Spec Ops Essays_JSOU_MAY 15

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Special Operations Essays

JSOU Report 15-2May 2015

Joint Special Operations University Tampa Point BoulevardMacDill AFB FL

https://jsou.socom.mil


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Joint Special Operations Universityand the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Te Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint specialoperations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendationsof national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF)students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defenseleadership.

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Opera-tions Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Te JSOUmission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders andselected other national and international security decision makers, bothmilitary and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in thescience and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to themen and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a jointand interagency environment.

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special OperationsStudies and Research (CSOSR) where effort centers upon the USSOCOMmission:

USSOCOM mission. Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces todefend the United States and its interests. Synchronize planning of globaloperations against terrorist networks.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Libraryweb page located at http://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Joint Spe cia l Operations Universit y Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES,President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.,Director, Center or Special Operations Studies and ResearchRobert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret.,Editor in Chie

Mark Moyar, Ph.D., History; Will Irwin, MMAS, L ieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Peter McCabe, Ph.D.Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; Gregory Salomon, Colonel, U.S. Army;Resident Senior Fellows

Anna-Marie Wyant, M.A., English, JSOU Press EditorFrederick Zimmerman, Master Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret., JSOU Press Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. BarrettPh.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian HistoryPublic Policy Center Middle East Institute and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. CeleskiColonel, U.S. Army, Ret. JSOU Senior FellowChuck CunninghamLieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret.Pro essor o Strategy, Joint AdvancedWarghting School and JSOU DistinguishedSenior Fellow

James J.F. ForestPh.D., Higher Education Administration Associate Pro essor, School o Criminology and Justice Studies, University o MassachusettsLowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret. Director, Joint Special Operations CommandCenter or Counterterrorism Studies

Tomas H. HenriksenPh.D., History,Hoover InstitutionStan ord University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National DefencePh.D., War Studies Director, CANSOFCOM Pro essionalDevelopment Centre

Russell D. HowardBrigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret. Senior Research Fellow and adjunct pro essor, Middlebury Institute o International Studies at Monterey and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. JogerstColonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James KirasPh.D., History,School o Advanced Air and SpaceStudies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. MendelColonel, U.S. Army, Ret. JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza PinheiroMajor General, Brazilian Army, Ret. JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. JSOU Senior Fellow

Bryan C. PriceMajor, U.S. ArmyPh.D., Political ScienceDirector, Combating errorism Center atWest Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.Ph.D., Political Science Director, International SecurityStudies Program, Te Fletcher School,ufs University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering Sandia National Laboratoriesand JSOU Associate Fellow

Jessica Glicken urnleyPh.D., Cultural AnthropologyGalisteo Consulting Groupand JSOU Senior Fellow

Francisco R. Wong-DiazJ.D., Ph.D., Political Science Pro essor o international affairs and law and JSOU Senior Fellow

Rich YargerPh.D., History JSOU Senior Fellow


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On the cover. Army Rangers of st Battalion, th Ranger Regiment, execute

fast rope training at Hunter Army Aireld, Georgia. U.S. Army photo bySpecialist Coty Kuhn.


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Report 15-2The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida2015

2015 Special OperationsEssays


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Tis monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.socom.mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication areinvited and should be forwarded to the Director of the Center for SpecialOperations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, ampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL .

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Te JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currentlyaccepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. Formore information, please contact the CSOSR Director at [email protected] you for your interest in the JSOU Press.

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Tis work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN: 978-1-933749-96-9


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Te views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the

authors and do not necessarily reect the views, policy or positionof the United States Government, Department of Defense, United

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not

disclose classied information, jeopardize operations security, ormisrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the

interest of furthering debate on key issues.


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Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Building Partner Capacity, February 2015, Harry R. Yarger

Islam: Ideology and Con ict,December 2014, Roby C. Barrett

Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police, October 2014, MarkMoyar

Challenges in the Asia-Paci c Theater for U.S. and Partner Nation SpecialOperations Forces, October 2014, Robert Haddick

Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African UnionMission in Somalia, 2007-2013, September 2014, Bronwyn E. Bruton, Paul D.Williams

U.S. Military Deployments to Africa: Lessons from the Hunt for Joseph Konyand the Lords Resistance Army, August 2014, James Forest

Persistent Engagement in Colombia, July 2014, Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan,Wil R. Griego

Partners or Competitors? The Evolution of the Department of Defense/CentralIntelligence Agency Relationship since Desert Storm and its Prospects for theFuture, May 2014, David P. Oakley

Countering the al-Shabaab Insurgency in Somalia: Lessons for U.S. SpecialOperations Forces, February 2014, Graham urbiville, Josh Meservey, James Forest

Strategic Culture, December 2013, Russell D. Howard


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Contents

Foreword ......................................................................................ix

Assistance Beyond Luck: Synchronizing Engagements in theGlobal SOF Network .................................................................... 1

Harnessing the Human Domain in Warfare ................................ 11

The First Women in SOF: Women Operatives in theOSS and SOE as a Framework for the Modern Enabler ................ 23

Training the Police Forces of a Fragile State ................................. 33

SOF and the Regionally-Aligned Force ....................................... 41

Special Operations Forces and the Professionalization ofForeign Internal Defense ............................................................. 49


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Foreword

T he Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) partnered with the Spe-cial Operations and Low Intensity Conict (SO/LIC) Chapter of theNational Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) in sponsoring the annualchapter essay contest. Te rst-place winner is recognized each year at theNDIA SO/LIC Symposium and awarded a , cash prize; this yearswinner is U.S. Army Major Andrew Ruszkiewicz. Te runner-up receives

; second place is U.S. Army Major James F. Razuri.Te competition is open to resident and nonresident students attendingProfessional Military Education (PME) institutions and has produced out-standing works on special operations issues. Tese essays provide currentinsights on what our PME students see as priority national security issuesaffecting special operations.

Essay contestants can choose any topic related to special operations. Sub-missions include hard-hitting and relevant recommendations that many

Special Operations Forces commanders throughout United States SpecialOperations Command nd very useful. Some entries submitted are a syn-opsis of the larger research project required for graduation or an advanceddegree, while others are written specically for the essay contest. Regardlessof approach, these essays add value to the individuals professional develop-ment, provide an outlet for expressing new ideas and points of view, andcontribute to the special operations community as a whole.

JSOU is pleased to offer this selection of the top essays from the contest. Te JSOU intent is that this compendium will benet the readerprofessionally and encourage future PME students to enter the contest for

. Feedback is welcome, and your suggestions will be incorporated intofuture JSOU reports.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research


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Ruszkiewicz: Synchronizing Engagements

Assistance Beyond Luck: Synchronizing

Engagements in the Global SOF NetworkU.S. Army Major Andrew Ruszkiewicz2015 Essay Contest - 1st Place

Introduction

You cant surge trust. You must build it, slowly and deliberately,be ore a crisis occurs. Retired Admiral William McRaven, ormercommander, USSOCOM

I n December , Mokthar Belmokthar, an al-Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM) affiliated terrorist leader in Northern Mali, releaseda statement calling or the mobilization o ghters to converge on Mali andght the impending Western military interventions in the war-torn country.An estimated , terrorists would eventually occupy the northern parto the country. Concurrently, West A rican governments apprehensivelypledged to support the ght against jihadist elements, but were drasticallyundertrained and under-resourced to meet the challenges. Ansar Dine,AQIM, and their associated groups continued to orti y their positions inthe Adrar des I oghas mountain range in advance o the coming battles.

In February , a erce reght broke out as a Chadian special opera-tions orces (SOF) unit operating in Northern Mali made contact with terror-ists entrenched in the ormidable mountain range. Hours later, Abu Zeid, thedeputy commander o AQIM, and approximately o his ghters lay dead.Only a week earlier, the same Chadian unit had entered the town o essalit,helping French orces liberate it and killing nearly ghters in the process.

Major Andrew Ruszkiewicz is a U.S. Army Civil Affairs of cer. He submit -ted this paper while attending the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,California, where he is currently pursuing a Masters of Science in Defense

Analysis with an Irregular Warfare Focus.


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2015 Special Operations Essays

Overlooking the battleeld, Brigadier General Abdraman Mery, com-mander o the Chadian special anti-terrorist group (SA G), surveyed the

damage to his orce: over killed and numerous more wounded. Te losseswere substantial, but signicantly less than should have been expected aferassaulting a orce that held a marked advantage in regard to terrain and timeto prepare or the battle. Only weeks earlier, General Mery and his spe-cial operators had embarked in their oyota Land Cruiser trucks with littlemore than crew-served weapons, and traversed the greater part o some othe most inhospitable terrain in the world: the Sahara Desert. In the spano three months, this orce had accomplished a eat most would not havebelieved possible. A year later, in May , General Mery would arrive inampa, Florida, or U.S. Special Operations Commands (USSOCOM) Inter-national SOF con erence where he would receive an award or his actionsduring combat operations in Mali. How did this happen?

