Sobriety checkpoints, American style

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Journal of Cnmmal Justice. Vol. 22. No. 5. pp. 437-444, 1994 Copyright 01994 Elsevier Science Ltd

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SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS, AMERICAN STYLE

H. LAURENCE Ross

Department of Sociology University of New Mexico

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87 13 1

ABSTRACT

In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz declared sobriety checkpoints constitutional in part because they were effective in reducing drunken driving. This report reviews the scientific literature on checkpoint effectiveness in order to evaluate the claim

of deterrent accomplishments made in the briefs supporting the police. It concludes that studies available at the time of the initial trial were insufficient to support the claim,, but that more recent studies

lay a better foundation for believing that checkpoints can deter drunken driving. The Court’s definition of eflectiveness, however, turns out to have been based on checkpoints’ yield of arrests rather than on considerations of deterrence.

INTRODUCTION

On June 14, 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States in Michigan Department of

State Police v. Sitz (1 10 S. Ct. 2481 [1990]) determined that police sobriety checkpoints were permissible under the Fourth Amend- ment to the U.S. Constitution. A key justi- fication for this conclusion was that there ex- isted empirical evidence for the effectiveness of checkpoints in reducing drunken driving. This article reviews the scientific literature on checkpoint effectiveness in order to evaluate this assumption.

The Michigan Court of Appeals, which had earlier labeled checkpoints as unconstitu- tional, and the Supreme Court agreed that the permissibility of checkpoints was dependent

on the extent to which a balancing test orig- inally proposed in the case of Brown v. Texas

(433 U.S. 47 [ 19791) applied to sobriety checkpoints. The first prong of the Brown test was the degree to which the state had a “grave and legitimate” interest in preventing drunk driving. The second prong concerned the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints for achieving that goal. The third concerned the intrusiveness of the operations on motorists. There was no disagreement concerning checkpoints meeting the test of state interest. The Supreme Court majority, however, dis- agreed with three dissenters and with the Michigan Court of Appeals concerning whether checkpoints met the other two criteria.

The issue of intrusiveness will not be con- sidered further here, but rather this article will

437

438 H.L. ROSS

review the research record available to the court and cited in amicus briefs by the United States Justice Department, Michigan state, the national office of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and the Insurance Institute for High- way Safety, along with various members of the insurance industry, as evidence of the effectiveness- of sobriety checkpoints. As will be seen, the literature is relatively thin, in part because until the Sitz decision, many law enforcement officials were reluctant to mount sobriety checkpoints. Since that decision, more agencies have used them and several evaluations are in process. The conclusion of this article is that the quantity and quality of studies available at the time of the Michigan hearing were marginal. More recent studies, however, provide better evidence and support for the view that well-designed and publicized sobriety checkpoint programs can have deterrent consequences. Definitive endorse- ment of the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints awaits analyses of new interventions that have been mounted following the deter- mination of checkpoint constitutionality in Sitz.

THE STUDIES

The available literature evaluating the effectiveness of American sobriety checkpoints as of 1983 is reviewed here. There are eight case studies, presented in order of date of publication, along with a multistate correlational analysis. The first four case studies were available at the time of the original Sitz trial, and the fifth and sixth were reported at least in part by the time the case was argued in the Supreme Court. Each intervention is briefly described and the evaluation findings are presented, both concerning changes in the perceived risk of arrest for drunk drivers and changes in impaired driving behavior. Each case description concludes with a personal estimate of the value of the study for dem- onstrating the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints.

1. Southern Delawu-e atzd Montgomery Count_v, Muryland (Williams and Lund, 1984). This is the earliest study of U.S. sobriety checkpoint programs in the literature. In one

comparison, the two counties of southern Delaware-Kent and Sussex-had been sub- jected to a state police program of considerable intensity for the time. Between their ini- tiation in September 1982 and September 1983, the Delaware State Police mounted seventy-five checkpoints, stopping more than 14,000 vehicles. The southern counties ex- perienced forty-nine of these operations. In contrast, checkpoints were not held in seven counties on Maryland’s Eastern Shore adjacent to those in Delaware.

