STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE ISLAMABAD (SSII) · STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE ISLAMABAD (SSII) Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad (SSII) was founded by Dr. Shireen M Mazari in 2013

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE ISLAMABAD (SSII)

Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad (SSII) was founded

by Dr. Shireen M Mazari in 2013. The purpose behind the

creation of the SSII was to establish a dedicated academic

and research institution for conducting research and

trainings on important issues related to Pakistan’s

security. SSII aim to put knowledge to practice by providing

an alternate narrative in critical areas of Strategic Studies,

especially Arms Control and Disarmament.

https://ssii.com.pk/shireen-mazari-2/

CONFERENCE

REPORT

1

Concept Note

The conference brought together scholars working on global nuclear

issues in Pakistan and across the world to discuss the challenges and

opportunities of the emerging nuclear non-proliferation regime. It

highlighted the proactive role Pakistan is playing in order to generate

new ideas on the subject. In assessing Pakistan’s role within the non-

proliferation framework we sought to include several issues facing the

non-proliferation regime. As such scholars from Pakistan, Russia, Iran,

Egypt, China, Europe and the US each brought their unique perspective

to the conference.

Understanding the global nuclear regime requires an investigation into a

number of issues such as The Ban Treaty, Multilateral export control

regimes with a special reference to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

The conference thus began by providing an overview of the

contemporary scenario in the aftermath of the Ban Treaty. It was

followed by a discussion on the future of the JCPOA. The session on

multilateral export controls featured an assessment of current trends

including discussions on the criteria based approach and possible Indian

and Pakistani membership. The next session reviewed certain global and

regional arms control developments and responses. This included

discussions on the Korean Peninsula, the CTBT, and the Middle East and

US-Russia Arms Control agreements. The session highlighted that

regional arms control approaches whether in the Middle East, Korea or

elsewhere will not be successful unless states' security concerns (within

and outside their geographical locations) are addressed. Moreover,

regional security concerns will not be met if states outside the region

maintain policies that are hostile to the states contemplating regional

non-proliferation and disarmament undertakings. In highlighting this

fact, the conference agenda worked its way up to the final part of the

conference on Strategic Stability in South Asia. It provided an over view

of military and arms control developments in Pakistan and India and

discussed prospects for crisis and strategic stability in the region.

Conference Themes

• The Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime after the Ban Treaty

• Impact of the Failure of JCPOA on Regional and Global Security

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• Supplier Cartels Focusing on the NSG

• Global and Regional Developments

• Strategic Stability in South Asia: Recent Developments

Conference Programme

The Global Non Proliferation Regime: Challenges and Responses

October 15, 2018 (Monday)

09:00 - 09:30 Registration (Serena Hotel)

10:00 - 10:03 National Anthem

10:03 - 10:05 Recitation from the Holy Quran

10:05 - 10:10 Opening Remarks by Ms. Amina Afzal

(Director General SSII)

10:10 - 10:20 Welcome Remarks by Dr. Shireen Mazari

(Federal Minister for Human Rights and Founder

SSII)

10:20 - 10:50 Keynote Address by Dr Arif Alvi

(President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan)

10: 50 – 10:52 Group Photograph

Session I

11:30 - 13:00 The Future of the Nuclear Non Proliferation

Regime

(An overview of the contemporary scenario in the

aftermath of the Ban Treaty)

Chair: Dr. Shireen M Mazari

11:30 - 12:10

Speakers

• Mr. Paul Ingram (Nuclear Non Proliferation after the Ban Treaty)

• Mr. Aaron Karp (Evolving US Nuclear Posture)

• Dr. Rabia Akhter (Evolving US Nuclear Posture)

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12:10 - 12:45 Discussion

12:45 - 13:00 Summary Remarks by the Chair

Session II

14:30 - 17:00 Supplier Cartels Focusing on the NSG – An

assessment of current trends including discussions

on the criteria based approach and possible

Indian and Pakistani membership.

Chair: Amb (Retd) Ayesha Riyaz

14:30 - 15:10

Speakers

• Amb (Retd) Zamir Akram (Supplier Cartels Focusing on the NSG)

• Dr. Dingli Shen (Suppliers Cartels Focusing on the NSG)

• Ms. Amina Afzal


15:45 - 16:00 Summary remarks by the Chair

October 16, 2018 (Tuesday)

Session III

10:00 - 12:00 Impact of the Failure of JCPOA on Regional and

Global Security

Chair: Mr. Tariq Rauf

Speakers

• Ambassador (Retd) Ali Soltanieh Impact of the Failure of JCPOA on Regional and

Global Security)

• Mr. Robert Eienhorn

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• (Impact of the Failure of JCPOA on Regional and Global Security)

• Dr. Bruno Tertrais


• Ms. Anastasia Shavrova




Session IV

13:15 - 16:15 Global and Regional Developments

Review of certain global and regional arms

control developments and responses.

Chair: Shen Dingli

13:15 - 14:00

Speakers

• Mr. John Tierney (Developments on the Korean Peninsula)

• Ambassador (Retd) Dr. Sameh Aboul Enein (The Global and Regional Developments: Middle

East NWFZ/MWDFZ)

• Mr. Tariq Rauf (Current Challenges and Risks in Nuclear Arms

Control)

• Ms. Alexandra Bell (Global and Regional Developments: Russia US

Arms Control)



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Session V

15:00 - 17:15 Strategic Stability in South Asia: Recent

Developments

Review of military and arms control developments

in Pakistan and India; prospects for crisis and

strategic stability.

Chair: Mr. Khalid Banuri

(Former DG ACDA)

15:00 - 16:00

Speakers:

• Mr. Subrata Goshroy (Via Skype) (The Strategic Stability in South Asia: Recent

Developments)

• Mr. Tong Zhao (Strategic Stability in South Asia: Regional

Developments)

• Dr. Shireen Mazari



6

INAUGURAL SESSION

Opening Remarks by DG SSII

Ms Amina Afzal

Distinguished guests, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, a very good

morning to all of you. On behalf of Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad,

it is my privilege to welcome you to this conference titled The Global

Non-proliferation Regime: Challenges and Responses. I would like to

extend a very warm welcome to our distinguished speakers and panelists

some of whom have travelled thousands of miles to be with us here

today. I wish all of you a very pleasant stay in Pakistan and two fruitful

days of discussion ahead of you. I would also like to take this

opportunity to thank Dr. Shireen Mazari, the Federal Minister for Human

Rights and the founder of SSII. Incidentally, Dr. Mazari is the person

who envisioned this conference and of course none of this would have

been possible without her constant support. So, without further ado, I

invite Dr. Shireen Mazari for her welcome remarks.

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Welcome Remarks by Minister for Human Rights,

Dr. Shireen Mazari

First of all, let me welcome the President of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan Dr. Arif Alvi. I think there could not have been a better suited

person in the Presidency; a thorough professional who became a

politician and has a vision which we have debated and discussed and I

am proud to say that he has stood steadfast with his vision and I think it

is an amazingly good fortune for the country that Dr. Alvi is now in the

Presidency. Of course, he is also a very close personal friend and we

have had many discussions and debates on global politics including in

the area of arms control and disarmament. So, he comes fully prepared to

this conference and I really appreciate the fact that he took time off and

agreed to inaugurate this very important seminar. We know that the issue

of non-proliferation is very important for Pakistan. We have been

confronted with discriminatory approaches at the global level. We have

issues at the regional level also where there is this tussle between trying

to maintain stability of nuclear deterrence and others trying to up the ante

in the ballistic arms race with the introduction of ballistic missile defence

in the neighbourhood and other such issues. So, we felt it was time that

we really had thorough discussions on the global non-proliferation

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regime: the challenges; Is the NPT being undermined? What role is there

for the Ban Treaty? What about the NSG: Is it going to be a

discriminatory instrument? or is there now going to be a criteria-based

approach for new entrants for membership of the NSG. So, we hope that

over the next two days we will have thorough discussions on this. And

we also hope that we will be able to understand from our perspective, the

changing US position, especially on the JCPOA and the impact that will

have on the overall non-proliferation debate at the global and regional

levels. Any how these are the issues that we will be discussing later, so

without much more ado let me welcome everybody. Finally let me thank

the President Dr. Arif Alvi and invite him to make his keynote address.

