Solidarity, Representativity and Accountability: The Origins, State and Implications of Shopfloor Democracy within the Congress of South African Trade Unions

SOLIDARITY, REPRESENTATIVITY AND

ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ORIGINS, STATE

AND IMPLICATIONS OF SHOPFLOOR

DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE CONGRESS OF

SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS

GEOFFREY WOOD*

T he present paper explores the extent of internal democracy and grassroots partici-pation within the Congress of South Africa Unions, focusing specifically on

questions of shopfloor organisation and the office of shopsteward, and is based on a nation-wide survey of members of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).The survey revealed remarkably high levels of participation within union internal structures, and deeply embedded notions of accountability and recall.

INTRODUCTION

A particular characteristic of union organisation in many anglophone countriesis the key role played by the shopsteward or workplace representative. Generallyelected by her or his peers, the shopsteward is both a union official and anemployee within a unionised enterprise. A particular source of strength to South Africa’s independent unions has been strong shopfloor organisation anddemocracy, centering on the office of the shopsteward. Based on a nationwidesurvey of trade union members, the present paper explores the current natureand extent of shopfloor democracy in South Africa’s largest union federation, theCongress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

ORIGINS OF THE SHOPSTEWARD SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Worker organisation in South Africa began in 1841, with the formation of a trade protection society by printers (Lewis 1984, p. 18). The discovery of goldin 1886 led to the rapid growth of trade unions on the British model (includingthe establishment of shopfloor representation centering on shopstewards), butwith one important difference: African workers were excluded. The resultantunions were faced with a dilemma: should they protect their interests through areliance on skill and collective action, or through racial solidarity? The historyof these unions is a complex one, punctuated by periodic outbreaks of militancy,

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 45, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2003, 326–343

* Professor of Comparative HRM, Middlesex University, The Burroughs, Hendon, NW4 4BT,United Kingdom. Email: [email protected] The author would like to thank the twoanonymous referees for their very helpful comments.

most notably the General Strike and Rebellion of 1922. However, by the 1950s,almost all had chosen the path of conservatism, and in an historic compromisewith capital, traded off militancy for job protection of racial lines.

Black trade unionism in South Africa has its origins in the Industrial andCommercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU), founded in 1919 (Bonner 1978).The ICU expanded rapidly, but had a ‘random and disorganized membership’,including labour tenants and rural peasants (Lewis 1984, p. 46). Power was centralised, making endemic leadership disputes even more damaging. This, anda lack of an effective policy agenda, resulted in the ICU effectively collapsing bythe late 1920s, although it enjoyed a modest revival in the urban centre of EastLondon in the late 1940s and 50s. Subsequent efforts to organise Africans, mostnotably under the umbrella of the Federation of Non-European Trade Unionsand, subsequently, the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) weresimilarly, albeit not so spectacularly, unsuccessful. This reflected sustainedemployer resistance, a lack of legal rights, and a reliance on a small coterie ofleaders. For example, the defeat of the 1946 African miner’s strike dealt CNETU’sorganisation a fatal blow, leading to a dramatic decline in membership and a bitter round of leadership struggles (Sutcliffe and Wellings n.d., p. 7).

In 1955, the rump of CNETU joined together with a cluster of trade unionsthat had refused (or were unable) to join the South African Trade Union Council(which represented the bulk of white trade unions at the time), on account ofthe latter’s increasing conservatism. The new federation, the South AfricanCongress of Trade Unions (SACTU), had its main power base and principal financial support from the parallel Food and Canning and Textile Workers Unions(FCWU 1955, n.p.). Nonetheless, SACTU represented a consolidation and revitalisation of union organisation, and while operating in an extremely con-strained environment, it indeed represented a new philosophy of more assertiveunionism: ‘political unionism’ (Lambert 1988, p. 32). The latter took the formof a close alliance with the African National Congress, and support for the latter’s community-based political campaigns and nationwide work stoppages.SACTU never really succeeded in establishing a significant presence outside ofits strongholds in the textiles and metal industries, and was forced into exile asa result of state repression in the early 1960s. While its neglect of day-to-dayworkplace organisation contributed directly to its collapse, it has been arguedthat SACTU had few strategic alternatives to ‘political unionism’ in the highlyrepressive climate of the late 1950s and early 1960s (Lambert 1988; c.f. Feit 1955).In the early 1970s, a grouping of intellectuals from ‘outside the ranks of the blackworking class’, assisted by former trade union officials, provided a new impetusto union organisation through the establishment of worker advice bureaus inSouth Africa’s major urban centres (Maree 1987a, p. 2). In Natal, the activitiesof the General Factory Worker Benefit Fund led to the formation of a numberof industrial unions, united under the umbrella of the Trade Union Advisory andCoordinating Council (TUACC). After signing on large numbers of membersin the aftermath of a strike wave, the TUACC unions shifted their tactics to those of consolidation, by placing a strong emphasis on building shopfloor organisation (ibid. p. 3). The unions devoted a large proportion of their resources

