,.Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San NicolasGR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring

Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant,” found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners, vs.THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge *in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners.

Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.

Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners. 1

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5

Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).

The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

xxx xxx xxx

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".

But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez, 6 that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children

mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. 7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. 9 Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Hebendus Est- Under this rule, a person, object or thing omitted from the enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim can operate when the omission had been clearly established.-comparraing two law old law and the new old.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3629             March 19, 1951

ELISEO SILVA, petitioner, vs.BELEN CABRERA, respondent.

Rivera, Castaño, Medina and Lozada and Roman Cruz for petitioner.Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

In the Public Service Commission Belen Cabrera filed an application for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain, and operate in the City of Lipa, an ice plant with a 15-ton daily productive capacity and to sell the produce of said plant in several municipalities of Batangas province as well as in the City of Lipa. Eliseo Silvaand Opulencia & Lat, holdres of certificates of public convenience to operate each a 15-ton ice plant, opposed the application on the ground that their service was adequate for the needs of the public, and that public convenience did not require the operation of the ice plant applied for by Cabrera. Instead of the Commission conducting the corresponding hearing in order to receive the evidence to be presented by applicant and oppositors, Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo by order dated July 14, 1949, commissioned Atty. Antonio H. Aspillera, Chief of the Legal Division "to take the testimony of witnesses" in this case pursuant to the provisions of section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 known as the Public Act Attorney Aspillera conducted hearings, and received extensive evidence, oral and documentary, the transcript of the stenographic notes taken consisting of 227 pages. Thereafter, the Commission in banc rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

In view of the foregoing, and finding from the evidence that public interests and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner by authorizing the applicant to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City, and that applicant is a Filipino citizen and is financially qualified to install and operate a 10-ton ice plant, the oppositions of Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat are hereby overruled, and a certificate of public convenience to operate a 10-ton ice plant in the City of Lipa is hereby granted to the applicant herein, Belen Cabrera, the said certificate to be subject to the following.

Eliseo Silva, one of the oppositors filed the present petition for review assigning two errors, to wit:

ERROR I. — That section 3 prohibits a hearing before any person other than a Commissioner in contested cases; consequently, the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera is illegal and contrary to law.

ERROR II. — That the decision is not supported by evidence to warrant the Grant of the certificate to applicant-respondent Belen Cabrera.

We shall address ourselves to the first assigned error because the determination of the same disposes of this appeal. The legal point raised in this assignment of error was also raised before the Commission. At the beginning of the hearing before Attorney Aspillera, counsel for oppositors, Silva, now petitioner, asked that the hearing be had before one of the Commissioners because it was a contested case. When his petition was overruled, he made it of record that his continuing "with the hearing of this case shall not be understood as a waiver of our objection" (t. s. n., p. 3). It is therefore clear that petitioner is not raising this issue here for the first time.

While petitioner Silva contends that the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera to take the testimony of witnesses was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178, respondent equally claims that said delegation is perfectly proper and legal. It will be remembered that the delegation to receive testimony was made under the provisions of section 32 of the Public Service Act (Com. Act No. 146). Said section reads as follows:

SEC. 32. The Commission may, in any investigation or hearing, by its order in writing, cause the depositions of witnesses residing within or without the Philippines to be taken in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Commission may also, by proper order, commission any of the attorneys of the Commission or chiefs of division to receive evidence, and it may likewise commission any clerk the court of first instance of justice of the Peace of the Philippines to take the testimony of the witnesses any case pending before the Commission where such witnesses reside in places distant from Manila and it would be inconvenient and expensive for them to appear personally before the Commission. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the Court of First Instance or justice of the peace so commissioned to designate promptly a date or dates for the taking of such evidence, giving timely notice to the parties, and on such date to proceed to take the evidence, reducing it to writing. After the evidence has been taken, the justice of the peace shall forthwith certify to the correctness of the testimony of the witnesses and forward it to the Commission. It shall be the duty of the respective parties to furnish stenographers for taking and transcribing the testimony taken. In case there was no stenographers available, the testimony shall be taken in long-hand by such person as the justice of the peace may designate. For the convenience of the parties the Commission may also commission any other person to take the evidence in the same manner.

For purpose of reference we are also reproducing the pertinent portion of section 3 of the same Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178, relied upon by the petitioner:

All the powers herein vested upon the Commission shall be considered vested upon any of the Commissioner, acting either individually or jointly as hereinafter provided. The Commissioners shall equitably divide among themselves all pending cases and those that may hereafter be submitted to the Commission, in such manner and from as they determine, and shall proceed to hear and determine the cases assigned to each; Provided, however, That (1) all contested cases, (2) all cases involving the fixing of rates, and (3) all petitions for reconsideration of orders or decisions shall be heard by the Commission in banc, and the affirmative vote of at least two Commissioner shall be necessary for the promulgation of a decision or a non-interlocutory order: And, provided, further, That in cases (1) and (2) the Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the Commissioners, who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him to enable it to render its decision. (Underlining is ours)

After examining the law, particularly the language used in section 3 and 32, above-quoted, we agree with the petitioner that the delegation made to Attorney Aspillera especially considering the manner in which he received the evidence, was contrary to the provisions of the public Service Act.

The law (sec. 3) is clear that in a contested case like the present, only the Commission in banc is authorized to conduct the hearing, although said Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the Commissioners who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 146 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 178, the Public Service Commission only of a Public Service Commissioner and a deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner acted only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service Commissioner, and in case of the latter's absence, illness or incapacity, he acted in his stead. The Public Service Commissioner alone heard and disposed of all cases, contested and non-contested. There could therefore be no hearing or decision in banc. The Legislature in promulgating Commonwealth Act 146 evidently believed that one Commissioner, either the Public Service Commissioner or his deputy if properly commissioned, was sufficient to hear and decide even contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates. Under said Commonwealth Act 146 before amendment, particularly section 32 thereof, the Commission besides authorizing the taking of depositions and the testimonies of the witnesses by clerk of courts of first instance and justice of the peace in the provinces, also authorized the reception of evidence by the Commission's attorneys and chiefs of divisions. Then came Republic Act 178 amending sections 2 and 3 of Commonwealth Act 146 making the Commission to consist of one Public Service Commissioners and two Associate Public Service Commissioner under the second section, and under section 3, as already seen from the reproduction of said section, requiring that all contested cases involving the fixing of rates, he heard and decided by the three Commissioners in banc although the reception of evidence may be delegated to one of the Commissioners alone. The inference is

obvious. In contested cases like present, the Legislature did not wish to entrust the holding of a hearing and the reception of evidence to anyone but the three Commissioners acting in banc or one of them when properly authorized.

