G E N E R A L T E R M S F O L L O W I N G S P E C I A L T E R M S (EJUSDEM GENERIS)It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular ands p e c i f i c m e a n i n g , s u c h g e n e r a l w o r d s a r e n o t t o b e c o n s t r u e d i n t h e i r  widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. But thisr u l e m u s t b e d i s c a r d e d w h e r e t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n i s p l a i n t o t h e contrary.  T h i s r u l e i s c o m m o n l y c a l l e d t h e “ e j u s d e m g e n e r i s ” r u l e , b e c a u s e i t teaches us that broad and comprehensive expressions in an act, such as“and all others”, or “any others”, are usually to be restricted to personsor things “of the same kind” or class with those specially named in thepreceding words.Rule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain

G E N E R A L T E R M S F O L L O W I N G S P E C I A L T E R M S (EJUSDEM GENERIS)It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular ands p e c i f i c m e a n i n g , s u c h g e n e r a l w o r d s a r e n o t t o b e c o n s t r u e d i n t h e i r  widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. But thisr u l e m u s t b e d i s c a r d e d w h e r e t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n i s p l a i n t o t h e contrary.  T h i s r u l e i s c o m m o n l y c a l l e d t h e “ e j u s d e m g e n e r i s ” r u l e , b e c a u s e i t teaches us that broad and comprehensive expressions in an act, such as“and all others”, or “any others”, are usually to be restricted to personsor things “of the same kind” or class with those specially named in thepreceding words.Rule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.

EXPRESS MENTION AND IMPLIED EXCLUSIONIt is a general rule of statutory construction that the express mention of  one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusionof all others.“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”.Except:•When there is manifest of injustice•When there is no reason for exception

I n d i v i d u a l s t a t e m e n t s b y m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s o n t h e f l o o r d o n o t necessarily reflect legislative intent. The best interpreter of the law or any of its provisions is the author of thelaw.CHAPTER VIIISTRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

GENERAL PRINCIPLESI f a s t a t u t e s h o u l d b e s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d , n o t h i n g s h o u l d b e i n c l u d e d   w i t h i n t h e s c o p e t h a t d o e s n o t c o m e c l e a r l y w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e language used.But the rule of strict construction is not applicable where the meaning of the statute is certain and unambiguous , for under these circumstances,there is no need for construction.O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e a r e m a n y s t a t u t e s w h i c h w i l l b e l i b e r a l l y construed. The meaning of the statute may be extended to matters whichcome within the spirit or reason of the law or within the evils which the law seeks to suppress or correct.L i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l a w o r r u l e s , h o w e v e r , a p p l i e s o n l y i n p r o p e r c a s e s a n d u n d e r j u s t i f i a b l e c a u s e s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . W h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t l i t i g a t i o n i s n o t a g a m e o f   technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted ina c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e t o i n s u r e a n o r d e r l y a n d speedy administration of justice.

PENAL STATUTES Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and in favor of  t h e a c c u s e d . H e n c e , i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a p e n a l s t a t u t e , t h e tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with suchstrictness as to safeguard the right of the accused.  I f t h e s t a t u t e i s a m b i g u o u s a n d a d m i t s o f t w o r e a s o n a b l e b u t c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n s , t h a t w h i c h o p e r a t e s i n f a v o r o f a p a r t y accused under its provisions is to be preferred.TAX LAWS Taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and p r o p e r t y r i g h t s o f t h e p e o p l e a n d t a k e s f r o m t h e m a p o r t i o n o f t h e i r property for the support of the government.A c c o r d i n g l y , i n c a s e o f d o u b t , t a x s t a t u t e s m u s t b e c o n s t r u e d s t r i c t l y against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for

taxes,b e i n g b u r d e n s , a r e n o t t o b e p r e s u m e d b e y o n d w h a t t h e a p p l i c a b l e statute expressly and clearly declares.Any claim for exemption from a tax statute is strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state.NATURALIZATION LAWNaturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.INSURANCE LAWC o n t r a c t s o f I n s u r a n c e a r e t o b e c o n s t r u e d l i b e r a l l y i n f a v o r o f t h e insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus, ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONSD o u b t s i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f W o r k m e n ’ s C o m p e n s a t i o n a n d L a b o r C o d e s h o u l d b e r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r o f t h e w o r k e r . I t s h o u l d b e l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d t o a t t a i n t h e i r l a u d a b l e o b j e c t i v e , i . e . , t o g i v e r e l i e f t o t h e  workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should dieor sustain in an injury.   The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and the law by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberalityin their favor.