Keynote address by President of Pakistan,

Dr. Arif Alvi

Honourable Dr. Shireen Mazari, Distinguished Director General of the

Strategic Studies Institute, Respected Scholars, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a pleasure for me to address this Conference. I thank the Strategic

Studies Institute (SSI) for inviting me as a Keynote speaker.

The subject of the Conference is of great contemporary relevance and

significance for Pakistan. The challenges to the global non-proliferation

regime ultimately impact peace and stability at all levels, national,

regional and global. For the Government in Pakistan, socio-economic

development and welfare of the people constitutes the topmost priority.

This, in turn, necessitates a peaceful neighbourhood in South Asia as

well as a stable global security environment. Therein lies the significance

of evolving a sustainable and equitable global non-proliferation regime

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which is based on recognition of the right to equal security for all states

and does not seek to preserve the security interests of the few at the

expense of others.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The international security landscape is far from encouraging. The

euphoria generated by the end of Cold War and the concomitant

expectations for meaningful steps towards global disarmament have

given way to a qualitative nuclear arms race among the leading nuclear

possessor states. The same is manifested in terms of increased reliance

on nuclear weapons in the national nuclear postures and policies of great

powers, plans to modernise and upgrade nuclear forces and testing of

new and more lethal weapon systems. Old conflicts continue to fester as

new ones flare up. Differences on perspectives, approaches and

modalities, are negatively impacting progress on nuclear disarmament

and non-proliferation. Double standards and exceptionalism are

undermining the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. As a result,

the global non-proliferation regime has come under increasing stress.

Alongside the existing challenges related to nuclear, chemical and

biological weapons, new threats have arisen. These include hostile uses

of Outer Space, offensive cyber capabilities, development and use of

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) and armed drones. Such

weapons can lower the threshold for war and put machines at the helm of

decisions of life and death. There is a need for legally binding global

framework to regulate the use of the emerging technologies to safeguard

against the new threats to international peace and security posed by the

weaponisation of such technologies.


In relation to the global non-proliferation regime, two opposing trends

are being witnessed.

On the one hand, there is dangerous talk of strengthening and expanding

nuclear capabilities to outmatch potential competitors. On the other

extreme, frustrated by the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, a

group of Non-Nuclear Weapon States is promoting the recently adopted

Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Ban Treaty). This Treaty

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trivialises the genuine national security concerns which have compelled

certain states to rely on nuclear deterrence for self-defence.

Pakistan believes that for global and regional peace and stability, the

motives which drive states to acquire weapons for self-defence need to

be addressed. These include threats from conventional and non-

conventional imbalances, existence of disputes and conflicts and

discrimination in application of international norms and laws. There is a

need for the UN to play its due role in facilitating the resolution of long-

standing disputes for example Kashmir and other conflicts which are

underlying factors for instability.

Distinguished participants,

Pakistan is committed to the objective of strategic stability in South Asia.

Prior to 1998, Pakistan relentlessly pursued the objective of keeping

South Asia free of nuclear weapons. Our proposals in this regard are well

documented. However, the nuclear tests conducted by our neighbour in

1998 ended any prospect for a nuclear weapons free South Asia. We

were forced to respond through our own tests to restore the strategic

balance in our region.

Pakistan has, however, not given up the pursuit of meaningful

engagement with India for confidence-building, avoidance of an arms

race and risk reduction. In this regard Pakistan’s proposal for a Strategic

Restraint Regime (SRR), encompassing nuclear and missile restraints,

conflict resolution and conventional balance, can provide a good basis.

Unfortunately, strategic stability in South Asia is being threatened by the

induction of destabilising weapons systems, such as the Anti-Ballistic

Missile systems (ABMs) and offensive force postures, such as Cold Start

and Proactive Strategy. Discriminatory exemptions by certain countries

for the supply of nuclear technology and advanced military hardware in

our neighbourhood further complicate the regional security dynamics.

While Pakistan will continue to demonstrate restraint and responsibility,

no one should doubt our resolve to deny any space for war to those

seeking such an opportunity despite the existence of nuclear weapons in

South Asia. We expect the international community to take serious note

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of talk of surgical strikes and limited war. The proponents of such

reckless fantasies would bear the responsibility for any consequences.

We hope that good sense prevails and both Pakistan and India are able to

agree on a framework for strategic stability. We owe it to our people to

employ greater efforts and resources towards their socio-economic

wellbeing.


Since its inception, the orientation of Pakistan nuclear programme has

been civilian. We were one of the early subscribers to the Atoms for

Peace vision and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA). We have a complete programme for harnessing peaceful uses of

nuclear energy including nuclear power plants, complete nuclear fuel

cycle capabilities, research reactors, agriculture and biotechnology

research centres, medical and oncology centres. As such, Pakistan can be

a significant contributor to the attainment of the Sustainable

Development Goals (SDGs) through international cooperation. We,

therefore, intend to further strengthen partnerships at the international

level, including with the UN, IAEA and developing countries, as

providers of services and expertise, for civilian nuclear applications.

Pakistan has applied for the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

(NSG). Pakistan adherence to the NSG Guidelines reflects our

commitment and contribution to the non-proliferation regime. We will

continue to support and actively participate in efforts for non-

proliferation, nuclear safety and security. As a country with a significant

civilian nuclear programme and the ability to supply items controlled by

the NSG, Pakistan’s participation will further the non-proliferation

objectives of the Group.

For Pakistan, one of the most vulnerable countries to the impact of

climate change, nuclear power generation provides a cleaner and more

sustainable alternative for energy security. In this regard, we would like

to underscore the imperative for a non-discriminatory and rule-based

global order for access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other dual-

use technologies.

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Exceptionalism and discriminatory waivers from rules undermine the

credibility of the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation

framework. Its future depends on the continuous commitment of the

international community to collective solutions. Challenges in the realm

of the non-proliferation regime have to be addressed through diplomatic

solutions and enhanced cooperation, not through polarisation, coercion

and exclusion. In this context, I would like to reiterate Pakistan’s full

support for the JCPOA and express our appreciation for Iran’s continued

implementation of its obligation under the agreement. We call upon all

concerned parties to honour their respective commitments. We also

welcome the recent positive developments in the Korean peninsula and

hope that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and other

concerned parties will abide by their international obligations for the

realisation of the goal of a nuclear weapon free Korean peninsula.

Ladies and gentlemen, we should be progressing for a nuclear-free world

but unless all countries come to some understanding and reduce the areas

of conflict throughout the world and look forward to preserving the

ecology, the environment, the world by itself, where in the last few

decades, we came up to a capability of destroying the world many times

over. The world where we live in, where human resource and human

poverty has led to situations where there is a big divide between the

haves and have-nots. Unless conflicts are resolved, unless we reduce our

postures, reduce our weapons, the world will not see peace easily and in

the near future. So, your deliberations in this conference are very

important and I think it will send out positive messages throughout the

world for what Pakistan wants and what the region deserves. Thank you

very much ladies and gentlemen, thank you Dr. Mazari, and thank you

the delegates who have come from abroad.

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SESSION I

Session Chair: Dr. Shireen Mazari

This is the first working session of the seminar and

it is on the future of the non-proliferation regime.

We have three excellent speakers. Mr. Paul Ingram

is from the UK and he is the Executive Director of

the British American Security Information Council

(BASIC) which is in London. He also has extensive

media experience. He is responsible for developing

the strategy of BASIC to help reduce nuclear

dangers through disarmament and collaborative non-proliferation. He has

authored a number of BASIC reports and briefings. He also hosted a

weekly prime-time talk show on IRINN, the Iranian domestic TV news

channel and in Farsi no less, where he addressed relevant issues relating

to global security between 2007 and 2012. He has recently co-founded

the Middle East Treaty Organisation project. There is a draft treaty

apparently that has been drafted to stimulate constructive discussions

around the Middle East WMD Free Zone. It should be interesting to see

the outcome of that since the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone for the Middle

East has died multiple deaths every time it is introduced. But anyhow, I

will start with Paul Ingram to give us his presentation.

