Sit Awareness

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Situational

Awareness

Charley Shimanski

Mountain Rescue Association

www.mra.org

In Mountain Rescue


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Charley Shimanski

Mountain Rescue Associationwww.mra.org

2008, Charley Shimanski/Mountain Rescue Association All rights reserved

COVER PHOTO: Rescuers on a litter lowering at 14,000 feet on Mount Evans, Colorado. Photoby Charley Shimanski.

OBJECTIVE PAGE PHOTO: Courtesy Howard Paul
http://www.mra.org/http://www.mra.org/http://www.mra.org/


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Mountain Rescue Association www.mra.org

Objective ..........................................................................................................1Introduction.....................................................................................................1

Situational Awareness ................................................................................................................... 1Data Collection and Interpretation ............................................................................................... 1

The Three Stages of Situational Awareness ................................................... 2Stage I - Perception of the Relevant Information.........................................................................2Stage II - Comprehension and Interpretation of the Relevant Information ...............................2Stage III - Projection into the Future............................................................................................4

An Everyday Example of Situational Awareness..........................................................................4Seven Key Factors that Reduce Situational Awareness................................. 6

Insufficient or poorly communicated information and communication.....................................6Fatigue and stress ..........................................................................................................................6

Task underload .............................................................................................................................. 7Task overload................................................................................................................................. 7Group mindset ...............................................................................................................................7Press on Regardless Philosophy................................................................................................. 7Degrading operating conditions....................................................................................................8

Additional Factors that Reduce Situational Awareness ................................8Complacency at the Highest Level ................................................................................................8Overconfidence Based on Experience...........................................................................................8

Common Errors in Situational Awareness .................................................. 10Stage I - Perception ..................................................................................................................... 10Stage II - Comprehension............................................................................................................ 10Stage III - Projection ................................................................................................................... 10

Ways to Avoid the Loss of Situational Awareness ........................................ 11Actively question and evaluate your mission progress ...............................................................11Analyze your situation..................................................................................................................11Update and revise your image of the mission............................................................................. 12Use assertive behaviors when necessary..................................................................................... 12Make suggestions......................................................................................................................... 12Provide relevant information without being asked.................................................................... 12

Ask questions as necessary.......................................................................................................... 12Confront ambiguities................................................................................................................... 12State opinion on decisions/procedures ...................................................................................... 12Refuse unreasonable requests..................................................................................................... 12

Ways to Increase Situational Awareness ......................................................13Break the chain ............................................................................................................................ 13Useful Tips in Situational Awareness ......................................................................................... 13

Conclusion .....................................................................................................14


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The Mountain Rescue Association, a national non-profit membership association dedicated tosaving lives through rescue and mountain safety education, has developed this program to beused by any organization that may be required to respond to a backcountry rescue operation.

At the conclusion of this course, students should be able to:

1. Identify how mother nature, physical elements, mental and emotional elements, andexternal influences contribute to risk in rescue operations;

2. Understand other external hazards affecting risks in rescues, and;3.

Understand methods to reduce risk on the basis of the elements presented.

This program would not have been possible without the kind assistance of many mountaineersand rescuers. Our thanks to all whom offered assistance.

Charley Shimanski is President and Education Director for the Mountain Rescue Association, anational organization of rescue mountaineers. A 20-year veteran of ColoradosAlp ine RescueTeam, Charley has participated as a field member and Incident Commander for hundreds ofrescues among Colorados highest peaks.

The author of the Mountain Rescue AssociationsHelicopt ers in Mounta in Rescue Operationsmanuals and several others, Charley has consulted rescue mountaineers, mountain guides, andclimbers throughout the world, from Israel to China, from Kilimanjaro to Aconcogua. Charley isa frequent speaker at meetings of the International Technical Rescue Symposium, The National

Association of Search and Rescue, the Wilderness Medical Society, and the Mountain RescueAssociation.


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I n t r o d u c t i o nSituational Awareness in

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In the past number of years, search andrescue teams have turned their attention torisk management. This focus on risk, andthe subsequent increased efforts to mitigaterisk, means that search and rescueorganizations must constantly stay aware oftrends and advances in risk managementtechniques and philosophies. Situational

Awareness is a term that has found its wayinto the vocabulary of SAR teams and SARleaders over the past few years.

SituationalAwareness

Situational Awareness is the degree ofaccuracy by w hich ones perception of

his/ her current environment m irrors

reality . The essence of SituationalAwareness is fairly simple perception vs.reality.

