South Africa's Nuclear Future

South African Instit

ute of Inte

rnat

iona

l Affa

irs

African perspectives. Global insights.

Governance of Africa's Resources Programme

O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 5 0

South Africa’s Nuclear Future

J o - A n s i e v a n W y k

J u n e 2 0 1 3

A b o u t S A I I A

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record

as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,

non-government think tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into

public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs

with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research

excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers

present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in

Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good

governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;

and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the

environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about

SAIIA’s work.

A b o u t t h e G o v e r n A n c e o f A f r I c A ’ S r e S o u r c e S P r o G r A m m e

The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme (GARP) of the South African Institute

of International Affairs (SAIIA) is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The

programme contributes to policy governing the exploitation and extraction of Africa’s

natural resources by assessing existing governance regimes and suggesting alternatives

to targeted stakeholders. GARP examines the governance of a number of resource-rich

African countries within the context of cross-cutting themes such as environmental change

and sustainability. Addressing these elements is critical for Africa to avoid deepening the

challenges of governance and reducing its vulnerability to related crises, including climate

change, energy security and environmental degradation. The programme focuses on the

mining, forestry, fisheries and petroleum sectors in select African countries.

Programme head: Oladiran Bello, [email protected]

© SAIIA June 2013

All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form by any

means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information or

storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Opinions expressed are

the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.

Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.

A b S t r A c t

The South African government has embarked on a programme to develop the country’s

nuclear energy capability in order to meet increasing national energy demand. In order

to achieve its nuclear ambitions, government has appointed a cabinet-level committee

to oversee the process, while key institutions are restructuring in line with government’s

ambitions. The nuclear plans have prompted questions within and outside South Africa

due to their opacity and their reliance on institutions of dubious managerial competence

and financial integrity. The questionable quality of this management also raises issues

concerning the country’s readiness to manage broader socio-economic issues arising

from its nuclear planning. The nuclear programme should be seen against the backdrop

of increased resource nationalism evident in South Africa’s diplomacy, especially in respect

of uranium. All these questions must be addressed by government if the integrity of the

nuclear planning process is to be protected.

A b o u t t h e A u t h o r

Dr Jo-Ansie van Wyk is a lecturer in International Politics in the Department of Political

Sciences at the University of South Africa (Unisa), Pretoria. She has completed a doctorate

on South Africa’s post-apartheid nuclear diplomacy. She is a Fulbright Alumna and

a member of the South African Academy for Science and Art. She has completed

consultancies for the World Bank, Unesco, the Institute for Security Studies, and Consultancy

Africa Intelligence. In June 2010, she was appointed by the minister of trade and industry

to serve on the South African Council for Space Affairs (Sacsa).

4

S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 15 0

G O v E R N A N C E O f A f R I C A ’ S R E S O U R C E S P R O G R A M M E

A b b r e v I A t I o n S A n d A c r o n y m S

AEMFC AfricanExplorationMiningandFinancingCompany

Afcone AfricanCommissiononNuclearEnergy

EIA EnvironmentalImpactAssessment

GHG GreenhouseGas

GWe Gigawattelectrical

HEU HighEnrichedUranium

IAEA InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency

INIR IntegratedNuclearInfrastructureReview

IPP IndependentPowerProducer

IRP IntegratedResourcesPlan

IUEC InternationalUraniumEnrichmentCentre

LEU LowEnrichedUranium

MW Megawatt

Necsa NuclearEnergyCorporationofSouthAfrica

NIP NationalInfrastructurePlan

NNEECC NationalNuclearEnergyExecutiveCoordinationCommittee

NNR NationalNuclearRegulator

NPC SouthAfricanCouncilfortheNon-ProliferationofWeaponsof

MassDestruction

NPT TreatyfortheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons

PBMR PebbleBedModularReactor

PWR PressurisedWaterReactor

Safari-1 SouthAfricanFundamentalAtomicInstallation

tU tonnesUranium

TWh TerraWattHours

ZAR SouthAfricanRand

S O U t h A f R I C A ' S N U C L E A R f U t U R E

5


I n t r o d u c t I o n

Thenuclearpowerplantaccidentof11March2011atFukushimainJapancaused

questions to be raised around the world about the future of nuclear power.

Internationalsupportfornuclearpowerseemstohavewanedintheaftermathofthat

event,despitethe‘nuclearrenaissance’ofrenewedinterestinnuclearpowerthathadbeen

evidentforsometimepriortoit.Anumberofcountries,includingGermany,Switzerland

andBelgium,havenowexpressedtheirintentiontophaseoutnuclearpowerprogrammes

intheshorttomediumterm,infavourofformsofrenewableenergysuchaswindand

solar,whichareregardedinsomequartersasviablealternatives.1

Notwithstandingsuchresponses,thedevelopmentofnuclearenergycapabilityand

outputcontinuesasdemandforpowerincreases.Inearly2013therewere437nuclear

powerreactorsinoperationworldwide,while67wereunderconstructionandonlyone

wasinlong-termshutdown.2AsFigure1shows,themajorityofactivereactorsarein

NorthAmericaandWesternEurope,understandablysointhelightofthosecontinents’

historicalleadershipinscientificdevelopment.Incomingdecades,however,growthin

nuclearinstallationsisexpectedtotakeplacemainlyinChinaandIndia,accordingtothe

directorgeneraloftheInternationalAtomicEnergyAuthority(IAEA)YukiyaAmano.3

Chinacurrentlyhasthelargestexpansionplans;apartfrom18operationalplants,ithasa

further28reactorsunderconstruction.BycontrasttheUS,whichhasthelargestnumber

(103)ofoperationalnuclearpowerstations,hasonlyoneunderconstruction,while

Russiahas33operationaland11underconstruction.4

Figure 1: Regional distribution of nuclear power plants

Africa

America – Latin

America – Northern

Asia – far East

Asia – Middle East and South

Europe – Central and Eastern

Europe – Western

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Operational Long-term shutdown Under construction

Source:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),PowerReactorInformationSystem(PRIS).The

DatabaseonNuclearPowerReactors,2013,http://www.iaea.org/pris/.

6



SouthAfrica isnot immuneto these international trends.Severeelectricalpower

outagesexperiencedsinceearly2008haveledtoanurgentneedtofocusonmeeting

energydemandsifthecountryistoachieveitssocio-economicdevelopmentalgoalsat

thesametimeasmeetingglobalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissiontargets.Atpresentmore

than90%ofthecountry’selectricityisproducedbycoal-firedpowerstations:SouthAfrica

isthereforeamajoremitterofGHGandhasindicatedits intentiontooptfor ‘green’

energysourcesinthequesttoreduceemissions.5SouthAfricapresentlygenerates6%

ofitselectricityfromnuclearenergy6andspeakingattheAfricaEnergyIndabaheldin

JohannesburginFebruary2013,EnergyMinisterDipuoPetersreaffirmedthatthecountry

plannedtoreduceitscarbonfootprintthroughtheuseofnewnuclearinstallations.7

Eskom, thestate-ownedpowerutility,canno longer fullymeetgrowingnational

energydemandsthroughitsageingnuclearandconventionalinfrastructure,hencethe

SouthAfricangovernment’sannouncementofitsintentiontoexpandnuclearenergyas

partofthecountry’stotalenergymix.8Itproposestobuilda‘fleet’ofsixnewnuclear

powerstations,togetherexpectedtoadd9600MWtoSouthAfrica’spowergeneration

capacity,by2020.9

Perhapscolouredby thepastmilitaryconnotationsof itsnuclearcapacity,South

Africa’scurrentintentionsinthefieldofenergygenerationmightbeexpectedtoraise

domesticandinternationalpoliticalconcerns.Inaddition,thedevelopmentofnuclear

energyisanexpensiveundertaking,whichinadevelopingeconomysuchasSouthAfrica’s

mightdivertresourcesfromcheaperenergysources,andfromurgentlyneededsocial

projects.Unquestionablyalso,somecountrieshaveusedthepursuitofnuclearenergy,and

inparticularitsmilitaryovertones,asapoliticaltooltoenhanceinternationalstatusand

prestige(asIranhasdone,forexample),whichmightalsoaccountforsomemisgivingsas

tothegovernment’smotivation.

This paper aims to address some of the main issues in respect of South Africa’s

nuclearfuture,includingthecountry’sgrowingenergydemands,itsnuclearagenciesand

structures,itsnucleardiplomacywithAfricaandtherestoftheworld,theroleofpublic

opinion,andsomemoregeneralconcernsaboutitsnuclearfuture.

G r o W I n G e n e r G y n e e d S

SouthAfrica’sgrowingenergyneedsaredrivenbyfourmainissues:rapidpopulation

growth, an ageing energy infrastructure, and an energy-intensive socio-economic

developmentagendathatdemandsmajorinfrastructuraldevelopmentandindustrialisation

programmes.Asregardsthefirstofthese,thepopulationincreasedfrom40.5millionin

1996to51.7millionin201110andatleast4.3millionhouseholdshavenoaccessto

electricity.11Onthismeasurealone,thepresentlevelofelectrificationinSouthAfrica,at

73%,istoolowbutevenso,agapofabout90TWhexistsbetweensupplyanddemand.12

ThesecondproblemisthatofEskom’sageingcoal-firedandnuclearpowerstations,

whicharenotclosingthatgap.Someconventionalpowerplantswereconstructedinthe

1950s,13andnuclearpowerhasbeengeneratedforalmost30yearsfromthesamefacility–

Eskom’ssinglenuclearpowerstationatKoeberg,approximately30kmnorthwestofCape

Town(seeTable1).


7


Table 1: South Africa’s nuclear power reactors

Reactor: code ZA-1 ZA-2

Reactor: name Koeberg-1 Koeberg-2

Type PWR PWR

Model CPI CPI

Capacity: Thermal 2 775 2 775

Gross 970 940

Nett 930 900

NSSS Supplier framatome framatome

Construction start July 1976 July 1976

Grid connection April 1984 July 1985

Commercial operation July 1984 November 1985

Source:IAEA,NuclearPowerReactorsintheWorld,Vienna,IAEA,2012,p.41.

Figure 2: South Africa’s nuclear electricity production and share, 1980–2011

2

4

6

8

12

14

10

Shar

e (%

)

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011

TW(e) 0 5.39 8.47 11.29 13 12.24 12 12.94

Share (%) 0 4.2 5.6 6.5 6.6 5.5 5.2 5.2

0

Source:IAEA,NuclearPowerReactorsintheWorld,Vienna:IAEA,2012,p.18.

Eskomistheowner-operatorofKoebergandasindicatedinFigure2hasincreasedboth

itsproductionofnuclearelectricityandnuclear’sshareoftotalpowergeneration.The

KoebergIand2pressurisedwaterreactors(PWRs)haveacombinedinstalledcapacity

of1 840MWbutincreasingdemandshavestrainedKoeberg’sunits,resultinginregular

8



shutdownsforinspection,maintenanceorrefuelling,andunforeseentripping14dueto

rapidlyageingplant(itsreactorshavebeingoperationalsince1984and1985respectively).

Therefuellingcycleofeachunittakesapproximately18monthsandhastobecarriedout

mainlyinsummerwhenpowerdemandislower;15in2012Koeberg1wasofflinefrom

7Septemberto25Novemberduetoafaultinoneofitsgenerators.16Aspartofitsattempt

tocurboutages,Eskomin2011adoptedtheKoebergBusinessPlan,whichcontainsa

newoutagestrategy.17AprojectisnowunderwaytoextendKoeberg’soriginalprojected

life spanof30 to40years,18 forwhichEskomhasissuedanexpressionofinterest

tenderforthedesign,manufactureandinstallationofsixnewsteamgeneratorsatKoeberg

in2016–2017.19KoebergsuppliesmostofWesternCapeProvince’spowerneedsand

contributes6%oftotalcapacitytothenationalpowergrid.20

In2007Eskomsolicitedbidsforafleetofupto12nuclearpowerreactors,butthe

processstalledinthewakeofthe2008globalfinancialcrisisandrenewedappreciation

ofthevalueofSouthAfrica’slargedepositsofcoalasasourceforcarbon-intensivepower

production.21Widespreadpoweroutagesand ‘load-shedding’ in2008galvanised the

SouthAfricangovernmentintoadoptingitsNuclearEnergyPolicy,publishedinJuneof

thatyear.Thispolicy,however,becamesomethingofaside-issueinpoliticalturmoilthat

followedtheSeptember2008nationalconferenceoftheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)

atPolokwane,whenincumbentPresidentThaboMbekiwasdeposed.Mbeki’ssuccessor,

KgalemaMotlanthe,didnotremainpresidentlongenoughtoimplementthepolicy.22

FollowingtheinaugurationofPresidentJacobZumain2009,however,nuclearenergy

receivedsomewhatmoreattention;Zuma’saccessiontoofficehappenedatalmostthe

sametimeastheAfricanNuclearWeaponsFreeZoneTreaty(thePelindabaTreaty)came

intoforceon15July2009,whichinturnraisedawarenessoftheadvantagesofnuclear

energyforthecontinent.