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Mr. Paul Ingram

Thank you very much Shireen, and thank you very

much for inviting me to this really important event.

It would be strange of me to spend any time at all

talking to you about some of the shortcomings of

the Non-proliferation Treaty because I think you

know them, though I also think the Treaty has had a

number of successes. It is about to celebrate its 50th

year. A sign of its success. But the fact that it has

been around for 50 years is also part of the problem. It has become rather

stuck and the ability to adapt and evolve has been rather limited. And I

think it is important for our institutions to be sufficiently adaptable to

continually be looking for new ways of tackling the evolving problems.

Let me be clear that the problems do evolve and shift along with global

power balances and it is important for us to rediscover objectives for

each generation: what it is that we are trying to do and why it is

important for states to collaborate in a constructive manner. There are

areas that are often ignored or not given sufficient attention, not just the

changing power structures, but also the changing technologies. They are

very important both constructively, in the sense of technologies for

verification and cooperation, as well as in terms of military trends.

Military trends and technology are generally for smaller, more smart and

robust swarming technologies rather than very large explosions. This

threatens the existing arrangements that we have depended upon for

strategic stability. Specifically, disruptive technologies could alter the

balance of power and military impact, undermine stability, and turn

nuclear deterrence into a major liability.

But for today, I have been invited to talk about another disruptive

influence, namely the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

(TPNW) or the Ban Treaty. The introduction of the TPNW seems to

have further polarised the international community, and to have harmed

the search for middle ground. Some states believe it threatens stability

and could harm moves towards disarmament. But the Ban Treaty exists.

It is gaining ground and at some point, it will enter into force. So

wherever one sits on the spectrum of opinion around whether it is a good

or a bad thing, one has to accept that it is here to stay and that we need to

15

maximise whatever opportunities it might bring, and minimise the

threats. We have to uncover what opportunities there may be for new

collaboration.

The Ban Treaty emerges from a very understandable frustration. It is

looking to deepen the norms of disarmament and to empower states that

have so far been excluded from the non-proliferation and disarmament

debate. The level of hostility towards the Treaty from the five NPT-

recognised nuclear weapon states has itself been a major dimension in

the polarisation within the international community. There are

opportunities here, within nuclear armed states, to see this as a

mechanism for engaging the international community. In the last year or

two since the Ban Treaty was agreed in New York, we have seen Ban

Treaty states be rather restrained in their criticism of the NPT. Expected

conflict over the Ban at the last PREPCOM was rather muted largely

because TPNW-supporting states wanted to demonstrate their continuing

commitment to the NPT and because they were not keen on driving a

conflict approach. This can be seen as an invitation to the nuclear

weapon states to engage in a more collaborative approach, to take more

seriously the agenda which, in the last few years, has been rather stuck.

States have the chance to choose a realistic agenda that requires more

political will than we have seen to date. It requires states to see beyond

their immediate national interests and to recognise that these lie in a

more constructive global conversation. We heard the President of

Pakistan earlier talk about the need for dialogue on strategic stability,

which is very welcome and could be built upon a raft of confidence

building measures. We need to look seriously at the realistic proposals

around risk reduction that are gathering steam, as governments support a

series of studies on the options available. We need to look at measures

such as transparency over posture and arsenals. We need to treat

seriously each state’s concerns when it comes to issues such as Fissile

Material Treaty, and the Test Ban, and move forward to realising these

goals. We need to drive progress on the Middle East WMD Free Zone as

a matter of urgency. The issue holds the key to a possible response to the

Ban Treaty that I think could be very constructive.

It is possible for the nuclear armed states to see the Ban Treaty in more

constructive and positive terms, without a short-term threat to their

16

nuclear postures. We could see the TPNW as an expression of the

disarmament pillar that already exists within the non-proliferation

regime. It could be seen as a global nuclear weapon-free zone that

covered those states that ratify it and that expands gradually over the

years with the objective of covering the whole planet at some future

point. The nuclear armed states more generally could issue protocols to

this treaty, demonstrating their legal relationship to it. That I think would

transform the Ban Treaty from being a source of conflict into one of

cooperation and could transcend the discrimination currently within the

NPT itself. This opens opportunities too for South Asian leadership: both

in welcoming the principle of the Ban Treaty and in demonstrating that

the wider regime needs to shift and change. There have been

achievements in the past but future successes demand a more positive

change in tune.

Dr. Shireen Mazari

Thank you for a very illuminating aspect of the Ban Treaty because in all

honesty, the Ban Treaty has not been discussed much in Pakistan. And I

think we need to give it more attention and discuss the pros and cons of

it.

For our next speaker, I am going to invite Aaron Karp. He is a senior

lecturer in political science at old Dominion University in Norfolk,

Virginia. Previous teaching posts include Columbia, Rutgers, Stockholm

University and the US Joint Forces Staff College. He also has held

research position as Arms Trade Project Leader at the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), External Mitarbeiter with

the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, and he was also

fellow with the Centre of International Affairs at Harvard University. Of

course, he has done a lot of work and has had much input into the

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as it finally came out. He

is also senior consultant to the Small Arms Survey, an independent

research institute in Geneva. He also did a lot of work on the missile

programmes of medium range powers at one stage. With no more ado let

me invite you to take the floor. And you are going to talk on the US

Nuclear Posture Review.

17

Mr. Aaron Karp

Nuclear weapons may be unique among deadly technologies in

remaining overwhelmingly important because they resist change. Some

seventy-five years after the first nuclear detonation at Alamogordo, there

are innumerable military technologies of equal age that remain important

today. Some already were mature then, and cling for relevance today,

like tanks and fighter planes. Others were just born like turbojet engines,

radar, guided missiles, electronic computing and solid state electronics.

While some degree of their significance was readily grasped at the time

of their birth, they required decades to mature, and their full implications

took just as long to become evident. Many continue to morph

dramatically as we watch.

As Richard Rhodes recently reminded us, nuclear weapons always were

different, their distinctive danger understood by Robert Oppenheimer

and others from the start. Initially the technology developed regardless,

evolving at a frenetic pace through the first fifteen years after

Alamogordo, as if racing to deny their reality. Early nuclear history

witnessed radical reduction in their size and mass, massive increases in

destructive power, and creation of a spectrum of ever more versatile and

unstoppable delivery systems. It was a desperate search for technological

solutions to their dilemmas, but it ended instead in acceptance of the trap

they create.

Since the early 1970s nuclear technologies have been distinguished more

by acceptance and stability, especially among the countries that deployed

them and their allies. The pace of technical change for nuclear weapons

per se, warheads, slowed to an almost imperceptible pace. Nuclear

weapons policy—another secondary technology like ballistic missiles or

inertial guidance—became part of nuclear stability. There still is

extensive relevant research and engineering today, but it is almost

entirely in secondary technologies—delivery systems, defences and

hypersonic alternatives—not warheads.

Our current trouble comes just such secondary technologies. Nuclear

weapons may no longer be changing much, but the policy consensus that

arose to tame their existence and guide their acceptance no longer holds

as persuasively. Arms control lies in taters, more a legacy or memory

18

that an active force. Its fraternal twin—nuclear deterrence—has been

diluted by changing circumstances, its relevance increasingly debated.

Both concepts are too foundational to become irrelevant. Something,

perhaps even quite a lot, will remain of both so long as nuclear weapons

themselves remain relevant. But their ability to explain the nuclear

environment is declining. Rather than focusing analysis and policy on

trying to patch them, students and policy-makers face unprecedented

demands to identify new foundations for nuclear stability, approaches

that include or replicate the remaining roles of deterrence and arms

control, but surpass their relevance for nuclear world emerging before us.

Have we reached the limits of nuclear policy?

