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Social Legislation and Agrarian Reform Full Cases Page

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93100 June 19, 1997

ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 97855 June 19, 1997

PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF FISHFARM PRODUCERS, INC. petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O NROMERO, J.:

Before this Court are consolidated petitions questioning the constitutionality of some portions of Republic Act No.6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

1

Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation,2

Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention Archie's Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna

3are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing

fishponds and prawn farms. They assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as theimplementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued bypublic respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional.

Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in the following manner:

1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to aquaculture landseven as Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands.

2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when theyare differently situated, and differently treat aquaculture lands and other industrial lands, whenthey are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection ofthe laws.

3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of aquacultureemployees and against other industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of theConstitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic and employment opportunities.

4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its government-induced investments in

aquaculture even as Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State torespect the freedom of enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns oninvestments and to expansion and growth.

The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has been ruled upon in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. vSecretary of Agrarian Reform

4regarding the inclusion of land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and

its coverage.

The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the same above-mentioned provisions insofar as theinclude in its coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms.

In their first argument , petitioners contend that in the case ofLuz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian ReformCourt has already ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not agricultural lands. In aquaculture, fishpand prawn farms, the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity and, hence, asin "Luz Farms," they too should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just as lands devoted to livestock, swine, and pohave been excluded for the same reason. They also argue that they are entitled to the full benefit of "Luz Farm

the effect that only five percent of the total investment in aquaculture activities, fishponds, and prawn farms, form of land, and therefore, cannot be classified as agricultural activity. Further, that in fishponds and prawn fthere are no farmers, nor farm workers, who till lands, and no agrarian unrest, and therefore, the constitutionintended beneficiaries under Section 4, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution do not exist in aquaculture.

In their second argument, they contend that R.A. 6657, by including in its coverage, the raising of fish andaquaculture operations including fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them as in the same class or classificaagriculture or farming violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and is, therefore, void. Further, Constitutional Commission debates show that the intent of the constitutional framers is to exclude "industrial"to which category lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms belong.

Petitioners also claim that Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 issued by the Secretary of the Department of AReform are, likewise, unconstitutional, as held in "Luz Farms," and are therefore void as they implement the aprovisions of CARL.

The provisions of CARL being assailed as unconstitutional are as follows:

(a) Section 3 (b) which includes the "raising offish in the definition of "Agricultural, AgricEnterprise or Agricultural Activity." (Emphasis Supplied)

(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as private agricultural lands devoted tofishpondsand prawn ponds. . . . (Emphasis Supplied)

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian reform the authority tsummarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the compreh

Agrarian reform Law.

(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in section 13

. . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands ardistributed within sixty (60) days at the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receiveProvided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million peannum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determines a lower ceiling.


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In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten percent (10%) of thenet profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90)days of the end of the fiscal year. . . .

While the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with constitutional issues,neither will it preempt the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, bymeans of amendment, said law or act. On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881

6was approved by Congress.

Provisions of said Act pertinent to the assailed provisions of CARL are the following:

Sec. 1. Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 3. Definitions. For the purpose of this Act, unless the context

indicates otherwise:

(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means thecultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including theharvesting of such farm products and other farm activities and practicesperformed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done bypersons whether natural or juridical.

Sec. 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. xxx xxx xxx

b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms andfishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That saidprawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate ofLand Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries

under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, orcommercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simpleand absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must consentto the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. when theworkers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the fishponds or prawnfarms shall be distributed collectively to the worker beneficiaries ortenants who shall form a cooperative or association to manage the same.

In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected tothe Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farm workersshall no longer be necessary, however, the provision of Section 32-A hereofon incentives shall apply.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Section 11, Paragraph 1 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 11. Commercial Farming. Commercial farms, which are privateagricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable and

cut-flower farms and cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be sto immediate compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten (10) yfrom the effectivity of this Act. In the case of new farms, the ten-yeashall begin from the first year of commercial production and operatiodetermined by the DAR. During the ten-year period, the Governmeninitiate steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon payment of juscompensation for the land and the improvements thereon, preferablyfavor of organized cooperatives or associations, which shall thereaftmanage the said lands for the workers beneficiaries.

Sec. 4. There shall be incorporated after Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 a section tas follows

Sec. 32-A. Incentives. Individuals or entities owning or operatingfishponds and prawn farms are hereby mandated to execute within smonths from the effectivity of this Act, an incentive plan with their refishpond or prawn farm workers' organization, if any, whereby sevenfive percent (7.5%) of their net profit before tax from the operation offishpond or prawn farms are distributed within sixty (60) days at the the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other pond workers iponds over and above the compensation they currently receive.

In order to safeguard the right of the regular fishpond or prawn farmunder the incentive plan, the books of the fishpond or prawn ownerssubject to periodic audit or inspection by certified public accountantsby the workers.

The foregoing provision shall not apply to agricultural lands subsequconverted to fishponds or prawn farms provided the size of the land

converted does not exceed the retention limit of the landowner.

The above-mentioned provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excludthe coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailedprovisions has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and TorreJJ., concur.Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes

1 Herein referred to as CARL.2 G.R. No. 93100.3 G.R. No. 97855.4 192 SCRA 51 (1990).5 Supra.


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6 An Act Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Entitled "An Act Instituting AComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program To Promote Social Justice And Industrialization,Providing The Mechanism For Its Implementation, And For Other Purposes.

RARARD vs Court of AppealsGR No. 165155

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Rules of procedure are tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not getin the way of achieving substantial justice. So long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair playtakes place, the rules should be liberally construed, especially in agrarian cases.

This Petition forCertiorariassails the June 9, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79304which granted the Petition forCertiorariof respondents and held that petitioners notices of appeal are mere scrap of paper forfailure to specify the ground for the appeal; and for being forged. Also assailed is the August 31, 2004 Resolution [4] denyingpetitioners motion for reconsideration. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED and the Notices of Appeal filedby the private respondents before the public respondent are hereby decreed without legal effect.

SO ORDERED.

Factual Antecedents

Respondents are co-owners of several parcels of land primarily devoted to rice production consisting of 58.8448hectares, located at Sta. Barbara, Baliuag, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-158564, T-215772, T-215776, T-215777, T 215775. Petitioners are in actual possession of the said land as tillers thereof. According to respondents,petitioners are agricultural lessees with the obligation to pay annual lease rentals. On the other hand, petitioners aver that they are

farmer-beneficiaries under Presidential Decree 27, who have been granted Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and (unregistered)emancipation patents (EPs).