ClimatechangeissuesareathirddeterminantinSouthAfrica’senergychoices.South

Africaistheworld’ssixthlargestproducerofcoalandits fifthbiggestexporter.Asa

majoremitterofGHG,largelygeneratedbyitscoal-firedpowerstations,SouthAfricahas

undertakentoreduceitscarbonemissionsby34%in2020and42%by2025.23Despiteits

environmentalimpactandthenationalcommitmenttomeetingemissiontargets,however,

coal-basedpowergeneration24willremainthe’mainstay’ofSouthAfrica’spowersupply

fortheforeseeablefuture’accordingtoDeputyPresidentKgalemaMotlanthe.25

The fourthdriverof SouthAfrica’s growingenergydemands is thegovernment’s

ambitiouseconomicdevelopmentplans.TheseareoutlinedforexampleinVision 2030,

theNationalDevelopmentPlan(NDP)oftheNationalPlanningCommission;according

towhichthegovernmentintendstospendaboutSouthAfricanRand(ZAR)4trillion

duringthenext15yearsoninfrastructuredevelopment.26Realisingdevelopmentgoals

ofthisorderwouldfurtherstrainscarceenergyresources,notleastbecauseEskom’snew

4800MWcoal-firedpowerstation,KusileinMpumalangaProvince,willcomeonline

onlyin2018.27

In2011thegovernmentapprovedtheIntegratedResourcesPlan(IRP)2010–2030.

Thistakesa20-yearprojectionofSouthAfrica’selectricitysupplyanddemandwhich

forecaststhatin20years’timeabout42%ofelectricitygeneratedinSouthAfricawillhave

tocomefromrenewableresources;itthereforeprovidesfortheincorporationof9.6GW

ofnuclearpowerand17.8GWofotherrenewableenergyby2030.Theplanoptedfora

nuclearfleet,insteadofoneortwonuclearunits,withatotaloutputof9.6GW.28


9


The adoption of the IRP coincided with the establishment of the Presidential

InfrastructureCoordinationCommission(PICC)inJuly2011.InFebruary2012,the

PICCadoptedtheNationalInfrastructurePlan(NIP)whichprioritised300projects,

consolidatedinto18StrategicIntegratedProjects(SIPs).Threeofthe18SIPsconcern

energy:theyarefirst,thedevelopmentofagreeneconomy(SIP8),secondelectricity

generation(SIP9),andthirdelectricitytransmissionanddistribution(SIP10).29These

SIPs,amongothers,pavedthewayforthegovernmenttosignthefirst28renewable

energyprojectagreementswithindependentpowerproducers(IPPs)inNovember2012.

Thesewillresultintheprocurementofabout7800MWofbaseloadcapacityfromIPPs

by2025,aswellasafurther3200MWofrenewablesby2020;andareinadditiontothe

3725MWcurrentlyprocuredfromIPPs.30IntermsofitsRenewableEnergyIndependent

PowerProducerProgrammethegovernmentisanticipatinginvestmentsofZAR47billion

fromIPPsintherenewableenergyprogramme.31Thereisafurtherconsiderationthat

thesedevelopmentswillcreatealargenumberofjobs.32

n u c L e A r d e c I S I o n m A K e r S

TheSouthAfricangovernment‘seffortstoaddressgrowingenergydemanddateback

someyears.In2008itadoptedtheNuclearEnergyPolicy,33atwhichtimethecabinetalso

approvedthereviewedNationalEnergyEfficiencyStrategy(NEES)andthegazettingof

adraftNEESsecondreviewdocumentforpubliccomment.Thereviewprocessanalysed

energyusagepatternsofvariouseconomicsectorsandexaminedthepotentialforadopting

modernenergymanagementpracticesandtechnologies,basedonadviceandopinionfrom

internationalexperts.Italsosetthesceneforfutureenergyreductiontargetsandtheusage

ofenergyresources.34

Thestrongestrecentindicationofthegovernment’sintentiontopursuenuclearenergy

activelywastheNovember2011cabinetapprovaloftheestablishmentoftheNational

NuclearEnergyExecutiveCoordinationCommittee (NNEECC)as theauthority for

decision-making,monitoring,andgeneraloversightof thenuclearenergyexpansion

programme.35AnexecutivebodyledbyDeputyPresidentMotlanthe,italsoincludesat

leasteightcabinetministers(seeTable2).

Table 2: National Nuclear Energy Executive Co-ordinating Committee as of May 2013

Deputy PresidentKgalema Motlanthe

(Chair)

Minister in the Presidencytrevor Manuel

(also head of the National Planning Commission)

Energy ministerDipuo Peters (Deputy chair)

Trade and industry minister

Rob Davies

Finance ministerPravin Gordhan

Public enterprises ministerMalusi Gigaba

Science and technology minister

Naledi Pandor

10



High education and training ministerBlade Nzimande

Economic development minister

Ebrahim Patel

Water and environmental affairs ministerEdna Molewa

Eskom NNR Necsa

NNEECC supported byNuclear Energy technical Committee

(Departmental Directors-general (of ministers represented in the NNEECC)

Source:DOE,IAEA,http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/pr/2012/Media%20Statement%20-%20

INIR%20IAEA%20Mission%201-%2017%20Oct%202012%20(2)[1].pdf.

Another indication of government interest is its initiation of an Integrated Nuclear

InfrastructureReview(INIR).The INIR isapeer-reviewedassessmentconductedby

internationalexpertsonnuclearenergy,coordinatedbytheIAEA,tosupportcountries

indevelopingtheirnuclearcapacitybydeterminingtheirinfrastructurestatusandneeds.

ThefirststepforcountriesundergoinganINIRisaself-assessmentbasedontheapproach

outlinedintheIAEAMilestonesandEvaluationpublications;thisrequiresadetailedself-

assessmentof19nuclearinfrastructureissues,specifictotheconditionsoftheparticular

country.36TheIAEArequiresall19tobeassessedwhendeterminingacountry’sreadiness

fornuclearenergyexpansion.Thecriteriaaddressissuesrespectivelyof:

• nationalpositiononnuclearpower(sic);

• nuclearsafety;

• management;

• legislation;

• fundingandfinancing;

• safeguards;

• regulatoryframework;

• radiationprotection;

• electricalgrid;

• resourcedevelopment;

• stakeholderinvolvement;

• sitingandsupportfacilities;

• environmentalprotection;

• emergencyplanning;

• securityandphysicalprotection;

• nuclearfuelcycle;

• radioactivewaste;

• industrialinvolvement;and

• procurementstructures.37

TheSouthAfricangovernmentadoptedtheMilestoneapproachandbyJune2012the

NNEECChaddevelopedtheself-evaluationreport.AnINIRmissionvisitedthecountry

from30Januaryto8February2013followingapre-missionworkshopwithrelevant

SouthAfricanstakeholderson15–17October2012,designedtoprovidecommentonthe

self-evaluationreport,andtodefinethescope,workplan,andlogisticalarrangements


11


forthe2013INIRMission.38ThedirectorgeneraloftheIAEAvisitedthecountryduring

themission;accordingtohimtheIAEAcarriedouta ‘thoroughreviewofallareasof

SouthAfrica’snuclearinfrastructure’.39Themissionalsoidentified‘strengthsinseveral

areassupportingboththeexistingandnewbuildprogramme,includingregulatoryself-

assessment,environmentalimpactassessment,electricitypowergriddevelopment,and

stakeholderinvolvement’.40Italsoresultedinrecommendationstofurtherstrengthenthe

country’snuclearinfrastructure.

S t A t e - o W n e d n u c L e A r e n t e r P r I S e S

EskomandtheNuclearEnergyCorporationofSouthAfrica(Necsa)arethetwomajor

state-ownednuclearenterprises(SOEs).Necsawasestablishedasasuccessor to the

nuclearcorporationsoftheNationalPartygovernment,whichleftofficein1994.The

SOEscontrolthreemajornuclearfacilities:Koeberg,ownedandoperatedbyEskom,and

twoNecsafacilities,respectivelyatPelindaba,westofPretoria,andVaalputs,southeastof

SpringbokintheNorthernCapeProvince,whichisthesiteoftheNationalRadioactive

WasteDisposalplant.Necsamanagesandoperatesboththelatterfacilitiesonbehalfof

theNationalRadioactiveWasteDisposalInstitute.

IntermsoftheNuclearEnergyActof1999Necsaundertakesandpromotesresearch

anddevelopmentinthefieldofnuclearenergyandradiationsciencesandtechnology.

It isalso responsible forprocessingsourcematerial, includinguraniumenrichment.

Necsaisalsoacommercialoperationwithseveralsubsidiaries(seeFigure3).Oneof

these,NTPRadioisotopes,istheNecsagroup’smainsourceofrevenuewithexportsof

ZAR842millionto60countriesin2012;Pelindaba-basedPelchem,whichhandlesNecsa’s

fluorochemicalinterests,achievedZAR186.1millioninsalesforthesameperiod,4.9%

higherthanin2011.41Necsaisalsotheowner-operatoroftheSouthAfricanFundamental

AtomicInstallation(Safari-1)reactor,commissionedin1965.

Figure 3: The Necsa group of companies

Necsa

NPt Logistics

Gammatec NDt plus five subidiaries

Cyclotope

AEC Amersham (with subsidiary Pharmatopes)

Limited Electronics South Africa

Subsidiariesfluoro Pack, fluorochem, fluoropharm

Pelchem operating activities such as various plants and contracts

NtP Radioisotopes Pelchem

Source:Necsa,Annual Report 2012.

12



12

Necsa isexpectedtoplaya leadingrole inthenuclear fuelcycleandinuranium

enrichment.Concernshavebeenexpressedinparliament,however,overaZAR31million

cutinthegovernment’sgranttoNecsafor2012–2013,toZAR455fromZAR486million

thepreviousyear,areductionthatpresumablyincreasestheriskthatNecsawillbeunable

tomeetitslegislativeandpolicymandates.42

r e G u L A t o r y e n v I r o n m e n t

SouthAfrica’snuclearactivities for themostpart fallunder theNuclearEnergyand

NationalNuclearRegulator(NNR)actsof1999,andthe2008NationalRadioactiveWaste

DisposalInstituteAct.Againstthisexistinglegislationandregulatoryframework,South

Africaisconsideringstrengtheningthelegislativeandregulatorystructurebyimproving

regulatoryoversightandthefunctioningoftheNNR.43

TheNNRreplacedtheCouncilforNuclearSafety(CNS).Itoverseesandenforces

nuclearsafetystandardsattendingtheoperationofnuclearfacilities,thepreventionof

nuclearaccidentsandthemitigationoftheresultsofanysuchevents.TheNNRregulates

thefollowingareasandfacilities:

• thecompletenuclearfuelcycle;

• uraniumexploration;

• uraniumminingandmilling;

• uraniumenrichment;

• fuelfabrication;

• Koebergnuclearpowerplant;

• wastemanagement(Vaalputs);

• theSafari-1researchreactor;

• decommissioningofnuclearvessels;and

• minesandscrapmetaldealers.44

Suchactivitiesembrace,amongothers,thelicensingofvisitingnuclearsubmarinesand

surfacevessels,includingsomefromtheUS(USSGeorge Washington,USSEnterprise,USS

Theodore Roosevelt),theUK(HMSTurbulent,HMSSceptre,HMSTalent)andRussia(the

battlecruiserPetr Velikiy);andtheissuingof42nuclearinstallationauthorisationsand

147certificatesofregistration.45

Inanticipationof itsextendedroleinoverseeingtheforthcomingfleetofnuclear

installations,theNNR’sbudgetallocationhasrisenfromZAR30.9millionfor2012–2013

toZAR31.6millionfor2013–2014,andtheregulatorhasrestructureditsorganisation.46

TheNNRhasalsoproposedamendmentstoitsenablingNNRAct47andinadditionis

developingacomprehensiveregulatoryframeworkwhilereviewingcapacityrequirements

inlinewithitsstrategyandstructure.48

SouthAfrica’sdual-usecapabilitiesareregulatedandcontrolledbytheSouthAfrican

Council for theNon-ProliferationofWeaponsofMassDestruction(NPC).Dual-use

capabilities are thosenational capacities in technology, expertise, services,material,

equipmentand facilities thatcancontribute to theproliferationofweaponsofmass

destructionbutcouldalsobeusedforconventionalmilitaryorcommercialpurposes.


