Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–95–3 July 1995 Vol. 8, No. 3

Doctrine is a subject that is much talkedabout but often misunderstood.

Opinions regarding doctrine and its valueare at times diametrically opposed. Somesay doctrine is the engine of change; otherssay it is the transmission of change. Somesay technology drives doctrine; others saydoctrine drives technology. Some say doc-trine should be proscriptive; others say itshould provide a common framework withinwhich operators are free to make decisions.

Regardless of the side of the doctrineargument we are on, it is important, as webuild the special-operations forces of thefuture, that we get our doctrine as nearlyright as possible. Doctrine profoundlyaffects the way in which SOF will train,fight and operate.

In our efforts to get doctrine right, wemust be careful to keep a fresh perspectiveas we consider future operations and evolv-ing technology. General Pershing, when hefirst viewed the airplane, remarked that itwould revolutionize getting hay to the hors-es. During the period between the worldwars, the French developed the most effec-tive doctrine ever seen. To their detriment,however, it was designed to win World WarI. In that same period, the Germans devel-oped their doctrine for the blitzkrieg.

Doctrine should be authoritative, but itis not inflexible — it is only “nearly” right.We must constantly fine-tune it by exam-ining it against the changing operationalenvironment.

In this issue, the article “Civil Affairs: AFunction of Command” is the first of aseries of doctrinal white papers written atthe JFK Center and School. The need tounderstand, plan for and coordinate civil-military operations has never been greater,and the article suggests doctrinal changesthat could make CA equal to other func-tions of command.

Also in this issue, Lt. Col. James Dunnand Maj. Jon Custer examine the experi-

ences of the XVIII Airborne Corps special-operations coordination element duringOperation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. Inassessing those experiences, they suggestways in which joint doctrine can moreclearly address the role of the SOCOORDat the JTF level.

Doctrine establishes operating principles,lays the groundwork for force structure andprovides a basis for training, and it canhelp to integrate SOF and conventionalforces. Christopher Lamb points out in hisarticle on emerging SOF roles that bydefining unique SOF characteristics, jointSOF doctrine can ensure that SOF retaintheir niche in U.S. military capabilities. Byholding firmly to that niche, we may beable to prevent SOF being used, like Per-shing’s aircraft, in “getting hay to the hors-es,” and make certain that our forcesreceive only the missions for which they areuniquely qualified.

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

Commander & CommandantMaj. Gen. William F. Garrison

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

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PB 80–95–3 ContentsJuly 1995 Special Warfare Vol. 8, No. 3

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly ofthe United States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Itsmission is to promote the professional development ofspecial-operations forces by providing a forum for theexamination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -5341.Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Features2 Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions

by Christopher Lamb

10 Emerging SOF Roles and Missions: A Different Perspectiveby Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, U.S. Army (ret.)

13 Waterborne Infiltration Training: Maintaining a BattleFocusby Maj. David E. Johnson

16 A USSOCOM View of Doctrineby Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

20 Civil Affairs: A Function of Command

26 Operation Uphold Democracy: The Role of the SOCOORDas Part of a Joint Task Forceby Lt. Col. James L. Dunn and Maj. Jon M. Custer

38 As I Remember It: Delegation and Decentralizationby Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

40 The Origin of the Crossed-Arrows Insigniaby Lt. Col. Charles King

Departments43 Letters46 Officer Career Notes47 Enlisted Career Notes48 Foreign SOF50 Update52 Book Reviews

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Gordon R. SullivanGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonActing Administrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

00313

Headquarters, Department of the Army

2 Special Warfare

Anyone who works with special-opera-tions forces cannot help being impressedwith their skills and dedication. Neverthe-less, an enthusiastic appreciation for SOFcapabilities can actually create a problemin some circumstances.

A great appreciation for SOF capabili-ties may incline decision-makers to giveany tough mission to SOF whether or notthe mission actually qualifies as a specialoperation. Such a tendency may also bereinforced by our changing security envi-ronment. Our future is uncertain, theproblems we face are complex, and politi-cal-military operations short of war taxthe capabilities of our conventional forces.“So,” some say in response, “special-opera-tions forces are flexible, sophisticated andaccustomed to nontraditional missions;why not assign more of these evolvingpost-Cold War missions to them?” Whilethere is a lot of good sense in this line ofreasoning, it can also lead us astray.

What follows is an attempt to examinethe strategic significance of special opera-

tions and to provide a more detailed lookat how we should assess future SOF rolesand missions. We will review the criteriafor judging roles and missions, discussappropriate SOF roles, look at someemerging missions and review some rulesof thumb that could be useful as the SOFcommunity evaluates each prospectivemission individually. The intent is not toprovide the definitive statement of rolesand missions for SOF, but to establishsome general principles and to help definethe terms of debate as the special-opera-tions community evaluates new and evolv-ing missions.

Three factors must be taken intoaccount when assessing new roles andmissions for SOF:

• The nature of the threats and the secu-rity environment we anticipate in thefuture. We must prepare to meet the mis-sions that will actually be required of ourarmed forces.

• The national security strategy that theUnited States is adopting to deal with thepost-Cold War security environment. Dif-ferent strategies may require differentmissions and capabilities.

• The nature of the forces themselves. Ifspecial-operations forces are asked to con-duct missions contrary to their currentnature, they will eventually evolve intodifferent types of forces. The risk inherentin such change is that SOF will duplicatethe capabilities of conventional forces and

Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions

by Christopher Lamb

This article was originally presented at a1994 conference co-hosted by Tufts Univer-sity’s Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysisand USSOCOM. Papers from that confer-ence have been collected and published bythe Fletcher School and USSOCOM as Spe-cial Operations Forces: Roles and Missionsin the Aftermath of the Cold War.

July 1995 3

will be unable to effectively conduct tradi-tional special-operations missions.

Nature of SOFWe can begin by reviewing the essential

characteristics of special-operations forces.This process not only helps define the tra-ditional roles that SOF have played inAmerican military strategy but also servesas a baseline against which we can judgetheir alternative roles. The simple defini-tion of SOF is that they are what conven-tional forces are not. Special operationsare those military operations that conven-tional forces cannot accomplish or under-take without unacceptable levels of bothrisk and expense of resources. Specialoperations have at least three, if not all, ofthe following four characteristics:

• Unorthodox approaches. Special oper-ations require tactics, techniques and pro-cedures that cannot be employed efficient-ly or effectively by conventional forces.This does not mean that special operationsnegate the traditional principles of war,but rather that they put a differentemphasis on the combination or ranking ofthose principles. For example, in specialoperations, surprise achieved by speed,stealth, audacity, deception, and new tac-tics and techniques is far more importantthan mass. Special-operations forces cantarget a conventional enemy’s weaknessesthrough unorthodox approaches, or theycan counter unconventional adversaries onthe adversaries’ own unorthodox terms.

• Unconventional training and equip-ment. All military training and equip-ment, from basic training to an Abramstank to the cockpit of a B-1 bomber, is spe-cial to some extent. Moreover, what isdefined as “unconventional” changes overtime. SOF have pioneered operations withnight-vision devices and deep-precisionstrike capabilities, but such operations areno longer considered unconventional. Atany given time, however, there are mis-sion requirements that must be defined asunconventional in comparison to existingconventional capabilities. The fact thatspecial operations use a broad range ofspecialized skills and are often conducted

at great distances from support facilities,beyond the limits of conventional militaryforces, means that they often require spe-cial training and equipment compared tothat of their conventional counterparts.

• Political context and implications.Army Special Forces doctrine rightly iden-tifies recognizing political implications asa special-operations imperative. Politicalconsiderations define the general parame-ters of almost all military operations, buta special-operations mission is often con-ducted in a politically sensitive contextthat constrains virtually every aspect ofthe operation. Local mores may dictatemethods, and more general political con-siderations may require clandestine,

covert or low-visibility techniques as wellas oversight at the national level.

• Special intelligence requirements. Spe-cial operations require special intelligence.As a result, it is sometimes necessary tocollect fine-grained intelligence about adifficult target; other times, it may be nec-essary to collect in-depth information onpolitical, social and cultural issues. In cer-tain instances the intelligence picture notonly helps design the special operation, itmay in fact determine its very feasibility.

Whether we are talking about CivilAffairs, hostage rescue, counterinsurgen-cy training, unconventional warfare orany other traditional, primary special-operations mission, it will manifest atleast three of the four SOF characteris-tics. Understanding the nature of specialoperations in reference to these criticalcharacteristics provides a workable,although not perfect, approach. Such anapproach still requires an element ofjudgment, but it is preferable to the circu-lar definition that one often hears: “Spe-cial-operations missions are missions con-

Political considerations define the generalparameters of almost all military operations, buta special-operations mission is often conduct-ed in a politically sensitive context that con-strains virtually every aspect of the operation.

4 Special Warfare

ducted by SOF, and SOF are the forcesthat conduct special operations.”

Traditional rolesThe strategic value of special-operations

forces is derived from the ways they canserve as a force multiplier in a majorregional conflict or expand the range ofoptions available in crises and conflictsshort of war. In carrying out strategic func-tions, American special-operations forceshave traditionally undertaken two broad,enduring roles, which for lack of betteralternatives we can call the unconvention-al-warrior role and the commando role.

Special-operations forces execute the roleof the unconventional warrior when theyinfluence, advise, train and conduct opera-tions with foreign forces and populations.Unconventional-warfare missions and for-eign-internal-defense missions, such astraining and advising counterinsurgencyforces, emphasize the indirect approachthrough host-government or indigenousforces. We can include Civil Affairs andPsychological Operations in the unconven-tional-warrior role because they also influ-ence foreign forces and populations. Theunconventional-warrior role places a premi-

um on language skills and political sensi-tivity. It tends to involve missions thatrequire a patient, long-term commitment inorder to achieve national objectives.

Special-operations forces in the com-mando role use stealth, speed and audaci-ty to undertake precision penetration andstrike operations in limited, specializedcontingencies across the conflict spectrum.Such commando-style operations areshort, self-contained, direct-action mis-sions that stress unorthodoxy, specialtraining and unique intelligence.

It would be a mistake to consider thecommando role only as a function ofwarfighting and the unconventional-war-rior role only as a function of operationsother than war. SOF undertake both rolesduring war and operations other than war.It would be a further mistake to identifythe two roles exclusively with specificbranches of special-operations forces. Ourmost proficient special-operations forcesfor commando-type missions must also beable to undertake foreign training, andsome of our most proficient forces forunconventional-warrior missions must beprepared to conduct direct-action, com-mando-type missions. The distinction isnot between war and OOTW, or between

U.S. Army photo

A PSYOP soldier handsout leaflets to civilians inHaiti, an example of theunconventional-warrior roleof SOF.

July 1995 5

one category of SOF and another, butbetween the commando role and theunconventional-warrior role.

Identifying these two traditional, gener-ic roles for special-operations forces isimportant for several reasons. First, thefocus on these roles highlights the particu-lar functions that only special-operationsforces are trained to perform. Convention-al forces cannot undertake these roleswithout essentially transforming them-selves into forces that are capable of spe-cial operations, thus duplicating SOFcapabilities.

Similarly, since all SOF missions tradi-tionally fall predominantly into one of thetwo categories, the roles serve as a helpfulreference in the evaluation of evolving andemerging SOF missions. If a proposed mis-sion does not fit into either role, it shouldbe examined especially closely. Odds arethat the mission will not properly consti-tute a special operation. If the concept ofspecial operations must be stretched toinclude the new mission, we may be dupli-cating the capabilities of conventionalforces while compromising our prepared-ness for traditional SOF roles.

Finally, not every special operator needbe, first and foremost, a commando. Sinceboth the unconventional-warrior and com-mando roles equally support the strategicSOF functions, they should receive equalemphasis by the special-operations com-munity. It is important to keep in mindthat the two roles may require some trade-offs between different competencies. Forexample, the cutting-edge physical andtechnical requirements demanded of thecommando differ from the linguistic, cul-tural and political skills required of theunconventional warrior. SOF must bal-ance force structure, training, missionassignment and public-education efforts toensure preparedness for both roles.

Suggested rolesIt is occasionally suggested that in addi-

tion to unconventional-warrior and com-mando roles, SOF should be responsible forperforming all covert paramilitary opera-tions and for providing support to domestic

authorities. Reportedly, the commissionsestablished by Congress to review thefuture of the Central Intelligence Agencyand the roles and missions of the Depart-ment of Defense are considering the meritsof turning over all covert paramilitary oper-ations to the DoD and SOF. While we can-not prejudge the findings of these commis-sions, we can identify several concerns.

Given the sensitive political nature ofcovert paramilitary operations, the elabo-rate legal and oversight requirements thatthey entail and, most importantly, theadditional specialized tradecraft that theyrequire, SOF would have to significantlyexpand their portfolio of capabilities inorder to successfully execute such responsi-bilities. Since no new resources appear tobe forthcoming, this process would mostlikely demand a reduction in the resourcesthat support traditional SOF missions. Can

such a reduction be justified?The passing of the Cold War and the

increased media exposure that all militaryoperations can expect in the future will sub-stantially diminish the necessity and thelikelihood of such sensitive special opera-tions. At the same time, the need for SOF toexecute missions emanating from theunconventional-warrior and commandoroles will most likely grow. It seems ques-tionable whether a major new role for SOFin the covert paramilitary area and therequired associated resources could be justi-fied. At a minimum, we must rememberthat assuming these responsibilities, whichwould constitute accepting a major new rolefor SOF, should be viewed with caution.

Another major role sometimes suggest-ed for SOF is that they support domesticauthorities — aiding local law-enforce-ment, disaster-relief and development pro-grams. Some argue, often with the disas-ter in Waco, Texas, in mind, that SOFcould assist, or assume responsibility

Since both the unconventional-warrior andcommando roles equally support the strategicSOF functions, they should receive equalemphasis by the special-operations community.

6 Special Warfare

from, local and national law-enforcementagencies in dealing with hostage or barri-cade situations. It is further argued thatthe SOF skills that proved so relevant tothe humanitarian mission to the Kurds innorthern Iraq could be used to similareffect during domestic emergencies; e.g.,the catastrophic damage to south Floridacaused by Hurricane Andrew. There haveeven been suggestions that SOF could usetheir training and language skills to goodeffect by teaching foreign languages ininner cities.

First of all, the relevance of SOF skillsto these kinds of domestic missions isquestionable and would be open to debateon a case-by-case basis. More fundamen-tally, however, there is no good reason toexempt SOF from the general reluctanceof the American people to solve civil prob-lems with military means. It is a funda-mental principle of democracy that themilitary is generally excluded from civil-ian affairs, to be called upon only in a lim-ited fashion and in extraordinary circum-stances. Routine military involvement incivilian duties can also be questioned onthe grounds of readiness and efficiency.

While the military in general can bringformidable capabilities to bear on nonmili-tary problems — martial efficiency, effec-tive organization and training, massiveand sometimes unique assets — tacklingdomestic problems routinely would requirethe military to become more like its civil-

ian counterparts and would blunt the verycharacteristics that make the military effi-cient at waging war. If martial efficiencyand military organization and training arerelevant to domestic problems, the pre-ferred solution should be to transplantthese characteristics to the civilian agen-cies normally tasked with such problems.When these characteristics cannot betransplanted, it is because the civilianenvironment imposes more constraintsthan does the military. Transferring theseconstraints to the military through theassignment of civilian missions, either ona routine basis or for an extended period,would reduce the military’s effectivenessin fighting wars. Any military organiza-tion, including SOF, that assumes a majorrole in support of domestic authoritiesrisks its readiness to participate in othermissions. Such a role also has the poten-tial of duplicating the capabilities of civil-ian agencies charged with primary respon-sibility for the mission area.

Changed environmentNothing we can ascertain about our

future security environment seems tochallenge the continued viability of thetraditional SOF unconventional-warriorand commando roles. Nevertheless, sometough questions should be raised aboutold, new and emerging SOF missions. Thenew security environment contains newproblems that argue for rethinking classic

Photo by Keith Butler

Special Forces soldiersprovide medical assistanceto victims of HurricaneAndrew in Florida.

July 1995 7

missions of unconventional warfare, directaction, special reconnaissance, foreigninternal defense and combating terrorism.These problems may require a higher pro-file for those collateral missions usuallydefined as security assistance, humanitar-ian assistance, antiterrorism, counter-drugs, personnel recovery, special activi-ties and coalition warfare. The future mayalso bring new emerging missions such ascounterproliferation and combat searchand rescue. The Secretary of Defense hasrefused to rule out pre-emption as a coun-terproliferation option, and potential SOFmissions in a pre-emption scenario wouldbe most demanding.

Hostage rescue is rightly still a primarymission for SOF. Classic terrorist-barri-cade situations are still a distinct possibil-ity, but we should also consider personnel-recovery missions in the context of peaceoperations, where the environment mightbe more complicated and less permissive.

The unconventional-warfare mission ismore problematic. Training friendlynations in popular defense may be a morelikely unconventional-warfare missionthan the extended, classic unconventionalwarfare/guerrilla warfare mission. Criticalcomponents of a successful popular-defense movement — unity of effort, popu-lar support, will to resist, leadership,intelligence, propaganda and outsideassistance — are more easily initiated ifplanned in advance. The deterrence valueof such planning and training for smallcountries with larger, more powerfulneighbors is not insignificant, as the Swissexperience attests. In any case, the uncon-ventional-warrior mission merits contin-ued attention since so many bedrock skillsemanate from it: training, language, cross-cultural communication, small-unit tacticsbehind the lines, and familiarity withguerrilla warfare.

Peace operations will require SOF toundertake coalition-support missions thatdraw upon linguistic, cross-cultural, nego-tiation and training skills. Peace opera-tions and other contingency operationsmay also require SOF to assist in rudi-mentary training for indigenous nationalpolice forces. With limited means avail-

able for security assistance, we may haveto rely to a greater extent on small mobiletraining teams in support of the foreign-internal-defense mission. Indeed, we haveseen an upswing in the number of MTTdeployments in recent years.

SOF also can expect more humanitarian-assistance missions such as providingtraining in mine awareness and demining,and assisting with camp organization indisaster-relief efforts. Humanitarian assis-tance should remain a collateral mission,however, since the capabilities required aresubsumed by other primary SOF missions.

Changes in the military-technical envi-ronment as well as in the political-militaryenvironment will force us to reconsidersome SOF missions. For example, we needto assess the impact of long-range, preci-sion-guided weapons on the direct-actionmission and the implications of theincreasing reliability and endurance ofunmanned aerial vehicles for the special-reconnaissance mission. Advancedrobotics may affect both mission areas.The risks associated with putting men onthe ground may be justified only when on-

United Nations photo

Members of a UnitedNations force train a host-country soldier in deminingoperations.