In the second comparison, Montgomery County, Maryland, in suburban Washington, had mounted between thirty and fifty checkpoints from October 198 I to September 1983. In contrast, no checkpoints were held in geo- graphically adjacent and socially similar Fairfax County, Virginia. Fairfax, though not using checkpoints, had considerably more drunk driving arrests at the time.

Telephone surveys in October 1983 found that Montgomery County residents were more impressed with police anti-drunk-driving ac- tivities and estimated a higher chance of arrest for impaired drivers than was the case for residents of Fairfax County. Both Montgom- ery and Fairfax respondents were more likely to believe counterfactually that the chance of arrest was higher in Montgomery. Similar, though smaller, differences were found between the Delaware counties and their control area.

These differences in perceived arrest risk, however, were not reflected in corresponding differences in reported impaired driving. Al- though the predicted requisites for deterrence were higher in the checkpoint areas, reported instances of drunk driving did not reflect this fact. (The study did not include direct measures of impaired driving or indexes, such as nighttime fatality rates.) The results are dis- appointing. Although it is possible that im- perfections of the survey method hid real differences in behavior, or that the checkpoints were too limited in scale to convince drivers to view the risk of apprehension as suffi- ciently great to require behavioral change, this report does not support the deterrent effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints.

2. Rurml Arizona (Epperlein, 1985). This

Sobriety Checkpoints, American Style 439

early study is remarkable for the use of ele- gant interrupted time-series analysis and for its anchoring in indexes of actual drunk driving behavior. The Arizona Department of Public Safety mounted two checkpoints on one weekend in each of three areas of the state in October 1983. The checkpoints were well publicized. No measures of public perception were taken, but the evaluation found a statistically significant 28 percent decline in the serious crash ratio of the combined adjacent areas. The change was quite limited in time; 98 percent of the reduction had disappeared by February 1984.

The Arizona study provides evidence of the deterrent effects of the checkpoints, but it questions their effectiveness over the long term. Both the intervention and its apparent results were extremely limited. Its implica- tions for policy are modest.

3. Charlottesville (Voas, Rhodenizer, and Lynn, 1985). Local police funded by external grants mounted a fairly intensive sobriety checkpoint program in Charlottesville, Vir- ginia, between New Years Eve, 1983 and the end of 1984. Close to two operations weekly were undertaken in this small city where word- of-mouth could be relied on to spread notice of the police activity.

The evaluation covered both perception and indexes of impaired driving. Surveys found that the citizenry, especially persons who both drive and drink, did notice the checkpoints. Awareness of police activity was greater than in a comparison community and it was largely maintained over time. Perceived risk of arrest was higher in Charlottesville, and respondents reported that checkpoints were the rea- son why arrest was more likely.

The program was associated with a significant 13 percent reduction in police-reported, alcohol-related accidents, along with a non- significant 8 percent reduction in night hour accidents. Both types of accidents were reduced as a percentage of all accidents in the city (again, only police-reported was significant) and there was a decline in the percentage of such accidents as a fraction of all Virginia accidents (only nighttime being statistically significant).

The methodology of the Charlottesville

study is limited to before-and-after compar- isons. These are susceptible to alternative interpretations, especially those related to secular trends in the data. The comparison with statewide numbers alleviates this problem to some degree, but the weakness of police-reported crashes as an index is especially great when comparing the output of different departments. As noted in the previous discussion, only three of the six differences in accidents were statistically significant. but the others were in the predicted direction and there were no negative cases. The congruence of survey and accident data in Charlottesville is also encouraging. Although better methods exist for interpreting changes over time, the experiences reported from Charlottesville are consistent with theoretical predictions and encourage belief in the deterrent competence of sobriety checkpoints.

4. Clearwater and Largo, Florida (Lacey et al., 1986). This study documents changes in public perceptions related to deterrence as well as apparent reductions in impaired driving. Its method, interrupted time-series analysis, represents a considerable improvement on the Charlottesville study.

Clearwater and Largo mounted a total of twelve sobriety checkpoints between October 1983 and December 1984. The report de- scribes these as having been extremely well publicized. Surveys found that local drivers increased their mean perceived risk of being caught and punished for driving while impaired, while such estimates by residents of comparison communities diminished. More- over, there was a significant 20 percent decline in (police-reported) alcohol-related crashes. Nighttime crashes also declined by a significant 8 percent.