For over 30 years, Situational Awarenesshas been studied and applied in military,

civil, commercial and aerospaceapplications. More and more, emergencyservice organizations are focusing onsituational awareness as a key factor inreducing risk and increasing safety.

Situational Awareness can also be looked atas a constantly evolving picture of the stateof the environment. It is the perception andcomprehension of the relevant elements inan incident within a volume of time andspace. In this regard, Situational Awareness

is not an event, but rather a process thatonly ends when the SAR incident isconcluded.

Data Collection andInterpretationSituational Awareness requires the humanoperator to quickly detect, integrate and

interpret data gathered from theenvironment. In the case of search andrescue operations, the human detector can

be anything from the Incident Commander

to a field grunt. That is the beauty (andchallenge) of situational awareness itrequires and demands awareness by allusers.

In a search and rescue response, theinformation that is collected can come inmany forms, including:

1. Information provided by outsidesources (e.g. interviews withreporting parties, information

provided by local law enforcement,etc.)

2. Information from the environment(e.g. weather)

3. Information from previousexperiences (e.g. other SAR missionsin the same location)

Situational Awareness is also much like theIncident Command System (ICS), in that itis flexible and should grow or shrink as theSAR incident grows or shrinks.



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To fully understand Situational Awareness,we need to look closely at its threeimportant stages. They are:

1. The perception of the relevantinformation;

2. The comprehension andinterpretation of that information;and

3. The projection of their states into thefuture.

Each of these stages is examined in detailbelow:

Stage I - Perceptionof the RelevantInformation

Yogi Berra once said, You can observe a lotby just watching. Observation is the key toperception. In this first step of situationalawareness, we are looking for clues. Theseclues can come in many forms, including:

Sensory clues - something you see,hear, smell, touch;

Anticipated clues - something thatcomes from prior experience; and

Innate clues something you justfeel in your gut.

In conventional search missions, forexample, rescuers are looking for CLUESmore than they are looking for the missingsubject. Why? Simply because there are farmore clues than there are missing subjects,and by finding and following clues, one canfind the missing subject much more quickly.

The first stage of situational awareness perception is arguably the most importantstage. After all, without perception ofinformation, one cannot really comprehend,

interpret and draw conclusions.

Many accidents in search and rescueoperations result from a series of differentthings happening. There are often anumber of contributing factors that, ifoccurring individually, might not haveresulted in an accident. Break any rescueaccident down, and you will often find thatthere were a number of elements that cametogether to make that accident possible.

In this important perception stage ofSituational Awareness, rescuers need to be

very attentive not only to the occurrenceof situations that are beyond theirexpectations, but to the frequency andnumber of those situations.

This perception stage requires that youOBSERVE! In order to be an effectiveobserver, one must remain attentive. Thiscan be one of the greatest challenges to asearch and rescue professional, as periods of

inactivity and boredom can hamper onesability to be an effective observer.

Similarly, searchers and/or rescuers whoare overworked might not be able to observethe environment around them. This too can

be a serious detriment to ones ability to bean effective observer.

Stage II -Comprehension andInterpretation of theRelevant InformationThe second stage of Situational Awareness,comprehension and interpretation,requires you to have and utilize yourtraining and experience. Training is a keycomponent of teaching SAR workers, but



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experience is the key to understanding howto best utilize that training.

The second stage of Situational Awareness

is the stage wherein one attempts tocomprehend and interpret the data collectedin the first stage. While the collection ofdata and the perception of the relevantinformation are important, thecomprehension and interpretation of thatdata can not be overlooked.

The key to this stage of SituationalAwareness is that it requires one to haveand utilize key training and experience. Forexample, a rescuer in a high mountain

rescue might have already perceived thatthe temperature is very hot. Still, withoutproper training in helicopter management,that rescuer he might not be able tointerpret that the high temperatures willhave an effect on the rescue teams use ofhelicopter resources since temperaturehas a significant effect on helicopterperformance at altitude. Without theproper training, a SAR worker might not beaware of the limitation that temperature hason the performance of helicopter assets.

Experience is also a key factor in this stageof Situational Awareness. While training isessential for any SAR professional, there isno substitute for experience. It is throughexperience that we learn and master theimportant skills associated with interpretingdata that is presented in the first stage ofsituational awareness.