8 Special Warfare

scene human judgment is required in fast-evolving situations, or when humans ormaterial substances must be secured andretrieved. Finally, the advent of new non-lethal technologies appears relevant to anumber of SOF missions and should beintegrated into the SOF capabilities port-folio. Nonlethal capabilities may helptransform the direct-action mission in par-ticular. When one considers that SOFdirect action is often a viable option partlybecause SOF can minimize collateral dam-age and unintended casualties, the valueof nonlethal capabilities is manifest.

Retaining focusAs mentioned at the outset, our objec-

tive is not to chart the specific directionfor each SOF mission area, but rather to

establish some general principles. Clearly,old missions should be re-evaluated inlight of the political-military and military-technical aspects of the evolving securityenvironment. Proposed new missionsshould be evaluated in light of the intrin-sic nature of special-operations forces andthe roles they can perform. In that evalua-tion, we should consider the following:

• Does the mission have as a necessarycondition for success the requirement thatcommandos/unconventional warriorsundertake it? If so, it should be considereda primary SOF mission.

• Will the odds for mission success signif-icantly increase if SOF perform or partici-pate in the mission? If so, their involve-ment might constitute a collateral mission.Some important points to remember are:

— It is often a characteristic of collater-al missions that SOF cannot accomplishthem alone.

— Collateral missions are often deriva-

tives of primary SOF missions.— Many, although not all, so-called

emerging missions fall into the collateral-mission category.

• Will the mission be only marginallybetter performed by SOF? If so, it proba-bly is not a SOF mission unless there arespecial circumstances. As a general rule,such a mission should not be formallyassigned to SOF, and the theater com-mander in chief should make the call on acase-by-case basis as circumstancesdemand.

• If SOF do not perform the mission aswell as or better than conventional forces,the mission obviously is inappropriate forSOF.

RisksIf we ignore these general guidelines

and assign inappropriate missions to SOF,we run the following risks:

• Inefficient use of specialized assets forconventional missions . This wouldencroach on conventional-force capabilitiesand waste scarce resources. Over time,SOF probably would become increasinglymore guilty of the old criticism that theyrob general-purpose forces of talent need-ed throughout the military at the small-unit level.

• Loss of an unconventional mentality.Forcing SOF to build up expertise in con-ventional missions will inevitably take atoll on unconventional thinking. Also,because the overall resources available toSOF will at best remain constant throughthe remainder of the 1990s, every newprogram or mission of a conventionalnature will come about at the expense ofother capabilities more appropriate to spe-cial operations.

• Threat of reabsorption. If SOF areincreasingly undertaking missions thatone may reasonably argue could be per-formed by conventional forces, someinvariably will ask why SOF should not bedivided up and redistributed back to theservices. Obviously this is not the intent ofthose who saw to the creation of USSO-COM in the first place.

If, on the other hand, SOF assume

Because the overall resources available toSOF will at best remain constant through theremainder of the 1990s, every new program ormission of a conventional nature will comeabout at the expense of other capabilities.

July 1995 9

responsibility only for missions that areappropriately understood to be specialoperations, we retain our focus on whatmakes SOF special:

• Relevance. By constantly re-evaluat-ing existing SOF missions and capabilitiesfor relevance to the security environment,SOF can keep current with the nation’ssecurity needs.

• Retain forward outlook. By constantlyre-evaluating existing SOF missions andcapabilities to ensure that they are consis-tent with the nature of SOF, we allowSOF to pass on to conventional forcesthose activities which no longer merit clas-sification as special operations. Mean-while, this frees resources for necessarynew missions and maintains SOF’sdynamic, forward-looking, unconventionalqualities.

• Unique capability/value. A broad con-sensus on how SOF differ from conven-tional forces will increase the likelihoodthat they will be used appropriately —SOF will neither be assigned missionsthat rightly belong to conventional forcesnor will they be denied missions that theyought to undertake.

By retaining this focus on what makesSOF special, we can maintain their rele-vance and their special place in thenation’s armory of military capabilities.Such a focus will ensure that SOF willcontinue to fulfill a unique niche in ourmilitary — supporting, not threatening,the conventional forces as well as thenational command authorities.

ConclusionThe traditional roles that SOF have

played in the national military strategystill seem appropriate. The roles of uncon-ventional warrior and commando do notduplicate the roles filled by conventionalforces, and they have continuing relevancefor the post-Cold War security environ-ment. In considering new and emergingSOF missions, several points are worthnoting:

• With regard to a new mission, theissue is not how important the mission is,but rather who should perform it. The fact

that the mission must be carried out doesnot produce a convincing argument thatSOF should take responsibility for it.

• Any new mission should fit the gener-al characteristics required of a SOF mis-sion: unconventional approaches, specialtraining and equipment, political aware-ness and special intelligence. If so, thenew mission will contribute to and rein-force SOF’s core roles and competencies.

• For a collateral mission, we shouldask whether it is a lesser-included case;i.e., a derivative from competenciesrequired for primary missions. If not, wemust ask what mission capabilities will bedisplaced, because, at best, SOF resourceswill remain roughly constant in realterms.

• Finally, with respect to a collateralmission in particular, if it is a special-oper-ations mission only in very special circum-stances, SOF probably should not assumeresponsibility for the entire mission.

The element of restraint expressed hereis not to be misinterpreted as lack ofenthusiasm for or confidence in SOF. Onthe contrary, SOF will be increasingly rel-evant to our problems of the future. Forthis reason, it is important that we remainfocused on what makes special operationsspecial. The guidelines we have mentionedare not rules to be applied mechanically.There are too many other factors, such aspolitics and budgets, that could influencethe assignment of roles and missions.They are, however, good rules of thumb forhelping us keep SOF on course in the 21stcentury, for ensuring SOF’s relevance as astrategic asset, for ensuring SOF’s bestpossible integration with conventionalforces, and for ensuring SOF will be usedappropriately and to maximum advantage.

Christopher Lamb is the director of poli-cy planning in the Office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense for Special Operationsand Low-Intensity Conflict.

10 Special Warfare

If the thoughts expressed in ChristopherLamb’s article, “Perspectives on EmergingSOF Roles and Missions,” reflect accurate-ly those that guide current policy withregard to roles, missions, tactics and strat-egy for special-operations forces, there issome cause for concern.

The author sets the tone for much of histhesis by giving his version of the natureof special-operations forces as follows:

The simple definition of SOF is that theyare what conventional forces are not. Spe-cial operations are those military opera-tions that conventional forces cannotaccomplish or undertake without unaccept-able levels of both risk and expense ofresources.

Part of the problem with the above defi-nition is that it is inaccurate. Only theU.S. Army’s Special Forces are capable ofperforming missions “that conventionalforces cannot accomplish,” and even thatstatement is open to compromise when weconsider the technical support that mustcome from sources other than SOF, espe-cially in connection with foreign-internal-defense missions.

Moreover, in submerging the identity ofthe U.S. Army’s Special Forces within thegeneral category of special-operationsforces, the unique characteristics of theformer that permit them to operate in for-eign environments and that require lan-guage and area skills of a particularlyhigh order seem to have been either down-

graded or overlooked.Other SOF components are heavily

dependent upon advanced technology andhardware to carry out their missions. Onthe other hand, Special Forces are a“human weapons system” with skills thatallow them to accomplish an amazingarray of tasks that range from persuasionby example to actual fire and movementusing indigenous, captured or even impro-vised equipment.

Within a SOF community overwhelm-ingly oriented toward the mechanics ofdirect action, the subtle sophisticationthat Special Forces can add to our nation-al strategic arsenal could be overlooked.

Other than Special Forces, there is noelement of the U.S. armed services that iscapable of performing across the entirespectrum of what is labeled, for want of abetter term, “low-intensity conflict.”

When the article addresses the questionof “inefficient use of specialized assets forconventional missions,” a related cautionmight well be that of counseling againstthe use of the highly honed Special Forcesin direct-action roles. The exception wouldbe when such missions involve cooperationwith foreign underground, auxiliary orother forces and call for language and areatraining and the cross-training peculiar tothe U.S. Army’s Special Forces. SpecialForces can perform as Rangers andSEALs, but the reverse is true only in avery limited sense.

Emerging SOF Roles and Missions: A Different Perspective

by Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, U.S. Army (ret.)

July 1995 11

The presumption that Civil Affairs andPsychological Operations are, per se, spe-cial operations should be examined close-ly. Civil Affairs are properly the concern ofany combat commander prior to, during orfollowing battle. To professional militaryofficers, Napoleon’s LXX Maxim meansthat attention to the imperatives of CivilAffairs must be part of the exercise of highcommand. It is not a “special operation”practiced only by special-operations forces.

Military psychological operations car-ried out by special-operations forcesshould, except in occasional tactical situa-tions, be products of policy-specific guid-ance and direction from the National Com-mand Authority. The fact that this has notalways been the case should be of particu-lar interest to the Director of Policy Plan-ning. The interrelationship and modusoperandi that would require the CentralIntelligence Agency, the U.S. InformationAgency and the PSYOP mechanisms of theU.S. Army to coordinate and combine inpursuit of various national PSYOP strate-gies should be goals that are constantlysought by the Office of the Secretary ofDefense.

The article’s observation that specialoperations “are often conducted at greatdistances from support facilities, beyondthe limits of conventional military forces,”omits an equally valid note that the logis-tics capabilities of conventional forces maybe essential elements of the overall team-work necessary to place and keep the spe-cial-operations forces on target. The differ-ences between special-operations forcesand conventional forces stem from theirassigned missions, not from any deficiencyin imagination, innovation or daring onthe part of conventional soldiers and theirleaders.

Some unfamiliarity with the fundamen-tals of the unchanging art of war is implic-it in the paper’s statement:

For example, in special operations, sur-prise achieved by speed, stealth, audacity,deception, and new tactics and techniquesis far more important than mass.

It is certainly one criterion of militaryprofessionalism to consider tactical andstrategic surprise, as compared to mass, to

be of extraordinary importance in any mil-itary operation against a hostile opponent.Surprise has historically been looked uponas one of the major principles of war.

Final decisions as to which of America’sstrategic interests are of such value thatour nation will commit its armed forces tosafeguard them are not made by the mili-tary. In a perfect world, professional mili-tary advice would be an important factorin shaping the overall national strategy.

The admittedly complex internationalsituation during the post-Cold War pre-sents challenges to which the U.S. mili-tary can respond in a variety of ways.However, unless these responses are care-fully considered, coordinated elements of

an overall politico-military strategy, theresults will be counterproductive.

Within the corporate body of the armedforces of the United States — both theactive and reserve components — thereare superb resources with which to supple-ment, complement and occasionallyreplace the civil elements of the nationalmechanism for projecting American powerand influence. For any segment of thearmed forces of the United States toaccomplish missions that fall within the“unorthodox” or “special” category, thereare basic requirements that must be met.Among these, the first and most importantis a clear statement of the goals to beachieved, the resources to be provided andthe chain of command to be assigned forevery aspect of the overall enterprise.

The latter is especially important inas-

American academic analysis of the special-operations phenomenon dates back morethan a quarter of a century. SOF theory hasbeen examined and discussed from everyconceivable angle. What is needed now ispractical, pragmatic application of the accept-ed principles that have emerged from the vol-umes of philosophical conjecture.

12 Special Warfare

much as special operations frequentlyinvolve, include or impinge upon areasnormally the responsibility and the “turf”of nonmilitary elements of the nationalpower structure. Instead of being preoccu-pied at the Defense Department level withthe presumed differences between special-operations forces and those of the conven-tional military establishment, it would bemost helpful and appropriate to pursuequestions involving national-level inter-agency coordination.

As Lamb confronts the complex andsometimes abstract nature of special oper-ations, he brings to mind the parable ofthe blind men and the elephant. Some ofhis observations and sensings are accu-rate, but his overall assessment of special-operations forces, especially their rolesand missions, projects a picture with someextremely fuzzy outlines.

American academic analysis of the spe-cial-operations phenomenon dates backmore than a quarter of a century. SOFtheory has been examined and discussedfrom every conceivable angle. What isneeded now is practical, pragmatic appli-cation of the accepted principles that haveemerged from the volumes of philosophicalconjecture.

Immediately following hisretirement from the U.S.Army in 1971 after 36 yearsof service, Lt. Gen. WilliamP. Yarborough undertook atop-secret project for theDepartment of the Armythat involved preparation of an opera-tional concept and plan for the conduct ofirregular warfare in certain areas ofSoutheast Asia. His other post-retirementactivities include serving as a consultant tothe Hudson Institute; Braddock, Dunn andMcDonald; and the BETAC Corporation ofArlington, Va. He has also served as amember of the Special Operations PolicyAdvisory Group, reporting to the Secretaryof Defense. He is an honorary member ofthe editorial board of Parabellum, theHungarian international magazine of spe-cial warfare and elite forces. His published

works relating to the special-operationsarea include “Terrorism — The Past as anIndication of the Future,” included inInternational Terrorism in the Contempo-rary World, Greenwood Press, 1978;“Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Role” (Chap-ter 8) in Guerrilla Warfare and Counterin-surgency, D.C. Heath, 1984; the sections“Low-Intensity Conflict,” “Guerrilla War-fare” and “Special Operations” inBrassey’s International Military andDefense Encyclopedia, 1993; and the sec-tion “Psychological Operations” in theEncyclopedia of the American Military,Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994. He is listedin Who’s Who in America and Who’s Whoin the World.

July 1995 13

A Special Forces combat-dive detach-ment leader and his team sergeant havedeveloped a concept for dive training thatcosts next to nothing, includes trainingwith the Navy, is in the perfect locationand is incredibly challenging. However,after briefing their battalion commander,they are in full retreat. What happened?

Although the training they recommend-ed was “high-speed,” the team leader andteam sergeant failed to tie their dive-training concept to the detachment mis-sion-essential task list, or METL. The bat-talion commander justly pointed out thatthe team’s valuable training time wouldbe better spent on battle-focused training.

The existing war plans of the theatercommander drive the selection of theMETL through mission letters. Once tar-gets have been identified and assigned tospecific teams, the teams generate plansof execution for inclusion in their special-operations mission-planning folders. Thetheater special-operations command usesthese plans to write the group mission let-ter. Mission letters do not include specificmeans of infiltration unless they arecalled for in the plans of execution.

Units must be careful to focus theirtraining on the most likely tasks. This isespecially true for waterborne infiltration.All theaters of operation have the poten-tial for surface waterborne infiltration,either coastal or inland. But given theSpecial Forces mission profile, rotary-wing

technology, and the existence of otherunits specifically designed for high-riskwater entry, a reasonable Special Forcesmission-letter analysis should identifyonly a limited number of waterborne-infil-tration tasks.

Any waterborne infiltration should betrained as only a part of the mission cycleand attached to a land infiltration and anobjective. Training should be prioritized,with actions on the objective taking prece-dence over infiltration. Ideally, trainingshould focus on high-payoff tasks commonto most mission profiles. For example,most Special Forces missions include thetask “conduct preinfiltration activities.”The amount of time spent preparing for

Waterborne Infiltration Training: Maintaining a Battle Focus

by Maj. David E. Johnson

Photo by Al Petersen

14 Special Warfare

this task is doubly invested: Regardless ofwhich training scenario is involved, thetraining will prepare the team for otheroperations at the same time. The mostcommon, and most complex, phase of allwaterborne infiltrations is the transitionof personnel and equipment to land infil-tration. High-payoff waterborne-infiltra-tion tasks are common to missions thatrequire coastal or inland-waterway pene-tration, regardless of the delivery system.

Training on a scenario-dependentdelivery system that is only one of a myr-iad of possibilities is an inefficient use ofresources. For instance, the Naval Spe-

cial Warfare Command, the proponentfor maritime operations, envisions thedoctrinal use of closed-circuit rebreatherequipment in a scenario with underwaterinfiltration, an underwater target andunderwater exfiltration.

In closed-circuit diving, a diverrebreathes his own air. The rebreathingunit recycles the diver’s breath, cleansingit of carbon dioxide and mixing it withoxygen. The rebreather produces no airbubbles, allowing the diver to operateundetected.

Other specific tactical scenarios maycall for a detachment to lock out of a sub-

SF Combat Diver Qualification Courseemphasizes waterborne infiltration

The Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course has recently changedits program of instruction to place more emphasis on techniques of waterborneinfiltration.

During the four-week course, held at Key West, Fla., students receive trainingin physical conditioning, equipment orientation, basic scuba, dive physics, under-water search techniques, dangerous marine life, dive tables, open-circuit diving,submarine operations, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Students and instruc-tors are challenged by 12- to 16-hour days, five days a week.

The new program of instruction, which began with Class 02-95 in March, elimi-nated the closed-circuit-diving portion of the SFCDQC and replaced it with trainingin waterborne-infiltration techniques. The change affects an eight-day block ofinstruction, according to Maj. Jose Olivero, commander of Company C, 2nd Battal-ion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, which teaches the SFCDQC.

Waterborne-infiltration techniques are designed to improve the infiltration andexfiltration capabilities of SOF in over-the-horizon operations. Students studytopics such as beach-landing-site procedures; nautical chart reading; effects oftides, currents and weather on small craft; navigation procedures; and dead-reck-oning procedures. They also learn to operate and maintain small craft, includingkayaks and Zodiac boats. Students are required to perform waterborne-infiltra-tion tasks during day and night, in all weather conditions, from distances as faras 25 miles offshore.

“The waterborne-infiltration techniques taught here are very mentally demand-ing, as opposed to the physical demands required of the closed-circuit portion of theCDQC,” said SFC Eddie Licon, an instructor with Company C.

The SFCDQC trains Army Special Forces and Rangers, Air Force ParachuteRescue and Combat Air Traffic Controllers, Marines and military forces fromother nations. Company C also conducts the Diving Medical Technician Courseand the Combat Diving Supervisor Course. — Paul D. Nelson, Public AffairsOffice, U.S. Army Special Operations Command

July 1995 15

marine, to conduct a deliberate waterjump using a special operations combat-equipment platform, or to helocast. Someof these scenarios are more likely to occurthan others. Infrequent training involvingevery possible delivery system can serveonly as a means of familiarization anddoes little to prepare the detachment for acombat mission. Training on the use ofunique delivery systems such as closed-circuit diving gear or submarines shouldbe part of the preparation for a specificoperation or deployment.

Diving is not a Special Forces mission.For Special Forces, diving is a subset ofwaterborne infiltration, which is, itself, asubset of infiltration. Other units in DoDare tasked with beach reconnaissance andtargets close to the water. Special Forcesunits are trained to infiltrate unobserved,undefended shores to conduct operationsinland. Any number of airborne, surface orsubmarine systems can deliver a detach-ment and its equipment to the transitpoint in the water.