It is urged on the part of the respondent that the order of delegation in favor of Atty. Aspillera "was a mere authority `to take the testimony of witnesses in the above-entitled case', which in fact is in the form of a deposition and not a reception of evidence, much less a hearing" (p. 9, brief for respondent), and so does not violate section 3. An examination of the record does not support this contention. What Atty. Aspillera did was to represent the Commission, act as a sort of Commissioner, conduct hearings, receive evidence, oral and documentary, and pass upon petitions and objections as they came up in the course of said hearing. He even addressed questions to the witnesses. He passed upon the competency and admissibility of exhibits and admitted them. In the transcript of the stenographic notes, Atty. Aspillera is repeatedly referred to as the "Commission" and the proceedings had before him on different dates as "hearings". (t. s. n. pp. 1, 3, 52, 62, 86, 90.) After the submission of the evidence Atty. Aspillera declared the "Case submitted". (t. s. n. p. 227.) It is obvious that the evidence received by Atty. Aspillera were not mere depositions or testimonies, and that his actuation that of a mere official like a justice of the peace receiving a deposition under the provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The role played by Atty. Aspillera was rather that of a Commissioner under Rule 34 wherein he acted as a representative of the Commission that made the delegation to him, passed upon petitions and objections during the trial, either overruling or sustaining the same and ordered witnesses to answer if the objection to the question was overruled, and then making his findings and report to the body that commissioned him.

Respondent cites the case of Abel G. Flores, applicant vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., oppositor, case No. 27141 of the Public Service Commission wherein the same point of the legality of a delegation to take testimony was involved. The oppositor in that case believing that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in making the delegation, brought the case to this Supreme Court under G.R. No. L-1637 but its petition for certiorari was dismissed for lack of merit. From this, respondent infers that even in contested cases the reception of evidence may be delegated to a person other than one of the Commissioners. We have examined that case and we find that the authority given there was not to receive evidence but to take a deposition and that the person delegated was a justice of the peace. We quote a portion of the order of Associate Commissioner Gabriel P. Prieto in that case:

Es verdad que el articulo 3 de la Ley claramente dispone que en los asuntos contenciosos y en que envuelven la fijacion de tarifas la Comision solo puede delegar la recepcion de lads pruebas a cualquiera de sus Comisionados. Pero tambien es cierto, que la deposicion no una delegacion de la recepcion de las pruebas, porque al funcionario que la toma, la ley no le concede las facultades del tribunal que ha ordenado dicha deposicion. En efecto, la Regla 18 de los Reglamentos que regula esta actuacion, no autoriza al funcionario que toma la deposicion para resolver las

cuestiones que surgen o se suscitan durante su actuacion; no le faculta para hacer sus conclusiones de hecho o de derecho; ni le permite, siquiera, rendir informe o report de todo lo actuado. Su unica ogligacion es certificar la declaracion tal como ha sido prestada por el deponente. El que toma la deposicion no es como el arbitro o comisionado de que habla la Regla 34 de los Reglamentos, que actua por delegacion y obra en representacion del tribunal que le ha nombrado.

It will readily be noticed from the portion of the order above-quoted that Commissioner Prieto admits that under section 3 as amended, in contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, the Commission may delegate the reception of evidence only to one of the Commissioners and to no one else.

The respondent also calls our attention to the case of Cebu Transit Co. Inc., vs. Jereza, (58 Phil., 760), wherein this court held that the Commission was authorized to designate Commissioners for the purpose of receiving evidence, and that the law did not contain any prohibition. That case is inapplicable for at that time in the year 1933 when the case was decided, Republic Act 178 had not yet been promulgated, said Act having passed only in 1947.

In conclusion, we hold that under the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act 178, the reception of evidence in a contested case may be delegated only to one of the Commissioners and to no one else, it being understood that such reception of evidence consists in conducting hearings, receiving evidence, oral and documentary, passing upon the relevancy and competency of the same, ruling upon petitions and objections that come up in course of the hearings, and receiving and rejecting evidence in accordance with said rulings. However, under section 32, of the same Act, even in contested cases or cases involving the fixing of rates, any attorney of chief of division of the Commission, a clerk of court of Courts of First Instance, or a Justice of the Peace, may be authorized to take depositions or receive the testimonies of witnesses, provided that the same is done under provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

We realize that our present ruling will greatly handicap the Public Service Commission and slow down its tempo in the disposal of contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, especially where the witnesses reside in the provinces; but where the law is clear, neither this court nor the commission may on grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the law or circumvent the same. The remedy lies with the Legislature if it could be convinced of the necessity of amending the law, and persuaded to approve a suitable amendment.

Finding that the delegation of the reception of evidence in this case as well as the exercise of the authority so given, are in violation of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended, we set aside the order of delegation of July 14, 1949, and declare all the proceedings had thereunder to be null and void. Setting aside the decision appealed from, let this case be returned to the Public Service Commission so that evidence may be submitted by the parties in a hearings before the Commission in banc of before any

of the Commissioners if properly authorized, unless of course, said parties agree at said hearing or hearings to re-submit the evidence already presented and taken down, with such modifications and under such conditions as they may agree upon, including such other evidence which they may wish to present. There is no pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

People v. MapaGR L-22301, 30 August 1967  (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur

Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm

Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.

Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301             August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that

application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Stare decesis – in people vs. macarandang he is acquitted as opposed by mapa.

What is deemed included is deemed excluded in people v. mapa.

In people v. macarandang they used ratio legis, defining as a public officer/maintaining peace over election time.

There were no more evidences about mapa/ no showing what mapa is doing

Plus leviste is a governor of leviste not manila.

