REPORT FROM A ROUNDTABLE HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S POLICY PLANNING STAFF

SELF-DETERMINATION

Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, andthe Right to Secession

Patricia Carley

UNITED STATESINSTITUTE OF PEACE

Summary v

Preface ix

1 Introduction 1

2 A History of the Self-Determination Concept 3

3 The Rise of Contemporary Self-Determination Movements 5

4 The Self-Determination Principle: Legal Definitions and Obligations 8

5 A Specific Case: The Crisis in Chechnya 11

6 U.S. Interests and Possible Policy Options 13

7 Conclusion 18

About the Author 19

About the Institute 20

CONTENTS

The right to self-determination has becomeone of the most complex issues for U.S. for-eign policymakers and the international

community at large. Confusion over the issuestems not so much from whether there exists aright to self-determination, which is included inmany international human rights documents, butfrom the failure of those documents to define ex-actly who is entitled to claim this right—a group, apeople, or a nation—and what exactly the right con-fers. At the same time, the international system,particularly in the post–World War II era, hassteadfastly defended the inviolability of existingnation-states’ borders, regardless of how and whenthey were determined.

In recent years, many groups that constitute mi-norities in their states have invoked the “right toself-determination” in their demands for auton-omy—or, in some cases, secession—and have re-sorted to violence to pursue their aims. Thesegroups typically justify their demand for self-deter-mination as a way to end years of repression andhuman rights violations by the majority ethnicgroup or the central government. The absence of aprecise definition of what the right to self-determi-nation entails has left the international commu-nity, and the states concerned, without guidingprinciples with which to respond.

Recognizing the challenge to peace posed by de-mands for self-determination (and governments’responses to them), the United States Institute ofPeace, working with the Policy Planning Staff ofthe U.S. Department of State, assembled a group ofpolicymakers and scholars to examine the origins,growth, and strategies of such movements, and todiscuss whether universal principles can be devel-oped to inform international, and particularly U.S.,responses. This report summarizes the discussionsat that meeting.

Self-determination as a political force in interna-tional society is a relatively recent phenomenon,emerging in the aftermath of World War I and thebreakup of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarianempires as a demand of national groups seeking todivide territory. President Woodrow Wilson wasthe statesman most closely identified with the self-determination principle, though ironically theterm does not appear in his “Fourteen Points”speech. While he referred to minority rights withina larger state, he rarely mentioned the establish-ment of new, independent states.

Self-determination became officially sanctionedafter 1945, when it was included in the United Na-tions Charter, though it applied to existing states,not to peoples or national groups. However, self-determination quickly evolved from a principle toa right, especially after the 1960 UN Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peo-ples, when the term came to denote decoloniza-tion. Still, self-determination applied to territoriesand not to peoples.

Since the 1970s, there has been a move to com-bine the ideas of minority rights and decoloniza-tion, and the result has been a tendency on thepart of some advocates to define self-determina-tion as conferring the right to independent state-hood on every distinctive ethnic group.

Many observers of this trend share the concernthat confusion about what the principle of self-determination means and what putative rights itconfers is helping to fuel the violence characteriz-ing contemporary independence movements. Yetthe realities of the international system provide arationale of sorts for such movements, includingthe view that internationally recognized bordersare “artificial, arbitrary, and accidental” and thatthey in fact legitimize the combining of differentpeoples arbitrarily, and often against their will,

v

SUMMARY

within the same territory. Moreover, the growth ofthese movements is not a temporary phenome-non, but the direct result of changes in the worldwrought by the universal application of Westernideas such as democracy and human rights. Mostof the world’s peoples have little experience withthe West’s long history of sovereignty and state-hood and are thus not prepared to adhere to theWestern insistence on the inviolability of existingborders. Those in the West who are alarmed by thegrowth of these nationalist movements shouldconsider not whether these contemporary mani-festations of nationalism are legal or appropriate,but rather that they are happening—and that theyvery likely cannot be stopped. The potential for vi-olence and international instability becomes evenmore obvious when one considers that some stillvery large empires, such as Russia and China, arelikely to be affected by these movements.

Unfortunately, turning to international legalstandards on the right to self-determination doesnot resolve the problem, since the right has neverbeen explicitly defined. In any case, it is impracti-cal to assume that legal principles alone will re-solve what are essentially territorial and politicaldisputes. Because the right has never been defined,the notion of self-determination typically embracesseveral different meanings, none of which ad-dresses the central issue of how to respond to a na-tional or other identity group’s aspirations for con-trol over the lives of its members.

Without a doubt, any new definition of self-determination must include customary humanrights standards (e.g., respect for individual andminority rights) and the right of an appropriatebody to enforce those standards. In their laterstages, self-determination movements typically be-come the target of human rights violations, whichshould be addressed before they reach the often in-tractable phase of organized struggle against thestate. However, the right to self-determinationmust be separated from the right to secession andthe establishment of independent statehood, withthe understanding that there are intermediate cate-gories short of statehood that can address a minor-ity group’s interests and aspirations, such as mem-bership in various international forums or regionalorganizations. Human rights violations are easy tocondemn; the dilemma is whether they justify thepersecuted group’s secession from the state, a

conclusion the international community is largelyunwilling to draw. Thus the question becomes,Can a principle be developed that stands some-where in between recognized human rights stan-dards and the right to self-determination?

Somewhat ironically, the very propagation ofthe idea of human rights intensifies demands forgreater recognition among minority groups that in-voke claims of human rights violations to supporttheir demands. However, the idea that humanrights and political stability are bound to clash istenuous, since states held together through terrorand repression are rarely stable in most senses ofthe word. In the end, though, it may not be possi-ble to compel an oppressive government to end itsunacceptable actions toward a minority group ifoutside countries are unwilling to intervene withmilitary force.

U.S. policy interests in the self-determinationdebate beg a preliminary question: What exactlydoes the United States care about with regard toself-determination movements—the outcome ofthe struggle (i.e., the shifting of boundaries and theproliferation of states) or the means used to obtainit (i.e., the violence that frequently accompaniessuch struggles)? Unfortunately, American diplo-macy often cannot decide between these two inter-ests, making a response that much more difficultto formulate. Generally, though, the United Statesshould be less concerned about outcomes in thesestruggles than about the means used; internationalpolitical stability is more likely to be maintained byfocusing on the process than by trying to manipu-late events to arrange a predetermined outcome.

The options for a minority group waging astruggle for self-determination do not have to beviewed in the zero-sum terms of independence orassimilation, despite the fact that international lawtends to reinforce this approach. The United Statescould encourage the practice of granting some in-termediate status short of independent statehoodto unrecognized peoples or other distinct eco-nomic or political entities. Parallel or multiple rep-resentation for substate entities that function au-tonomously (such as Taiwan’s participation in theGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) can pro-vide outlets for what otherwise might be secession-ist pressures. Legitimate secessionist aspirationscould be diverted to nonterritorial demands, thusavoiding a strictly territorial interpretation of

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self-determination. The United States might alsoconsider advocating a change in the current sys-tem that allows the government to conduct its af-fairs only with other states and not with subunitswithin states. However, offering subgroups somesort of recognition or representation in interna-tional forums or organizations may ultimately leadto greater demands from smaller and smaller iden-tity groups for independence and UN representa-tion.

The United States may have no choice but toavoid the pronouncement of clear doctrines andprinciples regarding self-determination move-ments and thereby avoid being driven to intervenein conflicts according to rigid principles that cer-tainly do not apply in every instance. The UnitedStates should, however, make absolutely clear thatsecession has not been universally recognized asan international right. It may choose, on the basisof other interests, to support the secessionistclaims of a self-determination movement, but notbecause the group is exercising its right to seces-sion, since no such right exists in international law.At the same time, an absolute rejection of secessionin every case is unsound, because the United

States should not be willing to tolerate anotherstate’s repression or genocide in the name of terri-torial integrity. Secession can be a legitimate aim ofsome self-determination movements, particularlyin response to gross and systematic violations ofhuman rights and when the entity is potentiallypolitically and economically viable.

Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to thedilemmas presented by self-determination move-ments in the world today. Clearly, in the face of thegrowing number of such movements, establishinga definition of the right to self-determination isnecessary, though agreement on such a definitionwill not be easy—and even then, it will not likely beconclusive and unequivocal. The desire among na-tional groups to seek self-determination is not asimple matter with a single cause. Rather, it stemsfrom multiple sources, including the denial of mi-nority rights, territorial disputes, national aspira-tions, and the belief in economic and political via-bility, among others. This desire may developgradually until the last resort to violence and seces-sion come into play. Unfortunately, the inattentive-ness of the world community often makes what isin fact a gradual process seem very sudden.

The thorny topic of self-determination has in-creasingly demanded the attention of U.S.policymakers and the international commu-

nity. Partly because of the postwar communica-tions revolution, peoples around the globe have anincreased awareness of the state system’s seem-ingly permanent configuration and of their placein it. Some of these groups, whether in pursuit ofgreater international recognition or in response torepressive government policies, are now seeking toexercise what they see as their right to self-determi-nation, which they assume includes the right to in-dependent statehood. Do such groups have thisright? Is this an inevitable consequence of theprocesses of imperial dissolution, decolonization,and increased global awareness? How should theinternational community, and the United States inparticular, respond?

All too frequently, self-determination move-ments resort to violence to achieve their aims. Theorigins of these movements sometimes remain ob-scure, however, and the outside world pays littleattention to them until conflict breaks out, leavingsimilarly inclined groups with the “lesson” that vio-lence is the only practical course of action. And, ofcourse, it is that much more difficult to determinea policy response when conflict has raised both the

stakes and the resolve of the players to pursuetheir aims at all costs.

With its mandate to pursue the study of peace-ful resolution to international conflicts, the UnitedStates Institute of Peace convened a meeting on“Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial In-tegrity, and the Right to Secession” in February1995. The all-day session, organized in conjunc-tion with the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. De-partment of State, allowed government policymak-ers and outside experts to gather and discussfreely, practically, and informally the complex is-sues surrounding self-determination and seces-sionist movements. The informal nature of the dis-cussions is particularly important, because in theWest the issue of self-determination is often ad-dressed from a formal, legalistic standpoint. Whilemost of the participants in this session were wellacquainted with the political and legal terminologyused to describe self-determination, what it meansin practical terms is by far the trickier issue. Be-cause self-determination encompasses so many is-sues—including individual and minority rights, re-gional autonomy, government repression,territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and claims toindependence, to name but a few—the most diffi-cult task in planning such a meeting was to deter-mine which aspects of the issue would be ad-dressed. The resulting focus on territorial integrityand the right to secession should not suggest thatthe other aspects are not important; rather, it wasan attempt to set limits on a topic that can easilybecome extremely complicated and broad.

The discussion proved to be so valuable that theInstitute decided to make it available to a wider au-dience. The session’s report, we believe, fills a gapin the literature available to members of the U.S.policy community who do not always have the op-portunity to read longer, more in-depth, scholarlytreatments of the subject. While the United StatesInstitute of Peace has published many works ex-amining the causes behind various self-determina-tion movements—books such as Minorities at Risk:A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts by TedRobert Gurr and its Series on Religion, National-ism, and Intolerance—this is the Institute’s first ef-fort to address the theoretical and practical aspectsof the self-determination problem in such a com-prehensive manner. The Institute plans to hold

ix

PREFACE

follow-up meetings to explore the self-determina-tion issue further, and reports from those sessionswill also be made available.

The meeting was organized by Institute pro-gram officer Patricia Carley. The Institute would

like to thank Adam Wasserman of the Departmentof State’s Policy Planning Staff for helping to orga-nize the meeting. This report was prepared by Ms.Carley and edited by Peter Pavilionis.

x

The right to self-determination as declared inmany international documents is fast be-coming one of the thorniest issues for the in-

ternational community and U.S. foreign policy-makers in particular. Considerable confusion andconflict have resulted not so much over the notionof the right to self-determination, proclaimed insuch documents as the International Covenantson Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act, butover the definition of self-determination. What ex-actly does this right entail—autonomy? statehood?What other rights come with it? Who is able to ex-ercise it? Who is not, and why?

Since the end of World War I, and especiallysince World War II, the world has ordered its af-fairs with an international system based on theconcept of states whose borders, no matter howthey were originally determined, are considered in-violable. However, few, if any, nation-states have in-ternational borders that unambiguously encom-pass one nation or people, or even several peopleswho voluntarily agreed to become part of onestate. Many peoples, distinct and recognizable bymost criteria, do not have their own nation-states,and they find themselves a discrete minoritywithin a state. In some cases, they are dividedamong several states.

The United Nations, and other international or-ganizations have steadfastly defended this system

of states. They have also defended the right of peo-ples to self-determination as outlined in the UNCharter. However, the self-determination principlehas been interpreted differently at different timesand has been inconsistently applied as a result. Inthe wake of rapid political, social, and technologi-cal changes in the world, distinct national groupshave pushed demands for their own states to thetop of their political agendas. These nationalgroups have armed themselves with the claim toself-determination, in which the right to secessionis seen as an implicit, integral part. Because the is-sue is so complex and potentially explosive, the re-sponse of the international community has fre-quently been to sidestep it.

However, this nonresponse is becoming in-creasingly untenable as the inconsistencies in thepresent system become more obvious. As a greaternumber of national groups demand some level ofrecognition, the international community finds it-self without concrete principles with which to re-spond. The failure to define self-determination ex-plicitly, while perhaps intentional, has left U.S.policymakers and international organizations illequipped to respond to the ever-increasing num-ber of claims from currently unrepresented (atleast in nation-state form) minority and other na-tional groups throughout the world.

In practical terms, the current system provides aseat at the United Nations for Monaco, but not forthe Kurds. Armenians and Uzbeks are now legallyoutside the bounds of Soviet-cum-Russian colo-nialism, but other non-Russians currently in theRussian Federation (such as the Chechens) arenot—not least because they were designated with adifferent ethno-territorial status in Stalin’s policy ofnational delimitation. Certainly the uncheckedproliferation of new states is not a desired out-come, but the reasons frequently cited against se-cession—the need for stability and the inviolabilityof borders—are falling on the increasingly deaf earsof those who consider them nothing more than asmoke screen to protect an existing—and, in theireyes, unjust—system.

As with many human rights matters, the likeli-hood that an unrepresented national identitygroup will move beyond demands for equality tofight for independence depends to some, perhapsa large, extent on the nature of the governmentthat has sovereignty over the group. Peoples whoare denied basic cultural, linguistic, and political

1INTRODUCTION

1

rights by their rulers are more likely to resort to vi-olence than those who have been given a largemeasure of local autonomy.

Encouraging democracy and respect for humanrights and granting local autonomy might be theanswer to the self-determination dilemma, but thisapproach does not resolve the matter across theboard, as self-determination struggles leading toseparatist demands exist in developed democra-cies (e.g., Canada’s Quebecois separatists and theScottish National Movement). Some nations orgroups feel so aggrieved, so repressed by theirrulers, that offers of local autonomy that mighthave sufficed at one point are no longer adequate.It is as if a certain line has been crossed, a point ofno return, beyond which full independence be-comes the only acceptable goal.

U.S. Interests

For its part, the United States has largely avoideddefining exactly what the right to self-determina-tion includes. It is usually defined by describingwhat it does not include—the right to secession, forexample—but that response has not proved to beadequate, nor has it been found acceptable tomany of the peoples in question.

The question should be asked, Must self-deter-mination be explicitly defined? Why should theUnited States want to address this complex andpotentially explosive issue? Perhaps there is nopractical course but to continue to approach thematter on a case-by-case basis, taking into accountother strategic, political, and economic interests ineach instance. However, this course does have itsdrawbacks, as witnessed in the continuing chaosand the terrorism that often accompany self-deter-mination movements.