In view of the need for battle focus, theJFK Center and School’s Special ForcesCombat Diver Qualification Course hasrecently modified its program of instruc-tion. Training on the closed-circuitrebreather has been replaced by water-borne-infiltration tasks and practical exer-cises in an effort to help future combat-dive and maritime-operations teamsbecome more proficient at transitioningfrom water to land. Of particular utilityare the blocks of instruction on beach-landing-site operations, use of combat rub-ber raiding craft and kayaks, and water-proofing of equipment.

The enhanced battle focus of theSFCDQC will provide detachments thatare better trained in those skills requiredby the warfighting commanders. Opera-tionally, only a few adjustments will berequired. Pre-scuba and SFCDQC willcontinue to produce well-trained soldiersfor the combat-dive and maritime-opera-tions detachments. Open-circuit divingwill continue, providing special-operationsforces the capability to serve as safetydivers for maritime operations, to conductsubsurface search and recovery and hydro-

graphic survey, and to adapt quickly whenmore advanced training is required.

Support and logistics requirements willremain almost unchanged. Dive lockerand maritime-operations support-mainte-nance facilities will continue to be inspect-ed. Equipment will continue to be main-tained under the Navy Material Mainte-nance Management System.

The late Vince Lombardi, coach of thechampionship Green Bay Packers, beganeach season by telling his players, “Gen-tlemen, this is a football.” In our excite-ment over the infinite number of tactics,techniques and procedures available, weshould not lose sight of the basics. TheSpecial Forces soldier is a jack-of-all-trades. We must help him as much as pos-sible by designing battle-focused trainingand by limiting the number of skills inwhich he must be an expert. With a moresolid battle focus, the force as a whole willbecome more efficient in meeting the stat-ed needs of the unified commanders. Inthis period of diminishing resources, ourdetachments should be spending valuabletraining time, money and energy on high-payoff tasks with a go-to-war applicability.

Maj. David E. Johnson isassigned to the Deputy Chiefof Staff for Operations, U.S.Army Special OperationsCommand, as the dive offi-cer. He was formerly com-mander of ODA 565 (combatdive) in the 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group.During Operation Desert Storm, he servedas commander of ODA 552; during Opera-tion Restore Hope, he served as the J-3 forthe Joint Special Operations Forces-Soma-lia. Johnson is a 1984 graduate of the U.S.Military Academy at West Point.

16 Special Warfare

The United States Special OperationsCommand’s view of doctrine mirrors that ofthe chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,which is that doctrine must do four things:

• Define the way we will train, fight andoperate.

• Be authoritative and universally practiced.

• Be authored by our senior leadershipand by the best and brightest, operationallyproficient action officers.

• Be accurate and easily understood, and taught as well as used by operationalcommanders.

With that in mind, we will examine threepoints: USSOCOM’s unique role in develop-ing doctrine; what doctrine is and what itdoes; and possibly most important, whatdoctrine is not.

The principal role of USSOCOM is toserve as a force provider to the regionalwarfighting commanders in chief. The legis-lation that created USSOCOM assigned anumber of service-like authorities andresponsibilities to this unified or combatant

command. The most widely recognized ofthese is the budgetary authority related toMajor Force Program 11. Less widely recog-nized, but in the long run possibly as signifi-cant, is the legislatively mandated authorityand responsibility for developing joint spe-cial-operations doctrine.

This authority, coupled with the strength-ening of joint doctrine and its influence overservice doctrine (once again by legislation,and by the interest and directives of pastand current chairmen of the JCS), places apowerful tool in the hands of the USSOCOMcommander. The two means by which westrengthen joint doctrine are by mandatingthat service doctrine conform to joint doc-trine and by placing increased pressure onjoint-force commanders to adhere to pub-lished joint doctrine.

The first of our three points is that unlikeother combatant commanders, the USCINC-SOC owns a piece of joint doctrine — specifi-cally, joint special-operations doctrine. Hetherefore controls service special-operationsdoctrine and strongly influences the conductof operations by the regional combatantcommands. The importance of this authoritybecomes apparent as we examine the secondpoint, what doctrine is and what it does.

Engine of changeDoctrine is an engine of change. As such,

it can serve as a tool for developing comple-mentary and widely understood force struc-

A USSOCOM View of Doctrine

by Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

This article was originally presented at a1994 conference co-hosted by Tufts Univer-sity’s Fletcher School of Law and Diploma-cy, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysisand USSOCOM. Papers from that confer-ence have been collected and published bythe Fletcher School and USSOCOM as Spe-cial Operations Forces: Roles and Missionsin the Aftermath of the Cold War.

July 1995 17

tures and operational procedures for theSOF of all services. Doctrine is, and shouldbe, the principal instrument in effectingdeliberate, evolutionary change. In general,“today” belongs to the operators, and“tomorrow” is in the hands of the trainersand training institutions. But the long-term future of the force depends on the doc-trine-development process. This is notmeant to imply that doctrine has, or shouldhave, no influence on operations and train-ing. On the contrary, doctrine provides abasis for training as well as tools for theoperator. The intent here is to describe howdoctrine drives the force into evolving ratio-nally in order to meet future challenges.

Doctrine comprises several elements. Itincludes a distillation of past experienceinto fundamental operating principles.These are supplemented by tested andproven tactics, techniques and procedures.These historically derived portions of doc-trine are combined with actual and antici-pated technological advances and our bestguess of what future requirements andoperational environments will be. Theresult is a description of how we see theforce operating in the future. This conceptof how and under what conditions we willbe operating is used to define organiza-tional and materiel requirements. Doc-trine, then, delineates our future capabili-ties and operational concepts.

As mentioned previously, doctrine is theinstrument of slow, deliberate change. Sim-ply describing what we want the force to beand to do does not cause significant thingsto happen. Doctrine must be implementedthrough changes in organization, training,materiel and leader development. Evolu-tionary change, as described in doctrine, isinstituted by developing new force struc-tures that embody doctrinal capabilities,appropriate equipment for those structures,institutional and unit training programsthat support new concepts and procedures,and leader-development programs thatenable commanders to effectively employtheir forces. This clearly takes time.

Implicit in all of this is that doctrine isnot responsive enough to be the preferredmethod of implementing minor changes orfine-tuning the force. As we said, tomorrow

belongs to the trainers. While fundamentalchange is driven by doctrine, fine-tuningand relatively minor changes are producedin the infinitely more responsive realm oftraining. Trainers must build upon thebase provided by doctrine.

Revolutionary changeSince doctrinal change requires time in

order to be effectively implemented, it isevident that the ability to accurately fore-cast future requirements is a necessity forgood doctrine. Occasionally, because ofunanticipated technological advances, dra-matic changes in the strategic environmentor other sudden changes affecting militaryrequirements and capabilities, revolution-

ary, not evolutionary, change is required.Doctrine must accommodate such change.In such a situation, doctrine is no longerthe proactive engine of change, but rather areactive force attempting to fit change intoa workable framework.

The reaction to sudden, massive changesrarely produces comprehensive, totallycoherent doctrine. Implementation of suchchanges is also hampered by a force struc-ture that may not be totally appropriate, bythe lack of institutional and unit training tosupport the new concepts, by inadequate orunfamiliar equipment, and by leaders whoare not comfortable with, or ready to imple-ment, the new doctrine. The force requiresadequate time to fully accept and imple-ment this kind of landmark change. As thenew concepts mature and become morewidely accepted and thoroughly implement-ed, we can achieve a return to orderly, dis-ciplined, evolutionary progress.

The legislation that produced USSOCOMand revitalized our special-operations capa-bilities illustrates such a change.1 Whether

In general, “today” belongs to the opera-tors, and “tomorrow” is in the hands of thetrainers and training institutions. But thelong-term future of the force depends on thedoctrine-development process.

18 Special Warfare

the impending change was unpredicted,ignored, or some combination of the two isirrelevant. In the past few years, there havebeen radical changes in SOF missionrequirements; force structure; materiel;operational concepts; and command, con-trol, communications and intelligence, orC4I. Only now are we beginning to see thenew body of SOF doctrine begin to matureand to be implemented and accepted.

We now stand at a critical point. It istime to transition from a period of revolu-tionary change, in which SOF doctrine hasbeen reacting to drastic change, to a periodin which change is once again anticipatedand accommodated by evolutionary develop-ment driven by well-thought-out and sys-tematically implemented doctrine. This con-

version to systematic progress will elimi-nate, or at least vastly reduce, the time lagsand inefficiencies inherent in reacting tounanticipated, externally imposed change.The importance of making this conversionwas clearly articulated by Air MarshallGiulio Douhet of Italy, who, referring to theadvent of air power as a force on the battle-field, stated, “Victory smiles upon those whoanticipate the changes in the character ofwar, not upon those who wait to adaptthemselves until after those changesoccur.”2

Complementary capabilitiesThe function of doctrine as an engine of

change can be illustrated by its overalleffectiveness in rationalizing the roles,missions, structure and operational proce-dures throughout the joint SOF communi-ty; and in integrating SOF with general-

purpose forces. The days are past ofredundant capabilities and service autono-my during operations. Escalating costs ofmodern militaries, coupled with the reduc-tion in resources available, make it simplyunacceptable to duplicate capabilities or tofail to obtain optimal impact from the totaljoint force through synchronization ofcomplementary capabilities.

USSOCOM inherited a diverse set offorces from the various services. Eachforce came with its own charter, historyand traditions derived from the require-ments the services had placed upon them.Before the creation of USSOCOM, not onlywas there no mechanism for eliminatingredundancy and ensuring mutually com-plementary capabilities, standard equip-ment and operating procedures, there wasno real motivation to do so. The USSO-COM charter to develop joint special-oper-ations doctrine provides the mechanismfor articulating the USCINCSOC’s conceptof the roles and missions of the SOF ser-vice components.

Rationalizing the force structure anddefining who does what has been alengthy and painful process. But driven byresource constraints and increasing opera-tional requirements, this process of defini-tion will continue. Joint SOF doctrine willevolve and more precisely define theextent and the limits of each componentforce’s functions and contribution to thetotal joint force. As these definitions aretranslated into service doctrine and subse-quently into organization, equipment andtraining, we will eliminate redundancyand meet emerging mission requirements.

Similarly, joint special-operations doc-trine will define concepts of employment,C4I relationships and planning proce-dures. These embody the capabilities andthe limitations of the force, telling jointstaffs what they can and cannot expect ofSOF. They also tell joint staffs what isrequired of them in order to receive thefull value of SOF as part of the total jointforce. Equally important, it tells SOFunits what they can reasonably expect inthe way of mission taskings, planningguidance and support. In the absence ofcoherent joint special-operations doctrine,

Doctrine is not a substitute for judgment,mission analysis and good leadership. It isnot a comprehensive checklist or a templatethat can be mechanically applied to any situa-tion. In itself, doctrine does not win wars orsolve the operational problems of today.

July 1995 19

joint headquarters cannot be expected toaccommodate different procedures anddoctrine for each of the SOF components,and SOF are likely to be omitted or mis-used. As joint special-operations doctrinebecomes better-known and practiced,rational and effective special operationscan be expected to contribute increasinglyto overall efforts.

No templateThe third point deals with the limita-

tions of doctrine. Doctrine is not a substi-tute for judgment, mission analysis andgood leadership. It is not a comprehensivechecklist or a template that can bemechanically applied to any situation. Initself, doctrine does not win wars or solvethe operational problems of today.

Operators, as stated earlier, own thepresent. Remember that doctrine is basedupon an anticipated requirement or situa-tion. The specifics of any operational mis-sion or situation are bound to vary fromwhat was anticipated. Michael Howard,the noted British military historian andstrategist, stated, “I am tempted indeed todeclare dogmatically that whatever doc-trine the armed forces are working onnow, they have got it wrong.”3

Does this make doctrine irrelevant or asterile effort? Of course not. The real pur-pose of doctrine is to come close enough inanticipating the future to provide thecapabilities that will enable the operatorto adapt to any situation. Doctrine shouldprovide the standard procedures, C4I andsupport mechanisms that will allow theoperator to focus on the unexpectedrequirements of the situation and notexpend creative energies on the routine.Michael Howard continues, “I am alsotempted to declare that it does not matterthat they have got it wrong. What doesmatter is their capacity to get it rightquickly when the moment arrives.”4

If the doctrine developers have donetheir jobs, the operator will have all thetools — organization, materiel, trainingand procedures — to accomplish his. Andthe tools will be better than those of hisopponent. From that point forward, it is

up to the operator.The authority granted USSOCOM to

develop joint special-operations doctrine iskey to the long-term success of specialoperations. As the command matures, doc-trine will provide the impetus and thefocus for evolutionary change andprogress. And joint special-operations doc-trine, if properly developed, will allow usto field a capable, well-trained and well-equipped force prepared to meet the chal-lenges of the future.

Maj. Gen. William F.Garrison is commander ofthe JFK Special WarfareCenter and School. In pre-vious assignments, heserved as commander of theJoint Special OperationsCommand, as deputy commanding gen-eral of the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand, and as deputy commander ofthe U.S. Army Intelligence SecurityAgency of the U.S. Army Intelligence andSecurity Command.

Notes:1 The Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Department

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, as attached tothe Defense Authorization Act, FY 1987.

2 Giulio Douhet as quoted in Contrails; The AirForce Cadet Handbook 23 (1977-78) : 147.

3 Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age ofPeace,” speech given 3 October 1973 at the ChesneyMemorial Gold Medal Lecture. As quoted in Journalof the Royal United Service Institute, March 1974, pp.3-9.

4 Ibid.

20 Special Warfare

In war as well as in military operationsother than war, soldiers and leaders at alllevels will be forced to deal with uniquesituations requiring interface with indi-viduals and groups outside the normalscope of traditional military operations.

Activities in Operations Urgent Fury,Just Cause, Desert Shield/Storm, ProvideComfort, Continue/Restore Hope, andUphold/Maintain Democracy have servedto convince the service chiefs that today’smaneuver commander must deal withcivilians, either as belligerents or as non-combatants. Whichever case applies,some knowledge of Civil Affairs opera-tions is of paramount importance if U.S.commanders are to discharge theirresponsibilities toward civilians withinthe scope of U.S. national intent andinternational agreements.

In planning for future operations andassessing their ability to influence orinteract with civilians in their area ofresponsibility,1 commanders should con-sider the following assumptions:

• Noncombatants2 have a significantinfluence on military operations.

• The number and the tempo of opera-tions other than war will increase in thefuture. With these unique missions comerequirements to conduct military opera-tions in spite of, or in concert with, civilianpopulations and agencies.3

• Because of the character of these mis-sions, military leaders at all levels mustbe able to understand and to exploit cul-tural and infrastructure peculiarities ofthe target population.

• A fourth spectrum of conflict,4 so-called “information war,” will require U.S.forces to be especially sensitive to actionswhich could be negatively interpreted orrepresented by the media.

• With the adoption of the concept offorce projection, it is essential that com-manders exploit host-nation and target-country capabilities which facilitate orsupport military operations.

• The number of combined or coalitionoperations is likely to increase.

• Humanitarian and civic-assistanceoperations, in concert with United Nationspeacekeeping operations, will alsoincrease.

Functions of commandGiven these assumptions, it is time for

the services to aggressively pursue doctri-nal and policy changes that will help toensure success in missions involving civil-ians. Although doctrine writers have con-

Civil Affairs: A Function of Command

This is the first of a series of whitepapers to be published by the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School. The series isintended to stimulate thought and discus-sion on SOF doctrinal issues.

July 1995 21

ceived new military terms for emergingtypes of warfare and operations other thanwar, the principles of war have remainedconstant. The many recent contingencyoperations have differed from anythingthe U.S. has undertaken in the past, yetno new principles of war have emergedfrom them.

Like the principles of war, another set ofstandards has evolved through the yearsto delineate the major tasks for whichcommanders bear sole responsibility.These standards are the functions of com-mand. They include personnel manage-ment, intelligence and security, operationsand training, administration, logistics,communications, and Civil Affairs.5

CA DirectiveSecretary of Defense William Perry has

recently issued the first definitive CivilAffairs directive, DoD Directive 2000.13, amuch-needed first step in correcting CivilAffairs planning and execution deficien-cies throughout the Department ofDefense. It establishes policy and assignsresponsibilities under various DoD direc-

tives for conducting DoD-wide CivilAffairs activities. The directive applies to“The Office of Secretary of Defense, theMilitary Departments (including the U.S.Coast Guard when it is operating as a Mil-itary Service in the Navy), the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the UnifiedCombatant Commanders, the DefenseAgencies, and the DoD Field Activities, ...Non-DoD organizations that are partici-pating in DoD civil affairs activities or arerequesting DoD civil affairs capabilities.”

Secretary Perry establishes the DoDpolicy that “The DoD shall maintain acapability to conduct a broad range of civilaffairs activities necessary to support DoDmissions and to meet DoD Componentresponsibilities to the civilian sector in for-eign areas in peace and war throughoutthe range of military operations.” He fur-ther directs that the Secretary of theArmy, “in conjunction with USCINCSOC,recruit, organize, train, equip, mobilize,and sustain Army civil affairs forces.”

The first step in preparing units andleaders to conduct military operationsinvolving noncombatants is to recognizethat Civil Affairs is a function of com-

A soldier from the 82nd Air-borne Division watches agroup of Grenadians nearPoint Salines Airfield dur-ing Operation Urgent Furyin 1983.

U.S. Air Force photo

22 Special Warfare

mand, not merely an arcane specialty rele-gated to the role of an afterthought in theplanning cycle. U.S. Army Field Manual101-5, Staff Organization and Operations,states:

Command includes the authority andresponsibility for effectively using avail-able resources and for planning theemployment of, organizing, directing, coor-dinating, and controlling military forces toaccomplish assigned missions … Interna-tional law and the Law of Land Warfarespecify the commander’s ethical responsi-bility in military operations and for theindigenous population in an area ofoperation. … Command and control is theprocess through which the activities of mil-itary forces are directed, coordinated, andcontrolled to accomplish the mission. Thisprocess encompasses the personnel, equip-ment, communications, facilities, and pro-cedures necessary to gather and analyzeinformation, to plan for what is to be done,to issue instructions, and to supervise theexecution of operations.6

Commanders routinely plan for fire sup-port, air defense and other components ofthe battlefield operating systems. Plan-ning for military contact with host-nationand target-country civilians and for sepa-rate civil-military operations should alsobe routine for all battalion-sized and larg-er units. As an example, even if a maneu-ver commander is not provided nonorganicfire-support assets, he will certainly plan

for the employment of his organic assetsin a fire-support role. Planning for CivilAffairs is no different. While conductingintelligence preparation of the battlefield,the commander should identify suchthings as:• Large concentrations of civilian

populations, • Likely refugee and migrant escape

routes,• Potential camp sites for dislocated

civilians,• Potential civilian and host-nation

sources of supply,• Specific groups or concentrations of

third-country nationals, nongovernmen-tal organizations, or private voluntaryorganizations, and

• Impacts of all the above on the operation.