Not sure if mapa is a peace officer, unlike in macarandang he is a peace officer.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. Nos. 24116-17           August 22, 1968CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant, vs.MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU, ET AL., defendants-appellees.Tomas P. Matic, Jr. and Lorenzo R. Mosqueda for plaintiff-appellant.Fernan, Osmeña and Bellaflor for defendants-appellees.FERNANDO, J.:In two separate actions, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company sought to test the validity of the distraint and thereafter the sale at public auction by the principal defendant-appellee, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, of 100,000 bags of cement for the purpose of satisfying its alleged deficiency in the payment of the municipal license tax for 1960, municipal license tax for 1961 as well as the penalty, all in the total sum of P204,300.00. The lower court rendered a joint decision sustaining the validity of the action taken by defendant-appellee Municipality of Naga. The case is now before us on appeal. We affirm.According to the appealed decision: "From all the evidence, mostly documentary, adduced during the hearing the following facts have been established. The efforts of the defendant Treasurer to collect from the plaintiff the municipal license tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Series of 1959 on cement factories located within the Municipality of

Naga, Cebu, have met with rebuff time and again. The demands made on the taxpayer ... have not been entirely successful. Finally, the defendant Treasurer decided on June 26, 1961 to avail of the Civil remedies provided for under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code and gave the plaintiff a period of ten days from receipt thereof within which to settle the account, computed as follows ...: Deficiency Municipal License Tax for 1960 — P80,250.00; Municipal License Tax for 1961 — P90,000.00; and 20% Penalty — P34,050.00, stating in exasperation, "This is our last recourse as we had exhausted all efforts for an amicable solution of our problem." "1

It was further shown: "On July 6, 1961, at 11:00 A.M., the defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the plaintiff that he was "distraining 100,000 bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of your delinquency in municipal license taxes in the total amount of P204,300.00" ... This notice was received by the acting officer in charge of the plaintiff's plant, Vicente T. Garaygay, according to his own admission. At first, he was not in accord with the said letter, asking the defendant Treasurer for time to study the same, but in the afternoon he [acknowledged the] distraint ..." 2

As was noted in the decision, the defendant Treasurer in turn "signed the receipt for goods, articles or effects seized under authority of Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code, certifying that he has constructively distrained on July 6, 1961 from the Cebu Portland Cement Company at its plant at Tina-an, Naga, Cebu, 100,000 bags of Apo cement in tanks, and that "the said articles or goods will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, and the proceeds thereof will be utilized in part satisfaction of the account of the said company in municipal licenses and penalties in the total amount of P204,300.00 due the Municipality of Naga Province of Cebu" ..."3

The lower court likewise found as a fact that on the same day, July 6, 1961, the municipal treasurer posted the notice of sale to the effect that pursuant to the provisions of Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code, he would sell at public auction for cash to the highest bidder at the main entrance of the municipal building of the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines on the 27th day of July, 1961, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the property seized and distrained or levied upon from the Cebu Portland Cement Company in satisfaction of the municipal license taxes and penalties in the amount of P204,300.00, specifying that what was to be sold was 100,000 bags of Apo cement.4 No sale, as thus announced, was held on July 27, 1961. It was likewise stated in the appealed decision that there was stipulation by the parties to this effect: "1. The auction sale took place on January 30, 1962, ..."5

In this appeal from the above joint decision, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company upholds the view that the distraint of the 100,000 bags of cement as well as the sale at public auction thereafter made ran counter to the law. As earlier noted, we do not see it that way.1. On the validity of the distraint — In the first two errors assigned, plaintiff-appellant submits as illegal the distraint of 100,000 bags of cement made on July 6, 1961. Its contention is premised on the fact that in the letter of defendant-appellee dated June 26, 1961, requiring plaintiff-appellant to settle its account of P204,300.00, it was given a period of 10 days from receipt within which it could pay, failure to do so being the occasion for the distraint of its property. It is now alleged that the 10-day period of grace was not allowed to lapse, the distraint having taken place on July 6, 1961.It suffices to answer such a contention by referring to the explicit language of the law. According to the Revised Administrative Code: "The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon the failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distrain any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency, and the expenses of the distraint."6

The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. The municipal treasurer "may seize and distrain any personal property" of the individual or entity subject to the tax upon failure "to pay the same, at the time required ..." There was such a failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time required. The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance with the above provision therefore came into play.1äwphï1.ñëtWhatever might have been set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not change or amend the law it has to be enforced as written. That was what the lower court did. What was done then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the statutory provision requires. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. That was what occurred in this case.7

2. On the validity of the auction sale — The validity of the auction sale held on January 30, 1962 is challenged in the next two errors assigned as allegedly committed by the lower court. Plaintiff-appellant's argument is predicated on the fact that it was not until January 16, 1962 that it was notified that the public auction sale was to take place on January 29,

1962. It is its view that under the Revised Administrative Code8 the sale of the distrained property cannot take place "less than twenty days after notice to the owner or possessor of the property [distrained] ... and the publication or posting of such notice."Why such a contention could not prosper is explained clearly by the lower court in the appealed decision. Thus: "With respect to the claim that the auction sale held on January 30, 1962 pursuant to the distraint was null and void for being contrary to law because not more than twenty days have elapsed from the date of notice, it is believed that the defendant Municipality of Naga and Municipal Treasurer of Naga have substantially complied with the requirements provided for by Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code. From the time that the plaintiff was first notified of the distraint on July 6, 1961 up to the date of the sale on January 30, 1962, certainly, more than twenty days have elapsed. If the sale did not take place, as advertised, on July 27, 1961, but only on January 30, 1962, it was due to the requests for deferment made by the plaintiff which unduly delayed the proceedings for collection of the tax, and the said taxpayer should not be allowed now to complain that the required period has not yet elapsed when the intention of the tax collector was already well-publicized for many months."9 The reasonableness of the above observation of the lower court cannot be disputed. Under the circumstances, the allegation that there was no observance of the twenty-day period hardly carries conviction.The point is further made that the auction sale took place not on January 29, 1962, as stated in the notice of sale, but on the next day, January 30, 1962. According to plaintiff-appellant: "On this score alone, the sale ..., was illegal as it was not made on the time stated in the notice." 10

There is no basis to sustain such a plea as the finding of the lower court is otherwise. Thus: "On January 16, 1962, the defendant Treasurer informed Garaygay that he would cause the readvertisement for sale at public auction of the 100,000 bags of Apo cement which were under constructive distraint ... On January 19, 1962, the said defendant issued the corresponding notice of sale, which fixed January 30, 1962, at 10:00 A.M., as the date of sale, posting the said notice in public places and delivering copies thereof to the interested parties in the previous notice, ... Ultimately, the bidding was conducted on that day, January 30, 1962, with the representatives of the Provincial Auditor and Provincial Treasurer present. Only two bidders submitted sealed bids. After the bidding, the defendant-treasurer informed the plaintiff that an award was given to the winning bidder, ..." 11

This being a direct appeal to us, plaintiff-appellant must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive what the lower court found as established by the evidence, only questions of law being brought to us for review. It is the established rule that when a party appeals directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the court below. 12

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated 23, 1964, is affirmed in toto. With costs against plaintiff-appellant.1äwphï1.ñët

Argument makes the issue..

Won the distraint is illegalIs the grace period is what is required by law.What is the meaning of time required-the law said that the time required is not 10 day, it is the time required by the law not the time required by the treasurerPlain language rule is applied on the issue of distraint.*absurdity- municipal defined…..Sc in looking for the purpose of the law - for the taxpayer to pay on time.The ordinance creating that license tax is the time required.