On March 6, 2002, respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners for non-payment of rentals before theDepartment of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Office of the Regional Adjudicator, San Fernando, Pampanga. Theyalleged that petitioners failed to pay and remit the agreed lease rentals to respondents since 1994, or for a period of eight years.The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-03-02-0213-Bul02.

Among the named defendants were Avelino Santos (Avelino) and Pedro Bernardo (Pedro), who were alreadydeceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Per the death certificates presented before the Regional Adjudicator, Avelinodied on December 29, 1997, while Pedro passed away on July 25, 1999. Thus, when the complaint for ejectment was filed in2002, the actual tillers on the land were already the successors-in-interest of Avelino and Pedro, namely Delfin Sacdalan (Delfin)and Roberto Bernardo (Roberto), respectively. Despite such disclosure, no amendment to implead the real parties-in-interest wasmade to the complaint. Instead on May 9, 2002, the Regional Adjudicator ordered the respective legal heirs to substitute thenamed decedents in the case. For some reason, no formal substitution of party litigants took place either. However, it is clear fromthe records, and neither party disputes, that notwithstanding the non-amendment of the complaint and the absence of a formalsubstitution, the heirs of Avelino and Pedro appeared and participated in the proceedings below. The position papers ofrespondents [6] as well as petitioners [7] both named Delfin and Roberto as the heirs of the two decedents and parties to the case.

[8] Thus, the records support a conclusion that the respondents acquiesced to the participation of the said heirs as the real parties-in-interest.

Rulings of the Regional Adjudicator

a) Decision dated Janu ary 23, 2003

After the submission of the parties respective position papers, Regional Adjudicator Fe Arche Manalang (Missued a Decision [9] dated January 23, 2003 in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Severing and extinguishing the existing tenancy/agricultural leasehold relationshipexisting between the plaintiffs-landowners and the defendants over the landholdingsdescribed in paragraph 2 of the complaint.

2. Directing the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to:

a. Vacate the landholdings in question and peacefully surrender possession thereof tothe plaintiffs;

b. Remove at their own expense all structures and other improvements introducedthereon if any;

c. Continue to pay to the plaintiffs the annual leasehold rentals due thereon until thelatter are fully restored to the premises in question.

3. Directing the said defendants to pay to the plaintiffs, jointly and severally theamount of P300,000.00 as and by way of liquidated damages;

4. Denying all other claims for lack of basis; and5. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

The Decision explained that with the exemption of the subject properties from the coverage of the Compr

Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), as evidenced by the December 18, 1992 Order issued by Department of Agraria(DAR) Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa (which also directed the cancellation of the issued CLTs/EPs in the propepetitioners could only retain their status as agricultural lessees if they complied with their statutory obligations to pay theleasehold rentals when they fell due. Since all the petitioners failed toprove that they complied with their rental oblirespondents since 1994, the Regional Adjudicator held that they could no longer invoke their right to security of tenure.

Aggrieved by the adverse Decision, petitioners filed two separate notices of appeal; one was filed on February[10] by petitioners Marciano Natividad, Alberto Enriquez, Benigno Cabingao, and Rodolfo Dimaapi (first group); while the filed on March 5, 2003 by petitioners Cecilia Maniego, Jose Bautista, Eliza Pacheco, Roberto Bernardo, Ismael NativJuanito Fajardo, Antonio Mananghaya, [12] Jovita R. Diaz, [13] Mario Pacheco, Emilio Peralta, Mario Galvez, andecedentsPedro and Avelino (second group). [14] Both notices of appeal were similarly worded thus:

DEFENDANTS, unto this Honorable Board, hereby serve notice that they are appealing thedecision rendered in the above-entitled case, which was received on February 18, 2003 to the DARAB,Central Office at Diliman, Quezon City on the grounds ofquestion of law and fact.

Unlike their previous pleadings, which were all signed by Atty. Jaime G. Mena (Atty. Mena), petitioners notices of appea

signed by a lawyer.

On March 6, 2003, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal [15] and an ex-parte motion for the issuwrit of execution and/or partial implementation of the decision against non-appealing defendants. [16] They presengrounds for the dismissal of the appeal: first, the two notices did not state the grounds relied upon for the appeal; second,


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5, 2003 Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period; third, the March 5, 2003 Notice of Appeal contained the forgedsignatures of the deceased defendants Avelino and Pedro.

b) May 6, 2003 Order

On May 6, 2003, the Regional Adjudicator issued an Order [17] giving due course to the appeal, except with respect tothe decedents Avelino and Pedro, whose signatures were held to be falsified. Thus, a writ of execution was issued against the non-appealing defendants and the deceased defendants.

The petitioners received the above Order only on May 8, 2003, together with the writ of execution, [18] which waspromptly implemented on the same day and on May 10, 2003.[19]

Dissatisfied with the May 6, 2003 Order of the Regional Adjudicator, both the respondents and the petitioners whoseappeal was disallowed, moved for reconsideration of the order. Respondents reiterated [20] that the Regional Adjudicator shouldnot have given due course to the appeal because it did not adhere strictly with Section 2, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules ofProcedure; and that it was a dilatory or frivolous appeal that deserved outright dismissal.

On the other hand, the petitioners who were included in the writ of execution, including the heirs of Avelino and Pedro,now represented by the DAR-Legal Counsel Atty. Dauphine B. Go,[21] argued that the May 6, 2003 Order was hastily executed,without giving them an opportunity to question its correctness. They pointed out that Pedros signature was not forged, since whatappears thereon is actually the name of his widow, Pilar Bernardo (Pilar). [22] As for the signature of Avelino, which was executedby his widow, Jovita Santos (Jovita), the same was an innocent error since she did not know which name to write, having beenunaided by counsel. Jovita maintained that she simply thought that writing her deceased husbands name on the Notice of Appealwould relay the intention of the heirs to appeal the adverse decision. [23]

A hearing was conducted on July 3, 2003, [24] where the heirs of Avelino and Pedro personally appeared to explain thealleged falsification of signatures. Pilar, the widow of Pedro, explained that she did not sign the Notice of Appeal herself, but thatshe allowed her son Roberto to sign it for her. Roberto confirmed his mothers testimony and admitted that he personally signed alldocuments and pleadings on behalf of his mother, Pilar. Their testimonies are verified by the records. As for Jovita, widow of

Avelino, she admits signing her deceased husbands name in all pleadings. All of them explained that their only intention was tosign the pleadings on behalf of their deceased relatives so as to be able to participate in the proceedings.

c) Augu st 5, 2003 Order

Based on these testimonies, Regional Adjudicator Manalang allowed the appeal of the heirs of the two decedents andnullified the writ of execution as regards them in an Order dated August 5, 2003. [25] It resolved the two motions in this wise:

Plaintiffs in their first-cited motion lightly brushed off the defendants Notice of Appeal as a merescrap of paper but [do] not elaborate how they arrived at this conclusion, apart from a general statement thatthe same [do] not assign any specific errors in the findings of fact and conclusions of law made in thedecision being challenged.

