Superpower intervention in client-state wars: an analysis of United States and Soviet interventionary behaviour in areas of disputed or uncertain interest symmetry

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UNIVERSITYOFLANCASTER

SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION IN CLIENT-STATE WARS:

AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTERVENTIONARY

BEHAVIOUR IN AREAS OF DISPUTED OR UNCERTAIN INTEREST SYMMETRY

Mohamed M. El-Doufani, B. A.

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph. D. ),Department of Politics, University of Lancaster. January 1988.



ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the relationship betweenintervention by the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. in client-statewars which occur in locales where the balance of Soviet-American interests is either disputed or uncertain, andsuperpower security in the era of stable nuclear deterrence.

In the first part of the study, a model of superpowerintervention in client-state wars is established. The

model consists of four propositions which deal with the

relationship between intervention, political and/orterritorial change, and superpower security; the occurrence

of the phenomena of non- and asymmetrical interventions

where reciprocal intervention offers the more rational

course of action; and the notion of crisis as a mechanismby which the United States and the Soviet Union could

resolve regional disputes peacefully.The second part of the work is an empirical analysis of

the model of intervention expounded in the first part.Three case studies of asymmetrical, double, and unilateral

superpower Interventions in grey area wars are employed in

order to explain the factors which determine the levels ofintervention by the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. in client-state

conflicts, and to examine the circumstances under which

crisis manipulation is used, and when it is most effective.The case studies are of the Korean war of 1950-1953, the

Arab-Israeli war of 1973, and the Ethio-Somali war of 1977-1978, that is, conflicts which took place at different

stages in the development of United States-Soviet relations.The third part of the study consists of the concluding

chapter. This reviews the relationship betweenintervention, superpower security, and peaceful changeagainst the background of the empirical analysis.



CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction

An Overview of the Study.... ....

1

PART I

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

,Chapter 2: Crisis, Intervention, and Peaceful Change

..27

Chapter 3: The Context of Intervention .... ....48

Chapter 4: Intervention and Superpower Security ....85

PART II

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

SECTION A: ASSYMETRICAL INTERVENTION:THE KOREAN WAR 1950 - 1953

Chapter 5: The Balance of Interests.... ....

124

Chapter 6: The Balance of Responses.... ....

158

Chapter 7: The Crisis Situation.... .... ..

197

SECTION B: DOUBLE INTERVENTIONTHE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 1973


230


265

Chapter 10: The Crisis Situation .... .... ..307

SECTION C: UNILATERALINTERVENTION

THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI WAR 1977-1978


336


394

Chapter 13: The Crisis Situation .... .... ..422



PART III

Chapter 14: Conclusion.... .... .... ..

439

BIBLIOGRAPHY



CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

An Overview of the Study

The ubiquity of intervention in international politics

The recurrence of intervention in the history of

international politics indicates that it is a principal, and

perhaps an inevitable instrument of manipulation in any

competitive international system. In the fifth century

B. C., the polarization of relations among the Greek states

around the affairs of Athens and Sparta led to a substantial

growth in intervention by the major powers in the affairs of

the lesser Greek states. Thus, the bipolarization of the

Greek political systemwhich accompanied

the long life-and-

death struggle between Athens and Sparta rapidly transformed

what began as alliance relationships linking the smaller

states to the two great powers into coercive patterns of

intervention on the part of the latter. 1 At the zenith of

its power, imperial Rome enjoyed a position of such

dominance in the international system that it could

intervene in the affairs of most of the lesser actors in the

system almost at will. In The 16th and 17th centuries, the

European system, which encompassed states, nation-states,

city-states, empires, and the church, intervention was also

ubiquitous. During this period, the combination of

religious strife and the extensive disorder associated with

the. transition to a state system made intervention a

dominant characteristic of international politics.

Likewise, the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic eras in Europe



were typified by high levels of intervention. The

incessant ideological attraction of the French Revolution

combined withthe immense

power ofNapoleonic France to

generate a state of turmoil in Europe in which intervention

and counter-intervention became virtually a norm. The

response to this turmoil in the post-Napoleonic era led to a

situation in which "conservative" interventions became the

order of the day. Hence, one of the great debates

regarding the conditions under which intervention is

legitimate and the modes which it should take took place

during the post-Napoleonic era. This debate was epitomised

by the growing divergence between Castlereagh and Metternich

following the Congress of Vienna. 2

The occurrence of intervention in the postwar

international system has been more or less as widespread as

in previous periods. Since 1945, states of various sizes

and capabilities and in almost every corner of the world

have either used or threatened to use military force in

order to affect the internal or external policies, or the

domestic political structures of other states.

By far the largest number of interventions has been by

the four great powers: Britain, France, the United States,

and the Soviet Union. Between them, these countries

account for at least 40 direct military interventions and

numerous other indirect interventions in the affairs of

independent states during the period 1946-1980.3 The

Soviet Union, for example, directly intervened militarily on

at least seven occasions during this period. These include

the four interventions aimed at either quelling discontent

or consolidating sympathetic communist party factions in



Eastern Europe, 4and the ones in the Egyptian-Israeli "War

of Attrition" of 1968-1970, and the Afghan civil war of

1979- The United States, for its part, directly

intervened militarily in not less than 10 countries since

1946. Amongst these have been North and South Korea during

the Korean War, North and South Vietnam during the

Vietnamese War, and Lebanon during the civil wars of 1958

and 1975- France intervened on at least 12 occasions,

most of which were counter-insurgency actions in Africa, for

instance, in Morocco in 1956, in Cameroon in 1960, and in

Chad in 1968,1978,1985, and 1987. The largest number of

direct military interventions has been by 'Britain, which

during the period under consideration intervened no fewer

than 13 times. Like France, many of these interventions

were a legacy of an imperial past and amounted to either

counter-insurgency actions, as in Muscat and Oman in 1957

and 1958, or other measures to protect the government of a

newly independent state, such as the attempts to suppress

military mutinies in Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda in 1964.

The use of intervention has also been widespread

amongst the developing countries. Egypt and Saudi Arabia

directly intervened on opposite sides in the Yemeni civil

war during 1963-1968. Egypt also intervened directly in

support of the Federal Government during the Nigerian Civil

Warof

1967-1970. Algeria intervened both directlyand

indirectly at different times during Morocco's war with the

POLISARIO guerillas over the Western Desert. Libya also

intervened indirectly in the Morocca-POLISARIO conflict, and

directly on the side of President Idi Amin in the Ugandan



civil war of 1978-1979, and in the Chad civil war in 1980-

1981,1983, and 1986-1987. Cuba intervened indirectly on

the side of the Eritreans against the Ethiopian government

before the downfall of Haile Selassie, and directly in

support of the regime after the Revolution. Cuba also

intervened directly in support of the Angolan government

against the South African-backed U. N. I. T. A. and F. N. L. A.

rebels. In Central America, the Cubans continue to

intervene on behalf of the Nicaraguan government against

U. S. - and Honduran-backed CONTRA rebels, and, allegedly, on

the side of the guerillas against the El Salvadorian

government. In south east Asia, Vietnam continues to

intervene in the domestic affairs of Kampuchea and Laos.

Although clearly a time-honoured means of manipulating

intra- and inter-state conflicts and other interactions,

intervention has acquired an added political and strategic

significance during the postwar period, which places it in a

qualitatively different category from the interventions of

earlier times. This added significance has been mainly due

to three systemic changes which have occurred since the end

of World War II. The first of these was the acquisition by

the United States and the Soviety Union of an invulnerable

nuclear capability, as well as conventional military forces

capable of reaching most parts of the globe. The second

systemic development consisted of the enlargement of the

international system as the whole world and not just Europe,

North America, and the Soviet Union became involved in the

system. Together, these two developments led. to a third

new phenomenon, which might be termed the "involuntary"

bipolarization of the world. This occurred as each of the

4



superpowers began to define the geographical components of

what it regarded as its own security sphere, irrespective of

the subjective inclinations of the states involved. 5 One

of the major consequences of these developments was that,

for the United States and the Soviet Union,

Security considerations and security motivations became

all-encompassing. Whatever contributed (or was

suspected of contributing) to the strengthening

of... one power anywhere in the world was considered as

of immediate security concern [... ] to the other [... ],

who therefore would try to oppose it or make up for it

by [its]own

increase inpower or

influence. 6

Postwar international relations, in other words, became very

much akin to a zero-sum game, with each of the two

superpowers being engaged in a struggle for global dominance

or, at least, in a competition to maintain their relative

positions. "An action by one directly affects the position

of the other, all international changes are of vital

significance in that they affect the balance between the

two. "7

The impact of the three postwar systemic developments

on intervention has been manifold. To begin with, the

acquisition by the United States and the Soviet Union of

global interests and the consequent widening of their

security area to include virtually the whole world has

vastly' increased the number of potentially interventionary

conflicts, that is, conflicts in which the superpowers are

likely to become involved. This, in turn, has had an

effect on both the interveners and the intervened or the

targets of intervention. As far as the latter are

concerned, superpower intervention, whether desired or not,

lays the stakes in their original dispute open to a complete

transformation. As one writer pointed out, the U. S. and

S



the U. S. S. R.

each retain the power to convert the terms of any

international crisis. At a maximum they hold the

option... to raise almost any issue to a superpowerconfrontation. Any such escalation by either wouldimply large risks of drawing in the other, and the

reciprocal effect... would be to alter the stakes of

the original issue profoundly. Once the superpowers

are drawn in, there follows a natural imperative to

compromise, and the goals of the original actors are

not likely to be achieved.8

For the United States and the Soviet Union, the

eruption of conflict in strategically important regions

often carries the danger of a possible escalation to nuclear

war because of the ever-present possibility of intervention

by these superpowers on behalf of their proteges in the

conflict. Consequently, such conflicts, more often than

not, tend to create an aura of crisis involving not only the

U. S. and the U. S. S. R., but also each of these countries and

its warring client(s) in the region concerned.

Intervention and crisis manipulation

Although the existence of client-state war stimulated

crises involving the superpowers is generally considered

undesirable, it presents welcome opportunities for the

United States and/or the Soviet Union on the one hand, and

their protagonist client(s) on the other, to challenge or

preserve the status quo. As Kissinger once pointed out,

"... [i]f you act creatively you should be able to use crises

to move the world towards the structural solutions that are

necessary... "9

' For a superpower, the existence of this type of crisis

provides it with the opportunity to settle without violence,

through the manipulation of the risk of war, those of its



disputes with the other superpower that are either too

severe to be resolved by ordinary diplomacy or are simply

not amenable to diplomatic settlement, such as the

ascertainment of a regional balance of interests.

Furthermore, it enables it to affect important changes in

the nature of its relationship with its client. This is

because clients tend to be more in need of, and therefore

vulnerable to pressure from, their superpower patrons in

situations of a real or perceived high threat environment.

