Structural Ism Realism After Cold War Waltz

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Structural Realism after the Cold WarAuthor(s): Kenneth N. WaltzSource: International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer, 2000), pp. 5-41Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626772

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Structural ealism afterKenneth. Waltz

the Cold War

Some students f in-ternational oliticsbelieve thatrealism s obsolete.1They argue that, lthoughrealism's concepts of anarchy, elf-help, nd power balancing may have beenappropriateto a bygone era, theyhave been displaced by changed conditionsand eclipsed by better deas. New times call for new thinking.Changingconditionsrequire revised theoriesor entirely ifferentnes.

True, f the conditions hata theory ontemplatedhave changed, the theoryno longer applies. But what sorts of changes would alter the internationalpolitical system o profoundly hat old ways of thinkingwould no longer berelevant?Changes of he systemwould do it; changes in the systemwould not.Within-systemhangestakeplace all thetime, ome important, ome not.Bigchangesin the means oftransportation,ommunication,nd war fighting,orexample, strongly ffecthow states and otheragents interact. uch changesoccur at the unit level. In modern history, r perhaps in all of history, heintroduction f nuclearweaponrywas the greatest f such changes.Yet n thenuclear era, international olitics remains a self-help rena. Nuclear weaponsdecisively change how some states provide fortheirown and possibly for

others'security; ut nuclearweapons have not altered the anarchic structureof theinternational olitical system.

Changes in thestructure f thesystem re distinct rom hangesat the unitlevel.Thus, changes npolarity lso affect ow statesprovidefor heir ecuritySignificant hanges take place when the numberof great powers reduces totwo or one. With more thantwo, statesrelyfortheirsecurityboth on their

Kenneth . Waltz, ormerordProfessorfPolitical cience t theUniversityfCalifornia, erkeley,s aResearch ssociate f he nstitutefWar nd Peace Studies ndAdjunct rofessort ColumbiaUniversity.

I am indebtedtoKarenAdams and RobertRauchhaus forhelp on thisarticlefromtsconceptionto its completion.For insightfulnd constructive riticisms wish to thank RobertArt,RichardBetts,BarbaraFarnham,Anne Fox,RobertJervis,Warner chilling, nd Mark Sheetz.

1. For example, Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, nd the FailureofRealism," nternational rganization, ol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 249-277; Jeffrey . Legroand Andrew Moravcsik,"Is Anybody Still a Realist?" Internationalecurity, ol. 24, No. 2 (Fall1999), pp. 5-55; Bruce Russett,Grasping he Democratic eace: Principles or Post-ColdWar Peace(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993); Paul Schroeder, Historical Realityvs. Neo-realist Theory," nternational ecurity, ol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 108-148; and JohnA.

Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. ProgressiveResearch Programs: An Ap-praisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition,"American oliticalScienceReview, ol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912.

Internationalecuirity,ol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000),pp. 5-41? 2000 by the President nd Fellows of Harvard College and theMassachusetts nstitute fTechnology

5



Internationalecurity 5:1 | 6

own internal ffortsnd on alliances theymay makewith others.Competitionin multipolar ystems s more complicated than competition n bipolar onesbecause uncertainties bout the comparativecapabilitiesof states multiply snumbers grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and strength fcoalitions are hard to make.

Both changes of weaponry and changes of polaritywere big ones with

ramifications hat spread through the system, yet they did not transformit. If the systemwere transformed,nternational oliticswould no longerbeinternational olitics,and the past would no longer serve as a guide to thefuture.We would begin to call internationalpolitics by another name, assome do. The terms world politics" or "global politics,"for xample, suggestthat politics among self-interested tates concerned with their securityhas been replaced by some other kind of politics or perhaps by no politics atall.

Whatchanges,one may wonder,would turn nternational olitics ntosome-

thing distinctly ifferent? he answer commonly given is that internationalpolitics s beingtransformednd realism s beingrenderedobsolete as democ-racyextends tssway, as interdependence ightenstsgrip, nd as institutionssmooth the way to peace. I consider these points in successive sections.Afourth ection explains why realisttheoryretains ts explanatorypower aftertheCold War.

DemocracyndPeace

The end of the Cold War coincided with whatmanytookto be a new demo-cratic wave. The trend toward democracycombined with Michael Doyle'srediscovery f thepeaceful behavior of liberal democratic tates nter e con-tributes trongly o the belief that war is obsolescent, f not obsolete, amongthe advanced industrial tates oftheworld.2

The democraticpeace thesis holds that democraciesdo not fight emocra-cies. Notice that I say "thesis," not "theory" The belief that democraciesconstitutea zone of peace rests on a perceived high correlationbetweengovernmental orm nd international utcome.FrancisFukuyamathinks hat

the correlation s perfect:Never once has a democracyfought notherdemoc-racy JackLevy says that t is "the closest thingwe have to an empirical aw

2. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, arts1 and 2," PhilosophyndPublic Affairs, ol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4 (Summer and Fall 1983); and Doyle, "Kant: Liberalism andWorld Politics,"American olitical cienceReview, ol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.



Structural ealism fter heColdWar 7

in the study of international elations."3 ut, f t is truethat democracies restreliably t peace among themselves,we have not a theory ut a purportedfactbegging for n explanation, s factsdo. The explanation givengenerallyrunsthis way: Democracies of the right kind (i.e., liberal ones) are peaceful inrelation to one another.This was Immanuel Kant's point. The term he usedwas Rechtsstaatr republic, nd his definition fa republic was so restrictive

that t was hard to believe that even one of them could come into existence,let alone two or more.4And iftheydid, who can say that heywould continueto be of the right ort or continueto be democracies at all? The short nd sadlifeof the WeimarRepublic is a reminder.And how does one definewhat theright ort of democracy s? Some American scholars thought hatWilhelmineGermanywas the very model of a modern democratic state with a widesuffrage, onestelections, legislature hat controlled hepurse, competitiveparties, freepress,and a highlycompetentbureaucracy5But in theFrench,British, nd American view afterAugust of 1914, Germanyturned out not to

be a democracyof therightkind.JohnOwen triedto finessetheproblem ofdefinition y arguingthatdemocracies thatperceiveone another o be liberaldemocracies will notfight.6 hat rathergives thegame away Liberal democ-racies have at timesprepared for wars against other iberal democracies andhave sometimes come close to fighting hem. ChristopherLayne shows thatsome wars betweendemocracieswere averted notbecause of the reluctance fdemocracies to fight ach otherbut for fear of a thirdparty-a good realistreason. How, forexample, could Britain and France fighteach other overFashoda in 1898 when Germany urked in the background? n emphasizing

the internationalpolitical reasons for democracies not fighting ach other,Layne gets to the heartof the matter.7 onformityf countries o a prescribed

3. Francis Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon,"Political cience ndPolitics,Vol. 24, No. 4 (1991), p. 662. JackS. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," n Robert . Rotberg ndTheodore K. Rabb, eds., TheOrigin nd PreventionfMajor Wars Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989), p. 88.4. KennethN. Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, nd War,"American olitical cienceReview, ol. 56, No. 2(June1962). Subsequent Kant references re found n this work.5. Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity f the Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions f ImperialGermany,"nternationalecurity, ol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 157ff.; hristopher ayne, in the

second half of Layne and Sean M. Lynn-Jones,houldAmerica preadDemocracy? Debate Cam-bridge,Mass.: MIT Press,forthcoming),rgues convincinglyhatGermany'sdemocratic ontrol fforeign nd military olicy was no weaker than France's or Britain's.6. JohnM. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," Internationalecurity, ol. 19,No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. Cf. his Liberal eace, LiberalWar:American olitics nd InternationalSecurityIthaca, N.Y: Cornell University ress, 1997).7. Christopher ayne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," Internationalecurity,Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49.




politicalformmay eliminate ome of thecauses of war; itcannot eliminate llof them.The democraticpeace thesiswill hold only fall of the causes ofwarlie inside ofstates.

THE CAUSES OF WAR

To explainwar is easier than tounderstand he conditions f peace. If one asks

whatmay cause war, the simple answer is "anything."That is Kant's answer:The natural state is the state of war. Under the conditions of internationalpolitics,war recurs;the sure way to abolish war, then, s to abolish interna-tional politics.

Over thecenturies,iberalshave showna strong esire togetthepoliticsoutofpolitics.The ideal ofnineteenth-centuryiberalswas thepolice state, hat s,the state that would confine ts activities o catchingcriminals nd enforcingcontracts. he ideal of the laissez-faire tate findsmany counterparts mongstudentsof nternational oliticswiththeiryento getthepower out ofpower

politics, he national out of nternational olitics, hedependence out of nter-dependence,the relativeout of relativegains, the politics out of internationalpolitics, nd the structure ut ofstructuralheory

Proponents of the democraticpeace thesiswrite as though the spread ofdemocracywill negate the effects f anarchyNo causes of conflict nd warwill any longerbe found at the structural evel. FrancisFukuyama finds t"perfectlypossible to imagine anarchic state systemsthat are nonethelesspeaceful." He sees no reason to associate anarchywith war. Bruce Russettbelieves that,with enough democracies in theworld, it "may be possible in

part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy, he securitydilemma ofstates) thathave dominated practice . . since at least the seventeenth en-tury"8Thus the structures removed from tructuralheoryDemocratic tateswould be so confident f thepeace-preserving ffects fdemocracythattheywould no longerfear that anotherstate,so long as it remaineddemocratic,would do it wrong. The guarantee of the state's proper externalbehaviorwould derive from ts admirable internal ualities.

This is a conclusion that Kant would not sustain.German historians t theturnof the nineteenth enturywondered whetherpeacefully nclined states

could be planted and expectedto growwheredangersfromoutside presseddaily upon them.9Kant a centuryearlier entertained he same worryThe

8. FrancisFukuyama,TheEndofHistorynd the astMan (New York:FreePress, 1992),pp. 254-256.Russett,Grasping heDemocratic eace, p. 24.9. For example, Leopold von Ranke, GerhardRitter, nd Otto Hintze. The American WilliamGraham Sumner and manyothers hared theirdoubts.



Structural ealism fterheColdWar 9

seventh propositionof his "Principlesof the Political Order" avers thatestab-lishment f theproperconstitutionnternally equirestheproper orderingofthe externalrelations of states. The first uty of the state is to defend itself,and outside ofa juridical order none but thestate tself an definetheactionsrequired. "Lesion of a less powerfulcountry," ant writes, may be involvedmerely n the conditionof a more powerfulneighborpriorto any action at all;

and in the State of Nature an attack under such circumstanceswould bewarrantable."10n the state ofnature, here s no such thing s an unjustwar.