While this may be so, it is not for this Office to pass on the merits of the appeal. All that it is calledupon to do is to determine whether the same was seasonably filed and perfected by the appellants within theprescribed reglementary period. With an affirmative finding on this aspect, nothing more remains to be doneexcept to allow the appeal to run its full course.

x x x x

Evaluating the parties conflicting claims x x x this Office finds for the plaintiffs x x x. However, withthe voluntary confessions of Pilar Bernardo and Jovita Santos x x x who are the widows of the deceasedtenants Pedro Bernardo and Avelino Santos that they really mean to appeal the adverse decision affectingtheir late spouses farmholdings, any perceived legal defect in the manner of affixing their signatures on thequestioned Notices of Appeal must give way to the greater demands of justice and equity. x x x

x x x x

FOREGOING premises considered, Order is hereby issued:

1. Denying the plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 13, 2003;

2. Noting without action the same plaintiffs Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed onMay 14, 2003;

3. Giving due course to the Motion for Reconsideration (from the Order of May 6, 2003and Writ of Execution dated May 8, 2003) filed by the Heirs of Pedro Bernardo, Heirs of

Avelino Santos, and of Ismael Natividad [26] and thereby allowing their appeal to theexclusion of the other defendants-movants;

4. Motu proprio quashing the Writ of Execution issued on May 8, 2003 directed againstaforenamed defendants and thereby nullifying all proceedings undertaken in connectiontherewith.

x x x xSO ORDERED.

Respondents moved for another reconsideration on August 14, 2003. [27] This was denied in the NovemberOrder, which also ordered the sheriff to restore the farmholdings of the heirs of Avelino and Pedro in view of the quashal of execution as to the said individuals. Respondents sought another reconsideration, which was again denied on Januar[30]

Respondents thus filed a petition for certioraribefore the CA. They argued that the DARAB no longerjurisdiction to reverse the portion of its Decision, which had already been duly executed upon the authority of a writ issued2003. They also insisted that both notices of appeal were infirm for failure to state the grounds for an appeal and for cforged signatures.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appellate court found merit in respondents petition.

It held that the Notice of Appeal of the second group bearing the signatures of deceased Avelino and Pedproduct of forgery, and thus had no legal effect. The appellate court brushed aside the heirs explanations that they merthe decedents names to show their intention to appeal the Regional Adjudicatorsdecision. It found their intentions immairrelevant to the nullity of a forged instrument.

Further, it found the two Notices of Appeal lodged by the first and second groups to be mere scraps of papefailed to comply with the mandate of Section 2, Rule XIII of the 1997 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (actually, it shobeen the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure [31]). According to the CA, the Notices of Appeal failed to specificallygrounds relied upon for the appeal. The statement that they are appealing on questions of fact and law was held to be ibecause an appeal, being a mere statutory privilege, must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the provisionauthorizing it.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration [32] was denied. Hence, this petition seeking a review of the Decis

June 9, 2004 of the CA.

Issue

The issues raised by both parties are as follows:


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(1) Whether the Notices of Appeal dated February 28, 2003 and March 3, 2003 are mere scraps of paper forfailure to state the grounds relied upon for an appeal; and

(2) Whether the Notice of Appeal dated March 3, 2003 is null and void for containing two falsified signatures.

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioners pray that their Notices of Appeal to the DARAB be given due course on the ground that they havesubstantially complied with the rules as set forth in Section 2, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure. They positthat their appeal on questions of fact and law should suffice, even if they omitted the phrase which if not corrected would causegrave irreparable damage and injury to them. They argue that the stringent application of the rules denied them substantial justice.

Petitioners also argue that the complaint itself was filed against their deceased predecessors-in-interest. Hence, iftechnicality is to be followed, the complaint should have been dismissed as to the deceased defendants. But the case continuedand they, as heirs, participated in the proceedings. Thus when they signed the Notice of Appeal, their intent was not to defraud butonly to continue their quest for justice.

Respondents Arguments

Respondents reiterate that the notices of appeal are mere scraps of paper for failure to state the grounds relied uponfor the appeal and for containing forged signatures. They insist that giving effect to the Notice of Appeal would countenance an actwhich is criminal in nature. Respondents maintain that there should be strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure becausethe DARAB rules frown upon frivolous and dilatory appeals.

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious. The defects found in the two notices of appeal are not of such nature that would cause adenial of the right to appeal. Placed in their proper factual context, the defects are not only excusable but also inconsequential.

Alleged failure to specify grounds for appeal

There is nothing sacred about the forms of pleadings or processes, their sole purpose being to facilitate theapplication of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules should beconstrued liberally. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon because rules of procedureshould not be applied to override substantial justice. Courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party ofstatutory appeal; they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilationof their causes, free from technical constraints. [33] If the foregoing tenets are followed in a civil case, their application ismade more imperative in an agrarian case where the rules themselves provide for liberal construction, thus:

Rule IGENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out theobjectives of the agrarian reform program and to promote just, expeditious, and inexpensiveadjudication and settlement of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.

x x x x

Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its Regional and ProvincialAdjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in theRules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in amost expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case inaccordance with justice and equity.

x x x x

Rule VIIIPROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ADJUDICATORS

AND THE BOARD

Section 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before the Board or its Adjudicatorsshall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the technicalitiesof law and procedure and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence obtained inthe courts of law shall not apply. x x x [34]Guided by the foregoing principles, we find that the Notices of Appeal substantially complied with all that is

under the 1994 DARAB Rules. The following provisions are instructive in making this conclusion:

Rule XIIIAPPEALS

Section 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or decisionof the Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a period of fifteen (15)days from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on theadverse party, if the appeal is in writing.

b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant,and a copy thereof shall be served upon the adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of the oralappeal.