Although the evaluation of Clearwater- Largo testifies impressively to the impact of the intervention, its significance for the general utility of sobriety checkpoints is less clear. The intervention included not only checkpoints, but also better police training and several strategies designed to improve the pro- cessing of arrestees. The volume of drunk driving arrests increased by 70 percent, perhaps more closely related to changing de- ployment of police than to the yield of checkpoints. It is hard to disagree with the evaluators

440 H.L. ROSS

that the intervention was successful, but it is equally hard to specify the role of sobriety checkpoints in this success.

5. Indianupolis (Lacey et al., 1988). The team that launched the apparently successful intervention in Clearwater and Largo at- tempted a similar program in Indianapolis in the following year (April 1984). The intervention included six sobriety checkpoints. Respondents noted these in surveys, but they did not significantly increase their perceptions of risk of punishment for drunk driving, nor did interrupted time-series analysis find reductions in most indexes of drunk driving. The difference from the Florida experience may lie in the smaller numbers or different details of the checkpoints. Alternatively, the different results may reflect differences in other aspects of these complex interventions. In contrast to Clearwater and Largo, the Indi- anapolis case gives only weak support for the effectiveness of checkpoints.

6. The Massachusetts survey (Hingson and Howland, 1989). Massachusetts police uti- lize sobriety checkpoints while police in New Hampshire cannot due to an adverse court ruling. A survey was administered to residents of both states, finding less reported drunk driving in Massachusetts than in New Hamp- shire. Information is not provided concerning direct measures of impaired driving and indexes such as nighttime fatalities, nor concerning the numbers and types of checkpoints used by the Massachusetts police.

Because of numerous possible differences between the two states beyond the use of checkpoints, the study has little probative value. The checkpoints may be unrelated to the differences found in the surveys. Perhaps Massachusetts police are more active against drunk driving than those of New Hampshire in matters other than checkpoints. Perhaps alcohol consumption overall and dependence on private automobiles for recreational trans- portation are greater in New Hampshire. Such differences, and many others, could plausibly have caused the differences in the survey results.

7. Bergen County, Ne,ra Jcrsq Levey, Asch, and Shea, 1990). A state program called Strike Force provides funds for local police

departments to undertake sobriety checkpoints. Over almost three years beginning in December 1983, police in Bergen County stopped approximately 35,000 drivers per year in checkpoints. (Unfortunately, neither numbers of checkpoints nor the driver population to which they applied are reported.) Inter- rupted time-series modeling found a reduction in single vehicle nighttime accidents of about 4 percent initially, increasing to nearly 30 percent after 2 years. Simultaneous safety programs, SOBER and DWI Task Force. emphasizing education and public relations, appeared to be important at first, but have had little long-term effect. There is, however, a possibility of interactions among the programs which needs to be kept in mind in de- signing future policy. Somewhat less support for program effectiveness was found in single vehicle nighttime fatalities, which are more closely related to alcohol impairment but present a much smaller data base.

A related analysis (Levy, Shea, and Asch, 1989) found similar results for Strike Force in a correlational analysis across New Jersey counties, increasing confidence that sobriety checkpoints may have been influential in reducing impaired driving. These accomplishments are notable because the media in New Jersey mainly emanate from New York and Philadelphia and their concern with local law enforcement campaigns is likely to be mini- mal. Furthermore. many impaired drivers in New Jersey are likely to be from out of the county and even the state; thus unreachable by local publicity. Although one might wish for more descriptive detail in these reports, the Bergen County and New Jersey analyses do support the usefulness of sobriety checkpoints as policy for reducing impaired driving.

8. Birqhamtorl, Net%? York (Wells, Preus- ser, and Williams, 199 I ). This was a sub- stantial intervention designed to increase the wearing of seatbelts as well as reduce impaired driving. In two years, from 1988 to 1990, the police mounted seventy-two checkpoints. testing nearly 10.000 in this city of 50,000. Surveys found that awareness of police enforcement, centering on checkpoints, rose considerably in Binghamton but not in a comparison city. The checkpoints themselves


were used to provide data on alcohol among drivers. The evaluation found a sustained reduction of nearly 40 percent in drivers who had been drinking, though there was no change in the proportion with illegal blood-alcohol concentrations (exceeding 0.10 percent BAC) . Statistical modeling found reductions of 24 percent in injury crashes and 23 percent in late night crashes.