The Institute Roundtable

Recognizing the challenge to world peace that de-mands for self-determination present, the United

States Institute of Peace convened a small studygroup in February 1995 to address the issue. TheInstitute worked with the Policy Planning Staff ofthe U.S. Department of State to bring togetherlawyers, political scientists, and regional expertswho have considered this question in the widersense, along with relevant policymakers who un-derstand the practical aspects of the problem. Thediscussion was chaired by Max Kampelman, vicechairman of the Institute’s board of directors andformer U.S. ambassador to the Conference on(now Organization for) Security and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE, now OSCE). The purpose of themeeting was to discuss candidly the nature of self-determination, its evolution, and the range of re-cent applications. The primary focus was whetheruniversal organizing principles can be formulatedto guide U.S. policymakers, and what likely chal-lenges and opportunities will be presented by fu-ture appeals to the right to self-determination.

The discussion raised several questions of keysignificance to policymakers. Do international or-ganizations to which the United States belongs—such as the UN and OSCE—provide adequate guid-ance on the self-determination issue for policy-makers? If not, is it possible to develop a set of gen-eral principles to use in responding to self-determi-nation crises? In other words, to what extent iseach situation so specific that general principlessimply cannot be applied? What activities are ac-ceptable for a sovereign state to use to hold itselftogether? How can potential problems be identi-fied before they erupt into conflict? More practi-cally, what influence can the United States exert onthe governments and peoples involved in suchconflicts?

2

Hurst Hannum of the Fletcher School ofLaw and Diplomacy described three erasthat have shaped the history of the con-

cept of self-determination. The first era began inthe nineteenth century and lasted through theWilsonian period, ending in approximately 1945.Hannum reminded the participants that John Stu-art Mill, among others, first suggested the connec-tion between ethnicity, language, and culture onthe one hand, and statehood on the other, a viewthat informed many of the nationalist movementsof the nineteenth century. Ironically, Hannum con-tended, the classic nationalist movements of thatera were not about the breakup of empires, butabout the unification of “nations” such as Germanyand Italy. It was only after the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires began to disintegrate that self-determination became a rallying cry of smaller na-tional groups as a means of dividing, rather thanunifying, territory.

At this time, Hannum continued, the essentialqualities of the concept of self-determination were,first, that it was a purely political principle, usuallyreferring to some sort of autonomy rather thanstatehood for ethnic or national groups, and sec-ond, that the right was not absolute, but relative:Certain political and economic requirements, suchas economic viability and geographic size, werenecessary to warrant statehood. Finally, in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the con-cept of self-determination was seen almost invari-ably in terms of another, much more important,political goal of promoting world peace.

These limitations on self-determination were ac-cepted by President Woodrow Wilson, who was,according to Hannum, the statesman most closelyidentified with the principle. Ironically, however,the term “self-determination” does not appear inWilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech, which primar-ily addresses autonomy and minority rights. More-over, Wilson distinguished between “internal” and“external” interpretations of self-determination; theformer, referring to a people’s right to choose itsown form of government without outside pres-sure, was of far greater concern to him. Indeed, herarely mentioned the external aspect of self-deter-mination, the one associated with the establish-ment of independent states. Wilson did want anarticle on self-determination included in theCovenant of the League of Nations, but he wasoverruled on this point, not least by the Europeanpowers, which were extremely suspicious of theterm. Wilson’s views on self-determination, Han-num stressed, should be understood in the con-text of his emphasis on a state’s internal politics—the protection of a minority’s cultural andlinguistic rights. Wilson never considered self-determination to be an absolute right.

The establishment of the United Nations in1945 marked the beginning of the second era ofthe self-determination idea. Unlike the League ofNations Covenant, the UN Charter mentions self-determination twice. However, Hannum pointedout, the term very clearly applies to states and notto peoples or groups. Yet, once the idea was writ-ten into the Charter, it very quickly evolved from aprinciple to a right. The UN continued to defineself-determination in broad language but, again, itwas never seen as an absolute or unlimited right.

The most important document in the promo-tion of the right to self-determination, and one that provides a clear indication of its meaning during this era, was the 1960 UN Declaration onthe Granting of Independence to Colonial Peo-ples. According to Hannum, the criteria underly-ing the right did not include possession of a dis-tinct ethnicity, language, or culture; rather,self-determination was simply a more appealingterm for decolonization. In fact, four principlescharacterize self-determination during this era.

3

2A HISTORY OF THE

SELF-DETERMINATION

CONCEPT

First, self-determination referred only to decolo-nization. Second, it did not apply to peoples but toterritories. Third, self-determination was now con-sidered an absolute right—though, again, forcolonies only; this marked a significant changefrom the previous era. Finally, self-determinationdid not allow for secession; instead, the territorialintegrity of existing states and most colonial terri-tories was assumed. The essential quality of self-determination during this era, Hannum empha-sized, was not that all peoples had the right ofself-determination, but that all colonies had theright to be independent.

The third, and most problematic, era in the de-velopment of the concept began with the end of

decolonization in the late 1970s and continues tothe present. This stage is characterized by the at-tempt in recent decades to fuse the first two eras;that is, to combine the ethnic and cultural rights ofminorities that Wilson championed with the terri-torial absolutism of decolonization. The result hasbeen a tendency to redefine self-determination tomean that every distinctive ethnic or nationalgroup has a right to independence. But thoughself-determination has taken on this new meaningin a popular sense, it has not been accepted by anystate or by international law.

4

The combination of self-determination’s origi-nal definition and later interpretations hascaused considerable confusion, Hannum

stated. Today, the goal of states should be, first, toidentify and explicitly define self-determinationand the criteria that determine which entities areentitled to exercise the right. Contemporary politi-cal movements that demand the right to secedehave frequently resorted to violence precisely be-cause of the confusion and uncertainty surround-ing their proclaimed goal of self-determination,and both international law and official Western re-actions have done little to clarify the situation. Sec-ond, the international community should developsome parameters that determine exactly what theright to self-determination includes. For example,according to Hannum, some people or groups maybe entitled to invoke and exercise this right, but itshould be made clear that this does not necessarilyinclude the right to independent statehood.

Modern Realities: The Impermanenceof Borders and Raised Expectations

Graham Fuller of the RAND Corporation declaredthat the United States must be prepared to under-stand the world “not the way it ought to be, but the

way it is,” since all too often in the case of self-determination and other nationalist movements“the law is running after reality.” In examining thecauses behind the outbreak of self-determinationmovements, several realities of today’s world sim-ply cannot be ignored. First, Fuller maintainedthat existing borders between internationally rec-ognized nation-states are “artificial, arbitrary, andaccidental.” Furthermore, they are not permanent.Second, although some states, mostly in the West,are a reflection of the congruence of ethnic and ter-ritorial boundaries, most are not so constituted.These other states are typically “mini-empires” oreven greater empires of ethnically distinct peopleswho find themselves arbitrarily forced to livewithin the same borders.

Third, the current concern over self-determina-tion is not merely a “post-Soviet blip”; that is, thedilemma is not just a regional, short-term phasefollowing the breakup of the Soviet Union. Manypeoples around the globe are going through theirown process of self-discovery. More than ever be-fore, these peoples seek liberation to “get back totheir history.” The origins of this self-discoveryprocess, Fuller said, are many. There is a growinginternational awareness that “things do not have tobe they way they are,” as identity groups discoverthat they no longer have to endure intolerableforms of government. This awareness has been ac-celerated by the contemporary application of theWestern heritage of democracy and human rights,and the peculiarly American notion of individualfulfillment. It is Americans, Fuller maintained, whoare in fact “corrupting the rest of the world” withthese ideas.