RETIREMENT LAWSRetirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and comfort, whenhe is no longer capable of earning his livelihood.

ELECTION RULESStatute providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to theend that the will of the people in the choice of public officer may not bedefeated by mere technical objections.

RULES OF COURTR u l e o f c o u r t s h a l l b e l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d i n o r d e r t o p r o m o t e t h e i r objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of everyaction and proceeding.The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and the law by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberalityin their favor.RETIREMENT LAWSRetirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and comfort, whenhe is no longer capable of earning his livelihood.ELECTION RULESStatute providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to theend that the will of the people in the choice of public officer may not bedefeated by mere technical objections.RULES OF COURTR u l e o f c o u r t s h a l l b e l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d i n o r d e r t o p r o m o t e t h e i r objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of everyaction and proceeding.  CHAPTER XCONFLICTING STATUTES

EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE ENTIRE STATUTEIt may happen that in a statute, conflicting clauses and provisions mayarise. If such situation may occur, the statute must be construed as a  whole.

STATUTES IN PARI MATERIAStatutes that relate to the same subject matter, or to the same class of  persons or things, or have the same purpose or object.Statutes in pari materia are to be construed together; each legislative acti s t o b e i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o o t h e r a c t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e s a m e matter or subject.However, if statutes of equal theoritical application to a particular casecannot be reconciled, the statute of later date must prevail being a later expression of legislative will.

GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTESS o m e t i m e s w e f i n d s t a t u t e s t r e a t i n g a s u b j e c t i n g e n e r a l t e r m s a n d a n o t h e r t r e a t i n g a p a r t o f t h e s a m e s u b j e c t i n p a r t i c u l a r l y d e t a i l e d manner.If both statutes are irreconcilable, the general statute must give way to t h e s p e c i a l o r p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n s a s a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l provisions.   This is so even if the general statute is later enactment of the legislature a n d b r o a d e n o u g h t o i n c l u d e t h e c a s e s i n s p e c i a l l a w u n l e s s t h e r e i s manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law.

STATUTE AND ORDINANCEIf there is conflict an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give  way.It is a well-settled rule that a substantive law cannot be amended by aprocedural law.A general law cannot repeal a special law.I n c a s e o f c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n a g e n e r a l p r o v i s i o n o f a s p e c i a l l a w a n d a particular provision of a general law, the latter will prevail.When there is irreconcilable repugnancy between a proviso and the bodyof a statute, the former prevails as latest expression of legislative intent.  T h e e n a c t m e n t o f a l a t e r l e g i s l a t i o n w h i c h i s g e n e r a l l a w c a n n o t b e construed to have repealed a special law.A statute is superior to an administrative circular, thus the later cannot repeal or amend it.Where the instrument is susceptible of two interpretations, one which  will make it invalid and illegal and another which will make it valid andlegal, the latter interpretation should be adopted.In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of  the Constitutions, the latter prevails.

ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE.   This is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words.

The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used to carry out, not to defeat the intent or purpose of the law; the rule must give way in favor of the legislative intent;

limitations of ejusdem generis   requisites: 1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general word or phrase; 2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or  are of the same kind; 3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by examples; 4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases a broader meaning.expressio unios est exclusio alterius.

the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence IMPLIES the EXCLUSION of OTHERS orWhat is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

RULES in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONThe solemn decisions of the judges upon a statute become part of the statute ; and the security of men's lives and property, require that they should be adhered to: for precedents serve to regulate our conduct ; and there is more danger to be apprehended from uncertainty, than from any exposition; because, when the rule is settled, men know how to conform to it; but, when all is uncertain, they are left in the dark, and constantly liable to error; for the same offence which, at one time, was thought entitled to clergy, at another, may be deemed capital ; and thus the life or death of the citizen will be made to depend, not upon a fixt rule, but upon the opinion of the judge, who may happen to try him, than which a more miserable state of things cannot be conceived.