Planning for noncombatantsCommanders at all levels must learn to

anticipate and plan for the effects of non-combatants on the battlefield. Often whenunits do not receive Civil Affairs augmen-tation, noncombatants are given minimalor no consideration. This has been recog-nized by the Army’s senior leadership.Recent rotations at the Joint ReadinessTraining Center have incorporated signifi-cant civilian play into the exercise scenar-ios. Commanders who experience the frus-tration and difficulties of dealing with

Photo by Keith Butler

Soldiers of the Army CivilAffairs and PsychologicalOperations Command pro-vide medical treatment to aThai woman during a medi-cal civic-action project.

July 1995 23

noncombatants in these exercises learnfirsthand the value of treating CivilAffairs as a function of command.

Despite these lessons from the field, theservices and the professional-military-edu-cation system have been slow to bring doc-trine and force structure up to date withreality. Civil Affairs is given little, if any,mention in combat-arms officer basic andadvanced courses, and the studentsreceive no formal instruction in this vital,emerging requirement. In fact, the onlyCivil Affairs involvement that studentsexperience in the Command and GeneralStaff Officer’s Course at Fort Leavenworthis relegated to an elective, which few stu-dents choose to attend, and minimal playin a battle simulation. This in spite of thefact that the most likely operational sce-narios for the immediate future (militaryinvolvement in Korea, Haiti, the FormerRepublics of Yugoslavia, and Somalia-style humanitarian assistance) either cen-ter around or involve significant play ofrefugees and noncombatants.

On a positive note, the Special WarfareCenter and School has taken a significantstep toward integrating civilian and non-combatant play into exercises and school-house instruction. The SWCS has recom-mended a modification to the age-old plan-ning tool of mission, enemy, terrain, troops,and time available, or METT-T, intoMETT-T-C, to include the weighty factor of“civilians” into the commander’s planningprocess. The new term has not, however,been promulgated in service manuals.

Restructuring effortsTo assist commanders in the perfor-

mance of their duties, the Army has devel-oped branches that support the variousfunctions of command — all are active-component branches except for CivilAffairs. Civil Affairs is a branch in the

Army Reserve only; it is a functional areain the active component. Since World WarII, the rationale for such an active-compo-nent void has been that the one active-component battalion would provide arapid response (if sufficient forces wereavailable) and the remaining require-ments would be fielded by the many CivilAffairs units in the USAR.

After-action reports on simulationsranging from command-post exercises tocomputer-assisted games, as well asreports on combat operations, attest to thefact that commanders have little, if any,knowledge of the Civil Affairs function ofcommand. Delegating that command func-tion to nonorganic active- and reserve-component units is not the commander’sbest course of action in meeting hisresponsibility toward civilians. The Spe-cial Warfare Center and School is workingto increase the number of CA positions inthe Army division.

CMO sectionTwo factors that preclude the effective

integration of the civil-military-operationssection into unit operations are the physi-cal separation of the CMO section fromthe intelligence and operations sectionsand the mindset that Civil Affairs is anissue detached from operationalplanning.7

Unlike the personnel and logistics staffsections, which are generally focusedinward toward sustaining unit operations,the CMO section, like the intelligence andoperations sections, is focused on theoperational area. It exists primarily toplan, facilitate and assist in the ongoingexecution of unit missions. To plan andcoordinate these missions, the operationssection must rely heavily on informationprovided by the intelligence and CMO sec-tions. Items such as situational and plan-

24 Special Warfare

ning maps, overlays of movement routesfor dislocated civilians, sources of host-nation support, national religious and cul-tural monuments, hospitals and powerplants, and most importantly, analysis,provide the operations officer with awider perspective. It is important that thetwo sections have access to the operationsofficer and to the immediate intent andviews of the commander.

The present structure of a typical CMOsection includes the primary CMO staff offi-cer, staff section assistants (officers andNCOs), and provisions for CA generalists orfunctional specialists in times of deliberateor crisis-action planning.

The lack of understanding and theunwillingness to give credence to CivilAffairs as a function of command havecaused the CMO section to be misused inmost cases. In many Army units the posi-tion of CMO staff officer has been down-graded to the point that it is one rank

lower than the other primary staff officers.The CMO staff officer at division and

corps levels serves as the commander’sprimary adviser on those aspects of mili-tary operations relating to civilians, theimpact of civil matters on military opera-tions, and the consequences of militaryoperations on the civilian population.

Although the combat uses of this keystaff officer are many, in only a few unitshas the CMO staff officer been allowed aposition in the main command post/tacti-cal operations center — a recognition ofCivil Affairs as a full-fledged, viable mem-ber of the intelligence/operations/CMOteam.

Current doctrine locates the CMO sec-tion in the rear command post duringdeployment. Thus positioned, it cannotfully analyze the impact of noncombatantson the operation and provide the com-mander and the operations officer with thecivil-military operations estimate, which

Photo by M.T. Huff

Members of the U.S.Marine Corps check ros-ters for names of Haitianrefugees coming in toGuantanamo Bay, Cuba.

July 1995 25

considers the commander’s moral andlegal obligations.

The CMO section must be located whereit can better monitor the current situationand provide advice to the commander, theoperations officer and the intelligence offi-cer. The CMO staff officer can plan, coor-dinate and provide staff oversight of civil-military issues only through direct coordi-nation with the unit operations officer,who is charged with planning and inte-grating the overall operational effort.

The current concept of battlefield oper-ating systems provides a superb mission-analysis tool. It includes every aspect ofwhat commanders may encounter ontoday’s battlefield — except civilians. Thisomission only reinforces the fact thatcommanders rarely plan and prepare forcivilians caught in the chaos of militaryoperations.

If the Army is to seriously address thosetasks directed by the Secretary ofDefense’s Civil Affairs directive, the fol-lowing three actions must occur:

• Include Civil Affairs instruction inschools when teaching the other functionsand responsibilities of command.

• Provide a capable CMO section to exe-cute those duties required within the CAfunctions of command.

• Position the CMO staff officer in themain command post/TOC, where interfaceand exposure can occur, not only with cur-rent intelligence, situation, plans and situa-tion reports, but also with the commander.

ConclusionThe challenges presented by noncombat-

ants on the battlefield during militaryoperations, both in war and military oper-ations other than war, will remain.

The main command post is the mostsuitable place from which to monitor thecurrent situation, review all incoming

information, develop input for courses ofaction and maintain the civil-militaryoperations estimate.

The Army needs to properly structureCMO sections at the corps and division lev-els and change doctrine to reflect that CivilAffairs is an operations function, not a sus-tainment function. These enhancementswill allow commanders to exercise CivilAffairs as a true function of command.

Notes:1 Dislocated civilians.2 Civilians, displaced persons, refugees and others

not openly carrying arms.3 Nongovernmental organizations and private vol-

unteer organizations.4 The four areas and means of waging conflict, sim-

ilar to the instruments of national power, being polit-ical, economic, military and informational. Informa-tional refers to the advantages gained by an adver-sary in capitalizing on available media outlets to pre-sent the struggle in a favorable light, while simulta-neously seeking to discredit the opponent’s activities,whether that opponent be an actual military force orsimply the political situation within the area at thetime U.S. forces participate in such activities.

5 Per Annex L (Civil Affairs) of the current JointStrategic Capabilities Plan; and the Secretary ofDefense’s Civil Affairs Directive, dated January1994.

6 Para 1-1, page 1-1, FM 101-5, dated 5 May 1984.7 CA planning is normally done in isolation, sepa-

rate from operational planning. Typically, oncecourses of action have been identified and a concepthas been drafted by the S-3/G-3/J-3, a distinctCMO/CA annex is prepared. The cycle remains thatthe operational concept is conceived, and then the S-5/G-5/J-3-CMO officer develops a plan to support thebase plan and intent. USAJFKSWCS contends thatintegrating the S-5/G-5/J-3-CMO into the operationalplanning cell would aid in both planning and execu-tion, particularly in military operations other thanwar.

26 Special Warfare

On the night of Sept. 18, 1994, nearly100 U.S. Air Force C-141 and C-130 air-craft loaded with paratroopers and heavy-drop equipment were either in the air orpreparing to take off from various bases inthe United States. Numerous U.S. Navy,Coast Guard, and Army ships and supportvessels were taking their designated posi-tions in the Caribbean. U.S. Marine Corpspersonnel were boarding amphibiousassault vessels or aircraft, and special-operations forces had been launched or

were preparing to do so.As part of Joint Task Force 180, all of

these forces shared the same mission:Conduct a forcible entry into Haiti, estab-lish a secure environment, and restoredemocratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was waiting inexile in the United States. A few hoursearlier, Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton, command-ing general of the XVIII Airborne Corpsand commander of JTF 180, had receivedthe execute order from U.S. Atlantic Com-

Operation Uphold Democracy: The Role of theSOCOORD as Part of a Joint Task Force

by Lt. Col. James L. Dunn and Maj. Jon M. Custer

Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton,commander of the XVIII Air-borne Corps and of JTF180, talks with Haitian mili-tary officials during Opera-tion Uphold Democracy.

Photo by Joel Herard

July 1995 27

mand, or USACOM, and was aboard theUSS Mount Whitney en route to Haiti.

Through the various command, control,communications, computer, intelligence,and information, or C4I2, systems on theUSS Mount Whitney, Shelton and his staffmonitored the progress of JTF 180 and thelate-breaking developments in Haiti. Know-ing that H-Hour was only five hours away,JTF staff members followed the progress offormer President Jimmy Carter, SenatorSam Nunn and retired Gen. Colin Powell,who were in Haiti’s capital city, Port-au-Prince, conducting last-minute negotiationsin an effort to solve the crisis without blood-shed. Soon the JTF received an abort mes-sage from USACOM — the American dele-gation and the Haitians had reached anagreement.

Upon the American delegation’s departurefrom Haiti, JTF 180 received new guidancefrom USACOM: In the early hours of Sept.19, Shelton and a symbolic force were tomake an unopposed entry into Haiti, afterwhich Shelton was to meet with Lt. Gen.Raoul Cedras to discuss further JTF 180deployments. As millions of Americanswatched on television the next morning,Operation Uphold Democracy began tounfold.

Though it looked simple, the operationrequired months of intensive planning andcoordination efforts which continued afterthe operation began. JTF 180’s special-oper-ations coordination element, or SOCOORD,played a small but important role in thoseefforts.

SOCOORD’s Army roleThe SOCOORD is a relatively new ele-

ment in the Army, having been conceptual-ized at the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand, or USASOC, in the late 1980s.By 1992, a SOCOORD was established ineach of the Army’s active corps headquar-ters. Each SOCOORD includes four mem-bers: the chief, a Special Forces lieutenantcolonel; the SF plans and operations officer,an SF major; the Ranger plans and opera-tions officer, an Infantry captain or majorwith Ranger Regiment experience; and theSOCOORD sergeant major, an SF sergeant

major. The SOCOORD works as a separateand distinct division within the corps G-3staff.

The SOCOORD concept is simple: to inte-grate Army SOF, specifically SF andRangers, into the Army’s conventional oper-ations. According to the SOCOORD Hand-book, published by the U.S. Army John F.Kennedy Special Warfare Center andSchool, the SOCOORD’s specific mission is:

To act as the principal adviser to the corpscommander and his staff concerning thecapabilities and limitations of Army SF andRanger units. The SOCOORD advises thecorps G3 which corps course of action bestallows for the optimal utilization of the capa-bilities of SF and Ranger units and developstarget nominations and mission require-

ments for the corps to forward to the jointforce commander (JFC) ,which will result inmission taskings appropriate for SF andRanger units. If SF or Ranger units areattached or [under operational control] to thecorps (normally on a mission-by-missionbasis), [the SOCOORD will] act as their focalpoint on the corps staff for coordination ofsupport (administrative, logistical, or intelli-gence) [those units] will require from thecorps and for synchronization of operations.

The XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORDaccomplishes its mission in numerous ways:

• Works in conjunction with the G-3plans division to conduct periodic reviews ofthe corps’ war plans and rewrites SOFannexes as required;

• Prepares a SOF estimate and writes aSOF annex for each operation or exercise ofthe corps;

• Coordinates with USASOC to ensureavailability of SF and Ranger units forintegration into corps- and division-levelexercises;

Operation Uphold Democracy requiredmonths of intensive planning and coordina-tion efforts. JTF 180’s special-operationscoordination element played a small butimportant role in those efforts.

28 Special Warfare

• Coordinates with USASOC for theassignment of special-operations com-mand-and-control elements, or SOCCEs,at corps or divisional headquarters;

• Serves as the SOCCE’s focal point forcoordination and integration within thecorps staff;

• Participates as a member of the corpsbattle management cell to ensure optimaluse of SF and Ranger units and synchro-nization with the corps’ battlefield operat-ing systems;

• Serves as a member of the corpsassault command post;

• Deploys with the corps and establish-es a SOCOORD/ SOCCE work site withinthe corps main command post in proximityto the fire-support element, the G-3 cur-rent operations section, and the G-3 plansdivision;

• Serves as a member of the corps deepoperations coordination cell; and

• Attends and provides input for corpstargeting board meetings.

How do these actions prepare the SOCO-ORD to work in a JTF headquarters? ForArmy personnel, a joint organization canappear complex: the presence of other ser-vice components and staff officers createsan unfamiliar environment. The Armyemphasizes that its manuals on doctrineand on tactics, techniques and proceduresbe prepared in consistency with joint publi-cations, but there are still differences thatrequire an understanding of joint terminol-ogy, organization, command relationshipsand planning processes. Nevertheless, sincespecial operations are by nature joint, andSOCOORD members normally have someexperience in the joint arena, the SOCO-ORD is well-suited for the work on a JTF.The following discussion describes how theXVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD integrat-ed itself into JTF 180’s staff and accom-plished its missions.

Complex planningOn Jan. 8, 1994, USACOM, through U.S.

Army Forces Command, tasked the XVIIIAirborne Corps to begin compartmenteddevelopment of OPLAN 2370 for a forcibleentry into Haiti. The XVIII Airborne Corps,

designated JTF 180 for this tasking,formed a small joint planning group, orJPG, with augmentation from various ele-ments within the Department of Defense.

Initially, the XVIII Airborne CorpsSOCOORD was only minimally involvedin the development of the OPLAN becauseof the small size and compartmentednature of the JPG, and because the SOCO-ORD, not formally recognized in joint pub-lications as part of a JTF, did not have aclearly delineated role at the joint level.The SOCOORD chief therefore attendedthe early planning sessions primarily tomonitor the JPG’s progress.

In coordination with USACOM, the U.S.Special Operations Command, or USSO-COM, provided a small team of SOF plan-ners to work on the JPG. The SOF plan-ners received guidance from the JPG andworked with their units to develop special-operations concepts to support JTF 180.USACOM’s J-34 (special operations) pro-vided guidance through the SOF portionsof USACOM’s orders.

In the early stages of the planning proc-ess, USSOCOM designated a joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF, whichincluded units from some of USSOCOM’scomponents. The JSOTF’s planners, con-ducting parallel planning in close coopera-tion with JTF 180’s JPG, developed initialconcepts for the employment of SOF indirect action, in foreign internal defenseand in certain collateral activities. One ofthe subordinate task forces of the JSOTFwas Task Force Raleigh. As the principalforce provider for Task Force Raleigh, the3rd Special Forces Group had its own plan-ning cell that developed and refined theconcept for the FID missions. The 3rdGroup planning cell coordinated its workwith the JSOTF and the JTF 180 planners.

JTF 180 SOCOORDThe expanding number and the multiple

levels of SOF planning cells and the growingcomplexity of the OPLAN made clear thatJTF 180 needed SOF planners who wouldanswer directly to the JTF J-3. Such anarrangement would ensure that the JTFcommander’s guidance and missions for

July 1995 29

SOF would be “protected”; that boundaries,linkup plans and other control measuresbetween SOF and the 82nd Airborne Divi-sion in central and southern Haiti were clearand fully coordinated; and that the interac-tion between SOF and the special Marineair-ground task force, or SPMAGTF, innorthern Haiti was fully coordinated.

Though it is not addressed in joint pub-lications, the SOCOORD was the perfectelement to perform such functions.Accordingly, the SOCOORD’s SF plansand operations officer took on a full-timeplanning and coordinating role in May.His primary contacts were at the JSOTF;however, this officer worked closely withall the key planning cells. At the JPG, hecontinually reviewed the JTF’s developingplan, integrated input from the variousspecial-operations planners, and devel-oped two key appendices for the JTF’sOPLAN 2370: Appendix 5 (Special Opera-

tions) and Appendix 21 (Linkups) toAnnex C (Operations). Over the next fewmonths, key-leader rehearsals and contin-uing coordination allowed the SF plansand operations officer to develop updatedversions of both appendices.

Parallel plansAs long as planning efforts were com-

partmented, the other SOCOORD memberswere not involved in the planning process.On July 1, however, new guidance fromUSACOM revised the focus of the planningeffort: Develop a plan for an unopposedentry into Haiti (OPLAN 2380), while con-tinuing to refine OPLAN 2370. A keyassumption in OPLAN 2380 was that polit-ical developments, negotiations and UnitedNations political pressure would cause thede facto Haitian leadership to leave theisland, opening the way for Aristide to

■ Jan. 8, 1994: XVIII Abn. Corps is designated JTF 180 for planning; begins compartmented planning for forcible entry (OPLAN 2370).

■ January-June 1994: Initial planning and re-hearsals; JTF 180 forces and JSOTF designat-ed; OPLAN 2370 essentially completed; fine--tuning and coordination continue.

■ July 1, 1994: USACOM directs planning for an unopposed entry; JTF 180 staff begins work on OPLAN 2380; staff-estimate process and rough draft of new OPLAN completed; refinements continue on OPLAN 2370.

■ July 29, 1994: 10th Mountain Division is desig-nated JTF 190 for planning and assumes plan-ning responsibility for OPLAN 2380; JTF 180 staff focuses on refining OPLAN 2370.

■ Sept. 2, 1994: USACOM directs JTF 180 to maintain OPLANs 2370 and 2380 while merg-ing both into OPLAN 2375; JTF 180 leads plan-ning process; new concept calls for forcible en-try by JTF 180 with quick transition to JTF 190.