Every studentof international olitics s aware of the statistical ata sup-portingthe democraticpeace thesis. Everyone has also known at least sinceDavid Hume thatwe have no reason to believe that the association of eventsprovides a basis for nferring he presenceof a causal relation.JohnMuellerproperly peculates that t is not democracy that causes peace but that otherconditions cause both democracyand peace.1"Some of the major democra-cies-Britain in the nineteenth entury nd the United States n the twentieth

century-have been among the most powerful states of theireras. Powerfulstates oftengain their nds by peaceful means whereweaker states eitherfailor have to resort owar.12 hus,the Americangovernment eemed the demo-cratically lected JuanBosch of the Dominican Republic too weak to bringorderto his country. he United States toppled his governmentby sending23,000troopswithin week, troopswhose merepresencemade fighting warunnecessarySalvador Allende, democratically lectedrulerofChile,was sys-tematicallynd effectivelynderminedbytheUnitedStates,without heopenuse of force,because its leaders thoughtthathis governmentwas takinga

wrongturn.As Henry Kissingerput it:"I don't see whywe need to standbyand watch a countrygo Communistdue to the irresponsibilityf its ownpeople."13Thatis theway it s with democracies-their people may show badjudgment. Wayward"democracies re especiallytempting bjectsof nterven-tionby otherdemocracies thatwish to save them.Americanpolicy mayhavebeen wise in both cases, but its actions surelycast doubt on the democraticpeace thesis.So do the nstanceswhen a democracydid fight notherdemoc-

10. Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy f Law, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh:T. and T. Clark, 1887),p. 218.

11. JohnMueller, Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" paper presented t the annual meeting f theAmericanPoliticalScience Association,Washington, .C., August-September 991,pp. 55ff; f.hisQuiet Cataclysm: eflectionsn theRecent ransformationf World olitics New York:HarperCollins,1995).12. Edward Hallett Carr,Twenty ears' Crisis:An Introductiono the tudy f nternational elations,2d ed. (New York:Harper and Row, 1946), pp. 129-132.13. Quoted in Anthony ewis, "The KissingerDoctrine,"New York imes, ebruary 7, 1975,p. 35;and see Henry Kissinger, he White ouse Years Boston: Little,Brown, 1979), chap. 17.




racy.14 o do the instances n which democratically lected legislatureshaveclamored forwar,as has happened forexample in Pakistan and Jordan.

One can of course say,yes,but the DominicanRepublic and Chile were notliberal democracies nor perceived as such by the United States. Once onebegins to go down thatroad, there s no place to stop. The problem s height-ened because liberal democracies, as they prepare for a war they may fear,

begin to look less liberal and will look less liberal still f they begin to fightone. I am tempted o say that he democraticpeace thesis n the formnwhichits proponentscast it is irrefutable. liberal democracy at war withanothercountrys unlikely o call it a liberaldemocracy

Democracies may live at peace with democracies, but even if all statesbecame democratic, he structure f international olitics would remain anar-chic. The structure f internationalpolitics is not transformed y changesinternal o states,however widespread the changes may be. In theabsence ofan externalauthority, state cannot be sure thattoday's friendwill not be

tomorrow's enemy Indeed, democracies have at times behaved as thoughtoday's democracy s today's enemyand a present hreat o them. n FederalistPaper number six, Alexander Hamilton asked whetherthe thirteen tates ofthe Confederacymight ive peacefullywith one another as freely onstitutedrepublics.He answered that herehave been "almost as many popular as royalwars." He cited themany wars foughtby republican Sparta, Athens, Rome,Carthage, Venice, Holland, and Britain.JohnQuincy Adams, in response toJamesMonroe's contrary laim,averred"thatthe government f a Republicwas as capable of intriguingwith the leaders of a freepeople as neighbor-

ing monarchs."'15n the latterhalf of the nineteenth entury, s the UnitedStates and Britainbecame more democratic,bitternessgrew between them,and the possibilityof war was at times seriouslyentertained n both sidesof the Atlantic.France and Britainwere among the principaladversaries inthe great power politics of the nineteenthcentury, s they were earlier.Their becoming democracies did not change their behavior toward eachother. n 1914,democraticEngland and France foughtdemocraticGermany,and doubts about the latter'sdemocratic tanding merely llustrate heprob-lem ofdefinition.ndeed, the democratic luralismofGermanywas an under-

lyingcause of the war. In response to domestic nterests,Germanyfollowed

14. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as Model for the World? A ForeignPolicyPerspective," S: Political cience nd Politics, ol. 24, No. 4 (December 1991); and Mueller, Is WarStill Becoming Obsolete?" p. 5.15. Quoted in Walter A. McDougall, Promised and, CrusaderState (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1997), p. 28 and n. 36.



Structural ealism fter heCold WarI 11

policies bound to frighten oth Britain nd Russia. And today if a war that afewhave fearedwere fought y the United States and Japan,many Americanswould say thatJapanwas not a democracyafter ll, but merely one-partystate.

What'canwe conclude? Democracies rarely ight emocracies,we might ay,and then dd as a word ofessentialcautionthat he nternal xcellenceofstates

is a brittle asis of peace.

DEMOCRATIC WARS

Democracies coexistwithundemocratic tates.Although democracies seldomfight emocracies, heydo, as Michael Doyle has noted,fight t leasttheir hareofwars against others.16 itizens of democratic statestend to thinkof theircountries s good, aside fromwhat they do, simplybecause theyare demo-cratic.Thus former ecretary f State WarrenChristopher laimedthat demo-cratic nations rarelystartwars or threatentheirneighbors."17One might

suggestthat he tryhis propositionout in Central or South America. Citizensof democratic states also tend to think of undemocratic tates as bad, asidefromwhat they do, simply because they are undemocratic.Democracies pro-motewar because they at times decide that the way to preserve peace is todefeat nondemocratic tates and make them democratic.

DuringWorldWar I, WalterHines Page, American ambassador to England,claimed that here is no securitynany partof the world wherepeople cannotthink f a governmentwithout kingand never will be." DuringtheVietnamWar,Secretary f StateDean Rusk claimed thatthe "United Statescannot be

secureuntil hetotal nternational nvironments ideologically afe."18 oliciesaside, thevery xistence f undemocratic tates s a dangertoothers.Americanpoliticaland intellectual eaders have often aken thisview. Liberal interven-tionism s again on the march.PresidentBillClinton and his nationalsecurityadviser,AnthonyLake, urged the United States to take measures to enhancedemocracyaround the world. The task, one fears,will be taken up by theAmericanmilitarywithsome enthusiasm.FormerArmyChiefof StaffGeneralGordon Sullivan,forexample,favored a new military model," replacingthenegative aim of containmentwith a positive one: "To promote democracy,

16. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies,and ForeignAffairs, art 2," p. 337.17. WarrenChristopher, The U.S.-JapanRelationship:The Responsibility o Change," address totheJapan Association of CorporateExecutives,Tokyo,Japan,March 11, 1994 (U.S. Department fState,Bureau of Public Affairs, ffice f PublicCommunication), . 3.18. Page quoted in Waltz, Man, theState, nd War:A Theoretical nalysis New York: ColumbiaUniversity ress, 1959), p. 121.Rusk quoted in Layne, "Kant or Cant," p. 46.



Internationalecurity5:1 | 12

regional stability,nd economic prosperity."19ther voices urge us to enterinto a "struggle o ensure thatpeople are governedwell." Having apparentlysolved the problemof justice at home, "the strugglefor iberal governmentbecomes a strugglenot simply for usticebut for urvival."20As R.H. Tawneysaid: "Either war is a crusade, or it is a crime."21 rusades are frighteningbecause crusaders go to war for righteouscauses, which they define for

themselves nd try o impose on others.One mighthave hoped thatAmericanswould have learned that hey re notvery good at causingdemocracy broad.But, alas, if the world can be made safe for democracy only by making itdemocratic, hen all means are permitted nd to use thembecomes a duty.Thewar fervor fpeople and their epresentativess at timeshard to contain.ThusHans Morgenthaubelieved that "the democratic election and responsibilityofgovernment fficials estroyed nternationalmorality s an effectiveystemofrestraint."22

Since, as Kant believed, war among self-directed tateswill occasionally

breakout, peace has to be contrived. or any government,oingso is a difficulttask, nd all statesare at times deficient n accomplishing t,even iftheywishto. Democratic eaders may respond to the fervor orwar that their citizenssometimesdisplay,or even try o arouse it,and governments re sometimesconstrained yelectoral alculations o deferpreventivemeasures.ThusBritishPrime MinisterStanleyBaldwin said that f he had called in 1935 for Britishrearmament gainst the German threat,his partywould have lost the nextelection.23 emocraticgovernmentsmay respondto internalpolitical mpera-tives when they houldbe responding o external nes. All governments ave

theirfaults,democracies no doubt fewer than others,but that is not goodenoughto sustainthe democraticpeace thesis.

That peace may prevail among democratic tates is a comforting hought.The obverse of the proposition-that democracy may promotewar againstundemocratic tates-is disturbing.fthe latterholds,we cannot even say forsure that thespread ofdemocracywill bringa net decrease in the amount ofwar in the world.

19. Quoted in Clemson G. Turregano nd RickyLynnWaddell, "FromParadigmtoParadigmShift:

The Military nd OperationsOtherthan War,"Journal fPolitical cience,Vol. 22 (1994), p. 15.20. Peter Beinart, The Returnof the Bomb," NewRepublic, ugust 3, 1998, p. 27.21. Quoted in Michael Straight,Make ThistheLastWar New York:G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), p. 1.22. Hans J.Morgenthau, olitics mongNations:TheStruggle or ower nd Peace,5th ed. (New York:Knopf, 1973), p. 248.23. Gordon Craig and Alexander George, Force nd Statecraft:iplomatic roblems f Our Time, ded. (New York:OxfordUniversity ress, 1990),p. 64.



Structural ealism fter heCold War 13

With republic stablished na strong tate,Kant hoped the republicanformwould gradually take hold in the world. In 1795, Americaprovided the hope.Two hundred years later, remarkably,t still does. Ever since liberals firstexpressedtheirviews, theyhave been divided. Some have urged liberal statesto work to upliftbenighted peoples and bring the benefits f liberty,ustice,and prosperity o them.John tuartMill, Giuseppe Mazzini,Woodrow Wilson,and BillClinton re all interventionistiberals.Other iberals,Kant and RichardCobden, for xample, while agreeingon the benefits hatdemocracy an bringto the world, have emphasized the difficulties nd the dangers of activelyseeking tspropagation.