The report provides good evidence of the success of checkpoints in reducing impaired driving, at least among the majority of drinking drivers who have relatively low BACs. The finding of no effect among higher-BAC drivers is consistent with the suggestion in the deterrence literature (e.g., Zimring and Hawkins, 1973) that the most committed de- viants may be least likely to respond to deterrent threats. The Binghamton study sug- gests that although this very dangerous population may not be significantly influenced, the contributions of the less extremely impaired drivers who can be influenced are important enough to result in large reductions in injuries.

9. New Mexico (Castle and Sewell, 1993). The New Mexico Department of Health, with grant funds, recruited police to do 189 sobriety checkpoints on high-accident, rural roads in 1989-90. The bulk of these were held nearly every weekend on a single road segment. In addition, the grant paid for 164 tele- vision advertisements which included footage of the checkpoints.

On the road segment with the most intensive enforcement effort, there were reductions in alcohol-involved crashes and Wednesday-Saturday nighttime crashes that were claimed to be statistically significant. A significant reduction was not claimed for fa- tal or injury-producing crashes. The report does not provide an estimate of the amount of reductions, nor are summary statistics provided for the remaining four sites that expe- rienced some checkpoints.

Unfortunately, the New Mexico study has important methodological weaknesses. About half the data, concerning the less intensively enforced sites, either was not analyzed or the analysis was not reported. Moreover, the statistical test used was inappropriate for time- linked data. In addition, the selection for

checkpoints of roads with initially high accident rates presents a bias towards finding reductions in the intervention years. Finally, as noted above, no effect was found in the accident counts. The study, thus, offers little support for the deterrent utility of sobriety checkpoints.

In addition to these eight case studies, a multistate correlational analysis provided by Evans, Neville, and Graham (1991) points to the possible effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints. The data base analyzed included information on a variety of statutory ap- proaches to deterring drunk driving during the period 1975-86. Included were administra- tive per se laws, prohibitions on plea bar- gaining, mandatory jail or community ser- vice for first offenders, illegal per se provisions, prohibitions on open containers, laws authorizing pre-arrest breath tests, and those authorizing sobriety checkpoints. Con- trolling for unemployment, vehicle mileage, beer taxes, and mandatory seatbelt-use leg- islation, the research found a significant effect only for laws authorizing sobriety checkpoints. The probative value of this finding is unfortunately weakened by the fact that the effective variable consists of authorization rather than actual checkpoints. Its effectiveness could plausibly be understood in terms other than the launching of checkpoints. For instance, checkpoint authorization laws may stand in for a serious governmental commitment to reducing drunk driving. This may it- self have effects, or the commitment may be effectively expressed through implementa- tion of policies other than checkpoints.

DISCUSSION

American-style sobriety checkpoints differ from the Random Breath Testing which ap- pears to have been a deterrent success in reducing crashes in Australia (see, for example, Homel, 1990). Random testing of drivers remains impermissible in the U.S. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Sitz specifically distin- guished checkpoints from random traffic law enforcement, which had been declared un- constitutional in the earlier case of Delaware

442 H.L. ROSS

V. Prouse (440 U.S. 648 119791). Random testing and checkpoints share an essential element, that of fostering police-citizen con- tacts in the absence of reasonable cause to believe that a citizen has violated the law. They may both serve to increase motorists’ perception of the certainty of punishment in the event of violating the law, but it is improper to argue that purported effectiveness of Ran- dom Breath Testing validates the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints, American style. The best evidence for that effectiveness must come from evaluations of programs that pass the Brown test as interpreted in Sirz. All the studies cited here are relevant.

