Somalia - Breaking the Deadlock

8/9/2019 Somalia - Breaking the Deadlock

1/8

No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 1

the TFG to engage in political deal-making thatco-opts key subclans and elite actors, and lays the groundwork for effective security operationsat a later stage.

Government Performance

In January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed succeeded Abdullahi Yusuf as pres-ident of Somalias Transitional Federal

Government (TFG). Sheikh Sharif took office following the conclusion of United Nations(UN)brokered peace negotiations in Djiboutibetween a warlord-dominated TFG and mod-erate opposition forces that led the Unionof Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. It washoped that Sheikh Sharif would move for- ward with the long list of transitional tasksrequired to establish a permanent govern-ment for the country and extend control over areas seized by al Shabab.1 To his credit,Sheikh Sharifs appointment led to the with-

drawal of Ethiopian forces from the coun-try, and eliminated al Shababs ability touse Ethiopian occupation as a rallying cry.TFG supporters also point to ongoing effortsto reinvigorate the constitutional process,draft a citizenship law, make senior-levelappointments in a revived judicial system,establish an independent central bank, utilizeport revenues for public service delivery, and

Somalias Transitional Federal Government(TFG) was given a second lease on life inJanuary 2009, after successful peace negotiations in Djibouti produced new TFG leadershipand yielded substantial international backing.However, the TFG remains weak and has yet to develop new political alliances or military

capabilities that provide traction againstIslamist insurgent groups. The insurgents themselvesincluding al Shabab and HizbulIslamiaare also weak and internally divided.

Local and international efforts to end the ongoing stalemate in Somalia have beenfrustrated, resulting in diverging strategicprescriptions for the way ahead. On the onehand, the TFG has proposed a military offensive to gain control over a larger swath of Mogadi-shu. On the other hand, the inability of foreignmilitary and governance support to advance the transition have led some analysts to argue

for a strategy of constructive disengagement.A detailed assessment of the current situationreveals opportunities for the TFG and its inter-national supporters to drive additional wedgesbetween the insurgent groups, degrade their ca-pabilities, and extend TFG control in Mogadishuand other parts of south-central Somalia. Rather than disengaging or rushing toward militaryaction, this requires international pressure on

Strategic Forum No. 257 June 2010Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense Universityhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Somalias Endless Transition:Breaking the Deadlock

by Andre Le Sage

craft political cooperation deals withregional administration in Puntland (east Somalia) and other militias oppothe insurgency.

Nonetheless, most of these efforton the drawing board and will do littlextend the TFGs political base of suparea of territorial control. The TFG stnot have a functioning, cross-clan mi force, let alone a capable police force

judicial system, despite continued forefforts to train and equip Somali forc2 Poor command-and-control systems, ited pay, internal clan divisions, and aof willingness to fight continue to haTFG as a unified force. Furthermore,service currently exists, and essentialservices are not being provided by thThe parliament is able to achieve quomeets infrequently, and many membeleft Mogadishu for security reasons. Ithe very survival of the TFG depends

continued presence of peacekeepers f African Union Mission in Somalia (AIn addition, the TFG is a divided

institution. Sheikh Sharif has not emas a strong leader, and much of the pin Mogadishu is wielded by his suboincluding the new Speaker of ParliamSharif Hassan, Minister of Interior Abdulkadir Ali Omar, and Minister


2/8

2 Strategic Forum No. 257, June 2010

for Defense Indha Adde, in their discreteareas of operation. These and other TFGofficials operate independently in a manner reminiscent of clan-based warlords in yearspast. Squabbling between factions of the TFGhas brought transitional efforts to a stand-still.4 The TFG also has a remarkably weak clan base of support. The key Hawiye sub-clans that dominate Mogadishu (includingthe Abgal, Habr Geidr, and Murosade) areall split internally between those that sup-port the TFG, those that support the insur-gency, and those (probably the majority) thatare hedging their bets between the two andattempting to survive.5