In order to better achieve synchronization o persistent SOF engagementscapable o leveraging partner SOF in an expeditionary manner, USSOCOMmust revise the special operations liaison officer (SOLO) program. Tis essay

builds upon previous concepts, such as the Volckmann Program proposed in by then Colonel Eric P. Wendt, as well as recent recommendations madein Special Operations Liaison Officer: Looking Back o See Te Future.Te concept proposed here goes beyond these previous recommendations asit argues or the creation o a regionally aligned, specially trained, SOF liai-son program under USSOCOM management. Tis new concept essentiallytrans orms the SOLO program into a special operations liaison team (SOL ).Te SOL concept would encompass the selection, training, and employ-

ment o mid-career special operators rom each o the our services to workdirectly with partner-nation SOF under the Office o Security Cooperationas part o the U.S. country teams. Te SOL would be composed o mid-grade to senior SOF noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and officerswho have completed key developmental jobs in a particular region. SOLmembers would be selected or their advanced regional expertise and wouldreceive specialized training in security assistance and security cooperationprograms and military advising, prior to their employment. Tey could bedeployed individually or in small, two- to our-operator elements.

Te SOL concept addresses the gaps in long-range planning and syn-chronization o persistent engagements, episodic engagements, and trainand equip unding efforts. It also provides expertise in advising interagency


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synchronization o engagements rst hand while serving as the commandero the SOFLE or nearly a year in . Te effects o these engagements still

achieved a level o success that is tangible, as General Mery credited mucho the success the SA G had in Mali directly to the training and equippingreceived rom U.S. SOF.

Te engagements with the SA G may seem well organized, but in real-ity were suboptimal and lacked coherent synchronization to meet U.S. andChadian intent or the partnership. Te SOL concept is organized to spe-cically address these and other issues by synchronizing SOF engagementswithin a given country. Numerous programs across USSOCOM and the various theater special operations commands ( SOCs) have attempted toaddress these very issues. At current count, no less than ve different namedtitles exist or managing these types o duties, but none o them specicallytrain and organize personnel or the actual job. Currently, these duties areper ormed by rotations o SOF elements, or in some cases, an augmenteerom one o the SOF service components.

Troughout the various persistent presence efforts, the narrow- ocused

and repetitive training o JCE s continued to be an issue or the SA Gcommander. Although grate ul or any support, the SA G commander con-cluded that in order to improve his orce, he needed to create the capacity tointernally train his ormations. Te SOFLE lobbied U.S. SOF orce providers via SOCAFRICA and explained General Merys vision to improve his orce.Te result was the rst internal Chadian cadre o trainers or the SA G. Tatcadre would soon assist the rst o multiple JCE s in training company-sized elements at a time. Tis was something previously in easible with the

personnel packages provided during JCE s. Tis capability undamentallychanged the capacity o the SA G to train its orce in late . Un ortunately,this initiative came too late to truly bear ruit; less than months later theSA G would be deployed to Mali.

Next came the daunting task o security assistance or our Chadian part-ners. o state that the SA G was poorly equipped and under-resourced isan understatement. Te SA Gs monthly operating budget was equivalentto approximately , or a unit o more than , soldiers. Almost theentire amount was spent on the basics o ood and uel or operations. Tislef no room or training, spare parts, or new equipment. Cannibalization o vehicles occurred regularly to keep the SA G operational. Over percento the SA G eet o oyota trucks was provided through American security


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assistance unding. Ironically, many o the orders or these U.S.-purchasedtrucks had to be altered at the last minute because they did not contain the

correct uel type utilized predominantly by the Chadian military. Tis criti-cal oversight by an American military planner somewhere in Germany couldhave had signicant negative effects but was luckily caught due to the closerelationship between the SOFLE and the SA G staff. I a SOL with estab-lished relationships both within the partner orce and with higher headquar-ters had been present, this issue would have likely never even mani ested.

What makes SOL different is it ormalizes these haphazard attempts toaddress identied gaps in synchronizing in-country efforts o SOF. SOLnot only addresses the gaps, but mitigates the need or ever changing in-theater SOF augmentation requests rom the SOCs. In lieu o receivingaugmentation to ll valid requirements, the SOL concept calls or a poolo regionally aligned, specially qualied personnel retained by USSOCOMor this specic SOF-peculiar mission. In many ways, this concept lookslike the SOF version o the oreign area officer program, and as such, or theprogram to work will require identication o valid candidates who are mid-

grade to senior noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and officers whohave also completed key developmental jobs in the same region to addressthis identied gap. Tese candidates would opt-in to specialize in this veryspecic career path.

Face-to- ace ghting with the Islamists is over. Te Chadian armydoes not have the skills to ght a shadowy, guerrilla-style war that istaking place in northern Mali. Idris Itno Dby, president o Chad

Would the presence o a SOL in Chad rom the beginning have improvedthe outcome o the SA Gs initial combat operation in Mali? Would theSA G have been better trained to operate holistically in an irregular war areenvironment? Lastly, would the SA G have been able to sustain its successesollowing major combat operations had they been better prepared to ghtwhat the Chadian president described as a guerrilla war? o answer thesequestions, we need only look eastward across the continent o A rica to thesuccesses in training and employment o the Kenyan Ranger Strike Force(KRSF), under the tutelage o SOF.


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Beyond Luck: Institutionalizing Success

Just outside o Nairobi, Kenya, a potential model or success has quietly beenongoing since . From to , a U.S. investment o approximately

million was spent to establish the Kenyan Ranger School. Te KRSFwas soon deployed, operating against al-Shabaab in Somalia. Tese successeswere due to the results o two critical persistent presence elements underUSSOCOM. First was the calculated placement o SOF at the KRSF head-quarters. Tis daily interaction with the Kenyan Ranger School, as well aswith the KRSF commander and staff, were essential in developing the KRSF

capabilities. Second was the assigning o a senior SOF officer as the SOLOin Kenya, tasked to help synchronize resources and engagements, directlyurthering the KRSF capabilities in support o U.S. national interests. Tesetwo positions are at the very core o what the global SOF network (GSN)should attempt to emulate as it moves orward in implementation.

Using the KRSF as a template, and urther incorporating numerous les-sons rom the Chadian SA G experiences, the value o persistent presenceis clear. Going beyond luck, USSOCOM can leverage the SOL to addressthis identied gap. Te SOL program would become a career path managedexclusively by USSOCOM, much like the SOLO program is managed cur-rently. Te main divergence between SOL and the Volckmann Program isthat Volckmann participants solely come rom Army Special Forces. UnderSOL , any SOF personnel would be eligible to apply to the program. Criticalto the success o the concept is that SOL members have longevity or assign-ment to U.S. embassies on three-year, permanent-change-o -station orders.

SOLs would all under National Security Decision Directive authoritiesand directly work or the Office o Security Cooperation and ultimately theU.S. ambassador. Additionally, SOLs would conduct coordination with the

Figure 1. Illustration of possible command and reporting relationships.


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SOC and ultimately USSOCOM. Figure illustrates one possible commandand reporting relationship in which command authorities (solid line) rest

with the U.S. country team and coordination and operational synchroniza-tion (dotted line) rest with the SOC.

By design, the SOL program directly addresses the majority o the criti-cal capabilities areas outlined in the USSOCOM Operating Concept andwould specically address concepts such as sustaining the GSN, cultural andregional expertise, SOF in ormation environment, invisible operator, andexpanded authorities. Tese areas would all be positively impacted throughpermanent embedding o SOF personnel, at the country team level, whoare specically selected and trained to address these capabilities. Addition-ally, the SOL would oversee the preponderance o other in-country SOFoperations, synchronizing engagements, and efforts to ully realize theirpotential and meet U.S. national security objectives. Figure shows just onehypothetical path or this process o becoming a SOL member.

Shortfalls and Barriers

Clearly, issues will arise rom the implementation o such a type o program.Funding and authorities will have to be negotiated between the servicesand civilian agencies. Within DOD there will be a need to stress the impor-tance o this type o program and establish its credibility and success as a viable career path or any members to keep themselves competitive. In hisVolckmann Program proposal, now Major General Wendt argued theseexact points, and provided details on how to avoid making this a career-

hampering move.Moreover, this concept could be perceived as an attempt by SOF to ur-ther militarize oreign policy. However, this is not the case at all. A SOLprogram would be in the service o the country team, while providing unique

Figure 2. A hypothetical path for the process of becoming a SOLT member.


