Strategic Relation in Military Between US, China &India @21st Century

8/14/2019 Strategic Relation in Military Between US, China &India @21st Century

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Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia The strategic relationship in military terms between the US,

Russia, China and India in the twenty-first century

Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA."

RESEARCH PAPERThe strategic relationship in military terms between the US, Russia, China and India

in the twenty-first century

Written By: LONG KimKhorn

Master of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

The Relationship Between Superpowers

Instructed By: Dr. TROND Gilberg, PhD and Dean of PUC

Social Science and International Relations Faculty

Phnom Penh, August 15, 2012


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.#

TABLES OF CONTENT

I. Abstract 3II. Acknowledgement 5III. Introduction 5IV. Literature Review 8V. Methodology 11VI. Scope of Research 11VII. Facts and Findings 11VIII. Conclusion &Recommendation 18IX. References 26


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.$

I. AbstractThe US became as the one of the most powerful and influential nations in the world

after math of World War II and has been the global hegemon since the end of the

Cold War in 1991. In 2011, the US President declared a shift of US focus to the

Pacific to maintain its regional leadership against the rising of China and India in

Asia-Pacific (McDaniel, 2012: 16). The Obama doctrine has been considered as the

pivot back to the Asia-Pacific with the aim of remaining the major strategic power

in the region. This pivot1 is main effort essentially to refocus US diplomatic and

military from the Middle East to Asia to maintain a consistent Asian presences and

demonstrate the power of the US diplomatic policy, economic and military

machinery. The recent visits by US Defense Secretary Panetta to India and Vietnam

reflect the ongoing US effort to reinforce and in some cases reinvigorate pre-existing

agreements in accordance with national strategy (McDaniel, 2012: 16).

US has several objectives in the Indian Ocean region as: preventing Iran or China

from threatening US interests; setting up red line for extremist groups from

threatening US and its allies interests; enlarging its diplomatic relations network to

achieve influence and military and trade relations; ensuring access to naturalresources and markets and ensuring the security of Sea Lines Of Communication and

maritime chokepoints. Main objective of US is to maintain the existing world order

favorable to US interests. This is where that make the three big bosses concern within

this Indo-Pacific strategic triangle (McDaniel, 2012: 17).

Even though, India shared democratic values during the first fifty years of its

independence but there is a loophole within India-U.S. relation regarding a state of

estrangement (Rajamony, 2002: 1-47). It is the reason that India, so far, pursuing a

policy of non-alignment, decided not to join the West in its effort against

Communism that offended the U.S. deeply2. The 1960s and 1970s, the United States

veering towards Pakistan while the former Soviet Union offered political, military and

economic support to India. India U.S. relations hit rock bottom in 1971 during the

war with Pakistan over the liberation of Bangladesh (Chatterjee, 2011: 76-81).

1

Colonel Dan McDaniel, India, China and the United States in the Indo-Pacificregion: coalition, co-existence or clash?, (Australia: 2012) p.16 &17.


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.%

America concerns about the Chinas military modernization and its fast economic

development. This has introduced an increasingly self-assured, rich, and potentially

powerful actor into the Asian strategic geopolitical environment. When China

improved its military capabilities to guarantee its regional major power, it viewed as

threats in the continental-maritime balance among Asian main powers. When

combined with its growing economic and concomitant diplomatic influence, China is

a major player in every aspect of Asian security3. By gradual military capability

improvement on its offshore, even for strategically defensive purposes, China is

beginning to establish a presence in the maritime region that has been the preserve of

the United States and its allies for the past half-century (Cossa, Glosserman,

McDavitt, Patel, Przystup, Roberts, 2009: 23).

There are few complex motives behind the current Indian-Chinese rivalry. While

Indias economy is several times smaller than Chinas and its modern military

capabilities making India concern about its role in the Asia-Pacific region in the next

decade. Beijing has begun to take notice of Indias growing global political and

economic clout, as well as the broad-based American support for expanding strategic

ties with India. For its part, India, long suspicious of Chinas close relations and

military support for Pakistan, views an increased Chinese presence in northern

Pakistan and expanded civil nuclear cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad as

particularly worrisome. Indian military strategists believe they must plan for the

possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan and China even as they actively seek

dialogues with both to diminish the chances of such a dire scenario (Curtis &Cheng,

2011: 2,5).

Noticing Chinas muscle in economic and military capabilities, the U.S. try to engagewith India in order to set up barrier in the road ahead of China and balance the power

of China in Asia preventing China from dominating the region and be the only God of

the Pacific ocean4.

2Ananya Chatterjee, India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a

Strategic Triangle Political Perspectives, (University of Reading, 2011) p.76-81.

3 Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region:


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.&

Security Strategy for the Obama Administration(CNAS, 2009) p.23.

New Delhinot unlike many other capitals in Asiabalks at the idea of being part of

an American-led China containment strategy. Some Indian strategists even favor ago-slow approach to the U.S.Indian partnership in order to avoid raising Chinese ire.

But Chinas recent posturing on its border disputes with India leaves New Delhi few

options other than to play all the strategic cards at its disposal, including deepening

and expanding ties with the U.S. One must also calculate that Chinese alarms over

containment may in part be a tactic to prevent closer Indian cooperation with

nations in the Pacific, including the U.S (Curtis &Cheng: 2011: 6,11).

II. AcknowledgementThe paper acknowledges the guides under the instruction of Dr. Trond and the

handful of documents/ sources/ data from the academia, scholars, researchers through

PUC library and accessible e.library via internet.