In the Juba Valley, Darod subclans, pri-marily the Marehan and Ogadeni, are alsosplit between pro and antial Shabab forces, with a clan-based struggle for the southernport city of Kismayo taking primacy over TFG-insurgent struggles. The southern agriculturalregions of Bay and Bakol are dominated by theRahanweyn clans that have done little to resistcontrol by al Shabab. In central Somalia, aseries of subclan-based militias and governanceinitiatives have emerged, many using the name Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ).6 However, they have not thrown their full weight behind theTFG despite recent political agreements betweenthe groups. Finally, the Isaq of the north- west and Darod:Majerteen of the northeast are focused respectively on the internal political

competition for control of the Somaliland andPuntland governments.7

Status of Insurgent Groups

Al Shabab and, to a much lesser extent,Hizbul Islamia control most of southernSomalia. However, these groups are facingtheir own challenges, and are not operat-ing from a position of strength. Both groupsare split internally, and they are increasingly competing with one another. Since the death

of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the futureof the East Africa al Qaeda cell and itsrelationship with al Shabab are uncertain.8 Given confusion surrounding the structureand leadership of these groups, there is a

dangerous tendency to treat them as singular,monolithic actors.

Hizbul Islamia has always been anamalgam of four different movements,including the Alliance for the Re-liberationof Somalia (ARS)Eritrea faction led by Hassan Dahir Aweis, the Somalia IslamicFront (SIF) led by Aweiss military protgs,the Ras Kamboni group in Lower Juba,and the very small Anole faction led by Darod:Harti clan interests in Lower Juba.9 Aweis and the SIF have been marginalizedby al Shababs advances in southernSomalia, the rise of ASWJ, and support for the TFG among many Habr Gedir:Ayr leaders. The Ras Kamboni group has comeunder control of more moderate, clan-based leadersnotably Ahmed Madobe andIbrahim Shukrisince its main Islamistleader, Hassan al-Turki, fell ill. Beyond thesedivisions, clashes between Ras Kamboni andal Shabab for control of Kismayo have leftHizbul Islamia so weakened that it no longer appears to function.10

The most hardline and ideologi-cally motivated al Shabab militias remainthose run by Ahmed Abdi Godane andFuad Shongole around Mogadishu, andIbrahim Haji Jama al-Afghani aroundKismayo.11 These individuals are seen asthe primary leaders of al Shababs foreign fighters (including the suicide bombers), the

strategists favoring al Shabab support for global jihadi agendas rather than a narrower focus on controlling Somalia, and those with the deepest ties to the East Africa alQaeda cell.12On February 1, these al Shabableaders issued a statement proclaiming their desire to connect the Horn of Africa jihadto the one led by al Qaeda and its leader Sheikh Osama bin Laden.13However, similar statements have been made by al Shabableaders in the past without a correspondingresponse from al Qaedas senior leadership to

cement a merger between the groups. Al Shababs leader in the Bay and Bakolregions, Mukhtar Robow, has been ableto run local affairs from Baidoa withoutsubstantial resistance from the Rahanweyn

clan. Despite his vociferous jihadi rhric, Robows governance agenda appextreme than that of his al Shabab coterparts. In fact, tensions have been hbetween Robow and other al Shababmanders for some time.14He came intoconflict with Godane, particularly afDecember 2009 Shamo Hotel bombithere are rumors that Robow has reacout to the TFG as a potential first ste from al Shabab. However, in the absa formal split with Godane and otherShabab, Robow has maintained his ecredentials by allowing foreign fighttraining camps to operate in his areacontrol, appearing in al Shabab propa videos with al Qaeda operatives, andal Shababs support for al Qaeda in Y15

Al Shababs rank-and-file militialocal clan partners evince even less lto the groups overall cause. Many ofjoin al Shabab for parochial reasons are not otherwise supportive of its ra

Salafist ideology. Some clans send mand money to al Shabab as a politicain uncertain times. Other clans agreeal Shabab as a means of gaining shorprimacy in long-running struggles wclans for local control. Some individujoin al Shabab for the financial incenit offers ($200 to $300 promised at thof recruitment), or for offers of food clothing. Other individuals are simplto join al Shabab as they impress youmilitia, often accompanied by threat

families not to resist.16

Nonetheless, some al Shabab milremain on the offensive. Al Shabab uappear responsible for a growing numrecent attacks in Puntland and SomaBoth regional administrations are facgovernance crisesdue to postponedelections in Somaliland, and increasiauthoritarian rule in Puntlandand a