Under such circumstances, the patron may intimate the

possibility of withholding or reducing its support for the

client, or the latter may anticipate such a course of

action. Consequently, the client may grant considerable

concessions to the patron, which it would not extend under

less threatening conditions. Such concessions can take the

form of base rights, treaties, international realignments,

or major changes in its international associations.10

Crisis can also be of utility to clients by providing

them with the opportunity of using their relationship with

their patrons towards their own ends. Since a client-state

is valuable to its superpower patron because of its

intrinsic worth and its ability to confer upon it a

competitive advantage over the other superpower, 11 it may

ignite a regional crisis involving the client(s) of the

other superpower, or at least refrain from trying toavoid

one, in the belief that, since its own patron cannot afford

to have it defeated at the hands of the other superpower and

its protege(s), its support will be automatically

forthcoming. Such a belief would be plausible in view of



the superpower's basic political and strategic interest in

protecting its allies and associates.12 Should the patron

extend the required help to its client, it may become

involved with the other superpower in an escalating cycle of

intervention which may lead it, 'together with its

competitor, to exceed by far their original intentions in

support of their proteges.13

The usefulness of crisis to superpower patrons and

their clients may lead them to manipulate it to their own

advantage through either crisis exaggeration or crisis

manipulation. In the former case, the patron or the client

takes a high-threat situation and, by alleging to be privy

to sensitive information, tries to convince the other that

the threat is actually much greater or more immediate, in

the hope of committing it to greater concessions than it had

been willing to make previously. Although this technique

does not usually involve an actual escalation of the danger,

that may happen as an unintended result.14

Crisis fabrication, on the other hand, usually involves

the patron or,more often,

theclient, announcing

its

intention to create a crisis situation that both the patron

and the client know the client cannot win. It is a

technique of last resort, one that is used when all other

forms of patron-client negotiation have failed. If

successful, it could lead to a tremendous boost in the

positions of both parties in the relationship. However,

should it fail, either the patron would lose credibility, if

it were the source of the fabrication or if it refused to

come to the aid of its client, or the client will be forced

to choose between backing down or engaging in a situation





superpowers. The loss of Western Europe, to be sure, would

cut into the economic strength of the United States, and the

loss of Eastern Europe would generate deep anxieties in the

U. S. S. R. But even such losses, according to Jervis, would

leave the Soviet Union and the United States with a

deterrent force that would provide more security than great

powers often possessed in the past.17

If this were wholly the case, then the sometimes

obsessive concern of the superpowers with territorial and/or

political change in areas outside their formal alliance

blocs is indeed an anomaly. Why, if such change is

inconsequential to superpower security, do the United States

and the Soviet Union intervene in many corners of the world

in order to affect or prevent changes in the status quo?

This tendency takes a most blatant form when either or both

of the superpowers intervene in client-state wars, risking

not only their mutual relationahip, but also a direct

confrontation and the possibility of escalation to a nuclear

war.

This apparent paradox arises basically from a failure

to take into account the full implications of the three

postwar systemic developments, mentioned above, for the

superpower rivalry. As with proponents of the territorial,

zero-sum conception of postwar bipolarity who, like Herz,

are inclined to view the components of superpower security

in the nuclear age as similar to those of the European great

powers a century earlier,18 Jervis fails to give due

recognition to the postwar qualitative transformation of the

form of, and the stakes in, the Soviet-American global



strategic contest. This transformation can be directly

attributed to the aforementioned developments. Thus, the

acquisition by the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. of a capability for

mutually assured destruction (M. A. D. ) and of conventional

military forces of a global range, -has created the situation

where these countries have mutual as well as conflicting

interests which are of a global and interdependent nature.

In this situation, the Soviet Union and the United States do

not simply "cancel each other out, " but pursue their

interests under new conditions of strategic interaction.

These occur in an environment in which

the role of force is still enormous even though it isimmobilized, but in which new nonmilitary concepts---mutually shared expectations, images, climate, signals,patterns of behaviour, and reciprocity---take on newstrategic significance. It is in the management of

these added factors that one superpower has anopportunity not to defeat but to outgain the other...19

It is only by taking account of the role of these factors in

the Soviet-American rivalry that the rationale behind the

superpowers' concern with regional territorial and/or

poilitical change, as manifested through intervention in

client-state wars and the manipulation of crises arising

from such wars, can be best understood.

The existing literature

Unfortunately, much of the existing literature on United

States and Soviet intervention and crisis manipulation is of

a descriptive nature and rarely addresses itself

systematically and comprehensively to the relationship

between intervention, crisis, and peaceful change in the

nuclear age. To be sure, there is an abundance of studies

on the theoretical 20 dimension of intervention. Numerous



case studies have been made on the subject, and a number of

valuable multistate comparisons have helped in understanding

the topic. 21 Interventions by various states have been

studied, including those of the U. S., 22 the U. S. S. R. 23 the

two superpowers together, 24and Britain. 25 Public excuses

or justifications for interventions have been analyzed,26

and many works have endeavoured to identify international

norms, rules, conventions, and tacit understandings

governing postwar use of armed force. 27

However, many of these works fall far short of looking

at the phenomenon of superpower intervention in its entirety.

This is to say, they tend to deal mainly with definitions,

or they attempt to describe the various "rules of the game"

that are thought to have developed between the superpowers

since World War II. In most cases, the raison d'etre for

superpower intervention is touched upon only to the extent

that the excuses and Justifications given by the U. S. and

the Soviet authorities are analyzed, sometimes very

superficially. Even then, few attempts are made to explain

such proclamations in the context of stable nuclear

deterrence, that is, to show why the superpowers continue to

be concerned with territorial and political change in grey

areas in the first place.

As with intervention, the subject of crisis has

attracted a lot of scholarly attention, most of which has

been focused on superpower crisis, including client-state

war stimulated crises, crisis prevention, and crisis

management.28 However, although some work has been done on

the manipulation of the risk of war as an instrument of



compellence and deterrence, 29 the notion of superpower

crisis management as a substitute for war has been accorded

only cursory consideration. As a result, a full

conceptualization of crisis as a surrogate for war, at least

as far as the nuclear powers are concerned, is still

lacking. Accordingly, studies of superpower intervention

in client-state war stimulated crises are often premised on

the presumption that such crises are unwelcome to the

superpowers and that, therefore, the latter's principal

objective during such events is to end the crisis, if

possible, without causing a serious setback for their

client(s). Victory for the client as a superpower

objective in such crises is not denied but is presumed to

take a secondary position unless, of course, the superpower

crisis stimulated by the client-state war is not severe.

The possibility, however, that a superpower may welcome a

client-state war stimulated crisis involving the other

superpower as a way of initiating or preventing change in

the regional and/or the international status quo is seldom

given serious consideration. Consequently, United States

and Soviet behaviour during international crises is left

open to misinterpretation, misunderstanding and sometimes

even incomprehension, " whilst the significance of some

superpower maneuvers during such crises can be missed

altogether.

Purpose of the research

It is against this background that the purpose of this

study has been set. The basic task is to investigate the

value or the rationale behind territorial and/or political



change in the era of stable deterrence, as far as the

superpowers are concerned. That is to say, to show why the

United States and the Soviet Union should be concerned with

changes that do not seem to directly affect their vital

security. After establishing a link between superpower

security and regional territorial and/or political change,

the work seeks to specify the exact circumstances under

which the superpowers are most likely to intervene in

regional crises in order to manipulate such crises to their

own ends. The third and final task of this study is to

explain why, in light of the link between regional

territorial and/or political change and superpower security,

one superpower sometimes allows the other to manipulate a

regional crisis to its own advantage either by not

intervening to an equal degree or by not intervening at all.

Propositions

The postulates underlying these objectives are set out

in the following propositions which, cumulatively,

constitute the main thesis of this work. These

propositions, however, do not necessarily follow the same

sequence or logical order as the objectives outlined above.

Proposition 1: Even in the age of stable nuclear

deterrence, changes in the territorial and/or political

status quo in areas outside the U. S. and the U. S. S. R.

can be considered as of vital security concern to these

countries. This is because such changes could be

of material importance to them, and could also strongly



bear on their general images of resolve and

credibility.

Proposition 2: In areas where the superpowers either

do not agree on the relative balance of their interests

or are not certain of their own or the other's interest

and find it difficult to assess how and to what extent

these interests will become engaged in a developing,

unstable situation, no hard and fast rules concerning

the permissability and type of intervention on behalf

of clients are likely to exist. The purpose of a

superpower's intervention on behalf of a warring client

in such a rule-free environment could be either or both

of the following. Firstly, itcould

be toresolve

the

dispute between itself and the other superpower over

the regional balance of interest in its own favour and

thereby establish a set of tacit "rules of the game"

ascertaining and legitimizing its regional interests

and rights. Secondly, it could be to impose a tighter

degree of control over the client. Thus, a client-

state war stimulated crisis may be functional in the

sense that it could provide a superpower with the

opportunity to adjust its relationship with the other

superpower, its own client, or both.

Proposition 3: The eruption of war which involves one

or more clients of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. tends to

create an aura of crisis which affects both the

superpowers and their protagonist clients. This is

because this kind of war often carries the danger of a



nuclear war due to the possibility of double superpower

intervention in support of their warring clients.

Such danger, in turn, generates intense pressure on all

the parties concerned, which can be exploited by one or

more of these parties to improve its (their) position

vis-a-vis the other(s).

Proposition 4: Where superpower-intervention takes an

asymmetrical or a unilateral form, this disparity could

be the result of either a) the crisis situation, that

is, the political and strategic environments and,

especially, the interventionary milieu, which determine

whether a superpower is sufficiently able to intervene

on behalf of a client and, if necessary, successfully

confront the other should the latter also intervene on

behalf of its own protege, and/or b) the depth of the

patron-client relationship, that is, how involved the

patron is with its client and, consequently, how

closelyit is

perceived to be identified with it.

The case studies

Three case studies of United States and Soviet

intervention in client-state wars are selected to illustrate

empirically the thesis advanced in this work. These are of

the Korean war of1950-1953, the Arab-Israeli

war of October

1973, and the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-1978. The case

studies were selected according to four different criteria.

The first of these was their utility to the thesis in terms

of their strategic value to the U. S. and the U. S. S. R.

The their in terms of their location



within the disputed/uncertain interest symmetry category of

superpower regional game structures. The third criterion

was the closeness with which the case studies fitted into

the conceptual definition of the relationship between

intervention, crisis, and superpower security put forward in

this study. The fourth and final criterion according to

which the three case studies were selected was the extent to

which they were able to illustrate the strategic imperative

of superpower intervention, whether in its asymmetrical,

double, or unilateral form. That is, they had to be of

wars that took place at qualitatively different stages in

the development of Soviet-American postwar relations in

order to show the constancy of the criteria which determine

whether and to what extent a superpower Intervenes on behalf

of a warring client. Hence, the Korean war was chosen as

an example of a client conflict which occurred prior to the

advent of detente, the October 1973 Middle East war was

selected because it took place at the height of detente, and

the Ethio-Somali conflict was chosen on the basis of its

occurrence during the demise of detente. Each of these

wars was also characterized by either double, unilateral, or

asymmetrical intervention by the superpowers on behalf of

their clients. The Korean war was a clear case of

asymmetrical intervention, with the U. S. helping its South

Korean client directly with money, men, and material, and

the U. S. S. R. extending indirect help to its North Korean

protege through the People's Republic of China. Although

indirect Soviet support of Kim Il-sung's regime was quite

substantial, it was qualitatively and quantitatively



inferior to the aid given by the U. S. to Syngman Rhee and to

what the U. S. S. R. could afford at the time. The Ethio-

Somali conflict, on the other hand, was a case of unilateral

intervention, with the U. S. S. R. massively intervening on

behalf of Ethiopia by supplying enormous quantities of

advanced weapons to Addis Ababa and facilitating the

transport of Cuban and other allied troops to that country,

and the U. S. doing virtually nothing to help the Somalis.

Finally, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was an unambiguous case

of double intervention, with both superpowers helping their

respective clients through the supply of arms and military

equipment, and by other moves directed both at each other

and at the regional powers.

Format of presentation

This study is divided into three parts. The first

part consists of Chapters 2,3, and 4 and deals with the

theoretical dimensions of Soviet-American intervention in

client-state wars. The second part, consisting of Sections

A, B, and C, is an empirical analysis of themodel of

intervention developed in Part I. The third part of the

study is made up of the concluding chapter which tries to

draw some threads together.

The main focus of the study is presented in Chapter 2,

which defines and explores the relationship between

intervention, crisis, and peaceful change. As well as

introducing a definition of intervention which can be

applied to inter-and intra-state conflicts, the Chapter

argues that intervention has become the principal instrument

of superpower manipulation of regional crises and,



consequently, for the instigation or prevention of change in

the status quo. Although such change could pertain to

either the regional balance of power between the United

States and the Soviet Union or/and the nature of the

relationship between a superpower and its regional client,

this study shall only deal with the former category of

change. The crucial link between intervention and the

affection or prevention of change is, it is argued, crisis.