1. Presumption of Correctnessa.  "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the statute to be valid."  Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional defect is on the challenger. "Every act of the legislature is presumed to  be constitutional, and the Constitution is  to be given a liberal construction so as to sustain the enactment in question, if practicable."  "When the constitutionality of an act is challenged, a heavy burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the challenge.  All laws are presumed to be constitutional and this presumption is one of the strongest known to the law.

b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enacting statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and interpretations thereof . Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, if two statutes are in pari materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or amends the earlier enacted statute. c. "The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation. d. When amendments are enacted soon after controversies arise "as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act, a formal change-rebutting the presumption of substantial change.  e. " We "assume that the legislature chose, with care,  the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute." 

f. when current and prior versions of a  statute are at issue, there is a presumption that the  CONGRESS, in amending a statute, intended to effect  a substantive change in the law. "Further,  we assume that CONGRESS’ amendments to a  statute are purposeful, rather than unnecessary.

g.  "The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that  it  is  a presumption  of statutory  construction  that,   where  both general  and  specific   statutes  appear  to address  a   matter,  CONGRESS  intends the  specific statute to  control the subject

h.  "When a statute begins with the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law," it is presumed that CONGRESS   intended to override any potential conflicts with earlier legislation.

 i.  "The construction of statutes by agencies charged with administration of those statutes is entitled to great weight. A decision of an agency specified to execute the law made by CONGRESS carries great weight and is entitled to deference unless it is proven the agency erred. The grant of regulatory authority extends only to duties or powers conferred by law. As such, "regulations, promulgated pursuant to definitive statutory authority, have the force and effect of law. Moreover, those regulations which "clearly and explicitly mirror" statutory authority are likeliest to be sustained. Any regulation of the Department must be reasonably grounded in an identifiable and definitive statutory foundation. "Generally, the court accords substantial deference to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations. Provided the interpretation "does not violate the Constitution, it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.j.  we will overturn  COURT’s  decision only if it can be fairly characterized as  "arbitrary or capricious" and thus a "clear abuse of delegated discretion." On the other hand, an "agency does not possess specialized competence over the  interpretation of a statute merely because it addresses topics within the agency's delegable  authority.  Pure statutory construction, a matter within the "core competency of the judiciary,"  . "This axiom stems from basic principles of separation of powers. It is emphatically the province and duty of the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to say what the law is.  It necessarily follows that the a priori question whether the statute delegates or withholds discretion is itself a question of statutory interpretation, one implicating our duty of de novo review."

k.  "The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review Board's reasoning, correctly noting that courts give "great deference" to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. This deference stems from Code § 2.2-4027, which requires that reviewing courts "take due account" of the "experience and specialized competence of the agency" promulgating the regulation. Even so, "deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ. No matter how one calibrates judicial deference, the administrative power to interpret a regulation does not include the power to rewrite it. When a regulation is "not ambiguous," judicial deference "to the agency's position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation." Though agencies may be tempted to adjudicate their way around unwanted regulations, such overreaching undermines the notice and public hearing procedures of the rulemaking process - thereby putting in jeopardy the "enhanced political accountability of agency policy decisions adopted through the rulemaking process" and the democratic virtue of allowing "all potentially affected members of the public an opportunity to participate in the process of determining the rules that affect them. l.  "However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts with the language of the statute or when the interpretation has not been consistently and regularly applied, the usual deference accorded to an agency's interpretation should be withheld.

m. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the implementation of an executive agency, it has no control over that implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise, legislation). The legislative and executive functions are not combined. But when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule's meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well. Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.