SOLIDARITY, REPRESENTATIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 327

to establishing ‘the shopsteward structure as the key link between managementand the shopfloor’ (Webster 1987a, p. 25). On the Witwatersrand, the IndustrialAid Society established the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU). Afterinitially impressive membership gains, MAWU virtually collapsed by the closeof the decade, in the face of managerial opposition and bitter internal struggles(Maree 1987a, p. 6). However, the union’s recovery was secured by concentratingon the building of intensive shopfloor organisation, again with the shopsteward playing a central role (ibid. p. 6). In the Western Cape, the Western ProvinceWorkers Advice Bureau (WPWAB) again recorded impressive gains followed by setbacks. As was the case with other organisational initiatives, the latter represented the product of strategic errors, managerial opposition, as well asbroader developments, including the start of an economic downturn, and the wave of state repression that followed the 1976 Soweto uprising. Once more,WPWAB rebuilt itself by placing a strong emphasis on elected factory representatives, and transformed itself into the Western Province GeneralWorkers Union (Maree 1987a, p. 5).

Meanwhile, a grouping of officials formerly employed by the conservative TradeUnion Council of South Africa (TUCSA) established the Urban Training Project(which, again, focused it attention on organising black workers) in theWitwatersrand region. Again, this project led to the establishment of a numberof unions: unions that were particularly badly hit by the post-1976 Soweto waveof repression (Maree 1987a, p. 5). However, this underscored the importance ofbuilding a strong base in the factories.

In placing a strong emphasis on the need for effective shopfloor organisation,the new ‘independent’ trade unions were not only informed by the experienceof SACTU (which highlighted the need for effective organisation at grassrootslevel in order to weather state repression), but also that of the British labour move-ment. The years 1968 to 1974 represented the high water mark of the expan-sion of union density in Britain (Kelly 1998, p. 91). This wave of mobilisation(albeit reflecting changes in the wider economy) was partially driven by theprominent role of––and continuing increase in the numbers of workplaces organised with––shopstewards (ibid. p. 96), and provided an inspiring examplefor those seeking to promote trade union development in South Africa (see Maree1987a, p. 2–3).1 In 1979, a new federation, the Federation of South African TradeUnions (FOSATU) was formed, incorporating the TUACC unions, some formerUrban Trading Project Unions, and the revitalised national MAWU.

The emphasis on shopfloor organisation, coupled with an insistence on ‘working class leadership’ in political struggles (and the reluctance to get involvedin popular politics should it be organisationally damaging) represented an organ-ising philosophy commonly described as ‘workerism’ (c.f. Baskin 1991). However,pressures from membership––especially following the outbreak of the MassInsurrection in 1983, and the resultant state repression––forced the FOSATUunions to reconsider their political role. It was increasingly evident that the rank-and-file (and shopstewards) desired their unions to be allied with like-mindedpolitical organisations, and that unions could not remain aloof from the broaderstruggle.

328 THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS September 2003

The 1970s also saw the emergence of a number of overtly political unions withformal links to political organisations: the ‘populist’ unions. Most notably, theBlack Allied Workers Union (BAWU) was founded by Black Consciousness-orientated students on the Reef as an umbrella union dedicated to organising all industrial workers (Friedman 1987, p. 44). However, BAWU soon encom-passed workers who did not necessarily support Black Consciousness, leading toBAWU’s transformation into the non-racial South African Allied Workers Union(SAAWU) in 1979. Despite its political origins, SAAWU again accorded a central role to shopstewards; although, feedback (in some cases, imperfect) was given to members via mass meetings (Maree 1987b, p. 36–7). SAAWU’s political activities––above all, opposing the ‘independence’ of the Ciskei homeland––resulted in repressive action by the authorities (including the murder of SAAWU activists). However, Maree (1987b, p. 37) argues that ‘too much reliance had been placed . . . on the union’s leader’s for many of its activities’, making it particularly vulnerable to repression (even though thestrongest shopfloor structures would have battled to withstand the sheer brutality of the Ciskeian regime). This resulted in SAAWU being more prag-matic in its dealings with the workerist unions.