Dr. Andre Le Sage is a Senior Research Fellow for Africa in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Comments or questions may be addressed to [email protected].

squabbling betweenfactions of the TFG hasbrought transitionalefforts to a standstill


3/8


Shabab appears to be capitalizing on these toextend its operational reach.17

Backlash Against Al Shabab

Somali public support for al Shabab andHizbul Islamia has dwindled rapidly. In fact,the groups political ascent was never due tomass public support for its violent, extremistideology. Until the rise of the Islamic CourtsUnion (ICU) in 2006, al Shabab was a small,clandestine group engaged in destabilizationactivities against warlords and the TFG, andthey provided protection for the East Africaal Qaeda cell. Its fortunes changed becauseof al Shababs participation as the mosteffective security force of the very popular ICUphenomenon, the groups leading role againstEthiopian forces after the ICU fell, and itssubsequent political/military prowess againstthe remarkably weak TFG and clan-based forces in southern Somalia.18

Since late 2007, al Shabab has attemptedto gain legitimacy by liberating villages from nominal TFG control, punishingcriminals who proliferated after the ICU fell, holding reconciliation ceremoniesamong local clans, and turning controlover to local groups under the guise of Islamic governance. Yet where al Shabab hasattempted to govern the territory it controls,local discomfort has become evident. There

are a number of different elements at work inthe public backlash. Somalis chafe against alShababs draconian vice laws (for instance,prohibitions against playing or watching football or listening to music) and hudud corporal punishments (including conductingamputations on thieves or stoning adulterers). Attacks by al Shabab, particularly theDecember 3, 2009, bombing of the Benadir University graduation ceremony at the ShamoHotel, are seen as atrocities committed againstthe best and brightest youth in Somali society.

Furthermore, al Shabab has disruptedor forced the closure of internationalhumanitarian efforts, including limitingUN and nongovernmental organizationpresence resulting in the suspension of foodaid. The group has promoted nonlocal claninfluences and leaders in southern Somalia;this includes the dominance of northernSomalis from the Isaq clan, including

YEMEN

KENYA

INDIAN

OCEAN

El Maan port

MogadishuMerka

Kismayo

150 miles250 kmRas Kamboni

international boundariesregional boundaries

city/town

Somaliland

Puntland

Disputed area

Dabaab

GEDO

LOWER JUBA

Bardhere

El Waq

Mandera

Doolow

Luuq

BAY

BAKOL

HIRAN

Jilib

LOWERSHABELLE

Afgoye

Baidoa

J u b b a

R i v e r

Balad

JowharMIDDLE

SHABELLE

Beled Weyn

S h a b e l l e

R i v e r

SOMALIA

ETHIOPIA

MIDDLE JUBA

G U L F O

F A D E N

DJIBOUTIDjibouti

AWDAL

Borama

Dire Dawa

Berbera

HargeisaBurao

TOGDHEERGarowe

MUDUG

NUGAL

Galkayo

Gardo

BARI

Bosaaso

SOMALIA

Erigavo

SANAAG

SOOL

Las Anod

Galgudud

Somalia


4/8


cal, military, or economic circumstan fight with either the TFG or the insuonce the offensive begins. Without unstanding and working to leverage theand capabilities of these nonaligned fincluding subclan and business militithere is a real danger that military plaare not taking into account all forces potentially be involved in the conflic

Third, there is a danger that buila strong TFG military capability willnonaligned groups (clans, subclans, aelites with their own militias) into a sive posture that opposes TFG and intional interests. It is common Somali for such groups to band together acroand ideological divides to strategicaance against any new military initiaof which they are not a part. After sedecades of colonialism, military dictship, and civil war, the main Somali ence with any state has been predato

negative. Building a strong TFG forcnot widely negotiated and representathe start may foment more oppositionTFG. At the extreme, groups that curare nonaligned could join with elemethe insurgency.