Interpret it in such a way that the time given is a threat, not the grace period.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-26712-16      December 27, 1969UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY, UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTERS, BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSION OF THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA, BOARD OF MISSION OF THE EVANGELICAL UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, COMMISSION OF ECUMENICAL MISSION ON RELATIONS OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, petitioners, vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.Sedfrey A. Ordoñez for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Buenaventura J. Guerrero for respondents.TEEHANKEE, J.:In this appeal from an order of the Social Security Commission, we uphold the Commission's Order dismissing the petition before it, on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act1 vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it has no legal authority to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the Social Security Act.The five petitioners originally filed on November 20, 1964 separate petitions with respondent Commission, contesting the social security coverage of American missionaries who perform religious missionary work in the Philippines under specific employment contracts with petitioners. After several hearings, however, petitioners commendably desisted from further contesting said coverage, manifesting that they had adopted a policy of cooperation with the Philippine authorities in its program of social amelioration, with which they are in complete accord. They instead filed their consolidated amended petition dated May 7, 1966, praying for condonation of assessed penalties against them for delayed social security premium remittances in the aggregate amount of P69,446.42 for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963.In support of their request for condonation, petitioners alleged that they had labored under the impression that as international organizations, they were not subject to coverage under the Philippine Social Security System, but upon advice by certain Social Security System officials, they paid to the System in October, 1963, the total amount of P81,341.80, representing their back premiums for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963. They further claimed that the penalties assessed against them appear to be inequitable, citing several resolutions of respondent Commission which in the past allegedly permitted condonation of such penalties.On May 25, 1966, respondent System filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that "the Social Security Commission has no power or authority to condone penalties for late premium remittance, to which petitioners filed their opposition of June 15, 1966, and in turn, respondent filed its reply thereto of June 22, 1966.

Respondent Commission set the Motion to Dismiss for hearing and oral argument on July 20, 1966. At the hearing, petitioners' counsel made no appearance but submitted their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument. Upon petition of the System's Counsel, the Commission gave the parties a further period of fifteen days to submit their Memorandum consolidating their arguments, after which the motion would be deemed submitted for decision. Petitioners stood on their original memorandum, and respondent System filed its memorandum on August 4, 1966.On September 22, 1966, respondent Commission issued its Order dismissing the petition, as follows:Considering all of the foregoing, this Commission finds, and so holds, that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it cannot legally do so. The policy enunciated in Commission Resolution No. 536, series of 1964, cited by the parties, in their respective pleadings, has been reiterated in Commission Resolution No. 878, dated August 18, 1966, wherein the Commission adopting the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation of the Social Security Commission ruled that it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act."WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and petitioners are directed to pay the respondent System, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order, the amount of P69,446.42 representing the penalties payable by them, broken down as follows:

United Christian Missionary Society P5,253.53

Board of Mission of the Evangelical United Brothers Church

7,891.74

United Church Board for World Ministers 12,353.75

Commission on Ecumenical Mission & Relations 33,019.36

Board of Foreign Mission of the Reformed Church in America

10,928.04

TOTAL P69,446.42

Upon failure of the petitioners to comply with this Order within the period specified herein, a warrant shall be issued to the Sheriff of the Province of Rizal to levy and sell so much of the property of the petitioners as may be necessary to satisfy the aforestated liability of the petitioners to the System.This Court is thus confronted on appeal with this question of first impression as to whether or not respondent Commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premium remittances.We find no error in the Commission's action.1. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act clearly rule out petitioners' posture that the respondent Commission should assume, as against the mandatory imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late payment of premium remittances, the discretionary authority of condoning, waiving or relinquishing such penalty.The pertinent portion of Section 22 (a) of the Social Security Act peremptorily provides that:SEC 22. Remittance of premiums. — (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding sections shall be remitted to the System within the first seven days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. "Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contribution shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the system, as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three per centum per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid . . .2

No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the enforcement of the law's mandate that the employer who fails to comply with his legal obligation to remit the premiums to the System within the prescribed period shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The prescribed penalty is evidently of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that employers do not take lightly the State's exercise of the police power in the implementation of the Republic's declared policy "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to employers against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."3 In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction between an employer who professes good reasons

for delaying the remittance of premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. From the moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium payments by force of law.2. Petitioners contend that in the exercise of the respondent Commission's power of direction and control over the system, as provided in Section 3 of the Act, it does have the authority to condone the penalty for late payment under Section 4 (1), whereby it is empowered to "perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the proper enforcement of this Act." The law does not bear out this contention. Section 4 of the Social Security Act precisely enumerates the powers of the Commission. Nowhere from said powers of the Commission may it be shown that the Commission is granted expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the Act.3. Moreover, the funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law have already been held by us to be "funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government."4 Being a mere trustee of the funds of the System which actually belong to the members, respondent Commission cannot legally perform any acts affecting the same, including condonation of penalties, that would diminish the property rights of the owners and beneficiaries of such funds without an express or specific authority therefor.4. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation and construction of the statute. The Court is therefore bound to uphold respondent Commission's refusal to arrogate unto itself the authority to condone penalties for late payment of social security premiums, for otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission's reading into the law discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein, and hindering and defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature.5. Petitioners cite fourteen instances in the past wherein respondent Commission had granted condonation of penalties on delayed premium payments. They charge the Commission with grave abuse of discretion in not having uniformly applied to their cases its former policy of granting condonation of penalties. They invoke more compelling considerations of equity in their cases, in that they are non-profit religious organizations who minister to the spiritual needs of the Filipino people, and that their delay in the payment of their premiums was not of a contumacious or deliberate defiance of the law but was prompted by a well-founded belief that the Social Security Act did not apply to their missionaries.