A part of Chapter 2 is, therefore, devoted to a

conceptualization of crisis as a nuclear-age substitute for

war, a means by which the superpowers can peacefully

ascertain their interests.

Chapter 3 looks at the context of intervention. It

notes that in many regions of the world the behaviour of the

United States and the Soviet Union 'Is constrained by a range

of tacit and explicit rules of the game which are a function

of the superpowers' postwar mutual, albeit tacit,

recognition of, and respect for, the relative balance of

their regional interests. These rules operate in

accordance with the principle of reciprocity and are thus

largely immune to fluctuations in the state of U, S. SQviet

political relations. In "grey areas, " however,

interventionary situations are likely to be characterized by

the presence of strategic interaction between the United

States and the U. S. S. R. This generates uncertainty and

disposes the superpowers to intervene on behalf of their

clients. Although in these locales "rules of the game" do

exist, they tend to facilitate "controlled competition" for

regional dominance rather than preclude military



intervention altogether.

Chapter 4 turns to the "grey areas", that is, locales

of disputed or uncertain superpower interest symmetry, and

considers the targets of intervention in those regions---

those components of the balance of power which, in spite of

the stable deterrence relationship which exists between the

superpowers, the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. still deem important

to preserve or change by manipulating crisis. It,

therefore, takes a close look at the concept of the

superpower balance of resolve, and examines the relationahip

between this, superpower security in the nuclear age, and

political and territorial change in grey areas. It argues

that, for a superpower, the resolution of uncertainty or

dispute in respect to its relative interests vis-a-vis the

other superpower in grey areas is of great importance not

only in a material sense, for example, to ensure future

petroleum supplies, but also because of the impact which its

performance in a contested region bears on its general

images of resolve and credibility. Needless to say,

sustaining a good image in these spheres is vital for a

superpower's credibility as an ally and for the credibility

of its nuclear deterrent. The Chapter ends by attempting

to explain the occurrence of unilateral and asymmetrical

interventions in grey areas in terms of the "crisis

situation" of regional conflicts, that is, the political and

strategic environments and the interventionary milieu.

Sections A, B, and C, consisting of Chapters 5 to 13,

seek empirically to illustrate the model of intervention

developed in the previous chapters with material from the

Korean war, the October 1973 Middle East war, and the Ethio-

20



Somali conflict of 1977-1978, as examples of asymmetrical,

double, and unilateral intervention respectively. These

three Sections differ only in their substantive content, and

-followthe same organizational format.

The first chapter that is common to all three Sections

seeks to determine the "grey area" status of the region

under consideration by analysing the relative balance of

superpower primary interests there. This type of interest

refers to both the historical involvement of the United

States and the Soviet Union in the region in question, and

the strategic, political, and economic interests of these

two superpowers in the area at the time of the eruption of

conflict. By ascertaining the balance of superpower

primary interests in the region under consideration, the

chapter sets the scene for an analysis of the relationship

between this balance and the pattern of superpower responses

to the outbreak of war in the area.

This first chapter is followed in each of Sections A to

C by a brief outline of the progress of the client-state

conflict and a comparison of the responses of the United

States and the Soviet Union to it. The purpose of this

discussion is to ascertain the type of superpower

intervention applicable to the conflict in question and

to establish the relationship between this and the regional

balance of Soviet-American primary interests.

The third chapter common to Sections A to C attempts to

explain the type of intervention chosen by the superpowers

with reference to three sets of variables. The first of

these is the perception by the United States and the Soviet



Union of the legitimacy and desirability of the regional

status quo. This concerns such variables as the regional

balance of power and the state of client-patron

relationships in the area. The second set of variables

according to which the choice of superpower responses to

client-state war is explained is the systemic context of the

war, and the third factor is the interventionary milieu in

which the war and the choice of superpower responses take

place.

The final part of this study is made up of the

concluding chapter. This attempts to integrate the

theoretical and empirical analyses presented in the

preceding chapters and thereby endeavours to draw the broad

outlines of a general theory of superpower intervention in

grey areas which explains asymmetrical, double, and

unilateral intervention in terms of a common frame of

reference.



Notes

1. See Thucydides, History of the Peleponnesian War, trans. RexWerner (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1954), andP. J. Fleiss, Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity(Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1966),Chapter 4.

2. See H. A. Kissinger, A World Restored (Grosset and Dunlap,New York, 1964), for a discussion of this debate.

3. H. K. Tillema and J. R. van Wingen, "Law and Power in MilitaryIntervention: Major States after World War II, "International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1982,

pp. 220-250.

4. The intra-mural interventions were in East Berlin in June1953, in Poland and Hungary in November 1956, and inCzechoslovakia in August 1968.

5. R. Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations(Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1970), p. 244.

6. J. H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age(Columbia University Press, New York, 1959), p. 240.

7. R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, multipolarity, and thefuture, " The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X, 1966,

p. 316.8. L. T. Caldwell, "The Future of Soviet-American Relations, "

Soviet-American Relations in the 1980's: SuperpowerPolitics and East-West Trade, ed. L. T. Caldwell and W.Diebold Jr. (McGraw-Hill Company, New York, 1981), p. 26.

9. Interview with James Reston, The New York Times, Oct. 13,1974.

10. C. C. Shoemaker and J. Spanier, Patron-Client StateRelationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age(Praeger, New York, 1984), esp. pp. 21,22,51,71.

11. Ibid., pp. 11,12,184.12. G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing, Conflict Among Nations:

Bargaining. Decision Making, and System Structure inInternational Crises (Princeton University

Press, Princeton,New Jersey, 1977), pp. 30-31.13. Shoemaker and Spanier, op. cit., pp. 12,72.14. Ibid., pp. 75-76.15. Ibid., p. 77.16. Jervis, op. cit., p. 245.

17. Ibid., pp. 245-246.

18. Herz, op. cit., esp. pp. 239-240.19. T. M. Franck and E. Weisband, Word Politics: Verbal Strategy

Among the Superpowers (Oxford University Press, New York,1971), p. 120.

20. L. G. M. Jaquet, Intervention in International Politics

(Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, The Hague,1971); Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 2,1968, pp. 165-302; G. Modelski, The International Relations

of Internal War (Centre of International Studies, WoodrowWilson School of Public and International Affairs, PrincetonUniversity, May 1961); J. N. Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War

in the Modern World (Johns Hopkins University Press,

Baltimore, 1974); J. N. Roseman (ed. ), International Aspects

of Civil Strife (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New



Jersey, 1964); E. P. Stern (ed. ), The Limits of Intervention

(Sage, Beverly Hills, California, 1977); O. R. Young, The

Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises

(Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1967);

idem "Intermediaries and Interventionists: Third Parties in

the Middle East Crisis, "International Journal, Vol. 23, Pt.1,1971, pp. 52-73.

21. J. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy (Praeger, New York, 1971); W. H.

Flanigan and E. Fogelman, "Patterns of Political Violence in

Comparative Perspective, " Comparative Politics, Vol. 3,

1970, pp. 1-20; D. Garnham, "Power Parity and Lethal

International Violence 1969-1973, " Journal of Conflict

Resolution, Vol. 20,1976, pp. 379-394; F. A. Pearson,

"Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes, "

International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18,1974, pp. 259-

290; idem "Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military

Interventions, " Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 18,1974, pp. 432-460

22. R. J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (World, New York,

1968); B. M. Blechman and S. S. Kaplan, Force Without War:

Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Brookings

Institution, Washington D. C., 1978); J. S. Odell,

"Correlates of U. S. Military Assistance and MilitaryIntervention, " Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism, ed.S. J. Rosen and J. R. Kurth (D. C. Heath, Lexington,Massachusetts, 1974); F. S. Pearson, "American MilitaryIntervention Abroad, " The Politics of Aid, Trade andInvestment,

ed.S. Raichur

andCraig Liske (John Wiley, New

York, 1976); F. S. Pearson and R. Bauman, "Foreign MilitaryIntervention and Changes in United States Business Activity, "Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 5,1977,

PP. 79-97; H. K. Tillema, Appeal to Force: AmericanMilitary Intervention in the Era of Containment (Harper andRow, New York, 1973); E. Weede, "U. S. Support for ForeignGovernments or Domestic Disorder and Imperial Intervention1958-1965, " Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 10,1978,pp. 497-527.

23. B. Dismukes and J. McConnell (eds. ), Soviet Naval Diplomacy(Pergamon Press, New York, 1979); S. S. Kaplan (ed. ),

Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a PoliticalInstrument (Brookings Institution, Washington EX., - 1981;R. A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact: Studies in CommunistConflict Resolution (Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971).

24. M. Beloff, "Reflections as Intervention", The Intellectualin Politics and Other Essays (Weidenfeld and Nicolson,London, 1970); R. Falk, "The Menace of the New Cycle ofInterventionary Diplomacy, " Journal of Peace Research, No.3, Vol. XVII, 1980, pp. 201-205; C. Holbraad, Superpowers

and International Conflict (Macmillan, London and

Basingstoke, 1979); R. Legvold, "The Super Rivals:Conflict in the Thirld World, " Foreign Affairs, Spring 1979,

pp. 755-778; R. D. McKinlay and A. Mughan, Aid and Arms to

the Third World: An Analysis of the Distribution and Impact

of 'U. S. Official Transfers (Frances Pinter, London, 1984);

L. B. Miller, "Superpower Conflict in the 1980's, " Millenium:

Journal of International Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1,1977, pp.45-63; D. Zagoria, "Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances

in the Third World, " Foreign Affairs, Spring 1979, pp. 733-



754.25. R. Little, Intervention:

-ExternalInvolvement in Civil Wars

(Martin Robertson, London, 1975); J. R. Van Wingen and H. K.

Tillema, "British Military Intervention, " Journal of Peace

Research, No. 17,1980, pp. 291-303.

26. Franck and Weisband, op. cit., K. Goldmann, InternationalNorms and War Between States (Scandinavian University Books,

Laromedelsforlagen, Sweden, 1971); R. Higgins, The

Development of International Law Through the PoliticalOrgans of the United Nations (Oxford University Press,London, 1963); J. N. Moore, "The Control of ForeignIntervention in Internal Conflict, " Virginia Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 9,1969, pp. 205-342.

27. I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force byStates (Clarendon Press, London, 1963); T. J. Farer,"Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on

Intervention in Civil Strife, " The Vietnam War andInternational Law, Vol. 4, ed. R. A. Falk (Princeton

University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969), pp. 1089-1116; J. Gowa and N. H. Wessell, Ground Rules: Soviet andAmerican Involvement in Regional Conflicts (Foreign PolicyResearch Institute, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1982); P.Keal, Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance (Macmillan,London and Basingstoke, 1983); N. Matheson, The "Rules ofthe Game" of Superpower Military Intervention in the ThirdWorld 1975-1980 (University Press of America, Washington,1982); A. M. Scott, "Military Intervention by the GreatPowers: the Rules

of theGame, " Czechoslovakia:

Intervention and Impact, ed. I. W. Zartman (New YorkUniversity Press, New York, 1970), pp. 85-104; T. V. Thiele,"Norms of Intervention in a Decolonized World, " New YorkUniversity Journal of International Law and Politics, 1978,PP. 141-174; I. W. Zartman, "The Norms of Intervention, "Czechoslovakia: Intervention and Impact. ed. idem, op. cit.,pp. 105-119.

28. G. T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the CubanMissile Crisis (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971);C. Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in DiplomaticManagement (Oxford University Press, London, Oxford, New

York, 1971); L. P. Bloomfield and A. C. Leiss, The Control ofLocal Conflict: A Design Study on Arms Control and LimitedWar in the Developing Areas (Centre for InternationalStudies, M. I. T., June 30,1967); idem, Controlling SmallWars: A Strategy for the 1970's (Allen Lane The PenguinPress, London, 1969); R. Cohen, Threat Perception inInternational Crisis (The University of Wisconsin Press,1979) idem, "'Where are the Aircraft Carriers? ' NonverbalCommunication in International Politics, " Review ofInternational Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1981; A. L.George (ed. ), Managing U. S. -Soviet Rivalry: Problems of

Crisis Prevention (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983);C. F. Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation

Analysis (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis and New

York, 1969); idem (ed. ), Crises: Insights from Behavioral

Research (Free Press, New York; Collier-Macmillan, London,

1972); O. R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation. War (McGill-Queen's

University Press, Montreal and London, 1972); M. Kosaka,

"Crisis Controls in Regional Conflicts, " Adelphi Papers No.

