Statutory Construction Part 3 - cases

7/29/2019 Statutory Construction Part 3 - cases

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STATCON PART 3

1. G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC.,petitioner,vs.

HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES,respondents.Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ DAVID,J.:The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the

manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such

as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as

stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to

the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,

transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the

Exchange Tax Law.

On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid

in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that

"foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the

Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof

of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." After the applications

were processed by the officer-in-charge of the Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the

petitioner that of the total sum of P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13 representing the 17% special

excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had

been approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced

amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors

are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December 4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central

Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used

in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to this Court thru the

present petition for review.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream

stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to

entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof, which reads as follows:

SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or

other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans,

butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, reference

books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board of Textbooks and/or established public or private educational

institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers;

book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of Textbooks) to

be supplied to the Government under contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by

the Director of Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films, laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies,

and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act,

in quantities to be certified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and medicines

listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time to

promote and protect the health of the people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor,

upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven

thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)


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The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those materials actually

used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction

that "general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific

language which indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule,

however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to

or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles

that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong

to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food products because they

are used in the farming and poultry industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine than food or

food product, for, as matter of fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the

appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among those listed preceding the term in question,

includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those for breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic

Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not always refer to food

for human consumption, was added among the items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of

the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of

the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the

principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we

distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law

does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of

toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense.

The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection

with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of

the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction and

Interpretation of Laws by Black, p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)

Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle to pass upon the other questions raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby ordered to audit petitioners applications for

refund which were approved by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount of P23,958.13.

Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,concur.Labrador, J.,reserves his vote.

2. G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU: THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), AFP ANTI-GRAFT BOARD,

COL. ERNESTO A. PUNSALANG AND PETER T. TABANG, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, AS PRESIDING JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR, BRANCH 15, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND TROADIO TECSON, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CORTES, J.:

This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through the New Armed Forces

of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), to investigate and cause the prosecution of petitioner,

a retired military officer, for violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379.

Assailed by the Republic in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order are the orders of respondent judge in Civil Case No. 57092 Branch 151

of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila: (1) dated June 23, 1989, denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss and

Opposition, and (2) dated June 26, 1989, granting private respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction. Thus, the petition seeks the annulment of the two orders, the issuance of an injunction to enjoin respondent judge

from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092 and, finally, the dismissal of the case before the trial court.

The controversy traces its roots to the order of then PCGG Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, dated May 13, 1986, which created the

New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board. The Board was created to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt

practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service. The order further stated that *t+he Board shall be primarily
http://larc.fluxfun.com/1990/08http://larc.fluxfun.com/1990/08


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charged with the task of investigating cases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.

3019, as amended) and shall make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies and instrumentalities

with respect to the action to be taken thereon based on its findings.

Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, private

respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the Board to submit his explanation/comment together with his

supporting evidence by October 31, 1987 *Annex B, Petition.+ Private respondent requested, and was granted, several

postponements, but was unable to produce his supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper

who had gone abroad.

Just the same, the Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, dated June 30, 1988, recommending that

private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.

The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case on the following

grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already

prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was

inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having retired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No.

3019. The Board opposed the motion to dismiss.

In a resolution dated February 8, 1989, the PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private respondent moved forreconsideration but this was denied by the PCGG in a resolution dated March 8, 1989. Private respondent was directed to submit

his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence on March 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m.

On March 13, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in

Pasig, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Case No. 57092 and raffled to Branch 151, respondentjudges court. Petitioner

filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground

that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case ofPCGG v. Pena, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159

SCRA 556. Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition.

On June 23, 1989, respondent judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. On June 26, 1989, respondent judge granted the

application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from investigating or prosecuting private

respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Hence, the instant petition.

On August 29, 1989, the Court issued a restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing his orders dated June 23,

1989 and June 26, 1989 and from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

Private respondent filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. A rejoinder to the reply was filed by private respondent.

The Court gave due course to the petition and the parties filed their memoranda. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.

The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

I

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER AND INTERFERING WITH THE ORDERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT.

II

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED JUNE 26, 1989 ENJOINING PETITIONERS FROM INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING

PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT

PRACTICES ACT AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT FOR THE FORFEITURE OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED

PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19.]