The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the Commission are not, however, before the Court, and the unilateral conclusion asserted by petitioners that the Commission had granted such condonations would be of no avail, without a review of the pertinent records of said cases. Nevertheless, assuming such conclusion to be correct, the Commission, in its appealed Order of September 22, 1966 makes of record that since its Resolution No. 536, series of 1964, which it reiterated in another resolution dated August 18, 1966, it had definitely taken the legal stand, pursuant to the recommendation of its Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation, that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act."6. The Commission cannot be faulted for this correct legal position. Granting that it had erred in the past in granting condonation of penalties without legal authority, the Court has held time and again that "it is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents."5 Petitioners' lack of intent to deliberately violate the law may be conceded, and was borne out by their later withdrawal in May, 1966 of their original petitions in November, 1964 contesting their social security coverage. The point, however, is that they followed the wrong procedure in questioning the applicability of the Social Security Act to them, in that they failed for five years to pay the premiums prescribed by law and thus incurred the 3% penalty thereon per month mandatorily imposed by law for late payment. The proper procedure would have been to pay the premiums and then contest their liability therefor, thereby preventing the penalty from attaching. This would have been the prudent course, considering that the Act provides in Section 22 (b) thereof that the premiums which the employer refuses or neglects to pay may be collected by the System in the same manner as taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code, and that at the time they instituted their petitions in 1964 contesting their coverage, the Court had already ruled in effect against their contest three years earlier, when it held in Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. Social Security Commission6 that the legislature had clearly intended to include charitable and religious institutions and other non-profit institutions, such as petitioners, within the scope and coverage of the Social Security Act.7. No grave abuse of discretion was committed, therefore, by the Commission in issuing its Order dismissing the petition for condonation

of penalties for late payment of premiums, as claimed by petitioners in their second and last error assigned. Petitioners were duly heard by the Commission and were given due opportunity to adduce all their arguments, as in fact they filed their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument and waived the presentation of an additional memorandum. The mere fact that there was a pending appeal in the Court of Appeals from an identical ruling of the Commission in an earlier case as to its lack of authority to condone penalties does not mean, as petitioners contend, that the Commission was thereby shorn of its authority and discretion to dismiss their petition on the same legal ground.7 The Commission's action has thus paved the way for a final ruling of the Court on the matter.ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Plea of good faith did not….

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-26419 October 16, 1970GEDEON G. QUIJANO and EUGENIA T. QUIJANO, petitioners-appellants, 

vs.THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, respondents-appellees.J. Alaric P. Acosta for petitioners-appellant.Esperanza Valenzoga for respondents-appellees. BARREDO, J.:.Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in its Special Civil Case No. 2519, dismissing the petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction filed therein by the herein petitioners-appellants Gedeon G. Quijano and Eugenio T. Quijano to compel the herein respondent-appellee Development Bank of the Philippines to accept said petitioners-appellants' back pay certificate payment of their loan from the said appellee Bank, and to restrain the herein respondent-appellee ex-oficio sheriff of the province of Misamis Occidental from proceeding with the scheduled foreclosure sale of the real properties the above-named appellant spouses had mortgaged with the Development Bank of the Philippines to secure the loan aforementioned.The said appealed decision was based on the following:STIPULATION OF FACTS.The undersigned parties, thru counsels, hereby submit the foregoing stipulation of facts, to wit:I. That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the herein respondent-bank, in the amount of P19,500.00;II. That the petitioners' urban real estate loan was approved per RFC Board Resolution No. 2533 on April 30, 1953;III. That the mortgage contract was executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent-bank on March 23, 1954;IV. That the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be received by the petitioners in several releases, subject among others, to the following conditions:."(1) That the amount of P4,200.00 shall be released only after:."(a) the execution and registration of the mortgage contract;"(b) the presentation of a duly approved building permit;"(c) the construction has been started and the value of the work done amounted to P6,500.00;."(d) the submission of the certificate of title covering Psu-136173, free form any encumbrance and"(e) the submission of evidence showing full payment of current estate taxes;

(2) That the subsequent releases shall not be more than 100% of the value of the construction completed in excess of P6,500.00; that all releases shall be made against the payroll of workers engaged in the project, receipts of all materials used and that there are no unpaid labor or unpaid materials;(3) That a sufficient amount may be withheld until the building is completed and painted and found in accordance with the plans and specifications submitted;(4) That the amount of insurance of the building, when completed, shall not be less than P18,000.00, which shall be secured by the mortgagee, in accordance with its Board Resolution No. 3395, series of 1947;(5) That the construction and painting of the building shall be completed within 120 days from the date of the mortgage contract;(6) That the release of this loan is subject to the availability of funds;(7) That the lien appearing on the face of the title shall be cancelled, otherwise, Luciana Jimenez shall sign as co-mortgagor; that this mortgage contract was registered on March 23, 1954 with the Register of Deeds of Misamis Occidental at Oroquieta;"V. That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other releases were made subsequent thereafter;"VI. That as of July 31, 1965, the outstanding obligation of the petitioners with the respondent-bank, including interests, was P13,983.59;"VII. That on July 27, 1965, petitioner Gedeon Quijano, as holder of Acknowledgment No. 10181, wrote the respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount of P14,000.00 for his outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to Republic Act No. 897;"VIII. That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of the non-acceptance of his offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when Republic Act 897 was approved;"IX. That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis City Branch, filed on October 14, 1965, an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners, and that acting on the application of the respondent-bank, the Provincial Sheriff, thru his deputies, scheduled the public auction sale for January 18, 1966, after advising petitioner Gedeon Quijano of the application for foreclosure filed by the respondent-bank;"X. That the parties herein agree to transfer the auction sale scheduled for January 16, 1966 to February 18, 1966, without the necessity of republication of the notice of sale."

Upon these facts and the submission of the parties that the only issue is whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897, the Amendatory Act of Julie 20, 1953 to Republic Act 304, the original back pay law, the trial court dismissed the petition, as already stated, and directed respondent sheriff to proceed and continue with the public auction sale of the property mortgaged in accordance with the foreclosure application of respondent Development Bank of the Philippines after due notice to petitioners. In their appeal, petitioners' sole assignment of error is that: "The trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the petitioners-appellants was not subsisting when Republic Act No. 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953."The appeal has no merit.The pertinent portions of the controlling provisions of the aforementioned Back Pay Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953,1 read as follows:.SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified in section one hereof and within one year from the approval of this Amendatory Act, and under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the recognition of the right to the Salaries and wages as provided in section one hereof and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state the total amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their issuance without interests: Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries and wages the right to which has been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement; ...It is indeed settled that under the above provisions, the Government or any of its agencies does not have any discretion in the acceptance of back pay certificates, 2 when they are used by the applicants or original