III. IntroductionOn 6 June 2012, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated in New Delhi

cooperation with India was a linchpin in American grand strategy towards Asia. He

expressed Washingtons willingness to expand bilateral ties with India to protect the

same interest against China. Enemy of my enemy is my friend. The following week,

at the third annual India-US Strategic dialogue, both countries agreed on measures to

stabilize Afghanistan, combat nuclear proliferation, enhance maritime security,

upgrade intelligence liaison on counterterrorism, and cooperate against organized

crime (Zurich, 2012: 1).

Even the geostrategic positions of the US and India are very different5but U.S. and

India has no other choice beside being friend with each other in front of Beijing giant.

Being a continent- sized fortress, protected by oceans and friendly neighbors on its

land borders, the United States is not nearly as vulnerable to overland military attack

as India.

The latter country has a history of failing to defend its frontiers from invasion, and

perceives itself to be diplomatically isolated since it lacks a cultural-civilizational link


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.'

4Lisa Curtis, Dean Cheng, The Heritage Foundation The China Challenge: A Strategic

Vision for U.S.India Relations (July 18, 2011 No. 2583) p.2-11.

with other states. For this reason, the Indian security establishment is extremelyreluctant to use force for purposes other than internal security and territorial defense

(Zurich, 2012: 2-3).

While one hand is shaking with New Delhi, the other is catching up with Beijing.

Early day at office both two elected terms, the Obama Administration has repeatedly

called for a stronger military-to-military relationship with China. Leaving the

military dimension of our dialogue underdeveloped on both sides causes us to run

unnecessary risk, Vice President Joe Biden argued in July 2013, observing that

Chinas military is expanding its presence in Asia at the same time that the United

Sates is implementing its rebalancing to the Asian Pacific, bringing the two militaries

into greater proximity. Dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation between the two

militaries must expand, he said, because We have to know what each other are

doing.6

A 2009 U.S.-China joint statement issued in the name of President Obama and his

counterpart at the time, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao, pledged the two countries

to take concrete steps to advance sustained and reliable military-to-military relations

in the future. A 2011 joint statement similarly pledged the two governments to

pursue a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship. Moves to

strengthen the military-to-military relationship did not begin to gain momentum until

after the 2011 joint statement, however, as the transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping

as Chinas top leader began unfolding. Some analysts believe an unusual visit to the

Pentagon accorded to Xi in February 2012, when he visited the United States as Vice

President, may have helped win his support for more regular exchanges, and that his

strong relationship with the Chinese military has allowed him to bring the Chinese

military along with him (Lawrence, 2013: 14).

5ETH Zurich,India-US Relations: Progress Amidst Limited Convergence (Center for


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.(

Security Studies, 2012No. 117)p.1-3.

6Susan V. Lawrence, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues

(Congressional Research Service, 2013) p.14-15.

After days of agreement, operational cooperation between the two main military

powers extremely limited, but in remarks in Singapore in June 2013, Secretary of

Defense Hagel characterized dialogue between the two militaries as steadily

improving. Among the positive developments in the relationship that he cited in his

remarks were: Xis February 2012 Pentagon visit and visits to China by the chief of

the Pacific Command Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III (July 2012); then-Secretary

of Defense Leon Panetta (September 2012); and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Martin Dempsey (April 2013); Chinas first ever participation as an observer

of the U.S.-Philippine Balikatan joint military exercise in April 2013; A first-ever

U.S.-China joint anti-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden in September 2012; A first-

ever U.S. invitation to China to participate in the United States largest military

exercises in the Pacific, the Rim of the Pacific or RIMPAC exercise, in the summer of

2014, and Chinas April 2013 acceptance of the invitation; An agreement for the

United States and China to co-host a Pacific Army Chiefs Conference for the first

time (Lawrence, 2013: 15).

As for the US relationship with India plays as an example model of its willingness

and ability to rapidly realign its relationships to suit its interests7. A former Cold War

proxy competitor, the US had imposed sanctions to limit Indias nuclear development,

however changed its legislation to allow the sharing of civilian nuclear material and

technology with India, as a balance to Chinas power and its nuclear relationship with

Pakistan. Despite Indias refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of

only four nuclear non-signatory nations, the US successfully lobbied the International

Atomic Energy Agency to grant India special status to trade in the technology under

the India Safeguards and Nuclear Suppliers Group agreements (McDaniel, 2012: 18-

19).

But so far as what we have being seen and known that the rise of China and India is

the cause of the relative decline of the United States (US) and the subject of increasedstrategic review and analysis in the last decade.


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.)

7Colonel Dan McDaniel, India, China and the United States in the Indo- Pacific

region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: October 2012) p.18-19.

While for much of the last decade the US has been focused on wars in the Middle

East, China and India have been rising in the Asia-Pacific region, factors

acknowledged by the US President during his 2011 declaration of an American

strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific Region.

The US, China and India have all

declared, through strategy, an intent to remain diplomatically, economically andmilitarily engaged in the region, making it a point of strategic intersection. The extent

to which they are in coalition, co-existence or they clash in the region could set the

agenda for global security in what many nations have dubbed the Asian Century8.

Why U.S. and China seems interesting so much with India? Beside the second single

biggest market country in Asia, the Indian Ocean has four of the six major maritime

chokepoints and serves as a maritime super highway for in-demand energy resources

that drive the worlds largest economies. Almost 68 percent of Indias, 80 percent of

Chinas and 25 percent of the US oil is shipped from the Indian Ocean Region.

While important in its own right, the Indian Oceans Eastern border with the Pacific is

increasingly irrelevant as shifts occur in the global balance and the Indo-Pacific

Region grows in geo-strategic significance (McDaniel, 2012: 1-4).