Section 2. Grounds. The aggrieved party may appeal to the Board from a final order, resolutionor decision of the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:

a) That errors in the findings of fact or conclusions of laws were committed which, if notcorrected, would cause grave and irreparable damage and injury to the appellant;

b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Adjudicator; or

c) That the order, resolution or decision is obtained through fraud or coercion.

x x x x

Section 5. Requisites and Perfection of the Appeal. a) The Notice of Appeal shall be filed withinthe reglementary period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It shall state the date when the appellantreceived the order or judgment appealed from and the proof of service of the notice to the adverse party; and

b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within thereglementary period to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicators is situated. x x x

Non-compliance with the above-mentioned requisites shall be a ground for dismissal of theappeal.

Both Notices of Appeal stated that the petitioners were appealing the decision on the grounds ofquestions oof law, which we find sufficient statement of the ground for appeal under Section 2(a), Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules. notices omitted to state that the decision would cause grave and irreparable damage and injury to the appellant, we fpunctilious fidelity to the language of the DARAB Rules unnecessary. Surely by appealing the Decision of the Regional Adthe petitioners were already manifesting that they will be damaged by the assailed decision. Requiring a literal applicarules when its purpose has already been served is oppressive superfluity.


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It must be stressed that the purpose of the notice of appeal is not to detailones objections regarding the appealeddecision; that is the purpose of the appellants memorandum.[35] In the context of a DARAB case, the notice of appeal serves onlyto inform the tribunal or officer that rendered the appealed decision ( i.e., the Regional Adjudicator) of the timelinessof the appealand of the general reason for the appeal, and to prepare the records thereof for transmission to the appellate body (i.e., theDARAB). Petitioners Notices of Appeal contain everything that is necessary to serve these purposes.

Another important consideration is the fact that petitioners were obviously not assisted by counsel in the filing of theNotices of Appeal. Only the parties were signatories thereto; Atty. Menas signature was missing, which gives credence topetitioners assertion that they had already terminated the services of their counsel at that time. Their new counsel, Atty. DauphineB. Go, DAR-Legal Counsel, entered her appearance only on March 13, 2003, or several days after the Notices of Appeal were filed.[36]

The Regional Adjudicator is also correct when she ruled that she has no power to determine if the appeal is frivolousand intended merely for delay. Such matters are for the appellate body to determine after it has studied the appellants brief or theappeal memorandum. The body which rendered the appealed decision should not pass upon the question of whether the appealwas taken manifestly for delay because such determination belongs to the appellate body. [37] For the lower body to do so wouldconstitute a review of its own judgment and a mockery of the appellate process. This principle is applicable to agrarian disputes byvirtue of Section 8, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules which states that the Board (not the Regional Adjudicator) has the power toimpose reasonable penalties, including fine or censure, on parties who file frivolous or dilatory appeals. The implication is that sincethe Board is the one which has the power to punish, it is also the one which has the power to decide if there has been a violation.The Regional Adjudicator has no such power. She must allow the appeal if it is timely and compliant with the reglementaryrequirements. It has been held that when an appeal is filed on time, the approval of a notice of appeal is a ministerial duty of thecourt or tribunal which rendered the decision. [38]

Effect of forgery on the March 5, 2003 Notice of Appeal

Respondents claim, and the CA has ruled, that the March 5, 2003 Notice of Appeal (filed by the second group) was aforgery and thus void, because it bore signatures above the names of the deceased Avelino and Pedro, which were obviously notwritten by the decedents themselves.

First of all, we have to point out that the confusion in this case was brought about by respondents themselves when theyincluded in their complaint two defendants who were already dead. Instead of impleading the decedents heirs and currentoccupants of the landholding, respondents filed their complaint against the decedents, contrary to the following provision of the 1994DARAB Rules of Procedure:

RULE VPARTIES, CAPTION AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS

SECTION 1. Parties in Interest. Every agrarian case must be initiated and defended in thename of the real party in interest. x x x

A real party in interest is defined as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitledto the avails of a suit. [39] The real parties in interest, at the time the complaint was filed, were no longer the decedents Avelino andPedro, but rather their respective heirs who are entitled to succeed to their rights (whether as agricultural lessees or as farmers-beneficiaries) under our agrarian laws.[40] They are the ones who, as heirs of the decedents and actual tillers, stand to be removedfrom the landholding and made to pay back rentals to respondents if the complaint is sustained.

Since respondents failed to correct their error (they did not amend the erroneous caption of their complaint to include thereal parties-in-interest), they cannot be insulated from the confusion which it engendered in the proceedings below. But at any rate,notwithstanding the erroneous caption and the absence of a formal substitution of parties, jurisdiction was acquired over the heirs of

Avelino and Pedro who voluntarily participated in the proceedings below. This Court has ruled that formal substitution of parties isnot necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated, and presented evidence during the proceedings. [41]

Going now to the alleged forgery, it is clear from the records that there was never an instant when the res(and the Regional Adjudicator) were deceived or made to believe that Avelino and Pedro were still alive and participatiproceedings below. In fact, respondents were clearly aware that the two were already deceased such that they even indnames of the respective heirs in their position paper before the Regional Adjudicator:

Plaintiffs are the agricultural lessors of the following tenant-lessees in the subject landholdingprimarily devoted to rice production, namely: x x x Pedro Bernardo (deceased), substituted by RobertoBernardo, Antonio Mananghaya (deceased) substituted by Mariano, Faustino, and Tranquilino all surnamedMananghaya, x x x Avelino Santos (deceased) substituted by Delfin Sacdalan x x x. [42]

Respondents also never questioned the appearance and participation of the heirs Roberto and Delfin in the proceedinThe parties, as well as the Regional Adjudicator, were all aware of the death of Avelino and Pedro, and of the fact that the (and its corresponding prayer for ejectment) is now directed against their heirs.

Therefore, it is unquestionable that when the heirs of Avelino and Pedro signed the Notice of Appeal, they did nand could not have intended, to visit fraud upon the proceedings. Indeed, any intention to mislead is simply negated by tadmission and participation in the proceedingsas heirs of Avelino and Pedro. Thus, there can be no deception or prethere were prior repeated disclosures that the named defendants were already dead.