Fourth, al Shabab and Hizbul Islare unlikely to confront TFG and AM forces in a toe-to-toe struggle to hold

in Mogadishu. Rather, the insurgentslikely to mount a limited resistance, porarily disperse their forces. Then, TFG attempts to hold the territory it seized, al Shabab and Hizbul Islamiabe able to harass it with more hit-andattacks, leading to a period of prolonmishes rather than stronger TFG conalone governance) of the contested a

Godane and al-Afghani in Hawiye areas of Mogadishu and Darod areas of Kismayo,respectively. Finally, al Shababled attacksagainst Sufist shrines and religious leadersand the groups Salafist interpretationsof Islam are viewed as the product of anunwelcome influence by foreigners.19

Despite this growing backlash, theSomali public remains politically weak and fragmented, and al Shabab maintainsa monopoly on the means of violence inareas under its control. Moreover, Somalicivil society groups have been intimidatedby insurgent assassinations and remaindisenchanted with the TFG. As a result, their role in mobilizing the public against alShabab remains limited. In addition, neither the TFG nor the international aid community has effectively utilized Somali anger over either al Shababs recent atrocities or thegroups role in denying relief assistance toSomalis as a means of further delegitimizingthe insurgents.

A number of new forces have emergedover the past year to counter al Shababinfluence in southern and central Somalia.Most notably, this includes multiple clan-based ASWJ groups operating in Galgadud,Hiran, and Gedo.20 There are also reportsof new groups emerging, including theGalmudug initiative linked to the Habr Gedir:Saad subclan and the Himan and

Heeb initiative of the Suleiman subclan.There is also potential for the Ras Kambonigroup under Ahmed Madobe and IbrahimShukri to defect from the insurgency into aposition that is not a political challenge andthat may end up supporting the TFG. Theseare all positive developments, but they remain fragile and local political ambitions over-lap. There is serious potential for each to fallinto the trap of warlordism and clan-basedcompetition for control of key locations andresources, which would further complicate

the quest for stability in central Somalia.

A Military Solution?

While al Shabab appears to have theupper hand in Somalia today, both the TFGand the insurgent forces are facing enormouschallenges. To date, al Shababs success insouthern Somalia is less an indicator of its

own strength, and more a function of the weakness of its opponents at the TFG, clan,and communal level. Overall, if the TFG isto succeed, al Shababs slow advance mustbe checked by a countermobilization thatprovides Somalis with an alternative for which they will truly fight. This requires further efforts by the TFG and its potentialSomali partners to create a unifying political vision and practical governance agenda, enter into negotiations to establish a network of key clan-based constituents, and show signs of success in order to mobilize public support.

Unfortunately, the TFGwith sup-port from AMISOM and international part-ners, including the United Stateshas optedto put a military campaign ahead of politicalaction. The TFG has publicly stated its intentto organize a military offensive in Mogadishu within the coming months, most likely withthe support of AMISOM forces.21Furthermore,Kenya is widely reported to be planningan antial Shabab offensive into the Jubaregions of southern Somalia, targeting thecapture of Kismayo.22 There is serious andgrowing concern that these offensives areunlikely to succeed.

First, given the TFGs military weak-ness and divisions between subclans, it risksengaging in a battle that, if unsuccessful, will cost the TFG the international and localconfidence it has been able to retain thus

far. In Mogadishu, the insurgents are awareof TFG plans and are likely reinforcing their positions in the city with a focus on thwarting AMISOMs armored vehicle capabilities.23 The Juba offensive may actually drive moreclans into the arms of al Shabab, includingpromoting an alliance of Marehan militia with al Shabab to defend Kismayo againstOgadeni control.