If the world is now safe fordemocracy, ne has towonder whetherdemoc-racy is safe forthe world. When democracy s ascendant,a condition that nthe twentieth entury ttended the winning of hot wars and cold ones, theinterventionistpiritflourishes. he effects heightenedwhen one democraticstatebecomesdominant, s the UnitedStates s now.Peace is thenoblestcauseof war. ftheconditions f peace are lacking, henthecountrywith a capabilityofcreating hemmaybe temptedto do so, whetheror notby force.The endis noble, but as a matterof right, ant insists,no state can intervene n theinternalarrangements f another. As a matterof fact,one may notice thatintervention,ven forworthy nds, oftenbringsmore harmthangood. Thevice to whichgreatpowers easilysuccumb n a multipolarworld is inattention;in a bipolar world, overreaction;n a unipolar world,overextention.

Peace is maintainedby a delicate balance of nternal nd external estraints.Stateshavinga surplusofpower are tempted o use it,and weaker statesfeartheirdoing so. The laws ofvoluntary ederations,o use Kant's language,aredisregardedat thewhim of thestronger,s theUnited States demonstrateddecade ago by mining Nicaraguan watersand by invadingPanama. In bothcases, the United States blatantlyviolated international aw. In the first,tdenied the jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt of Justice,which it hadpreviously ccepted. n thesecond, t flaunted he aw embodied inthe Charterof theOrganizationof AmericanStates,of which itwas a principal sponsor.

If thedemocratic eace thesis s right, tructural ealist heoryswrong.Onemay believe,withKant,thatrepublicsare by and large good statesand that

unbalanced power is a dangerno matterwho wields it. Inside of,as well asoutside of, the circle of democraticstates, peace depends on a precariousbalance of forces.The causes of war lie not simplyin statesor in the statesystem; heyare foundin both. Kant understoodthis.Devotees of the demo-craticpeace thesis overlook t.




TheWeakEffectsf nterdependence

If notdemocracy lone, may not the spread of democracycombinedwiththetighteningfnational nterdependence ulfill he prescription orpeace offeredby nineteenth-centuryiberals and so oftenrepeated today?24 o the suppos-edly peaceful nclination fdemocracies, nterdependence dds the propulsive

power oftheprofitmotive.Democratic states may increasingly evote them-selves to the pursuitof peace and profits. he trading state is replacingthepolitical-militarytate,and thepower of themarketnow rivals or surpassesthepower of thestate,or so some believe.25

BeforeWorldWar , Norman Angell believed thatwars would not be foughtbecause theywould not pay, yet Germanyand Britain, ach other's second-bestcustomers, ought longand bloodywar.26nterdependencen somewayspromotes peace by multiplying ontacts among states and contributing omutual understanding. t also multipliesthe occasions for conflicts hat may

promote resentment nd even war.27 lose interdependence s a condition nwhich one party can scarcelymove without ostling others; a small pushripples through ocietyThe closer the social bonds, the more extreme heeffectbecomes, and one cannot sensibly pursue an interestwithouttakingothers'interestsntoaccount. One countrys then nclinedto treat nothercountry'sacts as eventswithin ts own polityand to attempt o control hem.

That interdependencepromotes war as well as peace has been said oftenenough. What requires emphasis is that,eitherway, among the forces thatshape international olitics, nterdependence s a weak one. Interdependence

withinmodern tates s muchcloserthan t s across states.TheSovieteconomywas planned so that tsfar-flung artswould be not ust interdependent utintegrated.Huge factories epended fortheiroutputon products exchanged

24. Strongly ffirmativenswers are given by JohnR. Oneal and Bruce Russett, Assessing theLiberal Peace withAlternative pecifications: radeStillReduces Conflict," ournalfPeaceResearch,Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 999), pp. 423-442; and Russett,Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The ThirdLegof theKantian Tripod forPeace: International rganizations nd Militarized Disputes, 1950-85,"International rganization, ol. 52,No. 3 (Summer1998), pp. 441-467.25. Richard Rosecrance,The Rise of theTrading tate:Commercend Coalitions n theModern World

(New York:Basic Books, 1986); and at times Susan Strange,The Retreat fthe tate:TheDiffusionfPower n the World conomy New York: CambridgeUniversity ress, 1996).26. Norman Angell, The Great llusion, th rev. nd enlarged ed. (New York:Putnam's, 1913).27. Katherine Barbieri, Economic Interdependence:A Path to Peace or a Source of InterstateConflict?"Journal fPeace Research, ol. 33, No. 1 (February 1996). Lawrence Keely,WarbeforeCivilization:heMyth f he eaceful avage New York:OxfordUniversity ress,1996),p. 196, howsthatwith ncreasesof trade and intermarriagemong tribes,war became more frequent.




with others.Despite the tight ntegration f the Soviet economy, he state fellapart. Yugoslavia provides another stark llustration.Once externalpoliticalpressure lessened, internal economic interestswere too weak to hold thecountry together.One must wonder whethereconomic interdependence smore effect han cause. Internally, nterdependencebecomes so close thatintegration s theproperword to describe it. Interdependencebecomes inte-

gration because internally he expectationthat peace will prevail and orderwillbe preserved s high.Externally, oods and capitalflowfreelywhere peaceamong countriesappears to be reliably established. Interdependence, ikeintegration, epends on other conditions. t is more a dependent than anindependent variable. States, fthey can afford o, shy away frombecomingexcessively dependent on goods and resourcesthatmay be denied themincrises and wars. States takemeasures, uch as Japan's managed trade, o avoidexcessivedependence on others.28

The impulse to protect one's identity-cultural and political as well as

economic-from encroachment y others s strong.When it seems that "wewill sink or swimtogether," wimming eparately ooks attractive o those ableto do it. FromPlato onward, utopias were set in isolationfromneighbors othatpeople could construct heir ollective ifeuncontaminated y contactwithothers.With zero interdependence, either onflict or war is possible. Withintegration,nternational ecomes nationalpolitics.29 he zone in betweenisa gray one with the effects f interdependence ometimesgood, providingthe benefits f divided labor,mutual understanding, nd cultural nrichment,and sometimesbad, leadingtoprotectionism, utualresentment,onflict,nd

war.The uneveneffects f nterdependence, ith someparties o itgainingmore,

othersgaining ess, are obscuredby the substitution f RobertKeohane's andJosephNye's term asymmetric nterdependence" orrelations fdependenceand independence among states.30Relatively independent states are in astronger ositionthanrelatively ependentones. If depend more on you thanyou depend on me, you have moreways ofinfluencingme and affectingmy

28. On statesmanaging interdependence o avoid excessive dependence, see especially Robert

Gilpin,The PoliticalEconomy f nternational elationsPrinceton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress,1987),chap. 10; and Suzanne Berger nd Ronald Dore, eds., NationalDiversityndGlobalCapitalism(Ithaca, N.Y: CornellUniversity ress, 1996).29. Cf. KennethN. Waltz, n Steven L. Spiegel and Waltz, ds.,ConflictnWorld olitics Cambridge,Mass.: Winthrop, 971),chap. 13.30. Robert0. Keohane and JosephS. Nye, Power ndInterdependence,d ed. (New York:Harper-Collins, 1989).




fatethan I have of affecting ours. Interdependence uggests a conditionofroughly equal dependence of parties on one another.Omitting the word"dependence" blunts the inequalities that mark the relationsof states andmakes themall seem to be on the same footing.Much of international,s ofnational,politics s about inequalities.Separatingone "issue area" from thersand emphasizing thatweak states have advantages in some of themreduces

thesense of nequalityEmphasizingthelow fungibilityf power furthers heeffect.fpower is notveryfungible,weak statesmay have decisiveadvantageson some issues. Again, the effects f inequalityare blunted. But power,notveryfungibleforweak states, s veryfungiblefor trong nes. The history fAmericanforeignpolicy since WorldWar II is repletewithexamples ofhowtheUnited Statesused its superioreconomiccapability opromote tspoliticaland securitynterests.31

In a 1970essay, described nterdependence s an ideologyused byAmeri-cans to camouflagethegreat everagethe United Statesenjoys n international

politicsby makingit seem thatstrong nd weak, rich and poor nations aresimilarly ntangledin a thickweb of interdependence.32n her recentbook,TheRetreat ftheState, usan Strangereachedthe same conclusion,butby anodd route. Her argument s that "the progressive ntegration f the worldeconomy, hrough nternational roduction,has shifted hebalance ofpoweraway from tates nd towardworldmarkets." he advances threepropositionsin supportof herargument: 1) power has "shiftedupward fromweak statesto strongerones" having global or regional reach; (2) power has "shiftedsideways fromstates to marketsand thus to non-state uthoritiesderiving

power from heirmarket hares";and (3) some power has "evaporated" withno one exercisingt.33n international olitics,withno central uthority, owerdoes sometimesslip away and sometimesmove sideways to markets.Whenseriousslippage occurs,however, trongertates tep ntoreverse t, nd firmsofthestrongertatescontrol he argestmarket haresanyway.One maydoubtwhethermarkets ny more escape the controlofmajor states now thanthey

31. Keohane and Nye are on both sides of the issue. See, forexample, ibid., p. 28. Keohaneemphasized thatpower is not veryfungible nKeohane,ed., "Theoryof WorldPolitics,"Neorealism

and tsCritics New York:ColumbiaUniversity ress, 1986);and see KennethN. Waltz, Reflectionon Theory ofInternational olitics:A Response to My Critics," n ibid. RobertJ.Artanalyzes thefungibility f power in detail. See Art,"American ForeignPolicyand the Fungibility f Force,"Securitytudies,Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer1996).32. KennethN. Waltz, "The Myth ofNational Interdependence," n Charles P. Kindleberger, d.,The nternationalorporationCambridge,Mass.: MIT Press,1970).33. Strange,RetreatftheState, p. 46, 189.