■ Sept. 10, 1994: JTF 180 EOC begins 24-hour operations; JTF 180 staff begins crisis-action planning to continue development of OPLAN 2375.

■ Sept. 11, 1994: JTF 180 staff begins 24-hour operations; continues refinements necessary to merge OPLANs 2370 and 2380 into OPLAN 2375; JTF 180 components involved in loading of equipment, deployment to JOA or ISBs, and final mission preparation.

■ Sept. 18, 1994: JTF 180 command group and principal staff embark on USS Mount Whitney; components’ forces in place to begin forcible en-try; U.S. delegation in Port-au-Prince reaches agreement with Haitians; JTF 180 aborts forci-ble entry; USACOM provides new guidance.

■ Sept. 19, 1994: Operation Uphold Democracy begins when JTF 180 commander and initial JTF 190 forces go ashore; OPCON of TF Ra-leigh/ARSOTF Haiti shifts from JSOTF to JTF 190.

■ Oct. 12, 1994: Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras departs Haiti.

■ Oct. 15, 1994: President Jean-Bertrand Aris-tide returns to Haiti.

■ Oct. 24, 1994: JTF 180 relinquishes control of JOA to JTF 190 at 2400 Zulu.

■ Oct. 25, 1994: JTF 180 commander and staff redeploy to the U.S.

Operation Uphold DemocracyA Summary of Key Events

30 Special Warfare

“invite” U.S. military intervention; or thatthe de facto leadership, sensing the futilityof its actions, would itself open the door forsuch an unopposed intervention. The newplan would not be compartmented, so moreplanners could be involved.

Although the 82nd Airborne Division wasthe principal Army force for OPLAN 2370,the 10th Mountain Division took on therole under OPLAN 2380 (the SPMAGTF’sbasic role would not change). The unop-posed nature of OPLAN 2380 also negatedthe need for SOF DA missions envisionedunder the forcible-entry option.

On July 5, the new SOCOORD chiefbegan reviewing and supervising the

SOCOORD planning efforts. As the formerexecutive officer for the 3rd SF Group, hewas already familiar with the concepts ofoperation for the 3rd Group and the JSOTFunder OPLAN 2370.

Since overall planning now involved theparallel development of two separateOPLANs, the SOCOORD chief had the SFplans and operations officer continue towork primarily on OPLAN 2370 while theRanger plans and operations officer and theSOCOORD sergeant major worked onOPLAN 2380. The SOCOORD’s normalbusiness also continued as the corps staffbegan to focus on the upcoming CorpsWarfighter exercise (part of the BattleCommand Training Program, or BCTP)scheduled for December 1994.

JTF 190As work progressed on OPLAN 2380, no

one knew whether the unopposed-entryoption would be feasible. Indications fromHaiti in July were that the de facto govern-

ment appeared to be more entrenched andhostile than ever, and JTF 180’s staff felt itshould put a more intensive effort intoOPLAN 2370, since the forcible-entry planwas more complex and required fine-tuningof countless details. Therefore, with manykey members of the corps staff involved inboth OPLAN working groups, and withpreparation for the Corps Warfighter stillahead, Shelton recommended toFORSCOM and USACOM that the 10thMountain Division, as JTF 190, assumeresponsibility for the planning of OPLAN2380. The recommendation was approved,and on July 29, JTF 180 transferredOPLAN 2380 to JTF 190’s planners.

Since JTF 190 was based on an Armydivision and not a corps, it had no SOCO-ORD. But OPLAN 2380 involved extensiveSOF roles, and JTF 190’s staff needed ded-icated SOF planners. JTF 180’s SOCO-ORD was committed to OPLAN 2370 andto the preparation for Corps Warfighter.Therefore, during the SOF portion of thehand-off briefs to JTF 190’s planners, theXVIII Corps SOCOORD recommendedthat JTF 190 seek long-term augmenta-tion from USACOM’s Special OperationsCommand-Atlantic, or SOCLANT, andUSSOCOM. The SOCOORD also offeredto send one or two of its members to the10th Division headquarters at Fort Drumas a short-term fix.

Because of the 3rd SF Group’s extensiveFID role in OPLAN 2380, JTF 190 optedto accept 3rd Group’s offer to provide atemporary planning team. This solutionworked in the short term, but it left theJTF with no long-term dedicated SOFplanning and coordination cell. A full-timecell could assist with initial planning anddeploy with the JTF to continue workingon SOF issues.

Third OPLANAs the political and economic situa-

tions in Haiti worsened, USACOM pro-vided new OPLAN guidance on Sept. 2:Continue to refine OPLANs 2370 and2380, while merging them into a thirdOPLAN that would envision a forcibleentry by JTF 180, quickly followed by

A key assumption in OPLAN 2380 was thatpolitical developments, negotiations andUnited Nations political pressure wouldcause the de facto Haitian leadership toleave the island, opening the way for Aris-tide to ‘invite’ U.S. military intervention.

July 1995 31

the deployment of, and the transition to,JTF 190. JTF 180’s staff called this newversion OPLAN 2375.

In conjunction with the JTF 180 staff,the SOCOORD reviewed OPLANs 2370and 2380 in an effort to bridge gapsbetween the two. The most significantchallenge was to ensure that SOF com-mand-and-control channels remainedclear during and after the transitionbetween JTF 180 and JTF 190. Inpreparing OPLAN 2375’s synchroniza-tion matrix, the SOCOORD set a rela-tively firm schedule for the transfer ofoperational control of TF Raleigh fromthe JSOTF to JTF 190 on or about D+4,after which TF Raleigh would becomeArmy Special Operations Task ForceHaiti, or ARSOTF Haiti.

On Sept. 8, after receiving guidancefrom USACOM, JTF 180 activated itsemergency operations center and placedits personnel on a four-hour recall .Because the synchronization matrixincluded numerous t ime-sensit iveactions (including force deployments)that had to be accomplished, the EOCbegan 24-hour operations Sept. 10.

In the meantime, the JTF battle-man-agement cell, directed by the J-5, begandaily sessions to complete OPLAN 2375.SOCOORD members participated in allthese sessions, which produced a warn-ing order and the completed synchro-nization matrix.

On Sept. 11 (D-9), the JTF 180 staffbegan 24-hour operations in the corps’battle-simulation center. The JSOTFteam of liaison officers collocated withthe SOCOORD the same day. Additionaljoint augmentees and numerous teamsof LNOs arrived during the next fewdays.

During the next week, the SOCOORDand the JSOTF LNO team participatedin the JTF staff’s crisis-action planning.Once the JTF’s components began theirfinal preparations and the forces begandeploying to their designated maritimelocations and intermediate stagingbases, the bridging between OPLANs2370 and 2380 was essentially complete.

The SOCOORD monitored the

progress of SOF deployments and con-ducted final reviews and the coordina-tion of critical issues that could affectthe operation. For example, the SOCO-ORD reviewed the boundaries betweenSOF and the other JTF forces to ensurecomplete understanding by all parties;it confirmed linkup procedures throughdiscussions with the 82nd AirborneDivision staff and the JSOTF LNOs;and it updated the final changes to exe-cution checklists.

Additionally, the SOCOORD and theJSOTF LNOs, in conjunction with theJ-3 chief of operations, prepared fortheir deployment with the JTF staff.Working under the assumption that theJTF 180 commander would embark onD-1 aboard the USS Mount Whitney,the SOCOORD agreed that its chiefshould do the same. The SOCOORD fur-ther agreed that the JSOTF LNO cur-rently with the JTF staff would jumpwith the JTF’s assault command post onD-Day, and that the SOCOORD’s SFand Ranger plans and operations offi-cers would airland with the JTF mainCP on both D-Day and D+1. The SOCO-ORD sergeant major would remain atFort Bragg with the JTF rear CP; hewould be joined by a one-man JSOTFLNO and an augmentation officer fromthe Army Special Forces Command, orUSASFC, in order to maintain 24-houroperations.

During this period, USACOM pushedthe countdown ahead one day. Conse-quently, Sept. 15 became D-4. Havingcompleted all coordination, the JTFstaff began the final stages of its owndeployment on Sept. 18 (now D-1). TheSOCOORD chief embarked on the USSMount Whitney, and the SF and Rangerplans and operations officers preparedfor their own deployments.

By 1700 Zulu on D-1, the JTF’s com-mand group and principal staff, theLNO teams, the Navy forces staff, andthe joint rescue coordination centerwere aboard the USS Mount Whitney,which was steaming toward its desig-nated position near Port-au-Prince. Itwould arrive in position around H-

32 Special Warfare

Hour, D-Day, designated as 0400 Zulu,Sept. 19.

Fourth planAfter receiving the abort message and

new guidance from USACOM, JTF 180’sstaff realized it had less than 12 hours toexecute a variation of the three OPLANs.The JTF was no longer conducting aforcible entry into a hostile environment,but it could not assume entry into a per-missive environment. Accordingly, thestaff recommended and received approvalfor an unopposed entry into an uncertainenvironment, with JTF 190 as the maineffort. The staff called this the 2380(+)option, since it involved more aspects ofOPLAN 2380 than of the other twoOPLANs.

Within the special-operations realm, theJTF needed to involve SOF in the newplan as quickly as possible, since TFRaleigh’s primary role was to establishsecurity in the outlying areas of the coun-try through its presence and through closecontact with and monitoring of theHaitian military. Transfer of the opera-tional control of TF Raleigh from theJSOTF to JTF 190 was scheduled for D+4,after which TF Raleigh would become theArmy Special Operations Task Force.However, JTF 180 decided to transfer TFRaleigh’s operational control on D-Day,after JTF 190 had established initial secu-rity positions in the Port-au-Prince area.The JSOTF would retain responsibility forthe ARSOTF’s insertions into Haiti.

The early transfer of control causedgaps in the information flow for the follow-ing reasons:

• JTF 190 did not have a SOCOORD or aspecial-operations cell that could monitorand plan for ARSOTF Haiti’s operations.

• During the first few days, JTF 190focused on its buildup of conventionalforces and on the establishment of asecure environment in the Port-au-Princearea. It was not prepared to monitor orinfluence efforts to expand into the outly-ing areas.

• ARSOTF Haiti had a significant LNOpackage with the JSOTF, ensuring an

effective command, control and communi-cations link; it had no similar arrange-ment with JTF 190. By D+1, the ARSOTFdid have a one-man LNO at JTF 190, buta one-man shop cannot conduct 24-houroperations.

• JTF 180’s SOCOORD chief was a one-man SOCOORD who was aboard the USSMount Whitney.

Plan executionCommanded by Brig. Gen. Richard Pot-

ter, ARSOTF Haiti began its initial inser-tions into the Port-au-Prince area on D+1,followed by subsequent insertions into afew of the outlying areas on D+2 and D+5.JTF 180, however, did not have a clearreport of the ARSOTF’s progress.

The SOCOORD chief worked closelywith the JSOTF LNO over the next fewdays to follow ARSOTF Haiti’s progress.The two worked through ARSOTF Haiti’sLNOs at the JSOTF headquarters toestablish indirect communications withthe ARSOTF. During the same period,JTF 180’s J-3 repeatedly emphasized toJTF 190’s J-3 the importance of monitor-ing and reporting ARSOTF Haiti’sprogress. By D+1, the SOCOORD chiefhad also established limited communica-tions with the ARSOTF’s one-man LNO atJTF 190; however, this communicationslink remained sporadic and generallyunusable until D+6.

After JTF 180’s assault and main CPsarrived in Haiti on D+1 and D+2, theirpersonnel (along with the SOCOORD’s SFand Ranger plans and operations officers)assisted JTF 190 in establishing barracksand staff worksites near the airfield inPort-au-Prince. Most of the JTF 180 com-mand-post personnel who had been ashorewere redeployed to the U.S. by D+4; thetwo SOCOORD officers were among them.

On Sept. 24 (D+5), the SOCOORD chiefwent ashore for 24 hours to visit theARSOTF Haiti staff and its LNO at JTF190. They discussed methods for improv-ing the information flow and clarifiedquestions concerning the JTF 180 com-mander’s intent for SOF. Convinced thatthe problems concerning the information

July 1995 33

flow had been resolved, the SOCOORDchief returned to the USS Mount Whitneyon Sept. 25.

Potter, supporting efforts to expandoutward as quickly as the security situa-tion allowed, was aggressively involvedin daily meetings and constant coordina-tion with the senior Haitian militarystaff. Shelton met with Cedras eachmorning, and Potter met with Cedras’principal staff members each afternoonto make sure they understood what theyhad to accomplish to improve the securi-ty posture.

Meanwhile, the ARSOTF staff was plan-ning and issuing orders for an aggressiveexpansion. Special Forces forward operat-ing bases, B-detachments and A-detach-ments, accompanied by Civil Affairs andPsychological Operations specialists,would move into more than 20 townscountrywide.

Over the next few weeks, JTF 180 con-tinued its on-shore buildup of convention-al forces and SOF. With an improvedinformation flow, the SOCOORD closelymonitored ARSOTF Haiti’s expansion,contacts with military and civic leadersin the outlying areas, and efforts torestore basic services to the populace.

Working closely with the J-5 and theJSOTF LNO, and coordinating withARSOTF Haiti’s LNO at JTF 190, theSOCOORD also continued to review thedeveloping JTF 180 taskings in order tocoordinate SOF operations with those ofother forces. The SOCOORD chief cameashore three more times to keep coordi-nation channels open with the ARSOTFand its LNO at JTF 190.

During the same period, the SOCOORDworked on or monitored several otherissues related to ARSOTF Haiti. Periodiccoordination with the joint-force fires coor-dinator helped ensure that the ARSOTFhad support from AC-130 gunships duringinsertions. Discussions with the JTF engi-neer helped ensure that the JTF efforts toprovide power to outlying areas comple-mented the ARSOTF’s similar efforts. TheSOCOORD worked in conjunction withthe J-4 to monitor and recommendchanges to the time-phased force deploy-ment data as it related to ARSOTF Haiti’sdeployments. Finally, the SOCOORD initi-ated coordination with the J-6 to identifyconventional communications support,such as mobile subscriber equipment, forthe ARSOTF.

After the establishment of the interim

Brig. Gen. Richard Pottermeets with the Haitianbase commander in Port-au-Prince. Potter, the com-mander of ARSOTF Haiti,was in constant coordina-tion with the senior Haitianmilitary staff.

Photo by Brian Gavin

34 Special Warfare

public-security force, and with thedeparture of Cedras on Oct. 12 and thereturn of Aristide on Oct. 15, JTF 180prepared to transition control of thejoint operations area, or JOA, to JTF190. The SOCOORD made a series offinal checks with the JSOTF LNOs andARSOTF Haiti ’s LNO at JTF 190 toensure a seamless hand-off of any work-ing SOF issues.

At 2400 Zulu on Oct. 24, 1994 (D+35),JTF 180 relinquished control of the JOA toJTF 190. The following day, Shelton andhis staff, having completed their missions

in Operation Uphold Democracy, returnedto the U.S.

Lessons learnedThe XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD

learned the following lessons in preparingfor and conducting Operation UpholdDemocracy:

• To ensure that the joint-force com-mander has the information necessary fortimely decision-making, SOF must estab-lish and maintain well-understood, flexi-ble and responsive command-and-control

President Jean-BertrandAristide salutes Haitiantroops in Port-au-Princeduring his return to HaitiOct. 15, 1994. Ten dayslater, the commander andthe staff of JTF 180returned to the U.S.

Photo by Alejandro Cabello

July 1995 35

relationships. Before transferring opera-tional or tactical control of significantforces, such as an ARSOTF, we shouldensure that the receiving headquarters isprepared to provide command and controland to handle monitoring and reportingrequirements.

• By not clearly identifying the need forSOF-specific planners on a JTF staff, jointdoctrine leaves room for oversights in theplanning process. Because JTF 180 wasbased on an Army corps, it had a SOCO-ORD. JTF 190, on the other hand, neverhad full-time SOF planning and coordina-tion support. Using SOF planners orLNOs from a JTF’s subordinate special-operations units is an option, but it doesnot give the JTF its own SOF planningstaff. SOF planners who are part of theJTF staff will have the JTF commander’sguidance in mind as they prepare theJTF’s SOF annex and work SOF issues;planners from a subordinate unit willprobably have their own commander’sguidance in mind. During OperationUphold Democracy, the various planningstaffs worked well together, but JTF 190could have profited from having its ownSOF planners.

• The SOCOORD can make significantcontributions to SOF planning and coordi-nation if it is involved early on. From thestart, it should aggressively pursue involve-ment in the planning process of any opera-tion that anticipates a need for SOF.

• With only four men, a SOCOORD ishard-pressed to support 24-hour opera-tions at more than one location. During acritical period at the beginning of Opera-tion Uphold Democracy, the SOCOORD’sfour men were at three different locations.Throughout JTF 180’s involvement, theSOCOORD chief was the only SOCOORDrepresentative aboard the USS MountWhitney because of the ship’s berthinglimits. This shortage of personnel was aparticular problem during the first week,when the major SOF transitions occurred.The JSOTF LNOs aboard the USS MountWhitney and those ashore in Port-au-Prince provided excellent communicationsand coordination assistance, and USASFCprovided augmentation for JTF 180’s

SOCOORD at the rear CP at Fort Bragg.Nevertheless, the SOCOORD wasstretched thin. For future operations thatmight involve staggered deployments orthe need for multiple headquarters loca-tions with SOCOORD support, the SOCO-ORD will need augmentation, and itshould strive to have at least two men atany one location.

• Close cooperation between the SOCO-ORD, the JSOTF and the ARSOTF provedbeneficial. To foster such cooperation,SOCOORD members must develop effec-tive working relationships with the JTF’ssubordinate special-operations units. Itsmembers must understand the SOF sup-porting plans, and they must work closelyand effectively with the SOF LNOs. By fos-tering cooperation, SOCOORD membersopen doors to the sharing of ideas and to amutual understanding of perspectives.

• Nothing is more effective than face-to-face contact for coordination and informa-tion flow. During the planning process,SOCOORD’s daily meetings with JSOTFand 3rd Group planners proved invalu-able. During the operation, the SOCOORDchief was able to exchange more informa-tion in each of his short visits ashore thanin any other two or three days on the ship.

• SOCOORDs are well-suited to work inthe JTF environment. Though their contri-butions may be small compared to theoverall size of the operation, they providean important service in planning, coordi-nating and monitoring special operations.

Unanswered questionsIntegration of the SOCOORD into the

JTF 180 staff went smoothly because ofthe SOCOORD’s daily working relation-ship with the corps staff. The corps staffunderstood the SOCOORD and knew howit fit into the staff processes. As the XVIIIAirborne Corps staff transitioned into theJTF 180 staff, the SOCOORD performedits normal functions.