As to the first issue, petitioner contends that following the ruling of the Court in PCGG v. Pena the Board, being a creation and/or

extension of the PCGG, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On the second issue, petitioner strongly argues that

the private respondents case falls within the jurisdiction of the PCGG.


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The pivotal issue is the second one. On this point, private respondents position is as follows:

1. . . . he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being

imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are

acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege

so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him. . . .

If indeed private respondent amassed wealth beyond his legal means, the procedure laid down by Rep. Act 1379 as alreadypointed out before be applied. And since, he has been separated from the government more than four years ago, the action

against him under Republic Act 1379 has already prescribed.

2. . . . no action can be filed anymore against him now under Republic Act 1379 for recovery of unexplained wealth for the reason

that he has retired more than four years ago.

3. The order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board (Annex A, Petition) is null and void. Nowhere in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-

A is there any authority given to the commission, its chairman and members, to create Boards or bodies to be invested with

powers similar to the powers invested with the commission. . . . [Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 117-118.]

1. The most important question to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondent may be investigated and caused

to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379. According to petitioners,

the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he is a subordinate of former

President Marcos. They cite the PCGGs jurisdiction over -

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,

relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration

of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by

taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. [E. O.

No. 1, sec. 2.]

Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration of Pres. Marcos. However, what

has to be inquired into is whether or not private respondent acted as a subordinate of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of

E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG, when he allegedly unlawfully acquired the properties.

A close reading of E.O. No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the term subordinate.

The Whereas Clauses of E.O. No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President

Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.

E.O. No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda

Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or

participation.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is -

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general

words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or

class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954), citing Black on

Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203.]

the term subordinate as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former

Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close

relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.

Thus, as stated by the Court in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181, 205-

206:

The situations envisaged and sought to be governed [by Proclamation No. 3 and E.O. Nos. 1, 2 and 14] are self-evident, these

being:

1) that (i)ll-gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime;


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a) more particularly, that (i)ll-gotten wealth (was) accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate

family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, * * located in the Philippines or abroad, * * (and) business enterprises and

entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them, during * * (the Marcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by

taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship;

b) otherwise stated, that there are assets and properties pertaining to former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife

Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had

been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties

owned by the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions,

or by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust enrichment

and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;

c) that said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings,

shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines

and in various countries of the world; and

2) that certain business enterprises and properties (were) taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by

entities or persons close to former President Marcos. *Footnotes deleted.+

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration offormer Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his

close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall

under existing general laws and procedures on the matter. Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes

the corrupt practices of any public officer. Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any Property

Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor), whenever

any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to

his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,

said property shall be presumed, prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired [Sec. 2.] The Solicitor General shall file the petition

and prosecute the case in behalf of the Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or city prosecutor (Ibid.)

Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being investigated for unlawfully acquired wealth under Rep. Acts Nos.

3019 and 1379, andnot under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

Since private respondent was being investigated by the PCGG through the AFP Anti-Graft Board it would have been presumed that

this was under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. But the record itself belies this

presumption:

(a) The letter of the chairman of the AFP Anti-Graft Board to private respondent, dated October 16, 1987, states: This letter is in

connection with the alleged information received by the AFP Anti-Graft Board indicating your acquisition of wealth beyond legal

means of income in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. *Rollo, p. 39.]

(b) The Resolution dated June 30, 1988 of the Board categorically states:

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:

This refers to the case against Col Troadio B Tecson PC (Ret) for alleged unexplained wealth pursuant to R.A. 3019, as amended,

otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Act for Forfeiture

of Unlawfully Acquired Property. [Rollo, p. 43.]

The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by taking advantage of his office as Finance Officer

of the Philippine Constabulary. No attempt is made in the Boards resolution to link him or his accumulation of wealth to former

Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.

(c) The letter of the Board chairman to the chairman of the PCGG, dated July 28, 1988, is clear:

Respectfully transmitted herewith for the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan is the case folder of COLONEL TROADIO TECSON

(Ret) who after preliminary investigation of the case by the Board, found a prima facie evidence against subject officer for violating

Section 8, R.A. 3019, as amended by BP 195, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379,

otherwise known as an Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. *Rollo, p. 46.+


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Moreover, from the allegations of petitioner in its memorandum, it would appear that private respondent accumulated his wealth

for his own account. Petitioner quoted the letter of Ignacio Datahan, a retired PC sergeant, to General Fidel Ramos, the material

portion of which reads:

. . . After an official in the military unit received an Allotment Advice the same signed a cash advance voucher, let us say in the

amount of 5,000.00. Without much ado, outright, Col. Tecson paid the amount. The official concerned was also made to sign the

receipt portion on the voucher the amount of which was left blank. Before the voucher is passed for routine processing by Mrs.