did in the nineteenth entury r earlier-perhaps less so since the competenceof states has increased at least in proportionto increases in the size andcomplicationsof markets.Anyone, realist or not, might thinkStrange'sfirstproposition s the important ne. Never since the Roman Empire has powerbeen so concentratedn one state. Despite believing that power has movedfrom states to markets, Strange recognized reality. he observed near the

beginningof herbook thatthe"authority-the power over' global outcomesenjoyed by American society, nd therefore ndirectly y the United Statesgovernment-is still uperiorto thatof any other ocietyor any othergovern-ment." And near the end, she remarkedthat the "authority f governmentstendsto over-rule he cautionofmarkets." fone wondered which governmentshe had in mind,she answered immediately: The fate of Mexico is decidedin Washingtonmore than Wall Street.And the InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF) is obliged to follow the American ead, despite the misgivingsof Ger-manyorJapan."34

The history f the past two centurieshas been one of centralgovernmentsacquiringmore and more power. Alexis de Tocqueville observed duringhisvisit to theUnitedStatesin 1831 that"the Federal Government carcelyeverinterferesnany but foreign ffairs; nd the governments fthestates nrealitydirectsociety in America."35After World War II, governments n WesternEurope disposed ofabout a quarteroftheirpeoples' income. The proportionnow is more than half. At a time when Americans, Britons,Russians, andChinese weredecrying hecontrol f the state over their ives, twas puzzlingto be told thatstates were losing control over theirexternal affairs. osing

control, ne wonders,as compared to when? Weak states have lost some oftheir nfluence nd controlover externalmatters, ut strong tateshave notlost theirs.The patterns rehardlynew ones. In theeighteenthnd nineteenthcenturies, he strongest tatewith the longestreach intervened ll over theglobe and built history'smost extensiveempire. n the twentieth entury, hestrongest tatewith the ongestreachrepeatedBritain's nterventionistehav-ior and, since the end of the Cold War,on an ever widening scale, withoutbuilding an empire.The absence of empire hardly means, however,that theextent of America's influence and control over the actions of others is of

lesser moment.The withering way of thepower of the state,whether nter-

34. Ibid.,pp. 25, 192.35. Alexis de Tocqueville,Democracyn America, d. J.P.Mayer, rans.George Lawrence New York:Harper Perennial,1988), p. 446, n. 1.




nally or externally,s more of a wish and an illusion than a reality n mostofthe world.

Under the Pax Britannica, he interdependence f states became unusuallyclose,which to many portended a peacefuland prosperous future. nstead, aprolonged period of war, autarky, nd more war followed. The internationaleconomic system, onstructed nder American uspices afterWorldWar I and

lateramended to suit its purposes, may last longer, ut then again it may not.The characterof international olitics changes as national interdependencetightensor loosens. Yet even as relationsvary, states have to take care ofthemselves as best theycan in an anarchicenvironment. nternationally,hetwentieth entury or the most part was an unhappy one. In its last quarter,the clouds lifteda little,but twenty-five ears is a slight base on which toground optimistic onclusions. Not only are the effects f close interdepend-ence problematic, ut so also is its durability

The Limited ole of nternationalnstitutions

One ofthechargeshurled at realist heorys that t depreciates he mportanceof institutions. he charge is justified, nd the strangecase of NATO's (theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization's)outliving tspurpose shows whyrealistsbelieve that nternationalnstitutions re shaped and limitedby the statesthatfound and sustain themand have little ndependenteffect. iberal nstitution-alistspaid scant attention o organizationsdesigned to buttress hesecurity fstates until, ontrary o expectations nferred romrealisttheories,NATO not

onlysurvivedthe end ofthe Cold Warbut went on to add new members ndtopromiseto embrace tillmore. Far fromnvalidating ealist heory rcastingdoubt on it,however, he recenthistory f NATO illustrates hesubordinationof internationalnstitutionso nationalpurposes.

EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The natureand purposes of institutions hange as structures ary In theoldmultipolarworld,thecoreof an alliance consisted of a small numberof statesofcomparable capability. heircontributionso one another'ssecuritywereof

crucial mportance ecause theywere ofsimilar ize. Because majorallieswereclosely interdependentmilitarily,he defectionof one would have made itspartnersvulnerable to a competingalliance. The membersof opposing alli-ancesbeforeWorldWar weretightly nitbecause of theirmutualdependence.In the new bipolar world, the word "alliance" took on a differentmeaning.One country, he United States or the Soviet Union, provided most of the



Structural ealism fter heCold WarI 19

security or ts bloc. The withdrawal ofFrancefromNATO's commandstruc-ture and the defectionof China fromthe Soviet bloc failed even to tiltthecentralbalance. Early n theCold War,Americans poke withalarmabout thethreatof monolithic ommunismarisingfromthe combined strength f theSoviet Union and China, yetthe bloc's disintegrationaused scarcely ripple.American officialsdid not proclaim thatwith China's defection,America's

defensebudget could safelybe reduced by 20 or 10 percent r even be reducedat all. Similarly,when France stopped playing its part in NATO's militaryplans, American officialsdid not proclaim that defense spending had to beincreased for that reason. Properly speaking, NATO and the WTO (WarsawTreatyOrganization) were treaties fguaranteerather hanold-stylemilitaryalliances.36

GlennSnyderhas remarked hat"alliances have no meaning apartfrom headversary hreat owhich they re a response."37 expectedNATO to dwindleat the Cold War's end and ultimately o disappear.38 n a basic sense, the

expectationhas been borne out. NATO is no longereven a treaty fguaranteebecause one cannot answer thequestion, guarantee againstwhom? Functionsvary as structures hange, as does thebehaviorofunits.Thus the end of theCold War quickly changed the behavior of allied countries. n early Julyof1990, NATO announced that the alliance would "elaborate new forceplansconsistentwith the revolutionary hanges in Europe."39 By the end ofJuly,withoutwaiting for any such plans, themajor European members ofNATOunilaterally nnouncedlargereductions n their orce evels. Even thepretenseofcontinuing o act as an alliance in settingmilitary olicy disappeared.

With ts old purpose dead, and the ndividual and collectivebehavior of tsmembers altered accordingly, ow does one explain NATO's survival andexpansion?Institutions re hard to create and set inmotion,but once created,institutionalistslaim, theymay takeon something f a lifeof their wn; theymay begin to act witha measure of autonomy, ecomingless dependentonthe wills of theirsponsors and members.NATO supposedly validates thesethoughts.

Organizations, especially big ones with strong traditions, ave long lives.The March of Dimes is an example sometimes cited. Having won the war

36. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "International tructure,National Force, and the Balance of WorldPower," Journal f nternational ffairs,ol. 21, No. 2 (1967), p. 219.37. GlennH. Snyder,Alliance olitics Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1997), p. 192.38. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The EmergingStructure f International olitics," nternationalecurity,Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 75-76.39. JohnRoper, "Shaping Strategywithoutthe Threat,"Adephi Paper No. 257 (London: Interna-tional nstitute orStrategic tudies,Winter 990/91),pp. 80-81.




against polio, its mission was accomplished. Nevertheless, t cast about foranew malady to cure or contain.Even thoughthe most appealing ones-cancer,diseases of the heart and lungs, multiple sclerosis, nd cysticfibrosis-werealready taken, tdid find a worthy ause to pursue, the amelioration f birthdefects.One can fairly laim that the March of Dimes enjoys continuitys anorganization, ursuing an end consonantwith ts original purpose. How can

one make such a claim forNATO?The question of purpose may not be a very mportant ne; create n organi-

zation and it will find omething o do.40Once created, nd themore so onceithas become well established, n organizationbecomes hard to get rid of. Abig organization s managed by large numbers of bureaucratswho develop astrong nterestn its perpetuation.Accordingto GuntherHellmann and Rein-hard Wolf, n 1993 NATO headquarterswas manned by 2,640 officials,most ofwhom presumablywanted to keep their obs.41The durability f NATO evenas the structure f international olitics has changed, and the old purpose of

the organizationhas disappeared, s interpreted y nstitutionalistss evidencestrongly rguing fortheautonomy and vitality finstitutions.

The institutionalistnterpretationmisses the point. NATO is first f all atreatymade by states.A deeply entrenched nternational ureaucracy an helpto sustain the organization, ut states determine tsfate.Liberal institutional-ists take NATO's seeming vigoras confirmationf theimportance f interna-tional nstitutions nd as evidence of theirresilience.Realists,noticing hatasan alliance NATO has lost its major function, ee it mainly as a means ofmaintaining nd lengtheningAmerica's grip on theforeign nd military oli-

cies ofEuropean states.JohnKornblum,U.S. seniordeputyto theundersecre-taryof state for European affairs, eatly describedNATO's new role. "TheAlliance,"he wrote, providesa vehiclefor heapplicationof Americanpowerand vision to the security rder n Europe."42The survival and expansion ofNATO tell us much about American power and influenceand little aboutinstitutionss multilateral ntities.The abilityof the United States to extendthe lifeof a moribund nstitution icely llustrateshow internationalnstitu-tions are created and maintainedby stronger tatesto servetheirperceivedormisperceived nterests.

40. JosephA. Schumpeter,writing f armies,put it this way: "created yzvars hatrequiredt, themachine ow reated hewars t required."The Sociology of mperialism," nSchumpeter,mperialismand Social Classes New York:Meridian Books, 1955), p. 25 (emphasis in original).41. Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism,nd theFutureof NATO," Security tudies,Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), p. 20.42. JohnKornblum, NATO's Second Half Century-Tasks for n Alliance,"NATO on Track or he21stCentury, onferenceReport The Hague: NetherlandsAtlanticCommission,1994), p. 14.




The Bush administration aw, and the Clintonadministration ontinued tosee, NATO as the instrument or maintainingAmerica's domination of theforeign nd military olicies of European states. n 1991, U.S. Undersecretaryof StateReginald Bartholomew's etter o the governments fEuropeanmem-bers of NATO warned against Europe's formulatingndependentpositionsondefense. France and Germany had thought that a European securityand

defense identitymight be developed within the EU and that the WesternEuropean Union, formed n 1954, could be revived as the instrument or tsrealization.The Bush administration uickly squelched these ideas. The dayafter the signing of the MaastrichtTreaty n December of 1991, PresidentGeorge Bush could say withsatisfaction hat "we are pleased that our Alliesin theWesternEuropean Union . . . decided to strengthenhat nstitution sboth NATO's European pillar and the defense componentof the EuropeanUnion."43

The European pillar was to be containedwithinNATO, and its policies were

to be made in Washington.Weaker states have troublefashioningnstitutionsto serve theirown ends in theirown ways, especially in the security ealm.Think of the defeat of the European Defense Community n 1954, despiteAmerica's supportof it,and the inability f the WesternEuropean Union inthe more than four decades of its existence to finda significant ole inde-pendent of the United States. Realism reveals what liberal institutionalist"theory"obscures:namely, hat nternational nstitutions erve primarilyna-tional rather han international nterests.41 obert Keohane and Lisa Martin,replying oJohnMearsheimer's criticism f liberal nstitutionalism,sk: How

are we "to account for thewillingnessofmajor states to invest resources nexpanding international nstitutionsf such institutions re lacking in sig-nificance?"45fthe answerwerenotalreadyobvious, theexpansionof NATOwould make it so: to serve whatpowerful tates believe to be their nterests.