holders themselves for the settlement of any of the obligations or liabilities specifically enumerated in the law.3 It is equally clear, however, that the same provisions expressly require that the obligations — for which certificates of indebtedness may be accepted as payments of — must be subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897; hence when, as in the instant case, such back pay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of an obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said amendatory Act on June 20, 1953, which corporation may not, legally be compelled to accept the certificates.It is true that appellants' application for an urban real estate loan was approved by appellee bank on April 80, 1953. It appears, however, that appellants did not avail of it until much later, as in fact, they executed the mortgage contract only on March 23, 1954, and furthermore, that the release of the amount of the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be made in installments and subject to compliance with certain conditions by said appellants. Under these circumstances, Our ruling in the case of Rodriguez vs. Development Bank of the Philippines 4 is controlling.In that case, Rodriguez obtained a loan from the said Development Bank of the Philippines to be received by him in several releases and to be paid later in installments, under the terms and conditions specified in the loan agreement. Pursuant to said agreement, Rodriguez received the first release in the sum of P5,000.00 on May 27, 1953, while the subsequent releases covering the P9,000.00 — balance of the loan were all availed of and received by him later than June, 1953. Later, Rodriguez paid the installments as they fell due. When a balance of about P10,000.00 remained unpaid, Rodriguez offered to pay the said outstanding balance of the loan with his back pay certificate. The Bank refused at first to accept the said tender of payment in certificate, and when it accepted the same later, it limited its acceptance only to the amount of P5,000.00 representing the portion of the loan released before the passage of Republic Act No. 897, although the amount of the back pay certificate offered by Rodriguez was more than sufficient to cover the total unpaid balance of the loan. So, Rodriguez instituted an action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Davao to compel the Bank to accept his back pay certificate in payment of his whole outstanding obligation or, in other words, even for the portions of the loan corresponding to the releases made after June 20, 1953. This action was dismissed by the trial court and upon appeal to this Court, the dismissal was affirmed upon the following rationale:.It can not be said that appellant became indebted to the Bank for the total amount of P14,000.00 from the date of the agreement. The

releases of the balance of the agreed loan were made dependent on certain conditions (see additional conditions mentioned in paragraph 4 of the stipulation of facts, supra) among which is the availability of funds. Non-compliance with any of these conditions will not entitle the appellant to the release of the balance of the agreed loan and conversely, will not entitle the bank to hold the appellant liable for the unreleased amounts. Consequently, we hold, as did the trial court, that:."... the amounts released in July, 1953 and thereafter cannot be considered as obligations subsisting in June, 1953. The defendant may be compelled to accept a back pay certificate in payment of obligations subsisting when the Amendatory Act was approved (Sec. 2, Republic Act 897).têñ.£îhqw⣠Republic Act 897 was approved on June 20, 1953. The defendant may not be compelled to accept plaintiff's back pay certificate in payment of the amounts released after June 20, 1953."The case of Sabelino v. RFC (G.R. No. L-11790, Sept. 30, 1958) relied upon by appellant is irrelevant, as the mortgage indebtedness sought to be paid with appellee's back pay certificate therein, appears to have subsisted prior to the approval of Republic Act No. 897. ...Herein appellants' situation is even worse than that of Rodriguez. Here appellants actually availed of their approved loan only about nine (9) months after the enactment of Republic Act 897 and the corresponding releases thereof were received by appellants only after the execution of the mortgage contract on March 23, 1954. Undoubtedly, notwithstanding the approval by the appellee Development Bank of the Philippines (RFC) of appellants' loan application on April 30, 1953, appellants did not thereby incur any obligation to pay the same; only after the corresponding amounts were released to appellants after March 23, 1954 did such obligation attach; and it cannot, therefore, be said that the said loan was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953.It may be truly said, as contended by appellants, that when their application for the loan was approved by the appellee Bank on April 30, 1953, an agreement was perfected between them and said Bank, but it should be noted that under such agreement the only enforceable obligation that was created was that of the Bank to grant the loan applied for, whereas the obligation of appellants to pay the same could not have arisen until after the amount of the loan has been actually released to them; and said release was even subject to their compliance with certain conditions specified in the mortgage contract executed after the approval already of Republic Act 897. Appellants' appeal that a more liberal construction of the law would enable "many crippled or disabled veterans, or their wives and orphans, or those who had in one way or

another unselfishly sacrificed or contributed to the cause of the last war" to take advantage of their back pay certificates, does deserve sympathy, for indeed, among the avowed purposes of the said law are: "First, to serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or disabled veterans, and to their wives and orphans. Secondly, to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war, and particularly to those who have given their all for the cause of the last war." (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session, May 6, 1953, page 74, as quoted in Florentino, et al. vs. PNB, 98 Phil. 959, 961-963).têñ.£îhqw⣠On the other hand, however, We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible.5 No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to here a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.6 Thus, even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said law limited the applicability of back pay certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," this Court has ruled that obligations contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot come within its purview.Since the debt of appellants was contracted on November 24, 1948, they could not validly seek to discharge it by application of their back pay certificate under Republic Act 304, on June 18, 1948, because that Act, in terms, limited any such application to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act". (Sec. 2)7

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs.

Plain language ruleObligation is subsisting, in applying this, when the law disapprove.The obligation is only created when the contract is created.The intention of congress is that the obligation of the contract must be subsisting.What is the purpose of the back …. Certification law

For payment of the obligation / used for payment of the obligation

 REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC. VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURTOF TAX APPEALS, G.R. No. L-28463, May 31, 1971FACTS:

From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills (petitioner) exported Pollardand/or bran which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade whileanchored near the breakwater. The Commissioner of Customs and The Court of Tax Appeals(respondent) assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in thesum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protestIn this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would want the Court to interpret the words“products of the Philippines” found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code,as excludingbran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which isimported in the Philippines, they are merely waste from the production of flour. Another mainargument of the petitioner is that no government or private wharves or government facilitieswere utilized in exporting such products. In that way, it would not be liable at all for the wharfagedues assessed under such section by respondent Commission of Customs.On the other hand, the stand of respondent Commissioner of Customs was thatpetitioner was liable for wharfage dues “upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by avessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of government-owned or privatewharves.” Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law

RULING/HELD:

As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, "There shall be levied,collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of thePhilippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a feefor wharfage." appears to be quite precise. Section 2802 refers to what is imported andexported.The objective of this act must be carried out. Even if there is doubt to the meaning of thelanguage employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded fromthe operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympatheticconsideration. It was desirable then that the gates to such efforts at unjustified restriction of thecoverage of the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, butdefiance of, a clear legislative mandateThe decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed withcosts against petitioner.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC G.R. No. L-28463 May 31, 1971REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner, vs.THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.Agrava & Agrava for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for respondents. FERNANDO, J.:It is a novel question that this petition for the review of a decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals presents. Petitioner Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would have this Court construe the words "products of the Philippines" found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code 1 as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the Philippines, they are merely waste and not the products, which is the flour produced. 2 That way, it would not be liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such section by respondent Commission of Customs. It elevated the matter to respondent Court, as the construction it would place on the aforesaid section appears too strained and far remote from the ordinary meaning of the text, not to mention the policy of the Act. We affirm.In the decision of respondent Court now sought to be reviewed, after stating that what was before it was an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Customs holding petitioner liable for the sum of P7,948.00 as wharfage due the facts were set forth as follows: "Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling. During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964, inclusive, petitioner exported Pollard and/or bran which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater The respondent assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest." 3 The only issue, in the opinion of respondent Court, is whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in

