SK B9 Agency Comments 2 of 2 Fdr- FAA Comments on Chp 3 161

8/14/2019 SK B9 Agency Comments 2 of 2 Fdr- FAA Comments on Chp 3 161

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FAA Comments on Chapter 3-9/11 Commission Final Report

Section 3.3Page 14, paragraph 2, line 4:"But each layer relevant to suicide hijackings -intelligence, p assenger prescreening, checkpoint screening, and onboard security w as seriously flawed pr ior to 9/11."None of the layers of security in place on 9/11 were relevant to suicide hijackings because suchan attack was not anticipated. It would be more accurate to say that the layers of defense in placeon 9/11 were not designed with suicide hijackings in mind, and so were not effective againstthem.The two subsequent paragraphs, which state the rationale for the "seriously flawed" judgmentregarding intelligence, are criticisms of activities beyond the control of the intelligence functionitself. Th e failure of other agencies to provide appropriate information to the FAA Office of CivilAviation Security Intelligence, despite FAA's stated requirements, should not be considered anFAA intelligence failure.

Page 14,paragraphsIt is not correct to say that it was FAA's policy to use intelligence as the first line of defense fo rcivil aviation. Rather, in the aviation security realm, intelligence was used to design countermeasures which were in place every day for every flight. Ongoing analysis of new intelligencewas used to determine when adjustments or increases to countermeasures were needed. Eachlayer was important to the effectiveness of the system. When the intelligence was lacking,necessary countermeasures could not be designed.Describing the layers as being first, second, third, lines of defense gives an inaccurate impressionthat the layers worked as stand-alone, consecutive pieces. Rather, intelligence provided insightsinto methods of attack, and various countermeasures responded to those methods of attack. Thecountermeasures were physically applied in redundant rings around the aircraft, given the layoutof airports, and were designed to address every avenue of access to that aircraft, by passengers,carry-on bags, checked bags, cargo, employees, air crew, catering, etc.


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Page 147 paragraph 3, lines 3 & 4:"The FAA's 40 person intelligence unit (created after the 1988 bombing of Pan AmericanFlight 103)"...This is not accurate. The FAA Intelligence Division was created in 1986 based on lessonslearned in the hijacking of TWA flight 847 the previous year.

Page 14 , paragraph 3, last sentence:The portion of the sentence:"...or at least did not appear in its records."This is inflammatory an d should be removed. It implies that th e report in question may have beenreceived by the FAA. In fact, it has become public that the EC was not shared promptly evenwith other elements within the FBI.

Pages 14 & 15, paragraph 4, lines 5 through 8."Neither Administrator Garvey nor her deputy routinely reviewed daily intelligence, andwhat they did was screened for them. She was unaware of a great amount of hijackingthreat information from her own intelligence unit, which, in turn was not deeply involvedinthe agency's policy making process."

Both Administrator Garvey and her Deputy were advised of all significant intelligence products.Copies of all Information Circulars an d Security Directives issued by the FA A Office ofCivil Aviation Security were sent to the Administrator's and the Deputy's Office.Administrator Garvey an d Acting Deputy Belger were regularly briefed on intelligence mattersby the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and his staff.The function of the FA A Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence did not include th epromulgation or enforcement of aviation security policy. However, it played a critical role inproviding the threat information an d assessments on which policy decisions were based.Representatives from the Office of Intelligence routinely attended policy meetings to brief th eassessed threat and to respond to questions regarding the intelligence generating the assessment.

Page 15, paragraph 2, lines 2 through 8:"But as of 9/11, the FAA's "no fly" list contained the names of just 12 terrorist suspects


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(including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohamed), even though government watchlistscontained the names of many thousands of known and suspected terrorists. Thisastonishing mismatch existed despite the fact that four years earlier the Gore Commissionhad called on the federal government to maximize the use of terrorist watchlists to improvethe effectiveness of prescreening."