Understanding the CluesIn order to interpret clues, you must first

understand them. But how do you interpretclues if those clues do not make sense? On asearch for a missing hiker one summernight, a rescue professional notified thesearch command post that hed found a

bunch of orange pails in the middle of atrail while searching. The searcher went onto say that the pails were meticulously laidout in the shape of an arrow, pointing down

the trail. The Incident Command teamstruggled to figure out why there would beorange pails many miles back on a remote

backcountry trail. Several minutes later, the

command team asked for a clarificationfrom the rescuer, who coincidently was asoutherner with a deep southern drawl inhis voice. He was asked, What kind oforange pails are these? The man repliedYou know, the kind of pails you pail off anorange before you eat it! The man wastalking about orange PEELS, but that only

became evident after the command teamasked more questions. The data presenteddid not make sense at first, but madecomplete sense later, once the command

team remembered that the field rescuer wasfrom Georgia, and had a distinct southerndrawl.

Interpreting the CluesRequires TrainingDo you have sufficient experience tointerpret the information that you haveassembled? Traditional training might notteach you the skills necessary. For example,one search and rescue team trains itsmembers on helicopter skills in a uniqueand different way the rescuers are notschooled in how to help a helicopter pilot,rather they are schooled in how to BE ahelicopter pilot by learning how a pilotactually FLIES a helicopter. As such, theseSAR professionals are better able to thinklike a pilot.

Recognizing the Frequency ofthose Clues

As mentioned earlier, one should not only

pay attention to the clues themselves, butalso to the frequency of clues. This can helpa rescuer ascertain whether numerousseemingly inconsequential anomalies arecoming together to draw one large problem.

In a later section, "Break the Chain, we willreview an example of a rescue accident



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where numerous elements compoundedupon themselves and the accident occurred.

Stage III - Projectioninto the FutureThe third stage of situational awareness projection into the future is the stage

where one puts it all together. Once theclues are interpreted, the next step is toproject how that information will affect thefuture of the operation.

Lets use an example of a traditionalbackcountry search. Rescuers are called to a

local trailhead to search for a subject who is6 hours overdue from a planned hike. Thesubject told the reporting party (his wife)that he was going fishing at a local lake onthe trail. While some rescuers are searchingthe trail to the lake, other rescuers alsosearch the subjects car, and find that hisfishing equipment is still in the back seat,including his fishing license. Using this newinformation, the rescuers conclude that theyneed to expand their search area based onthe projection that the man changed his

plans, and did not go fishing at the lake asexpected.

An EverydayExample ofSituationalAwareness

Lets consider another example ofsituational awareness, one that takes place

in an everyday setting.

If you want to know if it is going to rain, youdont look for rain, you look for CLOUDS. If

you look for rain youll only know that rainis coming at the very moment that it arrives.Looking for rain alone would mean that youare only OBSERVING and

INTERPRETING, but not PROJECTINGinto the future.

If, on the other hand, you instead look for

clouds, then you have added PROJECTINGinto your situational awareness. In thatcase, you are more able to anticipate rainBEFORE it arrives.

Still, even looking for clouds does notconstitute the only important element thatis missing if you only look for rain. Youneed some training to know WHAT TYPESof clouds cause rain. For example, a sudden

build up of high cirrus clouds meanssomething completely different than a

steady accumulation of cumulonimbusclouds. Only through training andexperience can you learn this importantdistinction.

Visualize While En Route to aCallIn many emergency medical trainingprograms, students are taught the value of

visualizing the scenario prior to arriving atthe rescue call. In search and rescueoperations, rescuers often have an extendedperiod of time traveling to the scene of theSAR call. During that transport time, it can

be valuable to take the clues given (e.g. thedescription of the rescue accident) andproject into the future what kind ofproblems will be encountered by the rescueteam. For example, a rescuer may knowthat a rescue of an injured climber on theeast side of Highway 9 means that therescue team will need to create a technicalsystem to cross above a large creek. Whileen route to the call, rescuers will already be

planning in their heads the tyrolean systemnecessary for the creek crossing.

Similarly, SAR field teams can talk abouttheir pending rescue while heading into thefield. On a recent rescue of a survivor froman avalanche, rescuers were performing atechnical lowering of the patient to a rock

band where the helicopter could hover-



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load the patient. During that technicallowering, the helicopter crew members weresitting in their helicopter at the trailheadparking lot. The rotors were turning, and

the crew was discussing in great detail howthey would do the hot-load of the subject.They could have been discussing the latest

basketball game, or the lovely weather, butinstead they used the opportunity to briefeach other on what their duties would be,and on what possible complications mightoccur.