In 1985, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) waslaunched, bringing together the FOSATU unions, a number of non-alignedunions, populist unions such as SAAWU, and the massive National Union ofMineworkers (NUM), which had defected from the black-consciousness alignedCouncil of Unions of South Africa. Following on this, SAAWU disbanded, itsmembership being divided into new industrial unions that centred on the formerFOSATU industrial unions. The NUM was an industrial union, and already hadestablished shaft steward structures on its entry to COSATU as founder affiliate(Baskin 1991, p. 50; Friedman 1987, p. 387). A factor that facilitated union unitywas that, even in workerist unions, shopstewards were often also active in localcommunity campaigns as well; many had a direct interest in pursuing both factory organisation and community struggle simultaneously (c.f. Friedman 1987,p. 452–72). While an important dividing factor between community groupingsand unions was that often between representatives of the unemployed and theemployed (Friedman 1987, p. 453), in other cases––above all mining towns––keyworkplaces embodied the community. Even in some regions of high unemploy-ment, major employers––notably motor manufacturers and steel plants––formeda central focus for communities, according workplace leaders a stature both insideand outside the factory.

Local shopsteward councils became the backbone of COSATU, assisting inorganisational work, developing ‘ordinary worker leadership’, and representing‘the first line of defense against repression’ (Baskin 1991, p. 450; c.f. Von Holdt1991, p. 17–21). However, given the pressures placed on COSATU, particularlyafter the banning of the United Democratic Front and other mass-based politicalmovements, it could be argued that worker education became increasinglyneglected. There is little doubt that COSATU was not able to devote the samedegree of attention to training workplace representatives as its antecedents didin the 1970s and early 1980s (c.f. Baskin 1991); a problem that persisted into the


1990s as the unions had to contend with the new challenges of democratisationand economic adjustment (c.f. Barchiesi 1999, p. 22). Nonetheless, internalshopfloor democracy remained vibrant throughout the 1990s, providing a powerful check on managerial autonomy (Bohmke and Desai 1996; Barchiesi1999, p. 25). At the same time, ‘the exodus of experienced union leaders (at alllevels) towards political positions in the ANC and government’ has weakenedthe capacity of the labour movement (Barchiesi 1999, p. 25). This capacity can;however, be regenerated by effective shopfloor democracy, drawing up a new generation of leaders from the grassroots, especially because COSATU shop-stewards “have been historically aware” of the need for transparency, leadershipaccountability and the possibility of recall (ibid. p. 25).

Prior to 1995, shopstewards in South Africa had no statutorily delineated rights;although, within individual workplaces, they may have negotiated enforceablerights in terms of a union recognition agreement (Government Gazette No. 168611995). In terms of the 1995 Labour Relations Act, in any workplace where a repres-entative trade union (i.e. one that has organised a majority of employees at a work-place) has at least ten members, these members are entitled to elect ‘trade unionsrepresentatives’ from amongst their ranks (ibid.). Depending on the size of theworkforce, this number may vary from one (in the case of 10 or less than 10 unionmembers) to 20. Shopstewards are entitled to legal protection against victimis-ation, and have the right to represent employees in grievance and disciplinaryproceedings and to monitor the employer’s compliance with any law relating tothe terms and conditions of employment and legally binding collective agree-ments. In addition, they have the right to carry out any functions agreed uponby the representative union and management (ibid.). Shopstewards are furtherentitled to ‘reasonable’ paid time off during working hours to perform the functions of a trade union representative, and for further training relevant to the performance of her/his functions as a representative (ibid.).2

The 1995 Labour Relations Act also made provision for a second form of workplace representation, via ‘workplace forums’, the equivalent of Europeanwork councils. These forums have been generally eschewed by unions, reflectingconcerns that they might trigger off demarcation disputes and erode the trad-itional role of shopstewards (Wood and Mahabir 2001, p. 241).

South Africa’s historical experience continues to shape the organising strate-gies of unions. Drawing on the experiences of unions overseas and the failure ofprevious attempts at mass unionisation, the independent unions remain committedto retaining the office of shopsteward. There is similarly a general consensus concerning the importance of a vibrant shopfloor democracy. Less clear; how-ever, is the extent to which this is, and can be, maintained and reconstituted ina context of broader socio-economic change.

METHOD

This paper is based on a survey, conducted in late 1998, among members of SouthAfrica’s principal trade union federation; the Congress of South African TradeUnions (COSATU), working for private sector enterprises.3 The survey exploredchanges in the nature of worker organisation, and the attitudes and expectations


of members. Sample size was determined largely by the diversity of a population.The final sample size was calculated after the administration of a pilot study priorto the survey. It should be emphasised that there was a high degree of uniformityin responses to key questions, cutting across gender, age and skill; in short, respon-dents represented a relatively homogenous grouping (Wood and Psoulis 2001,p. 299). The pilot studies also facilitated greatly in the final structuring and layout of the questionnaire and, in the case of the first survey, in the eliminationof difficult-to-understand or ambivalent questions.