According to Fuller, it is perhaps ironic that theattraction to democratic values encourages ethnicself-awareness and, in some cases, secessionistmovements. Though it may be a cliché, it is evidentthat the revolutionary developments in mass com-munications are largely responsible for the spreadof these ideas. In many instances, the introductionof such democratic values as freedom of speech,assembly, and the press are accelerating the devel-opment of minority groups’ self-awareness and, insome cases, demands for greater autonomy oreven independence. Furthermore, there is a newkind of globalized elite that is increasingly alien-ated from the “lumpen” masses. Some of thosewho are disadvantaged as a result of rapid global

3THE RISE OF

CONTEMPORARY

SELF-DETERMINATION

MOVEMENTS

5

economic changes are turning to ethnicity and na-tionalism to address their grievances. The “massculture” emanating from the United States reflectsthis gross imbalance of economic power and in-creases resentment among disadvantaged groupsthe world over. Nationalism, ethnicity, and religionare increasingly used as instruments in expressingsuch resentment. This is apparent in many ThirdWorld countries that are experiencing rapid eco-nomic development and urbanization along withdeclining publicservices. In thesecountries, margin-alized groupssearch for newsources of identityand loyalty otherthan those offeredby a state that hasapparently aban-doned them. Theadoption of alter-nate sources of identity, such as ethnicity and reli-gion, and their use as political instruments is be-coming increasingly common.

Echoing some of Fuller’s assertions, Kampel-man noted that people in some countries arehealthier and living longer than ever before; how-ever, a significant portion of the world has not en-joyed such an improvement in living standards.Global communications (mainly television andfilms) display these higher living standards to theworld’s population, including those who have notbenefited from modernization. Understandably,they too want to experience the benefits, and ten-sions arise from the “unstoppable drive” of peoplein the Third World wanting what the advanced in-dustrial nations already have. This situation threat-ens those in the wealthier nations who are con-cerned that their benefits will decline as moreeconomic resources are transferred abroad andthose in the Third World who lead more tradi-tional lives and generally do not aspire to whatthey perceive to be “crass Western materialism.”

Unfulfilled Nationalism

Fuller also described a global “cycle of ethnicity”currently under way that has divided the world’speoples into two loose categories. There are those

in the camp of “matured nationalisms”—in westernEurope, for example—whose members are rela-tively “fulfilled” in terms of identity and are thuscomfortable surrendering varying degrees of sov-ereignty. Another, much larger, group of peopleslacks such fulfillment and thus clings tightly totheir ethnic sources of identity. For example, it isvery difficult to tell the Kazakhs to accept a multi-ethnic state cheerfully when they have just comeout from under Russian domination. For a Kazakh,

accepting a multi-ethnic state is tan-tamount to allow-ing the Russians tocontinue their aimof destroyingKazakh languageand culture. Thus,the nation-buildingagenda of theKazakh people ismarkedly different

from a similar Western agenda, which typically em-phasizes ethnic and cultural “diversity.” The realityis that some peoples are moving away from anation-state identity and giving up some sover-eignty, while other groups—the majority—are de-manding the right to establish themselves in a newnation-state, to build a “national project.”

According to Fuller, the issue now is notwhether these manifestations of nationalism are le-gal or appropriate, but simply that they are hap-pening. The question is what the West’s responsewill be. This process cannot be stopped, he con-tended: “There are no rules for saying that thegates of nationalism are closed because the rulesare being changed all the time.” It is not sufficientto say “just assimilate,” because most groups aresimply not going to “commit cultural suicide”through such assimilation. Furthermore, Fullersaid, the world is going to see some very big em-pires, including China and Russia, affected bythese developments. The continent of Africa islikely to be a “staggering mess” as the concepts ofethnicity and borders enter future debates overidentity.

Scott Thompson of the Fletcher School of Lawand Diplomacy, a member of the Institute’s boardof directors, disagreed with this last point, arguingthat in many Third World countries, such as thosein Africa, new loyalties to the state are in fact

6

The continent of Africa is likely to be a

“staggering mess” as the concepts of

ethnicity and borders enter future debates

over identity.

7

emerging. Over a period of forty years, for exam-ple, there have been no major challenges to thecolonial borders on the African continent. Indeed,for many African states, the colonially contrivedborders are the basis for their identity, and a newgeneration of elites in these countries owes its alle-giance to the state—though this is often the case,Thompson admitted, for less than admirable rea-sons.

In response, Fuller maintained that there willundoubtedly be a period of immense global chaosin the future. The United States is caught betweenwhat international law prescribes, on the onehand, and what its commitment to democratic val-ues and human rights implies on the other. Provid-ing these restive groups with financial assistancemay ease the situation, but it will not solve theproblem, since these “urges are not at heart eco-nomic.” Rather, they go to the matter of self-identity and knowing one’s place in the world.

Yugoslavia’s Breakup and theDemonstration Effect

Outlining some of the reasons that the world isseeing such an unprecedented growth in seces-sionist movements, Lori Damrosch of ColumbiaUniversity Law School suggested that the currentproblem is only partially a reflection of ancient ani-mosities among peoples. The international re-sponse to the situation in the former Yugoslaviahas also exacerbated the problem. Other relativelysmall ethnic groups in the world, Damrosch ex-plained, have likened themselves to the variousethnic groups in the Balkan territory and havecome to believe that they too can get a similar re-sponse from the international community to theirdemands for self-determination. That response, es-pecially from the European Community, suggestedthat a “federation” in the process of disintegrationcould seek “validation of a secessionist outcomeon the basis of a process that purported to be ju-ridical, but in reality was essentially political,” ac-cording to Damrosch. Leaders of other secession-ist movements, she maintained, could believe thatthey were in the midst of the same process, that

their federations (e.g., the USSR or the RussianFederation) were in the process of breaking up andthat the same purportedly juridical result—theemergence of an independent state—could be vali-dated through the supposedly “legal” claim of self-determination.

David Scheffer of the Department of State dis-agreed with Damrosch’s contention that the inter-national reaction to Yugoslavia’s dissolution hasfueled not only the resulting mass violence, butother peoples’ claims to the right to self-determina-tion as well. According to Scheffer, there is no evi-dence that if Yugoslavia had stayed together therewould not have been acts of genocide. No one cannow establish for certain that there would not havebeen a vicious civil war even in a unified Yugo-slavia. In fact, a great deal of the fighting occurredbefore the breakup of the country in 1992. Now,however, it seems like conventional wisdom to as-sert that if only the Western powers had restrainedtheir willingness to recognize the independence ofthe former Yugoslav republics, none of the fightingwould have occurred.

Kampelman argued that, regardless of whetheror not hasty Western recognition of the Yugoslavrepublics fueled independence movements, manyother peoples demanding self-determination havenow seen in the Yugoslav situation that violencecan work; after all, he said, it is working for theSerbs. It is difficult to ask other groups to re-nounce violence when it has gone so completelyunpunished in the former Yugoslavia. PeterSchoettle of the Department of State pointed outtwo other cases that illustrate why current self-determination problems have become so acute,often turning violent. Tamil separatists in SriLanka and the Turkish community in Cyprus havesought a political solution to their grievances fordecades. It became clear, however, that nonviolentmeans were simply not working; consequently, thetwo groups resorted to violence. Schoettle sug-gested that even if there were an international fo-rum that could have heard their grievances, or alegal mechanism in place to respond to them, theviolent outcome probably would not have beendifferent.

Ralph Steinhardt of George WashingtonUniversity Law School outlined four es-sential propositions regarding self-deter-

mination and international law. The first is that thelaw simply will not definitively resolve competingclaims for power or territorial disputes, though itcan provide the requisite mechanism in attemptsto do so. Yet the paradox remains: Self-determina-tion has little legal meaning but is nevertheless atremendously powerful political principle.

The second proposition regarding the legal con-text of self-determination is that international lawis not “univocal” on the subject. Self-determinationhas never been defined; hence, its mere mentionconjures up several different meanings at once. Ac-cording to one definition, self-determination refersto the end of colonialism and the creation of newstates. Another says that self-determination isshorthand for the rights of states; that is, the sover-eign prerogative that defines relations among ex-isting states (the right to their own political des-tiny, the right to equality in relations with otherstates, etc.). Yet another meaning of self-determina-tion involves the protection of individual and col-lective human rights and popular democratic rule.