Experience teaches rescuers toANTICIPATE possible scenarios based oninformation provided. Still, that same

experience teaches rescuers that theinformation provided may be wrong. Whileat work one day, an out-of-breath co-workerran into my office and said, Charley do youknow CPR? I followed the co-worker to thehallway, where another staff member waslying on the ground, seemingly lifeless.Prior to starting CPR, I checked mycolleague for a pulse, and asked bystanders

what happened. They described the patientas having experienced what sounded to melike a Grand Mal seizure. Indeed the patient

was in a Post Ictal state, and was not in needof CPR.


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The United States Navy developed seven keyfactors that reduce situational awareness:Navy

1. Insufficient or poorly communicatedinformation and communication;

2.

Fatigue and stress ;3. Task underload;4. Task overload;5. Group mindset;6. Press on Regardless philosophy;

and,7. Degrading operating conditions.

Each of these factors is detailed below.

Insufficient or poorly

communicatedinformation andcommunicationInsufficient or poorly communicatedinformation and communication can bedisastrous, particularly when the well-beingof a search or rescue subject is concerned.

One particular example where informationcan be poorly communicated is when SAR

teams in remote areas use radio relays inplaces where radio communication is poor

between field teams and the command post.Inexperienced relays can reinterpret themessage when transmitting it, rather thanrepeating EXACTLY what they heard.

After the Space Shuttle Challenger wasdestroyed 73 seconds after liftoff, NASA

determined that one of the contributorycauses was that The Commission istroubled by what appears to be a propensityat Marshall (Space Flight Center) to contain

potentially serious problems, and to attemptto resolve them internally rather thancommunicate them forward. This tendencyis altogether at odds with the need forMarshall to function as part of a system

working toward successful flight mission,interfacing and communicating with theother parts of the system that work to thesame end.

i

After the Space Shuttle Columbia was

destroyed on re-entry, NASA convened apanel of experts to review the accident. TheColumbia Accident Investigation Board(CAIB) concluded that poorlycommunicated information was acontributing factor in the events that led upto the loss of the orbiter on re-entry. They

went on to specify that the use of thecomputer presentation software,PowerPoint, played a role, as presentersoften had to find ways to distill pages andpages of information onto single

PowerPoint slides for their presentations.

Fatigue and stressFatigue and stress reduce ones ability tomake important observations andinterpretations. For this reason, it is veryimportant that rescuers monitor each other,and monitor shift durations during SARoperations. Any extended SAR operationshould include a place for rescuers to rest orsleep in between shifts.

Realizing that fatigue and stress reduceones abilities, the airline industry hasimplemented strict regulations regardingthe number of hours that flight crewmembers can fly before they are required tohave a day off. For the same reason, mostEmergency Medical Services agencies haveinstituted similar regulations.



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Task underloadTask underload can introduce an importantproblem the boredom factor. Task

underload is one contributory factor inmany motor vehicle accidents. It has alsohas been cited as a frequent problem forpersons in certain occupations, such assecurity guards.

Task underload was a factor in a fatal planecrash during a search operation in Coloradoin 1988. While flying at their assignedaltitude of 13,000 feet during a search, theplanes pilot told the spotter that he was

bored, and that they were going to fly at

11,000 feet. He descended to this loweraltitude. Shortly thereafter, the planecrashed in a downdraft. The pilot waskilled, although his spotter survived.

One way to combat this problem is to closelymonitor the tasks that are assigned topeople. If some personnel are withouttasks, find tasks for them to do.

On a recent search, a rescuer who wasawaiting a field assignment decided to set

up his spotting scope at the command Post.Within several minutes, he spotted themissing party high on a ridge. Similarly, arescuer at an avalanche rescue decided tospot probe the avalanche debris while she

was awaiting her assignment. While doingso, she happened to find the buried victim.

Task overloadTask overload is also an important factorthat reduces situational awareness. Theprobability of human error increases withlength and complexity of tasks.

Task overload is one reason why manystates have made it illegal to operate amotor vehicle while using a cellulartelephone.

Again, an effective method to combat thisproblem is to closely monitor the tasks that

are assigned to any individual. Taskoverload is often easy to recognize.