13


Dual-useitemsandtechnologiesaresubjecttotheMissileTechnologyControlRegime,an

informalpartnershipof34countriesaimedatcontrollingtheproliferationofsignificant

aerialmilitarynucleartechnology,andtheNuclearSupplier’sGroup(NSG)ofnations,

ofwhichSouthAfricaisamember.49In2011MinisterofStateSecuritySiyabongaCwele

indicatedthatprogresshadbeenmadeonaNationalSecurityStrategyandthatdual-use

technologyhasbeenidentifiedasa‘strategicsector’.AdepartmentaltaskteamfromSouth

Africa’sStateSecurityAgencyisconductinganassessmentofresourcesandactivities

relatedtonuclear,biological,chemical,aerospaceandmissiletechnologies,andisexpected

to develop a national strategy for promoting research, technological development,

innovation,co-ordination,integrationandoversightindual-usetechnologies.50

r e S o u r c e n A t I o n A L I S m

Oneofthecharacteristicsofglobalenergyacquisitionoverthepastfewdecadeshasbeen

thegrowthof‘resourcenationalism’–thetendencyofnations,especiallyinthedeveloping

world,toassertaggressivelytheirsovereigntyoverthenaturalresourceswithintheir

boundaries.Sincetheearly1990sSouthAfricahasshownincreasingevidenceoffollowing

thesamepath.Accordingtoindustrysourcesgovernmentpoliciesareaimedatsecuring

SouthAfrica’ssupplyofuraniumfor40–60years.51

ThevalueofSouthAfrica’stotalmineralreservesisestimatedatZAR18trillion52

andminingandrelatedindustriesemployapproximatelyonemillionpeople,contribute

18%togrossdomesticproductandpaynearly20%ofallcorporatetaxes.53SouthAfrica

accountsfor8%ofworlduraniumreservesandisthetenthlargesturaniumproducer,54

althoughitsoutputhasfallenoverthepastfewyears(seeFigure4).

Figure 4: South Africa’s uranium production (1 000kg)

0

500

1 000

1 500

2 000

2 500

3 000

3 500

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Source:DepartmentofMineralResources,http://www.dmr.gov.za.

14



ThesectorinSouthAfricaisprivatelyownedandin2011domesticminingcompanies

produced 656 tonnes of uranium (tU).55 More than 30 domestic uranium mining

companiesareactiveinSouthAfrica,56whileforeign-ownedand-registeredenterprises

operatinginthesectorincludeAreva(France),FirstUraniumCorporation(Canada),

LeopardResources(Australia),ShivaUranium(IndianandSouthAfricaninvestors)and

UK-basedUraMinIncorporated,nowabsorbedbyAreva.

ThedeclineinSouthAfrica’suraniumproductionamongotherreasonsisassociated

with a fall in the uranium spot price (see Figure 5), continuing global economic

difficulties,anda lackof investorconfidence inSouthAfrica’sminingsector.Global

demandforuranium,however,isincreasing:China,forexample,hasambitiousnuclear

powerexpansionplanswhichwillrequire10000tonnesofuraniumoxide(U3O8)by

2020.57Tohelpmeetthisdemand,ChinesefirmsareprospectingforuraniuminNamibia,

NigerandZimbabwe.58

Figure 5: Uranium spot price, 2008–2012

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

80

85

90

95

75

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Source:MiningInvestor.net,‘5yearuraniumspotchart’,5December2012,http://www.mininginves-

tor.net/uranium-spot-price-chart/?qm_page=32590.

Annualdemandfromtheworld’snuclearreactors,whichpresentlyhaveacombined

generatingcapacityof375gigawattelectrical(GWe),is68000tU59andaccordingtothe

annualjointIAEA-OECD(OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment)

publication,Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand(theso-called‘RedBook’),this

isexpectedtorise.TheRedBookestimatesthatglobaluraniumdemandwillincreaseto

between97645tUand136385tUby2035,anamountrequiredtofeednuclearreactors

whichbythenwillprobablyhaveacombinedcapacityof540–746GWe.60


15


SouthAfricadoesnotitselfenrichuraniumforitspowergeneration.Insteadthese

servicesareprovidedbyinternationalcorporationssuchasAreva(France),Westinghouse

ElectricCompany(Japan/US),Tenex(Russia)andUrenco(Germany,TheNetherlands

andUK).61TheGermanfirmNukemplayedapartinthedevelopmentoftheinnovative

PebbleBedModularReactor(PBMR)andtheRussianNuclearEnergyStateCorporation

(Rosatom) was involved in the isotope sector in South Africa. Areva and Toshiba’s

Westinghouse at present supply Koeberg’s two reactors with 30 tonnes of enriched

uraniumannually.62

In2007PublicEnterprisesMinisterAlexErwinannouncedthattheSouthAfrican

governmenthasdeclareduraniuma‘strategicmineral’.63Atthesametimetheministerof

mineralsandenergyannouncedthatdeclaringuraniumastrategicmineral‘wouldlead

tomorecontrolsoveritsproductionandexportationtoensurethatSouthAfricahas

adequatereservesofthemineralinyearstocome’.64Againstthisbackground,inJune

2011thegovernmentreleaseda‘beneficiationstrategy’forthemineralsindustrywhich

definedbeneficiationasthe‘transformationofamineral(oracombinationofminerals)

toahighervalueproduct,whichcaneitherbeconsumedlocallyorexported’andisa

termusedinterchangeablywith‘valueaddition’.65Thestrategyidentifiesten‘strategic

mineralcommodities’ includinguraniumandthorium,whichareusedas fuel inthe

nuclearindustry.66SouthAfrica’suraniumenrichment(thatis,beneficiation)facilities

(theso-calledY-andZ-Plants)werecloseddownafterSouthAfricajoinedtheTreaty

fortheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons(NPT)in1991;hencethecountrynow

exportsonlyU3O8material from the firstphaseofbeneficiation, and imports all its

enricheduranium.67Inordertoaccomplishthebeneficiationofuraniumthe2011strategy

proposesinterventionssuchasquantificationofSouthAfrica’suraniumand/orthorium

reservesandresources; investigations into theeconomic feasibilityof re-establishing

uraniumenrichment;planningfornuclearwastetreatmentandminerehabilitation;and

thefinalisationofthenationaluraniumpolicywithrelevantstakeholders.68

SouthAfrica’sgrowingresourcenationalismwasfurtherillustratedwhenPresident

Zuma,whileattendingtheMarch2012NuclearSecuritySummit(NSS)inSeoul,South

Korea,insistedthatSouthAfricareservedtherighttoenrichuraniumto‘anylevel’despite

globalattemptstocurbtheuseofhighly-enricheduranium(HEU),nowconsideredto

beanationalstrategicasset.69ZumaalsostatedthatdespitepressurefromtheUS,South

AfricawouldretaincontroloftheHEUderivedfromthenuclearweaponsprogrammeit

abandonedinthe1990s,seeminglyresentfulofthe2011repatriationtotheUSof6.3kg

oftheseveralhundredkgofHEUitholdsinstore.70Anotherillustrationofincreasing

resourcenationalismisastatementbytheministerofenergythatSouthAfrica’snuclear

programmeisalsoconcernedwiththebeneficiationofmineralresources,inparticularof

uranium;togetherwithpresumptionsoftheintenttowhichthenuclearpowerindustry

wouldcreateadditionalemploymentthroughtheuraniumminingandfuelmanufacturing

sector.71

Feasibilitystudiesrelatingtothere-establishmentofnuclearfuelcycleprogrammes

inSouthAfricawerecompletedin2011.72Necsa’spre-feasibilitystudies,incollaboration

withpotentialpartnersintheestablishmentofauraniumenrichmentfacility,aregoing

aheadandithasbeenagreedthatthestudywouldbereviewedeverytwoyears.73South

Africa’sproposednuclear installationsareexpected toconsumeabout465tonnesof

enricheduraniumannuallyby2030(seeFigure6).Necsa’sstudieshaveconcludedthatit

16



isthereforecommerciallyviabletorevivethenuclearvaluechain,includingenrichment,

conversionandnuclear fuelmanufacturing, to reduceSouthAfrica’sdependenceon

foreignsources,74andthecompanyhasexpresseditsintenttoestablishacapacityto

producenuclearfuelsandfuelfabricationfacilitiesforPWRs‘toensureeventualsecurity

offuelsupplyforSouthAfrica’.75

Figure 6: South Africa’s annual reactor-related uranium requirements, 2010–2035

500

1 000

1 500

2 000

2 500

Tonn

es u

rani

um

2010 2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035

Low demand (tU) 290 290 290 290 595 875 1155

High demand (tU) 290 290 290 290 1155 1715 2275

0

Source:OECDNuclearEnergyAgency(NEA)andIAEAhttp://wwweth.cern.ch/~dittmar/thoiry/

U2011.pdf.

In 2011 President Zuma reactivated the African Exploration Mining and Financing

Company(AEMFC),apreviouslydormantstate-ownedminingcorporationestablished

in1944andcurrently a subsidiaryof the state-ownedCentralEnergyFund (CEF).

TheAEMFCwillconsolidategovernment’sminingassetsandinterestsandconcentrate

ondeclaredstrategicmineralssuchasuraniumandcoal.76Itsprincipalactivitiesare

toacquireandholdprospectingandminingrightsforthestate,toperformgeological

explorationandfeasibilitystudies,todevelopmines,andtoengageinminingoperations.77

Inthe2011–2012financialyear,however,thecompanyincurredanetlossofZAR48.8

million;almostdoubleits2011losses,indicatingthatlikeotherSOEstheAEMFCis

notaviableoperation.78Thisperceptionnotwithstanding,inOctober2012theminister

ofmineralresources,calledforgreaterinvolvementoftheAEMFCintheSouthAfrican

miningindustry,79echoinganearlierstatementbyPresidentZumathatthestate’must

activelyparticipateintheminingindustrytoensurethatournationalinterestisprotected

andadvanced’.80

InDecember2012,thecabinetapprovedtheDraftMineralandPetroleumResources

DevelopmentAmendmentBill.Amongotherthingsthisaimstoregulatetheexploitation

ofassociatedminerals,andprovidesfortheimplementationofanapprovedbeneficiation

strategythroughwhichstrategicmineralscanbeprocesseddomestically.81Thegovernment


17


isalsodevelopinganuclearfuelcyclestrategyforthebeneficiationofuraniumresources

andtoestablishauraniumconversionplant,auraniumenrichmentplant,andafuel

fabricationplant.82SouthAfrica’sintentionsinthisrespectarealsoevidentinthe2012

DefenceReview,whichstatesthatitisintheSouthAfricannationalinteresttosecure

‘fundamentalresources,minerals(and)energy’.83

Resourcenationalismisalsoevident inSouthAfrica’sopposition to international

nuclearfuelbanksandenrichmentfacilities(seeTable3).84In2007Russiaestablished

theInternationalUraniumEnrichmentCentre(IUEC)thefirstinternationalenrichment

facility,withaviewtoallowingallcountriespursuingpeacefulnuclearenergyunimpeded

accesstothenuclearfuelcycle.ItscurrentmembersareRussia,Kazakhstan,Armeniaand

Ukraine.Rosatomholds70%ofitsshares.IntermsofanagreementwiththeIAEAthe

IUEChastomakematerialavailabletoanycountrydesignatedbythedirector-generalof

theIAEA.85TheUS,GermanyandtheUKarealsoconsideringestablishingnuclearfuel

facilities.86

Table 3: International uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel centres

International Uranium

Enrichment Centre

IAEA LEU bank American Assured Fuel Supply (AFS)

Location Russia to be determined; Kazakhstan has offered to host

US

Date of operation, authorisation or announcement

Operational since 17 December 2010

IAEA Board authorised, established 3 December 2010

Announced in August 2011

Owner Russian government through majority share in Rosatom

IAEA US government

Uranium enrichment levels

2–4.95% 2–4.95% 2–4.95%

LEU reserve (tonnes) 120 to be determined 230

Cost valued at $300 million

Donors pledged $125 million and EUR 25 million to cover establishment and initial operational expenses

Not available

Source:OECDNuclearEnergyAgency(NEA)andIAEA,Uranium2011:resources,productionand

demand,Paris,OECDNEA&IAEA,2012,pp.120–121;http://wwweth.cern.ch/~dittmar/thoiry/

U2011.pdf.