IV. Literature ReviewIn the last fifty years, Indian diplomacy had significant change and maturation toward

the region and the world. India has moved from a Cold War relationship with the

USSR to establishment as a nuclear power, a burgeoning relationship with the US and

a shift in its regional relationships based on a new Look East9policy.There are also

indications that Indian diplomacy is moving beyond its pre-occupation with border

security, specifically at its North Eastern and North Western land borders with China

and Pakistan respectively.This is evidenced by developing relations with South-East

Asia and its maturing diplomatic approach to its traditional enemies, Pakistan andChina, and its newest friend, the US (McDaniel, 2012: 6-8).


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.*

8&9Colonel Dan McDaniel, India, China and the United States in the Indo- Pacific

region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: 2012) p.1-8.

When India changed its foreign policy toward the region and the world, U.S. adjusted

its foreign policy toward Asia-Pacific, especially China. According to US Foreign

Secretary Hillary Clinton, ...in competition with China10,and the extent to which it

is prepared to act to protect its position in the regional order is to be seen. There is

nothing in public US policy to suggest that the US intends to curb Chinas growth or

contain China in a Cold War fashion. On the contrary, it is US public foreign policy

to integrate China into the existing world order

and confidential US policy

discussions support that position (McDaniel, 2012: 19).

Further more, Washingtons secret in the Hillary Clintons confidential discussions

with the then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in March 2009 has been revealedas instructive for their insight into classified US thinking on rising China. In this

leaked diplomatic cable, Clinton outlines the US desire for a ...successful China...

but one that takes greater responsibility in the areas of global economic behavior, free

markets and human rights. The US and China are aware of each others specific

diplomatic red lines, such as over Taiwan and Tibet, and are unlikely to press each

other in these areas; They are likely to remain issues of co-existence for at least the

next decade in the status quo (McDaniel, 2012: 19).

It is not the first time in history that U.S. and China has confrontation in foreign

policy between each other. However, it started when Sino-US relations have been

strained since the Korean War, however China softened its anti-US diplomacy and

rhetoric following the September 11, 2001, Islamist terrorist attacks on the US

mainland. China lacks the deep alliance and agreement network of the US and the

regional trust that the US and India enjoy11. Indo-Pacific nations seek Chinese

economic engagement but fear Chinese diplomatic and military dominance. Assertive

Chinese behavior plays into those fears and will prompt ASEAN countries to


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA."+

encourage India and particularly the US to remain diplomatically, economically and

militarily engaged in the Indo-Pacific, counter to Chinese strategic objectives

(McDaniel, 2012: 31-33).

10&11Colonel Dan McDaniel, India, China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific


Unlike China, U.S. has better foreign policy record with India because India is an

indispensable partner for the United States12. Geographically, it sits between the two

most immediate problematic regions for U.S. national interests. The arc of instability

that begins in North Africa, goes through the Middle East, and proceeds to Pakistan

and Afghanistan ends at Indias western border. To its east, India shares a contested

land border with the other rising Asian power of the twenty-first century, China. India

despite continuing challenges with internal violence is a force for stability,

prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law in a very dangerous neighborhood. With

the rise of Asian economies, the Indian Ocean is home to critical global lines of

communication, with perhaps 50 percent of world container products and up to 70

percent of ship-borne oil and petroleum traffic transiting through its waters

(Blackwill, Chandra, Clary, 2011: 3)

India needs the United States because U.S. is the crucially preeminent global power

for India to compliment its economic and military effort to be the major power in the

region competing China. America remains the critical stabilizing force in Asia

through its military and diplomatic power projection and commitments to the region.

The United States and India have a shared vital national interest in preventing a

unipolar Asia. The twentieth century bore witness to a multigenerational U.S. effort to

prevent the emergence of any hostile hegemon on the Eurasian landmass, a function

that the United States continues to fulfill today with the help of its Asian partners. No

other nation can play that role on which Indias rise depends (Blackwill, Chandra,

Clary, 2011: 7).

Even though, Beijing knew the secret deal between U.S. and India toward China in so


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what it called containment but China still use soft diplomatic approach to world

affairs in order to present as a powerful and peaceful friend rather than an aggressive

challenger13.

12Robert D. Blackwill, Naresh Chandra, Christopher Clary, The United States and

India A Shared Strategic Future (Council on Foreign Relations &Aspen Institute

India, September 2011) p.3-7.


region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: 2012) p.29.

It has accepted institutions and multilateralism as necessary features of engagement in

the region and while preferring a bilateral approach; Chinas willingness to conduct

diplomatic business multilaterally is evidence of its shift.While China has many

regional relationships, its relations with India and the US will determine regional

stability.

V.

Methodology

The paper will use all secondary data to write literature review, consult fact and

finding, discuss, compare, and contrast the arguments. Furthermore, paper is the

social research text, so I will use qualitative method to write the text.

VI. Scope of ResearchDue to time limit and depend on the purpose of the paper, text will focus only on the

current strategic relation in military between US, China and India in the 21stcentury.

VII. Facts and FindingsAfter the oath of Barack Obama to be the President of United States, Hillary Clinton,

Secretary of State, and Indias external affairs minister agreed to further strengthen

the excellent bilateral relationship between the United States and India. Soon after,

President Obama issued a statement asserting that, Our rapidly growing and

deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the worlds citizens and that thepeople of India should know they have no better friend and partner than the people


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA."#

of the United States.14As part of her confirmation hearing to become Secretary of

State, Clinton told Senators she would work to fulfill President Obamas commitment

to establish a true strategic partnership with India, increase our military cooperation,

trade, and support democracies around the world (Alan, Kerr, Martin, Vaughn, 2010:

2-5).