This is not just a dangerous time for international security, it is an

awkward time. We are re-learning how to think about nuclear security.

President Trump’s refusal to accept the entire liberal order of arms

control and disarmament is the most extreme statement, which he made

literal in his repeated advocacy of overwhelming American nuclear

superiority. Trump has since shown that was just his wishful thinking;

he is unwilling to support the US defence budgets that nuclear

superiority would require. But he also left no doubt of his willingness to

junk of every element of legal restraint. Abandoning the Iran deal and

INF Treaty in 2018 can only be understood as first shots in a personal

war against all forms of arms control, an unwinding that is certain to

continue.

Trump is making the change more extreme than it has to be, but he did

not invent it. The underlying problem has been obvious since 2009,

when President Obama’s call for nuclear disarmament failed to light any

fires. The Obama Administration struggled mightily to breathe life into a

sick regime. The broad consensus among world leaders was not there to

reciprocate, reflecting public uncertainty that anything can be achieved

through security bargains. And America was unwilling to gamble on the

steep concessions that a healthier process requires. Among the lessons of

Obama’s personal frustration was the futility of basing future action on

past successes. The effort was enough to show there is no going back,

and no going forward.

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The arms control and disarmament formula that worked for over thirty

years, most clearly from 1963 to 1996, from the Partial Nuclear Test Ban

to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. But even in the mid-1990s,

arms control and disarmament were not yielding consequential progress

any more. Failed negotiations and unratified treaties became hallmarks

of efforts at nuclear restraint. The successes that came since then were

due more to unilateral restraint, albeit often based on international

norms. The negotiating record among nuclear weapons states since then

has no clear success to show. Negotiated milestones include failures like

START II, ambiguous outcomes like CTBT, trivial like SORTS, or

modest in expectation and achievement, designed mostly to

institutionalise the status quo, like New START. The biggest possible

nuclear breakthroughs, like nuclear no first use or verifiable nuclear arms

control for other nuclear weapons states, have gone nowhere.

It is a measure of the depth of this blockage that nuclear strategic studies

have grown exponentially. Academic studies of nuclear weapons

proliferation and stability have never been more numerous. Their

methodological foundation also as achieved unprecedented levels of

scientific verifiability and reproducibility. It is reasonable to conclude

we have never known more about nuclear security. But it also would be

fair to conclude we don’t know much that is new or addresses the new

situation. Cutting edge research, like the flourishing world of nuclear

commentary, demonstrates extraordinary richness and depth, but as is

often the case with empirical social science, the price of certitude is

modesty. We know more and more about less and less.

Even in the less rigorous, but more imaginative environment of

commentary, there is precious little novelty on either side. Among

advocates of nuclear disarmament, the dominant themes are revealing in

their subjunctive tense: renewed disarmament could, should, would. In

essence, there is nothing wrong with old formulas, and no barriers that

greater political determination cannot solve. The most sensitive

commentary stresses the need to consider broader problems of changing

strategic circumstances, but offers no guidance on how to do that.

Similarly, advocates of re-energised nuclear re-armament stress there is

nothing wrong with old strategic formulas, and no barriers that greater

political determination to re-arm cannot solve.

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On both sides, nuclear strategic writing is dominated by romanticism.

Whether the work of disarmament or rearmament advocates,

commentary is overwhelmingly conservative; the solutions to

contemporary worries are to be found in the past. Rather than learn the

lessons of Obama’s disarmament failure, supporters persist in

emphasising his goal and methods, even though Obama repudiated those

in the last two years of his presidency, when he turned to comprehensive

nuclear rearmament. Similarly, nuclear re-armers, frustrated by the slow

pace of activity even under President Trump, would return to visions

from the 1950s and ‘60s.

Maybe, except for everything else

Nuclear romanticism would make sense if everything else remained

unchanged. If only. The greatest weakness of old fashioned arms control

and disarmament, and old fashioned superiority is everything else. With

the essential preconditions gone, the old formulas cannot generate the

same results. Never easy or guaranteed, their success is now undermined

completely.

It is tempting to see the problem as a crisis of political will, worsened by

the antics of Vladimir Putin—who wants the benefits of arms control but

refuses to pay the price—and Donald Trump—who neither understands

the benefits or is willing to learn why others do. But the earlier

frustrations of Obama and Medvedev prove there is stronger stuff at

work, forces that no amount of political will is likely to surmount. With

structural forces now dominant, argue neo-realists, expectations must be

severely lowered. Structural theorists say this is because arms control

and disarmament, like the benefits of superiority, always were

ephemeral. In essence, neo-realism cackles, after a long interlude of

wishful thinking, we’re just back to normal; sorry.

Few would challenge the diagnosis that things look bleak, but I question

the structuralist logic, that they have to be bleak. By investing everything

in forces beyond human control, structuralism leads to historicism,

confusing trends for inevitability and history for the future. It is much

more revealing to follow the lead of historians and post-structuralists

who see contingency at work. Events are ultimately events. Past

successes were real and offer vital lessons, but they also were historically

21

contingent on specific conditions, often accidental or lucky, prevailing at

the time. Past success cannot be recapitulated, but nor is humanity

doomed to repeat past disasters.

The problems that nuclear weapons compel us to wrestle with lie

elsewhere, not in system structure, but in beliefs. While the international

system has changed, it has not changed as dramatically as the rapidly

different nuclear situations implies. What is different are the attitudes

and assumptions about how best to manage nuclear weapons. Above all

we confront an environment of doctrinal uncertainty. An entire spectrum

of policy assumptions—from procurement policy, to targeting and

launch planning, arms control and crisis management—has been melting

away. We cannot answer basic questions about the dangers of nuclear

war, where those dangers are most serious, what form nuclear war is

most likely to take, and how it is most effectively prevented or managed

should it occur.

The declining of faith in nuclear deterrence is among the most visible

manifestations of this lost faith. In its place came tailored deterrence,

initially a response to the difficulties applying deterrence to the kinds of

threats that dominated American strategic thought after the Cold War.

Classical deterrence was well and good for suppressing the risks of

nuclear war with established nuclear powers like China and Russia, but

would it work with Iran and North Korea, with nuclear terrorism, or non-

nuclear threats to American interests? It is a call for more nuanced

application of nuclear threats, missile defences, and pre-emptive

conventional force, configured in different combinations for each

potential threat. Tailored deterrence never became a concrete doctrine.

There are no five easy steps. Rather, I view it as a plea to keep

deterrence relevant when it was losing its hold.

As an effort to patch up a blunt tool for a more nuanced world, tailored

deterrence was less a doctrine than a menu. Behind it’s ever more

elaborate combinations one clearly saw declining certainty, not so much

of an effort to patch up deterrence, but growing readiness to abandon it

altogether. This willingness to abandon deterrence became explicit in the

2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

22

As usual, the United States is most outspoken in its doctrinal

conditionality, but it is not alone. Russian nuclear doctrine remains as

nebulous as ever, and officials in Moscow do a fine job raising ever more

doubt, mostly through intermittent statements making its pervious

commitment to nuclear no first use ever more vaguely conditional.

China joined the tailored deterrence movement more explicitly when it

raised the possibility of using nuclear force to prevent Taiwan from

declaring independence and the possibly of using nuclear weapons in

regional conflict with the United States. Even India, the only nuclear

armed state to formally commit to nuclear no first use, is not widely

believed. Israel, North Korea and Pakistan, on the other hand, are only

too willing to appear to be wedded to first strike threats. One can only

sigh in relief for France and the United Kingdom.

Where ideas about stabilising nuclear order are shared, disarmament

remains possible. The strongest advocates of arms control and

disarmament today are states and NGOs, the actors with the strongest

doctrinal consensus. Getting the nuclear have-nots together to support

the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, or simply the

Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty) in 2017 was frightfully easy. It was so

easy, they all but fell over each other in their rush to vote in favor of a

poorly written treaty, drafted in less than six months, a treaty all about

norms, not details. The document simply reaffirms the shared non-

nuclear consensus of its 122 supporters in the UN General Assembly.