S o u t h A f r I c A ’ S n u c L e A r d I P L o m A c y

SouthAfrica isoneofvery fewcountries–othersbeingBrazil andLibya– tohave

voluntarilyterminateditsnuclearweaponsprogramme;theprocessbeganin1989and

18



endedin1993.87FollowingverificationoftheterminationoftheprogrammebytheIAEA

inthelatteryear,SouthAfrica’snucleardiplomacychangedfromadefenceorientation

tooneoffocusonthepeacefulusesofnuclearenergy,nuclearnon-proliferationand

nucleardisarmament.Ithasbeenlaudedespeciallyforitsbridge-buildingroleatvarious

conferencesoftheNPT.

Leavingasidethedismantlingofitsnuclearweaponsprogramme,thepost-1990period

hasbeenadynamictimeintermsofSouthAfrica’sinternationalrelationsanddiplomacy.

Between1990and2010itestablishednumerousbilateralrelations,accededtotheNPT(in

1991)andjoinedorre-joinedseveralnuclear-relatedorganisations,includingtheIAEA,

theWassenaarArrangementonExportControlsforConventionalArmsandDual-Use

GoodsandTechnologies,theNuclearSuppliersGroup,theZanggerCommitteeofnuclear

exporters,theNetworkofRegulatorsofCountrieswithSmallNuclearProgrammes,the

AfricanNuclearRegulators’GroupandtheGenerationIVInternationalForum.

SouthAfricahasreiteratedthata‘primarygoal’ofitsforeignpolicyisto‘reinforce

andpromote[itself]asaresponsibleproducer,possessorandtraderofdefence-related

productsandadvanced technologies in thenuclear,biological, chemicalandmissile

fields’.88ThegovernmentarguesthatSouthAfricainthisway‘promotesthebenefitswhich

non-proliferation,disarmamentandarmscontrolholdforinternationalpeaceandsecurity,

particularlytocountriesinAfricaandtheNon-AlignedMovement’.89

SouthAfricawasa founder-memberof the IAEAin1957.Today, it serveson the

IAEAboardofgovernorsandhassignedseveralmultilateralnuclear-relatedagreements;

respectivelythe:

• AgreementonthePrivilegesandImmunitiesoftheIAEA;

• ConventiononthePhysicalProtectionofNuclearMaterial;

• ConventiononEarlyNotificationofaNuclearAccident;

• ConventiononAssistanceintheCaseofaNuclearAccidentorRadiological

Emergency;

• ConventiononNuclearSafety;

• JointConventionontheSafetyofSpentFuelManagementandontheSafetyof

RadioactiveWasteManagement;

• RevisedSupplementaryAgreementConcerningtheProvisionofTechnicalAssistance

bytheIAEA(RSA);and

• AfricanRegionalCo-operativeAgreementforResearch,DevelopmentandTraining

RelatedtoNuclearScienceandTechnology(AFRA).

IthasalsosignedasafeguardsagreementandanadditionalprotocolwiththeIAEA.90

Ratificationoftheseagreementsisindicativeofashiftfromasecretiveapproachtonuclear

issuestoapolicysomewhatlessopaqueandmorecompliantwithinternationally-accepted

norms.Severalissuesrelatingtothecountry’snucleardiplomacyarepertinentinthis

respect.AmongotherstheyincludeSouthAfrica’snucleardiplomacywithotherAfrican

countriesandwithIran,anditsresponsestocountriescultivatingSouthAfricaaspotential

contractorsforthenewnuclearfleet.


19


Africa

InDecember2012thecabinetapprovedanamendedwhitepaperonSouthAfrica’sforeign

policyforsubmissiontoparliament.Thedraftwhitepaperusestheframeworkofthe

‘Diplomacyof“Ubuntu”’toexplainSouthAfrica’sforeignpolicy,andcitesAfricaasone

ofthepillarsuponwhichspecialstressisplaced.91InthelightofSouthAfrica’snuclear

diplomacywiththerestofthecontinentitisespeciallyimportantthat13otherAfrican

countries(Algeria,Egypt,Ghana,Kenya,Libya,Morocco,Namibia,Nigeria,Senegal,

Sudan,Tanzania,Tunisia andUganda), are considering thedevelopmentofnuclear

energy.92Apartfromitsbilateralandmultilateralco-operationonnuclearissuesonthe

continent,SouthAfricahostsand leads theAfricanCommissiononNuclearEnergy

(Afcone), thecompliancemechanismof thePelindabaTreaty,whichcameinto force

15July2009.SouthAfricaisintheprocessoffinalisingahostagreementwithAfcone;

AtnatiwosZelekeMeshesha,anAfconecommissioner,summarisedthemainelements

ofthePelindabaTreatyastherenunciationofnuclearexplosivedevices;theprevention

ofstationingnuclearexplosivedevices;prohibitionontestingnuclearexplosivedevices;

declaration,dismantling,destructionorconversionofnuclearexplosivedevicesand

thefacilitiesfortheirmanufacture;theconductofpeacefulnuclearactivities;physical

protectionofnuclearmaterialsandfacilities;prohibitionofarmedattacksonnuclear

installations;andexchangeofinformation.93

SouthAfricahassignedaZAR15millionagreementwiththeIAEAtopromotehuman

capitaldevelopmentandknowledge-sharing in technology inAfrica. In termsof the

agreementSouthAfricaandtheIAEAwillfocusonagricultureandlivestockproduction,

humanhealth,waterresourcedevelopment,environmentalmanagementandintegrated

pollutioncontrol, energy,humancapital fornuclear scienceand technology,andon

capacitybuildinginAfrica.94

Iran

SouthAfricahasconsistentlyexpresseditssupportforthe‘inalienableright’ofallstates,

especiallydevelopingcountries,todevelopnuclearenergyforpeacefulpurposeswithin

theframeworkoftheNPT.95ThishasresultedinstrongsupportforIran,althoughitis

suspectedofdevelopinganuclearweaponsprogramme.96Inthisregard,inJuly2012

SouthAfricasuspendeditsambassadortoIran,YusufSaloojee,followingaccusations

bytheSouthAfricanmobiletelephoneoperatorMTNthattheenvoyhadtakenbribes

toinfluenceSouthAfrica’svotingbehaviourintheIAEAandUNtowardsupportfor

Iran.97DuringOctober2012,however,whenSouthAfricawasservingasanon-permanent

memberoftheUNSecurityCouncil,thecountrysuspendedallimportsofcrudeoilfrom

IranforafifthconsecutivemonthincompliancewithSecurityCouncilsanctionsagainst

Iran.WhereasSouthAfricapreviouslyimported25%ofitscrudeoilfromIran,ithas

nowdiversifieditssuppliersincompliancewiththeUNsanctionstoalternativesources

includingAngola,EquatorialGuinea,Nigeria,SaudiArabia,andtheUnitedArabEmirates.

TheUSgrantedexemptionstoSouthAfricatoimportIranianoil,butsuchimportsare

stillsubjecttoEUsanctionsthatpreventinsurancecompaniesunderwritingoilshipments

fromIran.SouthAfricanlobbyingfortheEUtograntwaivershasbeenunsuccessful.This

placesadditionalstrainonSouthAfrica’sgrowingenergydemandsassomeofthecountry’s

20



refineriesaredesignedtotreatonlyIranian-typecrude.ReplacingIranasasourcewould

becostlyandmightresultinarepeatofdisruptionsinfuelsuppliesexperiencedin2011,

whentheIranianproblemfirstsurfaced.98

Foreign ‘courtiers’

Since the SouthAfricangovernment’s announcementof its proposednuclearpower

programme it has been courted by major global nuclear corporations such as the

FrenchandRussianstate-ownednuclearutilitiesArevaandRosatom.InOctober2012

a delegation representing some 40 French business enterprises, including nuclear

contractors, visited South Africa for a conference on business ties between the two

countries.99Inthereversedirection,agovernment-leddelegationincludingSouthAfrican

nuclearcompaniesandrepresentativesoftheNuclearIndustryAssociationofSouthAfrica

visitedRussiainNovember2012.MeetingswereheldwithRosatomsubsidiariesNizhny

NovgorodEngineeringCompanyAtomenergoproekt,whichoffersengineeringservices

innuclearpowerplantprojects(NPPs),andAtomstroyexport,whichspecialisesinthe

constructionofNPPsoutsideRussia.Thevisittookplaceinthecontextofamemorandum

ofunderstandingsignedbetweenNecsaandtheRosatomaffiliateRosatomOverseas.South

Africa’sNationalNuclearRegulator(NNR)hasalsosignedaco-operationagreementwith

theRussiannuclearregulator,Rostekhnadzor,coveringradiationandnuclearsafetyand

security.100NuclearissuesalsocameunderconsiderationinNovember2012atthe11th

sessionoftheSouthAfrica–RussiaInter-governmentalCommitteeonTradeandEconomic

Cooperation,agroupthatmeetsannuallytodiscussandstrengthensocial,economic,and

commercialrelationsaswellastechnicalco-operationbetweenthetwocountries.101

One of the main preoccupations concerning South Africa’s nuclear future is the

developmentofaskillspooluniquetothenuclearsector.Inthisconnection,Necsaand

AlstomSouthAfrica,asubsidiaryoftheFrenchpowergenerationandtransmissionand

rail infrastructuregroupAlstom,signedanagreementinNovember2012intermsof

whichAlstomSouthAfricaundertooktoinvestZAR8millioninequipmentforanew

codedweldingcentrelaunchedatNecsa’sNuclearSkillsDevelopmentCentre(NSD)in

February2013.102

P u b L I c o P I n I o n o n t h e n u c L e A r f u t u r e

SouthAfricanpublicopiniononthenuclearfutureisinfluencedbyfactorsmainlyrelated

toconcernsabout thecostandsafetyofnuclearenergy,andgovernment’sunilateral

decision-makingandsecrecyinrespectofnucleardecisions.Parallelshavealsobeen

drawnbetweenallegedseriousmalpracticesattendingthestrategicarmsprocurement

package(the‘armsdeal’)anddubiouslevelsoftransparencysurroundingtheproposed

nuclearprogrammeandtheterminationofoperationsatthePBMRproject.

What South Africans know

In2011Necsacommissionedoneofthefewpublicopinionsurveystohavebeenconducted

ontheSouthAfricanpublic’sattitudestonuclearenergy.Thesurvey,undertakenbythe


21


HumanSciencesResearchCouncil, concluded thatSouthAfricansknow littleabout

nuclearenergyanditsassociatedtechnology;40%ofrespondentscouldnot indicate

whetherornot theywere in favourofnuclearenergyandonly23%approvedof it.