134 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,



1977), pp. 29-36; J. L. Payne, The American Threat: The

Fear of War as an Instrument of Foreign Policy (Markham

Publishing Company, Chicago, 1970); A. Perlmutter, "Crisis

Management: Kissinger; s Middle East Negotiations (October

1973-June 1974), " International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19,

No. 3, September 1975, pp. 316-343; Shoemaker and Spanier,op. cit.: R. Smoke, Controlling Escalation (Harvard

University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London,

England, 1977); Snyder and Diesing, op. cit.; P. J. Tansey,

World Diplomacy: A Crisis Game in International Diplomacy

(Society for Academic Gaming and Simulation in Education andTraining, Moxeton-in-Marsh, Glos., 1968); R. Tanter,Modelling and Managing International Conflicts: The Berlin

Crises (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London, 1974); E.

Weintal and C. Bartlett, Facing the Brink: An Intimate

Study of Crisis Diplomacy (Charles Scribner's Sons, NewYork, 1967); P. Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation

and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (Martin Robertson, London,

1976); idem, "Detente and Superpower Crises: The MiddleEast War of 1973" (Paper prepared for the 1984 BISA

Conference, December 1984).29. For example, T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict

(Oxford University Press, New York, 1963).



PART I:

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS



CHAPTER 2: CRISIS, INTERVENTION, AND PEACEFUL CHANGE

Intervention is an integral component of client-state

war stimulated superpower crisis. It seems appropriate,

therefore, to begin this chapter by introducing the concept

of crisis and also by considering the relationship between

intervention and its other principal component,

confrontation. This will then pave the way for a full

conceptualization of superpower crisis as a surrogate for

war, a means by which the United States and the Soviet Union

can peacefully affect or prevent change in the status quo.

An analysis of crisis

At a most general level, crisis can be defined as a

"turning-point in the progress of anything", or "a state of

affairs in which a decisive change for better or worse is

imminent. "1 Thus, the prime feature of genuine crisis in

any given relationship is that the conflicts underlying it

rise to a level which threatens to transform the nature of

the relationship. In adversary crisis, such as that

involving the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., the potential

transformation is from peace to war; in intra-alliance

crisis, such as that between a superpower and its client, it

is from alliance'to rupture.2 It is, indeed, this very

prospect of transformation that constitutes the essence of

international crisis, and it is the possible manipulation of

this prospect which renders such crisis a potentially useful

instrument of peaceful change.

Crisis is a dynamic process and not a single, static

state of affairs. This is especially true in the case of



international crisis, which can be defined as "a sequence of

interaction between the governments of two or more sovereign

states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but

involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of

war. "3 The "severe conflict" inherent in international

crisis takes two forms. The first is a deep conflict of

interest between those involved. Such conflict, however,

is not in itself sufficient to ignite a crisis. One of the

parties must also initiate some form of conflict behaviour

in an endeavour to resolve the underlying conflict of

interest in its favour. This can occur when, for example,

one party tries to coerce the other with threats of violence

and the other party resists.4

It is, nevertheless, "the perception of a dangerously

high probability of war" by the parties involved which

constitutes the central ingredient of crisis. Although it

is impossible to specify how high this probability must be

to qualify as a crisis, it must be at last sufficiently high

to stimulate feelings of fear and tension to a degree which

implies that whatever is happeningmight result

in the

outbreak of war. It is precisely this qualification which

distinguishes crisis from other forms of conflict behaviour

such as "disputes, " "disagreements, " and "bad relations. " 5

The dynamic nature of international crisis, the fact

that it consists of a sequence of interaction between highly

conflicting states, makes it common for it to escalate

through a number of phases which could then either fairly

promptly lead to a resolution of the underlying conflict or,

alternatively, undergo a further process of de-escalation



which, ultimately, ends in a resolution of the issue(s) at

stake. The first of these phases may be termed the pre-

crisis, active conflict phase. In this phase, one party

indicates its dissatisfaction with the status quo, and gives

notice of its intention to do something about it. 6 The

parties involved then engage in mild recriminations,

threats, and warnings, although at this stage war is not

perceived as a distinct possibility.

This first phase is followed by the opening phase of

the crisis, the genesis of which may be accident, mutual

fear and suspicion, or deliberate challenge. During this

phase, the possibility of war moves into consciousness. In

the case of crises whose opening phase is accidental, the

parties either"stumble into"

confrontation as a result of a

series of moves undertaken, perhaps, during the pre-crisis

phase, but which neither expected to lead to a crisis, or

are drawn into a confrontation by circumstantial factors

beyond their control such as the actions of their clients or

allies. 8

"War scare" or "security dilemma" crises, on the other

hand, typically occur as a result of the fear of one or both

parties, in a fairly high state of hostility and tension,

that the other is about to attack it. In this type of

crisis, one party makes a move that appears like preparation

to attack, the other party reacts with partial mobilization,

the first party responds with further measures, which

confirm the second party's fears and cause it to mobilize

further, and so on. These various measures are undertaken

in preparation against a possible attack, and not to bring

coercive pressure upon the opponent. Nevertheless, though



defensive in nature, they only self-confirm each party's

fear that the other is preparing an attack, in the familiar

dynamics of the security dilemma. 9

Accidental and security dilemma crises contrast sharply

with those whose opening phase is triggered by a deliberate

challenge. In this type of crisis, one party percieves an

intolerable situation developing in its environment as a

result of moves undertaken by another party or parties10

and, consequently, issues either a verbal or physical

challenge. This challenge is then resisted by the

challenged party, thus triggering a crisis. Resistance to

the challenge could be immediate, overt, and unambiguous, or

it could be more diffuse, consisting of, for example, an

absence of official response to the challenge, adefiant

outcry in the media, continuance of an activity that the

challenger has demanded be stopped, or a quiet increase. in

military readiness. Even in the unlikely event of neither

clear nor diffuse signals of resistance, a crisis will

generally be perceived to exist as a consequence of the

challenge alone, since it will be clear both to the parties

involved and to external observers that important interests

of the challenged party have been threatened, and that it,

therefore, can be expected to resist, at least to begin

with1l.

The third phase in the stage model of crisis analysis

is that of confrontation. This could be the outcome of

either accident, a war scare, or the collision of challenge

and resistance. The confrontation may continue for

anything from days to months, and is typified by rising



tension and the increasing predominance of coercive tactics

on both sides. During this phase, each party stands firm

on its initial position and issues threats, warnings,

military deployments, and other signals to indicate

firmness, to undermine the other party's firmness, and

generally to persuade it that it must back down if war is to

be avoided.12 The phase may either escalate into war, in

which case the crisis ends and the parties move into a

different type of interaction, or, alternatively, it may de-

escalate to. a negotiation phase.

A confrontation will escalate into war under two

general conditions. The first of these is the failure of

the confronting parties to recognize in good time the

realities of power between them and thereby abort the pre-

emptive logic of military mobilization already begun. 13

The second general condition under which a confrontation

will escalate into war is the possession of interests by the

participants that are so deeply incompatible as to render

peaceful settlement impossible. 14 Other, more specific

reasons for the escalation of confrontation into war include

loss of control by statesman over subordinates, especially

military subordinates,15

and the presence of psychological

compulsions towards action or reaction16

The confrontation phase of a crisis will, however, de-

escalate to a negotiation phase either if one party clearly

establishesits dominance of credibility and resolve over

the other which, in turn, realizes its own weakness and

capitulates, or if both parties decide that they must

retreat from the brink to avoid mutual disaster. 17 Should

either of these eventualities occur, then the crisis enters



its fourth and final phase, that of negotiation. This

phase is characterized by accommodative tactics such as

bids, concessions, proposals and counter-proposals

alongside, perhaps, some coercive tactics, the aim of which

is to arrange the details of settlement. The exact type of

accommodative tactics chosen, and the balance between

accommodative and coercive measures will depend on whether

the negotiation phase was brought about by capitulation or

compromise. In the former case, "accommodation" often

includes the creation by the winner of some sort of face-

saving rationale for the loser; in the latter case,

accommodation will need some hard bargaining, with one or

both parties making displays of determination and mild

coercive moves somewhere along the path toward settlement.18

The denouement of a crisis can have wide-ranging

effects on the subsequent relations between the protagonists,

the latter and third parties, and on the general state of

the international system. It is with reference to the

nature of these effects that the success of crisis

management should be judged. A successful crisis is

basically one that has been peacefully resolved, that is,

one whose confrontation phase de-escalates into negotiation;

the ultimate sign of failure in crisis management is war.

It follows that, the extent to which a crisis has been

successfully managed should be determined primarily

according to whether the probability of war between the

chief protagonists has been increased or diminished.

Whilst some crises embitter and worsen subsequent relations,

others improve them. The exact effect of a crisis on the

32



subsequent relations between the conflicting parties depends

on a number of variables. In the foremost of these is

whether the crisis resolution also resolves or mitigates the

underlying conflict of interest between the parties.

Another variable is whether the loser is "driven to the

wall" and humiliated or provided with a face-saving

concession that can be presented as a "compromise. " A

third and, perhaps, related variable which affects the post-

crisis relations of the chief adversaries relates to the

precise impact on the power position of each protagonist

over the short and longer terms: a crisis which leaves one

side overwhelmingly predominant over the other is one that

sows the seeds for future conflict and possible war. Other

variables which affect the subsequent relations of the

participants in a crisis are the impact of the crisis on

alignments and on the "images" the parties develop of each

other. Finally, a further criterion according to which

success in crisis management should be measured is whether

the conduct of the crisis has in any way contributed to the

conventions and techniques of crisis management, and thus

added to the prospect of success in future crises.19

The extent to which a crisis has been successful

according to these criteria is contingent upon how the

confrontation phase, which constitutes the core of the

crisis, was conducted. In the case of client-state war

stimulated superpower crises, the principal instrument by

which confrontation is managed is intervention. It is,

indded, the threat or the use of intervention on the part of

the superpowers in order to affect the course of a client-

state war which transforms that conflict into a superpower



crisis.

Crisis and intervention

Intervention is not only a principal instrument in the

conduct of confrontation; it is also conceptually related

to it to the degree that they both represent methods of

affecting change, or trying to affect change, without war or

the serious risk of war20. In many instances,

confrontation may be a preliminary step towards

intervention, the latter thus being an escalation of

confrontation. This may occur in a conflict situation

involving one strong power and two or more weaker parties.

Under these circumstances, when confrontation does not yield

theresults expected by the stronger power initiating

it,

such power can escalate the confrontation so that it grows

into intervention. The Gulf of Tonkin confrontation of

August 4,1964, which was one of the steps on the ladder of

all-out U. S. intervention in Vietnam, is a case in point.21

The reverse relationship is, nevertheless, often the

case22 in client-state war stimulated superpower crises. A

typical scenario for a crisis of this type is one in which a

superpower threatens or tries to intervene in a regional

conflict either to support a client on the brink of serious

defeat or/and to counter the intervention of the other

superpower in the conflict. Consequently, confrontation

may develop out of, or within, a situation of intervention,

as was the case in the Congo in 1960 or in the Arab-Israeli

war of October 1973.

Conventionally, the term "intervention" has rarely been





The use of the term "intervention" to apply only to

acts of entry into the domestic affairs of a state---usually

a civil war---is rather unnecessarily restrictive. In a

general sense, intervention refers to, inter alia, the

action of "... 'stepping in' or interfering in any affair, so

as to affect the course or issue... "27 The target of

intervention thus need not be restricted to the domestic

dimension of a state, be it of a political or structural

nature. Indeed, increasingly, intervention is seen to

embrace inter- as well as intra-state conflicts. Clearly,

however, none of the conventional definitions are adequate

for such a wider application and, consequently, for the

purpose of this study.