With he administration's osnianpolicy ntrouble,Clinton needed to showhimself n effectiveoreign olicy eader.With he nationalheroes LechWalesaand Vaclav Havel clamoringfor theircountries' nclusion,foreclosingNATOmembershipwould have handed another ssue to theRepublican Party n the

43. Mark S. Sheetz, "Correspondence:Debating the Unipolar Moment," nternationalecurity, ol.22,No. 3 (Winter 997/98),p. 170; and Mike Winnerstig, RethinkingAllianceDynamics," paperpresented t the annual meeting f the nternational tudies Association,Washington, .C., March18-22, 1997, at p. 23.44. Cf.Alan S. Milward, The EuropeanRescue f heNation-StateBerkeley:University f CaliforniaPress, 1992).45. Robert0. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist heory,"nternationalSecurity, ol. 20,No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 40.




congressional electionsof 1994. To tout NATO's eastward march, PresidentClintongave majorspeeches inMilwaukee, Cleveland, and Detroit, itieswithsignificant umbersofEast European voters.46 otes and dollars are the life-blood of Americanpolitics. New members of NATO will be required to im-prove theirmilitarynfrastructurend to buy modern weapons. The Americanarms ndustry,xpecting o capture ts usual large share of a new market, as

lobbied heavily n favorof NATO's expansion.47The reasons for expanding NATO are weak. The reasons for opposing

expansionarestrong.48t draws new lines of division nEurope,alienates thoseleft ut, and can findno logical stoppingplace west of Russia. Itweakens thoseRussians most inclined toward liberal democracy and a market economy Itstrengthens ussians of the opposite inclination. t reduces hope for furtherlarge reductionsofnuclear weaponry. t pushes Russia toward China insteadof drawing Russia toward Europe and America. NATO, led by America,scarcely considered theplightof its defeated adversary Throughoutmodern

history,Russia has been rebuffedby the West, isolated and at times sur-rounded. Many Russians believe that,by expanding,NATO brazenlybrokepromises tmade in 1990 and 1991 that formerWTO memberswould not beallowed to join NATO. Withgood reason,Russians fearthat NATO will notonly admit additional old membersof the WTO but also former epublicsofthe Soviet Union. In 1997,NATO heldnaval exerciseswithUkraine nthe BlackSea, withmore ointexercises o come,and announcedplans to use a militarytesting round nwesternUkraine. n Juneof 1998,ZbigniewBrzezinskiwentto Kiev withthemessage thatUkraine should prepare tself o joinNATO by

theyear2010.49The farther ATO intrudes nto the SovietUnion's old arena,the moreRussia is forced o look to theeast rather hanto the west.

The expansionof NATO extends tsmilitary nterests, nlarges tsresponsi-bilities, nd increases tsburdens. Not only do new membersrequireNATO'sprotection, heyalso heighten ts concernover destabilizing vents near their

46. JamesM. Goldgeier, NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," Washington uarterly,Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter1998), pp. 94-95. And see his Not Whether ut When:TheU.S. DecisiontoEnlargeNATO (Washington, .C.: Brookings, 999).47. WilliamD. Hartung, Welfare orWeapons Dealers 1998: The Hidden Costs of NATO Expan-sion" (New York:New School for Social Research,World Policy Institute,March 1998); and JeffGerth nd Tim Weiner, Arms Makers See Bonanza in Selling NATO Expansion," New York imes,June29, 1997, p. I, 8.48. See Michael E. Brown, The Flawed Logic ofExpansion," Survival, ol. 37, No. 1 (Spring1995),pp. 34-52. Michael Mandelbaum,TheDawn ofPeace n Europe New York:Twentieth entury undPress, 1996). Philip Zelikow, "The Masque ofInstitutions," urvival,Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996).49. J.L.Black,RussiaFaces NATO Expansion: earingGifts rBearing rms? Lanham,Md.: Rowmanand Littlefield, 000), pp. 5-35, 175-201.




borders. Thus Balkan eruptions become a NATO and not just a Europeanconcern. n the absence of European initiative,Americans believe they mustlead the way because the credibility f NATO is at stake. Balkan operations nthe air and even more so on the ground exacerbate differences f interestamong NATO members nd strain he alliance. European membersmarvel atthe surveillance and communicationscapabilities of the United States and

stand in awe of the modern military orcesat its command. Aware of theirweaknesses, Europeans express determination o modernize theirforces ndto develop their ability to deploy them independently. urope's reaction toAmerica's Balkan operations duplicates its determinationo remedy deficien-cies revealed in 1991 during the Gulf War, determination hatproduced fewresults.

Will t be differenthistime?Perhaps,yet fEuropean statesdo achieve theirgoals ofcreating 60,000 strong apid reactionforce nd enlarging he role ofthe WEU, the tensionbetween a NATO controlledby the United States and a

NATO allowing for ndependent European actionwill again be bothersome.In any event,the prospect of militarily ogging down in the Balkans teststhealliance and may indefinitely elay its further xpansion. Expansion buystrouble, nd mounting roublesmay bring expansion to a halt.

European conditions and Russian opposition work against the eastwardextensionof NATO. Pressing n the opposite direction s the momentum ofAmerican expansion. The momentumof expansion has often been hard tobreak, a thoughtborne out by the empires of Republican Rome, of CzaristRussia, and ofLiberal Britain.

One is often emindedthat he UnitedStates s not ustthe dominantpowerin theworld but that t is a liberal ominant power. True,the motivations fthe artificers f expansion-President Clinton, National SecurityAdviserAnthony Lake, and others-were to nurturedemocracy in young, fragile,long-sufferingountries.One may wonder, however, why this should be anAmerican rather than a European task and why a militaryratherthan apolitical-economic rganizationshould be seen as the appropriatemeans forcarrying t out. The task of building democracyis not a military ne. Themilitary ecurityof new NATO membersis not in jeopardy; theirpolitical

development nd economicwell-being re. In 1997,U.S. Assistant ecretary fDefense Franklin D. Kramer told the Czech defense ministry hat it wasspending too littleon defense.50Yet investing n defense slows economicgrowth.Bycommoncalculation, efense pendingstimulates conomicgrowth

50. Ibid.,p. 72.




about half as much as direct nvestment n the economy. n EasternEurope,economic not military ecurity s the problem and entering military lliancecompounds it.

Using the example of NATO to reflect n the relevance of realism after heCold War leads to some important onclusions. The winner of the Cold Warand the sole remaininggreat power has behaved as unchecked powers have

usually done. In the absence of counterweights, country's nternal mpulsesprevail, whether fueled by liberal or by other urges. The error of realistpredictions hattheend ofthe Cold War would mean theend of NATO arosenot from failureof realist theory o comprehend nternational olitics,butfrom n underestimation f America's folly The survival and expansion ofNATO illustratenotthe defectsbut the limitations f structuralxplanations.Structureshape and shove; theydo not determine he actionsofstates.A statethatis stronger han any other can decide for tselfwhetherto conform tspolicies to structural ressures nd whether o avail itself ftheopportunities

that tructural hange offers, ith ittle earof adverse affectsn the shortrun.Do liberal institutionalists rovide better everage for explaining NATO'ssurvival and expansion? According oKeohane and Martin, ealists nsist thatinstitutions ave only marginal ffects."51n thecontrary,ealistshave noticedthat whether nstitutions ave strong r weak effects epends on what statesintend.Strong tates use institutions,s they nterpretaws, in ways that suitthem. Thus Susan Strange, n pondering the state's retreat, bserves that"international rganizationis above all a tool of national government, ninstrument orthepursuitofnational nterest y othermeans."52

Interestingly,eohane and Martin, n their effort o refuteMearsheimer'strenchant riticism f institutional heory,n effect gree with him. Havingclaimed thathis realismis "not well specified,"theynote that "institutionaltheoryconceptualizes institutions oth as independentand dependent vari-ables."53Dependent on what?-on "the realities fpower and interest."nsti-tutions, t turnsout,"make a significant ifferencen conjunctionwithpowerrealities."54 es! Liberal institutionalism,s Mearsheimer ays, "is no longeraclear alternative orealism, uthas, nfact, een swallowed up by t."55ndeed,it never was an alternative o realism. nstitutionalistheory,s Keohane has

51. Keohane and Martin, The Promise of Institutionalistheory," p. 42, 46.52. Strange,Retreat f theState,p. xiv; and see pp. 192-193. Cf. Carr,Thze wenty ears'Crisis,p.107: "international overnment s, in effect, overnment y that state which supplies thepowernecessaryforthe purpose ofgoverning."53. Keohane and Martin, The Promise of nstitutionalist heory," . 46.54. Ibid., p. 42.55. Mearsheimer,A RealistReply,"p. 85.



Structural ealism fter heColdWar125

stressed,has as itscore structural ealism,which Keohane and Nye sought "tobroaden."56The institutional pproach startswith structural heory, pplies itto the origins and operations of institutions, nd unsurprisingly nds withrealistconclusions.

Alliances illustrate he weaknesses of institutionalism ith special clarity.Institutional heory ttributes o institutions ausal effects hatmostly riginate

withinstates. The case of NATO nicely llustrates hisshortcoming.Keohanehas remarked that "alliances are institutions, nd both their durability ndstrength.. may depend inpart on their nstitutional haracteristics."57npart,I suppose, but one must wonder in how large a part.The TripleAlliance andthe Triple Ententewere quite durable. They lasted not because of allianceinstitutions, here hardly being any, but because the core members of eachalliance looked outward and saw a pressingthreat o their ecurityPreviousalliances did not lack institutions ecause states had failed to figure ut howto constructbureaucracies. Previous alliances lacked institutions ecause in

the absence of a hegemonic leader, balancing continued within as wellas across alliances. NATO lasted as a military lliance as long as the SovietUnion appeared to be a direct hreat o its members. t survivesand expandsnow notbecause of ts nstitutions ut mainlybecause the United Stateswantsit to.