14K. Alan Kronstadt, Paul K. Kerr, Michael F. Martin, Bruce Vaughn, India-U.S.

Relations (Congressional Research Service, 2010) p.2-5.

Strengthen relationship between U.S. and India is the diplomatic alert for China.

Beside new deal between U.S. and India, China concern about Indias military

buildup so far since the past 10 years. China also expressed the most concern over

Indias increasing strategic nuclear strike capability, primarily its land-based missiles,

and the next- most concern over its efforts to develop its own nuclear missilesubmarines. Several PLA analysts whose writings on the Indian military were

examined for this study have focused their concern on what they see as its

expansionist intentions and offense-oriented doctrinal development. Beyond the

actual military capabilities of these missiles, Chinese analysts expressed deeper

concern that India, in their view, has been actively publicizing the threat these

missiles could pose to China (Tanner, Dambaugh, Easton, 2011: 31-34).

China not sleep while India is shaking hands with U.S. The last 10 years China

speeded up its military capabilities in all fields and it made Indian security specialists

primarily concerned and considered it as the long-term issues in particular, Chinas

economic capacity to support a much more rapid military modernization and buildup

than India can sustain. They were also concerned about the long-term possibility of

China developing more aggressive and expansionist strategic intentions, as well as the

prospect of future rivalry or even conflict between the two countries. These specialists

were not nearly as concerned about the threat of a direct military confrontation with

China in the near future. This balance of relatively sanguine short-term views with


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA."$

longer- range concern has also been reflected in the recent public statements of senior

Indian officials, including Defense Minister Antony, who said in February 2011 that

India should not be unduly concerned about Chinas military modernization, but

should carry out a comprehensive review of its defense preparedness while

remaining vigilant at all times.15Most of these interviewees appeared to take as a

given that the future bilateral relationship would be characterized by intense strategic,

economic, and diplomatic competition, both bilaterally and regionally (Tanner,

Dambaugh, Easton, 2011: 35-37).

15Murray Scot Tanner, Kerry B. Dumbaugh, Ian M. Easton, Wary Partners:China and

India Assess their Security Relations(Center for Naval Analyses, 2011) p.31-37.

Chinas military modernization has been fueled by two decades of steadily increasing

military spending. According to the DOD report to Congress, Chinas officially

disclosed military budget increased an average of 9.7% annually in inflation-adjusted

terms over the decade from 2003 to 2012. At $114 billion, Chinas officially

announced budget for 2013 represents an increase of 10.7% over 2012. The Pentagon

believes Chinas actual military spending is higher than the officially disclosed

figures, with the report to Congress estimating that Chinas military spending for

2012 was in the range of $135 billion to $215 billion (Lawrence, 2013: 16).

In its 2013 report to Congress on military developments involving the PRC, the

Department of Defense (DOD) stated that it believed Chinas military modernization

is designed to improve the capacity of [Chinas] armed forces to fight and win short-

duration, high-intensity regional military conflict.16DOD assessed that the principal

focus and primary driver of Chinas military investment is preparing for a

contingency involving Taiwan, over which the PRC claims sovereignty. The DOD

report observed, though, that Chinas military modernization also appears

increasingly focused on developing capabilities for extended-range power projection

and operations in emerging domains such as cyber, space, and electronic warfare, as

well as other missions, including anti-piracy missions, peacekeeping, humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief, and regional military operations (Lawrence, 2013: 17).


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When China seem to accomplish their modernized military goal, the United States

and India signed a 10-year Defense Pact in Washington D.C on June 28, 2005 to

strengthen defense and military relations between the two countries. That landmark

agreement was a productive instrument for India and would help to facilitate joint

weapons production, co-operation on missile defense and the transfer of civil and

military technology to India. This agreement has paved the way for the possible

lifting of US export controls for sensitive military technology to India without signing

CTBT. The agreement is designed to achieve two main objectives17: (a) To help India

to advance Americas strategic goals in Asia; (b) To help India to become a major

world power this may project its military presence beyond its border.

16Susan V. Lawrence, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues


The both countries decided to formulate a defense procurement and production group

to examine defense trade, as well as prospects for co-production and technology

collaboration, research development, testing and evaluation and naval pilot training

(Fani, 138).

Dependent diplomatic or military relations with the United States is not yet enough

for India to secure its security. Self-reliant is a way for India to make sure that the ball

always in Indias court. All three main military services are currently instituting

reforms in order to meet Indias expanding strategic horizons18. The military is

moving toward intra- and inter-service network-centric organization aimed at

increasing interoperability.

India also continues to improve its nuclear weapons

delivery systems and aims to acquire a triad of land, air, and sea-based nuclear strike

options by 2014. The attention of Indias army and air force leaders has been shifting

steadily to the east; in 2010, the army was given an explicit directive from Defense

Minister Antony to prepare for a two-front war.According to the 2011-2012 MOD

Annual Report, the Indian Army (Kronstadt &Pinto, 2013: 8-9).

In 2011, India ranked as the sixth largest military spender in the world, accounting for

2.8% of total global military spending (by comparison, the United States was the

largest military spender at 41%, followed by China at 8.2%).India remains South


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA."&

Asias biggest defense spender by a large margin, accounting for more than three-

quarters of regional spending in 2011 (Pakistan accounted for about one-eighth).New

Delhi allocated just under $40.5 billion for defense expenditures in its FY2012/13

budget (Kronstadt &Pinto, 2013: 12-13).

Even though, U.S. has India in its line of containment strategies toward China but

U.S. still maintain and improved its decisive combat force - the US Department of

Defense employs 3.2 million people - its status as the largest single employer in the

world is a useful comparison to the place its military holds as the most powerful in the

world.