Respondentswereaskedtoidentifythebenefitsanddisadvantagesofnuclearenergyasa

sourceofelectricity.ThesurveyshowedthatmostSouthAfricanswereinclinedtoperceive

nuclearenergyasameansofensuringareliablesupplyofelectricity,andasanenergy

sourcethatwouldhelpcombatclimatechange(citedby23%and16%respectively).A

smallerproportion(14%)considerednucleargenerationascompetitiveincostandas

offeringanunlimitedsupplyofpower.Safetyrisks,nuclearwastedisposalandriskof

radiationwereregardedas itsmaindisadvantages.One-third(34%)believednuclear

accidents tobearisk,while the long-termdisposalofnuclearwasteandtheriskof

radiationorcontaminationwereissuescitedby20%ofrespondents.Despitesomesafety

concerns,40%‘agreed’or‘stronglyagreed’thatthenuclearreactorsatKoebergshould

continuetooperate(44%didnotknow);38%thoughtthatSouthAfricashouldconstruct

newnuclearreactorstogenerateelectricity(42%didnotknow).103

Theanti-nuclearlobbyinSouthAfricaissmall,butvocal:organisationssuchasSave

Bantamsklip,GreenpeaceSouthAfrica,theCoalitionagainstNuclearEnergy,andEarthlife

Africaarenotableinthisrespect.Theirwide-rangingactivitiesincludepublicprotest

actionsandparticipationinpublichearingsonnuclearissues.

Government’s efforts to influence public opinion

InthewakeoftheFukushimaincidenttheSouthAfricangovernmentiswaryoftheeffect

ofpublicopiniononnuclearpolicy.Accordingtotheministerofenergy‘[T]hesuccess

anddeploymentofnuclearpowerrequirespublicacceptance,andpubliceducationand

radioactivewastemanagementissuesarethemostimportanttopicsurroundingnuclear

energy.Wewillbeinvestingresourcesandgreatereffortinthisregard.’104InOctober2012

thegovernmentparticipatedinanIAEAtechnicalmeetingonnuclearcommunication

andstakeholders;105similarinitiativesweremountedbytheNNR,whichiscurrently

implementinganewcommunicationstrategy.106TheNNR’spublichearingsonNecsa’s

applicationforanuclearinstallationlicencetoconstructasmelter,however,resultedin

widespreadcriticismfromcivilsocietyandbusinessentitiesinthevicinityofPelindaba,

wherethesmelteristobesituated.Theproposedsmelterisexpectedtoprocess14000

tonnesofuranium-contaminatedscrapmetal,presentlystoredonNecsa’sPelindabasite.107

Governmenthas introducedseveralpublic information initiatives.These include

openingaNecsaVisitorCentreatPelindabaandlaunchingNecsa’snuclearawareness

advertisingcampaignin2011.The12-monthcampaignwaspromotedthroughradio,

print,theatre,websites,socialmediaandotherappropriatecommunicationschannels

andwassaidtohavereachedfourmillionpeople(Necsacontinuestoemploytheleading

advertisingagencySaatchi&Saatchitopromotethebenefitsofnuclearenergy).108In

2008thegovernmentspentZAR4millioninabidtoreworktheimageofnuclearpower

inSouthAfrica;Johannesburg-basedbrandconsultancyFreedthinkerswasappointedto

surveypublicopiniononnuclearenergy,inparallelwiththedevelopmentofanuclear

vocabularyinallSouthAfrica’s11officiallanguages.109

22



Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs)

Governmenthasidentifiedthreepossiblesitesfortheconstructionofnewnuclearpower

stations.TheyareBantamsklip(nearHermanus in theWesternCape),Duinefontein

(nexttoKoeberg)andThyspunt(betweenOysterBayandStFrancisBayinEasternCape

Province),allofthemareasofimportantbiodiversitythatmaybedisruptedifconstruction

goesahead.EskomhasconductedEIAsonallthesites.110Accordingtotheministerof

energy28studieshavebeencompletedintheEIA,whichassesstheimpactonbiodiversity

issuesaroundvulnerablefaunaandflora;wetlandsanddunemorphology;transport;

heritageandconflictwithothersocio-economicactivity(includinginparticularfishing

forchokka,aspeciesofsmallsquid,andotherfishing,tourismandagriculturalinterests).

A reviseddraft environmental impact reportwas released forpubliccomment in

2011;thecommentswillbeincludedinthefinalEIAreport.Inaddition,anumberof

revisedspecialists’reportshadbeenanticipatedforreleasetothepublicinmid-2012

butneverappeared.111AccordingtothepressuregroupThyspuntAlliance,Eskomand

itsconsultantshavenotpublishedthethirddraftoftheenvironmentalimpactreport

inrespectofThyspuntandinfacthavedelayeditspublicationforayear.112Hencethe

processoutlinedbytheministerinparliamentinApril2012hasbeensocompromised

thatthefinalenvironmental impactreportcouldnotbecompletedandsubmittedto

thedepartmentofenvironmentalaffairstowardstheendof2012,intimeforadecision

onenvironmentalauthorisation,adecisionnowexpectedin2013.113Inresponse,anti-

nuclear interest groups Earthlife Africa, Greenpeace Africa, Justice and Peace, and

Ceasefireformedanallianceaimedatraisingconcernsaboutthecostofthenewbuild

project,thesafetyofnuclearpowerandthelackoftransparencyandaccountabilityinthe

nuclearsector.

c o n c e r n S A b o u t S o u t h A f r I c A ’ S n u c L e A r P r o G r A m m e

Thegovernment’s2011assessmentofSouthAfrica’sreadinesstoprocureanuclearfleet

identifiedanumberofcriticalareas,suchasfinance,safety,radioactivewastemanagement,

humanresourcesandthelackofnuclearskills.114Theseissues,however,arefarfromthe

onlyones:severalotherconcernsaffectingtheviabilityoftheprogrammeneedtobe

addressedurgently.Theyinclude,inparticular,doubtsabouttheintegrityofpolitical

processesandcontrols,andreservationsastotheadequacyofEskom’sfinancialresources

andmanagement.

Turf wars

Thefirstoftheseissuesconcernsgovernment’sdepartmentalresponsibilitiesandpotential

conflicts.Thecabinet’sdecisiontogoaheadwithitsnuclearplansisinclearcontradiction

totheNationalPlanningCommission’sNDPwhich,locatedasitisinthepresidency,

laiddowna requirement for further feasibility studiesandwarned thatan ‘in-depth

investigationintothefinancialviabilityofnuclearenergywasvital’;itrecommendedthat

governmentreassessthedesirabilityofsuchaprogramme.115Thisisinstarkcontrastto

thepositionofamongotherstheDepartmentofEnergy,whichthroughitsministerisa


23


vocaladvocateofthenuclearplans.Suchinter-departmentaldifferencesmaybedueto

varyingperceptionswithingovernmentcirclesofnuclearenergyasawholeandinthat

waymayhaveanimpactonthecountry’sfuturenuclearplanning,especiallyitsfunding,

tenderproceduresandpowerdeliveryprocesses.

Cost

Oneofthecausesoftheturfwarsisdifferentviewsonthecostofthenuclearenergy

expansionplansandthefinancialburdenthismayplaceonthegovernment.Concerns

expressed by the National Planning Commission and civil society about the large

(ZAR300billion)capitalcostofnuclearpowerhavebeendismissedbytheminister

ofenergy,astrongsupporterofnuclearenergyandthegovernment’snuclearplans,as

‘typicalscaretacticsusedbypeoplewhodonothavethebestinterestofourpeopleat

heart’.116SimilarviewshavebeenexpressedbyANCleadersinthepastwhencriticisedor

opposed.117Suchstatementsoverlookthestarkfactthegovernment’scostestimatesfor

generatingnuclearenergy,at$3,000–4,000/kW,differmarkedlyfromgenerallyaccepted

informedestimatesof$7,000/kW.118Governmentestimates that totalpowercapacity

extensionundertheIRPwillcostapproximatelyZAR4trillionby2030,includingnew

powerplantsandtransmissionanddistributioninfrastructure.119Thislevelofexpenditure

willclearlyhaveanimpactonthefuturecostofelectricalpower,whichinSouthAfricais

alreadyhigh–evenafterNecsarejectedEskom’sapplicationofNovember2012fora16%

increaseinitsutilitytariffinfavourofan8%annualincreaseoverthenextfiveyears.120

Tender process

The South African government already stands accused of permitting irregularities

in respectof theawardof tenders to individualsandcompaniesclose to,orwithin,

governmentstructures.Expandingthecountry’snuclearpowergenerationanddistribution

willrequiretheawardofverylargegovernmenttenders,andconcernshavebeenraised

aboutthetransparencyofanyfuturenucleartenderprocess.Evenat thisearlystage

energy-relatedtendershavebeenawardedto,forexample,theANC’sinvestmentarm,

ChancellorHouseHoldings,whichisinturna25%shareholderinHitachiPowerAfrica,

oneofthecontractorstoEskom’sMedupiandKusilepowerstations.AtZAR38.5billion

thisisthelargestcontractinEskom’shistory.121Theprojectisalready20monthsbehind

scheduleandcostshaveincreasedtoZAR60billion–asituationwhichclearlyraises

questionsabouttheintegrityofthecostingandtenderingprocess–butnopenaltieshave

beenleviedonthepoliticallyconnectedHitachidespitesuchanapparentperformance

shortfall.122Suchasituationraisesobviousquestionsaboutthelikelyconductofthemuch

largertenderandcostingprocessfortheprocurementofthecountry’snuclearfleet.

Concernshavealsobeenexpressedaboutthenumberofhigh-profilenucleardecision-

makerswhohave takenupposts inother areasof thenuclear sector, giving rise to

speculationaboutconflictsofinterest,‘revolvingdoors’andpossibleconsequentialtender

irregularities.123MoveshaveincludedtheresignationofNecsa’sCEO,RobAdam,tojoin

theAvengGroup,aconstructionfirminthenuclearindustryrunbyaformercolleague,

Roger Jardine, when Adam was director-general of the department of science and

technology.124Adam’ssuccessoratNecsaisPhumzileTshelane,actinggeneralmanager

24



inEskom’snuclearnewbuilddivision.125InadditiontothesechangesDeputyPresident

MotlanthewasappointedtoleadtheNNEECCandtheNNRCEOBoyceMkhizehas

resignedto‘pursuebusinessinterests’.126

Eskom’s finances, management and resources

EskomisacriticalinstitutionfortherealisationoftheSouthAfricangovernment’snuclear

ambitions.It isgenerallyaccepted,however,that likemostSouthAfricanSOEs, it is

poorlymanaged.127InanefforttoassesstheperformanceofsuchorganisationsPresident

Zumain2010establishedthePresidentialState-ownedEnterprisesReviewCommittee.

Thecommittee’sreporton700nationalSOEsandpublicentitieswaspresentedtocabinet

inSeptember2012buthasnotyetbeenreleasedtothepublic.128Bymid-March2013,the

statusofthereportwasstillunclearandis‘stillbeingdiscussedbyCabinet’.129

Cabinet’sendorsementin2012ofEskomastheowner-operatorofthefuturenuclear

powerstationsreaffirmsthatutility’spositionintermsofthe2008nationalnuclearpolicy.

LikethoseofmanySouthAfricanSOEs,however,Eskom’sfinancesandmanagementarein

apoorstate,totheextentthatinOctober2012creditratingagencyMoody’sdowngraded

Eskom’sunsecuredbondrating.130One implicationof thisaction is thatEskomwill

experiencedifficultiesinsecuringinternationalfinancetosupportitsexpansionplans.

ItsTransmissionTen-YearDevelopmentPlan:2013–2022setsoutplannedinvestment

onpowertransmissioninfrastructureprojectsofalmostZAR150millionoverthenext

decade.131Eskom’s2012applicationfora16%tariffincrease,haditbeensuccessful,would

haveraisedZAR1trillion,butstillwouldnothavegeneratedsufficientcapitaltofinance

thenuclearfleet.132

Eskomisthestate-ownedentityresponsibleforpowergenerationanddistributionand

assuchisakeyplayerinrealisinggovernment’ssocio-developmentobjectives.Thefact

thatitfallsundertheDepartmentofPublicEnterprisesandnottheministerofenergy,

exacerbatesgovernmentturfwars.Furthermore,despitethefactthatitispoorlymanaged

andfinanciallystruggling,itsclosetiestopoliticalandbusinesselitesmayhugelyinflate

thetenderpriceofnuclearexpansionprojects,whichinturnwilladdtothecostof

expansionplans,powergenerationanddistribution.