But there are profound limits to what the have-nots can achieve by

themselves. As a treaty, the TPNW is better than the 2002 Strategic

Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORTS)—the comic relief of nuclear arms

control—which never was intended to be taken seriously. SORTS was

the first nuclear agreement to actually hurt strategic relations more than

it helped. It persuaded the Administration of President George W. Bush

that there would be no costs to abrogating the 1972 ABM Treaty.

It is hard to see how the TPNW could be worse than that at shaping the

nuclear environment, but there is little chance it can achieve more. The

non-nuclear parties don’t have to do anything except nod in agreement.

But implementation among nuclear weapons states would require several

meticulously designed agreements, matched to the specific problems of

disarmament processes and milestones, intrusive verification and

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safeguards. Above all, it would require nuclear weapons states to commit

their security to basic assumptions about nuclear non-use and

disarmament.

Lacking such provisions, the TPNW offers nothing to help nuclear

weapons states meet their pledge in Article 6 of the NPT, ‘to pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of

the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’. And

it offers nothing for the nuclear states outside the NPT system that

cannot be dismissed with shrug. It reveals much about the contemporary

mood that the votes in favor of the treaty from Iran and Saudi Arabia are

seen by many as evidence of the document’s weakness, not its strength.

Nuclear analysis and policy after strategic arms control

It seems extremely likely that the 2010 New START treaty, the last

strategic nuclear arms control treaty still limiting the arsenals of Russia

and the United States, will die when it is scheduled to expire on 5

February 2021. As with INF, President Putin wants to extend it, but

refuses to pay the price of negotiating away his advantages, in this case

superiority in tactical nuclear weapons, let alone solving linked issues

like Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In Washington, the Republican

Party opposes any limits on American missile defence, which Russia

probably would require. A simple extension remains feasible, but

President Trump seems unhappy with any element of international law

restraining American power.

The collapse of New START will mark the first time Russian and

American nuclear arsenals are unrestrained by a strategic treaty in 49

years. Nor are we simply witnessing a return to the nuclear environment

of 1972. Things are better in some ways; the American and Russian

arsenals are much smaller and better deployed for mutual security. Both

sides have greatly improved their ability to detect attack, and appear to

have reduced their sensitivity to false alerts, which probably strengthens

crisis stability. On-sight inspection, the top contribution of New START,

will be missed but can be coped with unilaterally.

But we also face a much more complicated strategic environment than

ever, with several other nuclear weapons states and potential nuclear

24

states greatly complicating stability. Despite President Trump’s personal

confidence, North Korea is becoming more of a threat to the United

States, and the danger of regional crisis escalation with China and Russia

is worse than it was in 1972. No less important, as argued here, is the

decline of belief in nuclear deterrence. In 1972 it was mutually accepted

by the governments that mattered most. Deterrence remains, but it is

greatly diluted. As evidence of their lack of belief in the reliability of

deterrence, in many conceivable situations, several nuclear armed states

are ready to launch first strikes.

Deprived of its greatest technologies, nuclear analysis and official policy

is poorly prepared to deal with the change. Based on assumptions that

seem increasingly peripheral, analysis and policy are weakened, unable

to offer helpful long-term guidance. Nuclear classics from Bernard

Brodie and Thomas Schelling, and current policy documents like the

2018 Nuclear Posture Review, seem vague and remote. The closest

historical guidance comes from the 1950s and early ‘60s, before

superpower deterrence became fully mutual. That era of bombast, threats

and hair-raising crises is hardly inspirational.

Deprived of concepts that would offer long-term guidance, analysis and

policy cannot do much more than advise on immediate problems. That’s

no small thing when nuclear weapons are involved, but hardly satisfying

given the stakes.

Dr. Shireen Mazari

Thank you, Aaron. That leaves a lot of food for thought and discussion

which I am sure will follow. Let me introduce the last speaker of the

session, Dr Rabia Akhtar. She holds a PhD in Security Studies from

Kansas State University. She joined University of Lahore and is the

founding Director of the Centre for Security Strategy and Policy

Research. Her research is focused primarily on US non-proliferation

policy towards Pakistan. And she also of course does Foreign Policy

analysis specially of the inter linkages within the US foreign policy

making structures, including issues relating to congressional oversight of

US foreign policy and she has focused on US foreign policy towards

Pakistan from Ford to Clinton. She was a Fulbright Scholar 2010 to 2015

and she co-authored a research monograph on Nuclear Learning in South

25

Asia which was published in January 2015 by the Regional Centre for

Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The floor is yours, Rabia.

Dr. Rabia Akhtar

It needs to be stated at the outset that the US

Nuclear Posture Review 2018 is as aggressive,

impulsive and threatening as President Trump

himself is. And just like him, it leaves you baffled.

Instead of reducing the number and reliance on

nuclear weapons, the US Nuclear Posture Review

2018 calls for an expanded role of nuclear weapons

in US nuclear security strategy. It expands to

include one of the non-traditional scenarios of

nuclear use; a major cyber-attack in the United States. The new

terminology that is being used is ‘non-nuclear strategic attacks’, but

there is hardly any explanation for it as to what does it entail. Can you

imagine a nuclear first use by a US president in a non-nuclear scenario?

Imagine the doors it will open for others. Instead of strengthening its

non-nuclear capabilities to fight non-nuclear scenarios, the United States

under Trump Administration is moving to cover non-nuclear strategic

space with nuclear weapons. Expanding the space to make US nuclear

weapons more usable than they already are on hair-trigger alert posture

should be alarming for all countries across the globe. At a cost of 1.25

trillion dollars over the next 30 years, US nuclear triad will be replaced

and upgraded. At sea, the US plans to deploy low yield nuclear warheads

on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and develop new

submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). It looks like the Cold War

is back since at the end of the Cold War, the US had off-deployed

nuclear SLCMs under the Bush Administration. Some US arms control

experts criticise the US need for more low-yield options when the US

nuclear deterrent already possesses low yield weapons. Reason for

lowering the nuclear use threshold in the US case does not come with

satisfactory explanation on this count. Experts also ask and rightly so;

how will the enemy who is at the receiving end on the nuclear SLCM

know that the missile is loaded with a low yield or full yield weapon?

This ambiguity is anything but stabilising. According to an estimate, the

US has 4000 operational warheads and nuclear weapons and around

1000 low yield nuclear weapons. Yet, it needs more low yield nuclear

26

weapons to signal the credibility of its deterrence towards Russia and

perhaps China. While the renewed US quest for low-yield nuclear

weapons diverts the world’s attention from Pakistan’s low yield nukes, it

is an unsettling development nevertheless. What does this expansion in

US nuclear arsenal - modernisation of nuclear triad, lowering of nuclear

threshold to include nuclear first use against non-nuclear strategic attacks

- mean for the non-proliferation regime? There is not much cause for

enthusiasm about the non-proliferation regime and its deliverables.

Therefore, US, as leader of the non-proliferation regime, losing face in

front of the global non-proliferation community on its assurances and

alliances is simply an idea whose time has come. Now at least the world

will openly see that the US does not care about non-proliferation policy

or nuclear disarmament. Had it been serious, it would have taken

measures to ensure that no agreement made by one president is so easily

discarded by the others who follow especially when it is made in

consensus with other regional powers to ensure nuclear compliance. A

case in point is the US walking away from the Joint Comprehensive Plan

of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and now bullying other countries to discard

it and not work with Iran.

The threat environment has not complicated for the United States – it is

the other way around. The evolving US nuclear posture is become

threatening for other countries. One key takeaway from this NPR is that

if the US being the conventional and nuclear super power needs more

nuclear weapons to feel more secure then perhaps the smaller nuclear

weapon states would need even more than they currently have to feel

secure as well. This has to be the most damaging lesson. It does not bode

well for the nuclear non-proliferation regime which after all these years

has been trying to achieve just the very opposite.