Second, it is unclear if the TFG, even with AMISOM support, has sufficient forcesto engage the insurgents effectively. Focusing

on the current disposition of forces betweenthe TFG and al Shabab is entirely misleading.The TFG and al Shabab may each be able tomobilize several thousand men under arms.However, this represents only a percentage of the number of armed militia in Mogadishu,let alone south-central Somalia. These other militia can be considered nonaligned forcesat the moment, but may be forced by politi-

there is a danger thatbuilding a strong TFGmilitary capability willdrive nonaligned groupsinto a defensive posturethat opposes TFG and

international interests


5/8


Nonetheless, AMISOM, the United States,and European partners have tacitly supportedthe TFGs plans for military action, possi-bly out of frustration with the inability of theTFG to gain momentum against al Shababthrough political negotiations or the provi-sion of good governance, social services, andpublic security. Despite speculation that theUnited States is preparing for its own military intervention in Somalia, U.S. officials haveclearly stated that they are only providingmilitary training, equipment, and fundingto the TFG.24 However, in the absence of overtcountervailing pressure to emphasize negoti-ations to build a stronger political base beforeresorting to force, this amounts to interna-tional approval and indirect support for theTFGs military course of action.

ConstructiveDisengagement

The ongoing stalemate in Somaliahas led some analysts to call for the UnitedStates and its partners to adopt a more radi-cal strategy called constructive disengage-ment. According to a recent report publishedby the Council on Foreign Relations, this would be a modified containment strategythat includes limited and precise U.S. mili-tary strikes against al Qaeda operatives inSomalia; tolerance of and dialogue with al

Shabab if that group rejects al Qaedas jihadiagenda, refrains from regional aggression,and allows foreign aid to flow; diplomaticengagement with Arab partners to supportnegotiations and with Ethiopia to limit itssupport for Somali militias; and further sup-port for development and governance capac-ity-building efforts.25

On the one hand, this strategy isgrounded in a politically realistic assessmentof trends in Somalia, and many of its com-ponents should be taken seriously. Foremost,

it recognizes the weakness of the TFG and itsinability to absorb foreign assistance to buildits capacity at this time. As stated above, theTFG remains deeply divided between compet-ing leaders. It also provides no real supportto the Somali population at this stage, andremains ill prepared militarily to seize andsustain control over territory from insurgentand clan militias. Hence, it is reasonable

to develop a strategy in Somalia that goesbeyond support for the TFG and conditionspolitical and military aid to Sheikh Sharif on his ability to build political alliances that will translate successfully into security gains.Negotiations, even with insurgent lead-ers, and diplomatic support from Arab and African partners alike may be useful in thisregard. On the other hand, in security terms,the call for constructive disengagement isproblematic. Foremost, this concept does notaddress how the United States or neighboring African countries will protect their nationalsecurity interests in Somalia. Adopting a wait-and-see approach in which al Shababmight collapse under its own weight due tothe challenges of governance in a clan-basedsystem and its own internal leadership rival-ries is not sufficient. The group, along withthe East Africa al Qaeda cell, already hassubstantial space to operate in Somalia andto plan for attacks on Somali, other African,and Western interests. Moreover, al Shababhas enough funds and savvy leaders that itmay be able to harness a sufficient coalitionin the absence of the TFG to again solidify control over southern Somalia.

Even if a constructive disengagementapproach is adopted, the United States,European countries, and concerned Africanneighbors would still need to be involved inSomali affairs to build effective liaison rela-

tionships to disrupt al Shabab and al Qaeda.The existence of the TFG today provides apolitical framework for such engagementunder the auspices of advancing the Djiboutipeace process, and foreign partners will notbe accused by the Somali public of directly supporting unpopular warlordsa situa-tion that helped bring al Shabab to the fore.To this extent, the transitional process and itsinstitutional structurealthough not neces-sarily the individuals who currently hold seatsin the TFGneed to be protected.

Continued support for the TFG shouldnot preclude engagement with other anti-insurgency and peacebuilding constituen-cies in the country. A robust approach tocountering the insurgency would see theUnited States and others simultaneously undertaking dialogue with the TFG, ASWJ,and other political, military, and economicactors throughout the country. Al Shabab

and Hizbul Islamia are relatively weunpopular in Somalia today, even if control more territory than the TFG.are also spread thinly across the soucountry. With effective negotiations,be possible to forge a common platfothe TFG to cooperate with local actocombat the insurgency.