Leonor Cagas, clerk of Col. Tecson and its facilitator, the maneuver began. The amount on the face of the cash advance voucher is

altered or superimposed. The original amount of P5,000.00 was now made say, P95,000.00. So it was actually the amount of

P95,000.00 that appeared on the records. The difference of P90,000.00 went to the syndicate.

. . . Boy Tanyag, bookkeeper in Col. Tecsons office took care of the work.

. . . In the liquidation of the altered cash advance amount, names of persons found in the Metropolitan Manila Telephone

Directory with fictitious addresses appeared as recipients or payees. Leonor and Boy got their shares on commission basis of the

looted amount while the greater part went to Col. Tecson. [Rollo, pp. 184-185.]

Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

2. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board and authorizing it to investigate

the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service, to support the contention that

PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent. The PCGG cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its

powers are limited. Its task is limited to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. The

PCGG cannot, through an order of its chairman, grant itself additional powers powers not contemplated in its enabling law.

3. Petitioner assails the trial courts cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent. Particularly, petitioner argues that the

trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the PCGG. This matter has already been settled in Pena, supra, where the Court ruled

that those who wish to question or challenge the PCGGs acts or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested

with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review

on certiorariexclusively by this Court. [Ibid, at pp. 564-565.]

The ruling in Pena was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363, Soriano III v. Yuzon, G.R. No.

74910 (and five other cases), August 10, 1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer v. RTC, NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No. 81385, February 21, 1989,

170 SCRA 478, among others, to enjoin the regional trial courts from interfering with the actions of the PCGG.

Respondent judge clearly acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 57092 and issued

the writ of preliminary injunction against the PCGG.

4. Thus, we are confronted with a situation wherein the PCGG acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, hence, may be enjoined from

doing so, but the court that issued the injunction against the PCGG has not been vested by law with jurisdiction over it and, thus,

the injunction issued was null and void.

The nullification of the assailed order of respondent judge issuing the writ of preliminary injunction is therefore in order. Likewise,

respondent judge must be enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation

of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action

that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to

exercise only the powers granted it.

5. The pronouncements made above should not be taken to mean that the PCGGs creation of the AFP Anti-Graft Board is a

nullity and that the PCGG has no authority to investigate and cause the prosecution of members and former members of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379. The PCGG may investigate and cause the

prosecution of active and retired members of the AFP for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379

only in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, i.e., insofar as they involve the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of former Pres.

Marcos and his family and cronies. But the PCGG would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling under Rep. Acts Nos.

3019 and 1379, as in the case at bar. E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A did not envision the PCGG as the investigator and prosecutor ofall unlawful accumulations of wealth. The PCGG was created for a specific and limited purpose, as we have explained earlier, and

necessarily its powers must be construed with this in mind.


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6. In his pleadings, private respondent contends that he may no longer be prosecuted because of prescription. He relies on

section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 which provides that *t+he right to file such petition *for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth]

shall prescribe within four years from the date of resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the officer or

employee concerned. He retired on May 9, 1984, or more than six (6) years ago. However, it must be pointed out that section 2

of Rep. Act No. 1379 should be deemed amended or repealed by Article XI, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which provides

that *t+he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their

nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. Considering that sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 was

deemed amended or repealed before the prescriptive period provided therein had lapsed insofar as private respondent is

concerned, we cannot say that he had already acquired a vested right that may not be prejudiced by a subsequent enactment.

Moreover, to bar the Government from recovering ill-gotten wealth would result in the validation or legitimization of the unlawful

acquisition, a consequence at variance with the clear intent of Rep. Act No. 1379, which provides:

SEC. 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions cannot be invoked by, nor

shall they benefit the respondent, in respect to any property unlawfully acquired by him.

Thus, we hold that the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e., the city or provincial prosecutor and the Solicitor General under sec.