For intervention to comprise international as well as

civil conflict, it should be, first of all, freed from the

proviso that it has to be aimed at "the structure of

political authority in the target society. " Secondly, it

should subsume acts of both indirect as well as direct

military intervention, neither of which should be

necessarily convention-breaking. Direct military

intervention refers to the introduction of either the

regular military units of the intervening state into the

conflict in question or those of an ally or proxy. These

units may become involved in such activities as "shows of

force, " transport or other logistical roles, actions to

deter other potential interveners short of the use of force,

or actual combat.28 Indirect military intervention, on the

other hand, refers to the supply of arms and related

military material such as transport, as well as- training



personnel for this equipment to a party to a conflict, and

funding it so that it could obtain weapons and supplies from

other sources.29 Although less dramatic than its direct

counterpart, indirect military intervention can have just as

decisive an effect on the outcome of a conflict, as when,

for example, a superpower suddenly supplies its warring

client with large quantities of advanced weapons which had

hitherto been withheld from it or only supplied to it in

very small quantities.

Intervention, however, especially superpower

intervention in wars between clients, often encompasses

activities of a less obvious nature. These occur, for

instance, when one superpower takes coercive measures

against the other superpower in the context of a client-

state war in order to deter it from initiating or continuing

a specific action, or to compel it to take certain action,

in relation to any of the warring clients.

A definition of intervention which embraces the three

forementioned stipulations should be, therefore, applicable

to both intra-and inter-state wars and also appropriate for

the framework of crisis manipulation as a means of peaceful

change adopted in this work. Consequently, it is proposed

that, for the purpose of this study, superpower intervention

in client-state wars will be defined as one or both of the

following. Firstly, the provision by a superpower or a

proxy of it of military personnel, weapons, or other

military assistance such as logistical support to a client.

Secondly, the threat or use of organized and systematic

coercion by a superpower either against a protagonist in a

client-state war with the aim of affecting or preventing a



change in its internal or external policies action or

capabilities, or in its domestic political structure, and/or

against the other superpower in order to compel it to

initiate or continue a specific action or to deter it from

adopting or carrying on with certain action in regard to the

client-state war.30 This definition is both wider and

narrower than that of, say, Rosenau. It is wider in the

sense that it includes inter-as well as intra-state

conflict, and narrower in that it excludes non-conflict

situations.

Crisis manipulation and peaceful change

The use of intervention by the United States and the

Soviet Union in themanagement of postwar confrontations

has

typically occurred in the context of crises that have been

of a distributive, 31as opposed to redistributive,

32nature.

Crises of this type are characterized by bargaining over the

acquisition or division of something that is mutually

desired; they take place when the object at stake is not

controlled by either of the contenders. The crisis thus

erupts when the protagonists collide in their simultaneous

endeavours to gain control.33 Soviet-American attempts to

gain dominance in a grey area by intervening on behalf of

their respective proteges in a client-state war in that area

would fall into this category of crisis. Redistributive

crises, on the other hand, are characterized by bargaining

over something that is already possessed, or is in the

process of being acquired by one of the contenders; the

other contender endeavours to compel the possessor to



surrender all or part of it, or to refrain from acquiring

it. The crisis thus erupts when the dissatisfied party

issues a "challenge" in the form of a demand that the other

party transfers to it something that it already has or

controls, or that it halts an ongoing process of acquiring

possession or control.34 The Berlin crises of 1948 and

1958-1961, and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 can be cited

as examples of this type of crisis.

The principal ingredient which conveys upon crisis its

potential as a mechanism for these types of peaceful change

is, as alluded to earlier in this chapter, the perception of

a dangerously high probability of war. It is, basically,

the manipulation of this risk of war which makes crisis an

instrument of deterrence and compellence. This fact,

however, may cast some doubt on the general utility of

superpower crisis manipulation as a means of peaceful change

when, in the age of mutually assured destruction, the risk

of war amounts to the risk of catastrophe. The basic

question which must, therefore, be addressed in this respect

is: How can the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. exert coercive

pressure at all during crises by threats which may lead to

nuclear escalation and which each thus knows the other

cannot possibly mean if it is rational? This, in turn,

raises two further questions in regard to, firstly, whether

the risk of nuclear war per se is a credible component of

superpower crisis bargaining and, secondly, whether the

stakes in areas outside the traditional superpower spheres

of influence are such as to make the risk of nuclear war a

more or a less potent component of the bargaining process.

The development of nuclear weapons has, undoubtedly,



been of momentous significance for the conception and role

of crisis in international relations. To begin with, the

deployment of these weapons by the United States and the

Soviet Union has, as far as these countries are concerned,

enormously widened the gap between the value of the stakes

in a conflict and the possible cost of war. In other

words, it has exacerbated the tension inherent in crisis

between winning and war-avoidance.35 During the pre-

nuclear era, the gap separating the interests in conflict

and the possible cost of war was either relatively narrow or

did not exist at all: states were often willing to tolerate

high risks of war or even deliberately to go to war to avoid

sacrificing an object in dispute, as it is, indeed, still

the case with non-nuclear powers. The entry of nuclear

weapons into the equation has not so much changed the

importance that states attach to their interests in

conflict, and hence their desire to win, as it has

strengthened the war-avoidance constraint, which in nuclear

crisis is equivalent to disaster-avoidance. 36 As Snyder

and Diesing put it, it is now "difficult to imagine any

issue that would be considered worth the costs of nuclear

war or a high risk of nuclear war. "37

The caution thus injected into crisis behaviour has

not, however, led to a restriction of the range of moves

available to the superpowers during crisis. On the

contrary. The knowledge of each superpower that the other

is at least as cautious as itself and, therefore, will

tolerate a considerable amount of pressure and provocation

before resorting to acts that seriously risk nuclear war has



raised the threshold of challenge or provocation below which

the United States and the Soviet Union can compete.

Consequently, it has released a wide variety of coercive

moves with which they can engage in contests of resolve and

"nerve, " and which in pre-nuclear times might have triggered

war. Such moves include not only verbal threats but also

physical means short of large-scale violence, and can be

grouped into three different categories. The first of

these includes such acts of indirect military intervention

as the provision of military aid to client-states who are

directly engaged in crisis or war; the second encompasses a

considerable expansion of demonstrative or signalling acts,

as well as an increased significance attached to them, and

the third category includes acts of minor violence.38

A certainty on the part of each superpower that crisis

manipulation will definitely not escalate into nuclear war

so long as vital interests in their traditional spheres of

influence are not interfered with, would deprive crisis of

its potential as a means of affecting or preventing change

in grey areas. This is because, under such circumstances,

the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. would operate in the knowledge

that, in the final analysis, they could call each other's

bluff, a fact that would, of course, make a mockery of

crisis bargaining.

No such certainty, however, is likely to exist between

the United States and the Soviet Union, especially in

situations which are sufficiently important for them to

engage in contests of resolve and nerves. This is because

under cover of the nuclear umbrella, the use of limited

violence as a means of crisis coercion is perfectly



conceivable so that in some cases "'crisis' may merge

imperceptibly into 'limited war. "'39 Although the danger

of uncontrolled escalation is less likely under these

circumstances where both the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. possess

second-strike capabilities than in a situation where either

one or both of them possessed only first-strike

capabilities,40 it is by no means altogether absent. In

the first place, the controllability of the escalation

process can be undermined by such autonomous risks as "the

logic of war, " rigid contingency plans, and insubordinate

military commanders, as well as by risks that are inherent

in the bargaining process such as miscalculation.41

Moreover, the process of escalation in limited war is very

much "context dependent. " As Smoke has pointed out in

reference to the Vietnam conflict, decisions that were made

by the United States in that conflict

... to escalate or not to escalate, or to de-escalate...depended substantially upon U. S. policymakers'immediate perceptions of the situations of the moment,and only very marginally upon generalizations, ideas,or theories of how escalation dynamics work. Theanalyst studying these decisions

madeduring the Korean

War, must be struck by the extent to which thesimilarities and differences are not explained bydifferent doctrines, theories, "rules, " or ideas aboutescalation, but by the concrete similarities anddifferences in the surrounding contexts---military,international, and domestic---of the two wars.

42

Thus, a violent or semi-violent action intended by one

superpower to probe the other's resolve over acertain issue

in a crisis may, due to unintended consequences or

unforeseen developments unrelated to the action originally

taken, lead to a totally unplanned escalation of the

violence, which the first superpower may feel obliged to

respond to with a further escalation of the violence. This



dynamic need not necessarily be confined below the so-called

nuclear threshold, for part of the built-in deterrent that

is designed to bestow credibility upon the conventional

armed forces of the superpowers in limited war has been the

incorporation of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons.

It, therefore, seems clear that, in view of the absence

of fool-proof safeguards against the escalation of coercive

bargaining in crisis into limited war and, perhaps, even

further, the risk of nuclear war per se can be a very

credible component of superpower crisis bargaining. The

manipulation of this risk, then, is a central ingredient of

crisis as a mechanism for peaceful change.

This holds as much for Soviet-American crises in grey

areas, thatis, locales

ofdisputed

or uncertaininterest

symmetry, as it does for crises that take place in the more

traditional areas of superpower competition. To be sure,

the transfer of the superpower competition from Central

Europe to other regions of the world such as the Middle

East, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian/Arab Gulf

following the establishment of a strategic parity situation,

should have mitigated or eliminated the intensity of the

competition between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., thereby

allowing it to take place in a relatively low-risk

environment. This, however, did not happen. As the

competition was transferred to the Third World, the United

States and the Soviet Union became involved in the very kind

of bilateral confrontations each sought to avoid. A web of

client-patron relationships was established, and as clients

sought the, backing of their superpower patrons, for



instance, during client-state wars, the superpowers, driven

by their own compelling competition, often became drawn into

a cycle of escalation. The identification of the patron's

credibility and resolve with the fate of its client makes it

very difficult for each superpower to permit its protege in

a client-state war to be defeated at the hands of the other

superpower and its client(s). Thus, the stakes in Soviet-

American crises in grey areas can be such as to warrant the

very sorts of action which make the risk of escalation to

nuclear conflict a real one. As in other crises, this risk

can be credibly manipulated by the superpowers in order to

affect or prevent change in regions of the Third World. 43

Crisis and patron-client relationships

Crisis can be as useful a mechanism in affecting

important changes in the nature of a patron-client

relationship as it is in settling U. S. -Soviet disputes.

This is especially so in the case of crisis that involves

the client because in this type of crisis the relationship

of the client to its patron often becomes indispensable for

successful resolution of the crisis. In contrast, in

crises that mainly involve the patron, the latter's

relationship with the client will probably become but one

factor in a whole range of considerations.44

Client states generally lack the economic, political,

and military strength to withstand major reversals, and

client regimes often do not have the institutional depth to

absorb major political or security upheavals. A crisis

involving a client, therefore, often involves the client's

very survival. It, consequently, provides the superpower





Notes

1. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary

2. C. Bell, The Convention of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic

Management (Oxford University Press, London, Oxford, New

York, 1971), p. 9.

3. G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing, Conflict Among Nations:

Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in

International Crises (Princeton University Press, Princeton,

New Jersey, 1977), p. 6.

4. Ibid., p. 7.

5. Ibid.

6. This fact should not be taken to imply blame or guilt forthe party who thus initiates the conflict. Nor does it

necessarily mean that such a party is a revisionist power.It is possible that this party is reacting defensively to

earlier actions of others that may have been provocative.See C. Lockhart, Bargaining in International Conflicts

(Columbia University Press, New York, 1979), p. 139.7. G. H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining", International Crises:

Insights from Behavioural Research, ed. C. F. Hermann (The

Free Press, New York; Collier-Macmillan, London, 1972), pp.218-219.

8. Snyderand

Diesing,op. cit.