NATO's survival also exposes an interesting spect of balance-of-powertheory.Robert Art has argued forcefullyhatwithout NATO and withoutAmericantroops n Europe, European states will lapse into a "security om-petition"among themselves.58 s he emphasizes, this s a realistexpectation.

In his view, preservingNATO, and maintainingAmerica's leading role in it,are requiredin orderto preventa security ompetition hatwould promoteconflictwithin, nd impairthe nstitutionsf, heEuropeanUnion.NATO nowis an anomaly; the dampening of intra-alliance ension s the main task left,and it is a tasknotfor he alliance but for ts leader. The secondarytaskof analliance, ntra-alliancemanagement, ontinuesto be performed y the UnitedStateseven thoughtheprimary ask,defenseagainst an external nemy,hasdisappeared. The point s worthpondering,but I need to say hereonlythat t

56. Keohane and Nye,Power nd Interdependence,. 251; cf. Keohane, "Theoryof WorldPolitics,"in Keohane, Neorealismnd Its Critics, . 193,where he describes his approach as a "modifiedstructural esearchprogram."57. Robert 0. Keohane, Internationalnistitutionsnd State Pozver: ssays in International elationsTheoryBoulder,Colo.: Westview, 989), p. 15.58. RobertJ. Art, "Why WesternEurope Needs the United States and NATO," PoliticalScienceQuarterly, ol. 111,No. 1 (Spring 1996).




further llustratesthe dependence of international nstitutions n nationaldecisions. Balancing among states s not nevitable.As inEurope, a hegemonicpower may suppress it. As a high-levelEuropean diplomat put it, "it is notacceptable that the lead nationbe European. A European power broker s ahegemonic power. We can agree on U.S. leadership, but not on one of ourown."59Accepting he eadership of a hegemonicpower prevents balance of

power from merging n Europe, and better he hegemonic power should beat a distance thannextdoor.Keohane believes that"avoiding military onflict n Europe after he Cold

War depends greatlyon whetherthe next decade is characterizedby a con-tinuouspatternof institutionalized ooperation."60fone accepts the conclu-sion, the question remains: What or who sustains the "pattern ofinstitutionalizedooperation"?Realists know the answer.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL AIMS

What s trueof NATO holds for nternationalnstitutions enerallyThe effectsthat nternationalnstitutionsmayhave on national decisions arebut one stepremoved from he capabilitiesand intentions f themajor state or states thatgave thembirth nd sustain them.TheBrettonWoods system tronglyffectedindividual statesand the conduct of nternational ffairs. ut when the UnitedStatesfoundthat the systemno longerserved its interests,heNixon shocksof 1971were administered. nternational nstitutions re createdby themorepowerful tates, nd the institutions urvive in theiroriginalform s long astheyserve themajor interests f their reators, r are thought o do so. "The

nature of institutional rrangements," s Stephen Krasnerput it, "is betterexplained by the distribution f nationalpower capabilitiesthanby efforts osolve problemsof marketfailure"61-or, would add, by anything lse.

Either nternationalonventions, reaties,nd institutions emain lose totheunderlyingdistribution f national capabilitiesor theycourtfailure.62 itingexamplesfrom hepast 350years,Krasnerfoundthat n all of the nstances itwas the value of strongstates that dictated rules that were applied in a

59. Quoted in ibid., p. 36.

60. Robert0. Keohane, "The Diplomacy of Structural hange: Multilateral nstitutionsnd

StateStrategies," n Helga Haftendorn nd ChristianTuschhoff, ds., America nd Europe n an Era ofChange Boulder,Colo.: Westview, 993), p. 53.61. StephenD. Krasner, Global Communications nd National Power: Lifeon the ParetoFrontier,"World olitics,Vol. 43, No. 1 (April 1991), p. 234.62. Stephen D. Krasner,Structural onflict: he Third World gainst Global LiberalismBerkeley:University f California, 985), p. 263 and passim.




discriminating ashion only to the weak."63 The sovereigntyof nations, auniversally ecognized nternationalnstitution, ardlystands in theway of astrongnation that decides to intervene n a weak one. Thus, accordingto asenior official,heReagan administration debated whetherwe had therightto dictate he form f another ountry'sgovernment. he bottom inewas yes,thatsome rights re morefundamental han theright fnations to noninter-

vention.... We don't have the right o subvert democracybut we do havethe rightagainst an undemocraticone."64 Most international aw is obeyedmost of the time,but strong tates bend or breaklaws when they choose to.

Balancing ower:Not Today ut Tomorrow

With o manyof theexpectations hatrealist heory ives rise to confirmed ywhat happened at and after he end of the Cold War,one may wonder whyrealism s inbad repute.65 key propositionderived from ealist heorys that

international olitics reflects he distribution fnational capabilities, propo-sitiondailyborne out.Anotherkey proposition s thatthebalancingofpowerby some states against others recurs. Realist theory predictsthat balancesdisruptedwill one day be restored.A limitation f the theory, limitationcommon to social science theories, is that it cannot say when. WilliamWohlforthrgues that houghrestorationwill takeplace, it will be a longtime

coming.66Ofnecessity, ealist heorys better t sayingwhat will happen thanin sayingwhen itwill happen. Theory annotsay when"tomorrow"will comebecause international olitical theorydeals withthepressuresofstructure n

states and not with how stateswill respond to the pressures.The latter s atask fortheories about how national governments espond to pressuresonthemand take advantage of opportunities hatmay be present.One does,however,observebalancingtendencies lreadytakingplace.

Upon the demise of the Soviet Union, the internationalpolitical systembecame unipolar. n the light of structural heory, nipolarity ppears as theleast durable of international onfigurations. his is so fortwo main reasons.

63. StephenD. Krasner, International oliticalEconomy:AbidingDiscord,"Review f nternational

Political conomy, ol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 16.64. Quoted inRobertTucker,nterventionnd theReaganDoctrine New York:Council on Religiousand International ffairs, 985),p. 5.65. RobertGilpin explains the oddity. See Gilpin, "No One Leaves a PoliticalRealist," SecurityStudies,Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring1996), pp. 3-28.66. William C. Wohlforth,The Stability f a Unipolar World," nternationalecurity, ol. 24,No.1 (Summer1999), pp. 5-41.




One is that dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their ownborders, hus weakening themselves n the long run. Ted Robert Gurr, fterexamining336 polities,reached thesame conclusion thatRobertWesson hadreachedearlier: Imperial decay is ... primarily result f themisuse of powerwhich followsinevitablyfrom ts concentration."67he otherreason for theshortduration ofunipolarity s thateven if a dominantpower behaves with

moderation, restraint, nd forbearance,weaker states will worry about itsfuture ehavior.America's founding atherswarned against theperils of powerin the absence of checks and balances. Is unbalanced power less of a dangerin international han n nationalpolitics?Throughout he Cold War,what theUnited States and theSoviet Union did, and how they nteracted,were domi-nantfactorsn international olitics.The two countries,however, onstrainedeach other.Now the United States is alone in the world. As nature abhors avacuum, so international olitics bhors unbalanced power. Faced withunbal-anced power,some statestry o increase theirown strength r they allywith

othersto bringthe nternational istribution fpower into balance. The reac-tions of other states to the drive fordominance of Charles V,Hapsburg rulerof Spain, of Louis XIV and Napoleon I ofFrance,of Wilhelm I and AdolphHitlerofGermany,llustrate hepoint.

THE BEHAVIOR OF DOMINANT POWERS

Will the preponderant power of the United States elicit similar reactions?Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others. Thepowerful tatemay, nd the United Statesdoes, think f tself s actingfor he

sake ofpeace, justice, nd well-being n the world. These terms,however, redefinedto the ikingof thepowerful,whichmayconflictwith thepreferencesand interests f others. n international olitics,overwhelmingpower repelsand leads others to tryto balance against it. Withbenign intent, he UnitedStates has behaved and, until tspower is brought ntobalance,will continueto behave in ways thatsometimesfrightenthers.

For almost half a century, he constancyof the Soviet threatproduced aconstancy fAmericanpolicy.Other countries ould relyon the United Statesforprotectionbecause protecting hem seemed to serve American security

interests. ven so, beginning n the 1950s,WesternEuropean countries nd,

67. Quoted in Ted RobertGurr, Persistence nd Change in PoliticalSystems, 800-1971,"Ameri-can Political cienceReviezv, ol. 68, No. 4 (December 1974), p. 1504, fromRobertG. Wesson,TheImperialOrder Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1967), unpaginated preface. Cf. PaulKennedy,TheRiseandFall of Great owers:Economic hange nd Military onflictrom 500 to 2000(New York:Random House, 1987).




beginning n the 1970s,Japanhad increasingdoubts about the reliabilityftheAmerican nuclear deterrent.As Soviet strength ncreased,WesternEuropeancountriesbegan to wonder whether he United States could be counted on touse its deterrent n theirbehalf,thus risking ts own cities. When PresidentJimmyCarter moved to reduce American troops in South Korea, and laterwhen the SovietUnion invaded Afghanistan nd strengthenedtsforcesn the

Far East, Japan developed similarworries.With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer

facesa majorthreat o its securityAs General Colin Powell said when he waschairmanofthe Joint hiefsof Staff: I'm running ut of demons. I'm runningout of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim I1Sung."68Constancyof threatproduces constancy of policy; absence of threat permits policy to becomecapricious.When few ifany vital interests re endangered, country'spolicybecomes sporadic and self-willed.

The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United

States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices. A dominant poweracts internationally nly when the spirit moves it. One example is enoughto show this. When Yugoslavia's collapse was followed by genocidal warin successor states,the United States failed to respond untilSenatorRobertDole moved to make Bosnia's peril an issue in the forthcomingresidentialelection;and it acted not for the sake of its own securitybut to maintainits leadership position in Europe. American policy was generated not byexternal security nterests, ut by internal political pressure and nationalambition.

Aside from pecificthreats t may pose, unbalanced power leaves weakerstatesfeelinguneasy and gives themreasonto strengthenheirpositions.TheUnited Stateshas a long history f interveningn weak states,oftenwith theintention f bringingdemocracyto them. American behavior over the pastcentury n Central America provides little evidence of self-restraintn theabsence of countervailingpower. Contemplatingthe historyof the UnitedStates and measuring tscapabilities, thercountriesmaywell wish forwaysto fendoff ts benignministrations. oncentratedpower invites distrustbe-cause it is so easily misused. To understand why some states want to bring

power into a semblance of balance is easy,butwithpower so sharply kewed,whatcountry rgroupof countrieshas the material apability nd thepoliticalwill to bringthe"unipolarmoment" to an end?

