SIX

PROPOSITIONSABOUT

RATHER UNUSUAL

JOHN MUELLER

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

1. Seen in reasonable context, terrorism generally has only

limited direct effects

Worldwide chances of being killed by international terrorism over a lifetime:

1 in 80,000 Worldwide chances of being killed by a

comet or asteroid over a lifetime: 1 in 80,000 Chances of an American being killed if

there were one 9/11 in the U.S. every three months for the next five years:

2 one hundreds of one percent

0

10

20

30

40

50

2001.5 2002.0 2002.5 2003.0 2003.5 2004.0 2004.5 2005.0 2005.5 2006.0 2006.5 2007.0

How likely do you think it is that there will be another terrorist act in the United States within the next few months: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not at all likely? (CBS News) Percent not at all likely.

How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism? Very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or not worried at all? (CNN/US Today/Gallup) Percent very worried or somewhat worried.

Concerns about terrorism, 2001-2006

2. The costs of terrorism very often come mostly from the

fear and consequent reaction (or overreaction) it

characteristically inspires

Bin Laden goal: overreaction

It is easy for us to provoke and bait....All that we have to do is to send two mujahidin...to raise a piece of cloth on which is written

al‑Qaeda in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human,

economic, and political losses. Our policy is one of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. The terrorist attacks cost

al‑Qaeda $500,000 while the attack and its aftermath inflicted a cost of more than $500

billion on the United States.

America is full of fear, from its north to its south, from its west to its east.

Thank God for that.

Bin Laden goal: fear

The costs of fear

EconomicTravel and tourismWaits in airportsInternational commerce restrictions

Human lifeDriving after 9/11Waits in airportsHealth effects, Chernobyl

Opportunity costsKatrinaVaccinesCrime

Wasteful and counterproductive policiesIraqGenerating Muslim hostilityThe quixotic quest for invulnerability

3. The terrorism industry is a major part of the terrorism

problem.

PoliticiansBureaucracyMediaRisk entrepreneurs

--Department of Homeland Security

Today's terrorists can strike at any place,at any time,

and with virtually any weapon.

Now putting your child on a school bus or driving across a bridge or just going to the mall—each of these things is a small act of courage.

And peril is a part of everyday life.

--Charles Gibson, ABC News, September 11, 2006

--Michael Ignatieff, 2004

we can confidently expect that terrorists will attempt to tamper with our election in November

a few individuals equipped with lethal technologies threaten the ascendancy of the modern state

inexorably, terrorism, like war itself, is moving beyond the conventional to the apocalyptic

4. Policies designed to deal with terrorism should focus more on

reducing fear and anxiety as inexpensively as possible than on objectively reducing the rather

limited dangers terrorism is likely actually to pose

New YorkWashington, DCChicagoLos AngelesSan FranciscoHoustonSeattle

PhiladelphiaBostonSan AntonioArlingtonSacramentoPortlandDallasMilwaukeePittsburghFort WorthPhoenixAnaheimSanta AnaOaklandSan JoseIndianapolisHonoluluAtlantaTampaLong BeachDenverSan Diego

CharlotteJersey CityLas VegasBuffaloNewarkCincinnatiOklahoma CityClevelandToledoLouisvilleBaton RougeBaltimoreDetroitMinneapolisNew OrleansKansas CitySt. LouisOmahaMiamiJacksonville

New YorkWashington, DCChicagoLos AngelesSan FranciscoHoustonSeattle

http://mermaid.weekiwachee.com/

John Athanason, Weeki Wachee marketing and promotion manager:

“I can’t imagine bin Laden trying to blow up the mermaids.”

“But with terrorists, who knows what they’re thinking.”

“I don’t want to think like a terrorist, but what if the terrorists try to poison the water at Weeki Wachee Springs?”

--St. Petersburg Times, April 22, 2005

Athanson said Weeki Wachee Springs is working to get some of the federal counterterrorism funding that has been allocated to the Tampa Bay region by the Department of Homeland Security.