',pp.

14,15.9. Ibid., p. 16.10. The existence of an intolerable situation which threatens a

state and provokes it into issuing a challenge could alsocome about inadvertently. As Lockhart points out, "Nationsdrift into conflicts of interest inadvertently as well asconsciously challenging one another, and the 'initiation' ofa conflict... does not necessarily imply consciousmanipulation. Through adaptation nations inadvertentlyviolate the tolerance boundaries of other nations. And,

while conscious manipulative actions certainly occur, theyhold no monopoly on the initiation of international

conflicts. " See Lockhart, op. cit., p. 140.11. Snyder, op. cit., p. 219; Snyder and Diesing, op. cit., pp.

11,13.

12. Snyder and Diesing, ibid., p. 14; Snyder, ibid.13. Snyder and Diesing, ibid. Indeed, among the greatest

hazards in a crisis is the existence of rigid military planswhich create a "necessity" for action in certain

contingencies. Under these circumstances, although the

statesman may technically be in control of the conduct ofthe crisis, he may find it difficult to resist the

imperatives built into the plans, or the pressures from

military commanders to implement them. See Snyder, ibid.,p. 241.

14. Snyder and Diesing, ibid.

15. Snyder, op. cit., p. 241. Also see Snyder and Diesing,

ibid., p. 452.16. Snyder, ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 219. Also see Snyder and Diesing, ibid., pp. 18-

19.

18. Snyder, ibid.; Snyder and Diesing, ibid., p. 14.



19. Bell, op. cit., p. 12; Snyder and Diesing, ibid., p. 19.

20. U. Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern

World (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1970), p.

9.21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 10.23. J. N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention, " Journal ofInternational Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 2,1968, p. 167.

24. Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 83-96. Also see idem "Intervention:

The Historical Development II, " Intervention in

International Politics, ed. L. G. M. Jaquet (NetherlandsInstitute of International Affairs, The Hague, 1971), pp.31-32.

25. M. Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World:

Antinationalism and Intervention (Praeger Publishers, New

York, 1974), p. 2.

26. R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order

(Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1974),p. 13.

27. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.28. N. Matheson, The "Rules of the Game" of Superpower Military

Intervention in the Third World 1975-1980 (University Press

of America, Washington, 1982), pp. 9,10.29. Ibid. p. 9.30. Also see the definitions given in ibid., p. 6, and in Y.

Evron "Great Powers' Military Intervention in the MiddleEast, " Great Power Intervention in the Middle East, ed. M.Leitenberg and G. Sheffer (Pergamon Press, New York, 1979),

p.17.

31. The notion of distributive bargaining was first introducedby R. F. Walton and R. B. McKersie, A Behavioural Theory ofLabour Negotiations (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965).

32. The concept of redistributive bargaining was firstintroduced by F. C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (Harper andRow, New York, 1964), pp. 30-35.

33. Snyder and Diesing, op. cit., p. 23.34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., pp. 450,451.36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 450.

38. Ibid., pp. 451,453. Also see Snyder, op. cit. pp. 220,240,241, and R. E. Osgood and R. W. Tucker, Force. Order. andJustice (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967), pp. 125-126,

145.

39. Snyder, ibid., p. 220.

40. Schwarz (1970), op. cit., pp. 19-20; K. Goldmann, Tension

and Detente in Bipolar Europe (Esselte Stadium, Stockholm,

Sweden, 1974), pp. 187-188; H. M. Pachter, Collision Course:

The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexitence (Pall Mall Press,

London, 1963), pp. 129-130; K. Waltz, "The Politics ofPeace, " International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3,

September 1967, p. 202; P. Williams, Crisis Management:

Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (Martin

Robertson, London, 1976), p. 49.

41. Snyder, op. cit., pp. 241-242.42. R. Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Harvard University

Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977), p. 5. Also see pp.9,10,11,17.

43. Matheson, op. cit., p. 36; C. C. Shoemaker and J. Spanier,

47



Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in

the Nuclear Age (Praeger, New York, 1984), pp. 11,12,184;

J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories

of International Relation: A Comprehensive Survey, 2nd ed.(Harper and Row, New York, 1981), p. 327; J. L. Gaddis,

Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An

Interpretive History (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1978),

pp. 218,278; C. Holbraad, Superpowers and International

Conflict (Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke, 1979), p.124; R. Lowenthal, "The Diffusion of Power and the Control

of Force in a New International Order, " Adelphi Papers No.

134 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,

1977), p. 14.44. Shoemaker, Spanier, ibid., pp. 68,71.

45. Ibid., p. 71.

r"

. ,+ý; .

48



PAGENUMBERING

AS ORIGINAL



CHAPTER 3: THE CONTEXT OF INTERVENTION

The utility of crisis as a means of affecting peaceful

change does not make it synonymous with a breakdown of

social order. This holds at least as much for

international crisis as for any other type of crisis.

Indeed, international crises rarely, if ever, take place in

an anomic environment, that is, a state of affairs that is

free from tacit or explicit rules, norms, conventions, or

codes of conduct. It stands to reason that a crisis which

is highly structured by tacit or explicit rules is one whose

course is relatively easy to predict. Such a crisis,

therefore, entails a relatively low degree of uncertainty.

This robs it of much of its coercive potential and,

consequently, makes it least amenable to manipulation for

the purpose of instigating or preventing change.

Conversely, a crisis which is least constrained by rules is

one whose course is highly unpredictable. Crises of this

nature carry a high degree of uncertainty and thus a great

potential for manipulation as mechanisms for peaceful

change.

The rules which structure international crises tend to

be more time-specific and partner- and region-specific than

timeless or actor-universal. That is to say, whilst there

are obviously somelongstanding basic

rules that are

universally held by international actors, the rules that

most affect states in their ongoing relations tend to be

both time-specific in the sense that they are subject to

erosion over time with new developments and hence cannot be



relied upon to work effectively in new situations that may

arise, and area-specific in content and coverage.1 This

means that,in

the case of client-state war stimulated

superpower crises, three different types of rules are likely

to be prevalent: those shaping superpower interaction,

those determining the behaviour of the superpowers towards

the protagonists, and vice versa, and those governing the

conduct of the clients towards each other. The first two

types of these rules are closely inter-related in the sense

that the United States and the Soviet Union not only set the

rules which govern their mutual relationship, but also, by

tacit or explicit understanding or by mutual self-limitation

or restraint, establish the rules which shape their

responses toa client-state

war. It is these two

categories of rules which provide the focus of this chapter.

The fact that international rules are more likely to be

area-specific than universal means that the extent of

intervention in client-state wars which each superpower can

expect of the other will widely vary according to the region

in question. Thus, in regions in which either one or both

superpowers have very strong, if not vital, interests, the

pattern of U. S. -Soviet intervention is likely to be fairly

predictable and not conducive to superpower confrontation.

This is because, in such regions, there are likely to exist

relatively well-defined, if only tacit, rules which reflect

or even legitimize these interests. Conversely, in areas

of disputed or uncertain superpower interest symmetry, the

eruption of a client-state war almost invariably creates an

aura of intense uncertainty and suspicion on the part of



each superpower regarding the probable response of the other

to the conflict. This aura inevitably promotes a

propensity for intervention, as each of the United States

and the Soviet Union acts in anticipation of the other's

moves with a view to resolve the dispute or uncertainty

between itself and the other superpower over the regional

balance of interest in its own favour and thereby establish

a set of tacit rules of the game ascertaining and

legitimizing its regional interests and rights. That is

not to say that in these grey areas there are no rules which

regulate Soviet-American competition. Rules do exist but,

as this chapter endeavours to show, they tend to be very

basic in that they primarily seek to prevent U. S. -Soviet

competition from escalating to the point where one

superpower might try to affect a rapid and drastic change in

the regional status quo through direct intervention, rather

than to stymie the use of intervention as a means of crisis

manipulation. Such rules, as this chapter shows, can be

said to be at least conducive to the promotion of U. S. -

Soviet competition in areas of disputed or uncertain

interest symmetry.

The area-specific nature of most international rules,

particularly those pertaining to superpower crisis

behaviour, should not'be allowed to conceal the fact that

there are many more or less effective superpower rules of

various types that are of a universal application. To put

things in perspective, therefore, it seems helpful to start

by looking at the spectrum of Soviet-American rules.



The spectrum of superpower rules

The behaviour of the United States and the Soviet Union

in the international system is generally motivated by the

desire to secure or consolidate their respective politico-

strategic interests on the one hand, and constrained by a

complicated network of explicit and tacit rules and norms,

and by the need to preserve or modify certain mutually

shared expectations, a particular image, climate, or pattern

of behaviour, on the other. These constraints can all be

conveniently placed within the general category of

"international rules. " Such rules can then be classified

according to two principal criteria that can be used as the

basis upon which to formulate a typology of rules that goes

beyond the more common tendency of focusing on the problems

of description and identification of international rules.

These criteria are, firstly, the form of the rule and,

secondly, the degree of explicitness with which it was

communicated. Thus, at one end of the continuum are placed

binding written agreements, and at the other end are

positioned mutual restraints on behaviour that have been

arrived at by convergence of self-interests without having

been communicated in any way. In between, on a descending

scale of explicitness, are found non-binding, but still

written understandings; verbal gentlemen's agreements;

and tacit understandings, which are rules of conduct

signalled non-verbally.2

Rules that restrict in one way or the other the freedom

of a superpower to decide upon whether and how to intervene

in a client-state war may fall anywhere along this

I





being pulled into an unwanted direct confrontation is

highest and where, therefore, the need for clear and

explicit rules is greatest.

The absence of explicit rules, however, does not mean

that in this area of "residual freedom" which, it must be

emphasized, encompasses the vast majority of Soviet-American

interations, superpower behaviour is unrestrained. On the

contrary. 'The tacit understandings and mutual self-

limitations and restraints that guide the United States and

the Soviet Union in this area turn out to be far more

effective constraints than the more explicit rules enshrined

in legally binding agreements, non-binding written

understandings, and "gentlemen's" agreements. One reason

for this is that the area in which the superpowers cannot

agree on explicit rules by which to regulate their behaviour

tends to be that in which their activities could tip the

balance of power---and, consequently, entail an enormous

risk of direct confrontation---and, therefore, also tends to

be the area in which they behave most cautiously.

Another, more fundamental reason is inherent in- the

principle of reciprocity which applies to all bilateral

inter-state relations but which, as a result of the

overwhelming capabilities of the superpowers and the world-

wide nature of the arena within which they interact, assume

a particular centrality in the case of the Soviet-American

relationship. This principle provides the main channel

through which the implications of the way each superpower

behaves in a particular region reverberate to affect its

position in other regions. Thus, given that the balance of



Soviet-American interests varies from region to region, and

that in some areas the superpowere fiercely dispute or are

uncertain about the balance of their interests, the

principle of reciprocity can be said to act as the main

constraint against the formulation of universal rules of

superpower intervention and crisis manipulation. A

careful consideration of this principle is, therefore,

important in order to understand the region-specific nature

of superpower rules of crisis management.

The principle of reciprocity, that is, "the duty to

give in equal or equivalent measure what one takes, "5

is a fundamental tenet not only of international relations

but also of all social arenas that attain a high degree of

continuous interaction. It serves as a starting mechanism

which transforms random interaction into systemic patterns

and functions, once the system is set up, to reinforce

systemic stablity.6 A manifestation of this principle is

the notion that something one superpower has previously

asserted by word and/or deed tends to inhibit it from

preventing the other superpower from subsequently asserting

the same right. Thus,

when a nation speaks to explain why it is embarking ona course of action, it is ordinarily understood as tobe proposing a principle for future conduct orreinforcing an existing principle. Other states havea right to assume that the speaker knows and intendsthis level of his meaning and that he knows that thelistening states make this assumption. On this sharedmutual expectation rests the element of predictability

that prevents relations between states in the nuclearera, particularly the superpowers, from being chaoticand far more dangerous than they usually are.