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SOF expertise that is the exception and not the rule in the paths o securityassistance and cooperation staffs. Tis institutionalization is required to

enhance effects through a synchronized and nested program, such as SOL.

Doing More With Less

Te axiom o doing more with less continues to be vocalized within DOD.Ironically, that is exactly the purpose o SOF and should be capitalized uponas the scal constraints o a shrinking DOD budget become evermore appar-ent in todays environment. Te engagement strategy employed in eitherChad or Kenya can be adapted across the world with SOF partners. It tookonly our persistent SOF members in Chad, augmented by quarterly JCE sand train and equip packages, to realize a tangible success: the unilateralemployment o a U.S. partner orce, without American advisement, againstan internationally recognized terrorist organization. Over the nine years oengagement in Chad, the average cost ran between , or episodicengagements and million or train and equip packages. o put it in per-spective, the estimated total expenditure on the SA G since has been

approximately million, and the KRSF has recently surpassed million,amounting to less than a single days expenditure to support combat opera-tions in Iraq or A ghanistan. Te United States has expended more undsin a week supporting combat operations than it has in over six years in thedevelopment o two success ul A rican Special Operations Forces. Tesetypes o operations directly address global national security objectives inan inexpensive manner and are devised to prevent the need or entrance oU.S. orces into combat. Te SOL program would serve to urther enhancethe cost-effectiveness o these engagements.

Conclusion

Previous concepts have not provided a program that creates a capability asproposed in this essay. Tis concept seeks to select mid-grade SOF personneland provide them advanced training in their already-assigned regional area,then assign them or a prolonged period in support o U.S. country teamsand partner nations with the intent o synchronizing special operationsto meet U.S. national objectives. Tese personnel would be selected romany o the service SOF components and utilized in their areas o regionalexpertise. Not without obstacles, this concept must address the aspects o


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career progression, unding, and expanded authorities required or sucha program. I implemented, the SOL concept would ultimately nest with

the vision o the USSOCOM Operating Concept, while accommodat-ing the scal constraints o todays operating environment by producingsuccess over years using a raction o the cost o what is expended per dayor major combat operations. All the while, SOL s would be meeting U.S.national objectives in a more discreet manner. Chad and Kenya are but tworegion-specic examples o what the SOL concept could produce. Te SOLconcept, i capitalized upon, would institutionalize the success highlightedin just two examples in A rica and negate the need or luck.

Endnotes 1. Wendt, Eric P., Colonel. Te Green Beret Volckmann Program: Maximizing the

prevent strategy. Special Warfare , 24(3), July 2011, 10-16; and Bieganek, Cory,Leitner, John, and Madsen, Phillip. Special Operations Liaison Officer: LookingBack o See Te Future. Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014.

2. Some such programs include Special Operations Forces Liaison Elements(SOFLE), Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLO), Joint Planning and Advi-sory (or Assistance) eams (JPA ), Planning and Assistance eams (PA s), etc.

3. Te SA G was not bound by a posse comitatus law and were the premier orceemployed by the Chadian Ministry o De ense, National Security Agency, andsometimes directly by the president to conduct counterterrorism operationswithin the countrys own borders.

4. Interestingly, upon his return rom Mali, Brigadier General Mery conveyed thatsome o the most important training his orce had received was that o CivilMilitary Operations (CMO). Te act the SA G received CMO training at allwas largely an effect o the only persistent SOF presence rom 2010 to 2012 o a

SOF Civil Affairs team. 5. 3D in Nairobi: An overview o diplomacy, development, and de ense at the

U.S. Mission, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2011, slide presentation. Accessed at:https://www.con erences.state.gov/RM/programevaluation2011/Related%20Documents/De ense%20Workshops/3Ds%20in%20Nairobi%20-%20An%20overview%20o %20diplomacy,%20development,%20and%20de ense%20at%20the%20U.S.%20Mission,%20Nairobi,%20Kenya.pd .

6. Wendt, Te Green Beret Volckmann Program, 10-16. 7. NSDD-38 is ofen a point o riction between the Department o State (DOS) and

Combatant Command commanders within their specic area o responsibilitywhen dealing with DOD personnel working rom a U.S. embassy. According tothe DOS website: Te National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 dated2 June 1982, gives the Chie o Mission (COM) control o the size, composition,


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and mandate o overseas ull-time mission staffing or all U.S. Government agen-cies. Accessed at: www.state.gov/m/pri/nsdd/ on November 30, 2014.

8. United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Oper-ating Concept. May 2013. Accessed at: http:// ortunascorner.les.wordpress.com/2013/05/nal-low-res-so -operating-concept-may-2013.pd .

9. Wendt, Te Green Beret Volckmann Program, 10-16. 10. Current estimates project the ongoing war in A ghanistan cost $10.17 million

an hour, and on average the daily cost o air operations against ISIS are approxi-mately $7.5 million. National Priorities Project, Cost o Military Programs,November 14, 2014. Accessed at: https://www.nationalpriorities.org/cost-o /category/military/.


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Razuri: Harnessing the Human Domain in Warfare

Harnessing the Human Domain in

WarfareU.S. Army Major James F. Razuri2015 Essay Contest - 2nd Place

Introduction

T he last years o sustained combat operations between OperationEnduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have demonstratedthe need or considering human actors and their effects on a strategy. Boththeatres have blended a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism approach,which have seen successes and shortcomings. Te common denominatorshave been people and culture. Anticipating such human actors in war andstrategy is nothing new. Clausewitz denes war as, an act o orce to compelour enemy to do our will. War is a battle or inuence, sometimes by physi-cal orce. Te human domain has been and will continue to be a complexyet critical aspect in warghting. Success in uture and uncertain operatingenvironments will be determined by how well we are able to understand,inuence, and, in some cases, counter a movement be ore it escalates todirect combat actions.

As the military reects back on the Iraqi conict and begins to draw

down rom A ghanistan, it is imperative to consider the main lesson o theseconictsthe importance o understanding people. Tis essay is dividedinto three sections. First, it will identi y an analytical process to understandhuman interactions better and highlight the concept o centrality. Te roleo Egyptian women will be used to validate this concept as will the use osocial media during the Arab Spring. Second, the essay will introducerecently developed sofware programs currently being used in the military

Major Jimmy Razuri is a U.S. Army Infantry of cer and has served in boththe 82nd Airborne Division and the 75th Ranger Regiment. This paper waswritten in ful llment of his Masters in Military Studies while attending theUnited States Marine Corps Command and Staff College.


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that have proven help ul in visualizing the human terrain. Finally, this essaywill identi y military-specic initiatives that address the human domain.

Te overall intent is not to provide a solution to dominate within the humandomain, but rather describe a ramework to understand and inuence inwhat Rupert Smith coined, war amongst the people.

Understanding Social Networks

Social Network Analysis. Social movements develop out o the need toaddress grievances and occur within a social or amilial circle. Social networkanalysis (SNA) is a use ul tool to identi y these interactions and assess whichactors are most important or inuential within a group. Ofen mistakenor link analysis, both are similar analytical tools but differ in approach. Link analysis, a tool common with military analysts, compares two differentactors (people to objects), whereas SNA compares similar actors (people topeople) and can provide more qualitative in ormation on their relationships.

The Concept of Centrality. Central actors within a network who possessa higher degree o interactions with its members enjoy many advantages,such as access to in ormation and resources. Subsequently, they become very inuential in a network. Tere are our different types o centrality:Degree centrality is how many ties an actor has within a network; Closeness centrality is how close an actor is to all the other actors; Betweenness central-ity indicates the shortest distance between actors or groups; and Eigenvector centrality measures the amount o ties to more central actors. Analyzing anactors centrality within a network can determine which one, or ones, are

the most inuential.Egyptian Women Example. An example o its utility in determining inu-ence within a social network is the role o Egyptian women in their in ormalnancial system. Historically, women did not hold any positions in the Egyp-tian government. However, they have always held a tremendous amount oauthority within the Shab, a socioeconomic group o people that remaintied to indigenous culture, social norms, and patterns o li e. Tis term is

used to describe a lower class o people. Based on this class difference, thisgroup orms a tight bond and develops its own concept, which Dr. DianeSingerman calls the amilial ethos. Tis idea centers on maintaining theintegrity o the amily with the onus ofen alling on the women as the males


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struggle to court, marry, and provide or a spouse due to nancial disparityacross the country. Te networking o women o the Shab helps close this

nancial gap by establishing an in ormal banking system. Tis system servestwo purposes: First, it maintains the integrity o their amilies, and second,it adds more central actors to their network. Herein lies the importance ounderstanding a social network and the inuence, or centrality, o womenin some cultures. Tis example also demonstrates that social networks canserve as an in ormal system o government.