68. "Cover Story:Communism's Collapse Poses a Challenge to America's Military,"U.S. Newsand WorldReport, ctober 14, 1991, p. 28.






been remarkably successful in integratingtheir national economies. Theachievement f a large measure of economic ntegrationwithout correspond-ing political unity is an accomplishmentwithout historical precedent. Onquestionsofforeign nd military olicy,however, he European Union can actonlywith theconsentof ts members,makingbold or risky ction mpossible.The European Union has all the tools-population, resources, echnology, nd

military apabilities-but lacks the organizational bility nd the collectivewillto use them.As Jacques Delors said when he was presidentof the EuropeanCommission: "It will be for he European Council, consisting f heads of stateand government. . , to agree on the essential nterests hey hare and whichtheywillagree to defend nd promote ogether."72olicies thatmustbe arrivedat by consensus can be carriedout onlywhen theyare fairly nconsequential.Inactionas Yugoslavia sank intochaos and war signaled thatEurope will notact to stop wars even among near neighbors.WesternEurope was unable tomake itsown foreign nd military olicies when its was an organization fsix

or nine states iving n fear of the Soviet Union. With ess pressureand moremembers, thas even less hope of doing so now. Only when the United Statesdecides on a policyhave European countriesbeen able to follow t.

Europe may not remain n its supine position forever, et signs of funda-mental change in mattersof foreign nd militarypolicy are faint.Now asearlier, uropean leadersexpressdiscontentwithEurope's secondaryposition,chafeatAmerica'smakingmost of the mportant ecisions, nd show a desireto direct heir wn destiny. rench eaders often ent their rustrationnd pinefor a world, as ForeignMinisterHubert V6drinerecentlyput it, "of several

poles, not just a single one." PresidentJacques Chirac and Prime MinisterLionel Jospincall fora strengtheningf such multilateral nstitutions s theInternationalMonetary Fund and the United Nations, although how thiswould diminish America's influence s not explained. More to the point,V6drine omplainsthat since PresidentJohnKennedy,Americanshave talkedof a European pillarforthealliance,a pillarthat s never built.73 erman andBritish eaders now more oftenexpresssimilar discontent.Europe, however,will not be able to claim a louder voice in alliance affairs nless it builds aplatform orgivingit expression. fEuropeans ever mean to writea tune to

go with their ibretto, heywill have to develop the unityin foreign ndmilitary ffairs hat theyare achieving in economic matters. f French and

72. Jacques Delors, "European Integration nd Security," urvival,Vol. 33, No. 1 (March/April1991), p. 106.73. Craig R. Whitney, NATO at 50: WithNations at Odds, Is It a Misalliance?" New York imes,February15, 1999, p. Al.






UnlikeChina, Japan s obviously reluctant o assume themantleof a greatpower. Its reluctance,however, s steadilythough slowly waning. Economi-cally, Japan's power has grown and spread remarkablyThe growthof acountry's conomiccapabilityto thegreat power level places it at the centerof regional and global affairs. t widens the range of a state's interests ndincreases their mportance.The high volume of a country's xternalbusiness

thrusts t ever more deeply into world affairs. n a self-helpsystem, thepossessionofmostbutnot all of thecapabilitiesofa greatpower leaves a statevulnerable to others hathave the nstruments hatthe esser state acks.Eventhough one may believe that fearsof nuclear blackmail are misplaced, onemust wonder whetherJapanwill remain mmune to them.

Countries have always competed forwealth and security, nd thecompeti-tion has often ed to conflict. istorically,tateshave been sensitive ochangingrelations of power among them. Japan is made uneasy now by the steadygrowth f China's military udget. ts nearly million trong rmy, ndergoing

modernization, nd the gradual growth of its sea- and air-power projectioncapabilities,produce apprehension n all of China's neighbors nd add to thesense of instabilityn a regionwhere issues ofsovereigntynd disputes overterritorybound. The Korean peninsula has moremilitary orcesper squarekilometer hanany otherportionof the globe. Taiwan is an unending sourceof tension.Disputes exist betweenJapanand Russia over the Kurile Islands,and betweenJapanand China over theSenkakuorDiaoyu Islands. Cambodiais a troublesomeproblemforbothVietnam nd China. Half a dozen countrieslay claim to all or some of the Spratly slands, strategicallyocated and sup-

posedly rich n oil. The presenceof China's ample nuclearforces, ombinedwith the drawdown of Americanmilitary orces, an hardlybe ignored byJapan, he ess so because economic conflictswiththe United States castdoubton the reliability f Americanmilitary uarantees.Reminders ofJapan's de-pendence and vulnerabilitymultiplyn largeand smallways. Forexample,asrumors bout NorthKorea's developingnuclear capabilitiesgained credence,Japanbecame acutely ware of ts ack ofobservation atellites.Uncomfortabledependencies and perceivedvulnerabilities ave led Japanto acquire greatermilitary apabilities, ven though manyJapanese may prefernot to.

Given the expectationof conflict,nd thenecessityof taking care of one'sinterests, ne may wonder how any statewith the economic capabilityof agreatpower can refrain rom rming tselfwiththe weapons thathave servedso well as the greatdeterrent. or a country o choose not to become a greatpower is a structuralnomaly For thatreason,the choice is a difficultne tosustain.Soonerorlater, sually sooner, he nternational tatusof countrieshas




risen n step with theirmaterialresources.Countrieswith greatpower econo-mies have become greatpowers, whether or not reluctantly ome countriesmay striveto become greatpowers; others may wish to avoid doing so. Thechoice, however, s a constrained ne. Because of the extentof their nterests,largerunits existing n a contentious rena tend to take on systemwide asks.Profound hange na country'snternational ituation roduces radicalchange

in its externalbehavior. AfterWorldWar II, the United States brokewith itscenturies-long radition f actingunilaterally nd refusing o make long-termcommitments. apan's behavior in the past half centuryreflects he abruptchange n its nternationaltanding uffered ecause of tsdefeat nwar. n theprevious half century, ftervictory ver China in 1894-95, Japan pressed forpreeminence n Asia, ifnotbeyond.Does Japan once again aspire to a largerrole internationally?ts concerted regional activity, ts seeking and gainingprominence n such bodies as the IMF and theWorld Bank,and its obviouspride in economic and technological chievements ndicate that t does. The

behavior of statesrespondsmoreto external onditions hanto internalhabitifexternal hange is profound.

When externalconditionspress firmly nough, they shape thebehavior ofstates. ncreasingly, apanis being pressed to enlargeits conventionalforcesand to add nuclear ones to protect ts interests.ndia, Pakistan, China, andperhapsNorth Korea have nuclearweapons capable ofdeterring thersfromthreatening heir vital interests.How long can Japan live alongside othernuclear states whiledenying tself imilar apabilities?Conflicts nd crisesarecertain omakeJapan ware of thedisadvantagesofbeingwithout hemilitary

instruments hatotherpowers command.Japanesenuclear nhibitions risingfromWorld WarII will notlast indefinitely;ne may expectthem to expireasgenerationalmemoriesfade.

Japanese officialshave indicated that when the protectionof America'sextended deterrents no longerthought o be sufficientlyeliable,Japanwillequip itselfwitha nuclearforce,whetheror not openly.Japanhas put itselfpolitically nd technologicallyn a position to do so. Consistently ince themid-1950s, he governmenthas definedall of its Self-DefenseForces as con-forming o constitutional equirements.Nuclear weapons purelyfor defense

would be deemed constitutional hould Japandecide to build some.77As asecretreportof theMinistry f ForeignAffairs ut it in 1969: "For the time

77. Norman D. Levin, "Japan's Defense Policy: The InternalDebate," in HarryH. Kendall andClara Joewono, ds.,Japan, SEAN, andtheUnited tates Berkeley: nstitute fEast Asian Studies,University fCalifornia, 990).




being, we will maintain the policy of not possessing nuclearweapons. How-ever, regardlessof oiningtheNPT [Non-Proliferation reaty] r not,we willkeep theeconomic and technicalpotentialfor heproduction fnuclear weap-ons, while seeing to it thatJapanwill notbe interfered ith n thisregard."78In March of 1988, Prime MinisterNoboru Takeshita called for a defensivecapabilitymatchingJapan's economic power.79 nly a balanced conventional-

nuclearmilitary apabilitywould meetthisrequirement.n June f1994,PrimeMinisterTsutumuHata mentioned n parliament hatJapanhad theability omake nuclearweapons.80

Wheresome see Japanas a "global civilianpower" and believe it likelytoremain one, others see a country hathas skillfully sed the protection heUnited States has afforded nd adroitly dopted the means ofmaintaining tssecurity o its regionalenvironment.81rime MinisterShigeru Yoshida in theearly 1950s suggestedthatJapan should rely on American protection ntil thad rebuilt ts economy as it graduallyprepared to stand on its own feet.82

Japanhas laid a firm oundationfordoing so by developingmuch of its ownweaponry instead of relying n cheaper imports.Remainingmonths or mo-ments away fromhaving a nuclear military apability s well designed toprotect hecountry's ecuritywithoutunduly alarming tsneighbors.

The hostility fChina, of bothKoreas, and of Russia combineswith nevi-table doubts about the extent o whichJapancan relyon the United Statestoprotect ts security.83n the opinion ofMasanori Nishi, a defenseofficial, hemain cause ofJapan's greater interestn enhanceddefensecapabilities" s itsbelief that America's interest n "maintaining regional stability s shaky"84

Whether eluctantlyrnot,Japan nd Chinawillfolloweach other n theroute

78. "The Capability to Develop Nuclear Weapons Should Be Kept: Ministry f ForeignAffairsSecretDocumentin 1969,"Mainichi,August 1, 1994,p. 41, quoted in SeligS. Harrison, Japan ndNuclear Weapons," in Harrison,ed., Japan'sNuclearFuture Washington, .C.: Carnegie Endow-ment for nternational eace, 1996), p. 9.79. David Arase, "US and ASEAN Perceptionsof Japan's Role in the Asian-PacificRegion," inKendall and Joewono,Japan, SEAN, and theUnited tates, . 276.80. David E. Sanger, In Face-SavingReverse,JapanDisavows Any Nuclear-Arms xpertise,"NewYork imes, une22, 1994, p. 10.81. Michael J.Green, State of the Field Report:Research on JapaneseSecurity olicy,"AccessAsiaReview, ol. 2, No. 2 (September1998), udiciously ummarized differentnterpretationsfJapan's

security olicy.82. KennethB. Pyle, TheJapanese uestion: ower ndPurposena New Era Washington, .C.: AEIPress, 1992), p. 26.83. Andrew Hanami, forexample, points out that Japanwonders whether the United Stateswould help defendHokkaido. Hanami, "Japan and the MilitaryBalance ofPower in NortheastAsia," Journal fEast Asian Affairs, ol. 7, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1994), p. 364.84. Stephanie Strom, JapanBeginning o Flex ts MilitaryMuscles," NewYork imes, pril 8, 1999,p. A4.




to becoming great powers. China has the greater ong-term otential.Japan,with the world's second or third argest defense budget and the abilitytoproduce the most technologicallydvanced weaponry, s closer to greatpowerstatus at themoment.