Construed Against the State/ Vaguenessa.  "It is an ancient maxim of the law that all such statutes must be construed strictly against the state and favorably to the liberty of the citizen.  The maxim is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in  the legislature and not in the judicial department. No man incurs a penalty unless the act which subjects him to it is clearly within the spirit and letter of the statute which imposes such penalty.  There can be no constructive offenses, and before a man can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute.  If these principals are violated, the fate of the accused is determined by the arbitrary discretion of the judges and not by the express authority of the law."b.  "When a statute is penal in nature, it "must be strictly construed against the STATE and in favor of an accused.c.  "While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly  construed against the STATE  in criminal cases, "we will  not apply 'an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute' that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.d.  "In determining whether a legislative enactment is  unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court has considered whether the words used have a  well-settled . . . meaning . . . (citing dictionary to determine "generally understood" meaning  for adjective in ordinance). "A penal statute is void for vagueness if it both fails to give a person of ordinary  intelligence notice that her contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute and encourages  selective prosecution

Statutory Exceptions, Negative Element v. Affirmative Defense

1) "When construing PENAL STATUTES which contain qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to their application, the limiting language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense which the prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court may

determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution. In determining whether specific limiting language is an element of the offense or a statutory defense, a court should look both to the intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of the underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. When determining whether the limiting language is a negative element or a statutory defense, this Court has identified four factors to be considered: 'the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.' An application of these factors to the present case demonstrates that the phrase "except as provided by law," as used in Code § 29.1-553, establishes a statutory defense as opposed to a negative element2) "In order to resolve whether there is a due process violation in this case, we first must address the threshold issue of whether the absence of a valid prescription is an affirmative defense or a negative element of the offense. If it is the latter, the burden of proof is on the STATE, and it cannot be shifted to the accused...When construing penal statutes which contain qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to their application, the limiting language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense which the prosecution must disprove.  Alternately, the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution. The ACCUSED BEARS THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE OF THE NEGATION of circumstances sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt.      In determining whether specific limiting language is an element of the offense or a statutory defense, a court should look both to the intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of the underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. Accordingly, we should consider the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. (It is undoubtedly the general rule that the state must prove all the essential facts entering into the description of the offense. But it has been held in many cases that when a negation of a fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant it is incumbent on him to establish that fact). We next observe that the "valid prescription" exemption of Code § 18.2-250 relates to a fact that would be solely within the knowledge of the accused. If we accept appellant's contention that the STATE must prove appellant had no valid prescription, the offense would be virtually unprovable. Under appellant's theory, to obtain a conviction under the facts of this case, the STATE would be required to prove that no medical professional, wherever located, in this Commonwealth or elsewhere, had prescribed the drug to appellant. This would involve a nationwide search of chain drugstores, as well as independent pharmacies, hospitals, prison infirmaries, etc. Appellant, at oral argument, conceded that such an undertaking would most likely be impossible. CONGRESS clearly did not intend such a result, nor would they enact such an impotent statute

Constitutional Construction1)  "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people not therein expressed.  2)“The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity. It thus proclaims, safeguards and preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and modes of thought and life of the people as developed under the common law and as existing at the time of its adoption to the extent and therein stated…The purpose and object sought to be attained by the framers of the constitution is to be looked for, and the will and intent of the people who ratified it is to be made effective.  As we have stated, CONGRESS may enact any law or take any action “not prohibited by express terms, or by necessary implications by the Constitution. 3)“A fundamental right is one EXPLICITLY  OR   IMPLICITLY  implied guaranteed by the constitution4) "It is an "established principle of constitutional law that a court will not rule upon the constitutionality of a statute unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the merits of the case. A statute will be construed to avoid a constitutional question whenever this is possible.