Given potentially important geographic variations, area sampling wasemployed. The country was divided into a number of key areas (Western Cape,Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng) where the bulk of South Africanindustry (and, indeed, the country’s overall population) is concentrated. In each of these strata, key sectors were encompassed (e.g. the metal industry, thechemical industry, etc.). A serious limitation of this method is that the samplesize within each strata (e.g. the Western Cape) has to be representative, necessi-tating a somewhat larger sample size than would otherwise have been the case.The regional offices of each of the COSATU unions were contacted by theresearchers, and support for the initiative was secured. Thereafter, individualemployers were contacted, and access to workplaces was arranged. Employerswere selected by means of Telkom4 listings. Thereafter, employers were contractedto confirm that their hourly/weekly paid workers were represented by aCOSATU union. The research project was a collaborative one, involving academics from a number of South African universities, including EddieWebster, Johann Maree, David Ginsburg, Roger Southall, Shane Godfrey and the author.

As an accurate list of trade union members was not available, final samplingwas performed systematically, within individual workplaces, the number of workers being selected in proportion to the overall number of employees at the workplace. Trained field workers conducted the interviews at individual workplaces and administered questionnaires. The field workers were fully familiar of the vernacular language within the relevant region. Respondents were informed of the purpose of the survey, and assured that strict anonymitywould be preserved and that the data would be used for overall statistical purposes only. The overwhelming majority of individuals selected reacted in an extremely positive manner, resulting in an extremely high response rate. Theadvantage of such a method is that the sample is compiled during the interviewingprocess. It would be technically possible for an individual worker who switchedjobs during the research process to be interviewed twice. However, to eliminatethis possibility, the actual surveying process was conducted in as short a time aspossible. While considerable effort was expended to select workers from the entireworkforce, the researchers relied heavily on the goodwill of both managementand shopstewards. It is, therefore, possible that workers who were hostile to both management and the relevant union could have been excluded from theselection process (Wood and Psoulis 2001). Finally, it is recognised that ‘the sampling procedure may be difficult to justify on purely technical grounds; it was overly multi-layered. However, given the need to secure the support of a


wide range of parties, and the lack of accurate trade union membership lists, itrepresented the only feasible option under the circumstances. While it wouldhave been easier to have interviewed workers attending union meetings, this wouldhave course, eliminated those who were less active in union affairs. (Wood andPsoulis 2001, p. 293–314).

COMPREHENDING SHOPFLOOR DEMOCRACY: ISSUES AND INDICATORS

According to Olsonian theory of collective action, unions are ‘encompassingorganisations’, members being subsumed into a general ‘mass’, leading to problems of representivity, and ultimately of maintaining mobilisation (Crouch1982, p. 65). However, Crouch argues that in reality, unions are very much more face-to-face organisations, in which the contributions of individual members are of great importance in determining the strength of the group (ibid. p. 66). Indeed, a study conducted by Goldthorpe and Lockwood in theUnited Kingdom found that members tended to disassociate the national profile of the union (to which they had little input) with shopfloor democracy(most notably shopsteward elections) in which they took an active part (ibid. p. 66). Again, a 1994 survey by Kelly and Heery of union officials found that the degree of support they gave for strikes largely depended on their perceptionsof workplace support and the potential for victory. In other words, shopfloor pressure played a central role in determining key union decisions at a local level,even if it may entail financial costs for the national union. However, vibrantshopfloor organisation does not seem to necessarily lead to the fragmentation ofunions on localised lines, owing to the reliance shopstewards placed on the unionfor advice and help, and because they needed ‘the legitimacy of its recognitionto enhance their own standing with management’ (Batstone in Crouch 1982, p. 66). In short, the shopfloor may be central to the making of trade union identity, with localised sub-cultures determining membership profiles and plant-level strategic choices.

Workers are more likely to have a direct influence over shopstewards thannational leadership; thus, there will not be the same problem of remoteness, ifshopfloor organisation is strong (Crouch 1982, p. 177; Kelly and Heery 1994).Second, unions with strong internal democracy at shopfloor level may be ableto escape the Olsonian trap of a gulf emerging between a passive membershipand an ‘apparatus that has been erected to do a collective task for them’ (ibid. p. 177). As Batstone et al. (1977, p. 2) argue, shopsteward organisation has been seen variously as proof of strong normative pressures towards democratis-ation, promoting centralisation, and representing an oligarchy. Unfortunately,defining both the concepts of trade union oligarchy and democracy remains problematic, in that both incorporate an immediate (i.e. they are the expressedwishes of union members implemented) and an ‘objective’ (e.g. is the long terminterest of the working class served) dimension (Batstone et al 1977:271). Indeed,members may have a range of concerns, a set of which may be exploited by leadership to impel the union in a conservative (or radical direction): again thisunderscores the importance of the question as to where members’ ‘real interests’lie (ibid. p. 272). This can be exacerbated by unequal access to information;