When Americans speak of preservingthe balance of power in East Asiathroughtheirmilitarypresence,85 he Chinese understandably take this to

mean that they ntend to maintainthe strategic egemony theynow enjoy nthe absence fsuch a balance. WhenChina makes steady but modest effortsoimprove the quality of ts nferior orces,Americans ee a future hreat o theirand others' interests.Whatever worriestheUnited Stateshas and whateverthreatstfeels,Japanhas themearlier nd feelsthemmore ntensely. apanhasgraduallyreactedtothem.China thenworries s Japan mproves ts airlift ndsealift apabilities nd as theUnitedStates raises itssupport evel forforces nSouth Korea.86The actions and reactionsof China, Japan,and South Korea,with or withoutAmericanparticipation,re creating new balance ofpower

inEast Asia,which s becomingpartof thenewbalance ofpower in the world.Historically, ncounters f East and West have often nded in tragedyYet,as we know fromhappy experience,nuclearweapons moderatethe behaviorof theirpossessors and render hem cautious whenevercrisesthreaten o spinout of control.Fortunately,he changingrelations of East to West,and thechangingrelationsofcountrieswithin he East and theWest, re takingplacein a nuclear context.The tensionsand conflicts hat ntensify hen profoundchanges in world politics take place will continue to mar the relationsofnations,while nuclearweapons keep the peace among thosewho enjoytheir

protection.America'spolicyofcontainingChinaby keeping 100,000 roops nEastAsiaand by providing ecurity uaranteestoJapanand South Korea is intendedtokeep a new balance of power fromformingn Asia. By continuing o keep100,000 roops n Western urope,where no military hreat s in sight, nd byextendingNATO eastward, heUnited Statespursuesthesame goal inEurope.The American spirationto freezehistorical evelopmentby working okeeptheworld unipolar is doomed. In the notvery ong run,thetaskwill exceedAmerica's economic, military, emographic, and political resources;and the

very effort o maintain a hegemonicposition s the surest way to undermine

85. Richard Bernstein nd Ross H. Munro, The ComingConflictvith hina New York:AlfredA.Knopf, 1997); and Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Walland theEmpty ortress:China's Search orSecurityNew York:W.W. Norton,1997).86. Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From CommercialLiberalismto ReluctantRealism," Survival,Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 43.






along a 2,600mile border,with ethnicminorities prawlingacross it,with amineral-richnd sparsely populated Siberia facingChina's teemingmillions,Russia and China will find t difficult o cooperateeffectively,ut the UnitedStates is doing its best to help them do so. Indeed, the United States hasprovided the key to Russian-Chinese relationsover the past half centuryFeelingAmerican antagonism nd fearingAmerican power,China drew close

to Russia afterWorld WarII and remained so until the United States seemedless, and theSoviet Union more,of a threat o China. The relatively armoni-ous relations heUnited Statesand China enjoyed duringthe 1970sbegan tosour in the late 1980s when Russian power visibly declined and Americanhegemonybecame imminent. o alienate Russia by expandingNATO, and toalienateChinaby lecturingts eaderson how toruletheir ountry,repoliciesthatonlyan overwhelmingly owerful ountry ould afford, nd only a foolishone be tempted, o follow.The United Statescannot prevent new balance ofpower from orming. t can hasten ts comingas it has been earnestlydoing.

In this section,the discussion of balancing has been more empirical andspeculativethantheoretical. thereforend withsome reflectionsn balancingtheory.tructural heory,nd the theory f balance ofpower thatfollowsfromit,do not lead one to expectthat tateswill always or even usually engage inbalancingbehavior. Balancing s a strategy orsurvival,a way of attemptingto maintaina state's autonomous way of life. To argue that bandwagoningrepresents behavior morecommon to statesthan balancinghas become a bitof a fad. Whether states bandwagon more often than they balance is aninteresting uestion. To believe thatan affirmativenswer would refutebal-

ance-of-power heory s, however,to misinterprethe theory nd to commitwhat one might all "thenumericalfallacy"-to draw a qualitativeconclusionfrom quantitative esult.States tryvarious strategies or urvival. Balancingis one of them; bandwagoning is another.The lattermay sometimes seem aless demandingand a morerewarding trategy han balancing,requiring esseffort nd extractingower costswhile promising oncrete ewards.Amid theuncertainties f international oliticsand the shifting ressuresof domesticpolitics, tates have tomake perilouschoices.They may hope to avoid war byappeasing adversaries, weak form fbandwagoning,rather hanby rearming

and realigningto thwartthem.Moreover,many states have insufficient e-sourcesforbalancingand little oomformaneuver.Theyhave to ump on thewagon onlylaterto wish theycould falloff.

Balancing theory does not predict uniformityf behavior but rather thestrongtendencyofmajor statesin the system,or in regionalsubsystems, oresort o balancingwhen they have to. That states trydifferenttrategies f



Structural ealism fterheCold War 39

survival s hardlysurprising. he recurrent mergenceof balancing behavior,and theappearance ofthe patterns he behavior produces, should all the morebe seen as impressiveevidence supporting he theory.

Conclusion

Every time peace breaksout, people pop up to proclaim that realism s dead.That is anotherway ofsaying that nternational oliticshas been transformed.The world, however,has not been transformed; he structure f internationalpoliticshas simplybeen remadebythedisappearanceof the SovietUnion,andfor a time we will live withunipolarity.Moreover, nternational oliticswasnot remade by the forces and factors hat some believe are creating newworld order.Those who set the Soviet Union on thepath of reformwere oldSoviet apparatchiks rying oright he Soviet economy n orderto preserve tsposition n the world. The revolution n Sovietaffairs nd the end of the Cold

War were notbroughtby democracy, nterdependence, r international nsti-tutions. nstead the Cold War ended exactly as structural ealism led one toexpect. As I wrote some years ago, the Cold War "is firmly ooted in thestructure fpostwar nternational olitics nd will lastas longas that tructureendures."89 o itdid, and theCold War ended onlywhen thebipolarstructureofthe world disappeared.

Structuralchange affects he behavior of states and the outcomes theirinteractions roduce.It does notbreak the essentialcontinuity f nternationalpolitics.The transformationf nternational olitics lone could do that.Trans-

formation, owever, waits theday whenthe nternationalystem s no longerpopulated by states that have to help themselves. f the day were here,onewould be able to say who could be relied on to help the disadvantaged orendangered. Instead, the ominous shadow of the future ontinuesto cast itspall over interacting tates. States' perennial uncertainty bout their fatespresses governmentsto preferrelative over absolute gains. Without theshadow, the leaders of states would no longerhave to ask themselveshowtheywill get along tomorrowas well as today.States could combine theirefforts heerfully nd work to maximize collectivegain withoutworrying

about how each mightfare n comparisonto others.Occasionally,one finds the statement hat governments n theirnatural,

anarchiccondition ctmyopically-that is,on calculationsof mmediate nter-

89. KennethN. Waltz, The Originsof War n NeorealistTheory," ournalf nterdisciplinaryistory,Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 628.




est-while hoping that the futurewill take care of itself. Realists are saidto suffer romthis optical defect.90 olitical leaders may be astigmatic,butresponsibleones who behave realistically o not suffer rommyopia. RobertAxelrod and Robert Keohane believe that World War I might have beenaverted ifcertain states had been able to see how long the future's hadowwas.91Yet, as their own discussion shows, the futurewas what the major

states were obsessively worried about. The war was prompted ess by consid-erations of present securityand more by worries about how the balancemight change later. The problems of governmentsdo not arise from theirshort time horizons. They see the long shadow of the future,but theyhave trouble reading its contours,perhaps because they try to look too farahead and see imaginary dangers. In 1914, Germany feared Russia's rapidindustrial nd population growth.France and Britain uffered rom he samefear about Germany, nd in addition Britainworried about therapid growthofGermany's navy. n an important ense,WorldWar was a preventivewar

all around. Future fearsdominatedhopes forshort-termains. States do notlive in thehappiestofconditions hatHorace in one of his odes imaginedforman:

Happy theman,and happy he alone,who can say,Tomorrowdo thyworst,for have lived today.92

RobertAxelrod has shown thatthe "tit-for-tat"actic, nd no other,maxi-mizes collectivegain over time.The one conditionfor uccess is that hegamebe playedunder the shadow of the future.93ecause statescoexist n a self-help

system, heymay,however,have to concernthemselvesnotwithmaximizingcollectivegain butwith essening,preserving, r wideningthegap in welfareand strength etween themselvesand others. The contoursof the future'sshadow look differentn hierarchic nd anarchicsystems.The shadow mayfacilitate ooperation n the former;t works against it in the latter.Worries

90. The point s made by Robert0. Keohane, After egemony: ooperationnd Discord n theWorldPolitical conomyPrinceton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1984), pp. 99, 103, 108.91. Robert Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy:Strategiesand Institutions," n David Baldwin, ed., Neorealismnd Neoliberalism: he Contemporaryebate

(New York:Columbia University ress, 1993). For German eaders, they ay, "the shadow of thefuture eemed so small" (p. 92). RobertPowell shows that "a longer shadow . . . leads to greatermilitary llocations."See Powell, "Guns, Butter, nd Anarchy,"American olitical cienceReview,Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), p. 116; see also p. 117 on the question of the compatibilityf liberalinstitutionalismnd structural ealism.92. My revision.93. RobertAxelrod,The Evolution fCooperationNew York:Basic Books, 1984).




about the futuredo not make cooperation and institution uilding amongnations mpossible;they do strongly onditiontheiroperation and limittheiraccomplishment. iberal nstitutionalists ereright ostart heirnvestigationswith structural ealism. Until and unless a transformationccurs, t remainsthebasic theory finternational olitics.

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