Lately, the US-Russian equation has started to resemble that of India-

Pakistan duo. Emphasis on the Russian strategy of ‘escalate to

deescalate’ and limited nuclear use talk to escalate out of a conventional

crisis situation gone bad are exactly those worries US scholars have been

writing about in the Indo-Pak context. Indians tried to mimic the US post

9/11 and started saying that if the US could attack Afghanistan to avenge

9/11, so could we on Pakistan to avenge the 2001 attack on the Indian

Parliament. The problem is not that Pakistan or Russia, if it will come to

that, cannot defend themselves. They can, they are not Afghanistan. The

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problem is that this kind of grand thinking can take root because rhetoric

matters. Words are important; you can ridicule twitter or President

Trump’s tweets, but they are read and they are policy statements taken

on face value. If you have a nuclear state in your neighbourhood that has

grandiose designs about becoming a global power, has threatening

missile ranges to cover as many continents possible, is moving towards

ensuring the centrality of nuclear weapons in its national security

strategy and idealises the United States, then following its footsteps is

only going to be a matter of time. India will only be encouraged by how

US modernises its nuclear arsenal therefore, making it difficult for

Pakistan to maintain strategic parity. With the evolving US nuclear

posture, there are direct negative implications for South Asian strategic

stability and the global non-proliferation regime.

Dr. Shireen Mazari

Thank you Rabia for a very straightforward assessment of the prevailing

situation especially after the Trump Administration came in. The floor is

open now for questions and comments.

Question & Answer Session

Question

Albert Einstein once defined insanity as doing same thing again and

again and expecting different results. So, I think that it has been

happening in nuclear non-proliferation regime. Unless the big powers

like the US, Russia and China reduce their stockpile of nuclear weapons,

rather they are increasing it day by day, how can they sermonise,

pressurise or even threaten the countries like Pakistan, Iran and other

emerging nuclear states? As Mr. Karp pointed out that Japan, South

Korea and UK are the only countries which really believe in arms control

and reducing nuclear stockpile. My question is why the other countries

like the US, Russia and China, they adopt the same policy?

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Mr. Aaron Karp

Going back to the original 1968 NPT deal, the article 6 statement, I do

not want to call it a commitment because I think it glorifies it, it was

never sincere. It was always speculative for the depository states or the

nuclear weapon states. The idea of nuclear disarmament has always

been this vague, that is why President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech was

so dramatic. He committed the US to this goal of disarmament. Of

course, he did not want his government to vote against the Nuclear Ban

Treaty which would have contradicted with that policy. So, we just did

not show up that day at the UN General Assembly. Nor did, however

many, what 60 other countries just did not show up, which is an extra

ordinarily powerful statement. On the other hand, I do not want to sound

too depressing. No, we are not building a lot of new nuclear warheads

right now. There is no nuclear arms race and that is a big enigma. We

cannot explain why there is no arms race. There was one country that

was arms racing until very recently, even North Korea appears to have

stopped racing and I do not know if they can do anything else. But there

is no racing anymore and that is very good. Pakistan is building up its

nuclear forces but it is not racing. So, there is stability out there. We just

do not understand it very well.

Dr. Shireen Mazari

I would be interested to know Aaron how you define racing? I mean, is

this a numbers thing that it is not just steady increase? Differentiate.

Mr. Aaron Karp

A classical arms race means France, Britain and Germany building

battleships in response to each other in a big spiral spending all of their

money. That is a great example and that also not only just defines but it

also contains the domain of an arms race. Usually when we use the term

arms race, it is just a metaphor. It is a way of saying, we are not in

control. That is really what we mean. But when you start measuring

things, defence expenditures are not going up very much. Nobody but

nobody spends more than 4% of the national wealth on defence, except

the Saudis. But ok. I just don’t see it.

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Amb. Ali Asghar Soltanieh

Amb. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, former Ambassador of Iran to the IAEA and

United Nations: One important thing that we have to focus on now is the

notion of nuclear arms control. I think this notion; this policy has in fact

put nuclear disarmament in archive because arms control itself has

legitimised existing nuclear weapons. How can we control it? Similarly,

another notion which I do not endorse is ‘no first use’. I appreciate that

China is accepting the no first use. No first use is a term to deceive the

real attention of public that look we are doing something. Therefore, the

arms control of the two super powers without any international

verification has pushed us where we are right now. Last but not the least,

you would not be surprised, as of course, I am talking about in my

personal capacity, the NPT itself is the most discriminatory treaty in the

world because the notion of non-proliferation means that existing

weapons, no more. As we noticed that lack of implementation of article 6

proved that it was a mistake and therefore, while I have some

reservations regarding the Ban Treaty, that in fact, reduces and defuses

the pressure on non-nuclear weapon states while putting it on weapon

states. But anyway, it was a concept, it was reality. Let us see what we

can do. We can put the things at right place. No talk anymore

highlighting arms control, let us talk about disarmament.

Dr. Shireen Mazari

Would anyone like to comment on this.

Mr. Paul Ingram

So, I began my talk being quite critical of the Non-proliferation Treaty.

The NPT is getting a bashing so I want to just come to its defence.

Because, 50 years ago, there was the expectation of great deal of more

proliferation and we have not seen it. Indeed, we ought to just

acknowledge the amount of nuclear arsenal in the world has come down

a huge amount. So, it is not a question of black and white here. It is a

score sheet and it is not entirely negative but it is also not positive. It is

complex and this brings me to a very personal explanation about where I

come from. I used to be a member of the peace movement in Britain. I

would break into American Airforce bases, apologies to the Americans

30

here! I would be arrested and I would be put in prison and I would be out

again and I would be, with my placards I would be demonstrating along

with the rest of them. What help did it bring? It raised the issue. The

awareness was there but it also actually made people feel very

comfortable with where they were at already. I believe that models of

change require cooperation with people who fundamentally disagree

with you and when you communicate, you need to be open to other’s

perspectives. That is the personal explanation. Now how does this apply

when you are talking about international communication? Well, it

applies by trying to understand and empathise even with the President

Trumps of this world to understand why and how they get the support

they get and to try to be cleverer in the way you engage in that

communication. Simply demanding disarmament is not going to get you

anywhere. Agreeing a Ban Treaty is not going to achieve the change that

the Ban Treaty states are looking for. But what we require is far more

understanding. That is why I am here in Islamabad today. I want to

understand better; why it is that Pakistan feels so locked into the

relationship it currently has with India and that requires me to listen and

not to preach. There is far too much preaching and not enough listening

that goes on in these conversations.

So, when it comes to achieving disarmament, I think arms control plays a

role. I am very sympathetic where you are coming from Ambassador

Soltanieh. I too in the past have been critical of arms control but arms

control is part of the confidence building required to achieve eventual

disarmament. I understand that the people manipulate and they use in

very cynical ways the arms control mechanisms in order to give the

impression that they are going in the right direction, when they do not

have intentions of doing so. But in order to bring them to a process

where there are eventually willing to relinquish the perceived advantage

they get from having nuclear weapons, one has to engage in a dialogue.

This is why whenever I have been to Iran, I have heard and believed a

commitment to the Non-proliferation Treaty. That I think is stronger than

it is in the United States and that is because there is a belief that I have

picked up in Iran, that nuclear weapons need to be got rid of and if we

believe that we need to engage openly with people who believe

otherwise. That is not a confrontational approach that is going to

succeed. I may speak more about it later, but, I think I have probably

said enough.

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Mr. Robert Einhorn

Robert Einhorn from Brookings Institution in Washington: I have one

question for any of the panellists. A comment, a question to Aaron and

one to a comment on Rabia’s presentation. Question to anybody:

Looking at Aaron’s various mysteries, the mystery of why non-

proliferation regime has been so stable; 25 years ago, there were nine

countries with nuclear weapons, today there are nine countries with

nuclear weapons. I would say 10 and 15 years from now, there will be

nine countries with nuclear weapons. Why that stability? I have my own

explanation for that. One is that not many countries see a need for having

nuclear weapons. They do not feel the threats that would generate

support for nuclear weapons. Those that feel threatened, either have

acquired nuclear weapons or they have a protector who is prepared to

help them with their security. But what is the explanation for the

stability? Aaron you mentioned, your thesis was that we should not look

so much toward these endogenous factors, we have to look at the

exogenous ones. What are those exogenous factors and why are they

going to make much of a difference in the world of arms control and

non-proliferation?