But some questions remain. With thesteadily growing emphasis on joint opera-tions, and with the proven value of SOCO-ORDs at Army corps level, shouldn’t jointdoctrine and publications address SOCO-

36 Special Warfare

ORD-like functions and responsibilities atthe JTF level? If not, who conducts SOFplanning and coordination for a JTF head-quarters not formed from an Army corpsheadquarters? Who takes on that role fora JTF formed by a Marine ExpeditionaryForce or by an Army division? Finally, ifwe recognize the need for a SOCOORD atthe JTF level, how should it be manned inorder to integrate joint SOF with otheroperations?

Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations; Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special

Operations Operational Procedures; andJoint Pub 3-05.5, Joint Special OperationsTargeting and Mission Planning Proce-dures, describe at length the planning rolesof theater special-operations commands,joint-force special-operations componentcommands, and special-operations mission-planning agents. All three publicationsemphasize the importance of the planningperformed by those who will execute themission. Joint Pub 3-05.3 also details theplanning procedures and responsibilities atthe theater level while stressing the impor-tance of LNOs in resolving any conflictbetween special operations and other joint-force operations.

None of the publications clearly addressthe preparation and the coordination ofthe SOF portions of a JTF’s OPLAN.Undoubtedly, the joint-force special-opera-tions component command for a JTF mustprovide input for the JTF’s plan, butshould its staff prepare the SOF portionsof the JTF’s overall plan? They have toprepare their own supporting plan. LNOs,who usually arrive just prior to the execu-tion of an operation, could assist with thecoordination of SOF issues, and they could

assist with SOF planning, but the deliber-ate planning conducted prior to the opera-tion would probably be beyond the scope ofthe LNO. Wouldn’t the JTF J-3 be betterserved by a SOF planning and coordina-tion cell that works for him and can pre-pare the SOF portions of the JTF plan aswell as coordinate SOF issues with theJFSOCC LNOs/staff and the JTF’s othercomponent staffs?

Though joint doctrine does not addressthe need for a SOCOORD-like cell at theJTF level, the experiences in OperationUphold Democracy justify its existence.The SOCOORD’s role during the planningand execution was comparatively small,but it was important. The SOCOORDwrote two appendices for OPLAN 2370 andone for OPLAN 2380, and it contributed tothe development of both the warning orderand the synchronization matrix for OPLAN2375. It contributed to the development ofOPLAN 2380(+) and continually coordinat-ed JTF-level issues related to ARSOTFHaiti. If the SOCOORD had not performedthese functions, who would have?

USSOCOM, as the unified command forall SOF, is in a unique position to influencejoint doctrine and publications as theyrelate to special operations. The command’sJoint Special Operations Forces Instituteshould review the issue of JTF SOCOORDsto determine if, how and where SOCO-ORDs should be addressed, what theirsources should be (e.g., USSOCOM’s com-ponents, theater SOCs, etc.), and how theyshould be organized for various types ofJTF missions. The JSOFI is reviewingJoint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations; Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine forJoint Special Operations; and Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.As it conducts these reviews, it may be ableto determine how SOCOORD-like functionsshould be addressed at the JTF level.

The XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD istaking steps to begin addressing theseissues. In an attempt to help standardizesome elements of the JTF staff processes,the corps is working with USACOM todevelop JTF standing operating proce-dures. The SOCOORD is contributing tothat effort in several ways:

With the steadily growing emphasis onjoint operat ions, and with the provenvalue of SOCOORDs at Army corps level,shouldn’t joint doctrine and publicationsaddress SOCOORD-l ike functions andresponsibilities at the JTF level?

July 1995 37

First, it developed a proposed manningdocument for a joint SOCOORD. In addi-tion to the four positions currently in ArmySOCOORDs, the document adds a Navalspecial warfare plans and operations NCO,a Ranger plans and operations NCO, andan SF plans and operations NCO. The doc-ument places the three plans and opera-tions NCOs in augmentation positions.These positions could be activated depend-ing upon the type of joint SOF involved inthe JTF’s concept of operations.

Second, the SOCOORD requested andreceived permission to include a SOFannex in the JTF SOP. The completedannex includes a brief list of references,sections on the characteristics of specialoperations, the mission and the battletasks of the Joint SOCOORD, dutydescriptions of SOCOORD personnel, andbrief descriptions of the joint special-oper-ations targeting and mission-planningprocesses.

Third, as part of an XVIII AirborneCorps effort, the SOCOORD reviewed thefirst draft of the Joint Task Force Head-quarters Mission Training Plan, a pro-posed joint publication being developed byUSACOM for the Joint Staff. This docu-ment, similar to the Army’s mission train-ing plans, should provide effective guid-ance for the training, planning and opera-tions of JTF staffs. The review focused onclarifying and highlighting JTF staffresponsibilities with respect to SOF. Inevery case, the responsibilities could beperformed by a robust SOCOORD. Thedraft document did not make clear whoseresponsibilities they would be in theabsence of a JTF SOCOORD.

Fourth, the SOCOORD is rewriting theXVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD SOP toincorporate lessons learned from Opera-tion Uphold Democracy and joint-exercis-es. The purpose of the rewrite is to ensurethat procedures are in place to provide theXVIII Airborne Corps with effectiveSOCOORD support, whether the corpsoperates as an Army corps or as a JTF.

Operation Uphold Democracy has beensuccessful in its efforts to restore stabilityand democracy to Haiti. SOF’s “quiet pro-fessionals,” with their unique skills, have

played major roles in the operation’s suc-cesses. The XVIII Airborne Corps’ SOCO-ORD made comparatively small contribu-tions to the overall operation, but its plan-ning, coordination and monitoring effortswere important at the JTF staff level. Byrealizing that SOCOORDs have a validand required role in joint operations,incorporating that requirement into jointdoctrine, and putting that doctrine intopractice, we can help ensure that futureJTFs are prepared to integrate SOF moreeffectively and more efficiently into theiroperations.

Lt. Col. James L. Dunn isthe SOCOORD chief for theXVIII Airborne Corps. Inprevious assignments, hecommanded an SF detach-ment and a company in the3rd Battalion, 10th SFGroup; served as a security-assistance staffofficer in the African Security AssistanceDivision of J-4 at Headquarters, U.S.European Command; served in the JFKCenter and School’s 1st Special WarfareTraining Group as commander of Compa-ny A, 1st Battalion, and as executive officerfor the 3rd Battalion; and served as theexecutive officer for the 3rd SF Group. Heis a graduate of the Army Command andGeneral Staff Officer Course.

Maj. Jon M. Custer is theSOCOORD Special Forcesplans and operations officerfor the XVIII AirborneCorps. In previous assign-ments, he commanded sever-al SF detachments andCompany A in the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFGroup. He served as the civil defenseadviser in El Salvador, commanded an SFdetachment in Operation Just Cause andserved as an SF battalion staff officer dur-ing Operation Desert Storm. He is a grad-uate of the Army Command and GeneralStaff Officer Course and the Army WarCollege Defense Strategy Course.

38 Special Warfare

There is an urgent need in special-oper-ations forces today for leaders with theability to think and act decisively underthe pressures and the complexities of thepost-Cold War era.

Only one philosophy adequatelydescribes the organizational requirementof the current operational environment:decentralization. Decentralization requiresthe confidence that one’s associates servingin decentralized positions will have the

capacity to make sound decisions in themajority of cases.

Such confidence starts at the seniorlevel. Decentralization cannot workwhen responsibility is exacted of the sub-ordinate but the authority to decide hasbeen withheld. When this occurs, thesenior commander is at fault, for he hasnot made a genuine delegation of author-ity. He shows a lack of confidence by

withholding part of the resources thatthe subordinate needs to get the jobdone, yet he expects the subordinate tocarry out the assigned mission. Thesenior may pay lip service to an abstrac-tion called “delegation,” but when thechips are down, he shows that he doesnot trust his subordinates.

Some claim that this is one of the penal-ties of a narrow span of control that seeksto ensure that each “i” is dotted and each“t” is crossed. Others assert that althoughevery military person subscribes to theprinciple of delegation and decentraliza-tion, in practice it is diluted because weare products of our own experiences.Accustomed to being closely supervisedthroughout our careers, we find it difficultto refrain from looking over a subordi-nate’s shoulder. As years pass, the habitbecomes ingrained. When we finally reachthe higher echelons, we behave in the pat-tern we have developed.

At a recent dinner party I was exposedto another possible explanation of thisbehavior. My dinner partner was a neurol-ogist from Canada. During the course ofthe meal, he explained to me that thebrain is divided into two equal parts —the right and left hemispheres. Each parthas unique functions.

The left hemisphere manages languagefunctions and does the linear, analyticaldeductive thinking. The right hemispherehandles spatial-perceptual matters. It sees

As I Remember It: Delegation and Decentralization

by Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

Military organizations have traditionally beenmore left-brained and more authoritarianthan civilian corporations or comparablegovernment agencies. This lingering authori-tarianism dies hard — one of its invidiouslegacies is a refusal to delegate and decen-tralize authority to subordinate levels.

July 1995 39

the big picture and engages in integrative,creative thinking.

One can assume that an evenly bal-anced individual uses the left hemisphereto logically organize step-by-step proce-dures and to express himself coherently.He uses the right hemisphere to take theoverview necessary to understand themeaning of the left-brain details and theirrelationship to one another. This kind ofindividual would more readily accept dele-gation and decentralization.

What happens, however, when one sidedominates? It would be reasonable to con-clude that a right-hemisphere-dominatedperson, when confronted with a problemrequiring analysis of detail, would eitherdeal in broad generalizations or ignorethe details and jump to conclusionsimpulsively.

A left-hemisphere-dominated personwould deal in details and analysis, com-pulsively making rules and regulationsbut never seeing the whole picture. Hewould be immersed in the “process” andnever see or understand the meaning ofhis activity in a larger context. This kindof person would tend to be authoritarianand prefer a centralized organizationalenvironment.

In other words, our approach to prob-lems is preordained; it is all in the head.Training and education have only a limit-ed impact.

One could argue that I rushed to judg-ment and drew the above conclusionunscientifically. However, the dinner onlylasted several hours, and with my left-hemisphere-dominated thinking, that wasthe best I could do .

The bottom line is that military organi-zations have traditionally been more left-brained and more authoritarian than civil-ian corporations or comparable govern-ment agencies. This lingering authoritari-anism dies hard — one of its invidious

legacies is a refusal to delegate and decen-tralize authority to subordinate levels.

Commanders must recognize that over-supervision will disappear only whenthose closest to the scene of the actionmake the operating decisions. Thismeans that staffs must be reduced in sizeand improved in quality to the point thatthey can fulfill their proper roles of giv-ing advice and counsel to the commanderinstead of concerning themselves withthe review and approval of operatingdecisions.

Of course we recognize that neither cen-tralization nor decentralization should beallowed to go too far: an equilibrium isalways necessary. Unfortunately, untilsuch time as this equilibrium can befound, the superior’s eraser will wear outbefore his pencil is used up, and it will bethe subordinate who develops an ulcer orhas a coronary.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shach-now’s commissioned servicespanned more than 30 years,during which he served aseither a commander or a staffofficer with Infantry, Mecha-nized Infantry, airmobile,airborne, and Special Forces units. Heserved as commanding general of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School, of theArmy Special Forces Command and of U.S.Army-Berlin. He holds a bachelor’s degreefrom the University of Nebraska and a mas-ter’s degree from Shippensburg University,Shippensburg, Pa. He retired from theArmy in August 1994.

40 Special Warfare

Officers and NCOs who wear thecrossed-arrows insignia of Special Forcesare members of the Army’s newest branch,but the crossed arrows themselves have ahistory that dates back more than 100years.

Of the first soldiers to wear the crossedarrows, their theater commander said:“Being armed, mounted, supplied, andbacked by troops, they cheerfully lead theway into the middle of their enemies. Inthe late expedition they have done most ofthe fighting and killing. They have alsoproven themselves very efficient when act-ing alone.”

The speaker was Gen. Fredrick Steele,commanding general of the Department ofthe Columbia. The year was 1867, andSteele was describing the Indian membersof the Regular Army, or as they were collo-quially known, the Indian Scouts.

Indian ScoutsBy act of Congress, as implemented by

General Order 56 of 1866, 1,000 NativeAmericans were authorized to be recruitedinto the Regular Army. Their recruitmentwas supported by such military leaders ofthe day as Steele, William T. Sherman,George Crook and Henry Halleck.1

Although the recruitment of Native Amer-icans was never as extensive as Congresshad envisioned, it was a significant forcemultiplier throughout the Indian Wars of

the next 30 years.2The Indian Scouts had four functions: to

serve as guides and intelligence-gatherers,to keep order on the reservations, to rein-force military government and to fight.Recruited primarily from Pawnee, Navajoand Seminole tribes, they were employedextensively throughout the west. Maj.Gen. George Crook, perhaps the most suc-cessful counterinsurgency fighter of histime, owed his success in capturing Geron-imo to his Indian Scouts.3

These Indian Scouts were neither auxil-iaries nor civilian scouts of the Quarter-master Department; they were duly enlist-ed members of the military establishment.As such they wore the U.S. Army uniform,were bound by military discipline, andcould and did receive military awards —15 Scouts received the Medal of Honorbetween 1869 and 1890.4 No Native Amer-icans ever became officers, however,because of the significant cultural and lin-guistic barriers that they would have hadto cross and because of the racial preju-dices of the time.

Recommended by supporters as a meansof assimilating the Indian population, therecruitment of Indian Scouts was notwarmly greeted by all. Some of the fieldcommanders, specifically Gen. PhilipSheridan, opposed it on the grounds thatit was counter to the perceived aims of theIndian campaign, which were subjugationand annihilation, not assimilation.5 This

The Origin of the Crossed-Arrows Insignia

by Lt. Col. Charles King

July 1995 41

resistance precluded the Indian Scoutsfrom ever becoming full strength.6

U.S. ScoutsNonetheless, the idea of Native Ameri-

cans in the Army persisted. In 1889, Gen.John Schofield, then commanding generalof the Army, attempted to institutionalizethe Indians within the Army force struc-ture. He added a Scout company, whichwas to be manned by Indian Scout soldiersand NCOs and led by white officers, tomost of the regiments. Army Circular 10of 1890 laid out detailed uniform andinsignia specifications, which included thecrossed arrows on lapels, campaign hatsand guidons. This was the first officialrecognition of the crossed-arrows insignia.General Order 28 of 1891 directed that the“L” troop of each cavalry regiment and the“I” company of each infantry regiment bemade up of Native Americans to be knownofficially as U.S. Scouts.

As with the less formally organizedIndian Scouts, the U.S. Scouts were nevermanned anywhere near their authorizedlevels because of resistance from the field.Various reasons are put forward for thisresistance, ranging from the language bar-rier, to the desire to imitate continentaland more conventional armies, to racialprejudice. In any event, the numbers ofU.S. Scouts remained small. According toone source, fewer than 200 were ever onactive duty at one time.7

The last combat seen by the organizedU.S. Scouts was with Gen. John J. Per-shing in Mexico.8 During the early 20thcentury the scouts led a quiet existence onArmy posts across the West. On Nov. 30,1943, the last U.S. Scout detachment wasdisbanded at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The lastthree Indian Scouts were retired in 1947.

New requirementAs the Scout units were being disband-

ed, a new requirement was being raised:In response to the need for an unconven-tional-warfare force during World War II,the U.S. and Canada established a com-bined commando force known as the FirstSpecial Service Force. In July of 1942, this

unit asked the War Department for per-mission to wear the insignia of the “IndianScouts … inasmuch as the entire motif ofthis force has been set up along Indianlines.”9

By August 1942 the crossed arrows wereapproved for wear by the officers and menof the force — both U.S. and Canadian.Myth has it that several members of theforce made a trip to Fort Huachuca to askthe surviving Indian Scouts for their per-mission. Whether or not this actually hap-pened, it is certain that the force request-ed to wear the crossed arrows becausethey had been the insignia of the IndianScouts.

Although the First Special Service Forcewas deactivated in the fall of 1944 after abrief but illustrious life, the arrows livedon. In Canada, they survive as the

A member of the U.S.Scouts wears the earlycrossed-arrows insignia.

Photo courtesy Nebraska State Historical Society

42 Special Warfare

insignia worn by the pipes and drums ofthe First Special Service Force at Canadi-an Forces Base, Pettawawa. In the U.S.Army, the arrows were revived in 1952when Col. Aaron Bank activated the firstSpecial Forces unit, the 10th SpecialForces Group, whose guidons and colorsbore the crossed arrows.

SF insigniaFor the next 30 years, the crossed

arrows were unofficially recognized as theinsignia of Special Forces, but they werepresent in its heraldry only on the colors.As the argument for a separate SpecialForces combat arm gained support, so didthe status of the arrows. In July 1984, theChief of Staff of the Army approved thewearing of the crossed arrows by enlistedmembers of Special Forces, in recognitionof the establishment of a distinct NCOcareer-management field, CMF 18.10 In1986, following the re-establishment of theFirst Special Forces as a regiment withinthe Army regimental system, officers affil-iated with the regiment who were servingin Special Forces billets were allowed towear the insignia.11 Finally, on April 9,1987, the Secretary of the Army approvedthe establishment of a new combat arm —the Special Forces Branch.

The insignia that was first worn in com-bat by the Indian Scouts, then worn by thesoldiers of the First Special Service Force,and worn unofficially by the officers andmen of Special Forces since its inception,was approved as the insignia of the ArmySpecial Forces Branch on May 22, 1987.12

The war-fighting role of Special Forcesin today’s Army is not dissimilar to therole played by the Indian Scouts. We stillgrapple with the intellectual and physicaltasks necessary for overcoming insurgen-cies and small wars. The Indian Scoutswere an unconventional solution to uncon-ventional problems, as was the Devil’sBrigade, as is Special Forces. The unset-tled relationship that existed between theIndian Scouts, their supporters and theArmy establishment was not altogetherdifferent from that which existed betweenSpecial Forces and the rest of the Army.

One of the goals of today’s SpecialForces community is to become betterintegrated into the mainstream Army,both doctrinally and professionally.Although much has been accomplishedtoward that goal, much remains. Under-standing the lineage of Special Forces, asembodied in its insignia, will assist sol-diers in understanding that Special Forceshas a legitimate history and tradition as apart of the Regular Army.

Lt. Col. Charles King iscommander of the 1st Bat-talion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group, JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center andSchool. His previous SpecialForces assignments includethe 10th SF Group, where he served as acompany commander, an operations officerand the group executive officer; the 5th SFGroup, where he served as a detachmentcommander; and the Special ForcesBranch, U.S. Total Army Personnel Com-mand, where he served as a branch assign-ments officer.