7

Similarly, a move by one superpower tends both to encourage

and to free the other to behave likewise. Once this

principle achieves a high degree of ubiquity, that is, once



states begin to understand that what they undertake and the

precepts according to which they proceed to act amount to

offers to allow other states to conduct themselves

reciprocally, by reference to the same principles, systemic

development begins and behaviour becomes patterned and

predictable.8 By the same token, systemic transformation

takes place when a superpower explains its conduct by

principles that are inconsistent with those applied

previously in similar circumstances. This would mean that

henceforth the other superpower would expect to have

recourse to the same principles.9

The pervasiveness. of the norm of reciprocity in

international relations presents each superpower with a

serious dilemma over how to respond to the eruption of

client-state wars. This dilemma has been summarized by one

writer who, in reference to American strategy in regional

disputes, noted that

...the United States' basic objectives are: first, to

win each dispute with another country and, second, to

avoid war and develop a fair way of settling suchdisputes---objectives which are somewhat inconsistent.

While the United States would like to win each dispute,it is not seeking a world in which any one country winsevery dispute. Internationally, as well asdomestically, our government is simultaneouslyinterested in winning each case and in promoting... aregime in which the government does not always win.

10

In other words, what each superpower must keep in mind in

deciding on how to manipulate a crisis in one region is that

the rules of the gameof

internationalpolitics are subject

to change in accordance with the way each crisis has been

manipulated, and that such changes may significantly

influence the outcome of future crises. This, of course,

renders the development of general rules or norms of



intervention and crisis manipulation applicable to all areas

virtually impossible. Since the balance of U. S. -Soviet

interests varies quite considerably from one geographical

area to another, the development of such rules would imply

that each superpower must accept the outcome of a

competition in a particular area, no matter how unfavourable

that outcome might be. However, whilst observation of

general rules may be favourable or without serious cost in

some cases, in others it may be excessive. Therefore,

rules that may seem quite attractive to a superpower in an

area in which it has no significant interests might be

viewed as rather prejudicial if intended to apply equally to

competition in locales in which its vital interests are at

stake.11 Consequently, what the principle of reciprocity

in effect means is that one superpower must concede to the

other in a region in which the latter's interests are

relatively greater than those of itself, and that the rules

of the game in each region must, therefore, be such as to

favour the superpower whose interests in that region are

greater than those of the other, and that the one with the

lesser interests must recognize and respect this asymmetry.

This stipulation would pose few, if any, problems in

areas where the balance of Soviet-American interests is

fairly self-evident and where, therefore, norms or rules of

the game reflecting that balance are likely to be generally

observed by the superpowers. The problems are likely to

arise, however, in areas of low interest to the superpowers

and in regions where the balance of U. S. -Soviet interests is

far from clear. It is in these areas that the superpowers



are most likely to resort to intervention and crisis

manipulation in order to apportion their regional interests

and thereby facilitate the development of tacit or explicit

rules of the game which reflect the balance of their

regional interests. As will be seen, rather than being

totally rule-free, such regions exhibit tentative rules

which recognize the contentiousness or uncertainty of

Soviet-American interests, and facilitate the use of crisis

coercion for the purpose of ascertaining superpower regional

interests.

A typology of superpower competitive games

The geographical diversity of U. S. -Soviet interests,

and the consequent area-specific nature of superpower rules

of the game make it possible to typologize their global

rivalry into a number of competitive "games" that have

different structures, rules and, thus, varying logics or

implications for crisis manipulation. Indeed, up to six

different game structures that are imbedded in the overall

Soviet-American competition can be identified by taking into

consideration the magnitude and the symmetry or asymmetry of

relative superpower interests in various regions of the

world.12 To begin with, there are regions of high-interest

symmetry in which both the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. have very

strong or vital interests. The intensity of superpower

interests insituations of

this kind facilitatesthe

development and general observation of rules and norms which

recognize, if not legitimize, respective Soviet and American.

regional interests, and also proscribe the manipulation of

regional crises for the purpose of altering the



configuration of the territorial or political status quo.

For example, the approximate equality of Soviet and American

interests in Europe led to the drawing up by Western and

Soviet leaders during the final stages of World War II of

zones of occupation for their respective forces, and to the

establishment " of rules and procedures for collective

decision-making and joint administration of occupied

Germany. Although these were temporary measures intended

specifically to forestall crisis and possible war as Soviet

and Western forces raced to fill the power vacuum in Central

Europe once the Nazis were defeated, most of them eventually

took on a permanent form as the U. S. S. R. and the Western

powers failed in the immediate postwar period to reach

explicit and mutually acceptable arrangements for Europe and

Germany. Thus, through a process of tacit understanding

and mutual self-limitation, these once-temporary steps have

succeeded for over 40 years in preventing serious Soviet-

American encroachments upon each other's regional interests.

Diagonally opposite to the above type of region are

locales of low-interest symmetry, that is, regions in which

both superpowers have modest interests. Theoretically, it

stands to reason that situations of this kind should be

amenable to the development of tacit or explicit rules of

the game. Given that what is at stake for the United

States and the Soviet Union in these situations is

relatively modest, it should not be too difficult to arrive

at a set of rules or norms that strictly limits the

objectives and the means of their regional competition. In

reality, however, this has, not always been the case.





particular area than it does should, in accordance with the

norm of reciprocity, moderate the objectives it will pursue

in that area and/or the means it will utilize on their

behalf. Although the recognition of an existing asymmetry

in this way effectively proscribes intervention and crisis

manipulation by the superpowers in each other's spheres of

interest, it does not inhibit the superpower with the more

modest interests at stake from competing either on behalf of

less ambitious objectives or by using moderate, less risky

means. Hence the U. S. endeavours to undermine the Soviet

position in Eastern Europe through the fervent propaganda

campaign over human rights and its moral, if not political

and financial, support for such non- or anti-communist

organizations as Solidarity in Poland, and the Soviet

Union's support for Nicaragua and, indirectly, for the

guerilla movement in El Salvador.

In contrast to locales of pronounced interest

asymmetry, areas of disputed or uncertain interest symmetry

---grey areas---are theleast

conducive to thedevelopment

of stable superpower rules of behaviour. These are regions

either in which the superpowers do not agree on the relative

balance of their interests, such as the Middle East, or in

which one or both superpowers are uncertain of their own or

the other's interests and find it difficult to assess how

and to what extent their interests will become engaged in a

developing, unstable situation, as in Angola. The

contentiousness or ambiguity of Soviet and American

interests in regions of this type naturally prevents the

development of tacit or explicit rules of the game in view



of the lack of agreement between the two countries over the

balance of their regional interests which such rules should

reflect. This state of affairs can be illustrated by such

inconsistent traits of behaviour as Washington's

condemnation of Moscow's pursuit of unilateral advantage

militarily in Angola during 1975-1976 on the one hand, and

its own simultaneous quest for much the same thing

diplomatically in the Middle East following the October 1973

war.13

The absence of interest-safeguarding rules of the game

in these types of region manifests itself in one of the

principal features of this kind of situation, that is, the

existence of an atmosphere of unpredictability and

uncertainty during crises. Such an atmosphere is often

compounded by a degree of suspicion as each superpower tries

to gauge the interests and intentions of the other through

cautious probing. This, in turn, tends to inject into the

situation a strong element-of tension and hostility as each

superpower undertakes measures in response to, or in

anticipation of, what it thinks the other is or will be

doing, a process that may eventuate in confrontation.

Perhaps the best way of infusing some predictability

and certainty into this sort of situation and thereby

lessening the probability of confrontation is for the

superpowers to issue, by signalling and/or through

diplomatic channels, a clear, credible, and timely

clarification of their interests and intentions in grey

areas during periods of dispute. This, however, is

unlikely to occur or, if it does take place, to have the

desired effect, for two main reasons. First of all, there



is a reluctance on the part of the United States and the

Soviet Union to define and delimit their interests in grey

areas lest they "give away" such areas or encourage the

other side to proceed in endeavours to consolidate or

increase its influence by allowing it to assume that such

endeavours will not risk a strong response.14 Secondly, it

is sometimes very difficult, if not impossible, for a

superpower to define or anticipate the full extent of its

interests in a grey area, particularly if that area is one

of uncertain interest symmetry, prior to the escalation of a

conflict into a crisis. Frequently, only after a situation

has deteriorated to a certain point, for instance, as a

result of a major escalation as with the Soviet-assisted

Cuban intervention in Angola, do its wider implications for

a superpower---in this case the U. S. ---become clear, forcing

consideration of a strong response. This dilemma can

hardly be avoided by exhorting the superpowers to define

their interests in advance, for in many situations what is

atstake

forone superpower

increasessubstantially and

unpredictably as a consequence of actions by the other

superpower, its allies, or through internal developments

within a third area.15

Thus, the eruption of a local crisis in a grey area is

likely to generate a high level of suspicion, tension, and

hostility among the superpowers as each one tries to

anticipate the actions of the other with measures of its

own. The danger of collision through misperception,

miscommunication, or the accumulation of incremental

measures inherent in such a situation is very great and is



most likely to induce a great deal of caution in Soviet-

American strategic calculations. By the same token, it

imbues local crises with a tremendous potential which the

superpowers can manipulate for the purpose of establishing

the balance of their regional interests. Whether such

potential is likely to be actually manipulated by the

superpowers is a matter that is primarily determined by the

nature of this type of situation. As will be seen, viewed

from theperspective

of the rational actor model, theproper

decision for a superpower to take under these circumstances

of anxiety and mutual anticipation is to manipulate.

Intervention and the problems of strategic interaction

The eruption of a client-state war in a grey area poses

a serious dilemma for the superpowers in that the decisions

each of them has to make on whether and how to intervene

and thus manipulate the ensuing crisis to its own advantage

are likely to be influenced not only by the possible gains

it can make but also by the presence of strategic

interaction. This is a situation, typical of crises in,

areas of disputed or uncertain interest symmetry, where two

or more parties, in this case the U. S. and the U. S. S. R.,

...find themselves in a well-structured situation of

mutual impingement where each party must make a moveand where every possible move carries fatefulimplications for all of the parties. In this

situation, each player must influence his own decisionby his knowing that the other players are likely to

try to think out his decision in advance and may evenappreciate that he knows that this is likely. Courses

of actions or moves will then be made in the light ofone's thoughts about oneself.

16

Superpower decisions made under these conditions are

contingent upon their mutual assessment of several aspects



of each other's positions. In the case of a superpower

contemplating intervention in a client-state war, at least

five different aspects of the other superpower's position

need to be assessed.17 The first of these is its "moves"

or choice of action. A number of possibilities have to be

considered. Perhaps the most important of these are what

might be called prepared and begun moves, that is, those

choices of action that the other superpower has proposed and

to which it has started to commit its resources. Less

important are "decisions" or moves that the other superpower

has decided to undertake but has, so far, done nothing about

implementing.

A second aspect of the other superpower's position that

has to be considered is its "operational code. "18 This

refers to all those factors that will generally influence

its approach to a given conflict. Included among these

factors are the superpower's utility function or preference

pattern, that is, its ordering of goals and aims, and its

normative constraints, namely, the self-imposed conditions

on advancing its aims which its decision-makers are likely

to observe for a variety of reasons such as, for example,

moral sentiment or conscience.

A further consideration which must be taken into

account by a superpower before making a decision on whether

and how to intervene in a client-state war concerns the

other superpower's "resolve, " its determination to pursue

its regional objctives regardless of the price to itself.

"Resolve, " it should be noted, "is to be considered relative

to a particular game and is not solely a function of the

opponent's resoluteness, that is, his general tendency to



persevere or not in whatever game he is playing. "19

In addition to these considerations, there is also the

problem of finding out about the other superpower's

information state. This refers to the knowledge that the

other superpower may have about the important

characteristics of its own situation and of the first

superpower's. For instance, if the United States plans to

deceive the Soviet Union about a certain matter, it will be

important for Washingtonto

knowwhat the

Soviet leaders

suspect or expect since these beliefs will indicate the

lines along which they can be misled.