Respondents insist that allowing the appeal would condone an act which is criminal in nature. We do not agre3 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that malice or criminal intent (dolo) is an essential requisite of all crimes anddefined therein. [43] The circumstances narrated above do not indicate the presence ofdolo. In this regard, it should be nthe heirs who signed the Notice of Appeal are lay persons unfamiliar with the technical requirements of procedure and pThis unfamiliarity, compounded by the absence of legal counsel, appears to have caused the imperfections in their signNotice of Appeal. We do not see any criminal intent motivating them.

Moreover, in cases of falsification of public documents, such as documents introduced in judicial proceedchange in the public document must be such as to affect the integrityof the same orchange the effects which it would produce; for, unless that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intent to commit the crime, which is re

Article 3 ofthe Penal Code. [44] In the instant case, given the heirs admissions contained in several pleadings that AvPedro are already deceased and their submission to the jurisdiction of the Regional Adjudicator as the successors-in-intedecedents, the effect would be the same if the heirs did not sign the decedents names but their own names on the apperecognized realparties in interest, the case actually proceeded against the heirs and the judgment rendered was executethem. It was thus unnecessary for the heirs to sign the decedents names when their own names, as the real parties would have served the same purpose just as effectively.

Given the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that the unfortunate matter of signing the dnames in the Notice of Appeal is an innocent and harmless error on the part of the heirs.

Respondents own procedural errors

At this juncture, we must point out that while respondents bewail petitioners lack ofstrict adherence to procedthey also failed to observe some rules. It is evident from the records that respondents filed two motions for reconsideratio

August 5, 2003 Order of the Regional Adjudicator. This is prohibited under Section 12, Rule VIII of DARAB Rules, whichthat only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.

Moreover, respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies [45] when they filed their petition forcertiothe CA, instead of the Board. [46] The DARAB Rules state that:

Rule XIVJUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order, resolution, award or ruling ofthe Board on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,


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enforcement, interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, may bebrought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari.

An aggrieved party can only resort to judicial reviewafterit has invoked the authority of the Board. Judicial review is not providedfor orders, rulings, and decisions of adjudicators. It is stated in Section 1, Rule II that the Board hasprimary and exclusive, originaland appellate jurisdiction over agrarian disputes involving agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Ifrespondents were strict adherents to procedural rules, they should have followed Section 2(b) of Rule XIII which provides for anappeal to the Board on the ground ofgrave abuse of discretionon the part of the adjudicator.

These matters, while not raised by the parties, are important considerations in resolving the case where one partylaments that she is prejudiced by the leniency that is afforded to the other party. It should be made clear that there was no partialityor undue advantage given to petitioners that had not likewise been enjoyed by respondents.

Allegation that the basis for the Regional AdjudicatorsDecision is an utter fabrication

Petitioners also raise for the first time in the entire proceedings of this case that respondents had presented to theRegional Adjudicator an entirely spurious and fabricated DAR Order exempting respondents landholdings from the coverage ofCARP. It will be recalled that the Regional Adjudicators decision below is based on the assumption that respondents landholdingsare exempt from CARP coverage, hence the obligation on the part of petitioners to pay lease rentals.

Petitioners maintain that they only discovered the spurious nature of the exemption order during the pendency of theirappeal to this Court. They presented several certificates from various DAR offices stating that the latter have no record of the saidexemption order in favor of respondents. If such exemption order is indeed fabricated, their possession of CLTs and EPs should berespected, thus they should be held under no obligation to pay rentals to respondents. Thus, they seek the nullification of theexemption order on the ground that it is counterfeit.

On the other hand, respondents assert that the validity of the exemption order had already been settled in theannulment case filed by petitioners against respondents in 1994, docketed as DARAB Case No. 602-B-94. They likewise maintainthat the issue involves factual matters which are not within the province of the Supreme Court.

DARAB Case No. 602-B 94 is a complaint for annulment of the regional directors order, which granted respondentspetition for the exemption of their landholdings from the coverage of the CARP. In that case, petitioners assailed the validity of theorder on the ground that they were not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence and that the title of petitioners to theland was not registered within the period prescribed by law.

Their complaint was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The provincial adjudicator, as later affirmed by theDARAB[47] and the CA, [48] ruled that only the Agrarian Reform Secretary has appellate jurisdiction over the exemption ordersissued by a regional director.[49] Petitioners filed a petition for review before this Court but it was not timely filed. Hence, aresolution was issued where the case was deemed closed and terminated. Entry of judgment was made on September 6, 2002.

Contrary to respondents arguments, there was never any ruling regarding the validity or authenticity of theexemption order. What was ruled upon, and became final, was that the exemption order cannot be reviewed by theprovincial adjudicator or DARAB since exclusive appellate jurisdiction rests in the Office of the DAR Secretary. Thus, itappears that petitioners right to question the authenticityof the exemption order in the proper forum has not yet beenforeclosed.

The instant case, however, is not the proper place to bring the issue of authenticity.

Exemption from the comprehensive agrarian reform law is an administrative matter the primary jurisdiction over whichhas been lodged with the DAR Secretary. [50] Moreover, the issue of authenticity is entirely factual. [51] Since this was neverraised below, we have no basis on record to rule on the authenticity of the exemption order.

A final note. After the decision was rendered by the CA, the record shows that several withdrawals of appeal wereallegedly filed with the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. This new development, however, was not raised by the

parties in their memoranda before the Court. For this reason and because of the necessity of verifying the auvoluntariness, and the personalities of the parties that signed the withdrawals of appeal, the Court deems it prudent to matter for the Board that would hear the appeal.

WHEREFORE,the instant petition is GRANTEDand the assailed June 9, 2004 Decision of the Court of AppeG.R. SP No. 79304, which gave no legal effect to petitioners Notices of Appeal, is hereby ANNULLED and SET AS

August 5, 2003 Order of the Regional Adjudicator giving due course to the two Notices of Appeal isREINSTATED. Let thof the case be transmitted forthwith to the Adjudication Board which is DIRECTED to proceed to dispose of the apdeliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990.]

LUZ FARMS, petitioner,vs . THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN RErespondent.