2 of Rep. Act No. 1379, may still investigate the case and file the petition for the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth against

private respondent, now a private citizen. (On the other hand, as regards respondents for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and

1379 who are still in the government service, the agency granted the power to investigate and prosecute them is the Office of theOmbudsman [Rep. Act No. 6770].) Under Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 violations of

Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 shall be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

7. The Court hastens to add that this decision is without prejudice to the prosecution of private respondent under the pertinent

provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other related penal laws.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated June 26, 1989 in Civil Case No. 57092 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Respondent

judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. 57092. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on August 29, 1989 is

MADE PERMANENT. The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent in I.S.

No. 37, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecution agency.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea,

and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., on leave.

3. G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant

all private prosecutor,petitioners,vs.

HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN,

MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO,respondents.

AQUINO,J.:pThe legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to

agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the

landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other

purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor

more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph

is omitted.)


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The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen

persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is

similar to the other fifteen informations, reads:

That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into,

occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as

successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area

has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and

cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant

from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the

whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)

Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the

accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839,

respectively).

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echavesmotu proprioissued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissingthe five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy",

whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of theabsence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule ofejusdem generisthe decree does not apply to thecultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with threat,

and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the

dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include agricultural

purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it

was intended to apply to squatting inurban communitiesor more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made bywell-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the

Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC

General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and

City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those

along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem inurbancommunitiesall over the country;WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong tothe affluent class;WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is

complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health,

safety and peace and order.

On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is

punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy

public agricultural lands. That law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat,

strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provision

of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the


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corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for any

person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to commit such acts.

Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both

such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs.

Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)

The rule ofejusdem generis(of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent ofthe decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule

ofejusdem generisis merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (GenatoCommercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, J., concur.

4. G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE BOARD,petitioner,vs.

HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK

MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES,

INC.,respondents.Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for private respondents.

DE CASTRO,J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision rendered by respondent judge, in Civil Case No.

52276 and in Special Civil Action No. 52383 both of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk

products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold

under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and

those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled

Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its

highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.

Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition for preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for

an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against

their filled milk products.

The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs-

private respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by

Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs'

private respondents to comply with said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation of the

aforesaid order. Section 169 of the Tax Code reads as follows:

Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk.All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from whichthe fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its

immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for

nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.


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The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated February 16, 1963 restraining the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from

requiring plaintiffs' private respondents to print on the labels of their rifled milk products the words, "This milk is not suitable for

nourishment for infants less than one year of age or words of similar import, " as directed by the above quoted provision of Law,

and from taking any action to enforce the above legal provision against the plaintiffs' private respondents in connection with their

rifled milk products, pending the final determination of the case, Civil Case No. 52276, on the merits.

On July 25, 1969, however, the Office of the Solicitor General brought an appeal from the said order by way of certiorari to the

Supreme Court.1In view thereof, the respondent court in the meantime suspended disposition of these cases but in view of theabsence of any injunction or restraining order from the Supreme Court, it resumed action on them until their final disposition

therein.

Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary

injunction. Petitioners therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade Board desist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No. I .

entitled "Antonio R. de Joya vs. Institute of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, etc." pending final determination of

Civil Case No. 52276. The facts of this special civil action show that on December 7, 1962, Antonio R. de Joya and Sufronio

Carrasco, both in their individual capacities and in their capacities as Public Relations Counsel and President of the Philippine

Association of Nutrition, respectively, filed FTB I.S. No. 1 with Fair Trade Board for misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or

misbranding. Among other things, the complaint filed include the charge of omitting to state in their labels any statement

sufficient to Identify their filled milk products as "imitation milk" or as an imitation of genuine cows milk. and omitting to mark the

immediate containers of their filled milk products with the words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than

one year of age or with other equivalent words as required under Section 169 of the Tax Code. The Board proceeded to hear the

complaint until it received the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance on March 19, 1963.

Upon agreement of the parties, Civil Case No. 52276 and Special Civil Action No. 52383 were heard jointly being intimately related

with each other, with common facts and issues being also involved therein. On April 16, 1971, the respondent court issued its

decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:

In Civil Case No. 52276:

(a) Perpetually restraining the defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his agents, or employees from requiring plaintiffs to

print on the labels of their filled milk products the words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year

of age" or words with equivalent import and declaring as nun and void and without authority in law, the order of said defendant

dated September 28, 1961, Annex A of the complaint, and the Ruling of the Secretary of Finance, dated November 12, 1962,

Annex G of the complaint; and

In Special Civil Action No. 52383:

(b) Restraining perpetually the respondent Fair Trade Board, its agents or employees from continuing in the investigation of the

complaints against petitioners docketed as FTB I.S. No. 2, or any charges related to the manufacture or sale by the petitioners of

their filled milk products and declaring as null the proceedings so far undertaken by the respondent Board on said complaints. (pp.