Lessons from the PMBR debacle

MisgivingsaboutthecompetenceofEskomhavebeenreinforcedbyfinancialfailures

inrespectofthePBMR,whichstill loomlargeandwill furtherconstraintheutility’s

future financing.PebbleBedModularReactor (Pty)Ltdwas established in1999 to

developandmarketsmall-scale,high-temperaturereactorsinSouthAfricaandabroad,

withan800-memberprojectteambasedinPretoria.In2010,however,PublicEnterprises

MinisterBarbaraHogan announced that the governmentwouldno longer invest in

thePBMR,whichhad already accounted forZAR10billion and forwhich another

ZAR30billionwasrequiredfromgovernment,giventhatthecompanyhadbeenunable

toattractfurtherprivateinvestors.Government’sfinancialcontributionhadamounted

to80.3%,whileEskomhad contributed8.8%andWestinghouse and the Industrial

DevelopmentCorporation4.9%each.133


25


Againstthisbackgroundthegovernmentcommissionedanindependenthigh-level

reviewoftheprojectandestablishedaninter-departmentaltaskteamtoconsiderthe

fateofthePMBR.Thecompanywassignificantlydown-sizedinaprocessthatinvolved

staffretrenchment,decommissioningof itsFuelDevelopmentLaboratory(FDL)and

mothballingoftheHeliumTestFacility.CabinetdecidedtoputthePBMRontoacareand

maintenancebasistoprotectitsintellectualpropertyandotherassets.134

EskomhasmanagedthePBMRsince1April2012andwillcontinuetodosountil

theendofthecareandmaintenancephasein2013,whenthegovernmentwillmakea

finaldecisiononthecompany.Thegovernmenthas,however,promisedto‘protectand

preserve’PBMR’sintellectualpropertyandassets,aprocessthatincludes‘packaging’more

than86%oftheintellectualpropertyforpreservation.Governmentisalsopursuingan

intellectualpropertyauditofthePBMR‘toprotectitsfuturevalue’andhasconducteda

skillsaudittodeterminehowthestockofacquiredexpertisecouldbeutilised.135Callsby

oppositionpoliticalpartiesandnon-governmentalorganisationsforafinancialauditofthe

PBMRtodeterminehowtaxpayers’moneyhadbeenspent,fellondeafears.136

Post-Fukushima nuclear safety and security

Nuclear safetyandsecurity inSouthAfrica remainaconcern,as recenteventshave

illustrated.On28April2012asecuritybreachoccurredatNecsa’sPelindabafacility.The

occurrencewasnotreportedtotheNNRinatimelymanner;infact,Necsaonlysubmitted

itsreportontheincidenton7July2012.Earlier,inApril2012,theNNRhadsuspended

Necsa’s acceptanceofnuclearwaste fromKoeberg followingnon-complianceby the

corporationatitsVaalputsnuclearwastestoragefacility.137InNovemberthesameyear

policediscoveredradioactivematerialonthesiteofthescrapmetalrecyclingcompany

SAMetalintheCapeTownsuburbofEpping:theoriginofthematerialisstillunclear138

althoughaccordingtoNecsa,in2011theIAEAhadfoundnoindicationofdiversion

ofdeclarednuclearmaterial frompeacefulpurposesandnoindicationofundeclared

nuclearmaterialoractivitiesinSouthAfrica.AlthoughtheIAEAalsoconcludedthat

allSouthAfrica’snuclearmaterialisdirectedtonon-militaryactivities,suchbreachesin

nuclearsecurityunderminethecountry’sinternationalstandingandposeariskofnuclear

proliferation.139

InJune2011,followingontheseincidentsandinthewakeoftheFukushimaleakage,

thegovernmentconcludedanagreementwiththeIAEAtoassistwithastresstestof

theKoebergpowerstationintheeventoffloodorearthquake.140Thesafetyassessment

wasdesignedtoevaluatethebehaviourof theKoebergplant inahypotheticalsetof

extremeconditionsthatcouldcausealossofpowerorcooling;theexercisesupports

theimplementationoftheIAEA’sinternationalsafetystandardsthatprotecthealthand

minimisedangertolifeandproperty.Koebergiscurrentlyundergoingitssecond10-year

safetyreview.141

TheNNRalsodirectedEskomandNecsatoconductreassessmentsoftheirreactors

todeterminewhether theplantscanwithstandmajorexternalevents.Its reviewof

thereassessmentsconcludedthattheinstallationswereadequatelydesignedandare

maintainedandoperatedtowithstandalltheexternaleventsconsideredintheoriginal

design protocols. The NNR has, however, identified five areas for improvement in

26



regulatorystandardsandpractices,whichwillbeaddressedaspartofacurrentreview

oftheregulatoryframework.142

AccordingtoaKoebergexecutivetheplantcanwithstandanearthquakeofsevenon

theRichterscale.143TheKoebergemergencyplan,conductedbytheNNR,isreviewed

every twoyears; the latestof theseexercises tookplaceon5September2012,when

thestation’semergencypreparednesswas testedsuccessfully.144 InadditiontheNNR

conductedaninspectionofSafari-1whichconfirmeditssafetyandoperationalintegrity.145

Despite considerable goodwill towards South Africa as a state that dismantled

itsnuclearweaponsprogramme,someinternationalconcernsremaininrespectofits

nuclearaffairs.TheNuclearMaterialSecurityIndexissuedin2012bytheWashington-

based Nuclear Threat Initiative indicated that although South Africa scores high in

termsoffivemeasures–anindependentnuclearregulatoryagency,safeguardsadoption

andcompliance,domesticnuclear-relatedsecuritylegislation,controlandaccounting

procedures,andinternationalcompliance–itrateslowerinpoliticalstability,corruption,

failure to specify quantities of nuclear materials, and poor physical security during

transport.146

Transparency

AlthoughtheSouthAfricanconstitutionguaranteestherightofSouthAfricancitizensto

accessanyinformationheldbythestate,therearesignificantconcernsaboutgovernment’s

transparencyinrespectofitsnuclearambitions.147TheSouthAfricagovernmenthas

beencriticisedforthesecrecyattendingthenewnuclearbuildingplans.Twopiecesof

legislation,theNationalKeyPointsAct(NKPA)of1980,andthePromotionofAccess

toInformationAct(PAIA),Actof2000,poseparticularconcerns.Draftedin1980,the

NKPAisahangoverfromthePWBotharegimeofthe1980sandgivesarbitrarypowers

totheministerofpolicetodeclareanybuildingorinstallationakeypointvitaltostate

security;underitsprovisionsthestateisundernoobligationtobeinanywayaccountable

inrespectofsuchakeypoint.148

In consequence the current SouthAfricangovernment’s secrecy about its energy

infrastructureprogrammeandpolicyisacausefordisquiet.InAugust2012,theofficial

oppositioninparliament,theDemocraticAlliance(DA)accusedtheministerofenergyof

beingeitherignorantor‘purposefullysecretive’aboutthesematters.Theministerrefused

toanswerquestionspertaining to thevolumeofSouthAfrica’suraniumstockpileat

Pelindaba,andpaymentsmadebyNecsatoKlydonLtd,auraniumenrichmentcompany,

duetotheir‘classified’and‘commerciallysensitive’nature.149Similarly,NGOssuchas

GreenpeaceAfricaandtheSouthAfricaHistoryArchiveshavelodgedaformalcomplaint

withthepublicprotectorandtheSouthAfricanHumanRightsCommissioninresponseto

theenergyminister’ssecondrefusaltopublicisetheINIR150compiledbyherdepartment

todeterminethecountry’spreparednesstobuildnuclearpowerstations,anddiscussedin

aclosedmeetingwiththeIAEAinOctober2012.151

The Mangaung legacy

TheANC’s53rdnationalconferenceheldinMangaung(Bloemfonteinmunicipality)in

December2012resultedinthere-electionofPresidentZumaasANCpresident,despite


27


challenges from Deputy President Motlanthe, among others. Several ANC officials

opposingZuma’scandidaturefailedintheirbidforre-electiontoseniorpartypositions:

they includedNNEECCmembersMotlanthe, the formerminister of financeTrevor

Manuel,DipuoPeters andEbrahimPatel.152Although these individuals retain their

cabinetmembership theyareno longermembersof therulingparty’s innercircleof

influenceanddecision-making,asituationthatmightbringwithitmarkeddifferenceson

nuclearissuesandagendas.

TheANCregardsenergysecurityasanimportantaspectofthecountry’seconomic

‘transformation’.AfurtheroutcomeoftheMangaungconferencewastheadoptionof

policydocuments(suchastheNDP)andresolutionsinrespectof,forexample,energy

securityandstrategicmineralresources.SuchANCconferenceresolutionsareoftena

precursortoanappearanceonthegovernment’sownagenda.TheANCalsoadopted

aresolutiononthecountry’smineralsector,thedevelopmentofwhichitbelieveswill

contributetoeconomictransformation.Theresolutiondistinguishesbetweenseveral

typesofmineralsthatrequiredevelopment,namelythoseformanufacturing(ironore,

basemetalsandtheplatinumgroup),energy(coal,gas,shaleanduranium),agriculture

(phosphates,sulphurandlimestone),andinfrastructure(steel,cementandcopper).The

resolutionstatesthat‘thosestrategicmineralsthatrequirespecialpublicpolicymeasures

willbeindentified’andcallsforthe‘strengtheningofthestateminingcompany[African

ExplorationMiningandFinanceCorporation]’.153

S u m m A r y A n d c o n c L u S I o n

SouthAfrica’sprogresstowardsitslargestnuclearprocurementprogrammeistakingplace

inthecontextofchangeswithintheANCrulingparty,anincreaseinglobaldemandfor

uranium,andgrowingenergyneedswithinSouthAfrica.Thereisanationalshortageof

electricitysupply,arisingfromanagingenergyinfrastructure,arisingpopulationandan

ambitioussocio-economicdevelopmentprogramme.Tohelpachieveitsenergyobjectives

thegovernmenthasestablishedacommitteetodriveitsnuclearexpansionplans,anaction

thatonthefaceofitcontradictstherecommendationsoftheNPCthatfurtherfeasibility

studiesonnuclearenergyshouldbeconductedbeforeadecisiononanewnuclearfleet

istaken;nonethelessvariousgovernmentandregulatoryinstitutions,suchastheNPC,

theNNRandNecsaarebeingrestructuredinpreparationfornuclearpowerexpansion.

AfailuretocompleteEIAsfortheproposedsitesforthenewpowerstations,taken

withthepoorfinancialpositionofEskom,andgovernment’ssecrecyaboutvariousissues

inrespectofitsnuclearplans,constitutesamajorconcernandhasresultedinsomepublic

protest.Inadditiontothesefactors,resourcenationalismisontheriseinSouthAfrica,

whichisaimingtosecureitsfutureuraniumsupplies.Finally,persistentconcernsabout

SouthAfrica’snuclearfutureincludethehighcostoftheprogramme,itspreferenceover

alternativeenergysources,anopaquetenderprocess,safetyandsecurityissues,ageneral

lackoftransparency,andthequalityofleadershipintherulingparty.

Likemanydevelopingcountries,SouthAfricaseemstoregardnuclearenergyasa

panaceaforitsdevelopmentchallengesandenergyrequirements.Inaddition,nuclear

powergenerationcapabilitycarrieswithitsomeinternationalstatusandprestige.Inthe

wakeoftheIAEAINIRmissiontoSouthAfricanofFebruary2013,theSouthAfrican

28



governmentindicatedthatitwillmakeanannouncementinrespectofthecountry’sfuture

nuclearexpansionplansinJuly2013.Itremainsunclear,however,whethergovernment’s

nuclearagendaisalignedwiththeSouthAfricancitizenry’sideals.Thecostlyandsecretive

natureofgovernment’snuclearplansraisesseriousquestionsofprobity,especiallywhen

viewedagainstthebackdropofwideruneaseoverfailuresingovernanceandtransparency

standards.Public-privatesectorcollusiononsomemega-constructionprojects,conflictsof

interestarisingfromtheANC’sbusinessinterestsintheenergysectorthroughitseffective

shareholdinginHitachi,andthehigh-profilecorruptionrevealedinthearmsprocurement

saga,allfallintothiscategory.