Enrique M. Belo for petitioner.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, Jp:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injuncagainst the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforassailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988

promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutirights of the petitioner.

As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:

On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising olivestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).

On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and ProceduresImplementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 8

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implemenSection 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and towith others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(bSection 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Compreh

Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing undNo. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof apromulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).


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Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, itis also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents fromenforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.

This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for theissuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).

Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion forReconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in theamount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file theirrespective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).

The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).

On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo,pp. 186-187).

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, AgriculturalEnterprise or Agricultural Activity."

(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock,poultry and swine raising . . ."

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d) Section 16(d) and 17which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determinethe just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

(e) Section 32which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the productionof such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year ascompensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above thecompensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entitiesrealize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, uponproper application, determine a lower ceiling.

In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten(10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and otherfarmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."

The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry andswine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.

The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

ARTICLE XIII

xxx xxx xxx

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of otherfarmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertak

just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congmay prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the pay

just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The

shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

xxx xxx xxx"

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowthe correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the PhilippInc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Compre

Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandthe Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (RolloLivestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undeand represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raiIndeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residcommercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processingcorporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings anamenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal faconsideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial liveand poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the te"agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that WeInternational Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:

"Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including afeeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.

It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .

Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.

Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).

The petition is impressed with merit.

The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction iascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the ConstitutioTuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).


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Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself.The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms areemployed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure

Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).

It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, thecourts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of theConstitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding waspreliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what wasmeant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way towardexplaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word

"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock andpoultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as lauddevoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record,CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamirproposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial andindustrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word"agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agriculturallands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial andresidential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).

In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions,among others, quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if itmeans that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right offarmers and farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by CommissionerTadeo, farmworkers include those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project andfor that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually,directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record,CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618).

xxx xxx xxx

The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay CommissionerRegalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at

livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestockworkers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural landsdevoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the

extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (R21).

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 d"corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing p(pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three perceof their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation isunreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is sthat the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be ancase or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional

must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necto the decision of the case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of AgrReform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 7977July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).

However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it whesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusioonly criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and dits purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisionsBlandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments, or of any official, bepeople's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secof Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico79777, 14 July 1989).

Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes thof the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is theessence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) awhich power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the ImpleRules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for beingunconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate OpinionsSARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I agree that the petition be granted.


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Social Legislation and Agrarian Reform Full Cases Page 1

It is my opinion however that the main issue on the validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. 6657 (theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its Implementing Rules and Guidelines insofar as they includethe raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in their coverage can not be simplistically reduced to a question ofconstitutional construction.

It is a well-settled rule that construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated thatapplication is impossible or inadequate without them. A close reading however of the constitutional text in point,specifically, Sec. 4, Art. XIII, particularly the phrase, ". . . in case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of thefruits thereof," provides a basis for the clear and possible coverage of livestock, poultry, and swine raising within theambit of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. This accords with the principle that every presumption shouldbe indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and the court in considering the validity of a statute shouldgive it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law.

1

The presumption against unconstitutionality, I must say, assumes greater weight when a ruling to the contrarywould, in effect, defeat the laudable and noble purpose of the law, i.e., the welfare of the landless farmers andfarmworkers in the promotion of social justice, by the expedient conversion of agricultural lands into livestock,poultry, and swine raising by scheming landowners, thus, rendering the comprehensive nature of the agrarianprogram merely illusory.

The instant controversy, I submit, boils down to the question of whether or not the assailed provisions violatethe equal protection clause of the Constitution (Article II, section 1) which teaches simply that all persons or thingssimilarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

2

There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that substantial distinctions exist between land directed purelyto cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for livestock, poultry and swine raising, thatmake real differences, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

No land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are no tenants nor landlords, onlyemployers and employees.

Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land nor are they "fruits of the land."

Land is not even a primary resource in this industry. The land input is inconsequential that all the commercial hogand poultry farms combined occupy less than one percent (1%) (0.4% for piggery, 0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45million hectares of land supposedly covered by the CARP. And most farms utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of land.

In every respect livestock and poultry production is an industrial activity. Its use of an inconsequential portion of landis a mere incident of its operation, as in any other undertaking, business or otherwise.

The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry production as an agricultural enterprise is nowhere more evident whenone considers that at least 95% of total investment in these farms is in the form of fixed assets which are industrial innature.

These include (1) animal housing structures and facilities complete with drainage, waterers, blowers, misters and insome cases even piped-in music; (2) feedmills complete with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts, generators, etc.;(3) extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies; (4) anti-pollution equipment such as bio-gas anddigester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds; (5) deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses and

accessory facilities; (6) modern equipment such as sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory facilitiescomplete with expensive tools and equipment; and a myriad other such technologically advanced appurtance

How then can livestock and poultry farmlands be arable when such are almost totally occupied by these struc

The fallacy of equating the status of livestock and poultry farmworkers with that of agricultural tenants surfaceone considers contribution to output. Labor cost of livestock and poultry farms is no more than 4% of total opcost. The 98% balance represents inputs not obtained from the land nor provided by the farmworkers inpuas feeds and biochemicals (80% of the total cost), power cost, cost of money and several others.

Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by tenancy law. Tare entitled to social security benefits where tenant-farmers are not. They are paid fixed wages rather than cr

shares. And as in any other industry, they receive additional benefits such as allowances, bonuses, and otheincentives such as free housing privileges, light and water.

Equating livestock and poultry farming with other agricultural activities is also fallacious in the sense that like manufacturing sector, it is a market for, rather than a source of agricultural output. At least 60% of the entiredomestic supply of corn is absorbed by livestock and poultry farms. So are the by-products of rice (rice-brancoconut (copra meal), banana (banana pulp meal), and fish (fish meal).

3

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that both kinds of lands are not similarly situated and hence, can not btreated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions which allow for the inclusion of livestock and poultry industry the coverage of the agrarian reform program constitute invalid classification and must accordingly be struck drepugnant to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Footnotes

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

1. In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 70 L. ed., p. 1059.2. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.3. Rollo, 29-30.