Social Media and the Egyptian Revolution. Social interactions are vital to

all humans with current research suggesting that positive social relation-ships and interactions can increase li e span by up to percent. Socialnetworking tools such as Facebook or witter aim to build social networksor social relations among people with shared interests and/or activities. Social media ullls this innate need or interaction in a timely and simplemanner, which was vital during events in Egypt in .

In comparing the days it took to overthrow the Shah in the Iranian Revolution to the days in which the Egyptian Revolution oustedHosni Mubarak, the latter can be attributed to a key catalystsocial media.In particular, Egyptian demographics and the popularity o social mediaplayed a pivotal role. Te population consisted o a disproportionate numberbelow years o age as depicted in Figure , which is expected to continueto be seen in Egypt over the next several decades. Te popularity o socialmedia within this demographic was also key, with nearly percent o Face-book users under the age o . Te combination o these two actors was

accordingly a recipe or timely mobilization and messaging.Social grievances have always been part o Egyptian society, but socialmedia allowed those grievances to be voiced quickly and to an inuentialdemographic. Jon Alterman provides a great metaphor to explain the speedby which media is used to accelerate a movement. He notes that the ourelements needed or a campre are: a spark, which creates a ash; tinder,which turns the spark into a ame; kindling, which grows the ame; anduel logs, which increase the li e o the campre. In comparison, social media

was not the spark o the revolution, but instead acted as both the tinder andkindling to mobilize the high number o Egyptians in ahir Square. In theend, however, the revolutionaries ailed to emplace a structure or enduringchangein essence, they could not provide the logs to uel sustainment. Just


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as SNA is not a silver bullet or combating illicit networks, social media is nota means or revolution, but instead a critical component o social interactionthat can be exploited to help map out the human terrain.

Mapping the Human Terrain

Tis section introduces two sofware tools that have been developed to spe-cically assist military orces in mapping out the human terrain. Both othese programs were developed at the Common Operational Research Envi-ronment (CORE) lab, located at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) inMonterey, Cali ornia. Te CORE lab is ocused on supporting the educationo both U.S. and oreign military officers in in ormation technology thatcould be used to understand and analyze network-based adversaries. Itprovides a bottom-up approach or military officers to apply in ormation

rom their parent organizations or countries to conduct real world analy-ses. Trough their coursework, officers return to the eld with the meansto not only understand or inuence the human domain with this emergingtechnology, but how to operate within it as well.

Figure 1. Egypt population pyramid. Source: United States Census Bureau,International Programs, 2011.


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Dynamic Twitter Network Analysis. Just as a topographic map depictsthe terrain in an area o operations, the programs developed at the CORE

labDynamic witter Network Analysis (D NA) and Lighthousetakein ormation that is gleaned rom social network mediums and provide amap o the human terrain. As witter has become a popular social mediaapplication, the CORE lab has begun using the Application ProgrammingInter ace (API) to sif through its keywords or phrase and generate a visualnetwork analysis in real time. Subsequently, D NA can provide the userwith sentiment analysis based on the in ormation pulled rom the witterAPI. Tree units within the Department o De ense are testing this programto better assess sentiment in an unnamed location. I used correctly, thisprogram could prove valuable in thwarting attacks on U.S. interests in aspecic region. D NA can also apply witters hashtags and key phrases to amapping eature as seen in the ollowing project conducted at the CORE lab.

Application of DTNA. Army Major Seth Lucente, a military intelligenceofficer and student at the CORE lab, analyzed social media in the Syria con-ict. Using D NA, he pulled in ormation rom several social media sites toidenti y the Assad regimes movements in combating protests and protectingacilities. Te under-resourced rebel orce was itsel using social media tocoordinate movement and provide situational awareness including battledamage assessment. From his analysis, Major Lucente was able to provide asnapshot o in ormation depicting the locations o bombings, protests, andgovernment attacks, including embedded videos o battle damage assessmentrom Syrian airstrikes. Additional sentiment analysis provided the name

o a rebel group that was used to protect these sites in the event o a gov-ernment collapse. Tis project proved extremely use ul in mapping out thehuman terrain and was conducted in a span o two months. By comparison,conventional means would have taken longer and required more analysts.

Lighthouse. Te second sofware, Lighthouse, was developed by two stu-dents, U.S. Marine Corps Captain Carrick Longley and U.S. Army SpecialForces Warrant Officer Chad Machiela. Tis Android-based program col-

lects demographic in ormation and produces a geospatial social networkmap that depicts links between individuals. Like D NA, this programhas been validated in both humanitarian relie efforts and combat opera-tions. For example, Lighthouse was used in a medical action project by the


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Marines prior to the start o the Cobra Gold Exercise in Tailand todetermine patient demographics and distance traveled to the medical site.

In the uture, this in ormation can provide commanders and humanitarianrelie experts the ability to measure the effectiveness o relie operations andallocate priorities as necessary.

Application of Lighthouse. In , a Special Forces Operational Detach-ment Alpha (ODA) team in southern A ghanistan success ully applied theLighthouse program to their Village Stability Operations (VSO) to help iden-ti y tribal alignment. At the time, the ODA was located in the Khakrez

district and began collecting data on a ew hundred villagers to establish asocial network map. Within three weeks, the ODA was able to pinpoint aaliban sympathizer with high centrality in the village that was unreceptiveto plans o marginalizing aliban inuence. Subsequently, the ODA reducedhis inuence to the VSO. Like the Syria project, use o the program took lesstime than conventional means and provides another example o integratingtechnology with SNA concepts to generate non-kinetic targeting.

Tese examples demonstrate that social media and other in ormationintegrated with these programs provide a large pool o widely accessible datathat can be used to map the human terrain and assess sentiment in order toapply an appropriate approach to a problem. More importantly, this in or-mation can be readily accessible as a means or SOF conducting preparationo the environment. Doing so would in orm policymakers and operatorson the ground which group is aligned with U.S. interests be ore setting ootin a country. Tese programs are limited specically in areas o the world

with reduced bandwidth or where a host nation has blocked Internet access.Keeping in mind the ast-moving nature o technology, these tools will bedifficult to ormalize and will require commanders to understand their valueand effectively employ them.

The Military and the Human Domain

Te Army and Marine Corps have agreed on the denition set orth byUnited States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the totality othe physical, cultural, psychological, and social environments that inuencehuman behavior to the extent that the success o any military operation orcampaign depends on the application o unique capabilities that are designedto inuence, ght, and win in the population-centric conicts. Tis effort


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to dene the human domain was the result o similar experiences o theArmy, Marine Corps, and USSOCOM operations in A ghanistan and Iraq.

Although the two services and USSOCOM provide three distinct purposesor de ense, they share a common operating spacelandand, there ore,people. With this commonality, the two service chie s and USSOCOM com-mander collectively signed and published a white paper entitled StrategicLandpower: Winning the Clash of Wills, establishing the Strategic Landpowerask Force. Tis task orce will assist in capturing the lessons o the last years and provide a DO MLPF-P ramework or building a uture orce.O the three services, the Army was the rst to introduce the concept o thehuman domain into doctrine.

Army Approach. Mind ul o scal constraints and global uncertainty, theArmy announced specic concerns it anticipates in . O those, onerelates to doctrine ocused on the human domain and another to regionalalignment. Te rst will add a seventh warghting unction within Armydoctrine. o introduce this warghting unction, the Armys raining andDoctrine Command recently published RADOC Pamphlet - - enti-tled Te U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement . Tis publicationaddresses our imperatives o the uture Army orce: both Army and partnerorces capabilities will need to be leveraged in uture operations; inuencein a country or region will require an understanding o human actors byArmy orces; the methodology o by, with, and through will acilitate hostnation capabilities; and support to the joint orce commander will requireArmy conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) to work in concert

with one another.Te second effort is regional alignment. With the exception o the dAirborne Division, which will remain as the Global Response Force, divisionswill deploy brigades to each geographic combatant commanders (GCC) areao responsibility on a rotational basis. Tis will provide the means to buildpartner capacity and simultaneously posture or securing national inter-ests abroad. One challenge is size; employing a large unit counters strategicguidance o maintaining small- ootprint approaches. More importantly,

conventional units do not have the necessary language and cultural skillsand are scally constrained making prioritization o training and undingcritical or success. Doctrinal changes and growing requisite capabilities will


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take time; there ore, USSOCOM units are best suited to maintain the leadin the human domain as it relates to warghting.