Although not specifically stated in the

Navys Seven Factors that ReduceSituational Awareness, some studies haveshown that one key time where seriousmistakes are made is during theTRANSITION from task overload to taskunderload at time at which a rescuermight let his guard down. Similarly, thetransition from task underload to taskoverload may be a time when rescuers makemistakes particularly because the braintakes some time to transition from a level of

boredom to a level of high activity.

Group mindsetGroup mindset was also cited as a factorthat reduces situational awareness. Groupmindset refers to the fact that onespropensity to agree with a group increasesas the size of the group increases.

So, the group all agrees, right? Or does it?Could it be that some of the group membersagreed due to peer pressure?

An accident investigation board wasassembled in 1967 after the Apollo I disasterin which Gus Grissom, Edward White, andRoger Chaffee were killed in a fire aboardthe spacecraft just days before their plannedlaunch. In assembling their list ofcontributing factors, the Board coined a newphrase: Go Fever.

Press on

RegardlessPhilosophyOnce a plan has been developed, a press onregardless philosophy can take shape. Thiscan be detrimental to the ability toadequately reevaluate and alter or abandona plan.



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Complacency at theHighest Level

The first disaster involving a Space Shuttle The Challenger on January 28, 1986 is agood example of the press on regardlessphilosophy. Known defects in the O-rings of

the solid rocket booster had been identifiedas early as 1979, but NASA officials pressedon with the Space Shuttle program anyways.Numerous shuttle engineers expressed theirconcerns, but those concerns were dispelledand the space shuttle program continued.

One factor that seems to be prevalent inmany SAR organizations is complacencyamong those most experienced members ofthe team. It seems that as members of SARteams acquire ten or more years experience,they can tend to develop a perception thatthey are the teachers in the organization,and that there is little left for them to learn.Still, as the world of SAR evolves, there ismore for these experienced members tolearn.

The decision to delay a shuttle launch haddeveloped into an unwanted decision bythe members of the Shuttle team. In other

words, suggestions made by any groupmember that would ultimately support a

shuttle launch were met with positivesupport by the group. Any suggestion that

would lead to a delay was rejected by thegroup

Young or newer members of SAR teamsseem less prone to this complacency duringthe period where they experience a steeplearning curve.ii

Degrading operatingconditions

OverconfidenceBased on Experience

In SAR operations, degrading operatingconditions can come in many forms. Often,this can be associated with bad weather

conditions. Whenever this occurs, rescuersshould consider slowing their pace toprovide time to recognize whether thechange in weather is affecting their efforts.

Dr. Ken Kamler was an expedition physicianon a Mt. Everest expedition in 1996 the

year that several climbers tragically losttheir lives in a storm. Dr. Kamlerhypothesized from that tragedy that some ofthe climbers were lulled into a false sense ofsecurity on the mountain, due in large partto the fact that they had successfullyclimbed Mt. Everest many times before.From this observation, Kamler suggestedthat, Familiarization, and prolongedexposure without incident, leads to a loss ofappreciation of risk.

This can be especially true in SAR

organizations, where leaders can tend tostay with the organization for a long time.The longer and more frequently that one issuccessful and error-free, the easier it is forthat person to lose sight of the risksassociated with the particular activity.

In addition to the seven key factorsidentified by the Navy above, we haveidentified two additional factors that canreduce situational awareness in rescueorganizations

Consider, as an example, that mostavalanche victims have had avalanche



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training. It is not the novice who isnormally caught in an avalanche, but ratherthe experienced and educated winter

backcountry traveler. This is because the

experienced backcountry user can tend tolet his/her guard down.


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Bill Wade is a recently retired National ParkService Superintendent for many years, andformer Education Director for the National

Association for Search and Rescue(NASAR). Mr. Wade developed severalCommon Errors in Situational

Awareness.iii These are presented in detail

on the following pages.

Stage I - Perception

Too much or too littleinformationIt is a challenge to interpret information ifthere is too little information to interpret inthe first place. Similarly, rescuers can beparticularly challenged if there is too muchinformation to interpret.

Failure to adequately reviewthe information

Another common error is for the rescuers tospend too little time adequately reviewingthe information that has become available.

A prudent Incident Commander willdedicate sufficient resources so that theoverhead team and field rescuers each havesufficient time to carefully review theinformation that is presented to them.Carefully and frequently monitoring thenumber and complexity of tasks assigned is

an effective method to accomplish this.