17Muhammad Ishaque Fani, The Indo- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11:

Implication for Pakistan(Pakistan: Vol. 10 No. 2) p.138.

18K. Alan Kronstadt, Sonia Pinto, U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues


Equally comparable is that the Peoples Liberation Army is the second largest single

employer in the world, at 2.3 million. The US is economically engaged with China

but is planning to rebalance its current naval disposition to 60 percent in the Pacific

and 40 percent in the Atlantic by 2020 (McDaniel, 2012: 21-23).

But the US National Military Strategy acknowledges the risks of growing national

debt and the challenges associated with the rise of India and China. While the strategy

does not mention India, it singles out China, specifically the challenges posed by the

existing friction points of anti-access/area denial capability development, missile

technology, the Taiwan Strait, competition in the space and cyber domains and

Chinas more assertive behavior in its claims to maritime areas of various surrounding

seas. The US military does however express the need for closer military ties with

China including security effort, specifically counter-piracy, counter proliferation of

WMD, disaster assistance, countering terrorism and influencing North Korea to

maintain a stable Korean Peninsula (McDaniel, 2012: 24-25).

The U.S. use two-face swords strategy in Asia-Pacific to contain China. One way is to

pivot India into the throat of China and another is to buildup military-to-military tie.

But without a formal military-to-military relationship between the PLA and US


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA."'

forces, the opportunities to increase transparency are reduced to initiatives such as the

India/US/China participation in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy is

an issue in the Malacca Straits and, given the importance of this SLOC20(Sea Lines

of Commerce) chokepoint to future geopolitical interaction between the strategic

triangle of the US, China and India, a cooperative operation mirroring the Gulf of

Aden would be a prime opportunity to increase transparency and familiarity

(McDaniel, 2012: 34-36).

It is not arm race, we may say, but military race among the three. India boasts some of

the largest individual military services,and the fourth largest overall military, in the

world,behind that of both the US and China. Size however, does not necessarily

equate to capability. Indias 2012-13 Defense budget is set to consume 1.9% of its

sample GDP, an increase of 17% from 2011-12,yet its military lacks an expeditionary

19&20Colonel Dan McDaniel, India, China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific

region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: 2012) p.21-25 &34-36.

capability,operates with outdated and redundant equipment and has such inefficient

acquisition processes that it returns billions of dollars annually in underspend;

USD1.1 billion in 2009. Indias status as a nuclear state has afforded it greater

influence and confidence21. India declared that its nuclear capability was a response to

Chinas rise and its nuclear arming of Pakistan,which dislocated China as the US

used the opportunity to engage India more closely. Certainly its more aggressive

response to the threat of Chinese containment has surprised Beijing (McDaniel, 2012:

9-10).

For China, since the founding of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), till the end of

the Cold War, Chinas relations with the United States were overshadowed by

ideological rivalry in the context of the East-West balance of power (Hook, 2005: 34).

Sino-American tensions lessened in the 1970s following the Sino-Soviet rift of late

1960s and the opening up of China by the efforts of Nixon-Kissinger duo22. Despite

the beginning of the economic modernization programme under Deng Xiaoping after

1976, Sino-U.S. bilateral relations continued to be plagued by U.S. complaints about

Beijings human rights policy, neglect of environmental problems, weapons transfers


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA."(

and arms sales to Iran, Pakistan and others and maintenance of protectionist trade

policies (Chatterjee, 2011: 82).

To project Chinas major power and reduce the strategic weight of U.S. to herself,China mature its relationship with India into one of the most important bilateral

relationships in world politics and their continuing economic growth are projecting

them to influential positions within the global market. According to the United States

National Intelligence Council Report on emerging global trends, by 2015,

international community will have to confront the military, political and economic

dimensions of the rise of China and India. How these two countries manage their

relationship will have a tremendous impact on peace and stability in the regional and,

increasingly, global context (Chatterjee, 2011: 84).



22Ananya Chatterjee, India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a

Strategic Triangle/ Political Perspectives (University of Reading, 2011) p.82-84.

According to triangular relationship theories23, several requirements should be

satisfied to establish a strategic triangle relationship: First, the three parties forming

the triangle are global or regional powers, with high status in the international system.

Second, the development of each partys national power is different in its direction or

speed, which results in the different perceptions of their national interest, especially in

terms of national security. Third, each party has a different attitude to the other two

parties. Factors affecting their attitudes to one another include history, ideology,

political system and culture. Fourth, each bilateral relationship has overt or covert

influences on the third party, resulting in reciprocal checks and balances among the

three parties.

In the case of the China-India-US triangle, the United States is the only global

superpower; China and India are regional powers. Therefore, the first requirement is

satisfied. Chinas rapid economic development, and its rising political influence over

the past decade, worries both the United States and India; they definitely feel the


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.")

pressure from China. China and India had a conflict over border disputes in 1962.

Since then, India has regarded China as one of its biggest threats. The United States is

the largest capitalist country in the world and China is the largest communist country,

while India regards itself as the largest democracy in the world. Thus, on the ideology

front, Americans see India as their natural ally.

Although the first three requirements of a strategic triangle are met, we cannot say

that, between China, India, and the US, each bilateral relationship has significant

effects on the third party. The China-India-US relationship is not like the China-

Soviet-US strategic triangle formed during the Cold War, because, at that time, both

the Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American bilateral relationships were actually in situations

of cold or hot military confrontation but triangle between U.S., China &India is not

direct military confrontation. But any change in any one of the bilateral relationships

would have had a material influence on the national security or national economic

interest of the third party (Zongyi, 2012: 2).