5) "The construction of a constitutional provision by CONGRESS  (note it is congress construing,   not the supreme court, that is why it is CALLED  “CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION”)is entitled to consideration, and if the construction is  contemporaneous with adoption of the constitutional provision, it is entitled to great  weight.   In addition,  Long acquiescence in such an announced  construction so strengthens it that it should not be changed unless plainly wrong.6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER SELF-EXECUTING  OR MANDATORY.

 A self-executing provision does not require enabling legislation for its enforcement.

A mandatory provision declares or imposes a duty or  requirement that must be followed.

A Directory provision sets forth procedures  or " confers discretion on the legislature" for its implementation.

7) "We review arguments regarding the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE DE NOVO. When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we are guided by the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are presumed to be constitutional. Where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation. As a general rule, "a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights8) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a statute, departs from the express limitations of the Constitution and relies instead on implied constitutional restrictions, the legislative usurpation must be very clear and palpable to justify the court’s holding that an enactment is unconstitutional.

9) "This Court’s jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section 12 is well established. “The fact that many things of a diverse nature are authorized or required to be done in the body of the act, though not expressed in its title is not objectionable, if what is authorized by the act is germane to the object expressed in the title, or has a legitimate and natural association therewith, or is congruous therewith, the title is sufficient.   “[I]f there is doubt as to the sufficiency of the title, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its sufficiency, as courts will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless it is plainly so.   The analysis of a particular act must necessarily “stand on its own,” and we must look to both the body and to the title of the act under scrutiny to determine whether the act violates the Constitution. 10) "As a general rule, where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation."  We have  said that classification ordinarily will be upheld "if any state of facts  can be reasonably conceived that would support it."  But where the  statute creates a "suspect classification" (e.g. race, sex, or religion) or  where it affects a fundamental constitutional right, the presumption  of constitutionality fades, and the "strict scrutiny" test, rather than the  more relaxed "rational relationship" test applies.11) "Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court.de novo is a Latin expression meaning "from the beginning," "afresh," "anew," "beginning again."

Retroactive Enactment of Laws1) "Accordingly, when a statute is amended while an action is pending, the rights of the parties are  to be deemed in accordance with the law in effect when the action is begun, unless the amended  statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. (Our analysis is guided by the fundamental  principles of statutory construction that retroactive laws are not favored, and that a statute is  always construed to operate prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is manifest.);  New laws will  apply only to future cases unless there is something in the very nature of the case, or in the  language of the new provision, which shows that the new law was intended to have a  retrospective effect. Further, every reasonable doubt is resolved against a retroactive operation of  a statute, and words of a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so  clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them . Retroactive effect will be given to a statute only when  legislative intent that a statute be so applied is stated in clear, explicit, and unequivocal terms. 

Common Law

1) In construing statutes, the statutory definition must prevail over the common law definition 2) CONGRESS  is presumed to have known and to have had the common law in mind in the enactment of a statute. The statute must therefore be read along with the provisions of the common law, and the latter will be read into the statute unless it clearly appears from express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of the statute was to change the common law.    3) "We also apply the established principle that a statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested.  Therefore, a statutory change in the common law will be recognized only in that which is expressly stated in the words of the statute or is necessarily implied by its language.    4) " A statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested.  "Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express terms. Accordingly, "[a] statutory change in the common law is limited to that which is expressly stated in the statute or necessarily implied by its language because there is a presumption that no change was intended. "When an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule

Previous Construction of a Statute1) "Where a statute has been construed by the courts, and  is then re-enacted by the legislature, the construction given to  it is presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature, and  thenceforth becomes obligatory upon the courts."  Hence, when the court finds the old construction should be modified, it cannot anymore, since the court is BOUND by its old construction because such statute was RE-Enacted.

2) "The term "battery" possesses "a long history of definition by" the courts, and therefore, it "carries its historical construction" when used by CONGRESS in a statute.3) "We have said that “when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as well.”  (STARE DECIS becomes the interpretation and construction of a law or STATUTE that is ambiguous even if it was applied to a private case)

New Law New Remedy4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute prescribing a new remedy for an existing right should never be construed to abolish a pre-existing remedy in the absence of express words or necessary implication.    Further, " 'when a statute gives a new remedy, and contains no negative, express or implied, of the old remedy, the new one provided by it is cumulative, and the party may elect between the two.'