SOF in the Lead. U.S. SOF units are deployed in over countries to par-ticipate in a wide range o operations, rom advising oreign partners tocombating violent extremist organizations and other sensitive operations.Tese units language capabilities, cultural training, and advanced skillsar surpass the capabilities o conventional orces. Te U. S. Army SpecialForces Command has ve active duty Special Forces Groups that are geo-graphically aligned to the GCCs. Tese operators are provided extensive

educational opportunities throughout their career to help ensure their suc-cess in core activities and operations relevant to the human terrain, includ-ing counterterrorism, oreign internal de ense, and unconventional war are(UW). In essence, UW is counterinsurgency in reverse. An example is theU.S. involvement in assisting, training, and advising the A ghan Mujahe-deen during the A ghan-Soviet War o the s, and is inherently tied tooperating with indigenous people. Te degree to which social movements,revolutions, and UW intersectillustrated in Figure has been capturedin SOF curriculum and publications. Tis understanding underscores SOFsocus on the human domain.

Conclusion

John F. Kennedys inaugural speech provided a glimpse into how war-are changed in the latter part o the th century. Kennedy described a typeo war are that was, New in intensity, ancient in its originwar by guerillas,

subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead o by combat; byinltration, instead o aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhaustingthe enemy instead o engaging him. Tis recognition implied a ocus onthe human element and continues to resonate today. Social network analy-sis concepts are a means to understand the complexity o human actors.While the advent o social media is, in military terms, decisive terrain orboth insurgent and counterinsurgent, it provides the opportunity or inu-ence. Illicit organizations have taken to this medium to transmit their thcentury ideology using st century technologies to increase their ollowers.

Tis essay introduced tools that should be used and incorporated by mili-tary planners and interagency organizations alike to counter the spread othis ideology. Although there is no single solution or combating terrorism,


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the understanding o the human domain and the militarys ability to inu-ence it can prioritize already limited resources as we look toward an uncer-

tain uture operating environment.

Endnotes 1. Paret, Peter. Clausewitz in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to

the Nuclear Age, 45. Edited by Peter Paret.Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1996.

2. Smith, Rupert. Te Utility of Force: Te Art of War in the Modern World , 269.New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2005.

3. Everton, Sean F. Disrupting Dark Networks, 6. New York, NY: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2012. 4. Ibid., 12. 5. Singerman, Diane. Where Has All the Power Gone? Women in Politics in

Popular Quarters in Cairo, 174, in Fatma Muge Gocek and Shira Balaghi, eds,

Figure 2. Social Revolution, Social Movement, and Unconventional Warfare.Source: Doowan Lee, A Social Movement Approach to UnconventionalWarfare, Special Warfare, JulySeptember 2013.


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Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East . New York: Columbia University Press,1994.

6. Ibid., 174-200. 7. Ibid., 178. 8. Ibid., 190. 9. Holt-Lunstad, Julianne, imothy B. Smith, and J. B. Layton. Social Relation-

ships and Mortality Risk: A Meta-analytic Review. PLOS Medicine 7 , no. 7(2010): http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/in o%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000316#s2.

10. Dubai School o Government. Facebook Usage: Factors and Analysis. ArabSocial Media Report 1, no. 2 (JAN 2011): 3.

11. Alterman, Jon. Te Revolution Will Not Be weeted. Te Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2011): 105.

12. Laremont, Ricardo R. Demographics, Economics and echnology: Backgroundto the North A rican Revolutions. Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3,(2012): 10: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php?N=%20Results%20& =12&A=separate&R =0&Y=2011&R=-1&C=EG.

13. Dubai School o Government, Facebook Usage: Factors and Analysis, 7. 14. Alterman, Te Revolution Will Not Be weeted, 106. Tis type o metaphor

is not unique to Jon Alterman. Mao se-tungs book Chairman Mao se-tungon Peoples War (1967), also known as the little red book, uses the phrase Asingle spark can start a prairie re.

15. Te Naval Postgraduate School is an Intermediate Level Education program ormilitary officers to include Special Operations Forces senior Non-CommissionedOfficers. For additional in ormation on the CORE program see the Naval Post-graduate School site: http://www.nps.edu/da/corelab/.

16. Stewart, Kenneth. NPS CORE Lab Rethinks raditional Intelligence Ana-lysts, September 13, 2012: http://www.nps.edu/About/News/NPS-CORE-Lab-

Rethinks- raditional-Intelligence-Analysis.html. 17. Ibid. 18. An API is a set o programming instructions and standards or accessing web-

based sofware. Basically a sofware company releases its API to the public so thatother sofware developers can design products that are powered by its service.For more in ormation see Dave Roos, How to Leverage an API for Conferencing ,How Stuff Works, accessed on February 20, 2014: http://money.howstuffworks.com/business-communications/how-to-leverage-an-api- or-con erencing1.htm.

19. Davie, Kerry. Can the US Military Fight a War with witter? Computerworld.com, November 8, 2012: http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9233399/Can_the_US_military_ght_a_war_with_ witter_?taxonomyId=236&pageNumber=1.


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20. Ibid. See Google Map accessed at: https://maps.google.com/maps/ms?msa=0& msid=212070240894988529972.0004cdd34638cc2d553e2&hl=en&ie=U F8&t=h&ll=34.697183,38.479958&spn=4.308843,4.877243&source=embed.

21. Ibid. 22. Stewart, NPS CORE Lab Rethinks. 23. Ibid. 24. Person, Karen, Staff Sergeant. U.S. Marines Use Lighthouse Application at

MEDCAP. III Marine Expeditionary Force Homepage, February 8, 2012: http://www.iiime .marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/967/Article/14063/us-marines-use-lighthouse-application-at-medcap.aspx.

25. Hanlin, Rory. One eams Approach to Village Stability Operations. SmallWars Journal , September 4, 2011: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/one-team%E2%80%99s-approach-to-village-stability-operations.

26. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, xxvii. 27. Ibid. 28. Headquarters, Department o the Army. A P 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare ,

3-1. Washington, D.C: 2013. Preparation o the Environment (PE) is dened inthis publication as the umbrella term or activities conducted in oreign coun-tries to shape and prepare an area or potential operations. Te skills or these

activities resides in USSOCOM. 29. Roulo, Claudette. McRaven: Success in Human Domain Fundamental to SpecialOps. U.S. Department o De ense, American Foreign Press Service, June 5, 2013.http://www.de ense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120219.

30. Ibid. 31. DO MLPF-P is the DOD acronym that pertains to the eight possible non-

material elements involved in solving warghting capability gaps. Te acronymstands or: Doctrine, Organization, raining, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel,Facilities and Policy. For more in ormation see CJCSI 3170.01 Joint Capabilities

Integration and Development System. 32. 24 Issues Tat Will Shape the Army in 2014. Army imes , January 2, 2014.

Accessed on January 16, 2014 at: http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140102/NEWS/301020012/24-issues-will-shape-Army-2014.

33. Headquarters, Department o the Army. ADP 3-0, Unied Land Operations .Washington, D.C.: 2011. A Warghting Function is dened as a group o tasksand systems (people, organizations, in ormation, and processes) united by acommon purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions.

34. Headquarters, Department o the Army. RADOC Pam 525-8-5, U.S. ArmyFunctional Concept for Engagement , 6. Fort Eustis, VA: 2014.

35. Ibid. 36. Exception to this is U.S. Northern Command (USNOR HCOM). However,

USNOR HCOM will establish SOCNOR H in 2015 to serve as its SOC. For


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urther in ormation see Andrew Feickerts CRS report on US SOF: Backgroundand Issues or Congress, dated September 18, 2013.

37. Te American Presidency Project. John F. Kennedy: Remarks at West Point tothe Graduating Class o the U.S. Military Academy. Accessed at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8695.

38. Roberts, James Roberts. Addressing the Zawahirist Outsurgency. Small Wars Journal , (March 3, 2010). Accessed at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/addressing-the-zawahirist-outsurgency.