To Rabia, I am less alarmed than you are about Trump’s 2018 Nuclear

Posture Review. Most of it is a kind of posture review that President

Obama would have issued under current international circumstances.

Now, I think it was rather restrained. I do agree with you that it

articulates a number of contingencies in which the US might consider

using nuclear weapons that are broader than what Obama talked about; A

response to strategic non-nuclear attacks and will United States really

use nuclear weapons against conventional bombing of a population

centre, I do not think so. I do not think the Trump Administration would

use the nuclear weapons in some of the contingencies that it is talking

about. But the Trump Administration believes that a strong rhetorical

position on using nuclear weapons will reinforce deterrence. I am

concerned about that because I think there can be some

counterproductive effects. I mean if the US signals that it might use

nuclear weapons early in a conflict, would it not give incentives for

adversaries to employ them first? It might be better off. So, I think it is

dubious but I am not quite alarmed about these two new nuclear systems;

nuclear Sea Launched Cruise Missile, the low yield Submarine Launched

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Ballistic Missile. I am not convinced at the rationale for needing those

systems in European context. But I am aware of the tremendous support

those systems have in US allied states in Northeast Asia where they

contribute to US extended deterrence and could be important factors in

reducing the incentives of Japan and South Korea to develop their own

indigenous nuclear weapon capabilities.

Mr. Aaron Karp

Thank you very much, I was looking forward to your questions. On

nuclear proliferation, what happened to President Kennedy’s prophecy of

25 or more by 1970? He was really good on the moon; he said the moon

by 1970. But he also expected 25 nuclear proliferators. Fortunately, he

did not get that one so good. A part of it obviously is yes, the world is

fairly a secure place. Countries are assured and another big element is

you did your job. Thank you! You did a really good job. You made it

really tough for countries to go out and get the bomb. It is not easy

especially if they go the reactor route which is extremely difficult. But

now it has happened. I think with centrifuge enrichment technology it

has got much easier to develop a surprise programme and I am very

worried about big surprises as a result of that. Because, of the enormous

sensitivity we do not need 25, we need one and I think it is going to blow

our little minds when that comes. I worry about the stability of regime

and our willingness to trust the regime after that one comes, whenever it

is. As far as exogenous forces, above all, I am concerned about the

transformation in international legitimacy. The people in this room used

to be everything in arms control and disarmament. They wrote the

agreements, they convinced the governments to accept the agreements

and then they implemented them and it worked really well. With the

transformation of legitimacy with the rise of populism, that is not

acceptable anymore. Your expertise does not give you authority. It

undermines authority. The man on the street, the common man, and the

common man’s predilections are determinate and we see in the United

States, the whole debate over the meaning of the Nuclear Posture Review

within US. I mean, so what, yeah you got document cool! Ok, now what

we are going to do, it is a huge disjuncture because the political system

makes the noised disjuncture between the drafting of policy statements

and action policy. They are different universes. They are different people

and we have to deal with that. This goes to Paul’s point about listening, I

33

think. The arms control and disarmament community need to listen to

people who love and I mean literally love Vladimir Putin and who love

and literally love Donald Trump. We have to listen to that to an end of

that. We have to reconcile arms control and disarmament ambitions with

the desires of those people.

Dr. Rabia Akhtar

Thank you so much for your comments, it is very well taken and I will

bring my alarm levels down after it coming from you. But the point I

was trying to make, which you also made while commenting, was use of

rhetoric to reinforce deterrence and that is what is dangerous. Because

when thoughts take root; the next step is action. And if it is coming from

you know a person like Trump, who is unpredictable by the minute, one

does not really know where is the line between rhetoric and reality. It

becomes profound.

Mr. Paul Ingram

I think there are many explanations, some better than others. I will just

force the fact that we have stability that we were expecting. I have

already mentioned the non-proliferation treaty itself and the norms that

come with it. But I would question, whether people actually believe that

nuclear weapons are as effective as they often are assumed? Because

they have not been used so it is all rather conjectural and the concept of

nuclear deterrence makes sense internally and it appeals to people

because it seems to make sense. But I think it is also in peoples’ mind

that there is also a contradiction at the heart of it. Because it is

impossible to know whether it really works. So, they are very expensive

financially and in political terms, their use is uncertain. As I said in my

talk that military trends are in a very different direction towards useable

small scale, small in size possibly large in number, of units operating in

smart and targeted ways. The military do not generally tend to like

nuclear weapons because they are not usable and they are really quite

political in nature. The one reason that I can see why countries like

Britain and France still retain nuclear weapons is; Bruno will disagree

with me here, but I think it has a lot to do with status frankly. I think that

there is perception that these things bring power within the international

community and I think it is deeply challengeable and increasingly so as

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actually the measure of power is far more based upon economic power

and other matrix than it is upon the possession of nuclear weapons. I see

that going, this is a very unusual perspective and I see that increasing. I

think the increasing salience of nuclear weapons more recently is a blip.

Over the longer period, the utility of nuclear weapons in terms of their

perception is I believe in the other direction. And I think the fact that

fewer countries have acquired them is an indication of the fact that

people are increasingly seeing nuclear weapons as irrelevant to global

power status and to defence more generally.

Mr. Khalid Banuri

Khalid Banuri, I am former Director General of Arms Control and

Disarmament at Strategic Plans Division. I have two questions, even if it

is stating the obvious. First to Paul: If the interest in Ban treaty by the

states that have nuclear weapons is lukewarm at best, what do you think

can actually incentivise all of these states for a formal control of nuclear

weapons? There is some win-win where you think all states that have

nuclear weapons can agree? Question to Aaron and Rabia on the

posture, let me throw out this scenario which might appear very

preposterous but we know of Donald Trump’s twitter politics; what if

there is this situation of an intent of use of nuclear weapons, what would

be the mechanism within the American command and control to ensure

that the decision to use nuclear weapons will be well considered and not

ad hoc. Thank you.

Mr. Paul Ingram

So, what will incentivise the nuclear weapon states to engage in

disarmament conversations; my perception sitting in London is that I am

detecting that there is interest within the British Government to engage

more seriously, partly my perception as a result of the Ban Treaty. That

is because they are concerned as many states are with the state of Non-

proliferation Treaty, they see the Ban Treaty as a symptom of the

challenge and they value the Non-proliferation Treaty hugely for several

reasons, obvious it being the norm, that has been used to try to prevent

further proliferation. But secondly, it provides the legitimacy upon which

they sit and if that legitimacy is being shaken, then they need to engage.

So, my perception is the part of the reason that why we have seen

35

nuclear weapon states being so critical of the Ban Treaty. It is actually a

symbol of its success and this is coming from somebody who is quite

sceptical about the Ban Treaty. I am not a Ban Treaty supporter

naturally. But actually, most recently, I have come to see it as a positive

disruptive factor. It holds challenges and it holds opportunities and I

think it is important for people, say across the spectrum, however they

sit, to see the threats and the opportunities that come with this

instrument. I perceive that some on the more reasonable end are starting

to come around to the idea that they need to engage more seriously on

the disarmament agenda and they are thus talking more openly. Now I do

not think you can continue to engage in a confrontational way and I will

be appealing to the Ban Treaty states to see if they can find ways and

continue to try to bring treaty into force. They inevitably will continue

their efforts and I think they will succeed at some point either before or

after the review conference. They also need to be reaching out for

dialogue and conversation with the nuclear weapon states to see if we

can build a framework and drive the disarmament agenda forward. It is

important to see states as more complex then we often do; we see states

often in terms of immediate special interests and of course they play a

role. But states also are made up of individuals, human beings who

desire to see progress, who desire to climb out of the traps they are in

and we are all in traps. I think if we engage more constructively and

more openly then there is more chance of climbing out of those traps.