UnlessSouthAfrica’snuclearplannersmeetsuchconcernshead-on,theirprogrammes

willfailtoinspireconfidence,athomeorabroad.

e n d n o t e S

1 IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency),World Energy Outlook 2012.Paris:IAEA,2012,p.6.

2 IAEA(InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency),The Database on Nuclear Power Reactors, 2013,

http://www.iaea.org/pris/.

3 AmanoY,Nuclear power after Fukushima, statementbyIAEAdirectorgeneral,Johannesburg,

8February2013,http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2013/amsp2013n02.html.

4 IAEA,Power Reactor Information System (PRIS): Country Statistics. Vienna:IAEA, 2013,http://

www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=JP.

5 Eskom,RSABriefing toTWG-LWR(TechnicalWorkingGroup–LightWaterReactors),

17thMeetingoftheTechnicalWorkingGrouponAdvancedTechnologiesforLWRs(TWG-

LWR), 18–20 June 2012, http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/Technology/

meetings/2012-06-18-20-TWG-LWR-HWR/5.SouthAfrica-LWR.pdf.

6 IAEA,Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. Vienna:IAEA,2012,p.76.

7 Engineering News, ‘Nuclear, shale gas shouldbepart of SA’s futurepowermix–Peters’,

19February2013,http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/nuclear-shale-gas-should-be-part-

of-sas-future-power-mix-peters-2013-02-19.

8 Government of South Africa, Statement to 56th Regular Session of the IAEA General

Conference, Vienna, 20 September 2012, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/

Statements/southafrica.pdf.

9 MotlantheK,video message by Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe,NationalNuclearEnergy

Conference,Sandton(Johannesburg),29May2012,http://www.presidency.gov.za/pebble.

asp?relid=6128.

10 Statistics South Africa, Census 2011: Statistical release. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa,

30October2012,p.14,http://www.statssa.gov.za/Publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf.

11 DBSA (Development Bank of Southern Africa), The State of South Africa’s Economic

Infrastructure 2012: Opportunities and Challenges.Midrand:DBSA,2012,p.61.

12 Engineering News, ‘SA needs bold, immediate decisions on energy plan implementation

– Eskom’, 6 November 2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-needs-bold-

immediate-decisions-on-energy-plan-implementation-eskom-2012-11-06.

13 DBSA,op. cit.,p.70.

14 ESI-Africa.com,‘KoebergtripputspressureonSApowersystem’,21February2013,http://

www.esi-africa.com/node/16032.


29


15 Eskom,2012,op. cit.

16 ESI-Africa.com,‘Koebergunit2backonthegrid’,3December2012,http://www.esi-africa.com/

node/15769.

17 Eskom,2012,op. cit.

18 South Africa, National Assembly, Portfolio Committee on Energy, Report of the Portfolio

Committee on Energy on the Strategic Plan of the 2012/13 – 2015/16 period and Budget Vote

No. 29 of the Department of Energy, 15May2012,http://www.pmg.org.za/files/doc/2012/

comreports/120516pcenergyreport.htm.

19 Nuclear Engineering International,‘News’,September2012,p.10;Eskom,mediastatement,

‘Koebergpowerunit2shutdown’,7September2012,http://www.eskom.co.za.

20 Eskom,Koeberg Power Station,2013,http://www.eskom.co.za/c/article/12/koeberg/.

21 NEA(OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment[OECD]NuclearEnergy

Agency)andIAEA,Uranium 2011: Resources, Production and Demand.Paris,OECDNEA&

IAEA,2012,p.91.

22 MotlantheservedaspresidentfromSeptember2008untilMay2009.

23 PetersD,Keynote Address by the Minister of Energy,tomeetinghostedbyMECforEconomic

Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, East London, 28 November 2012a,

http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/speeches/2012/Address%20by%20the%20Minister%20

EC-EU%20Renewable%20Energy%20Conference%20-%2028%20Nov%202012.pdf.

24 IAEA,Country Nuclear Power Profiles.Vienna:IAEA,2012,http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/

Publications/PDF/CNPP2012_CD/countryprofiles/SouthAfrica/SouthAfrica.htm.

25 MotlantheK,op. cit.

26 Polity.org.za, ‘SAplansR4-trillioninfrastructureroll-outover15years’,19October2012,

http://www.polity.org.za.

27 Mail & Guardian, ‘EskomtoownSouthAfrica’snuclearenergydream’,8November2012,

http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-08-eskom-to-own-south-africas-nuclear-energy-dream.

28 South Africa DOE, (Department of Energy), Integrated Resources Plan for Electricity

2010–2030,Pretoria,2011,p.11,http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/irp%20files/IRP2010_2030_

Final_Report_20110325.pdf.

29 SouthAfrica,DinP(DepartmentinthePresidency),Replies by President Jacob Zuma to questions

asked in the National Assembly, Question No 2911,19October2012,ThePresidency,Pretoria,

8November2012.

30 Engineering News, ‘Eskomwelcomesnuclearmovement,but saysguidance stillneeded’,

8 November 2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/eskom-welcomes-nuclear-

movement-but-says-guidance-still-needed-2012-11-08.

31 PetersD,2012a,op. cit.

32 PetersD,Mediabriefingonrequestforproposalfortherenewableenergyindependentpower

producersprocurementprogramme,Pretoria,29October2012b,http://www.energy.gov.za/IPP/

Minister%20Remarks%20-%20IPP%20W1%20Announcement%20-%2029Oct2012.pdf.

33 SouthAfrica,DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy),Nuclear Energy Policy for the Republic

of South Africa, Pretoria, 2008,http://www.energy.gov.za.

34 SouthAfrica,CGIS(GovernmentCommunicationsandInformationService),Phased decision

making model for nuclear build approved, 8 November 2012, http://www.sanews.gov.za/

news/12/12110812351002.

35 PetersD,addressbytheministerofenergytoNationalUnionofMineworkers(NUM)Nuclear

Energy Workshop, Johannesburg, 23 April 2012c, http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/

30



speeches/2012/RemarksByMinister_NUM_WorkshopOnNuclearEnergy_23April2012.pdf.

36 IAEA, INIR: Integrated infrastructure review mission. Guidance on preparing and conducting

INIR missions.Vienna:IAEA,2011,p.3.

37 SouthAfrica,DOE,IAEA-Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Pre-Mission to SA,media

statement, 17 October 2012, http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/pr/2012/Media%20

Statement%20-%20INIR%20IAEA%20Mission%201-%2017%20Oct%202012%20(2)[1].pdf.

38 Ibid.

39 IAEA,IAEAreviewsSouthAfrica’snuclearinfrastructureforexpansion,statement,8February

2013,http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2013/sainfrastructure.html.

40 Ibid.

41 Necsa(NuclearEnergyCorporationofSouthAfrica),Annual Report 2012.Pretoria:Necsa,

pp.16&44.

42 PortfolioCommitteeonEnergy,op. cit.

43 SouthAfrica,DME,op. cit.

44 Engineering News, ‘Russian-SouthAfricannuclearcooperationstrengthened’,9November

2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/bilateral-russian-south-african-nuclear-

cooperation-strengthened-2012-11-09.

45 NNR(NationalNuclearRegulator),Annual Report 2012,pp.36–41,http://www.nnr.co.za/

wp-content/uploads/2011/07/NNR-AR-2012.pdf.

46 Business Day Live,‘NuclearregulatorCEO’sresignation“willnotaffectplan”’,7November

2012a,http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/energy/2012/11/07/nuclear-regulator-ceos-resignation-

will-not-affect-plan.

47 SouthAfrica,DOE,Amendments to National Nuclear Regulator Act in pipeline,Parliamentary

reply,CapeTown,29November2011,http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/mining-and-energy/articles/

amendments-national-nuclear-regulator-act-pipeline.


49 SouthAfrica,DOD(DepartmentofDefence),South African Defence Review 2012,p.210,

http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=163572.

50 Addresstoparliamentbytheministerofstatesecurity, CapeTown,2June2011,http://www.

ssa.gov.za/Portals/0/SSA%20docs/Speeches/2011/Minister_Budget%20Vote%202011%20

Revised.pdf.

51 Ibid.,p.386.

52 ZumaJ,AddressatlaunchofAfricanExplorationMiningandFinanceCompany,26February

2011,http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=16569&tid=28970.

53 ChamberofMines,Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources, Johannesburg,

25March2011,www.bullion.org.za/documents/Parliament-presentation-2011.ppt.

54 South Africa, DMR (Department of Mineral Resources), South Africa’s Minerals Industry

2009/2010,27thedition.Pretoria:DMR,2010,p.7.

55 Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Facts and figures 2012, Johannesburg, 2012, p. 40,

http://www.bullion.org.za/documents/F_F_2012_Final_Web.pdf.

56 Ibid.,p.41.

57 HechtG,‘Anelementalforce:uraniumproductioninAfrica,andwhatitmeanstobenuclear’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,68,2,p.26.

58 Ibid.

59 WNA(WorldNuclearAssociation),Supply of uranium,updated,London,August2012,http://

www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf75.html.


31


60 OECDNEAandIAEA,op. cit.,p.12.

61 Ministerofenergy,Reply to National Council of Provinces Question 493,29November2011,

http://discover.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/policydocuments/policies11/DK113758.pdf;Kalinin

A,Rosatom Global Development, International Cooperation Perspective,RosatomSeminaron

RussianNuclearEnergyTechnologiesandSolutions,Sandton,2–3April2012,http://www.

niasa.co.za.

62 Reuters,‘SouthAfricaconsidersnuclearfuelcyclefacilities’,2April2012,http://www.reuters.

com/article/2012/04/02/safrica-nuclear-idUSL6E8F21AU20120402.

63 SouthAfrica,BuaNews (GCIS), ‘Govt identifiesuraniumas “strategicmineral” to secure

nuclearenergysupply’,12February2007,http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/govt-

identifies-uranium-as-strategic-mineral-to-secure-nuclear-energy-supply-2007-02-12.

64 Ibid.

65 SouthAfrica,DMR,A benefication strategy for the minerals industry of South Africa,June2011,

p.ii,http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=147564.

66 Thesemineralscomprisechromium,coalanduranium,diamonds,gold,iron-ore,manganese,

nickel,platinum,titaniumandvanadium.

67 SouthAfrica,DMR, op. cit.,p.ii,http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=147564.

68 Ibid.,p.15.

69 Independent Online,‘SAplayingbothsidesofthenuclearcoin’,30March2012,http://www.iol.

co.za.

70 Ibid.

71 PetersD,2012b,op. cit.


73 Necsa,op. cit.,p.16.

74 Reuters,op. cit.


76 ZumaJ,op. cit.

77 CentralEnergyFundLtd,annualfinancialstatementsforyearended31March2012,2012,

pp.16&18,http://www.cefgroup.co.za//pdf/CEF%202012%20VOLUME%201.pdf.

78 Ibid.,p.18.

79 The Wall Street Journal,‘SouthAfricapusheswiderstateminingrole’,23October2012,http://

online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203406404578074491566675444.html.

80 ZumaJ,op. cit.

81 SouthAfrica,DinP,statementonthecabinetmeetingof5December2012,6December2012,

http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=33060&tid=93594.

82 SouthAfrica,GCIS,South Africa Yearbook 2011/2012.Pretoria:GCIS,2011,p.179.

83 SouthAfrica,DOD,op. cit.

84 Engineering News, ‘Internationaluraniumenrichment facility attracts interest as it starts

delivering’, 16 November 2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/international-

uranium-enrichment-facility-attracting-growing-interest-as-it-starts-delivering-2012-11-16.