However, the China-India-US strategic triangle relation doesnt like the China-Soviet-

US formation. The reason is that each of the bilateral relationships has only weak

implications for the third party. For a long time, the core issue between China and the

United States has been the Taiwan issue, but India has no interest in Taiwan. Now,

though, with more and more global issues intruding on the bilateral relations of China

and the United States, some of Indias national interests have also become involved

(Zongyi, 2012: 3).

It is undeniable that United States enjoys some more advantages than China and India

in triangle relationship because U.S. is only superpower even though it is relatively.

Both China and India want to maintain a good relationship with the United States, as

the only superpower, because both of them are trying to avoid becoming contained by

US policies. At the same time, both China and India want to gain some support from

the US. This might be where Seema Sirohis romantic triangle comes from. But, in

the current trilateral relationship between China, India and the US, Chinas rapid rise

has provoked concern and even problematic sentiments in the United States (Zongyi,

2012: 4).

VIII. Conclusion and Recommendation


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA."*

To ensure success in the military relationship in triangle, U.S. uses several principles

to guide its force and program development. First, because U.S. cannot predict how

the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, U.S. will maintain a

broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across

the range of U.S. main objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. Second, U.S. has sought

to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that

can be deferred.

Third, U.S. is determined to maintain a ready and capable force, even as they reduce

our overall capacity. We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to

retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas. Fourth, the

Department of Defense must continue to reduce the cost of doing business. This

entails reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, finding further efficiencies in

overhead and headquarters, business practices, and other support activities before

taking further risk in meeting the demands of the strategy to reduce collateral

damages.

23Liu Zongyi, The China-India-US Relationship: Where Will It Go? (Future

International Direction, 2012) p.2-4.

Finally, U.S. Department of Defense suggest to examine how this triangle strategy

will influence existing campaign and contingency plans so that more limited resources

may be better tuned to fulfill the objectives. This will include a renewed emphasis on

the need for a globally networked approach to deterrence and warfare. Sixth, the

Department will need to examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve

Component (RC) elements best suited to the triangle US-China-India strategy.

Chinas military modernization and objective are not a secret it keeps from the region

and the world. Until today top Chinese leaders not yet know whether China will

become the United States friend or enemy in the decades ahead. Its next generation

of leaders, other internal developments, and the future of cross-Strait relations will

ultimately determine chinas military destiny, yet Americas strategic response will


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.#+

also shape the future of the U.S.-China relationship.

In this given strategic uncertainty, the United States has no choice but to pursue a

two-face policy toward China. One way is to engage China and encourage it toresponsible its overall actions as world major power in the international affairs. The

second is to set up China in containment strategy against competitive or aggressive

behavior by China, pursuing continued engagement rather than treating the country as

an enemy because China is too big for America and Beijingers are not kid that U.S.

can fool around.

Mao Zedong gave the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) a strategy of Peoples War

the idea was to draw invading armies deep into Chinese territory, envelop them, and

destroy them slowly in a protracted war of attrition. In contrast, Deng Xiaoping and

his successors have advocated new theories of Local War (versus total war) and

Rapid War, Rapid Resolution (as opposed to war of attrition). First step to

modernize Chinese military capability is the Moist legacy downsizing the PLA and

making Chinas defense R&D system and military industry more efficient. Chinas

reforms aim to increase the readiness of selected PLA units, train them intensively,

and perform realistic exercises (including joint exercises with Russia and other

nations).

The second step is to bring Chinas three military services into the age of joint

operations. The Chinese further stress the need for informationization, what the

United States calls command, control, communications, computer, intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). To this end, the 2004 White Paper

replicates the US emphasis on satellite and airborne sensors, unmanned aerial

vehicles, and information warfare.

Finally, China plans to maintain strategic nuclear deterrence and challenge American

dominance wherever possible. Despite Americas overwhelming military superiority,

China aims to exploit vulnerabilities in key US capabilities using counter-space,

counter-carrier, counter- air, and information warfare to prevent the United States

from dominating a military confrontation or achieving quick and easy victory.

Chinas recent anti-satellite missile test demonstrated its commitment to reducingAmericas advantage in space.


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.#"

Sino-Indian frictions are growing, and the potential for conflict remains high. Alarm

is rising in India because of frequent and strident Chinese claims about the Line of

Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, where Indians have complained of

a dramatic rise in Chinese intrusions into Indian Territory over the last few years,

most along the border in Arunachal Pradesh, which China refers to as Southern

Tibet. China has upped the ante on the border issue. It has been regularly protesting

against the Indian prime ministers visit to Arunachal Pradesh, asserting its claims

over the territory.

Even though, Pakistan has always been a crucial foreign policy asset for China, but

with Indias rise and U.S.-India rapprochement, its role in Chinas grand strategy is

bound to grow even further. Not surprisingly, recent revelations about China's shift

away from a three-decades old cautious approach on Jammu and Kashmir, its

increasing military presence in Pakistan, planning infrastructure linking Xinjiang and

Gwadar, issuing stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir and supplying

nuclear reactors to Pakistan, all confirm a new intensity behind Chinas old strategy

of using Pakistan to secure its interests in the region.

Chinas economic transformation has given it the capability to emerge as a major

military power, spending as much as $65 billion a year on its defense forces. Chinas

military may or may not be able to take on the United States in the next few years; it

will surely become the most dominant force in Asia. As a consequence of its growing

capabilities, China has started asserting its military profile more significantly than

before. Beijing is also considering sending combat troops abroad in support of United

Nations peacekeeping efforts. Chinese military officers are openly talking of building

the worlds strongest military and displacing the United States as global hegemon, bymeans of a war if need be. This might be a bit premature, as the U.S. military still

remains far more advanced than Chinas, which does not yet possess the capability to

challenge the United States far from Chinese shores. Its Chinas neighbors, however,

who are bearing the brunt of Chinas new assertiveness.