Leading withNegotiations

To build an effective political cothat would increase the chances of evmilitary success, the TFG needs to dcally improve its outreach to key Somclans and clan-based elites who are esupporting or acquiescing to the insuIf the TFG is not to follow the exampits predecessor, the Transitional NatiGovernment, in a slow slide to oblivirequires the use of political and econinducements, as well as the threat ofsanctions, to win new supporters, expTFGs base of support, and enable it influence into new areas.

Many different negotiation mechare available to Sheikh Sharif in his position, including both carrots and sThe carrots include the allocation of level posts in government and publicsector partnerships to cooperatively m

port revenues, introduce new currencshare out postconflict reconstructiontracts. Potential sticks would include

to target spoilers of peace efforts aporters of the insurgency with UN-ba financial and travel sanctions againstactors, not to mention the potential fsanctions or targeted military operati26 Such wheeling and dealing may no

continued support forthe TFG should notpreclude engagementwith other anti-insurgencyand peacebuildingconstituencies in

the country


6/8


appetizing to would-be peacebuilders, but iscommon in the Somali context. The point isto address how the material benefits of suchdeals are spread around in a strategic man-ner that can co-opt key subclans and eliteinterests that are required to extend the TFGsbase of support and undermine that base for the insurgency.

For instance, in North Mogadishu, theTFG would need to focus on key leaders within the Abgal:Harti community. Thoseconnected with El Maan port (including Abukar Omar Adane and Abdulkadir Enow)are key power brokers with vested property and business interests that they feel arethreatened by the TFG. Their current support for insurgents may be primarily driven by these financial interests, which the TFG couldoffer to protect and even promote in return for political support. Similar approachescould yield fruit with other key subclans,including the Habr Gedir and Murosade, whose key business and political leadersinclude individuals such as Mohamed Deilaf, Ahmed Nur Jumale, and others.27

Further engagement with new antial Shabab militias, such as the Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa groups in central Somalia, isalso urgently required. This dialogue needsto focus on improving TFGASWJ politicaland military cooperation. Developing better international understanding of the groups is

also important so diplomats can work with ASWJ to develop coherent political agendasand some degree of local representation.It is critical to ensure that their short-term operations against al Shabab do notdegenerate over time into something morepredatory against the local population, intoindependent political ambitions that compete with the TFG as much as al Shabab, or intosimple and parochial clan-based initiatives focused on seizing land and other assets fromneighboring clans.

Finally, the international community needs to continue applying pressure on thepolitical leadership and opposition in bothSomaliland and Puntland to resolve their internal crises and reinvigorate their localpolitical processes. This will involve sendingclear messages of dissatisfaction with currentperformance, withholding nonessentialassistance efforts, and encouraging dialogue

on the future political dispensation in eachregion. Without a resolution of the immediateproblems in northern Somalia, al Shabab willhave an increasingly open field to penetrateSomaliland and Puntland, destabilizetheir security situation, ally with existingopposition forces, and provide leadership tothe disenfranchised.

Strategic SecurityPlanning

Once the TFG has established a suffi-cient base of political support, additional mil-itary support will be required. However, rather than focusing strictly on a short-term offen-sive, it should be premised on longer termplanning to deepen clan-based alliancesand support the countrys plan for a decen-tralized form of government.28 The TFG (or whatever Somali authority follows) will cer-tainly require a well-trained, highly mobile,and effective security force controlled fromthe central level of government in Mogadishu.However, that is unlikely to be the only secu-rity force the country requires, and the cur-rent approach to military support for theTFG does not address this issue. A decentral-ized Somali system may include not only amedium-size national force, but also multiplesmaller forces at the regional level. Designingand supporting such a structure today could

help to absorb forces currently under the sway of warlords or other power brokers outside thecapital city. Allowing regional leaders to keeptheir forces under local command would alsoease clan and elite actors tensions about theemergence of an overwhelming TFG forcethat they cannot control.