The problem is, Steinhardt continued, that noneof these definitions speaks to the central issue ofhow to respond to an identity group’s aspirationsfor control over its own future. Even the third

definition, the “democracy gloss” on self-determi-nation, fails to answer this question, since democ-racy is essentially majority rule, and in most casesthe majority is more likely to trample on than tohonor the rights of a minority identity group. Fur-thermore, international law is not univocal on thevalue of independent statehood; it is currently soft-ening its “premium” on statehood by allowing non-state actors to play roles in the articulation and en-forcement of international law.

The third basic proposition about the legal con-text of self-determination is that it is not a “suicidepact” in that it does not oblige any state to subju-gate its own self-interest. Law is basically an ex-pression of self-interest and has evolved accord-ingly over time.

The fourth proposition is that law is constantlychanging. After several distinct eras, Steinhardtmaintained, the self-determination norm is at a leg-islative turning point. There are several new mean-ings or “clusters of principles” that should be in-cluded in the right to self-determination, just asthere are new ways in which the right should be in-terpreted.

First of all, the right to self-determination mustbe addressed in light of customary human rightsconcerns, especially those of interest to identitygroups. Second, it should be understood that iden-tity groups have options short of statehood to airtheir demands. Specifically, they have the right toparticipate in bodies such as assemblies of nationalminority affairs, local autonomous administra-tions, decentralized and local forms of govern-ment, and mixed commissions (either regional orinternational) to facilitate a continuing dialogue onthe issue. All of these are possible institutionalarrangements short of statehood that the UnitedStates could encourage. Third, the right to self-determination must include the right of enforce-ment and scrutiny by an appropriate body, mean-ing the abandonment of the idea that self-deter-mination somehow erects a wall of exclusive do-mestic jurisdiction for any country.

Kampelman stressed that the right to self-deter-mination must be separated from the right to se-cession. Many international documents have es-tablished self-determination as a right, but it hasnever been defined. Thus, many documents con-tain a contradiction between the right to secessionand the right to territorial integrity, and such docu-ments should seek a balance in separating the

8

4THE SELF-DETERMINATION

PRINCIPLE: LEGAL

DEFINITIONS AND

OBLIGATIONS

8

9

rights to self-determination and secession. The lat-ter is simply not, according to Kampelman, inher-ent in the legally stated right of self-determination.Self-determination may be an internationally rec-ognized principle, but secession is a national issue,one for states themselves to decide. For example, agovernment may wish to allow its nation’s con-stituent parts the right to secession in its own set oflaws, but no international documents compel it todo so. Self-determination, Kampelman main-tained, means inter alia the right to cultural inde-pendence, religious freedom, and the use of one’sown language, but not secession. Unlike secession,these rights are “manageable,” making it possiblefor the United States to both address and influencethem.

Jamison Borek of the Department of Statepointed out that legal principles are not the drivingfactor behind either self-determination move-ments or U.S. policy to-ward them. After all, theUnited States has nottaken a position on theprecise legal definition ofself-determination. Norhas the scope of the term“peoples” been deter-mined, and the debatecontinues over whetherself-determination in-cludes a right to secedeoutside the context of decolonization. In general,the United States has not recognized the right tosecession for portions of established countries.Moreover, in keeping with the general U.S. orienta-tion toward individual rights, U.S. policy prefers tospeak to individual human rights (including civiland political rights) rather than group rights suchas self-determination. It is not productive, Borekcontinued, to debate legal principles in the ab-stract without addressing pragmatic realities. Afundamental problem is what the United Statesand other countries are willing and able to doabout situations in which governments actively op-press minority groups in their countries. While theresponse options range from economic sanctionsto the use of force, ultimately it is not possible tocompel an oppressive government to change itsbehavior if other countries are not prepared to in-tervene militarily.

Self-Determination and Human Rights

Fuller suggested that the very propagation of theidea of human rights intensifies demands forgreater recognition among the unrecognized peo-ples of the world. In telling other states to observethe human rights of their citizens, the UnitedStates is giving these citizens a greater forum to de-mand more for themselves. Steinhardt concurredby suggesting that self-determination is a “symp-tom” of the human rights crisis. In fact, claims toself-determination usually indicate a human rightsproblem in its final stages. This is one of the mainreasons that complaints about human rights viola-tions must be addressed before they reach thisstage.

In this context, Scheffer disagreed with Han-num’s assertion that the concept of self-determina-tion must return to the more static framework of

previous eras. Scheffersaid rather that self-de-termination “is a real-ity from which we can-not escape,” sincethere are people allover the world whoare “screaming thatword.” What isneeded, he said, isgreater recognition ofthe postcolonial devel-

opment of human rights law and principles as aninfluencing factor on self-determination move-ments, however they are defined. Moreover, hecontinued, democracy is increasingly consideredan “entitlement.” Even the United Nations is em-bracing this view in its formal documents, andpeoples in the process of asserting their right toself-determination increasingly look to interna-tional language on human rights as a moral pillarto support their claims.

Referring to the international community’s de-sire to maintain world peace, Schoettle noted thatin the past, the goal of world (and regional) peacehas generally ranked higher than the defense ofhuman rights. Which goal is more important to theUnited States today? The policy of holding up re-gional peace as a more important goal than humanrights risks achieving the opposite. Groups seekingindependence will quickly realize that by creating

Many international docu-

ments have established

self-determination as a right, but it

has never been defined.

10

enough violence—significantly disturbing thepeace—their demands will more likely be satisfied,or at least addressed, eventually in the name ofpromoting peace. This will drive such groups toever more extreme, peace-threatening actions. Thegoal of maintaining regional peace also raises amoral question: Does the United States, or anymember of the international community, have theright to tell a minority group that its human rightsmust be curtailed in some form to promote worldpeace?

The issue of human rights and their violation isrelatively easy to react to, according to Borek, sinceacknowledged international standards exist. Themuch more difficult question involves the right tosecession and independence: Does a people have aright to independence? If there is going to be aprinciple that recognizes this right, there must besome consideration of whether that people has thecapability to establish independence and, if not,whether the United States or any other state is go-ing to help them in the task, even if military forcemust be used to do so. On this point, Borek sug-gested, there must be some realism. After all, theUnited States is not in a position to support suchendeavors all over the world. The crucial questionin the interim is, Can the international communityfind a guiding principle somewhere between de-fending human rights and upholding the right toself-determination?

Fuller reiterated that there need be no clash be-tween American values such as human rights andthe need to promote stability in a particular country,as neither of these is an absolute. Nations that are

wracked with internal dissent and held togetheronly through terror and repression are not neces-sarily useful in the promotion of U.S. national in-terests. In other words, such states do not merelypose a choice between human rights and stabilityfor the United States, since a state that routinely vi-olates its citizens’ human rights is rarely stable.Kampelman added that the “confrontation” be-tween human rights and self-determination couldbe largely avoided if secession were not an inher-ent part of the discussion.

Gidon Gottlieb of the University of ChicagoLaw School pointed out that in many ways the en-tire discussion about human rights and the rightto self-determination takes place in a Western (andlargely American) context. From the U.S. perspec-tive, concern about human rights is based onAmerican values and adherence to a particularview of individual rights. However, in many statesthat are on the receiving end of Western criticismover human rights, such rhetoric is perceived as aninstrument to advance a certain minority group’sclaims to independence. It is impossible for theUnited States to ignore the impact of its humanrights arguments at the other end, where they maybe (perhaps deliberately) misinterpreted as sup-port for some group’s claims, while the U.S. objec-tive may be precisely the opposite. The bottomline, according to Gottlieb, is that the “consumers”of the human rights discourse in other countriesmay understand such claims in a very differentway than they are intended, a reality that cannotbe ignored.