Only a few of the studies, however concern checkpoint programs that are clearly focused, intensive, well-publicized. and that have strong measures of effectiveness, not only concerning perceived deterrent threat, but also the bottom line of reduced crashes. The following weaknesses concern the independent

evaluator:

I. The Williams and Lund ( 1984) study of Del- aware and Montgomery County, Maryland, although cited in the Sitz briefs as evidence of checkpoint effectiveness, does not reasonably support that claim. The main problem is that the survey data found no changes in drinking and driving as a consequence of the checkpoints, and no direct or index evidence of behavior was offered. This study demonstrated that checkpoints were associated with a greater perceived deterrent threat, but in the matter of the bottom line it did not find evidence for effectiveness.

2. The Epperlcin ( 1985) study in rural Arizona concerned a very limited intervention in a most unusual environment. and its most important demonstration was how brief the apparent deterrent effect turned out to bc. It is a slender reed on which to lean in claiming the value of checkpoints.

3. The Charlottesville study by Voas. Rhod- enizer, and Lynn (1985) does concern a rcl- atively intensive program. Its results favor belief in checkpoint effectiveness, both‘increasing perceived threat and reducing a- cohol-related crashes. It employs useful controls for a variety of competing interpretations of the experience. Its before-and-after design, however, is methodologically weak and the principal measure of drunk

driving is the inferior one of police-determined alcohol-related crashes. This is ea- pecially troublesome because the same police agency ran the checkpoints and gathered the data for their evaluation. The Clearwater and Largo report by Lacey et al. ( 1986) does provide reasonable grounds for concluding that the overall intervention was successful in reducing impaired driving. It is unclear, however, that responsibility for this effect can be allocated exclusively or even primarily to the checkpoints.

These reports exhaust the empirical evidence on checkpoints available to the Mich- igan trial court when the Sirz case was orig- inally heard. The trial court’s conclusion that effectiveness of the policy was unproved seems reasonable.

Lacey et al. ( 1988) report on Indianapolis is less persuasive than the one on Clearwater and Large. There were fewer checkpoints and there was less evidence of any impact from the interventions. The comparison of survey data from Mas- sachusetts and New Hampshire by Hingson and Howland (1989) is a classic example of a deficient evaluation method. There is a complete lack of control of numerous plau- sible alternative causes for the diffcrcnces observed. The study adds virtually nothing to the evidence favoring checkpoints. The Bergen County study by Levy, Asch, and Shea (1990) is among the more imprcs- sivc of reports favoring checkpoints. Al- though the published report leaves out much detail and requires the general reader to take the statistical modeling on faith, the evaluation criteria seem appropriate and the method fits the nature of the data. The lack of any data on the perception of risk of punishment and the obvious difficulty of directing publicity about the intervention to the target au- dience, however, leave one wondering how these accomplishments were attained. The Binghamton study by Wells, Preusser, and Williams (1991) is also useful. The intervention was reasonably intense and the evaluation reported both increases in the perceived deterrent threat and decreases in crash indexes. Moreover. counts of drunk drivers in the course of the checkpoints themselves vouch for less drinking and driving in the jurisdiction. One is, however. left


wondering how the notable impacts were achieved when the numbers of high-BAC drivers appear not to have been affected.

9. The New Mexico study of Castle and Sewell ( 1993) uses inappropriate analytical tech- niques and the findings are susceptible in any event to explanation in terms of regression

of extreme data towards the mean. A lack of apparent impact in. serious crash data casts doubt on the deterrent claims based on alcohol-related and nighttime crashes.

The usefulness of the Evans, Neville, and Graham (1991) multistate analysis is com- promised by the fact that authorization, rather

than use, of checkpoints was demonstrated to be related to lower crash rates.

In summary, belief in the deterrent capa- bility of American style checkpoints rests on a relatively small evaluation literature, most of which contains more or less serious methodological deficiencies. Four of the studies