In major urban areas such as Mogadishu,there are also opportunities to recreate someof the localized, sub-district level security ini-tiatives that existed before the UIC took power.These were quite effective in some locations

from 2004 to 2006. If political negotiations followed by a TFG offensive are successfulin expanding a green zone in Mogadishu, working to stand up new neighborhood secu-rity groups, business security groups, and(moderate) sharia courts could help governany space that the TFG claws back from theinsurgency.29Finally, outside Mogadishu, thereare opportunities to work with Ethiopia, Kenya,

and others to ensure that their ongoingport for ASWJ and other Somali forceto al Shabab falls in line with a broadecoherent political agenda to build the base of the TFG and ultimately transfsecurity sector in a strategic manner.

If Somalias Transitional FederalGovernment is too fragmented to undtake such negotiations and strategic pning, international partnersparticulthe United States and European alliesneed to resist the TFGs impulse to semilitary solution without sufficient poical preparations. They should increapressure on President Sheikh Sharif tovercome factionalism within TFG rato engage in negotiations with key claconstituencies, and to broaden the TFbase of support. The TFG also needssuch efforts to take advantage of schi within the ranks of al Shabab and HiIslamia. If the TFG continues on its ctrajectory, it will have achieved little time its transitional mandate ends in 2must be put on notice that even thouginternational community values the Ttransitional role, its leaders cannot excontinued international diplomatic, fiand military support without tangibleimprovements in performance.

Notes1 Ken Menkhaus, John Prendergast, and Co

Thomas-Jensen, Beyond Piracy: Next Steps toStabilize Somalia, Enough Project, May 2009, able at .

2 Thus far, training for TFG security forces hprovided by Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, Kenya, SuUganda. The European Union has also announcedtrain additional Somali forces. See Amnesty InteControls on Military Assistance to Somalia MusTightened, January 21, 2010.

3 Paul D. Williams, Into the Mogadishu MaThe African Union Mission in Somalia, International Peacekeeping 16, no. 4 (August 2009), 514530.

4 UN Integrated Regional Information NetwSomalia: Government infighting good for insurg7, 2010.

5 In summer 2009, al Shabab attempted to dislTFG from Mogadishu and effectively fought througSharifs own Hawiye:Abgal:Harti subclan territory forces blocked its advance. The unwillingness of thresist al Shabab in favor of a president from its ownis a remarkable demonstration of the TFGs lack of

6 Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa has traditionally bnonpolitical and nonmilitary movement uniting S


7/8


scholars and preachers in Somalia. Over the past 2 years,however, some leaders within this network have developed amilitia capacity opposed to al Shabab in Central Somalia.The largest contingents are drawn from the Hawiye:Habr Gedir:Ayr and Hawiye:Abgal:Waescle subclans.

7 Information on clan dynamics in Somalia is derived fromthe authors field research in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2010.

8 Luis Martinez, US Launches Military Strike inSomalia Against al Qaeda Target, ABC News, September 14,2009.

9 United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Groupon Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1811(2008), S/2008/769, December 2008.

10 More Troops for Mogadishu, Africa Confidential 51, no. 6 (March 19, 2010).

11 See BBC Monitoring , Profile: Abu-Zubayr, thereclusive leader of Somalias Al-Shabaab movement, May 20, 2009.

12 Shababs Mixed Messages, Janes Terrorism and Security Monitor, January 27, 2010.

13 Huma Yusuf, Somali Militant Group Al Shabab Aligns with Al Qaeda,Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 2010.

14United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Groupon Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853(2008), S/2010/91, March 10, 2010.

15Mohamed Ibrahim, Somali Rebels Pledge to SendFighters to Aid Yemen Jihad,The New York Times, January 1, 2010.

16 Sudarsan Raghavan, Somali Refugees Recruitedto Fight Islamist Militia,The Washington Post , April 6, 2010.

17See International Crisis Group, Somalia: TheTrouble with Puntland, Africa Briefing , no. 64 (August 12,2009), and Human Rights Watch, Hostages to Peace: Threatsto Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland, July 2009.