ROMANITA CONCHA, BENITA COSICO, DOMINGO GARCIA, ROMEODE CASTRO, PEDRO CONCHA, CONSTANTINO CONCHA, ROLANDONAVARRO, ROSALINDA DE TORRES, CANDIDA DE TORRES,RODELO COSICO, TEODOLFO CAPUNO, ANTONIO DE TORRES,MAXIMA CONCHA, GABRIEL CONCHA, IRINEO CONCHA, ANDBRAULIO DE TORRES,

Petitioners,

G.R. No. 162446

Present:

CORONA, J., ChairpersonVELASCO, JR.,


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- versus -

PAULINO RUBIO, SOFIA RUBIO, AMBROCIA BARLETA, SEGUNDOCRISOSTOMO, MILAGROS GAYAPA, LASARO CONCHA, ANDLORENSO NAVARRO,

Respondents.

NACHURA,

PERALTA, and

PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 29, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari,1[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to

set aside the Amended Decision2[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 73303.

The controversy involves the determination of who between petitioners Romanita Concha, Benita Cosico,

Domingo Garcia, Romeo de Castro, Pedro Concha, Constantino Concha, Rolando Navarro, Rosalinda de Torres,

Candida de Torres, Rodelo Cosico, Teodolfo Capuno, Antonio de Torres, Maxima Concha, Gabriel Concha, Irineo

1[1] Rollo, pp. 9-29.

2[2] Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de Los Santos, with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-

de la Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court), concurring; id. at 39-41.

Concha, and Braulio de Torres and respondents Paulino Rubio, Sofia Rubio, Ambrocia Barleta, S

Crisostomo, Milagros Gayapa, Lasaro Concha, and Lorenso Navarro, are qualified to become beneficiarie

portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-140494, T-140492 and T-140491, registere

name of Lilia E. Gala, Luisita E. Gala and Teresita E. Gala, respectively, with an aggregate area of

hectares, more or less.

The facts of the case, as succinctly put by the CA, are as follows:

The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. On June 16, 1993, aNotice of Coverage was sent to the landowners.

In her Affidavit dated August 17, 1993, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)of Tiaong, Quezon, named as beneficiaries, viz: IRENEO CONCHA, BRAULIO DE TORRES,LAZARO CONCHA, SEGUNDINA CRISTOMO, AMBROSO BARLETA, RAYMUNDO GAYAPA,SOFIA RUBIO, SOSIMO LOPEZ, SEGUNDA LOPEZ, LORENZO NAVARRO, INANG RUBIO,GABRIEL CONCHA, ROMANITA CONCHA, BENITA COSICO, DOMINGO GARCIA, ROMEODE CASTRO, PEDRO CONCHA, CONSTANTINO ZITA, ROLANDO NAVARRO, ROSALINDADE TORRES, CANDIDA DE TORRES, RODELO COSICO, TEODOLFO CAPUNO, ANTONIODE TORRES, and, MAXIMA CONCHA (Annex A of the Complaint, Rollo, pp. 52-53).

On March 24, 1995, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their tenancy andtheir identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of the petitioners to becomebeneficiaries over the subject landholding docketed as DARAB CASE NO. IV-Qu-1-014-95

(Annex D, Rollo, pp. 45-51). They alleged that they are the tenants thereof and have notrelinquished their rights over the same, as they returned the monetary awards given by thelandowners (Ibid., p. 4, Rollo, p. 48).

Meanwhile, the registered owners of the subject land entered into a joint project with1

stA.M. Realty Development Corporation, represented by Atty. Alejandro Macasaet for its

development.

On April 26, 1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approved thelandowners application for conversion, subject to the following conditions:

1. The farmer-beneficiary, if any, shall be paid disturbance compensation pursuantto R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389;

2. The remaining 18.5006 hectares shall be covered by CARP under compulsory

acquisition and the same be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

x x x x

In relation to paragraph 2 thereof, the MARO pursued the coverage of the remaining18.5006 has. The petitioners herein were identified as qualified farmer-beneficiaries where three


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(3) Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA) were issued in their favor (Annexes C, C-1. & C-2).

Respondents, on the other hand, were paid of their disturbance compensation. Theynow, however, question the validity and legality of the institution of the petitioners asbeneficiaries over the subject landholding.

Sometime on January 1996, respondents together with the landowners filed anothercase for annulment of CLOAs and prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Orderdocketed as DARAB CASE NO. IV-Qu-I-006-96. This case was consolidated with the earlierDARAB CASE NO. IV-Qu-I-014-95 and the hearing(s) were jointly held.3[3]

On August 9, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a Decision4[4] dismissing

the case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, it is judged that, this case be, and hereby is, DISMISSED for lack ofmerit.

SO ORDERED.5[5]

The PARAD ruled that respondents had waived their rights as tenants and as farmer-beneficiaries of the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) program, as evidenced by theirSalaysay(for respondent Paulino Rubio) and

theirMagkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay(for the rest of the respondents).6[6] In addition, the PARAD ruled that it

had no authority to rule on the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, as the same was a purely administrative matter

under the jurisdiction of the DAR.7[7]

3[3] Rollo, pp. 113-115.

4[4] Records, pp. 162-169.

5[5] Id. at 169.

6[6] Id. at 166.

7[7] Id. at 168.

Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal8[8] of the PARAD Decision.

On November 17, 2000, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) ren

Decision9[9] setting aside the PARAD Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated 09 August 1999 ishereby SET ASIDE. Order is given to the Register of Deeds for the Province of Quezon to

cancel the Certificates of Land Ownership Award issued to Private Defendants-Appellees, andthe MARO of Tiaong, Quezon and PARO for the Province of Quezon to generate and issue newCertificates of Land Ownership Award in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

SO ORDERED.10[10]

The DARAB ruled that in order for a voluntary surrender by an agricultural tenant of his landhold

valid, the same must be done due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family a consid

which, the DARAB found, was bereft of any evidence as shown by the records of the case.11[11]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration12[12] of the DARAB Decision. On Sept

2002, the DARAB issued a Resolution13[13] denying their motion.

8[8] Id. at 170.

9[9] Id. at 191-195.

10[10] Id. at 191.

11[11] Id. at 192.

12[12] Id. at 199-206.

13[13] Id. at 219-221.


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Petitioners then appealed to the CA.

On September 9, 2003, the CA issued a Decision14[14] ruling in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion

of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The 17November 2000 Decision of the DARAB is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The titles over the

subject land issued in favor of herein petitioners are upheld.