Mr. Aaron Karp

Let me thank Air Commodore Banuri for the questions. If I might refer

to the Nuclear Ban Treaty, the analogy that comes to my mind is the

Hague code of conduct on ballistic missiles, 2002. There is an interval,

the Ban Treaty will never go away. It is permanent, it is there. Is it going

to become consequential? So, there is period in which this thing has to

mobilise, it has to take off. It has to get enough ratifications first before

coming into force. But even then, is it going to have its effect greater

than the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban? Is it going to do better than

that? That will be the test and I think by the time Donald Trump leaves

office by the year 2024, he will definitely be gone by then so we will

know, the fate of this. Regarding American command and control of

nuclear use, of course you recall the debate we were having a year ago

when we were all remembering Richard Nixon, when he was not doing

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so well and arrangements were made apparently. The grownups were in

the room and now watch the grownups leave. We are very confident that

within fairly decent time, all the grownups will be gone and that has to

happen. So, what is going to happen then? It is purely personal,

observing Donald Trump; he cares about two things in governance that I

can tell one is trade deficits, the other is allied burden sharing. I do not

know if he cares about anything else. Literally, I do not think he cares

about international security that much. He does not have an emotional

stake in this. That is very helpful, that is good. He does not have an

emotional stake so he cannot be reasoned with on this. The other thing I

would emphasise about Donald Trump is, he does negotiate everything.

His negotiating tactic is very well known. Shoot for the moon, ask for

everything and settle for something just a little bit beyond what your

adversaries are comfortable with and then you are done.

Dr. Rabia Akhtar

I think he really answered it well. But had it been anybody else other

than Trump, looking at all previous administrations, I would have had a

lot of faith that there is a system in place and the systems will work. Just

because they have nuclear weapons; this means they can use it, is not

going to happen. So, one can only hope that the things are still pretty

much in control even though he is the Commander in Chief. It is really

quite unpredictable with him being at the helm of affairs.

Ms. Sadia Tasleem

I am Sadia Tasleem from the Department of Defence and Strategic

Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University. Thanks chair and all the panellists

for such wonderful presentations. I have two questions: One for Rabia

and one for Paul. Rabia my question for you is, given the kind of power

transitions that we are witnessing today, how central is the United States

to the future of non-proliferation? Also, I understand the imitation

argument, I have been working on how Pakistan and other states have

been imitating the US deterrence thinking but given the decline in the US

soft power and also with the US facing a sort of reputational crisis, how

much incentive there is for other states to imitate what the United States

does?

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To Paul, being a proponent of the Ban Treaty, I am asking this question,

as Dr Mazari has already mentioned that we have not seen any

conversation on Ban Treaty in Pakistan. But we also have not seen any

engagement from the proponents of the Ban Treaty with Pakistan on this

question. Is there a strategic rationale for this, which is like once the

major powers or the P5 fall in place other states will follow, is there that

kind of logic that is guiding the kind of engagement the Ban Treaty

proponents have with the other states? Or is there a perception that the

response probably would not be favourable? What is stopping the Ban

Treaty proponents from engagement.

Dr. Rabia Akhtar

Thank you, Sadia, I think, you know as long as United States is the

centre of the world from where research comes out from, its credibility is

not at stake and whatever other countries follow on deterrence literature,

on arms control and non-proliferation. As long as this is coming from the

United States, they are in control of generating the narrative that they

want the rest of the world to follow. That is where everybody will be

looking at. There is no research coming out of Pakistan, for example,

since we are here gathered here today, all researchers and scholars talk

about these issues. There is no article or paper any research scholar has

written in Pakistan as to what deterrence means to Pakistan and as to

how it is going to take shape let say in next 5 to 10 years. Everything you

refer back to American scholars, western scholars for that matter. As

long as that control is with the United States, as long as that research

centre is there, you can bet on it, that any new thing any new thinking

that is going to come out is going to be from there and rest of the world

will continue to follow like it has been. On the other hand, I think states

have their own limitations as India and Pakistan, over a period of years,

have found out that what worked during the Cold war for Soviet Union

and the United States cannot work for India and Pakistan. But, that

learning, the nuclear learning takes time and I think after twenty years of

nuclearisation, both India and Pakistan have come to a point where they

are thinking that each has their own limitations and they can only push

the envelope. You know, they have been learning whether they can fight

limited war under nuclear umbrella or not and how far can they go. We

will continue to see crisis situation between India and Pakistan. As this

learning which will become indigenous learning that is going to happen

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in coming years of time. But you know, third point that I would like to

make is that the credibility of the United States is probably not going to

be damaged by just one president. You know Trump is here today, he

might not there tomorrow. You might get another Obama like president

to restore some of the faith of humanity and bring the leadership back to

the United States. So, it is quite transitional; this personality-based

assessment and I do not think that should let us judge as to you know its

veining all together. It is the leader, it is the sole super power in this

world today. It is the leader of the non-proliferation regime, whether

anybody likes it or not. It is the biggest contributor in the United Nations

and other structures in the world and all other organisations. As long as it

keeps putting in the money, it is going to remain in that leadership

position.

Mr. Paul Ingram

I would like to emphasise that I am not a proponent of the Ban Treaty.

But my observations were very much from the perspective of somebody

who wants to see disarmament and progress. I believe that the reason, the

two you gave, the second is the reason. There is a belief that Pakistan

would not engage constructively within international civil society groups

that are operating to promote the Ban Treaty. I believe that comes from a

lack of analysis, lack of understanding of the conversation that could

happen here in Pakistan. Because for the reasons I gave in my talk I

think the Ban Treaty is disruptive, potentially positive and potentially

negative disruptive force within the non-proliferation regime. And

Pakistan would like to see a disruption to the current regime. So, there

are good reasons from a Pakistani perspective to support the objectives.

Even though one cannot imagine Pakistan formally joining the Ban

Treaty anytime soon. I think they have missed the trick and I think that

comes from ignorance rather than any strategy.

Mr. Tariq Rauf

Tariq Rauf from Vienna, I have a question to Aaron. So, I saw in your

bio slide, the very last line said that you had provided some of the

intellectual underpinning to the missile technology control regime. And

for the last 10 chairs of the MTCR, I have gone to them and said, do you

know that within the MTCR, there is one nuclear armed state that leases

39

strategic ballistic missiles from another nuclear armed state and this is

the UK which leases SLBMs from the US and puts warheads on them or

tests dummies and when it fires one off, it pays the US the value of it. So

how would you tolerate this within the system? because, it is clearly

against the intent and ranges within the MTCR and each of these chairs

feel very uncomfortable. This is the first time, somebody hit them

between the eyes on this issue. They all promised to look into it and then

they all come back and do nothing. Since you were one of the intellectual

strengths behind this, I was wondering if you had any views about this

particular issue.

Second, Aaron you are also concerned about proliferation of centrifuge

technology. Nuclear energy is growing in the world today. There are 65

new powerplants under construction. If the world is to meet sustainable

development goals, nuclear energy will play a critical role in keeping

emissions below 2% or whatever it is. So, for that in the future we will

need new enrichment technology to provide low enriched uranium for

these new nuclear powerplants. At the moment commercial enrichment

is controlled by four providers, and there are others who are waiting in

the wings. So, spread of enrichment technology in and out itself need not

be bad, it depends how it is done and in the Nuclear Suppliers Group at

the moment there is a strict ban on further dissemination of what is

called ENR i.e. enrichment and reprocessing technology. But it is leaked

out as you have pointed out yourself. So, I have always argued that

technology controls which are based on denial have failed and the

missile technology control regime and the Australia group and the

Nuclear Suppliers Group. We need to have a better way of dealing with

how we, in a sense, promote the dissemination of technology for

peaceful purposes while limiting its misuse. So, I was wondering

whether you

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE ISLAMABAD (SSII) · STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE ISLAMABAD (SSII) Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad (SSII) was founded by Dr. Shireen M Mazari in 2013