Successful Military InnovationThe fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and subsequently the collapse of the Soviet empire changed the political military situation within Europe. Nearly five decades of Cold War between the Western Alliance and the Warsaw Pact countries, with relatively large standing armies and prepared mobilization plans, ended. The fight between large mechanized formations on European countryside became more and more improbable, and forced many Western countries to identify a new role for their armed forces as new threats emerged. Yet, those military organizations often struggle with such doctrinal innovations, especially in economic austere conditions combined with rapidly technological improvements. While such strategic situations determine the environment in which the military operates, ultimately people lay the foundations for a new approach. Therefore, successful innovation within a military organization depends on aligning political and military strategy, creating a learning organization, and assuring popular support to the military.This essay identifies principles that induce change on organizational level based upon examples from the interwar period, and has not the intention to discuss neither tactical nor technical changes in detail. Such an essay would require more in depth study that draws us away from the initial argument. Without a doubt, during the interwar period almost all military organizations reformed, based on their lessons learned from World War I, and each of them booked significant advances in certain domains. Nonetheless, some organizations as a whole proved to possess more adaptive skills than others.Above all, innovations within military organizations depend on the integration of political and military vision. Indeed, the military are subjected to political authority and a nations leadership directs its armed forces. Now, if a nation wants to achieve its strategic goals by conducting war that nation must prepare its forces correspondingly, and so The political object will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. Though the Treaty of Versailles prevented Germany from developing military air power, as soon as the Nazis controlled the Air Force as of 1933, it became one the most innovative military organizations. The development of German air doctrine reflected clearly its strategic situation within Central Europe, and as a result the Luftwaffe had to protect the German vulnerabilities, namely cities and troops, by destroying the opponents air capabilities (air superiority and air interdiction), rather than developing an offensive strategic bombing capability like the British Royal Air Force. Additionally, the German air force reinforced and supported heavily the ground approach of mechanized units, and thus enabling the first combined warfare doctrine. Moreover, to ensure this unified air concept was implemented, Hitler appointed Gring in 1938 to Generalfeldmarschall, the highest ranking officer in Germany.The rise of the Red Army depended heavily on such integration. Though Svechin and Thukashesky had divergent opinions on the strategic concept of war, namely attritional versus annihilation warfare, ultimately politics determined the direction of the army. By 1937, the Soviets had built a mechanized and airborne force that combined the concept of deep strikes and mobilization of the Soviet population and economy around fixed officer cadres. Above that Stalin held a strong political grip on the army through the use of political party commissioners in order to prevent subversive thoughts and assuring that the Red Army remained a force loyal to the people. The purges in 1937 eliminated much of the innovations process in the Red Army. Nevertheless, the innovations between 1924 and 1937 laid the foundations for its later success against the German Operation Barbarossa.Another principle of successful innovative approach resides in creating an honest, learning culture. While Great-Brittan and France believed in the defense combined with heavy artillery, General von Seekt recognized the shortfalls of the Ludendorff offensive doctrine developed in 1917. Based on his experiences on the Eastern front, he chose to continue the development of the Ludendorff doctrine by creating a specific staff element within the German military command, namely the Truppenamt, where critical and open minded German officers could develop the changes needed for the organization based upon honest examination of the facts of WWI. Approximately four hundred of the four thousand officers worked on doctrinal innovation and investigated all organizational aspects, which led to Army Regulation 487. This document clearly articulated the principles of flexibility, tempo, decentralization of command and assuming responsibility necessary to create the capability of Bewegungskrieg.Meanwhile, the British senior military leadership failed to integrate new concepts of land warfare. Indeed, Field Marshal Haig incompetence to capture unified lessons learned that could improve doctrine, resulted in uncoordinated doctrinal innovations without significant organizational changes. More importantly, it took the British Army fourteen years to establish a committee to examine WWI, and their report got modified by the interventions of Field Marshal Montgomery-Massingberd. Besides those interferences, the British Army fell short in its military education system. The esprit de corps mentality prevented officers to think out of the Regimental system, and thus reflecting on the operational and tactical lessons. Officers deemed academic and critical investigation inferior to loyalty to the Regiment. Such climate prevented innovative officers from reaching senior positions.Although the French Army organized their lessons learned system after the Great War probably more seriously than the British, their focus remained predominantly on a tight control of the maneuver and reinforcing existing doctrine. On top of that, French military leadership didnt confront their political authorities with the discrepancy between requirements and available resources. They preferred avoiding the discussion with left oriented politicians, which had pernicious effect for the French Air Force development.Finally, a successful innovation process in military organizations needs broad support, not only from society, but also within the organization. The high number of casualties and the cruelty of WWI created an anti-war environment in many European countries during the interwar period. A prominent example of such dislike to British military authorities manifested itself in the Oxford resolution, which declared that Britains best and brightest would not fight for either king or country. A similar feeling existed in France, where the cult of the offense led to over one million dead or missing soldiers, or 16.4 % of its mobilized male population. All these sentiments resulted in the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, in which certain countries renounced the use of war unless in self defense. This affected the political climate in which military organizations existed, as politicians provide funding and direction. .In contrast to Great-Britain and France, the German Army remained popular during the interwar period. The German population perceived the Versailles treaty as unfair and too severe to Germany, and thought that the military had done everything to win the war. As a result, they continued to admire the military profession as a full-time profession, rather than an honorable occupation. More over, as soon as Hitler came in power in 1933, the Nazi regime, with its broad popular support, allowed the German Army to continue its rearmament programs.Furthermore, organizational leaders and prominent innovative thinkers must guarantee broad support from within. Liddell-Hart and Fuller conducted such attacks on British military leadership and refused help from peers that they undermined their own position and doctrine. Their failure to ensure support from their commanders, the organization they needed to convert, and politicians who set military policy resulted in retarding the innovation. In the same way, Billy Mitchells vision based on scientific elements, neglected combat experience, which resulted in mass casualties amongst pilots at the beginning of the strategic bombing campaign by the allies in WWII.In short, throughout history the strategic environment, budgetary constraints and a continuous technological evolution challenged military organizations. In todays environment most Western defense forces experience a similar situation then the one during the interwar period. An emerging threat, now coming from Asia and Islam extremism, limited available resources as a result of a financial crisis since 2008, and the network enabling technology create comparable circumstances in which improvement and reform remains difficult. However, armed forces can continue to be a successful, innovative organization if political and military leaders clearly define the role and function of armed forces, if military leaders embrace critical and out-the-box thinkers, and if society sufficient bolsters and sustains its army.

Works Cited

Jonathan, M. House. Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine and Organization in the 20th Century. Thesis presented at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1984, 65-70.Carl, von Clausewitz. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 80 and 87.Williamson, Murray. Strategic Bombing, in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 108-116 and 128-143.Jacob, W. Kipp. Military Reform and the Red Army 1918 1941, in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941. Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 129 131.Jonathan, M. House, Red Army Developments, 1921-41, US Army Command and General Staff College, H200 Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, August, 2011), 45-46.Kipp, op. cit., 112.Ludendorffs tactical innovations provided a breakthrough, yet a high cost. Timothy, T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactital Doctrine During the First World War. Leavenworth Papers No.4. (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College, 1981), 41-49.James, S. Corum. A Comprehensive Approach to Change, in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941. Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 37-41.Williamson, Murray. Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experience, in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22-24.Eugene, C. Kiesling in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941. Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 3 and 10-11.Murray, op. cit., 14-15.Ibid, 9.Ibid, 13.House. Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine and Organization in the 20th Century. 66.Murray, op. cit., 17.Ibid, 24-25.Murray, op. cit., 125-127 and 139.

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