in others backyards, or even protect them ina crisis, it is more prudent to accept that this is justgeopolitical bad luck for the likes of Southern Cyprus,Georgia, or the Ukraine, whose inclusion could drawNATO into con ict or give opportunities to secession -ists or nationalists to manipulate NATO into a crisis.NATO is not obliged to do what it cannot prudentlydo, or what it cannot do without taking on suicidalrisks; in this case, an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontationon a militarized frontier, or an Article V commitmentto war with Russia. NATO does not exist to defendvulnerable states that live in the shadow of giants orto be a crusading Delian league of democracies. Itexists to protect the North Atlantic world. Part of thattask is to negotiate distance with outside powers and

reassure them from a position of strength, rather thanclose the gap and antagonize them from a positionof overreach. 63

Just as criticisms have been leveled at offshore bal-ancing strategies, so too has the notion of a securityregime attracted doubters. Consider the concert ofEurope as the major case in international history. Thisdebate is complicated by the problem that historiansdisagree on what sustained and what undermined theconcert, and even when we should date its life anddeath. 64 But from the balance of the historiography,we can con dently assume that such regimes may beimpermanent and hard to sustain. A successful regimerequires a common perceived interest, most power-fully provided by a common perceived threat, and

such threat perceptions are normally not permanent.Security regimes require an unusual level of restraintin their members, who expect gains to ow from their


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cooperation and who are motivated to avoid the coststhat defection would bring. Collaboration needs trust

and the restraint of competitive behavior, and this ishard to forge, given the uncertainties of detecting whatothers are doingwhy they seek arms, the dif cultiesof predicting who allies and enemies will be, and thesuspicion that other members of the concert will cheat.Ironically, by reducing fear and suspicion, promotingcooperation, and lessening the security dilemma, suchregimes may contain the seeds of their own failureby encouraging states to push harder for individualgain, behave competitively, and thereby erode theregime itself. 65

The 19th-century European concert is hardly anexact parallel to today. As some have observed, it washammered out from a common original crisis (theNapoleonic wars), a common European elite diplo-

matic culture, a shared fear of revolution, and roughpower parity between members of the concert. Today,we are arguably dealing with disparate cultures, notbound together by the same fear of revolution, withpower parities possibly shifting rapidly. 66 But in otherways, conditions could be ripe for a power-sharingagreement. As already shown, both defense-dominantmilitary technology and delicate economic relation-ships in a mercantile age would make it prudent tonegotiate an arrangement for reciprocal restraint. Inaddition, while there is no common political spectersuch as mass revolution, or a common national adver-sary such as a resurgent Napoleonic France, there arecommon areas of material interestindeed, threats tothe global commonsthat could be the focal point and

source of motivation. These include nonproliferationand the prevention of nonstate actors obtaining WMDand the securing of loose nuclear materials, energy


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security, natural disasters, diseases, and epidemics.In addition to these common areas, the major states

in the world are faced with a global nancial crisis inwhich they cannot afford the major consumer marketof America to fail too quickly or too deeply.

The most discouraging difference between the19th-century example and todays conditions lies inthe different con gurations of power. The concertof Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and then Francecontained states that were much more closely compa-rable in terms of military-strategic might than, say, theUnited States and its potential concert partners today.Moreover, they were exhausted by an epochal warand disenthralled from further con ict. The Congressof Vienna in 1815 represented the collective effort toaddress a common problem and forge a broader senseof an international interest. Opinion in Washington

may well resist the suggestion that the United Statesshould allow for a rebalancing of power in the medi-um-term future. For proponents of a modern-dayconcert of India, Russia, China, America, and somecombination of European states, the strongest coun-terargument would be that the shift of wealth fromWest to East (if it continues) will bring these statescloser to rough parity.

To bolster such an arrangement with deeper levelsof trust, it would be desirable to intensify diplomaticcommunication and dialogue. A concert today, like its19th century antecedent, pivots on horse trading, com-promise, and ongoing negotiation. It therefore shouldwork as an informal arrangement rather than rely on aformal institutional architecture. 67 A shared sense of a

European, Gulf, and Asia-Paci c security communitywould be useful. Even if this were unrealistic, con-certs on a day-to-day basis require a lot of diplomaticspadework. To maintain a collaborative order based


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on mutual restraint and trust would need a great dealof summitry as well as lower-level communication.

As the nal section will argue, stepped-up diplomacywould need greater investment and resources.The most dif cult, possibly the most fatal, obstacle

to forging a security regime is that it is easily carica-tured. It would be crudely accused of representingappeasement. In American (and Australian) dip-lomatic history, this is a strong and enduring mytho-logical theme. 68 Making concessions and grantingstrategic space to Russia or China, it is argued, wouldrepeat the strategic and moral errors of British PrimeMinister Neville Chamberlain, whose misguideddiplomacy whetted the appetite of the predator Hitler,with disastrous results. In political life, many effortsat compromise or concession, or even the very act oftalking to other states, have drawn this accusation.

The appeasement slur traf cs on a simplistic readingof Britains complex mixture of rearmament, adjust-ment, and compromise in the deteriorating strategicenvironment of the late-1930s, builds its timelessargument on an atypical historical case, and ignorescontrary cases in which prudent negotiation has suc-ceeded (such as President Ronald Reagans armscontrol talks with the General Secretary of the SovietUnion Mikhail Gorbachev). The slur also ignores casesin which in exible escalation and the obsession withlooking strong has led to overstretch and disaster(such as the Suez or Vietnam). 69 In any event, a secu-rity regime is not the same thing as appeasement. It isan informal arrangement for bargaining, not a methodfor endlessly capitulating to one aggressor in the hope

that it will be satiated. The concert carries with it thepotential for counterbalancing against defectors andaggressive revisionist powers.