Too much stressToo much stress can make it difficult forrescuers to evaluate and interpret theinformation available. Since stress isinherent in search and rescue operations, itis important to monitor the level of stressassociated with the functions being

performed, and to mitigate that to thegreatest extent possible.

Stage II -Comprehension

Too little experienceIt can be difficult for rescuers with littleexperience to adequately assemble andinterpret information. For this reason,rescue leaders should be careful to limit theroles and responsibilities of novice rescueprofessionals. Give those rescuersimportant tasks and challenges, but be

careful not to overextend them.

Using previous experienceincorrectlyIt is possible for experienced rescuers to relyon previous experience, which can createartificial blinders for those rescuers. This

will be discussed in greater detail insubsequent pages.

Interpreting data incorrectly

or using it incorrectlyMisinterpreting the data available can be aserious problem, as the conclusions drawncan be specious as a result. For this reason,a series of checks and balances should bedeveloped in certain situations. Have morethan one person review and interpret theinformation available, and see if they allcome to the same conclusions.

Stage III - Projection

Doing something the sameway over and overDoing something the same way over andover can effect your future projections. Thisrepresents one of the greater challenges tothe very experienced rescue professional,especially if the way weve always done ithas been successful in the past. Rescue



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leaders may get stuck on one way of doingthings, reducing creativity when it is mostneeded.

Not questioning what youredoing

Wade summarized his thoughts byconcluding that You need to be alwaysquestioning what youre doing. This isespecially true in SAR operations where

your expectations are not being met. If youare involved in a lengthy search operation,for example, then perhaps its time to stopand ask yourself what assumptions youve

been making. Ask then whether your plan

would change if you stopped making any ofthose assumptions.

One of the keys to applying SituationalAwareness in rescue operations is toanticipate always anticipate. The moreone looks to the future and considers thepossibilities, the better one can projectpossible outcomes.

For many years, rescuers have applied aWhat if? mentality to their efforts. Forexample, an Incident Commander keeps abash team back at the command postduring large scale operations, in the eventthat a rescuer is injured. Similarly, and AirOperations Chief keeps a fire truck at theHeliport, to respond in the event of a crashor other accident. This type of pre-planningis important in SAR operations, andrepresents an element of Situational

Awareness.

The U.S. Navy also developed these tenhelpful methods to prevent the loss ofsituational awareness. These techniques

should be considered frequently, andthroughout the incident.

1. Actively question and evaluate yourmission progress;

2. Analyze your situation;3. Update and revise your image of the

mission;4. Use assertive behaviors when

necessary;5. Make suggestions;6. Provide relevant information

without being asked;7. Ask questions as necessary;8. Confront ambiguities;9. State opinion ondecisions/procedures; and,10.Refuse unreasonable requests.

Again, each of these will be discussed indetail below.

Actively question andevaluate your

mission progressThis advice applies to everyone in a SARresponse, from the Incident Command teamto the field grunt. Rather than simplycarrying out the task given them, theexperienced rescuer will stop on occasionand evaluate the progress of the missionand their assignment.

Are your personnel having more or lesssuccess than expected? If the answer isless, then you should actively question

your methods and consider whetheralternatives should be considered.

Analyze yoursituation

A frequent evaluation of the situationsurrounding the Incident is also helpful. Is



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the weather changing? If so, how will thataffect your present plan and your futuredecision-making?

By evaluating the current situation, you willbe better able to project the future needs ofthe Incident.

Update and reviseyour image of themission

As the situation changes, so should yourimage of the rescue mission. Information is

constantly being presented, and with thatnew information comes the need to adjustyour expectations.

Use assertivebehaviors whennecessaryIf something looks wrong, it probably is

wrong. Be assertive, and mention thatsomething looks wrong. Also, experienced

rescue professionals should encourage theirless-experienced colleagues to speak up anytime something looks wrong.

Make suggestionsProviding input to decision makers isimportant. To this end, it is equallyimportant for the decision makers to ASKfor input from others. Again, newermembers of the search and rescue agencyshould be encouraged to provide input.

Provide relevantinformation withoutbeing askedRescue professionals are generally notinherently timid people. Still, your rescue

organization should encourage teammatesto speak up whenever they feel the need to.Newer members of the organization should

be encouraged to provide feedback without

being asked.