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Goldstein: The First Women in SOF

The First Women in SOF: Women

Operatives in the OSS and SOE as aFramework for the Modern Enabler

U.S. Navy Lieutenant Andrea Goldstein

Four women kneel behind the crematorium at Dachau concentrationcamp in Germany. It is September . One by one, they are shot

in the back o the head by their Nazi executioners. Yolande Beekman,Noor Inayat Khan, Elaine Pewman, and Madeleine Damerment survivedmonths o horric conditions in Gestapo prisons. Long be ore they mettheir deaths at dawn, they endured months o interrogation, shackles, andisolation. Not a single one o them betrayed her country under such duress.All were operatives or the British intelligence organization Special Opera-

tions Executive (SOE), plucked rom jobs as radio operators and translatorsand hand-selected to serve behind enemy lines, only captured afer betrayalby a double-agent. One o the captured operatives, -year-old Noor InayatKhan, an Indian Muslim o royal descent, was brutally beaten be ore herexecution, and yet uttered the word liberte be ore she was shot. Tese ourwomens vibrant lives came to a horric end in the service o their countries.Tey had each knowingly assumed the risk to their lives, proud that servingtheir homelands was a cause to live and die or, a sentiment shared by women

who serve in the modern era.All our o these women, as well as the vast majority o operativesboth

men and womenwho served in the SOE and its American counterpart, theOffice o Strategic Services (OSS, itsel the oundation o both the CentralIntelligence Agency and modern Special Operations Forces, or SOF), hadone thing in common: they spoke French well enough to pass as French. Teact that they were women made them even better suited to operate behind

Lieutenant Andrea Goldstein is a U.S. Navy expeditionary warfare of cer.She wrote this essay while attending the JSOU College of Special OperationsInternational and Interagency Special Operations Course. She is currentlyserving as a department head in Coronado, California.


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occupied French lines because Femininity was indeed the best disguise. Noor Inayat Khan, Virginia Hall, and Christine Granville were rom differ-

ent countries (France/England, the United States, and Poland respectively),but had several commonalities. Tey were privileged and educated, theyhad traveled and spoke multiple languages, but above all had a thirst oradventure. In a time o total war that drew on the resources o the entirepopulation, it became an absolute necessity to trust qualied women withthe most dangerous and critical clandestine missions.

Contemporary American SOF employ scores o women as enablersthat is, in billets whose specic mission is not direct action. Yet despite theoverwhelming need to engage with the emale indigenous populations indeployed environments, Navy Special War are (NSW) and Army SpecialForces (ARSOF) did not orm Cultural Support eams (CS ) until , years into the Global War on error. Furthermore, there are short alls

within the modern military about properly recruiting, detailing, and retain-ing those personnelespecially womanwho might bring unique capabili-ties to the Battlespace. JP - , Doctrine for Special Operations, specically

outlines the core tasks o special operations, and direct action is only oneo them. Women in the OSS and SOE were actively employed in missionsconducting special reconnaissance, oreign internal de ense, unconventionalwar are, civil affairs operations, military in ormation support operations,and in ormation operations. We can look to the employment o womenoperatives in the OSS and SOE in World War II as an effective example ohow women were recruited, trained, and deployed against the enemy.

Unsurprisingly, in , there was hesitance to employ qualied women

who volunteered or hazardous duty in a time o acute crisis, but it wasbrushed aside in the necessity o total war. OSS Head William Wild BillDonovan wrote in the post-war years that, Te heart o American wartimeintelligence was a collection o highly implausible operators[who] showedwhat intellect, diligence, courage, and willingness to get around can accom-plish. Donovan had long since discovered the truth behind the mantra thatAmerican SOF has adopted, Humans are more important than hardware.In the art and practice o human intelligence (HUMIN ), the very persono the collector, or operative as they were re erred to in the SOE and OSS,was critical. Tese women had the same intellect and thirst or adventure astheir male counterparts, and their gender as much a needed asset to interact


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with the local populationand the enemy Nazisas their uency in thelocal language or adeptness at operating a radio.

Approximately , women served in the American OSS, though mostwere based in Washington, D.C., and were the ones at home who patientlyled secret reports, encoded and decoded messages, answered telephones,mailed checks, and kept the records Only a small percentage o the womenever went overseas, and a still smaller percentage was assigned to actualoperations behind enemy lines. Te number o operatives, male and emale,who went into enemy territory was very small compared to the sheer size othe Allied orce. It should be no surprise, then, that the women selected orthese treacherous assignments were truly exceptional even be ore the war.

Virginia Hall was born into privilege in Baltimore, Maryland. She stud-ied at Radcliffe and Barnard Colleges be ore completing her studies at theprestigious Sorbonne in Paris and Konsularacademie in Vienna, becominguent in French and German. Following graduation rom university, sheeventually ound employment as a consular clerk at the U.S. Embassy inWarsaw. She had diplomatic aspirations, however a hunting accident led

to the amputation o her lef leg, which at the time was a barrier to joiningthe Foreign Service. Equipped with a new wooden leg, which she wouldname Cuthbert, Hall traveled Europe, and was living in Paris at the start othe war, eeing to England when France ell in . Fluent in French, andhaving lived in Paris, Hall was per ectly suited to serve behind enemy lines inFrance. She served or the SOE rom - , organizing French Resistancegroups. She trans erred to the OSS in , and was immediately insertedback into occupied France, where she assisted a Jedburgh team afer theD-Day invasion o Normandy. In , she was awarded the DistinguishedService Cross, and remained in the OSS through to its transition to the CIA,where she worked as an analyst or decades to come.

Christine Granville, a Polish beauty queen, was born Krystyna Skarbek inWarsaw to an aristocratic ather and Jewish mother. Granville came to adoptthe ormer, her nom-de-guerre, as her true name. She grew up largely at heramily estate in the countryside, riding horses in the summer, and strappingheavy wooden skis to her eet to ski in the mountains in the winter. Alwaysrestless, she spent her secondary school days being expelled rom the bestschools in Poland, learning French along the way, and eventually graduating.She and her rst husband, Jerzy Gizycky, were in A rica, driving rom SouthA rica to his diplomatic posting in Nairobi when they learned the news that


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Hitler had invaded Poland, and they had no Embassy to go to. Tey turnedaround and boarded a ship bound or London, where Granville volunteered

her services to the SOE. While it is unclear how exactly she was acceptedinto British intelligence, it is apparent that she was dedicated to using herlanguage, skiing, and interpersonal skills to help her beloved country how-ever she could. She was soon skiing over the Hungarian border into Polandwith microlm and subversive Allied propaganda sewn into her clothing.She collected on the tactical situation on the ground, meeting sources inshady ca es or simply blending into the population and reporting what sheobserved. Granville served all over Eastern Europe, North A rica, and theLevant region, and it wasnt long be ore she was parachuting into OccupiedFrance well in advance o D-Day orces.

A childrens book writer o Indian descent, Noor Inayat Khan would atrst glance seem an unlikely candidate or an intelligence operative, butlike many o her peers in the SOE, she had a ascinating li e well be ore thewar. She was born in Moscow to a Su Muslim ather rom an aristocraticIndian amily and an American mother. Te amily moved to London at the

outbreak o World War I, and then to Paris afer the armistice. An introvertand a dreamer, Khan studied at the Sorbonne in Paris and chose to write.Her entire amily ed to England once the Germans came to occupy France.Tough quiet, Khan was also passionate. David Harper wrote, She was aparadox. She was sensitive, a lover o music and poetry, a musician and writero childrens stories. Yet she was terribly strong-willed and prepared to riskher li e or a cause; she was ghting or an ideal, like so many others at thattime. With staunch patriotism and a ervor to combat the tyranny o the

Nazis, Khan joined the Womens Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) as a radiooperator. Her uency in French, however, soon came to the attention o theSOE, and by she was in France, transmitting secret radio transmissionsback to London.

Tough rom a variety o backgrounds, these women were all eager toassume the risks involved with conducting espionage and an unconventionalwar are campaign against the Nazis. And they excelled at it. In many situa-tions, their emininity was an advantage, but above all, it was an importantactor that added to the toolkit that the Allies had to ght the Nazis, muchlike the all- emale CS s o modern SOF proved to directly improve villagestability operations in A ghanistan.


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Te persistent cultural stereotype o the emale spy is o a hyper-sexualMata Hari, the ultimate emme atale, an exotic dancer executed or spying

or the Germans during World War I. Indeed, many o the women opera-tives in the OSS and SOE were attractiveChristine Granville hersel wasnamed the second most beauti ul woman in Poland when she was yearsold but overwhelmingly did not rely on their sexuality in order to beeffective operatives. Tese women were intelligence pro essionals, and wereaware that their emininity was an effective means o gathering in ormation,but solely in the sense that they were aware that their emininitytheir mereexistenceinspired greater immediate trust rom the people they interactedwith.