The FAA, as a consumer of intelligence, had fonnal written "Reading Requirements" on file withthe Intelligence Community agencies which specified the information FAA needed to assess andmitigate threats to civil aviation. Among the requirements was the "Identification andcapabilities of individuals, groups, and organizations which pose a threat (either actual orpotential) to U.S. or foreign civil aviation." The Intelligence Community owned and controlledthe use of the information that was sent to the FAA in response to those requirements. Uponidentifying individuals in the reporting who could pose a specific threat to commercial aviation,FA A had to request permission from the originating agency to identify the individuals to theairlines in order to prohibit boarding on aircraft within its regulatory responsibilities. Theserequests were not always approved because the originating agency deemed certain name(s) toosensitive to declassify.The Gore Commission final report appropriately levied the responsibility to use terroristwatchlists in prescreening on the agencies that owned and controlled the terrorist informationand databases:"... the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would allow important intelligenceinformation on known or suspected terrorists to be used in passenger profiling withoutcompromising the integrity of the intelligence or its sources". The FAA had no control over thatinitiative, yet, in the context of the Commission's report, as written, it appears as a "serious" flawin FAA's passenger pre-screening process.

Page 15, paragraph 2, lines 8 through 12:"Indeed, the long-time chief of FAA's civil aviation security division testified to theCommission that he was not even aware of the State Department's TIPOFF list of knownand suspected terrorists (some 60,000 before 9/11) until he heard it mentioned during theCommission's January 26, 2004public hearing".FAA did not have access to the entire TIPOFF database, known as TIPOFF web. FAA hadaccess to a limited version known as TIPOFF Lite, which was also classified. FAA had access tothe 61,000 names in the TIPOFF Lite but did not have access to the all of the underlyingintelligence that served as the basis for including those names. Due to this limited content andthe technicaldifficulty in using the list, the FAA did not have the ability to undertake a review ofeach name on the list. It was difficult to use for on going reviews of the entire list, because it didnot highlight new names or entries from the previous day or log-on session. As a result, FAAwould have had to reconcile day-to day changes in the list manually. Much of the informationthat FAA did have access to was incomplete or unreliable. Many records lacked anybiographical data, which is a critical component for the identification of individualsw ho should


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be denied transport. Names of dead or arrested terrorists were not purged or separated fromTIPOFF Lite. Without the underlying intelligence for names on the list, it was difficult toidentify the reporting agency that had the intelligence related to a particular name on the list,Nothing in the TIPOFF Lite identified the reporting agency, which FAA was obligated to contactto get permission to use a name. Therefore, TIPOFF Lite was not a useful tool fo r FAA.

Page 45, endnote 70.

9/11 Closed by Statute

FAA Comments on Chapter 8-9/11 Commission Final ReportPage 9, paragraph 5, line 1."FAA advisories generally did not relate to the terrorist threat at all."This is not .accurate. The following FAA Information Circulars were in effect onSeptember 11,2001:

1C 98-13, Increased Aviation Security Awareness in Light of Continued Threatsfrom. Osama Bin Ladin, October 8, 1998.

1C 2001-01,Prospects for a Terrorist Hijacking, April 27, 2000. 1C 2000-10, Group planning to BombAircraft, November 29, 2000 ICs 2001-03/03A/03B, Recent Terrorist Activity in th e Middle East, March 30,20017 June 4, 2001/July 26, 2001


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ICs 2001-04/04A, Continued Middle Eastern Threats to Civil Aviation,April 18,2001 and July 31,2001

1C 2001 -06, Ressam 'sPlot Against LAX, June 4,2001 1C 2001-07/07A, Violence Increases in Israel, June 4,2001 and August 28,2001 1C 2001 -08, Possible Terrorist Threat Against American Citizens, June 22, 2001 1C 2001-09, Possible Terrorist Threat Against A merican Citizens, July 2,2001 1C 2001-11, Possible Terrorist Threat - Arabian Peninsula, July 18, 2001

Also, a Security D irective, SD 108-01-01, w as issued on August 21, 2001, It was based oncredible intelligence reporting about a terrorist threat to aviation. However, it was not clear thatU.S. civil aviation was the target. Nevertheless, the Directive w as m ade applicable to U .S. aircarriers because available information indicated that the potential existed.

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SK B9 Agency Comments 2 of 2 Fdr- FAA Comments on Chp 3 161