leadership may be out of touch with the material conditions of communities, whilethe latter may not necessarily have full knowledge of macro-economic trendsand/or the overall performance of specific industries. This can result in real tensions between conciliatory leaders and a more radical grassroots: a ‘demo-cratic rupture’. The conservative response is simply to suggest that national unionscould do more to reign in ‘disorderly’ local activists (Boraston et al. 1975, p. 195).However, there are other ways in which this gap may be bridged; moreover, reigning in shopfloor activists may be very difficult, and may result in union organisation being damaged severely (ibid. p. 195–6), as borne out by the experi-ences of NUM of South Africa during the Mercedes-Benz and Volkswagen disputes.5 In the end, this is bound up with questions of power: to what extentcan union members make their views felt within the union, and to what extentcan they immediately recall leaders that have been perceived to have departedfrom their brief? Again, this is considerably easier at a shopfloor rather than anational level. However, if there are strong horizontal linkages (i.e. if unions relyon grassroots solidarity across workplaces when engaging in collective action)officials are likely to have a wider range of local contacts, and be more in touchwith local debates (Kelly 1988, p. 170).

Two closely interrelated issues set South Africa apart from Britain and the restof the Anglo-Saxon world. First, there is the racial dimension. South Africaexpanded its domestic industrial sector under heavy state protectionism in thepost WW2 period, with a policy of active import substitution; what set the coun-try apart from other industrialising countries was a rigid racial division of labour,that is sometimes referred to as ‘racial fordism’ (Rogerson 1991, p. 356). Africanswere excluded from a wide range of semi-skilled and skilled occupations, and upuntil 1979, were excluded from official collective bargaining structures. The per-sistence of racial segregation within and without the workplace in the 1980s pre-cluded the government from politically incorporating the unions (Webster 1987b);the emergence and consolidation of a radical shopfloor tradition owes much tothis. However, the complex nature of racial segregation sowed further divisionswithin the working class among oppressed groupings as a result of unequal accessto resources. Such divides included that between ‘coloured’ (i.e. mixed racial origin) and Indian workers. Second, there is a spatial one: a system making widespread use of migrant labour and hostels resulted in a particularly close link between work and residence for many workers. While this inevitably led tosome tensions with township dwellers,6 it also facilitated a common solidarityforged around shared experiences of discrimination, including insecurity of abode (c.f. Rogerson 1991, p. 359–60).

In summary, first, it is clear that shopfloor democracy matters. A high level ofshopfloor democracy means that unions are likely to be far more vibrant (albeitinternally diverse) than monolithic unions pursuing an Olsonian agenda at anational level. Second, the danger of a ‘democratic rupture’ between national leadership (that is invariably under considerable pressure from government andbusiness to be more conciliatory) and the rank and file is omnipresent under such a scenario. However, unions will also be ‘pushed together’ by the symbioticrelationship between union leaders (who rely on shopstewards to help reconstitute


a mass base) and shopstewards (who rely on the union for legitimacy). Third, astrong shopfloor democracy means that union officials are likely to be more awareof localised concerns. This leads us to the question of how shopfloor democracy,and the extent and constraints on a ‘democratic rupture’ with regional and nationalleadership, may be measured.

First, there is the extent of horizontal linkages within and between unions atgrassroots level; in other words, the extent of mutual support that workers lendeach other (and indeed, the exchange of ideas) at grassroots level (Kelly 1988, p. 170). Invariably drawn into a coordinating role, officials are more likely to be aware of grassroots concerns and debates under such a scenario (ibid.). In the survey, this is measured by the extent to which respondents had direct experience of receiving concrete support from other unions or community organisations when engaging in collective action.

Second, there is the question of ‘remoteness’ (Kelly and Heery 1994). In otherwords, do union members see national leadership––and indeed, the leadershipof allied political organisations––as somehow distinct from workplace organis-ation, subject to different rules, and not bound by the same degree of account-ability? This is measured in the survey by the extent to which union memberssee political leaders as bound by the need to report back, and subject to recall ifneed be.

Third, while much of the contemporary literature on the possibility of aMichelsian ‘iron law of oligarchy’ being in force focuses on tensions betweenshopfloor activists and national leadership, it is possible that shopstewards themselves can constitute an oligarchic elite (Crouch 1982, p. 182). The obviouscheck on such a development would be if shopstewards can be readily deposedby their constituents if they fail to carry out their wishes, and whether this regu-larly takes place in reality (see ibid.). In the survey, respondents were asked ifthey believed if shopstewards should be subject to recall if they exceeded theirbrief, and whether they had personal experience of having deposed a shopsteward.

Fourth, there is the question of whether unions can escape the ‘Olsonian trap’ playing a national role of limited local relevance, or whether they remainface-to-face organisations, with high levels of grassroots participation in theirinternal life (Crouch 1982, p. 65). This is measured by the extent to which respondents regularly attended union meetings.