Two Statutes Pertaining to the Same Subject1) "It is well accepted that statutes relating to the same subject should not be read in isolation.   Such statutes should be considered in pari materia.   Moreover, statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be construed together to achieve a harmonious result, resolving conflicts to give effect to legislative intent.   An accepted principle of statutory construction is that, when it is not clear which of two statutes applies, the more specific statute prevails over the more general. Also, when statutes provide different procedures on the same subject matter, "the general must give way to the specific."As a preliminary matter applicable to all of your questions and in accord with the rule of statutory construction in pari materia, 

 statutory provisions are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law.    Such provisions are to be considered as a whole, or as parts of a greater connected, homogeneous system of laws, or a single and complete statutory compilation.

 Statutes in pari materia are considered as if they constituted but one act, so that sections of one act may be considered as though they were parts of the other act.

As a general rule, where legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a system of related general provisions indicative of a settled policy, new enactments of a fragmentary nature on that subject are to be taken as intended to fit into the existing system and to be carried into effect conformably to it, and they should be so construed as to harmonize the general tenor or purport of the system and make the scheme consistent in all its parts and uniform in its operation, unless a different purpose is shown plainly or with irresistible clearness. It will be assumed or presumed, in the absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the legislature did not intend to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or violate a general statute or system of statutory provisions the entire subject matter of which is not directly or necessarily involved in the act (noting that in absence of words to contrary, legislature did not intend to alter or repeal general statute or system).  3) Closely related statutes must be read as being consistent with one another. Two statutes which are closely interrelated must be read and construed together and effect given to all of their provisions. Statutes should be construed, if possible, so as to harmonize, and force and effect should be given the provisions of each.4) The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. 'In interpreting statutes, "courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.  Potentially conflicting statutes should be harmonized to give force and effect to each.    5) City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the Constitution. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can  be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them  together.

The Meaning of Words

1) In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are presumed to have their usual and ordinary meaning. 3) A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary. "We must assume that the legislature did not intend to do a vain and useless thing.  "It is a well established rule of construction that a statute ought to  be interpreted in such a manner that it may have effect, and not  found to be vain and elusive.  "A word or clause contained in a statute may only be rejected as surplusage if it "appears to have been inserted through inadvertence or mistake, and  which is incapable of any sensible meaning," or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of the statute.

4) "We will not construe a statute by singling out a particular term or phrase, but will construe the words and terms at issue in the context of the other language used in the statute.5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, that intention must be gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction would involve a manifest absurdity. "The Court has stated the related principle that "the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction." Statutes should not be interpreted in ways that produce absurd or irrational consequences. 

6) "A statute must be construed with reference to its subject  matter, the object sought to be attained, and the legislative  purpose in enacting it; the provisions should receive a  construction that will render it harmonious with that purpose  rather than one which will defeat it.

7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly clear and definite, effect must be given to it. It is unnecessary to resort to any rules of statutory construction when the language of a statute is unambiguous. In those situations, the statute's plain meaning and intent govern. "Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than one way, refers to two or more things simultaneously, is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness.”

9) "Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed. 2004) defines "valid" as "Legally sufficient; binding." (noting that if the STATUTE does not provide a statutory definition we may look to the dictionary definition to determine legislative intent

10) "In drafting the statute, the legislature separated the two prohibitions with a comma  followed by the disjunctive word "nor." We have noted that, pursuant to the rules of grammar,  "phrases separated by a comma and [a] disjunctive . . . are independent. The disjunctive serves to connect the two parts of the sentence but also to keep them separate and independent.”