18 On the historical emergence of al Shabab, seeRoland Marchal, A Tentative Assessment of the SomaliHarakat Al-Shabaab, Journal of Eastern African Studies3,no. 3 (November 2009), 381404.

19See Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Backlash May BeMilitants Worst Foe,The New York Times, March 23, 2010.

20

VOA News, Somali Government, Religious GroupForming Anti-Rebel Alliance, February 22, 2010.21 Janes Intelligence Weekly, Mogadishu Braces for

Imminent Somali Government Offensive, February 24, 2010.22 Malkhadir Muhumed, Kenya Vetoes Somali Wish for

Troops in Mogadishu,The Washington Post , March 30, 2010.23 Agence France Presse, Al-Shabaab Reinforces

Mogadishu as Somali Government Readies for Offensive,February 10, 2010.

24 Johnnie Carson and Ertharin Cousin, Statementon U.S. Policy in Somalia, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, March 12, 2010.

25 Bronwyn E. Bruton, Somalia: A New Approach,Council Special Report No. 52 (Council on Foreign Relations,March 2010).

26 The Obama administration has already taken a first

step in this direction with the imposition of an ExecutiveOrder in April 2010, seeking to block the property of individu-als contributing to the conflict in Somalia. See AssociatedPress, Obama Addresses Deteriorating Somalia Security, April 14, 2010.

27 Many of these individuals were identified in theMarch 2010 UN Monitoring Group report cited above. For ahistory of deal-making by these individuals, see Andre LeSage, Somalia: Sovereign Disguise for a Mogadishu Mafia, Review of African Political Economy29, no. 91 (March2002), 132138.

28 For a detailed analysis of this potential, see MattBryden and Jeremy Brickhill, Disarming Somalia: Lessonsin Stabilization from a Collapsed State,Conflict, Security, and Development 10, no. 2 (May 2010), 239262.

29 See Andre Le Sage, Stateless Justice in Somalia:Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, January 2005.

I N S T I T U T E F O R N AT I O N A L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S

Phillip C. SaundersInterim Director of Research

Christopher J. LambInterim Director

The Strategic Forum series presents original

research by members of NDU as well as other

scholars and specialists in national security

affairs from this country and abroad. The

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations

expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any

other agency of the Federal Government. Visit

NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu.

The mission of the Institute for National

Strategic Studies is to conduct strategic

studies for the Secretary of Defense,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

the combatant commanders, to support

the national strategic components of the

academic programs at the National Defense

University, and to provide outreach to other

U.S. Government agencies and to the broader

national security community.


8/8


Prioritizing Strategic Interests inSouth AsiaRobert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes (Strategic Forum 256, June 2010)

Africas Irregular Security Threats:Chatllenges for U.S. EngagementAndre Le Sage (Strategic Forum 255, May 2010)

Nuclear Politics in IranJudith S. Yaphe, ed.(Middle East Security Perspectives 1, May 2010)

Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflictsin AfricaClement Mweyang Aapengnuo (African Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 4, April 2010)

Lessons Learned from PeaceOperations in AfricaPaul D. Williams (African Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 3, March 2010)

Strengthening the IAEA: How theNuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its BarkGregory L. Schulte (Strategic Forum 253, March 2010)

U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: ACompatible InterfaceVictor E. Renuart, Jr., and Biff Baker (Strategic Forum 254, February 2010)

Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in theU.S. Nuclear DeterrentJohn P. Caves, Jr.(Strategic Forum No. 252, December 2009)

STARTIDES and Starfish Networks:Supporting Stressed Populations withDistributed TalentLinton Wells II, Walker Hardy, Vinay Gupta, and Daniel Noon (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 70,December 2009)

Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining the Roles of African Maritime SecurityForcesAugustus Vogel (African Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 2, December2009)

To Build Resilience: Leader Influenceon Mental HardinessPaul T. Bartone, Charles L. Barry, and Robert E.

Armstrong (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 69,November 2009)

Other titles from

NDU Press For online access to NDU Press publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu

Documents

Somalia - Breaking the Deadlock