Women were subject to less scrutiny by occupying Nazi orces, and peopleinstantly had a greater trust or them. Former SOE Operative Claire Everettmused in the postwar years, Women could get by with a smile and do thingsthat men couldnt, and no matter what you had hidden in your handbag oryour bicycle bag, i you had a nice smile, you know, just give [the Germans]a little wink. Although ofen strikingly attractive, these women could still

pass in plain sight. While on a train rom Hungary to Warsaw carrying asuitcase ull o subversive propaganda, Christine Granville struck a conver-sation with a Nazi sitting in her compartment, asking i he would carry herluggage past the border checkpoint, because she was bringing contrabandtea to her sick mother. Te soldier obliged, the thought o a woman beinginvolved in such an operation not even part o his consciousness. Being awoman was the best disguise o all.

Women are tremendously effective when it comes to earning trust oanother individual, certainly or engaging with other women. Although ittook nearly a decade into the Global War on error and wars in Iraq andA ghanistan to be nearly at a close or the creation o all- emale CS s, it wasstill ultimately recognized as a need. Te U.S. Army John F. Kennedy SpecialWar are Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), which runs the primary CSprogram, states on their recruitment page, Cultural support training willprimarily ocus on basic human behavior, Islamic and A ghan cultures,women and their role in A ghanistan, and tribalism. It wasnt until it wasclear that all-male units could not engage with hal the population due tocultural sensitivities that emale CS members were recruited and trained.


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Just as in World War II, it was only in a case o extreme need that womenwere given a chance to succeed. Te official publication o Naval Special

War are, Ethos, explains:Cultural Support eams rst came into existence in late whenit became obvious to commanders that having male soldiers patdown A ghani women or weapons and ask them questions aboutenemy activity was not working, in act it was seriously upsettingand in uriating to the very people with whom operators were tryingto build trusting and productive relationships.

Like their oremothers in the OSS and SOE, CS personnel are expectedto accede to the program with special skills, with USAJFKSWCS listingnurse practitioner ( P), nurse midwi e ( G D), health care specialist( W), military police ( B) or military intelligence specialist ( M, F,P) as pre erred career elds, and language skills, particularly Dari, Urdu,

and Pashto are also valued.As o late , U.S. combat operations have decreased globally, and SOF

has primarily shifed to a oreign internal de ense approach to de eating ter-rorismthat is working by, with, and though a partner orce. Tis poses thequestion: What is to happen to the model o employing women in the orcenot only or the exceptional pro essional skills they have developed withintheir military disciplines, li e, and educational experience, but also becauseo the advantages that the access to indigenous populations that women areuniquely able to gain?

At the end o World War II, the women operatives who had risked their

lives and sa ety or the winning cause were given the highest military deco-rations, thanked or their service, and then pushed out the door. VirginiaHall, despite having proven hersel as one o the most success ul Americaneld operatives deployed by the OSS, was relegated to a desk job as an ana-lyst at the newly- ormed offspring o the OSS, the CIA, and despite beingone o the most seasoned agents in the agency, was underemployed by theleadership, not tting the good old boy prole o many o her World War IIpeers. She was a sort o embarrassment to the noncombatant CIA types, bywhich I mean bureaucrats. Her experience and abilities were never properlyutilized. At the very least she should have been lecturing to trainees at theCIA indoctrination arm near Williamsburg.


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Christine Granville earned her place in history as one o the SOEs mostsuccess ul spies, renowned in her own time, and the eventual inspiration

or the character o Vesper Lynd in Ian Flemings James Bond novel CasinoRoyale. Yet in , the SOE all but orsook her. She was short-changedon her military decorations, given a ar lower-ranked medal than her malepeers whom she had outshone. She was a Pole, a oreigner, and a woman,and despite six years o risking her li e or the British Empire, her militarydecorations, and service record, nobody really knew what to do with her.She was a woman without a country, unable to return to Poland because oher service or the Allies. Britain denied her request to naturalization dueto the act that she had not resided in the country or more than ve years,blatantly ignoring that she had operated in Egypt, Syria, Hungary, France,and Palestine on British orders. She was neither suited to, nor did shedesire a steady office job, and instead held several odd jobs that allowed herto travel, barely scraping by nancially. Her restless post-war years came toa tragic close in , when she was murdered in a hotel lobby by a colleaguewhose advances she had rejected.

Modern SOF should learn rom the lesson o abandoning seasonedwomen operatives. Special operations doctrine itsel espouses the act thatcompetent special operations orces cannot be created afer emergenciesarise. Te necessity that stems rom total war allows a temporary culturalparadigm shif, allowing women to ll previously nontraditional roles, likesoldiers and spies. But it also allows women to prove that they not onlybelong there in the desperation o wartime, but in the shaping o peacetimeenvironments and ongoing stability operations, and continue to developpro essional skills to apply to the next conict or emergency.

It is this authors hypothesis that the institutional practice o SOF to over-look women as excellent candidates or sensitive, non-direct action missionsdraws rom widespread but antiquated notions that hazardous duty is a mans job. Wayne Nelson, an OSS operative during World War II noted on womenoperatives, I still dont like the idea o putting girls in to do a mans work.You eel aw ul small when you leave them just beyond the lines. Tere isan unspoken but pervasive cultural ear o women dying or their country,and a need to protect women by barring them rom undertaking missionsthat may have that result. Te United States military employs an all-volunteerorce, and unconventional assignments such as to SOF again require can-didates to volunteer. Tat implies accepting the risks involved with taking


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assignments that are inherently so. Christine Granville was in uriated whenshe was treated like a helpless little girl when she had clearly proven that

she could not only take care o hersel , but save others. Despite the lifing othe Combat Exclusion ban in , unspoken, unwritten restrictions remain.

As U.S. SOF shif ocus rom unilateral direct action and more towardthe other core activities, there is an opportunity to develop CS person-nel and other emale enablers as a regularly integrated part o the orce.While some units already do this in a de- acto, as-needed basis with emaleenablers, it should be incorporated as part o routine practice. USASOC iscurrently conducting the Project Diane initiative, named afer VirginiaHall, to explore urther opportunities to integrate women into SOF combatunits. U.S. SOF have a unique opportunity during this period o transition.Te shif rom two large conicts to dozens o ractious missions means thatspecialized skills and the people themselves are most critical. And womenshould be not be excluded rom that effort.

Endnotes 1. Cookridge, E.H., Four Roads to Dachau. Te Daily elegraph , April 25, 1975,

26-27. 2. Hamilton, Alan. Exotic British spy who deed Gestapo brutality to the end.

Te imes of London , May 13, 2006, 26. 3. Cookridge, Four Roads to Dachau, 26-27. 4. Pattinson, Juliette. Passing unnoticed in a French crowd: the passing per or-

mances o British SOE agents in occupied France. National Identities . Vol. 12,No. 3. September 2010, 301.

5. Canales, Dominique. NSW CS : Females Fill Critical Battleeld Role. Ethos:Te Official Publication of Naval Special Warfare . March 1, 2012, 19-21.

6. United States. Special Operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, 17 July 14, II-3. 7. Donovan, William J. Intelligence: Key to de ense. Life, September 30, 1946,

108. 8. United States, Special Operations, 25. 9. McIntosh, Elizabeth P. Sisterhood of Spies: Te Women of the OSS. Naval Institute

Press, 1998, 11. 10. Ibid., 16.

11. Zabecki, David . Te Limping Lady Spy Military History , Vol. 25, Issue 5,21-22.

12. McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 122-123. 13. Ibid., p. 127.


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14. Mulley, Clare. Te Spy Who Loved . Macmillan, 2012, 19. 15. Ibid., 29.

16. Ibid., 184. 17. Hamilton, Alan. Exotic British spy who deed Gestapo brutality to the end.

Te imes o London, May 13, 2006, 26. 18. Hudson, Christopher. Spy Betrayed By Her Own Masters. Daily Mail (London),

February 17, 2006, 59. 19. Canales, NSW CS : Females Fill Critical Battleeld Role, 19-21. 20. Mulley, Te Spy Who Loved , 21. 21. Pattinson, Passing unnoticed in a French crowd, 301.

22. Ibid. 23. Mulley, Te Spy Who Loved , 55-56. 24. Te U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special War are Center and School, Cultural

Support Prerequisites and Requirements. http://www.soc.mil/swcs/cst/prereq-uisites.html.