Finally, there is little doubt that the global trend is towards greater diversityin the workforce; while there continue to be good reasons for workers to unite,there are powerful centripetal tendencies. Many writers have highlighted the differences in experiences workers may bring to the workplace, and the vital need to overcome gender, skill and age divisions (see, for example, Moody 1997;Hyman 1992; Rogers 1995; Weinbaum 1999; Wood and Psoulis 2001).

FINDINGS

The responses to a range of key questions are summarised in Table 1.In general, the survey revealed a remarkably high degree of social solidarity

among COSATU members, straddling occupational, skill and gender divides(Wood and Psoulis 2001). However, there were some statistically significant


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335

Table 1 Summary of responses to key questions

Question AnswerYes (%) No (%) Unsure (%) n

Has your union embarked on industrial action since 1994? 66.0 28.6 5.3 636Did your union receive any solidarity action from other unions? 46.3 33.1 20.6 432Do you have shopstewards at your workplace? 97.5 1.7 0.8 639If a shopsteward does not do what workers want, should they 92.8 4.7 2.5 639

have the right to remove her/him?In your workplace, has a shopsteward ever been removed? 35.9 58.9 5.2 633

Note: All figures have been rounded off to the nearest 0.1.

cleavages between different categories of respondents to a number of key questions dealing with or related to issues of shopfloor democracy. Where divisions proved to be statistically significant, they are presented in the form of cross-tabulations.

Horizontal linkagesAs can be seen from Table 1, two-thirds of respondents had experience of their union embarking on industrial action since 1994. Of these, the mode hadexperience of solidarity action from fellow unions. This would strengthen the hands of workers engaging in collective action, and, through co-ordinatingefforts, make union officials more aware of grassroots concerns (Kelly 1988, p. 170).

It is interesting to note that, while those with different skill and educationalattainments were equally likely to strike, men were more prone to engage in collective action than women, as can be seen in Table 2.

This discrepancy may be partially explained by the fact that a large proportionof the female members of COSATU is concentrated in the South African Clothingand Textile Workers Unions (SACTWU).7 The latter’s low strike profile repre-sents a combination of a long tradition of quiescent unionism,8 ethnic and culturaldivisions,9 coupled with large scale down-scaling in that industry (and hence, fearof job losses) following the dropping of protective tariffs (c.f. Baskin 1991;Friedman 1987). However, a lower proclivity to strike could also reflect the tendency of women to be less active in union affairs.

RemotenessIn terms of the tripartite alliance with the ruling African Congress (ANC),COSATU is entitled to nominate 20 senior members to be placed in prominentpositions on the ANC’s list of parliamentary candidates (South Africa’s electoralsystem is based on the principle of proportional representation). Drawing on thefindings of the survey database, Wood and Psoulis (2001) found that COSATUmembers saw their parliamentary representatives as subject to the same rules ofaccountability and recall as their shopstewards. In short, while utility of theAlliance for COSATU may be contested (see Habib and Taylor 1999), it is evident that the rank and file do not see national leadership as being subject todifferent rules of accountability to those elected at local level; support remainscontingent on delivery (Southall and Wood 1999).


Table 2 Gender by experience of strike action (%)

Experience of strike action Yes No Unsure

GenderMale 70.2 26.2 3.6Female 56.1 34.4 9.5Total 66 28.6 5.3

Notes: All figures have been rounded off to the nearest 0.1. χ2 = 15.948; d.f. = 2; s = 0.00; n = 636.

It should be noted that a deeply embedded culture of non-collaboration forgedin the liberation struggle persists. To many, the state is still a contested terrain,rather than a liberated zone. The same holds true for many other social institu-tions (c.f. Southall and Wood 1999; Habib and Taylor 1999; Barchiesi 1999). Thismilitancy is a two-edged sword: it represents a powerful means of mobilisation,but makes it difficult for leadership to hold members to agreements reached, andfor membership to accept the legitimacy of other interest groupings in society.

Checks on oligarchic tendencies at shopfloor level: Accountability and recall of shopstewardsAs can be seen from Table 1, 97.5% of respondents had shopstewards at theirworkplace. There is little doubt that this office remains an important character-istic of union organisation in South Africa. More than one-third of respondents(35.9%) had personal experience of an errant shopsteward being relieved of theiroffice. The most common reasons given were a perceived untrustworthiness of the incumbent, a failure to deliver on worker demands and/or an inability toeffectively represent worker interests. Moreover, 92.7% of respondents reportedthat the shopstewards at their workplace were democratically elected by theirconstituents, most commonly by means of a secret ballot.10 Again, there was generally a high degree of commonality in response to these questions, cuttingacross gender, age, skill and educational divides. However, female respondentswere somewhat more uncertain of the method of election (Table 3), while a show


Table 3 Gender by method of electing shopstewards (%)

How were your shopstewards Show Secret Don’t know/ Totalelected (if elected)? of hands ballot can’t remember