11

Scheffer advised policymakers to use the cri-sis in Chechnya as the basis for analyzingsimilar situations in the future. Events dat-

ing back to 1991, when President Dzhokhar Du-dayev first declared Chechnya’s independencefrom the then Soviet Union, should be analyzed todetermine if there was a basis in our relations withthe Soviet and Russian governments to discuss theChechen situation in light of how human rightsand democratic principles were being appliedthere, and how, if necessary, those principles couldbe further analyzed with regard to particular typesof autonomous relationships. Scheffer suggestedthat such an analysis could be useful in maintain-ing stability in the Russian Federation. Stability is aconcern, he noted, since the consequences of in-stability, whether in terms of refugee crises or theneed for humanitarian aid, pose a potential threatto the larger American aid program to Russia. A lit-tle preemptive work in this case would have beenextremely useful, Scheffer added.

Adam Wasserman of the Department of Statepointed out that though the self-determination is-sue is legally unsettled, the United States has madeits position on the issue clear in practical terms. Re-garding Chechnya, the United States has consis-tently affirmed the territorial integrity of the Rus-sian Federation, and there has been little ambi-guity in this stance. Kampelman contended that

problems arose in U.S. policy toward the Chechenconflict not because the United States reiterated itsrecognition of Russia’s sovereign rights, but be-cause that reiteration implied an approval of Russi-a’s methods of asserting its sovereignty. It is impor-tant to be consistent, Kampelman said. If minoritygroups are told that achieving their aims throughviolent means is unacceptable, then central gov-ernments must be told this as well. The UnitedStates did not make this clear to the Russian gov-ernment in its initial reaction to the Chechen crisis.

Hannum suggested that in seeking a solution tothe Chechen conflict, greater attention should begiven to the example of Tatarstan, which was will-ing to accept a “fuzzy, legally imprecise set of docu-ments” in negotiating its status within the RussianFederation that essentially deferred the most diffi-cult questions indefinitely. This arrangement maynot solve all the problems between the Russiangovernment and the country’s non-Russians, but itis an alternative to violent conflict. Patricia Carleyof the United States Institute of Peace pointed outthat the history of the Russians and Tatars is quitedifferent from that of the Russians and Chechens.The Tatars have been part of “Russia” since the six-teenth century, even though for some Tatars thisdoes not justify continued Russian domination.Not until the nineteenth century did the Russiansconquer and colonize the Chechens in a particu-larly lengthy and brutal campaign that continuedwell into this century and included Stalin’s reloca-tion of the entire Chechen population duringWorld War II.

Furthermore, as the Chechens see it, they werecolonized by the Russians only a few decades ear-lier than the Central Asians, who have become in-dependent from Russia. Carley stressed the impor-tance of understanding situations such as theconflict in Chechnya from the viewpoint of thepeople themselves—in this case, the Chechens. Forthe United States to be of any help in diffusing thissituation, it must try to understand Chechen moti-vations and grievances and the history of their rela-tionship with Russia. Statements about legal prin-ciples and territorial integrity mean little to peoplewho believe they are fighting for their very exis-tence.

Gottlieb maintained that the Chechens have al-ways had the status of a tributary state—they havenever had any other existence. In other words, theChechens have always been subject to some

5A SPECIFIC CASE: THE

CRISIS IN CHECHNYA

colonial or other major power. Under an earlier in-ternational legal system, the Chechens would havehad no basis for advancing the type of claim to in-dependence they are now pursuing, and the cur-rent international system, according to Gottlieb, isat fault for raising their expectations to the pointthat they feel justified in making such a claim. Car-ley pointed out, though, that millions of peoplethroughout the world used to know only the exis-tence that Gottlieb described, and many of themnow live in independent states; thus, looking to

past experience does not necessarily justify theperpetuation of a particular current status. In anycase, can it be considered the “fault” of theChechens, or any other peoples, that they have hadthe misfortune of existing as a tributary state formuch of their history? In other words, must thisstatus determine their future as well? Can theUnited States openly acknowledge that the repres-sive status the Chechens—or any other similarlyoppressed peoples—have always known is the onein which they must remain?

12

13

Before turning to how the United Statesshould address current self-determinationmovements, Gottlieb raised the question of

whether or not the United States should careenough to become a party to these disputes at all.He contended the United States should perhapscare more about waves of migration in Europe,which are pushing the continent’s politics in thedirection of political extremism. However, theUnited States should also care about self-determi-nation movements, he said, because several cur-rent conflicts have the potential to change the faceof some of the major actors on the world stage, in-cluding our immediate neighbors—witness theQuebec separatists in Canada and the Chiapasrebels in Mexico. Finally, the United States mustcare, because if it does not assert its values in theinternational arena, U.S. foreign policymakers willlose the support of the American public to an evengreater extent than is the case now.

What is the Primary AmericanConcern?

Crystal Nix of the Department of State proposed acrucial preliminary question in determining whatthe U.S. policy response to self-determinationmovements should be: What exactly does the

United States care about regarding struggles forself-determination—the aim of the struggle or themeans employed? Does the United States objectonly to the shifting of borders as a threat to its na-tional interest, or is it more concerned with themeans used to make those changes? If the concernis with the means, the United States would mostlikely not object to groups that seek to change ex-isting borders as long as they refrain from using vi-olence and do not violate international law. Or per-haps the United States would object to redrawingborders along specifically ethnic and religiouslines, regardless of the means.

In fact, Nix continued, American diplomacy andrhetoric are often in conflict over these issues. Ifborder changes are the primary concern, the rangeof that concern will be relatively narrow, sincethere are only a certain number of border changesthat the United States would consider threateningto its national security. If the means of effectingthese changes is the paramount issue, some actionmay be required to make groups accountable forthe way they attempt to achieve their goals. How-ever, if the main objection concerns the goal of re-drawing borders along religious and ethnic lines,the United States should be prepared to involve it-self more heavily in the matter than in previous,similar cases. Clearly, Nix concluded, the UnitedStates “needs to be more precise about which ofthese three options it is really concerned about.”

Hannum stated that the United States shouldgenerally be less concerned with the outcome ofthese situations than with the means used. Order,stability, and predictability are more likely to bemaintained, he said, by insisting on a peacefulprocess of resolving conflicting claims than by try-ing to manipulate events to arrange a predeter-mined outcome.

Promoting Human Rights

Damrosch asserted that the U.S. governmentshould use all available means of nonforcible lever-age to prevail on other governments to respect thehuman rights of all minority groups within theirstates. In some cases, demands for greater auton-omy can be supported, but she was skeptical aboutthe United States, as a matter of policy, endorsingdemands for self-determination and the creation ofnew states. According to Damrosch, the only

6U.S. INTERESTS AND

POSSIBLE POLICY

OPTIONS

instance in which the United States may decide forreasons of policy to support the emergence of anew state is in the “genocide or postgenocide”phase. In that instance, all “legal inhibitions” couldbe “shucked aside.”

According to Hannum, the self-determinationdebate would be much clearer if the United Statessimply stated that there is no right to secession,with the possible exception of responding to geno-cide (though such an exception would put theUnited States in the position of arguing that theKurds have a right to a separate state). Besides,U.S. foreign policy already has a method for deal-ing with minority problems in other countries: hu-man rights. Human and minority rights normscontinue to evolve, and the United States shoulddeclare its position as one of concern for the hu-man rights of every state’s citizens. Beyond that,the United States should not enter into the debateon the merits of self-determination claims. In fact,responding directly to claims for self-determina-tion is probably the worst policy option for theUnited States.

Providing Outlets for Minority Groups

“Sovereignty does not have to be a zero-sumgame,” Damrosch said, though international lawunfortunately tends to reinforce the zero-sum ap-proach. For example, when Taiwan lost its seat atthe United Nations to the People’s Republic ofChina, there was one big winner and one disap-pointed loser. Now, however, Taiwan is pursuing amore pragmatic arrangement of representation fortwo governments from one divided state, using theprecedents of Germany and Korea. Unlike the UN,Damrosch noted, international bodies that governsuch spheres as trade and finance do not use thezero-sum approach. In these bodies, economic re-alities frequently take precedence over strictly for-mal notions of sovereignty. Taiwan retained itsmembership in the Asian Development Bank, forexample, after its UN membership was revoked.Similarly, Hong Kong and Macao enjoyed member-ship in the General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (which has been succeeded by the WorldTrade Organization) under provisions allowingparticipation by nonstate entities that have func-tioning autonomy over their international eco-nomic relations. Policy options should include

parallel or multiple representation for territorialunits that function autonomously in such areas astrade and international economic relations, pro-viding outlets for what might otherwise be seces-sionist pressures.