SO ORDERED.15[15]

Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

On February 27, 2004, the CA issued an Amended Decision16[16] granting respondents motion for

reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is herebyGRANTED and the DARAB Decision dated November 17, 2000 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.17[17]

The salient portions of the Amended Decision are hereunder reproduced to wit:

14[14] Rollo, pp. 112-117.

15[15] Id. at 117.

16[16] Id. at 39-41.

17[17] Id. at 40.

A more than cursory reading of the arguments in support of their Motion forReconsideration prompted Us to reconsider Our Decision for the following reasons:

1. Why would respondents choose to remain tenants on the 15-hectare retained areawhen they can be beneficiaries of the 18-hectare remaining portion of the subject agriculturalland? In other words, why would they choose to be leaseholders when they can be landowners?

2. If indeed they chose to remain in the 15-hectare retained area, the same waseventually developed into a residential subdivision under the Conversion Order issued by theDAR. Obviously, there can be no agricultural tenant over a residential land. And

3. It is indubitable that respondents are recognized tenants on the subject land andthey had returned the disturbance compensation for the 15-hectare retained area and instead,opted to be beneficiaries over the CARP covered 18-hectare portion. Respondents should

therefore be given the priority in the selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries under Section 22of RA 6657.18[18]

Hence, herein petition, with petitioners raising a sole assignment of error, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORMADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) IS CLOTHED WITH JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THEISSUE INVOLVING THE IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION OF QUALIFIED FARMER-BENEFICIARIES OF A LAND COVERED BY THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORMPROGRAM (CARP).19[19]

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioners argue that the DARAB is not clothed with the power or authority to resolve the issue

the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries since the same is an Agrarian Law Implem

case, thus, an administrative function falling within the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.20[20]

18[18] Id. at 39-40.

19[19] Id. at 17.

20[20] Id.


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Petitioners argument is well taken.

In Lercana v. Jalandoni,21[21]this Court was categorical in ruling that the identification and selection of

CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively

cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.22[22]

In addition, in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,23[23] this Court had an occasion to

discuss the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary in the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, to wit:

x x x Suffice it to say that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6657, the identification ofbeneficiaries is a matter involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP,a matter which is exclusively vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, through itsauthorized offices. Section 15 reads:

SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination withthe Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act,shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farm workers who arequalified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries withthe assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:

(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length oftenurial relationship;(c) location and area of the land they work;(d) crops planted; and(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.

A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shallbe posted in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangaywhere it shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.

Meanwhile, Administrative Order No. 10 (Rules and Procedures Governing theRegistration of Beneficiaries), Series of 1989, provides:

21[21] 426 Phil. 319 (2002).

22[22] Id. at 329-330.

23[23] 493 Phil. 570 (2005).

SUBJECT: I. PREFATORY STATEMENT

Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian ReformLaw of 1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian ReformCommittee (BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register allagricultural lessees, tenants and farm workers who are qualifiedbeneficiaries of the CARP. This Administrative Order provides theImplementing Rules and Procedures for the said registration.

x x x x

B. Specific1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP.24[24]

Even a perusal of the DARAB Revised Rules shows that matters strictly involving the admin

implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations, are the exclusive prerogative

cognizable by, the Secretary of the DAR. Rule II of the said Rules read:

SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian ReformAdjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine andadjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving theimplementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657,Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic ActNo. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules andregulations.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:

a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in thecultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws;b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and payment of

just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbancecompensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning thefunctions of the Land Bank;c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions ofDAR officials other than the Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale ortheir amendments under the administration and disposition of the DAR andLBP;d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership or representation incompact farms, farmers cooperatives and other registered farmersassociations or organizations, related to land covered by the CARP andother agrarian laws;

e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-emptionand redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or

24[24] Id. at 602-603. (Emphasis supplied.)


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other agrarian laws;f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT),Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP)and the administrative correction thereof;g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred toit by the Secretary of the DAR.

Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation ofthe CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of andcognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.25[25]

The administrative function of the DAR is manifest in Administrative Order No. 06-00,26[26] which provides

for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. Under said Rules of Procedure, the DAR

Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-

beneficiari es. Section 2 of the said Rules specifically provides, inter alia, that:

SECTION 2. Cases Covered. - These Rules shall govern cases falling within theexclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall include the following:

(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Program (CARP), including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions forlifting of coverage;

(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries;

(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;

(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and CARP BeneficiaryCertificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, includingthe issuance, recall or cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of LandOwnership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;

(e) Exercise of the right of retention by landowner; x x x27[27]

25[25] Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,supra note 23, at 606-607. (Emphasis

supplied)

26[26] Issued on August 30, 2000.

27[27] Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Amante,supra note 23, at 608. (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied.)

Based on the foregoing, the conclusion is certain that the DARAB had no jurisdiction to iden

between the parties should be recognized as the beneficiaries of the land in dispute, as it was a purely admin

function of the DAR. The PARAD was, thus, correct when it declared that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the

to wit:

As earlier stated no other agency of government is empowered or authorized by law inthe selection and designation of farmer beneficiaries except the DAR being purely anadministrative function. The Adjudication Board is not clothed with power and authority torule on the selection of farmer beneficiaries. To do so would be an ultra viresact of saidBoard, being administrative in character.28[28]

It behooves this Court to ask why the DARAB granted affirmative relief to respondents, when cle

PARAD decision subject of appeal was categorical about its lack of jurisdiction. A reading of the DARAB D

however, shows that no discussion of the Boards jurisdiction was made. The failure of the DARAB to look

jurisdictional issue may, however, be attributed to the fact that petitioners did not raise said issue before the

Nevertheless, this Court is of the opinion that the same should not be an excuse for, nor should it war

DARABs action, especially since a plain reading of the PARAD Decision, as earlier stated, shows that it cate

discussed the bodys lack of jurisdiction. The same holds true for the CA Decision, which did not ta

jurisdictional impediment hounding the petition notwithstanding that petitioners raised said issue in their petit

While this Court in Torres v. Ventura29[29] ruled that it was hard to believe that a tenant, who h

tilling the land in question for a long time, would suddenly lose interest in it and decide to leave it for good

time when he knew that full ownership over the same was soon going to be in his hands,30[30] this Court

that the same consideration should not apply to the case at bar.

28[28] Records, p. 168, (Emphasis supplied.)

29[29] G.R. No. 86044, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 97.

30[30] Id. at 103.


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