20- 21, Rollo).

From the above decision of the respondent court, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board joined together

to file the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, assigning the following errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEC. TION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS BEEN REPEALED BY IMPLICATION.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS LOST ITS TAX PURPOSE, AND THAT

COMMISSIONER NECESSARILY LOST HIS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE SAME AND THAT THE PROPER AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE

THE HEALTH OF INFANTS IS THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN RA 3720, NOT THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS OF FOOD LAWS IS

ENTRUSTED TO THE FOOD AND DRUG INSPECTION, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND THAT THE FAIR TRADE BOARD IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ALLEGEDMISBRANDING, MISLABELLING AND/OR MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENT OF FILLED MILK PRODUCTS. (pp, 4-5, Rollo).


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The lower court did not err in ruling that Section 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by implication. Section 169 was enacted

in 1939, together with Section 141 (which imposed a Specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized the sale of

skimmed milk without payment of the specific tax and without the legend required by Section 169). However, Section 141 was

expressly repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, and Section 177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463. By the express

repeal of Sections 141 and 177, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.

Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying

terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of

the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the

general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule ofejusdem generisthat general andunlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.

Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the "Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of the Board of

Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other

hand, is any milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has been added or

which has been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or

semblance of milk cream or skim milk." The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the

fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or

corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.

The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an opinion that filled milk does not come within the purview of Section

169, it being a product distinct from those specified in the said Section since the removed fat portion of the milk has been

replaced with coconut oil and Vitamins A and D as fortifying substances (p. 58, Rollo). This opinion bolsters the Court's stand as to

its interpretation of the scope of Section 169. Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or

implement administrative laws command much respect and weight. (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.

R. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617; Tan, et. al. vs. The Municipality of Pagbilao et. al., L-14264, April 30, 1963, 7

SCRA 887; Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of Carigara L-12347, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 103).

This Court is, likewise, induced to the belief that filled milk is suitable for nourishment for infants of all ages. The Petitioners

themselves admitted that: "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome

and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk

have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk." (p. 45, Rollo).

There would seem, therefore, to be no dispute that filled milk is suitable for feeding infants of all ages. Being so, the declaration

required by Section 169 of the Tax Code that filled milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age would,

in effect, constitute a deprivation of property without due. process of law.

Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk product and not as against manufacturers,

distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL, ENFAMIL, OLAC, in which, as admitted by the

petitioner, the fatty part has been removed and substituted with vegetable or corn oil. The enforcement of Section 169 against the

private respondents only but not against other persons similarly situated as the private respondents amounts to an

unconstitutional denial of the equal pro petition of the laws, for the law, equally enforced, would similarly offend against the

Constitution. Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,30 L. ed. 220).

As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its tax

purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the

same. This was so held by his predecessor immediately after Sections 141 and 177 were repealed in General Circular No. V-85 as

stated in paragraph IX of the Partial Stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, to wit:

... As the act of sewing skimmed milk without first paying the specific tax thereon is no longer unlawful and the enforcement of the

requirement in regard to the placing of the proper legend on its immediate containers is a subject which does not come within the

jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section 177 of the said Code having been repealed by

Republic Act No. 463. (p. 102, Rollo).

Petitioner's contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of the Tax Code which provides

that the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall also "give effect to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by

this Code or other laws" is untenable. The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only when necessary in the

enforcement of its principal powers and duties consisting of the "collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges,

and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected therewith." The enforcement of Section 169 entails the


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promotion of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the exclusive function of the Food and

Drug Administration of the Department of Health as provided for in Republic Act No. 3720. In particular, Republic Act No. 3720

provides:

Section 9. ... It shall be the duty of the Board (Food and Drug Inspection), conformably with the rules and regulations, to hold

hearings and conduct investigations relative to matters touching the Administration of this Act, to investigate processes of food,

drug and cosmetic manufacture and to subject reports to the Food and Drug Administrator, recommending food and drug

standards for adoption. Said Board shall also perform such additional functions, properly within the scope of the administration

thereof, as maybe assigned to it by the Food and Drug Administrator. The decisions of the Board shall be advisory to the Food and

Drug Administrator.