Damrosch went on to suggest that the U.S. gov-ernment might consider expanding its range of of-ficial contacts in the international community fromstrictly interstate relations to contacts among sub-units of states; such contacts could be developedthrough functional relationships with unofficialentities. For example, Damrosch noted that theRussian constitution of 1993 allows some flexibil-ity in the establishment of foreign relations by sub-units within the Russian Federation; and Tatarstan,after negotiating with Moscow, was given a veryfunctional flexibility in its external relations. An-other option for the United States is economicsanctions, which, Damrosch suggested, could beused in a differentiated fashion—either to punishthe bad or reward the good territorial unit claimingthe right to self-determination.

Similarly, Steinhardt suggested that the UnitedStates should recognize as legitimate intermediatetypes of association to protect vulnerable popula-tions. U.S. policy should not imply that minoritygroups’ options are limited to secession or noth-ing. Scheffer agreed that it is in the U.S. interest todeal with more than just central governments;there should be a dialogue with the subnationalgroups involved as well. However, the UnitedStates should strive to hold minority groups ac-countable so that they understand they have cer-tain responsibilities as well, not only under inter-national law but also in their domestic actions.Damrosch agreed that these groups should beheld accountable, but questioned whether theUnited States could hold out as a “carrot” the possi-bility that, if they are democratic enough, they willeventually gain international recognition. Scheffercountered that independence need not, and inmost cases would not, be one of the carrots of-fered, as many intrastate political arrangementsshort of independence are available, all with vary-ing degrees of autonomy.

Gottlieb said that more effort should be made tooffer new outlets for legitimate aspirations of self-determination movements in order to divert themto nonterritorial demands. Simply put, minoritygroups need an international forum to expresstheir desires, and a variety of regional organizations

14

could offer them such an arena. There is a need to“deconstruct” the self-determination principle,Gottlieb said, to demonstrate that it has other in-terpretations than just the territorial and that thereare different ways identity groups can lead and ex-press national life. Not every nation can be given aterritorial state, so there should be other optionsunder the self-determination rubric and new waysof relating to national minority groups in the inter-national arena. The State Department could be thepioneer in such an effort, but the legislative branchcan be in the forefront as well. Nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) can also play a leading rolein this regard in much the same way as they pro-vide advance warning of potential subnationalconflicts. Congressional hearings already provideone way for minority groups to express their griev-ances and speak about their national homelandsas something other than states. In general, Gottliebasserted, the international community mustchange the perception that self-determinationleads only to the formation of a new state. Ratherthan setting the threshold of international recogni-tion at the highest level of the state, organizationsand international conventions should be open toother political entities as well.

Responding to the notion that aggrieved minor-ity groups should be satisfied with some statusother than statehood, Gottlieb acknowledged thatthis suggestion was in no way a universal remedy,although it might work in the case of the Basquesor the Corsicans. Its purpose is not to providemaximal solutions for minority groups, but a “re-lease process” for the United States and the groupsthemselves. It may be possible to satisfy some na-tional minority groups with something other thanstatehood, though such solutions will not alwaysbe acceptable or realistic. Fuller responded thatany attempt to offer minority groups outlets in theinternational arena will be extremely menacing tothe many “bad-guy” states that rule over them.

Carley suggested that the United States andother Western governments consider giving moreattention to such groups as the Unrepresented Na-tions and Peoples Organization (UNPO), whichmet in The Hague in January 1995 to determinewhere potential conflicts over self-determinationmovements might arise. This group of peoples thatdo not have seats at the UN has been in existencesince 1991 and was organized in part to protest theinternational community’s unwillingness to

recognize them. Members include the Chechens,Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Gagauz, and Abkhaz,all of whom are distinct peoples of the former So-viet Union who live within the territory of a statedominated by a different ethnic group. Othermembers are Tibet, East Turkestan, and Kurdistan.Many of UNPO’s members, Carley pointed out,consider themselves colonies, and many are, infact, in the generally recognized sense of that term.Furthermore, they believe that they did not gain in-dependence during the two great periods of decol-onization—immediately after World War II and fol-lowing the breakup of the USSR—simply becauseof bad luck or a quirk of fate, but not because theyare any less deserving. Will the international com-munity continue to ignore this group at its peril?

Unlike other participants, Hannum cautionedagainst offering subgroups some sort of recogni-tion or representation in regional or trade organi-zations or providing UNPO with a platform at theUN, which he said may ultimately lead to greaterassertions from smaller and smaller identitygroups, to the point where each is demanding in-dependence and a seat at the UN. Raising falsehopes, according to Hannum, may be the veryworst step to take. International law and politics—and U.S. policy—must reflect only the possible. Butwhich approach is preferred: diffusing statehoodaspirations by offering platforms to nonstate sub-units or providing such platforms only sparinglyto avoid raising a minority group’s expectations?Gottlieb replied that both approaches are neces-sary. With regard to the UN, providing platforms isprobably a potentially destabilizing policy. How-ever, in the case of technical conventions on suchthings as assigning communications frequencies,maritime rules, or environmental protection, par-ticipation need not be limited to states. Gottlieb in-sisted that the aura surrounding statehood shouldbe minimized and devalued.

Proclaiming a Clearly Defined Principle

Gottlieb asserted that the United States really has nochoice but to “avoid clear doctrines and clear princi-ples” when it comes to self-determination move-ments, as it would be “disastrous” for the UnitedStates to be driven to intervene in remote conflictsby rigid principles that could not possibly applyacross the board. There are simply no appropriate

15

global principles, and no arrangements should bepromoted in terms of global principles. The onlyexception is the defense of human rights; for exam-ple, the absolute unwillingness to tolerate geno-cide. Agreeing with Hannum, Gottlieb maintainedthat the United States should have a policy of “pas-sivity,” meaning that it should not take sides dur-ing a conflict or take a stance on a particular out-come. Instead, the United States should use itsleverage to push toward an accommodation. Fur-thermore, Gottlieb suggested that more could bedone to make groups understand the costs ofstatehood—not only the economic costs, but thepolitical ones as well. Hannum agreed that policy-makers must keep their pronouncements on thisissue ambiguous, as it is impossible to articulateself-determination explicitly and absolutely. How-ever, principles such as human rights, democracy,and nonviolence can be articulated, and should besupported and promoted consistently.

On the other hand, Fuller noted that even ex-pressing ambivalence on the subject of self-deter-mination movements will make the United Statesappear as an enemy to much of the Third World bythreatening those states’ national unity. Obviously,early intervention in such situations is highly de-sirable, and Fuller suggested an approach alongthe lines of marriage counseling. In any conflict be-tween a central government and a secessionistmovement, all options short of “divorce” should beconsidered: cultural autonomy, political auton-omy, federation, confederation, or internationalguarantees, to name a few.

In any case, the United States should most defi-nitely “put states on notice” that their repressivepolicies will likely lead to the emergence of prob-lems with their minority groups. Perhaps such no-tice could best be handled by NGOs to avoid thepolitical implications of warning a state that it iscourting instability. Fuller stated that the UnitedStates would do well to make it clear to states thatif they cannot satisfy the cultural aspirations oftheir minorities, they are headed for trouble. TheUnited States should also make it clear that it is notgoing to be a guarantor of an unacceptable statusquo. Scheffer agreed that NGOs could publiclyidentify these potential hot spots, since govern-ments cannot do so publicly, though they shouldprivately. He further suggested that places to watchin the future with regard to self-determination

movements include Kosovo, Taiwan, Hong Kong,Tibet, Western Sahara, and parts of Kurdistan.