GenderMale 42.3 53.6 4.1 100Female 43.2 43.7 13.2 100Total 42.6 50.6 6.8 100


Table 4 Education by method of electing shopstewards (%)

How were your shopstewards Show Secret Don’t know/ Totalelected (if elected)? of hands ballot can’t rememberHighest educational level

<6 shopstewards 57.4 34.3 8.3 1006–10 shopstewards 39.8 54.0 6.2 100Postmatric qualification 40.8 51.0 7.7 100Total 42.8 50.5 6.7 100


of hands was more commonly employed among less educated workers, reflectingliteracy problems (Table 4).11

There is little doubt that a deeply entrenched internal culture of accountabilityand recall represents a powerful check on any oligarchic tendencies at workplaceorganisational level.

Escaping the Olsonian trap: Grassroots participation in union affairsAs can be seen in Table 5, the vast majority of COSATU members regularly participate in union affairs. Moreover, less skilled and less educated workers were just as likely to attend union meetings as their better educated peers.12 Inshort, the unions have been able to secure enviable levels of participation at grassroots level; mass demobilisation has not taken place. However, the caveatmentioned earlier also holds; in a deeply divided society, it may be difficult to persuade the rank and file to accept the legitimacy of the state and other institutional configurations, democratisation notwithstanding.

Also of some concern is the fact that women remain less likely to participatethan men. Meetings remain male-dominated affairs while a patriarchal organis-ational culture persists within many COSATU affiliates.13 In addition, the ‘manyincidents of sexual harassment of women comrades by male comrades . . . sexualexploitation taking place right within our own union structures’ would also deterwomen from attending union meetings (Transport and General Workers Union,quoted in Baskin 1991, p. 356). As a Chemical Workers Industrial Union officialremarked: ‘These things are killing the struggle and women’s involvement in the union’ (Baskin 1991, p. 356). Moreover, a major barrier to female attendanceat union meetings is housework. As Elizabeth Thabethe, a Chemical WorkersIndustrial Union official remarked: ‘To increase women’s participation in unionsmeans changing the relationship between men and women. It needs men to share in domestic duties with women, and we have a long way to go before this happens’ (Baskin 1991, p. 374). Nonetheless, a sizeable number of femalerespondents continued to regularly attend union meetings.

Again, women were somewhat less likely to have recently participated in elections for shopstewards, although, as can be seen in Table 6, the frequency of participation by both genders remains high.


Table 5 Gender by frequency of attendance at union meetings (%)

Frequency Once every Less than once Twice a year Neverof attendance month or more a month by more or less

than twice a year

GenderMale 46.0 35.5 7.1 11.4Female 33.5 33.5 6.8 26.2Total 42.3 34.9 7.0 15.8


SO

LID

AR

ITY, R

EP

RE

SE

NT

AT

IVIT

YA

ND

AC

CO

UN

TA

BIL

ITY

339

Table 6 Gender by when last participated in shopsteward elections

Last participation <1 month ago 1–6 months 7–12 months 1–2 years >2 years Never Don’t know

GenderMale 4.9 20.2 24.4 26.9 14.6 5.6 3.4Female 2.6 20.0 18.9 29.5 8.4 12.6 7.9Total 4.2 20.0 22.8 27.7 12.7 7.7 4.7


Changes since 1994The survey represented a follow-up of one conducted in 1994 that employed similar methodologies (see Ginsburg et al. 1995). An earlier survey of COSATUshopstewards was conducted in 1992 (as part of a broader study of media usageby union members) (Orkin and Pityana 1992). Both of these surveys found levelsof shopfloor democracy and internal participation on a similar level to the 1998one. Table 7 compares differences in responses to key questions between 1994and 1998.

Most of the differences between the findings of the 1994 and 1998 surveyswere so slight as to be possibly due to sampling differences. The somewhat higherproportion of elected shopstewards found in the 1998 survey would probably bea function of union maturity. Unions may appoint shopstewards in the initialorganisational phases, then switch over to formal elections once a presence hasbeen established (in the early 1990s, there was a wave of unionisation in the service sector). The slightly higher percentage of respondents who reported that they had personal experience of shopstewards being removed from office in 1998 could simply be due to the fact that independent unions had been around longer. However, it could also reflect an increasingly complex bargainingenvironment, with the battle lines being less clear-cut in the post-apartheid era.The more frequent shopsteward elections in the early 1990s are probably a product of the wave of union mergers that took place at that time, in many casesleading to a consolidation of shopfloor organisation between former rivals at workplaces.