Section 26. ...

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act shall be conducted by the Board of Food and Drug Inspection which shall submit

recommendation to the Food and Drug Administrator.

(d) When it appears to the Food and Drug Administrator from the reports of the Food and Drug Laboratory that any article of food

or any drug or cosmetic secured pursuant to Section 28 of this Act is adulterated or branded he shall cause notice thereof to be

given to the person or persons concerned and such person or persons shall be given an opportunity to subject evidence

impeaching the correctness of the finding or charge in question.

(e) When a violation of any provisions of this Act comes to the knowledge of the Food and Drug Administrator of such character

that a criminal prosecution ought to be instituted against the offender, he shall certify the facts to the Secretary of Justice through

the Secretary of Health, together with the chemists' report, the findings of the Board of Food and Drug Inspection, or other

documentary evidence on which the charge is based.

(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the Food and Drug Administrator to certify for prosecution pursuant to

subparagraph (e) hereof, minor violations of this Act whenever he believes that public interest will be adequately served by a

suitable written notice or warning.

The aforequoted provisions of law clearly show that petitioners, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are

without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of filled

milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and Drug inspection and the Food and Drug

Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, also intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be

instituted. To hold that the petitioners have also jurisdiction as would be the result were their instant petition granted, would only

cause overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce confusion and conflict of official action which is neither practical nor

desirable.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmeden toto. No costs.SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez, Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 G.R. No. L-30793-94.

5. G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N.

LOPEZ,petitioners,vs.

SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO

GAYUTIN,respondents.


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Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.

Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.

Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.

QUIASON,J.:This is a Petition forCertiorari, Prohibition andMandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order,under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the preventive suspension

of petitioners,Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias, Technical

Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for

Mental Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator

Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against

petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition,Rollo, pp. 19-21).The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-

0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de

Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to

disqualify Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).

On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition.

On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130); Annexes to

Supplemental Petition;Rollopp. 140-163) and an "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation;Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring developments thattranspired after the filing of the petition and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or

temporary restraining order.

On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime, theSTATUS

QUOpending filing of comments by said respondents on the original supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated

September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required

respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion.

On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its

Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the

motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus

Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners

(Rollo, pp. 268-480).

The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore,

disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman

. . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52;Rollo,pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical

conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury,

falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54;Rollo, pp. 261-263).On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to

Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation attached toRollowithout pagination between pp. 613 and 614thereof).


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On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a) "despite the

issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing respondents to maintain thestatus quo, respondent Secretary refuses tohold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated

September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension, thestatus quoobtaining thetime of the filing of the instant petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of

petitioners' preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace petitioner

Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992; and(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 immediately, by

restoring thestatus quo antecontemplated by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment attached toRollowithout paginations betweenpp. 613-614 thereof).

In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestatedstatusquoorder, statinginter alia, that:It appearing that thestatus quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable uncontested status which preceded the presentcontroversy was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners

were then actually occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the

duties of their respective positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be lawfully entitled to, and that

respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the

aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992 until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rolloafter p. 615 thereof).On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental Manifestation,

stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and

(b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions

required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case" (Attached

toRollowithout pagination).In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman can only

suspend government officials or employees connected with his office. Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to

disbar petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached toRollowithout pagination).The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working inoffices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said

officials and employees.

In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to LiftStatus Quo,

etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his

authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or

employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would

warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not more than six months,

without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence

or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension

herein provided.

Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was

contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such

other power or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."

On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only

recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing

administrative investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.

They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter aliathepower, function, and duty to:


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Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,

suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct powers, namely: (1)

direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal,

suspension, demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated

December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).

The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that what the

Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a preventive suspension.

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees

(Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said

provision referred to penalties in administrative cases,e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule ofNoscitor a sociis,the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is

equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in

which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar,

18 SCRA 247 [1966]).

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employeesfacing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after

compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or

prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such

actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious

and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.

The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of

evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to

decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.

Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory Construction,

Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether

a penalty is imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris,

Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute

and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).