Generally, Fuller maintained, it is in the interestof the United States to see the proliferation of de-mocratic states in the world. Undemocratic statesthat rely on force and repression to maintain theirexistence not only run counter to American princi-ples, they are also unstable—maybe not so much inthe short term, but certainly in the longer term.Steinhardt contended that the United Statesshould take a very high-profile position in interna-tional institutions, especially those that are region-ally based, since these organizations have gener-ally proved to be good forums for articulating theidea that certain practices and behaviors of statesare required by law—a sort of psychology of com-pulsion.

Robert Hansen of the Department of Statepointed out that there is danger in fostering confu-sion between the standards for self-determinationand state recognition on the one hand, and thequestion of what the United States is prepared todo to effect that policy on the other (i.e., whatAmericans are or are not prepared to sacrifice interms of money and troops). Though the UnitedStates may decide not to take an active part in sup-porting a particular self-determination movement,that decision may not make it any less importantthat there be clear, defensible legal standards whenit comes to providing moral support. Perhapsmore effort should be devoted to making a distinc-tion between these two options.

Approaching the Claim to Secession

Secession has not been identified as an interna-tional right, and Kampelman declared that this factshould be made clear to all groups with claims toself-determination. If a particular group wants in-dependence, he said, it can agitate, propose negoti-ations, and/or initiate a propaganda campaign toconvince the international community that its sta-tus as part of another state is unjust. If majorbloodshed would likely result from such actions,this would be because of a decision the minorityassumed when it chose to agitate for indepen-dence. This is not to say that the United Statesshould overlook the bloodshed, but that it shouldmake clear to those seeking independence that

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they cannot object to the violence waged againstthem by claiming they were simply attempting toexercise their “right” to secession. In the end, itmay be in the U.S. national interest to help thisgroup, but not because any international rightshave been violated. Kampelman stressed that theextent to which the United States and other statesmake it clear that secession is not an internationalright will lessen the likelihood that violence will beused toward this goal. In these instances, other av-enues would likely be pursued.

Secession is, according to Steinhardt, a legiti-mate exercise of self-determination in some cases,particularly in response to gross and systematic vi-olations of human rights and when the resultingentity is economically viable. Thus, a rigid rejec-tion of secession is unsound. Policymakers shouldabandon the distinction between self-determina-tion and other categories of human rights. Like-wise, Alan Romberg of the Department of Statenoted that the right to secession cannot always beexcluded as a matter of principle. The rights to self-determination and secession may not be identical,but they are also not entirely incompatible. Statingthat it is the means and not the aim of self-determi-nation movements that should be of concern tothe United States, Romberg suggested that somestandards of behavior for achieving the goal of in-dependent statehood may be necessary.

Steinhardt maintained that the United Statesshould not allow its policy options to become po-larized because of an apparent tilt against seces-sion. Kampelman argued in favor of such a bias,since secession frequently entails mass violence.Certainly, Steinhardt acknowledged, the UnitedStates should be concerned about the uncheckedproliferation of states, but the question remains:What is the United States prepared to tolerate inthe name of territorial integrity?

Negotiations

Timothy Sisk of the United States Institute of Peacesuggested that one option for resolving thedilemma of self-determination versus territorial in-tegrity is the promotion of a negotiated settle-ment—to the extent that it is possible. The UnitedStates need only make clear that it will abide by

whatever the parties to the negotiations decide.Though it may be the case that some on either sidewill not want to enter negotiations, there are fre-quently cleavages within groups that leave somefactions willing to negotiate. Furthermore, theUnited States should examine cases in which ac-commodated outcomes have occurred, how andwhy they did, and which institutional arrange-ments were instrumental in resolving the conflict.Several options are available, such as the formationof power-sharing or coalition governments and aproportionality of government appointments, op-tions that typically form a crucial part of a negoti-ated settlement. The main goal is to de-link ethnic-ity from the state and from citizenship. It waspointed out, however, that the cases that are usu-ally the easiest to deal with are those in which theparties are willing to negotiate. It is possible, for ex-ample, to imagine negotiations between Ottawaand Montreal or London and Edinburgh. All toooften this is not the case, and the fundamentalproblem or conflict stems from the inability of thesides to agree on the terms under which theymight consider even entering into negotiations.

Elections

The participants did not view elections as a satis-factory way to determine the political status of aparticular region because secession is not an issuethat can be voted on. Sisk mentioned the difficultyof relying on majority rule. Very often the cause ofthe problem in the first place is that a minoritygroup believes it is repressed by the majority. Han-num stated that the problem with elections is thatif, say, Quebec voted to secede, smaller nationalgroups within Quebec would have to be given thesame right. Carley raised the problem of evaluatingthe validity of elections in essentially totalitarian orpost-totalitarian states, reminding participants thatonly a few months before the Soviet Union col-lapsed, its citizens voted en masse to remain partof the USSR in elections that were very much likeold Soviet-style polls. Kampelman said that, ulti-mately, it would not be useful for the United Statesto set elections as a condition for any kind of pol-icy decision it wants to make.

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There is no easy solution to the dilemmasposed by self-determination movements inthe world today. Clearly, in the face of the

growing number of such movements, there is aneed to establish a more concise and workable def-inition of the right to self-determination, thoughsuch a definition will not be easily arrived at, andeven then it will most likely be inconclusive andequivocal. In any case, the international commu-nity would do well to recognize that the desireamong identity groups to seek self-determinationis not a simple matter with a single cause. The urgeto seek self-determination has multiple origins, in-cluding the denial of minority rights and otherforms of government repression, territorial dis-putes, national aspirations, and perceptions of eco-nomic and political viability, among others. It de-velops gradually until violence and secessioncome into play as a last resort. Unfortunately, theinattentiveness of the world community oftenmakes what is a gradual process seem all too sud-den. Perhaps carefully analyzing the origins of self-determination movements, addressing the mostsalient factor or factors in a particular identitygroup’s claim or struggle, and attending to thempromptly and directly will help the United Statesand the international community address thesedemands before violence and secession are seen asthe only means of achieving them.

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CONCLUSION

Patricia Carley is program officer forthe former Soviet Union and Turkey atthe United States Institute of Peace,where she also works on broader issuessuch as the OSCE and Western relationswith the Islamic world. She is the authorof several Institute publications, includ-ing The War in Tajikistan Three YearsOn, Turkey’s Role in the Middle East:

A Conference Report and The Future of the CSCE. She receivedher B.A. in Soviet studies from the University of Texas at Austin in1981 and an M.A. from George Washington University in 1983. Be-fore coming to the Institute, Carley was a staff adviser at the Com-mission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Her other publica-tions include the Central Asia section of Human Rights andDemocratization in the Newly Independent States (1993),“Turkey and Central Asia: Reality Comes Calling” in RegionalPower Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran(M. E. Sharpe, 1995), and “The Legacy of the Soviet Political Sys-tem and the Prospects for Developing Civil Society in Central Asia”in Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New Statesof Eurasia (M. E. Sharpe, 1995).

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created byCongress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, includingresearch grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services,publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the Presi-dent of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. CrockerVice Chairman: Max M. KampelmanPresident: Richard H. SolomonExecutive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

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Peaceworks No. 7. First published March 1996.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author or conference participants alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NW, Suite 700Washington, DC 20005-1708

Phone: 202-457-1700E-mail: usip_requests@usip.orgInternet: gopher.usip.org

Other titles in the Peaceworks series:

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: A Conference Report by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No.1)

Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity by Nancy Lubin (PeaceworksNo. 2)

From the Managing Chaos conference:

Keynote Addresses by Les Aspin and Ted Koppel (Peaceworks No. 3)

Sources of Conflict: G.M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming Anarchy’ and the Nation-State under Siege” (Peaceworks No. 4)

NGOs and Conflict Management by Pamela R. Aall (Peaceworks No. 5)

Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa by David R. Smock (Peaceworks No. 6)

UNITED STATESINSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NWWashington, DC 20005 Peaceworks No. 7