(Charlottesville, Clearwater-Largo, Bergen County and Binghamton), however, are reasonably strong. They concern relatively intensive checkpoint programs and their results

favor the interpretation that properly-mounted checkpoint interventions can reduce drunk

driving and lower the associated crash toll. The study designs in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico have to be re- garded as too flawed to be helpful, and lim- itations of the interventions in Arizona and Indianapolis constrain the usefulness of those

results. Only one study (Delaware and Mont- gomery County) has found flatly negative results for the impact of checkpoints on drinking and driving, and even there the finding was mitigated by evidence of increased perception of the deterrent threat. The currently available literature on balance supports the view that sobriety checkpoints pass the second prong of the Brown test and reinforce the view that checkpoints can be compatible with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution. As a concluding comment on the legal pro-

cess, although the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court understood and argued for deterrent effectiveness of checkpoints as discussed in this article, the Court’s majority

had a different understanding of effectiveness. The analysis in the Sitz opinion was exclusively focused on checkpoints’ yield of arrests. By comparing the 1 percent arrest yield estimated for sobriety checkpoints with the 0.5 percent yield for immigration checkpoints that had previously been deemed effective in the case of United States v. Mar- tinez-Fuerte (428 U.S. 543 [1976]), the

majority concluded that checkpoints “can reasonably be said to advance [the state’s] interest” in preventing drunk driving. Neither the effect of checkpoints in increasing the perception of a deterrent threat nor their accomplishments in actually reducing highway casualties were relied on by the Court in support of its conclusion.

REFERENCES

Castle, S., and Sewell, C. (1993). Evaluarion of rhe effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in reducing highway injuries in New Mexico. Report to the Centers for Disease Control. Santa Fe, NM: Department of Health.

Epperlein, T. (1985). The use of sobriety checkpoints as a deterrent: An impact assessment. Phoenix, AZ: Arizona Department of Public Safety.

Evans, W., Neville, D., and Graham, J. (1991). General deterrence of drunk driving: Evaluation of recent American policies. Risk Analysis 1 1:279- 289.

Hingson, R., and Howland, J. (1989). Public perception about drunk-driving roadblocks: Surveys in Mas- sachusetts and New Hampshire. Report to Massachu- setts Governor’s Highway Safety Bureau. Boston, MA: Boston University School of Public Health.

Homel, R. (1990). Random breath testing and random stopping programs in Australia. In Drinking and driving: Advances in research and prevention, eds. R. Wilson and R. Mann. New York: Guilford Press, pp. 159-202.

Lacey, J., Marchetti, L., Stewart, J., Popkin, C., Murphy, P., Lucke, R., Jones, R., and Rusch- mann, P. (1988). Enforcement and public information strategies for DWI general deterrence: The Indianapolis, Indiana experience. Technical report. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Lacey, J., Stewart, J., Marchetti, L., Popkin, C., Mur- phy, P., Lucke, R., Lucke, R., and Jones, R. (1986). Enforcement and public information strategies for DWI general deterrence: Arrest drunk driving-The Clearwater and Large, Florida, experiences. Tech- nical report. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Levy, D., Shea, D., and Asch, P. (1989). Traffic safety effects of sobriety checkpoints and other local DWI programs in New Jersey. American Journal of Public Health 79~291-293.

444 H.L. ROSS

Levy, D., Aach, P., and Shea. D. (1990). An assessment of county programs to reduce driving while intoxicated. Health Education Resrurch S:247-255.

Voas, R., Rhodenizer. E., and Lynn, C. (1985). Evrtl- uation of Charlottesville checkpoint operctrion.s: Final reporr. Technical report. Washington. DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Wells, J., Preusser. D., and Williams. A. (1991). E/I- fcwcing alcohol-imp uirrd dril?ng md srcrr belt use ICIMX

Eir~ghcrmton, Nerr York. Arlington, VA: Insurance In- stitute for Highway Safety.

Williams, A.. and Lund, A. (1984). Deterrent effects of roadblocks on drinking and driving. Trc@ Srrfery Evrrlurrtim Reseurch Re~+ew 3:7- IS.

Zimring, F., and Hawkins, G. i 1973). Deterrerice: The lrgrrl rhreur in crime control. Chicago: University 01 Chicago Press.

CASES CITED

Rronw v. Terns. 443 U.S. 47 ( 1979).

Delmrwr v. Proust. 440 U.S. 64X ( 1979).

Mickigcor Depcrrtmenr ofSrate Police v. Sit-. I IO S. Ct. 248 I ( I 990)

United Stures v. Morririr;-Flrrrrc,. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).

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Sobriety checkpoints, American style