25. Ibid. 26. Canales, NSW CS : Females Fill Critical Battleeld Role, 19. 27. Te U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special War are Center and School, Cultural

Support Prerequisites and Requirements. 28. Obama, Barack. National Strategy or Counterterrorism. United States White

House, June 28, 2011. 29. McIntosh, 127. 30. Mulley, Te Spy Who Loved , 341-342.

31. Ibid., 294. 32. Ibid., 288. 33. Ibid., 330. 34. United States Army Special Operations Command, SOF ruths: http://www.soc.

mil/USASOCHQ/SOF ruths.html. 35. Nelson, Wayne. A Spys Diary of World War II : Inside the OSS with an American

Agent in Europe. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009, 175. 36. Mulley, Te Spy Who Loved , 294. 37. United States Army Special Operations Command, Project Diane: http://www.

soc.mil/USASOC alks/ProjectDiane.html


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Akerley: Training the Police Forces of a Fragile State

Training the Police Forces of a Fragile

StateU.S. Army Major Scott Akerley

T he terrorist attacks o September saw the introduction o a newera or the strategic de ense o the United States. Te rst Director othe Office o Homeland Security was appointed days afer the attack andcharged to oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy tosa eguard the country against terrorism and respond to any uture attacks.Te ransportation Security Administration ( SA) was established on November designed to prevent similar attacks in the uture. Te U.S.military also responded with the rst Special Forces (SF) team inltratinginto A ghanistan on October to begin the process o destroying thealiban government which had been providing sanctuary or al-Qaeda, the

terrorist organization responsible or the / attacks. Te U.S. militarysinvolvement in A ghanistan was the initiation o what would develop intoover a decade o ull-scale stability operations within ragile states exploitedby destabilizing threats and terrorist organizations.

Te United States National Security Strategy provides guidance or stabil-ity operations in an increasingly complex strategic environment, declaringthat paramount to success is the need or operations which help establishlegitimate, well-governed states. Inherent in the governance o a state is theability to police itsel , thereby creating an environment o law and order.However, the police orces in a ragile state ofen nd themselves disorga-nized, ill-equipped, untrained, and generally incapable o acing the myriadchallenges which con ront them. Te U.S. executes stability operations to

Major Scott Akerley is a Combat Operations Analyst with the U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command Analysis Center. He wrote this essay whileattending the Joint Special Operations Universitys Evolution of U.S. Spe-cial Operations course. He is currently engaged in several Department ofDefense studies focusing on mission command and the mission commandwar ghting function.


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assist ragile states, and a number o the stability tasks are ocused on lawen orcement and establishing a sa e and secure environment. Te complex-

ity o these stability tasks necessitate that the correct U.S. organization bechosen to lead in the building and empowerment o the police orce acedwith the challenges ofen associated with a ragile state. U.S. Army SF are thecorrect organization to carry out this critical mission. Many o the specialoperations core activities are aligned with the missions a ragile states policemust undertake. SF possess the cultural and linguistic training necessary toovercome personal and pro essional boundaries. In addition, they also havethe resources and the operational latitude to assist host nation police andhelp them achieve legitimacy.

Te operations in Iraq and A ghanistan are the two most recognizedexamples o U.S. stability operations and are both operations in which theU.S. military has helped host nation police establish rule o law. An examina-tion o the national police strategy in one o these countries, A ghanistan,reveals that several o the threats identied by the A ghan Minister o Inte-rior Affairs are related to core activities o U.S. Special Operations Forces

(SOF), specically Army SF. Te A ghan National Police Strategy (ANPS)identies ve major security threats in addition to normal criminal activi-ties. Tese security threats are: terrorist threats and armed opposition tothe government, unlaw ul governance and corruption, illegal drug trade,organized crime, and illegally armed groups. Te SOF core activities thatcan be interwoven within these identied security threats include: coun-terterrorism (C ), oreign internal de ense (FID), security orce assistance(SFA), counterinsurgency (COIN), and direct action (DA).

Fragile states provide terrorist organizations an environment in whichto thrive, as the lack o governance and rule o law allow them reedom omaneuver, access to resources, and an unstable, unsecured population inwhich to recruit. Police orces within these states must be able to deny theseassets by executing effective counterterrorism operations in order to establishcivil control. JP - Special Operations states that, SOF activities usedin concert with stability operations, counterintelligence (CI), civil-militaryoperations (CMO), and communication synchronization, enable partnersto combat terrorism, deter tacit and active support or terrorism, and erodesupport or terrorist ideologies.

Denying terrorist organizations the reedom to operate within a stateinvolves police cooperation and coordination with other host nation security


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orces. Tis type o interagency cooperation is difficult to achieve and com-plex to maintain. Te incorporation o police into a nations overall internal

de ense is another area o expertise unique to SF. FID is a SOF unctionwhich supports a host nations internal de ense and development (IDAD)strategy. Specied within the characteristics o FID is the leverage o lawen orcement to support a host nations IDAD strategy.

Te ability o law en orcement to accomplish their missions as part o thelarger security strategy will depend largely on their ability to build capableindividuals and units. Tis is a core activity SF have per ormed repeatedlyover the past several decades. SFA typically brings to mind military assis-tance, but JP - , Special Operations, species that SFA includes many hostnation organizations, including police orces. SF have the expertise andexperience necessary to provide training and guidance, specically in thoseareas not traditionally considered police roles, such as counterterrorism andcombating insurgent networks.

Te police orces o a ragile state ofen have to contend with insurgenciesand the signicant security threats they impose. Host nation police must be

able to skill ully manage both the armed action o an insurgency and thepopulation the insurgency is targeting. As noted in JP - , the populationis the center o gravity o success ul COIN. Police are paramount to thesecurity o the population and building support to legitimize a host nationgovernment. SFs prociency in COIN operations makes them ideal train-ers or local police orces attending to this delicate mission. Tey can teachhost nation police orces the undamentals o a success ul COIN, targetingtechniques, and the measured and precise use o orce.

Police orces can learn a considerable amount about the use o orcethrough training in another core SF activity, DA. Te techniques used duringDA missions are similar to those used by a police orce, whether in the con-duct o COIN, counterterrorism, or while executing traditional law en orce-ment. DA missions ofen involve operational techniques and the applicationo orce very similar to those used during law en orcement missions. Temissions themselves are similar, as DA includes raids, direct assaults, andseizures, all o which are short in duration and include specic targets.

o accomplish all o these identied missions and tasks, a U.S. orceexecuting stability operations and assisting law en orcement must be ableto establish conditions conducive to building strong relationships with themembers o the police orce they are trying to train. Tis does not apply


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only to the leadership o the unit partnered with a police orce, but includesevery person within the unit. Building these relationships necessitates a

strong understanding o the background and current environment within ahost nation, a particular city, a specic ethnic group, or even a unique tribewithin that ethnic group. Even the most junior privates ailure to recognizeand understand cultural differences between a United States soldier and ahost nation police officer can have, as Major Lynda Liddy stated in her articleTe Strategic Corporal, strategic and political consequences that can affectthe outcome o a given mission.

SF negate the possibility o the Strategic Corporal not only throughthe experience o its soldiers, but through specic cultural training directedat ensuring they comply with several principles o their own special opera-tions imperatives. Included in these imperatives are: understand the opera-tional environment, recognize political implications, and consider long-termeffects. Brigadier General (Ret.) Russell Howard states that SF should, ata minimum, possess cultural awareness, which is more than an under-standing o simple dos and donts; it is a basic recognition o the existence

o different cultural backgrounds, values, and perspectives that must beconsidered be ore conducting operations. Tis emphasis on culture allowseach member o an SF detachment to ully participate in building and train-ing a police orce while preventing distractions and setback. It also allowsthem to better understand their operational environment and coordinatetraining to match that environment.

Another SF attribute intimately tied to cultural training and awarenessis language prociency. Te ability to communicate in the host nations lan-

guage is essential to creating a solid relationship and removes an otherwiseinsurmountable obstacle between SF operators and their police partners.AR EP - - M P states that SF soldiers must possess a minimumlanguage capability o +, + through language-trained soldiers or avail-able translators. Tis minimum standard, not approached by conventionalorces (CF), allows SF to concentrate on building the capacity and capa-bilities o a police orce, and even participate in operations, while avoidingmisunderstandings.

Cultural and linguistic training are only two o the many resources indig-enous to SF and not ound in most CF. SFs wide list o activities and missionsgives them access to many other resources which greatly enhance their abilityto train and conduct operations with host nation police. Not only do SF have


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immediate access to aviation support, unmanned aerial surveillance sup-port, electronic war are, and communications assets to assist in combined

police operations, but they also have other SOF resources to call upon. SF canleverag