Ask questions asnecessaryIt is an overused clich that there is nosuch thing as a stupid question. Still, thatclich applies here. Many accidentinvestigations have concluded that someindividuals were aware of a problem, butchose to not say or ask anything. After a

fatal plane crash during a search operationin 1988, it was later learned that membersof the search and rescue team questioned intheir own minds the decision to use fixed

wing aircraft on the fifth day of a search, butthey did not mention their concerns to anymember of the Incident Command Team.

Confront ambiguitiesAgain, if something looks wrong, it probablyis wrong. Even if the ambiguities arerelatively insignificant, you should confrontthem. Keep in mind that a series ofrelatively minor ambiguities can compoundupon each other to create a major problem.

State opinion ondecisions/proceduresToo many times, rescuers will carry out atask given to them, even when they questionthe need for that task to be carried out.

Refuse unreasonablerequestsThis advice should be communicated tonewer members of the organization often, asthey are the most prone to intimidation, andmight feel obliged to carry out a task thatmay otherwise be unreasonable.


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The Mountain Rescue Association haspublished a training document entitled,Accidents in Mountain RescueOperations. A quick review of the dozens

of rescue accidents profiled in thatdocument will underscore how numerouselements can compound upon each other tocreate a dangerous situation.

One way to increase situational awareness isto increase the resources you are using tomake decisions. This includes resourcessuch as computers, maps, decision-makingmodels, other people, etc.

For example, if rescuers are working arescue on a small slope with some low tomoderate avalanche potential, there may bethe perception that there is little risk. Buthow does the risk evaluation change if thatsmall slope is directly above a 100 foot-cliff?

Add one additional element and the whole

projection of possible outcome changes.

Identify what your assumptions are in yourcurrent decision-making model. If you are

having less success than expected, you mayneed to go back and reevaluate thoseassumptions. In a search for a missingparty, rescuers suddenly asked themselves ifthey would change their searchmethodology if they presumed that themissing subject was suicidal. They madethe appropriate changes, and indeed foundthe subject within a matter of a few hours indeed it was a suicide.

Useful Tips inSituationalAwareness

Finally, we have compiled these additionaltips, which come from a variety of sources:

1. If something doesnt look or feelright, then it probably isnt right;Break the chain

2. Watch out when you are busy orbored;

As mentioned earlier, most accidents occurwhen a number of elements go wrong andcompound upon each other. 3. Old habits are hard to break;

4. Expectations can reduce awareness;5. Things that take longer are less likely

to get done right;On June 25, 1994, a contract helicopterresponded to a rescue effort in RockyMountain National Park. The helicoptercrashed, although nobody was seriouslyinjured. The Office of Aircraft Servicesreport on the accident concluded thatnumerous elements went wrong that day,each of them contributing to the accident.Specifically, the report stated that Incorrectload calculation, argument between flightcrew members, loss of natural light, and ahurried pilot were all contributory causes.

6. Its hard to detect something thatisnt there.

7. Distraction comes in many forms;8. Dont rely on reliable systems;9. Dont get too excited if an emergency

occurs. Thats when youll make

poor decisions; and,10.Prevention is the best way to avoid

emergencies, and SituationalAwareness is one of the best forms ofprevention there is.

iv

Had any of the participants recognized thatthere was a sequence of problems buildingup, someone might have called for a closerlook at the situation.



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Conclus ionSituational Awareness in

Mountain Rescue14

In a perfect world, search and rescueincidents would be simple affairs carriedout expeditiously and without complication.But while most rescues fit that idyllicpattern, many do not. And far too often,those rescues that do not flow seamlesslycannot be anticipated in advance. For thisreason, SAR professionals need toconstantly be aware of the information thatis available, and interpret and project futureneeds based on that information.

This training material is intended to be used

by SAR teams and individuals. To be mosteffective, it should be reviewed frequently.

iThe Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger

Accident Report; June 6, 1986ii

The Challenger Shuttle Disaster: A Failure in Decision Support

System and Human Factors Management; Jeff Forrest; MetropolitanState College of Denveriii

Wade, Bill; Situational Awareness, NASAR Response conference,

Reno, NV, May 2003iv

United States Office Of Aircraft Services report


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The Mountain Rescue Association is an organization dedicated to savinglives through rescue and mountain safety education

www.mra.org
http://www.mra.org/http://www.mra.org/http://www.mra.org/

Documents

Sit Awareness