12) "The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without  justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately,  perversely[.]  The word is also employed to characterize  a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful.  The term "willful act" imports knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act done.  The act done must be intended or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of another and will probably result in an injury. [T]he term "gross, wanton, and culpable" describes  conduct.  The word "gross" means "aggravated or increased  negligence" while the word "culpable" means "deserving of  blame or censure."   'Gross negligence' is  culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts of  commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature,  showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of, the probable result of his acts13) "But, courts  are not permitted to add language to a statute nor are they  permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial interpretation."  Rather, when the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not assign a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually has stated.   14)  "It is  equally well established, however, that if the language of a  statute is clear and unambiguous, a regulatory interpretation by  the Department that is in conflict with the plain language of the statute cannot be sustained.   15) "Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of persons or things is enumerated in a statute and general words follow, the general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the less general, particular words.  Likewise, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated words) when general and specific words are grouped, the general words are limited by the specific and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those things identified by the specific words.  16)  If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within its terms, the exception negates the idea that any other class is to be excepted.

17)  One such rule, sometimes referred to as the last  antecedent doctrine, is particularly applicable here and can be summarized as follows: Referential and qualifying words and phrases,  where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.  The last antecedent is  'the last word, phrase, or clause that can be  made an antecedent without impairing the meaning  of the sentence.'  Thus a proviso usually is  construed to apply to the provision or clause immediately preceding it.   (explaining and applying  "the grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows . . . ."); (noting that construction of a statute according to the last antecedent rule is "quite sensible as a matter of grammar19) "An erroneous interpretation of a statute by those charged  with its enforcement cannot be permitted to override [the statute's] clear meaning. Amendments of statutes can only be made by the legislature and not by the courts or administrative  officers charged with their enforcement

20) "But principles of statutory construction are not so rigid. Although we presume that the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in a single statute, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized that presumption as “effectively irrebuttable.” We also understand that “[m]ost words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same section.” Thus, the “natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning … is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent.” Ibid. A given term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies." 

Ibid. (Latin, short for ibidem, meaning "the same place") is the term used to provide an endnote or footnote citation orreference for a source that was cited in the preceding endnote or footnote. It is similar in meaning to idem (meaning something that has been mentioned previously; the same), abbreviated Id., which is commonly used in legal citation.[1] To find the ibid.source, one must look at the reference preceding it. 21) "Generally, phrases separated by a comma and the disjunctive "or," are independent. (finding that, the word "or" connects two parts of a sentence, "'but disconnect[s] their meaning'"); (noting disjunctive results in alternatives, which must be treated separately); (finding that limiting phrase in statute is independent of and does not modify two earlier phrases because the limiting phrase is separated from the first two by a comma and the disjunctive "or"); (interpreting the use of a comma and the disjunctive "or" as implying two separate and independent phrases in a Virginia statute authorizing payment of dividends by corporation "out of net earnings, or out of its net assets in excess of its capital"). Accordingly, the phrase, "made by the Defendant to any law enforcement officer," is independent of and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny written or recorded statement or confessions." 

Inconsistent Regulations/LawsAs a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that regulations of Executive Departments   have the force of law, and that any  Executive Department concerned with the execution of a statute’s interpretation of its governing statutes, as reflected in its regulations, is entitled to great weight. Regulations, however, may not conflict with the authorizing statute.  Whether a regulation is inconsistent with its enabling legislation is properly a subject of judicial review. If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and be given effect, it is the duty of the courts to harmonize them and not nullify the ordinance. City and municipal ordinances must be consistent  with STATUTES.  Such ordinances are inconsistent with state law when they cannot co-exist with a statute. The fact that a county or municipal ordinance enlarges  on a statute's provisions does not create a conflict with  the statute unless the statute limits the requirements (Separability Clause is inserted)for  all cases to its own terms. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can  be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them  together.

A Single Body of Law1) "When attempting to define terms in one part of the Code, courts should read a statute with "a view toward harmonizing it with other statutes. "Ordinarily, when a particular  word in a statute is not defined therein,  a court must give it  its ordinary meaning. 2) "When asked to interpret various code sections, the SUPREME Court often examines other related statutes that contain similar or  contrasting language to help determine legislative intent.