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There is an important and unsettled question ofwhen precisely that negotiated order should see itself

as threatened, and how much other states shouldactively counterbalance against one member. AsStephen Walt acknowledges, the United States, par-ticularly in East Asia, faces the Goldilocks problem:how to get diplomacy just right, neither too hot andantagonistic, thereby overburdening Americas pow-er, intensifying competition, and strengthening thehardliners of potentially adversary nations; nor toocold, tempting its Asian partners either to escalatetheir own balancing behavior to dangerous levels, oreven bandwagoning and creating precisely the kindof regional imbalance America fears. 70 Where andhow to draw such lines is the subject of the next and

nal section.Even when allowing for the more incisive criti-

cisms of Concert-Balance strategies, current condi-tions in some important respects would be conduciveto such a strategic shift. Four converging trends makepossible a sober reappraisal of Americas position, atleast toward a major retrenchment, and beyond that,a substantive shift in grand strategy. These factorsare the reluctance of potential coalition members totake part in unbridled competition; the advantagesof defending and deterring; transnational problemsrequiring collaborative efforts from great powers; andhegemony fatigue among the American people.

The Lack of Appetite for Unbridled Competition.

Two recent incidents suggest that when faced

with the real prospect of it, states have little appetitefor unbridled competition. The rst was the abortivequadrilateral initiative of 2007, when U.S. Vice-


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President Cheney and Japanese Prime Minister Abeattempted to introduce India into the three-way dia-

logue of Australia, Japan, and the United States, lead-ing to large joint military exercises. Beijing respondedby issuing threats and formally protesting againstwhat it regarded as a small NATO forming againstit. In turn, India and Australia stepped back from theinitiative, for fear of their counterbalancing effortsbecoming a self-ful lling prophecy that would turnChina into a committed enemy. States that might haveformed part of a coalition to contain another state (likeChina) instead balked at the prospect of a prematurelyhard-line containment strategy, in effect choosing todevelop their own military capabilities and developbilateral security arrangements while waiting to seehow Chinas peaceful rise would take shape. 71 Thissuggests that the notion of a loose Western bloc exist-

ing as a counterbalancing force in being may be morefragile and reluctant than some expect. 72 AustralianPrime Minister Gillard has resumed this dialogue, butalso insists that Canberras goal is not to contain China.These two impulsesto accommodate a rising Chinawhile hedging against any threats it might poserep-licate the two principles of a Concert-Balance strategy.

The second revealing incident occurred in Septem-ber 2010, when a Chinese trawler and a Japanese patrolship collided near a contested island. After a Japanesepatrol arrested the trawler captain, China demandedhis release and an apology. China then halted theexport of rare earth metals to Japan, threatening tocripple Japanese manufacturers, because Japan is reli-ant on these metals for making electronics and hybrid

automobiles. Japan retaliated, promptly devaluing theyen in currency markets, dropping it 3 percent againstthe Chinese yuan. A destructive trade and currency


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war loomed. Both sides had a taste of a spiraling tradeand currency war, and stepped back from the brink. 73

These two incidents point to a broader issue, that inthese mercantile times, international relations are toofragile for an all-out contest for supremacy between aU.S.-led coalition and China. States are demonstrablywilling to compete within limits, to build up militarycapabilities, court allies and partners, make claims onscarce resources, and generally jostle for advantage.However, thus far, states have proven to be nervouswhen disputes escalate. Assembling a coalition to con-tain China too intensively could trigger crises, not leastbecause China holds hundreds of billions of dollarsin U.S. debt that could be dropped onto the market.America might nd its allies distancing themselveswhen the hard costs of unmitigated competition focustheir minds.

Thus, any viable U.S. strategy that a coalitionwould buy into must straddle the delicate balancebetween a self-defeating containment strategy and anexcessive withdrawal leading to power vacuums. AsGordon de nes the dilemma:

concede too much strategic space to China too eas-ily, and Beijing might simply assume weakness; form acoherent strategy for collectively balancing China andBeijing might be alienated and pushed into somethingakin to a new cold war. 74

This desire to balance competition with strate-gic cooperation is hardly a guarantee against futurearmed con ict. However, it does suggest that amiddle-ground strategy is a better t with the currentdiplomatic and economic pattern.


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The Defenders Advantage.

In addition to the reluctance of regional powers toengage in all-out competition, there is a military-stra-tegic basis for a more collaborative order, namely, therelative dif culty and high costs of attack and coer -cion and the relative ease of defending and deterring.Historically, the dynamic competition between swordand shield is never-ending. As things stand, however,the defenders advantage, at least in theory, offers asound reason for maintaining good political relationsamong the major states. 75

The lethality, accuracy, and range of modernweapons, combined with the nuclear deterrent, makeexpansionism and military adventurism more costlyand dif cult than ever. 76 Technological innovationssince 1945, such as intercontinental missiles and

nuclear weapons proliferation, clearly have a shrink-ing effect in terms of the projection of sheer offensivepower, but strategically they also have a wideningeffect, making it very dif cult to translate violenceinto military expansion against well-defended states.Nuclear weapons make the conquest of any stateprohibitively expensive. The United States (and soonChina) will have effective deterrent forces with securesecond-strike capabilities. Defending states withsecure second-strike ability to retaliate can devastateaggressor forces even with only a few punitive strikes.Nuclear weapons may not deter limited wars or all-out nuclear exchange, and accident or misperceptioncan take states to the brink of catastrophe. But theyconstrain the capacity of aggressors to expand. Other

innovations such as ballistic and cruise missiles, satel-lites, and information technology confer on defendingstates a pre-targeting and long-range strike capability,


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enabling them to in ict severe damage on expedition -ary forces operating from forward bases.

Documents

Sharing Power? Prospects for a U.S. Concert-Balance Strategy