Notes:1 Robert Wooster, The Military and United States

Indian Policy 1865-1903 (New Haven, Conn.: YaleUniversity Press, 1988), p. 128.

2 Ibid., p 140.3 Fairfax Downey and Jacques N. Jacobsen, The

Red-Bluecoats (Fort Collins, Colo.: The Old ArmyPress, 1973), p. 104.

4 The Congressional Medal of Honor (ForestRanch, Calif.: Sharp and Dunnigan, 1984).

5 Wooster, p. 51.6 Wooster, pp. 35, 128.7 Edward M.Coffman, The Old Army (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 259.8 Downey, p. 155.9 Memo, HQ FSSF, Subject: Request for Authoriza-

tion of Insignia, 26 July 1942.10 Memo, DCSPER, Subject: Collar Insignia for

CMF 18, 26 June 1984.11 Memo, CG, USAJFKSWCS, Subject: Request for

Wear of Crossed Arrow Insignia, 15 September 1986.12 Memo, CG, USAJFKSWCS, 2nd End, Subject:

Request for Wear of Crossed Arrows, 22 May 1987.

SF soldiers provided stability to Haitians

The following letter was writtento the commander of the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command by amissionary in Haiti. — Editor

I am writing you concerning themen of (ODA 363) C Company, 2ndBattalion, 3rd SF Group, who werestationed in Leogonne, Haiti, untillate February. They came to ourcommunity during a very uncertainperiod just following the peacefulintervention in October. They gaveto us, the missionaries, and to thelocal Haitian people, a sense ofsecurity and stability at a timewhen Haiti had no law enforcementto speak of.

The reason I am personally writ-ing is to share with you the superbconduct these men exemplified toall while they were here. Their abil-ity to be firm and compassionateportrayed Americans well. It wasmy pleasure to be around thesemen and watch the reaction of thelocal citizens.

After the devastating hurricane,it was these men and the mission-aries who came to the rescue ofmany people. The Haitian govern-ment still has done little to aidthese desperately poor people.Actually, this government seems tobe in worse shape now than before.The future looks dim.

I had never before been aroundthe U.S. military, so I only had pre-conceived ideas of their behavior.How pleasantly surprised I was tofind such courteous and helpfulmen! Please relay to them just whata void they left here. I commendyou for any role you may have had

in their training. May God bless youand them and America!

Kathy LandChristianville Foundation, Inc.Port-au-Prince, Haiti

SF needs warfightingemphasis

During my time in SpecialForces, I have seen a new orienta-tion of thought and action thatconcerns me. This concern is theshift from SF being a warfightingunit to becoming a Civil Affairscomponent.

Each issue of Special Warfaretestifies to the fact that we are everevolving into a weapon-totingPeace Corps. The thoughtsexpressed in the magazine themajority of the time are not com-bat-oriented articles. We attachnew names that mask our true mis-sion, such as an unconventionaloperations or unconventional war-fare, to a mission that consists ofhanding out food. Feeding Kurds orfeeding Haitians is a CA mission.This is not our primary mission, asFM 31-20 clearly states.

It is our actions that speaklouder than our words. When wespend six months vegetating in atown in Haiti, years going in andout of Turkey, or wasting away ina camp in Panama or Guan-tanamo, our combat skills arediminishing at an incredible rate,and they cannot be retrieved at amoment’s notice. Our students inthe SF Qualification Course arealready being taught the newdirection. With two or three daysremaining at the end of Robin

Sage, they now pack it in and gocut wood or paint fences. Runninganother patrol would be moreappropriate.

A captain comes to SpecialForces with certain combat skills:He is a graduate of the InfantryOfficer Advanced Course andoften Ranger-qualified and from acombat-arms branch. In additionto those skills, he must ultimatelybe capable of maneuvering a bat-talion. But what about the SFwarrant officer? Should not thewarrant officer, who must beready to take command of anODA, possess the same warfight-ing capabilities as the captain?These are the actions that depictour new direction.

My ODA, as with most in SpecialForces, is made up mostly of sol-diers from Infantry and other com-bat-arms MOSs who came to thisunit to advance their knowledge inan international realm, whether inpeace or war. Handing out cup-cakes is not what anyone I knowcame to do. If we continue the waywe are going, we will have very lit-tle in common with the men whofirst earned the Green Beret.

SFC (P) Brian Duffy3rd Battalion, 3rd SF GroupFort Bragg, N.C.

The two preceding letters aretimely in that they highlight currentdiscussions about the relevance andapplicability of Special Forces intoday’s world. While they are basedon completely different points ofview, each letter is “on the money.”The two letters illustrate the vastlydifferent roles that Special Forces

LettersSpecial Warfare

July 1995 43

play in the spectrum of conflict andthe way that we see ourselves fittinginto that spectrum.

SFC(P) Duffy’s frustration in notbeing able to focus at least themajority of his training efforts onpreparation for conflict is under-standable. The image of the SpecialForces soldier in the commando roleis one that is prevalent in manypeople’s thinking. This view, howev-er, fails to account for the full valueand utility of Special Forces. Whydoes our national and militaryleadership decide to commit a Spe-cial Forces unit to a task whichdoes not involve the application ofviolence? Is it because we havebecome so adept at “handing outcupcakes” that we are viewed as thebest to accomplish this role? Or is itthat our reputation of being able toaccomplish violence gives us theinstant credibility to accomplishthese other missions successfully?

Our ability to fulfill the com-mando role, as well as other SFunique attributes such as languageand cultural awareness, give usthe credibility required to worksuccessfully in a myriad of activi-ties. Numerous recent examplesillustrate this point of view: A Spe-cial Forces team is able to walkinto a Kurdish camp and immedi-ately begin to organize and focusthe people of the camp. Morerecently, Special Forces soldiersprovided assistance to Cubanrefugees during Operation SafeHaven. Each of these examplespoints out the utility of SpecialForces and their ability to estab-lish instant credibility.

The second point of view revolvesaround the question of why SpecialForces are chosen to execute thesemissions. Some people argue thatthere are other forces who perhapsare better trained to accomplishmissions of this type. While this istrue in some instances, soldiersfrom Special Forces are often cho-sen because they possess the opera-tional awareness to accomplish the

mission as well as the politicalaptitude and maturity to accom-plish missions with minimumattention. A recent article in themagazine of the Center for ArmyLessons Learned contained an arti-cle on how an infantry unit pre-pared to conduct operations inHaiti. Included were some veryrevealing comments: “This isn’twar. Respect the nationals. … Thecommand directs that soldiers stopevery 20 to 30 minutes duringpatrols and speak to the people onthe street. If soldiers do not do this,they quickly lose perspective andregard for the people.”

Special Forces soldiers do notneed such reminders. The very atti-tudes which conventional forcesmust teach their soldiers are thenatural modes of operation for Spe-cial Forces. This is one reason whySF has drawn positive commentsfrom our national leadership.

Ultimately we return to thesource of SFC Duffy’s frustration:the lack of time required for him tokeep his team highly trained andcapable of conducting combat oper-ations. As long as there are sensitivemissions requiring soldiers ofunique skills, SF soldiers will findthemselves fighting to find the mostvaluable resource of all — time.

(This response was prepared bythe staff of the Special Forces Doc-trine Division, Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine, USAJFK-SWCS — Editor.)

CSM has role in tacticaloperations

As my battalion prepared for itsrotation to the National TrainingCenter, I asked myself “What doesthe command sergeant major doduring tactical operations?”

The Army charges the CSM withoverseeing the individual trainingprogram and the professionaldevelopment of the NCO Corps,and with taking care of soldiers

and their families. The CSM roleduring tactical operations is not aswell-defined.

The CSM is one of the most expe-rienced members of the SF battal-ion. It is therefore only natural thathe participate in the tactical deci-sion-making process, or TDMP. TheCSM has unlimited access to everysection in the forward operationsbase, or FOB, allowing him to iden-tify problems and to influence cor-rective action without involving thecommander.

Thanks to his relationship withthe commander, the CSM knowsthe commander’s intent better thananyone in the unit. This knowledgeis invaluable when an operationaldetachment or staff section has aquestion about the commander’sguidance.

Before our NTC rotation, the bat-talion conducted a two-week desert-training program and one week offull mission profiles. Six detach-ments were given a mission, isolatedand launched on a short 24- to 48-hour FTX. It is obligatory that theCSM spend time with these detach-ments. The company sergeantsmajor can provide information tothe commander during pre-missionactivities concerning detachmentstrengths and weaknesses, butwhen the operation starts, they per-form duties in the isolation facility,special-operations command-and-control element, and advanced oper-ations base, thus restricting theirinput. By concentrating on the“players,” the CSM can provideinformation the commander wouldnormally get from the company’sleadership. By attending staff mis-sion briefs and briefbacks, by study-ing the enemy and friendly situa-tion, by reading all incoming andoutgoing messages and by sitting inon the commander’s update briefing,the CSM accumulates a tremendousamount of information and can keepthe commander informed on thewhole operation.

During tactical operations, the

44 Special Warfare

CSM is the commander’s trou-bleshooter. Experienced as a Spe-cial Forces operator and leader, theCSM can contribute to the successof the mission through his mentor-ing, problem-solving and maintain-ing the momentum of the battal-ion’s efforts.

CSM Michael W. Jefferson3rd SF GroupFort Bragg, N.C.

Publication needs ideas from SF thinkers

I was heartened to see the article“Ambushing the Future” by Dr.James J. Schneider in the April1995 issue of Special Warfare. For along time, I have felt that the Spe-cial Forces community should be asconcerned about where we are goingas about where we have been.

Many of his points werethought-provoking and do deservecomment. For example, I find ithard to envision a Special Forcesgroup being augmented by conven-tional armor, infantry andartillery. Running an SFOB isenough work for a group staff.However, that mix could be han-dled by a joint special-operationstask force. It would be interestingto let a JSOTF take on that jobdown at the JRTC in a peacekeep-ing/peace-enforcement scenario.

I would like to see more articleslike Dr. Schneider’s, but comingfrom our own community’sthinkers. I have always beenimpressed that the British SpecialAir Service cultivated thinkers aswell as operators in their communi-ty. On one hand, their post-WWIIrebirth had been operator-drivenwith their ability to quickly andingeniously respond to a require-ment for deep-penetration opera-tions during the Malaysian Insur-gency, followed by similar employ-ment in Borneo and Oman. Howev-er, their ability to respond to thePrincess Gate hostage crisis was

thinker-driven as a result of astrategic repositioning set in motionyears before in anticipation of thethreat of terrorism.

We in Special Forces have alsobeen able to take advantage ofopportunities and, because of thesuperb quality of our operators,perform marvelously. The CIDGand recon programs in Vietnam,the work of the 5th Group on MTTsand the work of the 7th Group inLatin America in the 70s and 80sthat played a large part in our ownrebirth, the coalition-support teamsof Desert Shield/Desert Storm, andthe 10th Group’s work on ProvideComfort are just a few cases thatcome to mind. All have been prece-dent-setting demonstrations of Spe-cial Forces’ unique abilities, and, Iwould argue, all have been opera-tor-driven.

On the other hand, the only roleswe could fashion against our majorCold War threat were specialreconnaissance and direct action onmain supply routes. We didn’t real-ly have any thinker-driven alterna-tives that could meaningfullyemploy the full range of SpecialForces capabilities.

If Dr. Schneider could be so con-ceptually innovative, why can’tsome of our own SF operators? Thereal issue now is one of strategicpositioning, and it’s a job for ourthinkers. The thinkers in the SASsolved it in time for Princess Gate.We need to start solving it as well,and one of the best places to start isby advancing creative ideas in ourown professional journal.

Col. Page DuffyU.S. Army Reserve (ret.)Andover, Mass.

Tofflers missed importanceof nonlethal weapons

The review essay of “War andAnti-War” by Charles Swett thatappeared in the January edition ofSpecial Warfare was outstanding.

The single most important pointmade by Mr. Swett is that of theimportance of nonlethal weapons.Perhaps more than any other newtechnology, effective nonlethalweapons can transform specialoperations as we currently knowthem. Mr. Swett correctly pointsout that the Tofflers missed “thecritically important issue of how(nonlethal weapons) can help easedomestic political constraintsagainst intervention overseas.”

Domestic political constraintsare the collective wisdom of ourpeople and political leaders thatacts as a brake against precipitousmilitary action. However, situa-tions involving weapons of massdestruction may demand earlyaction. The proliferation ofweapons of mass destructionamong extremist states is growingevery day, and there is a very realdanger of these weapons fallinginto the hands of terrorists. In cer-tain cases, early action, takenbefore a political consensus can bedeveloped, may be required. Inthose few cases, effective nonlethalweapons may make early inter-vention a politically viable option.

Currently, the Dismounted Bat-tle Lab at Fort Benning is the pro-ponent for the development ofthese weapons for the Army.USASOC is providing input; how-ever, its influence is limited. Therequirements of the Infantry andMilitary Police will dominate andwill probably not overlap perfectlywith those of special operations.USSOCOM will have to take thelead, to ensure that our specialrequirements are addressed.

Lt. Col. Robert BradyUSASOCFort Bragg, N.C.

July 1995 45

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

46 Special Warfare

The Total Army Personnel Command recently completed functional-areadesignations for officers in year group 1989. As the proponent for the SpecialForces branch, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School makes an annu-al recommendation to PERSCOM for the FA breakout of each year groupduring its fifth year of service. SWCS bases its recommendation on projectedlong-term branch FA requirements. The proponent FA model envisions thefollowing percentages of SF officers in each FA by the year 2010:

FA39 (PSYOP/CA) 9 percentFA41 (Personnel Programs Management) 14 percentFA45 (Comptroller) 15 percentFA46 (Public Affairs) 10 percentFA48 (Foreign Area Officer) 6 percentFA49 (ORSA) 8 percentFA53 (Automation) 2 percentFA54 (Operations, Plans and Training) 36 percent

SF officers, in coordination with the SF Branch at PERSCOM, should strivefor FA qualification as soon as possible after completing ODA command. FAtraining and assignments not only provide rewarding opportunities for ser-vice to the SOF community, they also support the integration of the SFBranch throughout the Army and joint community. Depending on the specif-ic FA, FA qualification can also provide enhanced opportunities foradvanced civil schooling, command (FA 39) and promotion.

• The Special Forces Warrant Officer Professional Guide is scheduled to bepublished Oct. 1, 1995. The guide will provide approved career guidance,doctrinal duties, job descriptions and principal duty titles and will assistcommanders and their senior warrant advisers in establishing unit profes-sional-development programs. During the review process, copies will be fur-nished to all Special Forces groups for comment. Comments will bereviewed during the Warrant Officer Advanced Course in August 1995.• Special Forces-qualified officers in National Guard units who are inter-ested in a direct appointment into MOS 180A should apply through theirchain of command. Training requirements may vary; all officers musthave a successful performance history and a minimum of three years on aSpecial Forces A-detachment.• Commanders are encouraged to interview all MOS 180A applicants aspart of their unit recruiting program. To enhance the quality of the inter-views, the unit senior warrant-officer adviser and the command sergeantmajor may be invited to attend.• The point of contact on MOS 180A issues is CWO3 Shaun Driscoll orthe incoming manager, CWO3 Wayne Searcy, at DSN 239-2415/9002 orcommercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

FA qualification importantfor SF officers

SWCS to publish guide forSF warrant officers

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

July 1995 47

SF medics assigned to the Ranger Regiment

PERSCOM points of contact

Authorizations increasefor CMF 18 drill sergeants,

detailed recruiters

As part of the initiative to obtain more personnel authorizations, CMF 18has secured 50 drill-sergeant and detailed-recruiter positions. TwentySFC detailed-recruiter authorizations and 30 drill-sergeant authoriza-tions (staff-sergeant and sergeant-first-class) will be available to CMF 18soldiers who currently hold an 18B, 18C, 18E or 18F primary MOS. TheSpecial Forces Branch has already received and screened several packetsfor both programs. These packets have been sent to the PERSCOMRecruiting and Retention Team and the drill-sergeant program managerfor consideration. The majority of these authorizations will be filled bythe end of FY 95. Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison, commander of the Spe-cial Warfare Center and School, has approved the acquisition of 30 moredrill-sergeant and 10 more detailed-recruiter authorizations. These addi-tional authorizations will most likely be filled in FY 96.

The commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command hasdirected that 12 SF medical sergeants (18D) be assigned to the RangerRegiment. The addition of SF medics will enhance the regiment’s trauma-management capabilities and give selected 18Ds a unique opportunity towork with another unit of the Army Special Operations Command.

The following is a list of the staff of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch,Enlisted Personnel Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command:

Capt. Adrian Erckenbrack SF Enlisted Branch chiefMSgt. Terry Palmore Senior career adviserSFC Stewart Marin 37F career adviser, CMF 18/37F

NCOES managerMrs. Faye Matheny 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10th SF

groups, JFKSWCS, USASOC, SF Command, SATMO, 96th CA,ROTC assignments, and JRTCassignments

Ms. Dyna Amey SFQC student managerAssignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manag-er and career-development questions to the senior career adviser. Studentsattending the SF Qualification Course who have questions on assignmentsshould contact their student PAC. Questions regarding NCOES should firstbe directed to the SF group schools NCO. The branch phone number isDSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395, fax -0524. Address correspon-dence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0454.

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

48 Special Warfare

Mujahedin intensifyoperations in Bosnia

“Ninja” violence reportedin East Timor

Indonesian military forces have reacted with patrols and greater vigi-lance in the streets of East Timor’s capital of Dili in reaction to attacks onthe local population by gangs consisting of 12-15 individuals. Known as“ninjas,” because they wear black clothes and masks, these groups roamthe city at night terrorizing the population. Typically, their activitiesinclude entering private residences and beating and torturing the occu-pants, assaulting nighttime strollers, and killing pets and poultry. Thisincreased activity, coupled with the killing of six East Timorese byIndonesian military forces earlier in 1995 near Dili, has heightened secu-rity concerns in Indonesia’s troubled 27th province.Formerly a Portuguese colony, East Timor was annexed into the Republic

Mujahedin units, possibly supported by Iranian SOF, have once againintensified their activities in central Bosnia now that the weather hasbecome conducive to offensive combat operations. Their increasing influ-ence on both the Muslim government in Sarajevo and the three armycorps located west of the city has alienated much of the local populaceand has developed into another source of irritation for the U.N. peace-keeping forces there. Detachments of Mujahedin have assisted in thetraining of selected Bosnian army elements for the past two years, butlast summer they also began to spearhead many of the tactical-levelattacks against Bosnian Serb forces. The potential for the Mujahedin toescalate their activities remains high and will further threaten regionalstability in the republic’s hinterland.Funding for the Mujahedin has been provided by Iran and by variousother Islamic states that have an interest in expanding extremism intothe European theater. Additionally, international radical groups, such asHizbollah, have been added to the suspected list of sponsors. Bosnian gov-ernment sources have grudgingly admitted the presence of the Muja-hedin, but they publicly intimate that they have accepted the Mujahedinpresence as a “necessary evil” to maintain the flow of aid from interna-tional Islamic contributors. Aid has been distributed in forms rangingfrom hard currency to clandestine arms shipments.Although the numbers of Mujahedin currently operating in Bosniaremain a matter of speculation, most credible estimates indicate approxi-mately 2,500 members. However, “professional holy warriors” constituteonly a minority among them. Many of the others are indigenous BosnianMuslims who demonstrate appropriate religious zeal and allegiance tothe organization. In the near term, the Mujahedin are expected to contin-ue to focus on local military operations and on the most effective means ofestablishing their influence with the Bosnian Muslim government. Intime, they will likely surpass these original objectives and divert theirattention to politicizing the Muslim population and attempting to estab-lish an Islamic republic obedient to fundamentalist doctrine.