accordance with law. The main contention before respondent Court of petitioner was "that inasmuch as no government or private wharves or government facilities [were] utilized in exporting the pollard and/or bran, the collection of wharfage dues is contrary to law." 4 On the other hand, the stand of respondent Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was liable for wharfage dues "upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of government-owned or private wharves." 5 Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code, relying on our decision in Procter & Gamble Phil. Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs. 6 It did not feel called upon to answer the question now before us as, in its opinion, petitioner only called its attention to it for the first time in its memorandum.Hence, this petition for review. The sole error assigned by petitioner is that it should not, under its construction of the Act, be liable for wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and pollard as they are not "products of the Philippines", coming as they did from wheat grain which were imported from abroad, and being "merely parts of the wheat grain milled by Petitioner to produce flour which had become waste." 7 We find, to repeat, such contention unpersuasive and affirm the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals.1. The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines ... exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage ...." One category refers to what is imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that are exported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. Petitioner appeared to have entertained such a nation. In its petition for review before respondent Court, it categorically asserted: "Petitioner is primarily engaged in the manufacture of flour from wheat grain. In the process of milling the wheat grain into flour, petitioner also produces 'bran' and 'pollard' which it exports abroad." 8It does take a certain amount of hair-splitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner calls "waste" resulting from the production of flour processed from the wheat grain in petitioner's flour mills in the Philippines. It is always timely to remember that, as stressed by Justice Moreland: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without

them." 9 Petitioner ought to have been aware that deference to such a doctrine precludes an affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. It is as simple, as that. 102. There is need of confining familiar language of a statute to its usual signification. While statutory construction involves the exercise of choice, the temptation to roam at will and rely on one's predilections as to what policy should prevail is to be resisted. The search must be for a reasonable interpretation. It is best to keep in mind the reminder from Holmes that "there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what obviously means." 11 To paraphrase Frankfurter, interpolation must be eschewed but evisceration avoided. Certainly, the utmost effort should be exerted lest the interpretation arrived at does violence to the statutory language in its total context. It would be then to ignore what has been stressed time and time again as to limits of judicial freedom in the construction of statutes to accept their view advanced by petitioner.3. Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring fidelity to the legislative purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrates. Its objective must be carried out. Even if there be doubt as to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. No undue reflection is needed to show that if through an ingenious argument, the scope of a statute may be contracted, the probability that other exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in statutory construction has never recommended itself. It does not now. 12WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. EismaGR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances.  On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.

On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the union, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor

arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.

The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners.The Solicitor General for public respondents.Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. FERNANDO, C.J.:This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer, here private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma 1 then of the Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by petitioners National Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its

officers and members. It was such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required that the officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them and in the meanwhile such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this Court." 2The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. 4Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no." 6 The strike began on May 23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as

noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court required respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary injunction to be heard on Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11 After such hearing, a temporary restraining order was issued, "directing respondent Judge and the commanding officer in Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunction dated July 20, 1982; and to restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the until otherwise case effective as of [that] date and continuing ordered by [the] Court. In the exercise of the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: '(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.' " 12On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction of respondent Judge and maintaining that the order complained of was not in excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on the other hand, instead of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof. He met squarely the issue of whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He (i)ncluded that "the instant petition has merit and should be given due course."He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the decisions issued by this Court after each of such changes. As pointed out, the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied by this Court in Garcia v. Martinez 15 and in Bengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978, however, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and provided "that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages." 17 The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of employees. 18 That is not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the end of the story, for on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further amending Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus enabling them to decide "3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits

provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by tills Code." 19 An equally conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of first instance then, a regional trial court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took effect on August 21, 1981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded thus: "(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 20 This is to be compared with the former phraseology "(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 21 It is to be noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations.Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition. certiorari and prohibition lie, respondent Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter.1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant ruling of this Court even prior toLizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 22 a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call for obedience. Thus, "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 23 It is so even after the lapse of sixty years. 242. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that ossesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the opening paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an

employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages — the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" 26 It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case." 27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ... Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code." 28 That same month, two other cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman 29 and Aguda v. Vallejos. 303. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March of 1982, was not followed by private respondent when it filed the complaint for damages on July 9, 1982, more than four months later. 31 On this point, reference may be made to our decision in National Federation of Labor, et al. v. The Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, 32 promulgated on September 15, 1983. In that case, the question involved was the failure of the same private respondent, Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., to admit the striking petitioners, eighty-one in number, back to work after an order of Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations Commission the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. It was noted in the first paragraph of our opinion in that case: "On the face of it, it seems difficult to explain why private respondent would not comply with such order considering that the request for compulsory arbitration came from it. It ignored this notification by the presidents of the labor unions involved to its resident manager that the striking employees would lift their picket line and start

returning to work on August 20, 1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion for reconsideration insofar as the return-to-work aspect is concerned which reads: 'We find no merit in the said Motion for Reconsideration. The Labor code, as amended, specifically Article 264 (g), mandates that whenever a labor dispute is certified by the Minister of Labor and Employment to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and a strike has already taken place at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall immediately return to work and the employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with competence to act on the matter.4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "the rather thorny question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn" 35 between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." 36 Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982, issued by respondent Judge, is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and respondent Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the Regional Trial Court to which this case is assigned, is enjoin from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 716 (2751),

except for the purpose of dismissing it. The temporary restraining order of August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.

-All other claims-All money claims

*when it comes to employer-epmloyee relationship there is a special law which is the labor code, special law … against ordinary law

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company

GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)

Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.

The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its petition

for mandamus. The court determined Republic Act 2023 was enacted only to

compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees’ debt from the

latter’s salary and turn this over to the employees’ credit union; but which

does not convert the credit union’s credit into a first priority credit.

Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of

payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions.

Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for

the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope

of its operation, must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil

Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference

of credits. In the present case, the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023

speaks for itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the

legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023

were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of

employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so

expressly declared. There is nothing in the provision of Republic Act 2023

which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit

unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees’ wages

and salaries.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement

as to costs.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs.MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee.Gregorio E. Fajardo for appellant.