The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to

him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such

interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of

the Ombudsman should be avoided.

A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the

purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983,

142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).

InNera v.Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the

person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases who are employed

in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24

of R.A. No. 6770.

The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive suspension

and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority

pending an investigation . . . ."


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Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code also

authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority."

However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service Commission by the

Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus

and offices, the phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his

authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any

subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).

The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any subordinate

officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).

The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read "suspend any

officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of

the word "subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the Congress intended to

empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of

whether they are employed "in his office" or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative

complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to

determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension.

In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction

when he issued the suspension order without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them during

the preliminary conference and even after petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero

(Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that assumingarguendothat the Ombudsman has the powerto preventively suspend erring public officials and employees who are working in other departments and offices, the questioned

order remains null and void for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated

December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).

Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-

blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties. InNera,supra, petitioner therein also claimed that theSecretary of Health could not preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The

contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out was merely preventiveand therefore, as held inNera, there was "nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before thocharges against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia.,supra).There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension of a

respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the charts against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,

oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or employees under investigation were found

in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.

The import of theNeradecision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt isstrong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of

the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of

preventive suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative complaint and the "Motion for the

Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated the charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus

Submission,Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4,Rollo,pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by

petitioners of the members of the private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission,Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminaryconference wherein the complainant and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and

documentary evidence.

Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission,Rollo, pp. 336-337) whileprivate respondents submitted their list of exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission,Rollo, pp. 338-348).


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Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest

partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with

grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation.

The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to

openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not prosper

(Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that

the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and

propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients.

On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private respondents hurled against

petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5).

A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be

respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in

the profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel

constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in

pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.

The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which is confined to questions of

jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers.

There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and theStatus quoordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

BELLOSILLO,J.,concurring:I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec. 24 of R.A.No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively charged before him pending the

investigation of the complaint, the reason being that respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the prosecution of the

case.

However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts thus far presented may not provide adequate basis to reasonably place

petitioners under preventive suspension. For, it is not enough to rule that the Ombudsman has authority to suspend petitioners

preventively while the case is in progress before him. Equally important is the determination whether it is necessary to issue the

preventive suspension under the circumstances. Regretfully, I cannot see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive suspension.

That is why, I go for granting oral argument to the parties so that we can truthfully determine whether the preventive suspension

of respondents are warranted by the facts. We may be suspending key government officials and employees on the basis merely of

speculations which may not serve the ends of justice but which, on the other hand, deprive them of their right to due process. The

simultaneous preventive suspension of top officials and employees of the National Center for Mental Health may just disrupt, the

hospital's normal operations, much to the detriment of public service. We may safely assume that it is not easy to replace them in

their respective functions as those substituting them may be taking over for the first time. The proper care of mental patients may

thus be unduly jeopardized and their lives and limbs imperilled.

I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to justify the

preventive suspension of petitioners.

#Separate OpinionsBELLOSILLO,J.,concurring:


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I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec. 24 of R.A.No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official or employee administratively charged before him pending the

investigation of the complaint, the reason being that respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the prosecution of the

case.

However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts thus far presented may not provide adequate basis to reasonably place

petitioners under preventive suspension. For, it is not enough to rule that the Ombudsman has authority to suspend petitioners

preventively while the case is in progress before him. Equally important is the determination whether it is necessary to issue the

preventive suspension under the circumstances. Regretfully, I cannot see any sufficient basis to justify the preventive suspension.

That is why, I go for granting oral argument to the parties so that we can truthfully determine whether the preventive suspension

of respondents are warranted by the facts. We may be suspending key government officials and employees on the basis merely of

speculations which may not serve the ends of justice but which, on the other hand, deprive them of their right to due process. The

simultaneous preventive suspension of top officials and employees of the National Center for Mental Health may just disrupt, the

hospital's normal operations, much to the detriment of public service. We may safely assume that it is not easy to replace them in

their respective functions as those substituting them may be taking over for the first time. The proper care of mental patients may

thus be unduly jeopardized and their lives and limbs imperilled.

I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to justify the

preventive suspension of petitioners.

6. G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988MANOLO P. FULE,petitioner,vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondent.Balagtas P. Ilagan for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:This is a Petition for Review oncertiorariof the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of theRegional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of V

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Statutory Construction Part 3 - cases