July 1995 49

Many states around the world face high levels of crime and violence thatare beyond the capabilities of their police or military forces to handle. As aresult, these states are becoming host to large numbers of “private justice”groups, some of which have turned to vigilantism, crime or subversion. InCentral and South America, for example, private security organizationshave long existed to deal with the spillover from wars and terrorism aswell as violent crime. Their relative merits, spotty performance and clearabuses continue to be debated. Despite concerns, private security organi-zations are expected to play an important role in helping the SouthAfrican government cope with high levels of crime and violence as it worksto consolidate democratic gains and to reorganize its police and securityforces. It is the former USSR and Eastern Europe, however, where crimeand turmoil have led to remarkable growth in private security organiza-tions. As of April 1994, 6,605 Russian “private security enterprises andsecurity services” had been officially registered, with some 26,000 individ-uals — many former military or security-service personnel — acquiringprivate investigative licenses. A number of these firms and individualshave become involved in organized crime or have turned into small privatearmies for individuals or organizations. An analogous situation exists inEastern Europe. Romania, for example, now a crossroads of drug andarms trafficking and other forms of organized and random crime, and aperiodic stopover for terrorists, has more than 160 private-detective agen-cies. A number of these are manned by personnel formerly of the commu-nist military (police), Department of State Security and Ministry ofDefense. Technologically, some agencies are well-equipped, and three arereportedly working for “foreign espionage services.” These kinds of devel-opments have appeared throughout Eastern Europe, highlighting the needto consider private-security elements as a growing security considerationthere and in other areas of the world.

Private security groupsturn to crime, espionage

of Indonesia in 1976 following an invasion the year before. Since then, itspro-independence forces have been waging war against Indonesian forces.According to current estimates, there are approximately 200 East Timo-rese conducting a guerrilla war against approximately 5,000 Indonesiantroops. The ninja activity is the most recent twist in the battle for EastTimor. Both sides deny ownership of the gangs. Catholic priests in Diliclaim that the ninjas are members of Indonesia’s special forces, with thespecific mission to intimidate opponents of Jakarta’s rule. Dissidents inDili claim that the government is trying to suppress their activities,which include the international embarrassment experienced when 29East Timorese occupied the U.S. Embassy compound during PresidentClinton’s November 1994 visit to Indonesia.The Indonesian government claims that the ninjas are gangs of dissidentEast Timorese youths. It points to the February 1995 arrest of 12 EastTimorese who were said to have confessed both to their role in master-minding ninja activity and to their efforts in tarnishing the image of theIndonesian military occupation. However, in the minds of many Timo-rese, the real identity of the ninjas and their agenda remains an issuethat is far from resolved.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., Lt. Col. John E. Sray and Maj. Thomas E.Sidwell of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

UpdateSpecial Warfare

Army SF Command gets new commander

Brig. Gen. William P. Tangneytook command of the U.S. ArmySpecial Forces Command in a cere-mony at Fort Bragg’s Main PostParade Field May 1.

A native of Worcester, Mass.,Tangney was formerly the deputycommanding general and chief ofstaff of the U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command. He has alsoserved as commander, SpecialOperations Command, U.S. CentralCommand; commander of the 10thSF Group; chief of the SF OfficerBranch at the Army Military Per-sonnel Center; and commander ofthe 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group.

Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott, commander ofthe Army Special Operations Com-mand, praised Tangney’s experi-ence at every level in SpecialForces. “He has the personal andprofessional credentials required tolead the command into the 21stcentury,” Scott said.

Tangney replaced Maj. Gen.Harley C. Davis, who is now deputycommanding general of the FifthArmy at Fort Lewis, Wash.

Reserve SOF positions still available

Despite downsizing in the U.S.Army reserve components, thereare still numerous reserve-compo-nent special-operations forces posi-tions available, according to thechief of strength management forthe U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

Positions for Civil Affairs soldiers(38A) and Psychological Operationsspecialists (37F) are currently avail-

able in the U.S. Army Civil Affairsand Psychological Operations Com-mand, which has units located in 26states and in Washington, D.C.,said Lt. Col. Samuel A. DeRocco.Although there are vacancies insome company-grade officer and E-7positions in those units, most of thevacancies are for soldiers in theranks of E-3 through E-6.

CA soldiers are required to havea skill-technical score of 100 orgreater, a high-school diploma anda secret clearance (or eligibility forthe clearance). PSYOP soldiers arerequired to have a skill-technicalscore of 105 or higher, a high-schooldiploma, a Defense Language Apti-tude Battery score of 85 or higherfor seven specific languages and 89or higher for all other languages,and a secret clearance (or eligibilityfor the clearance).

Interested civilians should con-

tact their local Army recruiters;reservists should contact theirstrength-management office; andsoldiers leaving the active Armyshould contact their unit’s transi-tion NCO, DeRocco said. — JerryHealy, USASOC PAO

MFF instructor sets parachuting record

A military free-fall instructorfrom the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School has set a newrecord for the most parachutejumps in a 24-hour period.

CWO3 Jay Stokes, assigned toCompany B, 2nd Battalion, 1st Spe-cial Warfare Training Group, made331 jumps at the Raeford MunicipalAirport, Raeford, N.C., May 30-31.

A-Frame lifts burden for SOF units

A special-operations soldier whoinvented an A-frame hoist has seenthe idea he drew on a paper napkinbuilt and field-tested within a mat-ter of months.

Lt. Col. Richard C. Burmood,commander of the 528th SpecialOperations Support Battalion, hadbeen in Haiti just two weeks whenhe pinpointed a problem with waterdistribution to Special Forces sol-diers in Haiti’s hinterlands.

Water was stored in 500-gallonwater bags, or blivits, which lie onthe ground. Gravity will drain onlyabout 400 gallons from the bags,leaving them too heavy to be liftedexcept by helicopter or wrecker.

Burmood thought of the idea ofusing an A-frame to manually liftand drain the blivits, but it wasduring a briefing that he saw a way

50 Special Warfare

Brig. Gen. William P. Tangney receives thecolors of the Special Forces Command.

Photo by Mike Brantley

of getting his idea off paper andinto the field.

“Bill Chadwick was giving a brief-ing on combat developments in thepre-command course (at the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School),”Burmood said. Lt. Col. WilliamChadwick is the director of SystemsAcquisition, Directorate of ForceIntegration, U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command. “I drew it ona paper napkin; he took it and ran.”

Burmood’s idea was passed toMaj. Todd Wendt, a test coordina-tion officer for Systems Integration.“The napkin showed up here, and Iwas asked, ‘What can you do withthis?’ ” Wendt said. Three monthslater, the A-frame was fielded.

The 528th surveyed the Armysystem and the local economy for adevice to lift and drain the blivits.“The closest thing on the economywas $240, but it also weighed 3-4times as much as the A-frame,”Wendt said. The next steps were todevelop specifications and to findsomeone to construct the device.Wendt contacted the Airborne andSpecial Operations Test Directorateat Fort Bragg to develop and buildthe A-frame. The project took twoweeks and cost $850.

The A-frame was engineered tobe small enough to fit into a dufflebag but strong enough to lift a half-full blivit completely off the ground.The result was a 60-70 pound, alu-minum A-frame, with harness andratchet straps, that can be easilybroken down and reassembled bytwo or three people.

Combat development usuallytakes years, Wendt said. “Usually,it is not as simple as this one. Wejust didn't have to go through theformal system, because it was sim-ple.” Even though the informalprocess was used for the project,Wendt said, standards for safety,engineering and market analysiswere thoroughly researched andadhered to during the A-frame'sdesign and construction.

The 160th Special Operations

Aviation Regiment has expressedan interest in the A-frame to drainfuel blivits, Wendt said. If SOFunits decide to buy the A-frames,the Systems Acquisition Branchwill find a contractor to build anumber of the devices at a costmuch lower than that of the proto-type. — Carol Jones, USASOC PAO

SODARS helps SOF soldiersin mission planning

Soldiers involved in missionplanning for an overseas deploy-ment may not be aware that theycan take advantage of lessonslearned by other teams that haveoperated in the same areas.

The Special Operations Debrief-ing and Retrieval System, orSODARS, is an automated informa-tion system designed to capturespecial-operations mission debrief-ing reports, store them and makethem available to the SOF commu-nity. These reports are to be usedto prepare teams/individuals forfuture OCONUS deployments.

“Through the SODARS program,OCONUS-deploying personnel canprovide valuable, mission-specific,operational information which willsignificantly enhance the missionplanning of future OCONUSdeployments,” said CWO2 BillCrawford, the USASOC SODARSmanager.

USASOC Regulation 381-1requires the debriefing of ArmySOF personnel (active and reservecomponents) returning fromOCONUS deployments. Informa-tion obtained from these debrief-ings is entered into a data basemaintained by USSOCOM. Thisinformation is accessible to theSOF community via the SpecialOperations Command Research,Analysis, and Threat EvaluationSystem, or SOCRATES.

To support SOF elements notconnected to SOCRATES, USSO-COM has developed a collateraldial-up program that is currently

being field-tested. The system, theCollateral Users Bulletin Board, orCUBB, will allow all SOF, activeand reserve, to retrieve SODARSreports.

In October 1994, USASOC com-pleted production of the USASOCSODARS Reference Guide. Thisguide contains a checklist outliningeach step of the SODARS process.The guide also contains theSODARS annexes which corre-spond to each type of SOF mission.Each annex is followed by a corre-sponding debriefing guide designedto assist debriefers in the question-ing phase of the debriefing. Byclosely following the checklists andother recommendations in theguide, users can save hours in thedebriefing and reporting process.

“Soldiers’ participation is essen-tial in developing a SODARS pro-gram that will achieve its goal ofbeing the best and most compre-hensive mission-planning toolavailable to the SOF community,”Crawford said.

For more information onSODARS, contact CWO2 Bill Craw-ford, USASOC SODARS manager,at DSN 239-5754 or commercial(910) 432-5754.

Special Forces increaseas Army shrinks

While the Army has decreased insize over the last 10 years, autho-rizations for Special Forces soldiershave increased.

In fiscal year 1987, according tohistorical data from the SWCS Spe-cial Operations Proponency Office,there were 4,015 SF soldiers in anArmy of 676,745, giving SF 0.59percent of the Army’s authoriza-tions. The projection for FY 97 is5,802 SF soldiers in an Army of495,000, giving SF 1.17 percent ofthe Army authorization.

July 1995 51

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

Leadership and the New Sci-ence. By Margaret J. Wheatley.San Francisco: Barrett-KoehlerPublishers, 1992. ISBN 1-881052-01-X. $22. 164 pages.

It is not often that a book is trulysurprising — this one is. MargaretJ. Wheatley, Professor of Manage-ment at Brigham Young Universi-ty, has made a unique contributionto our understanding of leadershipand its relationship to the newestdiscoveries in science.

At 164 pages, the book is clearand concise. But watch out for thatfirst step: The new science is notimmediately comprehensible to all.

The author makes a convincingargument that 17th-century Newto-nian principles have led us collec-tively down the wrong leadershippath. Her thesis is that we havebecome victims of our own science,and that repeated attempts by aWestern, linear and mechanisticculture to reduce humans to quan-tifiable entities is doomed to failure.

We may all have an aversion tothe conduct of human affairs “bythe numbers,” yet this anti-humanmethodology has infected CEOs andsenior military officers alike. Wecreate questionnaires, take pollsand collect data, all in a vainattempt at prediction. Our correctfocus should be on the “process” ofleadership and the establishment ofproductive and mutually beneficialrelationships with co-workers andsubordinates.

Rigidly hierarchical organiza-tions, like the Army, are the veryantithesis of Wheatley’s conception.Yet even the Army and its soldierscan benefit from the author’s

unusual approach to the topic. Oneof the keys is “informal leadership.”

We all have memories of poorleaders who, because they werebright enough to trust in a high-quality senior NCO or subordinateofficer, succeeded. Perhaps theyweren’t so dumb after all. Evenloyal subordinates will seek theleadership they need, perhaps out-side the chain of command, whenthe boss is not up to the challenge.

Wheatley recognizes that organi-zations develop their own kind ofconsciousness. Soldiers who havebeen present for the deactivation ofa beloved unit know that it is likeattending the funeral of an oldfriend. Our memories and the ener-gies that all former membersexpended in that unit make it so,creating a very human reality.

The point is that organizationalenergy is the result of the contribu-tions made by every member, notthe leader or CEO alone. The bestleaders manage to control theirown egos and to develop the collec-tive energies of all to meet organi-

zational ends.One of the most radical depar-

tures taken by Wheatley from con-ventional wisdom is reflected in thisquote, “Growth is found in disequi-librium, not in balance. The thingswe fear most in organizations —fluctuations, disturbances, imbal-ances — need not be signs ofimpending disorder that willdestroy us. Instead, fluctuations arethe primary source of creativity.”

Creative solutions to problemsencountered during ARTEPs, forinstance, are generally not well-received by evaluators — prescrip-tions based on doctrine are. In theattempt to measure intangibles likecombat readiness, we are compelledto create only those situationswhich can provide us measurableresults, in something like anARTEP. The result is a skewed per-ception of reality. Is the unit trulycombat-ready or just ARTEP-smart?

Lenin said “Freedom is good, butcontrol is better.” Wheatley pointsout, “If organizations are machines,control makes sense. If organiza-tions are process structures, thenseeking to impose control throughpermanent structure is suicide.”Although it is overstated, herassertion contains an underlyingtruth. Overarching control and thefailure to give subordinates deci-sion-making authority can destroyany chance for a positive commandclimate.

Information, according to theauthor, is the primary ingredient increating a successful organization.This comes as no surprise to seniorArmy leaders, but putting informa-tion to work is often problematic.

52 Special Warfare

The senior leader’s task is twofold:(1) create a vision of where the unitneeds to go (2) articulate thatvision so it is understood by everymember of the organization.

Those interested in quantummechanics, nonlinear equations,fractals, chaos theory and self-orga-nizing systems will find this bookparticularly interesting. Wheatleymakes some startling connectionsbetween these new sciences and theart of leadership — connectionsmost of us wouldn’t look for. Herunconventional approach to thetopic, in this reviewer’s opinion,possesses extraordinary merit. Thebook is well worth the price.

Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr. Joint Special Operations Cmnd.Fort Bragg, N. C.

Bravo Two-Zero. By Andy McNab.London: Bantam Press, 1993. ISBN:0-593-03421-X. 374 pages.

The author, a British Special AirService NCO, provides a candidfirst-person account of his patrol’saction in the 1991 Gulf War. Theeight-man patrol (call-sign BravoTwo-Zero) received two missions: tolocate and destroy Iraqi telecom-munication land lines which paral-leled a main supply route; and toidentify and destroy mobile Scudmissile launchers. Inserted 100miles northwest of Baghdad byhelicopter five days after the airwar began, the dismounted patrolquickly encountered a series of inci-dents that doomed the mission.

Radio frequencies for the opera-tion were inoperative, causing thepatrol to lose communication withits base. Contrary to intelligencereports, 3,000 Iraqi troops werepresent in the immediate area ofoperations. The patrol’s four sur-vival radio beacons proved inca-pable of contacting orbitingAWACS aircraft, eliminating anypossible close air support or aerialextraction. The hide site was com-

promised by a young Iraqi goatherder, leading to a firefight and asubsequent escape-and-evasionattempt of 120 kilometers towardthe Syrian border.

Three patrol members died. Fourwere captured and endured captivi-ty and torture in Baghdad for amonth before repatriation. Theirinterrogation, described in brutaldetail, provides a classic contempo-rary case study of resistance tointerrogation, reiterating somepoints taught in our own SEREcourse. One man successfully evad-ed capture, completing a 300-kilo-meter march to arrive at the

British Embassy in Damascus.According to the author, “It wasone of the most remarkable E&Esever recorded by the Regiment.”

As the patrol leader, the authorgives an honest, often anguished,overview of the mission planningand execution. While some termi-nology, equipment and tacticsmight differ from our own, U.S. sol-diers will find the concepts andtechniques familiar. He is blunt inexplaining the circumstances andthe rationale for his decisions, pro-viding ideal points for the reader tocontemplate, “What would I have

done?”The straightforward narrative

dispels some of the popular mythsand mystique of the SAS while pro-viding frank observations andinsight into the unit. For instance,the author’s comments on theessentials of the regiment’s profes-sionalism, “It’s all very well doingall the exciting things — abseiling,fast-roping, jumping through build-ings — but what being SpecialForces is mostly about is thorough-ness and precision. The real mottoof the SAS is not ‘Who Dares Wins’but ‘Check and Test, Check andTest.’ ”

The brief discussion of lessonslearned and why things wentwrong is disappointing, possiblyleaving the reader with unan-swered questions. With the benefitof hindsight, one can speculate,Was the pre-mission planning thor-ough enough? Why was intelligenceon the area insufficient? Whatspecifically caused the failure of thepatrol’s communications? Was thecombination of direct-action andspecial-reconnaissance missionsexcessive for the size and composi-tion of the unit?

Not surprisingly, Bravo Two Zeroreportedly became the most deco-rated patrol in the British Armysince the Boer War. The storyleaves one staggered by the sheercourage, tenacity and endurance ofthe participants. It should evokediscussion and introspection fromthe professional soldier, remindinghim that exceptional individualsmust always be the foundation ofany special-operations organization.

Erik SyvertsenWaynesville, Mo.

July 1995 53

Department of the ArmyJFK Special Warfare Center and SchoolATTN: AOJK – DT – PBMFort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

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