Chinas sustained military build-up will continue over the next few years and will

pose a challenge to Indian military planners as the Indian militarys modernization

program is fast losing momentum. India needs to urgently review its defense

preparedness vis--vis China. As the policy paralysis post-Mumbai has revealed, it


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.##

seems to have lost even its conventional superiority over Pakistan. The real challenge

for India, however, lies in Chinas rise as a military power. India is speeding up its

defense procurement but the process remains mired in bureaucratese and lacks any

sense of strategic direction. Between 2010 and 2016, India is expected to spend $112

billion on capital defense acquisitions in what is being described as one of the largest

procurement cycles in the world. The Indian Army is raising two new specialized

infantry mountain divisions (35,000 soldiers) and an artillery brigade for Arunachal

Pradesh, designed to redress the imbalance on the Sino-Indian border. It is also

revising its conventional war-fighting doctrine that is aimed at deterringas opposed

to dissuadingChina, though its meaning in operational terms remains far from clear.

The Indian military is currently refining a two-front war doctrine to fend off

Pakistan and China simultaneously.

China is acquiring naval facilities along the crucial choke points in the Indian Ocean

not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic regional

presence. There is evidence to suggest that China is comprehensively building up its

maritime power in all dimensions. Its growing reliance on bases across the Indian

Ocean region is a response to its perceived vulnerability, given the logistical

constraints that it faces due to the distance of the Indian Ocean waters from its own

area of operation. Yet, China is consolidating power over the South China Sea and the

Indian Ocean with an eye on India. This power consolidation was expressed in an oft-

cited secret memorandum issued by the director of the General Logistic Department

of the PLA: We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the

Indians ... We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.

China deployed its Jin class submarines in 2008 at a submarine base near Sanya in thesouthern tip of Hainan Island in South China Sea, raising alarm in India as the base is

merely 1,200 nautical miles from the Malacca Strait. The base will be its closest

access point to the Indian Ocean. The base also has an underground facility that can

hide submarine movement. The concentration of strategic naval forces at Sanya will

further propel China towards a consolidating its control over the surrounding Indian

Ocean region. The presence of access tunnels on the mouth of the deep water base is

particularly troubling for India. This is because of the strategic implications, allowing

China to interdict shipping at the three crucial choke points in the Indian Ocean. The


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.#$

choice of Hainan is poor, but no alternatives exist as other places are hemmed in by

islands. So Chinas chief maritime nuclear base is also currently her southernmost

point. She would want the waters around clear so that, among other things, no one can

track her submarines.

The Indian Navy is aiming for a total fleet of 140-145 vessels over the next decade,

built around two carrier battle groups: Admiral Gorshkov which will now be handed

over to India only by 2013 and the indigenous carrier, the 37, 500-tonne STOBAR

Air Defense Ship likely to be completed by 2015. Indias ambition to equip its navy

with two or more aircraft carriers over the next decade, as well as its decision to

launch its first indigenous nuclear submarine in 2009, is seen as crucial for power

projection and to achieve a semblance of strategic autonomy. Indias emerging

capability to put a carrier task force as far as the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf

has given boost to Indian Navys blue-water aspirations and India hopes to induct a

third aircraft carrier by 2017, ensuring that the Indian Navy has two operational

carriers at any given point. The deployment of the Jin class submarine at Hainan by

China will also force India to speed up its indigenous nuclear submarine project that

has been in the making for more than a decade now with the Indian Navy, rather

ambitiously, aiming at the induction of five indigenous Advanced Technology

Vehicle (ATV) nuclear submarines. A submarine-based nuclear arsenal is considered

critical by Indian strategists to retain a second-strike capability. While a focus on

augmenting its platforms, systems and weapons is clearly visible in the Indian Navy,

concomitant changes in doctrine and organization have been relatively slow to come.

India is using its naval forces to advance its diplomatic initiatives overseas and in

particular towards shaping the strategic environment in and around the Indian Ocean.Indian interests converge with those of the United States in the Indian Ocean region

and it is trying to use the present upswing in U.S.-India ties to create a more favorable

strategic environment for itself in the region despite its historical sensitivities to the

presence of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean. The United States has also recognized

the importance of Indias role in the region, viewing it as crucial in maintaining peace

and stability in the Indian Ocean and its vast periphery. The U.S. and Indian navies

have stepped up their joint exercises and the United States has sold India the USS

Trenton (renamed INS Jalashwa), the first of its class to be inducted into the Indian


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.#%

Navy. The United States would like India to join its Container Security Initiative

(CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) but India remains reluctant. PSI is

viewed as a U.S.-led initiative outside the United Nations mandate while the CSI

would result in the presence of U.S. inspectors in Indian ports, making it politically

radioactive. However, India has indicated that it would be willing to join the U.S.-

proposed 1,000-ship navy effort to combat illegal activities on the high seas, given the

informal nature of the arrangement. India is seen as a balancer in the Asia-Pacific

where the U.S. influence has waned relatively even as Chinas has risen. Indias ties

with Japan have also assumed a new dynamic with some even mooting a concert of

democracies proposal involving the democratic states of the Asia-Pacific working

towards their common goals of a stable Asia-Pacific region.

While such a proposal has little chance of evolving into anything concrete in the near

term, especially given Chinas sensitivities, Indias decision to develop natural gas

with Japan in the Andaman Sea and recent military exercises involving United States,

Japan, India and Australia does give a sense of Indias emerging priorities.