85 Ibid.

86 OECDNEAandIAEA,op. cit.,pp.120–121.

87 Formoreonthisprocess,refertoVanWykJK,South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy, 1990–2010:

Securing a niche role through norm construction and state identity, unpublishedDPhilthesis,

UniversityofPretoria,Pretoria,2013,http://www.academia.edu/2604774/South_Africas_nuclear_

diplomacy_1990-2010_Securing_a_niche_role_through_norm_construction_and_state_identity.

32



88 SouthAfrica,DFA(DepartmentofForeignAffairs),EU-Multilateral,2009,http://www.dfa.gov.

za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/treaties/.

89 Ibid.

90 NNR,op. cit.,p.3.

91 SouthAfrica,DinP,statementontheCabinetmeetingof5December2012,6December2012,

op. cit.

92 ElegbaSB, ‘NuclearpowerprogrammesinAfrica:nuclearsecurityandnon-proliferation’,

presentationtoInstituteforSecurityStudies(ISS)workshoponProgressonSecuringAfrica’s

NuclearResources,Johannesburg,8–9February2012.

93 MesheshaAZ,‘AfricanNuclearWeapon-FreeZoneTreaty(PelindabaTreaty):overview,status

&itsmajormilestones’,PresentationtoISSworkshoponProgressonSecuringAfrica’sNuclear

Resources,Johannesburg,8–9February2012.

94 Business Day Live, ‘SAsignsagreementonsharingnuclearknowledge’,6November2012,

http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/science/2012/11/06/sa-signs-agreement-on-sharing-nuclear-

knowledge.

95 SeeVanWykJK,‘Nucleardiplomacyasnichediplomacy:SouthAfrica’spost-apartheidrelations

withtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency’,South African Journal of International Affairs,

19,2,2012.pp.179–200;and‘SouthAfricaandtheglobalnuclearbazaar:normsandstate

identityinthenuclearexportcontrolregime’,Strategic Review for Southern Africa, XXXIV,1,

2012,pp.45–69.

96 Reuters,‘SouthAfricathrowsUNnuclearmeetingonIranintodisarray’,13September2012,

http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCABRE88C0I620120913.

97 SouthAfrica,DIRCO(DepartmentofInternationalRelationsandCooperation),updateon

investigationintoSA’sAmbassadortoOman,pressstatement,Pretoria,23October2012.

98 Reuters, ‘SAsuspendsIrancrudeimportsagain’,30November2012,http://www.iol.co.za/

business/markets/commodities/sa-suspends-iran-crude-imports-again-1.1433848.

99 Business Day Live, ‘Statekeeps independentpowerproducerswaiting’,16October2012,

http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/energy/2012/10/16/state-keeps-independent-power-

producers-waiting.

100 Engineering News,‘Russian–SouthAfricannuclearcooperationstrengthened’,op. cit.

101 SouthAfrica,DIRCO,statementbydeputyministerofinternationalrelationsandcooperation,

Pretoria,13November2012.

102 Engineering News,‘Alstom,Necsasignagreementonestablishmentofcodedweldingcentre’,

9November2012,http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/alstom-necsa-agreement-on-the-

establishment-of-coded-welding-centre-2012-11-09.

103 StruwigJ&BRoberts,‘HeartoftheMatter:NuclearAttitudesinSouthAfrica’,Human Sciences

Research Council (HSRC) Review,10,2, June2012,http://www.hsrc.ac.za/HSRC_Review_

Article-315.phtml.

104 Ministerofenergy,BudgetVote2012,NationalCouncilofProvinces,CapeTown,24May2012,

http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/speeches/2012/Combined%20Minister’s%20NCOP%20

Speech%202012%20Final%20Distribution%20copy.pdf.

105 SouthAfrica,DOE, ‘NuclearCommunicationandStakeholderEngagement’, presentation

totechnicalmeeting organisedbyIAEAandEuropeanAtomicForum(Foratom),Vienna,

9–11October2012,http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2012/2012-10-

09-10-11-TM-NPE/SouthAfrica-Maimane.pdf.

106 SouthAfrica,PortfolioCommitteeonEnergy,ReportontheStrategicPlanofthe2012/13–


33


2015/16periodandBudgetVoteNo.29oftheDOE,15May2012,http://www.pmg.org.za/files/

doc/2012/comreports/120516pcenergyreport.htm.

107 Engineering News,‘ConcernsraisedoverproposedNecsaPelindabasmelter’,11October2012,

http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/concerns-raised-over-proposed-necsa-pelindaba-

smelter-2012-10-11.


109 Engineering News,‘R4mforgovtnuclear“research”project’,2September2008,http://www.

engineeringnews.co.za/article/r4m-for-govt-nuclear-research-project-2008-09-02.


111 Ministerofenergy,ReplytoNationalAssemblyQuestion797,11April2012,http://discover.

sabinet.co.za/webx/access/policydocuments/policies12/DL040839.pdf.

112 ElectroniccommunicationwithThyspuntAlliance,13November2012.


114 Mail & Guardian Business,‘SAnotfitfornuclearexpansion’,23November2012,p.2.

115 SouthAfrica,NationalPlanningCommission(NPC),National Development Plan (NDP): Vision

2030,Pretoria,2011,p.172,http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=172300;

Mail & Guardian, ‘EskomtoownSouthAfrica’snuclearenergydream’,8November2012,

http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-08-eskom-to-own-south-africas-nuclear-energy-dream.

116 PetersD,2012b,op. cit.

117 See,forexample,mediastatementsbyGwedeMantashe,ANCGeneralSecretary.

118 Business Report, ‘Nuclear programme could burden future generations, committee told’,

31October2012,http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/nuclear-programme-could-

aburden-future-generations-committee-told-1.1414434.

119 Ministerofenergy,BudgetVote2012,CapeTown,17May2012,http://www.energy.gov.za/files/

media/speeches/2012/BudgetVoteSpeech_17May2012.pdf.

120 Business Report, ‘WhyNecsacutEskom’spricehike’,2March2013,http://www.iol.co.za/

business/business-news/why-nersa-cut-eskom-price-hike-1.1479562#.UTksK9a2bf8.

121 HitachiPowerAfrica,statementontheEskomboilercontractatMedupiandKusile,20April

2010,http://www.polity.org.za/article/statement-by-hitachi-power-africa-on-the-eskom-boiler-

contract-at-medupi-and-kusile-20042010-2010-04-20.

122 DA(DemocraticAlliance)mediastatement,‘PoliticallyconnectedHitachimustpaypenalties

fordelays’,24August2012,http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/pag

e71654?oid=321885&sn=Detail&pid=71654.

123 Mail & Guardian, ‘Govtnukebossgoesprivate’,9December2011,http://mg.co.za/article/2011-

12-09-govt-nuke-boss-goes-private.

124 Aveng Group, ‘Prominent physicist Rob Adam joins Aveng Group’, Media Release,

30November2011,http://www.aveng.co.za/news-room/press-releases/prominent-physicist-

rob-adam-joins-aveng-group.

125 Necsa,‘AppointmentofnewNecsaCEO’,mediastatement,16August2012,http://www.necsa.

co.za/Article/d817ec06-2286-4026-b8b8-f212426aede2/6/Appointment-of-new-necsa-ceo--

august-.aspx.

126 Business Day Live,2012a,op. cit.

127 South Africa, Parliament, Extended public committee, debate on Vote No 11 – Public

Enterprises,16May2012,http://www.parliament.gov.za.

128 Business Report, ‘CabinetwelcomesSOE’sreport’,7September2012,http://www.iol.co.za/

business/business-news/cabinet-welcomes-soes-report-1.1378142.

34



129 The New Age, ‘Stateownedentitiesreviewcontinues’,23January2013,http://www.thenewage.

co.za/mobi/Detail.aspx?NewsID=79717&CatID=1007.

130 Fin24 (CapeTown),‘Moody’scutsEskom,Telkomratings’,2October2012,http://www.fin24.

com/Economy/Moodys-cuts-Eskom-Telkom-ratings-20121002.

131 Engineering News,‘EskomoutlinesR149bntransmissionexpansionplanto2022’,23October

2012, http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/eskom-outlines-r149bn-transmission-

expansion-plan-to-2022-2012-10-23.

132 Mail & Guardian Business,‘Eskominpoweratallcosts’,9November2012,p.2.

133 BuaNews,‘GovthaltsPebbleBedModularReactorproject’,16September2010,http://www.

buanews.gov.za/rss/10/10091616351001.

134 Ibid.

135 Engineering News,‘FinalfateofPBMRtobedecidedduring2013’,17May2012,http://www.

engineeringnews.co.za/article/final-fate-of-pbmr-to-be-decided-during-2013-2012-05-17.

136 CANE(CoalitionagainstNuclearEnergy),‘SAofficiallyendssupporttoPBMRasactivists

rejoice&callforprobes’,29September2010,http://www.cane.org.za/pebble-bed-modular-

nuclear-reactor/sa-officially-ends-support-to-pbmr-as-activists-rejoice-call-for-probes/.

137 Business Day Live,‘SAnuclearcorporationinhotwaterover“breachofsecurity”’,9July2012,

http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2012/07/09/sa-nuclear-corporation-in-hot-water-over-breach-

of-security.

138 Die Burger, ‘Radioaktiewe materiaal in Epping gevind’, 8 November 2012, http://www.

dieburger.com/Suid-Afrika/Nuus/Radioaktiewe-materiaal-in-Epping-gevind-20121108#.


140 IAEA,IAEAandSouthAfricaworktogetheronstresstest,mediastatement,IAEA,Vienna,

23June2011,http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/koeberg.html.


142 Ministerofenergy,BudgetVote2012,CapeTown,17May2012,http://www.energy.gov.za/files/

media/speeches/2012/BudgetVoteSpeech_17May2012.pdf.

143 Eskom, Koeberg Public Safety Information Forum(PSIF), minutes, 27 September 2012,

http://www.nnr.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/PSIF-held-on-27-September-2012-at-Bulk-

Stores-6.pdf.

144 Ibid.


146 NTI(NuclearThreatInitiative),NTI Nuclear Material Security Index: building a framework for

assurance, accountability, and action.Washington:NTI,2012,p.109.

147 Section32oftheConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica,Act108of1996.

148 Mail & Guardian,‘Statewieldsapartheid’sbigstick’,16November2012,p.35.

149 DA,‘DAQuestionsEnergyMinister’sVeilofSecrecy’,pressrelease,24August2012,http://

allafrica.com/stories/201208250212.html.

150 GreenpeaceAfrica, ‘Greenpeace lodges complaintwithpublicprotector and thenation’s

HumanRightsCommission’,pressrelease,Johannesburg,19November2012,http://allafrica.

com/stories/201211200292.html.

151 Eyewitness News, ‘Greenpeace goes to Public Protector’, 18 November 2012, http://ewn.

co.za/2012/11/18/Greenpeace-goes-to-Public-Protector.

152 ANC,NationalExecutiveCommittee,2012,http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=9999.

153 ANC,53rd National Conference Resolutions, 2012,p.20and23,http://www.anc.org.za/docs/

res/2013/resolutions53r.pdf.

South African Institute of International Affairs

Jan Smuts House, East Campus, University of the Witwatersrand

PO Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Johannesburg, South Africa

Tel +27 (0)11 339-2021 • Fax +27 (0)11 339-2154

www.saiia.org.za • [email protected]

S A I I A ’ S f u n d I n G P r o f I L e

SAIIA raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual

donors. Our work is currently being funded by, among others, the Bradlow Foundation, the

United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, the European Commission,

the British High Commission of South Africa, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the

International Institute for Sustainable Development, INWENT, the Konrad Adenauer

Foundation, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Danish Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, the Royal Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International

Development Cooperation Agency, the Canadian International Development Agency,

the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations

Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Economic Commission for

Africa, the African Development Bank, and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa.

SAIIA’s corporate membership is drawn from the South African private sector and

international businesses with an interest in Africa. In addition, SAIIA has a substantial number

of international diplomatic and mainly South African institutional members.

African perspectives. Global insights.South Africa

n Institute of In

te

rnat

iona

l Affa

irs

Documents

South Africa's Nuclear Future