CONCLUSION

The survey findings revealed the persistence of a culture of internal democracyand participation within the COSATU unions, doubtlessly contributing to the


Table 7 Differences between the 1994 and 1998 surveys

Question 1994 1998 (% respondents) (% respondents)

Attend union meetings at least once a month 77 71Have shopstewards at workplace 99 97Shopstewards at workplace were elected 84 92Participated in shopsteward elections in the last 12 months 60 48Workers should have a right to dismiss shopstewards should they fail to carry out the wishes of their constituency 93 93Shopstewards should consult workers every time they act on their behalf 65 59

Have personal experience of shopstewards being removed from office 30 35

continued high levels of union penetration in key sectors of South African industry in an age of union stagnation and decline (c.f. Kochan 2001, p. 1). Morespecifically, the survey revealed evidence of a culture of accountability and recall;members regularly removed ‘unresponsive’ shopstewards from office.Respondents had similar expectations from national leadership. In addition tovertical linkages, the survey revealed evidence of horizontal linkages betweenCOSATU unions. Such linkages would draw officials closer to grassroots concerns (c.f. Kelly 1988), and be strengthened through shared experiences ofracial discrimination, and space and place; almost a decade after democratisation,most South African workers continue to reside in crowded hostels and townships.Finally, while the survey revealed a high degree of social solidarity, importantgender divisions persisted. Women were somewhat less likely to participate inunion affairs (although still at a relatively high level). Moreover, a number of key COSATU affiliates faced membership drops in the 1990s, largely due to widespread redundancies in key areas of mining and manufacturing in responseto heightened overseas competition. However, these losses have since been offset by impressive gains in the public sector, and through renewed member-ship drives in the private sector (Wood 2001). Indeed, the COSATU unions haveseemingly managed to reconstitute much of the internal vigour of their youth,and represent an inspiring example for unions faced with the challenges of renewalworldwide.

ENDNOTES1. Decentralised bargaining will, of course, have the immediate effect of further strengthening

the position of existing shopsteward structures, and as such, is often favoured by shopstewards(Towers 1992, p. 167). However, an over-reliance on decentralisation proved disastrous to theBritish labour movement in the face of state and employer hostility by the early 1980s. Again,in South Africa, shopstewards have, in a number of notable cases, actively opposed centralisedagreements at industry or firm-wide level. The wider institutional environment (other thanin the economic sphere) remains relatively labour-friendly. However, the extent to which avibrant shopfloor democracy may reduce the possibility of a broader social accord (going beyondthe existing National Economic Development and Labour Advisory Council [NEDLAC],which has proved incapable of deflecting government from a neo-liberal policy trajectory),that would secure a national voice for organised labour over the medium term, remains uncertain.

2. An excellent overview of current challenges in South Africa’s industrial relations system canbe found in Webster (1998).

3. The survey represented a follow-up of one conducted in 1994 (see Ginsburg et al. 1995). Anearlier survey of COSATU shopstewards was conducted (as part of a broader study of mediausage by union members) (Orkin and Pityana 1992). Both these surveys found levels ofshopfloor democracy and internal participation on a similar level to the 1998 one.

4. Telkom, the parastatal telecommunications company maintains up to date listings of businesses;listings that are available to researchers.

5. In both cases, bitter and protracted industrial disputes followed clashes between union leadership and ‘rebel’ shopstewards.

6. Africans residing in housing and flats in segregated residential areas. Up until the 1980s, Africanscould only lease property in urban areas, and faced the omnipresent threat of forced removalas part of periodic government drives to reorder urban space.

7. Significant numbers can also be found in the National Education, Health and Allied WorkersUnion (NEHAWU), the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and the SouthAfrican Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU). However, the survey concentrated onCOSATU’s members in the private sector.

8. Former affiliates of the conservative (and now defunct) Trade Union Council of South Africaformed the core of SACTWU.


9. SACTWU has a strong following among ethnic, coloured and Indian workers. These groupshad more rights under apartheid than African workers, making it difficult to build an effec-tive non-racial union, a task made even harder by differences in home languages (Baskin 1991, p. 394).

10. A total of 92.7% of the 633 respondents who answered the question said that their shopstewardshad been democratically elected by their constituents, the mode of the remainder (2.7%) beingappointed by union officials (sometimes used as an interim measure when shopfloor organis-ation is still in its infancy). 50.6% of respondents said that their shopstewards had been electedby means of a secret ballot, 42.6% by means of a show of hands, and the rest were uncertain.

11. In South Africa, less than standard 6 level of education is often taken as a measure of functional illiteracy.

12. The relationship between education and attendance at union meetings was not statistically significant (χ2 = 4,016; d.f. = 2; s = 0675; n = 639). The relationship between skill level andattendance at union meetings was equally not statistically significant (χ2 = 12.136; d.f. = 15;s = 0669; n = 639).

13. COSATU’s internal journal, The Shopsteward, regularly airs concerns of sexist behaviour withinsome COSATU unions.

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Documents

Solidarity, Representativity and Accountability: The Origins, State and Implications of Shopfloor Democracy within the Congress of South African Trade Unions