China remains the only major power that refuses to discuss nuclear issues with India

for fear of implying a de facto recognition of Indias status as a nuclear power. It

continues to insist on the sanctity of the UN resolution 1172 which calls for India (and

Pakistan) to give up its nuclear weapons program and join the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.

The U.S.-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact came as a shock to Beijing.

China made every possible effort to scuttle the deal until the last minute. It made its

displeasure with the nuclear pact clear by asking India to sign the NPT and dismantle

its nuclear weapons. Since the U.S.-India deal is in many ways a recognition of

Indias rising global profile, China, not surprisingly, was not happy with the outcome

and quickly declared that it would be selling new nuclear reactors to Pakistan. This

was a not so subtle message to the United States that if Washington decided to play

favorites, China also retained the same right.

China has vigorously asserted its old claims along the border with India and has

combined it with aggressive patrolling. Violating the 1993 India-China agreement onpeace and tranquility on the Line of Actual Control, Chinese troops have been


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.#&

engaging Indian troops in verbal abuses, asking them to leave their own territory.

Even as India considered the Sikkim border issue settled, repeated Chinese incursions

in the Finger Area in northern Sikkim, in the past few years, are aimed at opening a

fresh front against India.

Beijing is also determined to put the historically undisputed border with Sikkim back

in contestation. Concerns are growing about covert Chinese intrusions into the Indian

territory to strengthen its claims on the disputed border areas. Chinese forces regularly

intrude into Bhutanese territory at the tri-junction with India and destroy Indian Army

posts. These incursions are strategic as they are precariously close to Indias

chicken-neckthe Siliguri corridor which links the Northeast Passage. Chinese

intrusions into the non-delineated parts of Bhutans northern border with Tibet are

also aimed at forcing Bhutan to settle its boundary issue with China.

There are set of general recommendations for triangle military relation between US,

China and India: (1) Set a long-term vision for the overall military relationship as well

as strategic end states for each area of service cooperation; (2) Each service should

have a dialogue about strategic trends and developments within the Indo-Pacific

region that would include, as two prominent examples, regular conversations onChinese military power and Afghanistans stability. These discussions will not craft

binding policy but rather serve as a vehicle to better inform both sides about their

respective positions on key strategic issues;

(3) Develop a mutually agreed-on understanding about the concept ofinteroperability to include alternate terminology and required minimum capabilities;

(4) Develop common protocols for disaster response contingencies across the air

force, army, and navy. Topics to be covered include command and control,

communications protocol, equipment standardization, and common training.

Resurrect the Disaster Response Working Group as a vehicle for this purpose; (5)

Work toward instituting joint operations across all service exercises and engagements;

(6) Conduct multilateral security activities across air, land, and sea domains with

other Asian and Oceanic powers, including Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia,

and South Korea;

(7) Explore the idea of complementary posture by examining how the U.S. and


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Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.#'

Indian militaries can use each others berthing and intelligence facilities throughout

the Indian Ocean Region. Reciprocal use of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as well

as Diego Garcia could be possibilities; (8) Conduct joint maritime security patrols

with India in the South Asia maritime region, which includes Sri Lanka, Maldives,

and Bangladesh, among other states. Also work with India to establish a corollary to

the highly successful Pacific Partnership program in the Indian Ocean; (9) Both

countries air forces should examine possibilities for closer cooperation on Space

Situational Awareness, which is increasingly important due to the large amount of

space debris that could threaten U.S. and Indian space-based assets;

(10) Commence a discussion about missile defense policy. More specifically, both

sides should have a policy discussion aimed at exchanging perspectives on the

effective deployment and operation of missile defense systems; (11) Both armies

should explore the possibility of joint capacity building in areas related to disaster

response, peacekeeping, police training, and principles of civilmilitary; (12) Work

together on building maritime capacity for other naval forces; focus could be on

coastal security, vessel boarding, and maritime law enforcement, with each side

addressing topics in which they have expertise;

(13) Work toward improved Maritime Domain Awareness in the South Asiamaritime region through the use of technologies and information exchanges not only

bilaterally but also with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives; (14) Work more

closely on building the Indian Navys human capital in naval architecture to assist

Indias ship design and shipbuilding capabilities; (15) Establish an officer exchange

program whereby U.S., Indian and Chines officers would serve tours in the other

sides respective bureaucracies. For example, U.S. officers could perhaps serve on the

Integrated Defense Staff while Indian and Chines officers could serve on the Pacific

Command (PACOM) staff. Implementing such a recommendation would be a

daunting challenge because both sides would need to work out the modalities of

access to sensitive spaces and information. However, merely having the discussion

would be a good exercise in enhancing the mutual understanding of bureaucratic

procedures.


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IX. References1. McDaniel, D. (2012). India, China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific

region: coalition, co-existence or clash? 16 &17.

2. Chatterjee, A. (2011). University of Reading. India-China-United States: The Post-

Cold War Evolution of a Strategic Triangle Political Perspectives.76-81.

3. Cossa, Ralph A., Glosserman B. (2009). CNAS. The United States and the Asia-

Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration.23.

4. Curtis, L., Cheng, D. (2011). The Heritage Foundation The China Challenge: A

Strategic Vision for U.S.India Relations.2-11.

5. Zurich, E. (2012). Center for Security Studies. India-US Relations: Progress

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6. Lawrence, Susan V. (2013). Congressional Research Service. U.S.-China

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7. McDaniel, D. (2012). Australia. India, China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific region: coalition, co-existence or clash?1-8 &18-33.

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