Gregorio Baroque for appellee. FERNANDO, J.:In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-operative. (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative." 1To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the following: "Then petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. As can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a member of the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does not appear.In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly

declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. 2Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief, succinctly pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the documents known as Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the order of priority of payment out of the salaries of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit "3", [and] Exhibit "P" respondent, in effect, implemented the said provision of law. 3This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: 4 "It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently born to that effect. 5.2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a a suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v. Montesa, 6 this Court held. "Man-damus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. 7 The opinion continued in this wise:"According to former Chief Justice Moran," only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the above view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was there categorically stated: "This court has held that it is

fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the required act.' As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion: "It is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful." To the same effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed." 8 So it has been since then. 9 The latest reported case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, 10 this court speaking through Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. 11WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

The only right granted is the right to compel- what is not included is deemed excluded, the law is clear then apply.

Why did sc did not look into the rgument of the kapisanan –textually wala naman talaga.

When do you use ratio legis

-people vs. magan

When do you use verbal egis

-

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION 

G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs.NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE, respondents. PADILLA, J.:Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, with the following identical texts:MANONG POLING DIED INTERMENT TUESDAY 1Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. Private respondent filed a letter-complaint against the RCPI with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company.Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to answer the complaint and set the initial hearing of the case to 2 May 1989. After two (2) resettings, RCPI moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds:1. Juan Alegre is not the real party in interest;2. NTC has no jurisdiction over the case;3. the continued hearing of the case violates its constitutional right to due process of law. 2RCPI likewise moved for deferment of scheduled hearings until final determination of its motion to dismiss.On 15 June 1989, NTC proceeded with the hearing and received evidence for private respondent Juan Alegre. On 3 October 1989, RCPI's motion to dismiss was denied, thus:The herein complainant is the husband of the sender of the "rush" telegram that respondent allegedly failed to deliver in a manner respondent bound itself to undertake, so his legal interest in this administrative case cannot be seriously called in question. As regards the issue of jurisdiction, the authority of the Commission to hear and decide this case stems from its power of control and supervision over the operation of public communication utilities as conferred upon it by law.

Besides, the filing of a motion to dismiss is not allowed by the rules (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of Practice and Procedures). Following, however, the liberal construction of the rules, respondent (sic) motion shall be treated as its answer or be passed upon after the conclusion of the hearing on the merits. . . . 3Hearings resumed in the absence of petitioner RCPI which was, however, duly notified thereof. On 27 November 1989, NTC disposed of the controversy in the following manner:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Commission finds respondent administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service defined under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and hereby imposes the penalty of FINE payable within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof in the aggregate amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) for:1. Rush Telegram sent to Valencia, Bohol on March 17, 1989 and received on March 21, 19893 days x P200.00 per day = P600.002. Rush Telegram sent to Espiritu, Ilocos Norte on March 17, 1989 and received on March 20, 19892 days x P200.00 per day = P400.00Total = P1,000.00ENTERED. November 27, 1989. 4A motion for reconsideration by RCPI reiterating averments in its earlier motion to dismiss was denied for lack of merit; 5 hence, this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates. RCPI submits that its position finds support in two (2) decided cases 6 identical with the present one. Then Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando writing for the Court stated:. . . There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission imposing the fines for these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio companies, as noted was the (sic ) fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for negligence or misfeasance. It was bereft of such competence. It was not vested within such authority. . . .The Public Service Commission having been abolished by virtue of a Presidential Decree, as set forth at the outset, and a new Board of Communications having been created to take its place, nothing said in its decision has reference to whatever powers are now lodged in the latter body. . . . . . . (Footnotes omitted)Two (2) later cases, 7 adhering to the above tenet ruled:Even assuming that the respondent Board of Communications has the power of jurisdiction over petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to

insure adequate public service, petitioner cannot be subjected to payment of fine under sec. 21 of the Public Service Act, because this provision of the law subjects to a fine every public service that violates or falls (sic) to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions and regulations of the Commission. . . . .The Office of the Solicitor General now claims that the cited cases are no longer applicable, that the power and authority of the NTC to impose fines is incidental to its power to regulate public service utilities and to supervise telecommunications facilities, which are now clearly defined in Section 15, Executive Order No. 546 dated 23 July 1979: thus:Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall exercise the following functions:xxx xxx xxxb. Establish, prescribe and regulate the areas of operation of particular operators of the public service communications;xxx xxx xxxh. Supervise and inspect the operation of radio stations and telecommunications facilities.Regulatory administrative agencies necessarily impose sanctions, adds the Office of the Solicitor General. RCPI was fined based on the finding of the NTC that it failed to undertake adequate service in delivering two (2) rush telegrams. NTC takes the view that its power of supervision was broadened by E. O. No. 546, and that this development superseded the ruling in RCPI vs. Francisco Santiago and companion cases.The issues of due process and real parties in interest do not have to be discussed in this case. This decision will dwell on the primary question of jurisdiction of the NTC to administratively impose fines on a telegraph company which fails to render adequate service to a consumer.E. O. 546, it will be observed, is couched in general terms. The NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the Board of Communications which exercised powers pursuant to the Public Service Act. The power to impose fines should therefore be read in the light of the Francisco Santiago case because subsequent legislation did not grant additional powers to the Board of Communications. The Board in other words, did not possess the power to impose administrative fines on public services rendering deficient service to customers, ergo its successor cannot arrogate unto itself such power, in the absence of legislation. It is true that the decision in RCPI vs. Board of Communications seems to have modified the Santiago ruling in that the later case held that the Board of Communications can impose fines if the public service entity violates or fails to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any order, decision or regulation of the Commission. But can private

respondent's complaint be similarly treated when the complaint seeks redress of a grievance against the company? 8 NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission (G. R. No. L-27250, 21 January 1987, 147 SCRA 269) says so categorically.Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties.xxx xxx xxxThe act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.Moreover, under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that:Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective . . . (Globe Wireless case, supra).WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it. The temporary restraining order issued on 18 June 1990 is made PERMANENT without

prejudice, however, to the filing by the party aggrieved by the conduct of RCPI, of the proper action in the proper forum. No costs.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.Medialdea, J., is on leave.

RCPI VS. KAYUMANGGI

Whether or not rcpi is covered by e.o 546

Eo 546- powers of ntc

Sc said they are not, the eo repeals the public service law sec.1416 where the rcpi is exempted

Won rcpi needs to get certificate of public convenience to cooperate in the area.

There was a legislative franchise- frnachise( to exist as a corporation which can engage in the business of telecommunication) for rcpi, BUT a corporation cannot be created through law.

The Juridical entity is the primary franchise

The cpc is the secondary franchise

That R.A which gives the rcpi a franchise, to operate in such area but such is subjected to …… of public works.

Needs to secure certificate of public convenience

R.A 2036

They use pari materia rule.

Take it as a whole.

PHILEX MINES VS.

There was an accident, a cave in.