PoliceNuclearSeek to reduce fear

AbsorbPut risks in contextExplore security theater

Avoid policy overreactionReassess the quest for invulnerability

Potential public policy projects

Airport security—costs, risk comparisons, costs of waitingEconomic impact of terrorism responseIs a repeat of 9/11 possible?Health impact of terrorism response—the costs of anxietyValue of security symbols (theater?)—visible, nonvisibleHardening potential targets (M. Stewart)Determining potential targets (malls? bridges?)Costs and value of relocating personnel (Army)Determining acceptable radiation levels for dirty bombs (cleanup costs,

property value)Enlisting ordinary people as emergency responders or health workersRisk communication—can accepted fears be reduced? Sunstein, SlovicCost and other comparisons with anxieties about crime (property values)Costs and value of exit visasInternational economic effects—immigration, commerce, tourism, travelValue of security cameras, if anyCosts of increased border waitsEvaluation of the air marshal program

Potential public policy projects

How has DHS determined risk?Assessment of DHS expendituresIncentives to increase fearsValue and costs of police at subway entrances9/11’s impact in reducing spending and increasing savingImpact of terrorism on charitable givingOpportunity costs—health service, crimeTerrorism and other instances of probability neglectDemocracy, security, and the pork barrelEfforts Hollywood and television to exploit fears of terrorism (24, WTC)The media and terrorismTerrorism reporting (compare to crime or health reporting?)The incentives for politicians, bureaucrats to exaggerate the threatThe cost and effectiveness of policing effortsThe fate of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation on getting responders

to be able to communicate with one another and the communications industry

The war in Afghanistan and the war on drugsFear of terrorism and political outbidding

Potential public policy projects

Policing terrorism—costs and effectivenessInsurance opportunitiesCosts and effectiveness of data miningComparisons with policing domestic Communism (Stephan and

“Communazis”)Potential value of repeated terror warnings on reducing fear (cry wolf)Assessment of official predictions about the imminence of another attackImpact of terrorism warnings on politics, on Bush’s approval ratingsGetting computers to work at the FBI and NSACosts and value of heightened border securityCosts and effectiveness of the US-VISIT programTradeoff between policing terrorism and policing crimeOpportunity costs of the war on terrorism (health, Katrina)Security barriers in panic situationsComparing terrorism to other risks (lightning, astroid impact, eating nuts,

deer)Reasons for the remarkable absence of terrorism in the US since 9/11Costs and value of requiring passports to go to Canada, MexicoCosts and value of training security guards

5. Doing nothing (or at least refraining from overreacting) after a terrorist attack is not necessarily unacceptable

Lebanon 1983Lockerbie 1988Somalia 1993World Trade Center 1993Oklahoma City 1995Khobar Towers 1996U.S.S. Cole 2000Anthrax 2001Madrid 2004London 2005

6. Despite U.S. overreaction, the campaign against terror is

generally going rather well

The United States is living on borrowed time‑‑and squandering it.

How much security is enough: when the American people can conclude that a future

attack on U.S. soil will be an exceptional event that does not require wholesale changes in how

they go about their lives.

The entire nation...must be organized for the long, deadly struggle against terrorism.

--Stephen Flynn

I think, therefore they are, 2003

--Robert Mueller February 11, 2003 testimony

The greatest threat is from al-Qaeda cells in the US that we have not yet identified.

al-Qaeda maintains the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the US with little warning.

That threat is increasing partly because of the publicity surrounding the DC sniper shootings and the anthrax letter attacks.

al-Qaeda has developed a support infrastructure inside the US that would allow the network to mount another terrorist attack on US soil.

I think, therefore they are, 2003

--Robert Mueller February 11, 2003 testimony

The greatest threat is from al-Qaeda cells in the US that we have not yet identified.

al-Qaeda maintains the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the US with little warning.

That threat is increasing partly because of the publicity surrounding the DC sniper shootings and the anthrax letter attacks.

al-Qaeda has developed a support infrastructure inside the US that would allow the network to mount another terrorist attack on US soil.

I think, therefore they are,

--Robert Mueller February 16, 2005 testimony

I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing. (bolded)

unable to identify a single true al‑Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in

the country--FBI, secret report, 2005

2005

--Robert Mueller January 11, 2007 testimony

We believe Al Qaeda is still seeking to infiltrate operatives into the U.S. from overseas.

2007

19 in US before 9/11?9/11 effect, Afghanistanmany arrests (overseas)reactions to post-9/11 terrorismal-Qaeda’s vast enemies list

all Middle Eastern regimesMuslims who don't share their viewsmost Western countries JewsChristians the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan,

Russiamost news organizations the United Nations international NGOs

amount of destruction

9/11: aberration or harbinger?Lockerbie 1988Oklahoma City 1995Aum Shinrikyo 1995DC sniper 2003WWII

But WWI, WTC 1993

Charles Krauthammer, 2004: “three years in which, contrary to every expectation and prediction, the second shoe never dropped”

Graham Allison, 2004: “in the weeks and months following 9/11, the American national security community focused on what was called the question of the 'second shoe.' No one believed that the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were an isolated occurrence”

In our recent Western history war has been following war in an

ascending order of intensity; and today it is already apparent that the War of 1939-45 was not the climax

of this crescendo movement.

--Arnold J. Toynbee, 1950

THE END