The fifth consideration for a superpower contemplating

intervention in a local war involves the assessment of its

own and the other superpower's resources, that is, all those

resources or capacities which the other will be able to draw

upon in its adaptations to the situation in question.

Acquisition of information by one superpower about

these aspects of the other superpower's position under

conditions of strategic interaction is a complicated affair

which is, however, a necessary but not sufficient condition

for making a strategic decision or move. As one writer has

pointed out, in strategic interaction, even if one actor (A)

knows the range of alternatives available to the other (B),

even if it had knowledge of B's preference pattern or

utility function, and even if it had information about the

probability distributions affecting B's choices and

attributable to nature rather than to the presence of

strategic interaction, it will still face a genuine dilemma.

The crucial problem, - Young says, is that B's choice of

65



action will be contingent upon its estimate of the actions

or choices of A which will, in turn, be contingent upon its

estimate of B's actions or choices.20 This leads to the

problem of recursion or "outguessing" regress:

[A] must come to terms with the fact that the

assessment he is trying to penetrate, namely, the onethat [B] is likely to make, will contain as one of itsfeatures the fact that [A] will try to penetrate it.Thus, [B] that [A] is trying to dope out is anotherthat is known to himself and to [A] as someone tryingto dope out [A] and someone whom [A] is trying to dope

out.21

Needless to say, such a complicated process is hardly likely

to produce accurate predictions or confident expectations

concerning the choices of either actor so long as the

relationship continues to be characterized, by the presence

of strategic interaction. In fact, as Young points out,

"if one or both of the participants did achieve accurate

predictions or confident expectations of the choices of the

other, the situation would (ipso facto) cease to be

characterized by the presence of strategic interaction. "22

,There are a number of possible ways by which

strategically inter-related actors can attempt to by-pass

the problem of recursion. 23 Some of these, however, such

as the negotiation of a settlement between or among the

actors, or the qualitative transformation of a given

strategic relationship via, for example, the introduction of

an outside actor or "third party" which can intervene in

such a way as to impose a settlement of the issues at stake

on the original particpants, are not feasible ways by which

the problem of recursion in superpower strategic

interaction, especially during international crises, can be

circumvented.



In theory, an actor confronted with a situation that

involves strategic interaction has the option of ignoring

this aspect of its choice problem by responding to the

situation as if its decision-making environment were fixed,

assigning specific values or expected values to the

alternatives it faces without reference to the impact of

other purposive actors on its decision problem. The use of

this procedure, it should be stressed, is likely to yield

acceptable results only if the effect of strategic

interactin on the actor's choice problem is negligible.

This, however, is unlikely to be so in the case of

superpower behaviour during client-state wars, where the

issues involved are of immense importance for, among other

things, each of the superpowers' prestige and perceived

security interests.

A third possible way by which actors involved in

strategic interaction can try to circumvent the problem of

recursion is to move or make their choices sequentially

rather than simultaneously or independently. This, for

instance, seems to be the case in tacit arms control

"agreements" where, initially, one power makes a single

unilateral gesture which is not followed up until it is

reciprocated by the other power. Sequential movement,

however, is unlikely to be made by the superpowers when

confronted with a potentially interventionary client-state

war. This is because in a conflict which is sufficiently

important for the superpowers to warrant serious

con$ideration of intervention, the costs to a superpower of

not making a "strategic move, " that is, a move that

influences the other superpower's choice in a manner

67



favourable to itself, 24may well outweight those of the

uncertain ties of recursion.

A further path through which strategically inter-

related actors can endeavour to avoid the problems of

recursion is that of collusion. In the case of the

superpowers confronted with a client-state war, there are

two conceivable situations where this could take place.

Firstly, there is the presently hypothetical case where a

local war erupts in which the belligerents possess and

threaten the use of, or even begin to use nuclear weapons.

A second and more conceivable instance where the U. S. and

the U. S. S. R. might collude during a potentially

interventionary client-state war is where they could satisfy

their own aspirations in the region in question at the

expense of another party, for example, China. There are,

however, very few instances where such collusion is possible

and, even where it is, it cannot, in the ultimate analysis,

resolve the problems of strategic interaction among the

United States and the Soviet Union because at some point

after they satisfy their own original aspirations they would

still have to confront the problem of "dividing the spoils"

amongst themselves. In certain circumstances this may lead

to externally-encouraged eruption of regional hostilities

where the superpowers would once again face the problems of

strategic interaction.

It thus seems clear that the problems of strategic

interaction are most unlikely to be by-passed where the

relevant issue of contention is of vital or high importance

to the strategically inter-related actors. Instead, these



problems would have to be managed and, given the

uncertainties and suspicions that go along with strategic

interaction, a relatively "safe" way by which one actor

involved in strategic interaction can do this is by

attempting to manipulate its decision-making environment.

In other words, one of the ways by which the moves of the

relevant other(s) can be made more predictable is to gain as

much leverage or influence over their behaviour as possible.

Ideally, this would enable an actor to gain complete control

over the behaviour of the relevant other, allowing it to

accurately predict their behaviour so that the problem of

strategic interaction would disappear so far as it is

concerned.25 The main method of gaining control over the

behaviour of others in a situation of strategic interaction

is to manipulate the information they use in their decision-

making processes. In this context, information would

consist of ""knowledge about all those factors (whether

intrinsic to the individual decision maker or aspects of his

decision-making environment) which affect the ability of an

individual tomake choices

in any given situation in such a

way as to maximize his ability. "26 There is a wide variety

of distinguishable tactics available to an actor to

manipulate information likely to be used in the decision-

making processes of those actors to which it is

strategically inter-related. However, as Young has pointed

out, "the effectiveness of any given tactic will be

influenced by the fact that the relevant other(s) may well

be attempting to manipulate the information of the first

[actor] at the same time. "27

Clearly then, management of the problems of strategic



interaction will only marginally reduce the uncertainties

emanating from that sort of situation. At the very best,

manipulation of the decision-making environment by an actor

will enable it to make more accurate predictions or to have

more confident expectations about the choices of the

relevant other(s) and, therefore, reduce the problems of

strategic interaction, but only if it is substantially more

competent in the art of manipulation than the actor(s) to

which it is strategically inter-related. Such substantial

asymmetry, however, does not and is not likely to exist

beween the United States and the Soviet Union. In view of

this, how are the superpowers likely to cope with the

dilemmas of whether and how to intervene in a client-state

war?

The rational solution to the intervention dilemma

The simple answer is that a superpower is likely to

choose the most rational option. But what is the most

rational option? Game theory provides two different

answers.

According to one version of game theory, that of

"chicken, " each of the superpowers has a choice between

two strategies. Firstly, it can choose not to intervene so

as to avoid the possibility of collision with the other

superpower but at the risk of a grave regional setback and

of harming its general images of resolve and credibility

should the other superpower decide to intervene.

Secondly, a superpower can choose to intervene and risk

collision with the other superpower. If both superpowers



Figure 1 The rationality of non-intervention:the game of "chicken"

United States

N

NI

-------------- --------------5 +10

k-50Soviet Union ------------' --------------

-10 -50

I

+10 50

Figure 2 The rationality of intervention:

"the prisoner's dilemma"

United States

N

Soviet Union

I

NI

-------_5-- ---------+20

-5 -20

-------------- ---------------20 -10

+20---------1

-ý --10-------------



decide to intervene, the result will be their collision.

If only one intervenes, it triumphs and the other loses.

Each superpowermakes a

"move" by deciding whethernor not

to intervene; but the outcome of the move depends not only

on that decision but also---and crucially---on the decision

taken by the other superpower.

The four possible outcomes of this game are shown in

Figure 1. In the first place, both superpowers may choose

not to intervene (N, N) and thereby avoid the risk of

collision but incur the costs of lost prestige and a

reputation for unreliability (-5, -5) among their regional

clients. Alternatively both superpowers may decide to

intervene (I, I) and risk collision (-50, -50). A third

outcome occurs where one superpower, the Soviet Union,

decides not to intervene while the other, the United States,

decides to intervene (N, I); in which case the former loses

in position, prestige, and reputation (-10) while the latter

enhances all three (+10). The fourth and final outcome is

the reverse of the third one (I, N): the Soviet Union

intervenes and thus enhances its position, prestige, and

reputation (+10) but the United States refrains from

intervening and, consequently, loses on all three counts

(-10).

The uncertainties of strategic interaction render each

of the superpowers unable to predict what the other plans to

do, hence each must choose in advance the best strategy and

act on it. In the game of "chicken, " this would be non-

intervention for both the United States and the Soviet Union

because, at best, if both superpowers refrain from



intervention, they will avoid collision (and the risks of

escalation and mutual annihilation) even though they will

both lose in prestige and reputation (-5, -5); and at worst,

if one intervenes the other will have avoided collision, but

it will suffer diminished prestige and reliability (+10,

-10). This choice of N for each superpower is unambiguously

rational, as long as for each of them the cost of double

intervention (-50, -50) is clearly greater than that of lost

reputation and prestige (-5 at best, -10 at worst), and as

long as the penalty for the outcome (I, I) is also clearly

greater than the temptation for each superpower to deceive

the other by encouraging non-intervention so as to

accomplish its disgrace and its own triumph.

Another version of game theory, however, that of the

"prisoner's dilemma, " which resembles interventionary

situations much more closely than does the game of

"chicken, " prescribes the opposite strategy. As in

"chicken, " in the "prisoner's dilemma, " each superpower has

two strategies from which to choose: it can either

intervene (I),or not

intervene M. The fourpossible

outcomes of the game are shown in Figure 2. Firstly, both

superpowers may refrain from intervention (N, N), and by

doing so avoid collision but also forego whatever tangible

and intangible gains either could have made had it

intervened and the other stayed out of the war (-5, -5).

Secondly, one of the superpowers, the Soviet Union, may

choose not to intervene, but the other, the United States,

intervenes (N, I) and, consequently, the U. S. S. R. loses in

prestige and may even be dislodged by its erstwhile client

whilst the Americans enhance their prestige and reputation



and consolidate their strategic position in the conflict

region (-20, +20). The third outcome occurs when the reverse

of this happens, with the Soviet Union intervening and the

United States not intervening (I, N) and, as a result, the

Soviets make political and strategic gains whilst the

Americans incur losses in one or both of these areas (+20,

-20). The fourth and final outcome takes place when both

superpowers decide to intervene (I, I), collide, and neither

makes gains at the expense of the other (-10, -10).

According to the "prisoners' dillema" version of game

theory, each superpower would know the pattern of possible

outcomes but, given the global politico-strategic

competition between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., and the gains

that one superpower could make should it intervene whilst

the other keeps out of the conflict, neither would be

tempted to communicate or co-ordinate its strategy with the

other. In this situation, the rational strategy for each

superpower to choose is intervention. This is because, at

best, intervention could lead to enormous political,

diplomatic, and strategic gains; and, at worst, collision,

which could take the form of a short, limited war. Non-

intervention, on the other hand, at best promises freedom

from the risk of collision and the costs of a limited war

and incurs intangible political and diplomatic losses for

both sides, and at worst, results in the political and

strategic triumph of one superpower and the eviction of the

other from the conflict region. So long as the superpowers

are under the conditions of strategic interaction, so long,

that is, as each superpower is uncertain as to how the other



will react to the client-state war, each in its own rational

self-interest must choose intervention, with its higher

benefits and lower costs. Accordingly, both superpowers

intervene and, since they are equally rational, they do so

simultaneously.

As in the game of "chicken, " the United States and the

Soviet Union would have been much better off if they had co-

ordinated their strategies and refrained from intervention.

However, in contrast to the game of "chicken, " the

superpowers in "prisoner's dilemma" do not opt for the non-

intervention strategy. This is because whilst in the game

of "chicken" it is rational not to intervene rather than to

intervene, for the cost of double intervention (-50) Is

clearly greater than the temptation to intervene in the hope

of making a gain should the other side not intervene (+10),

in "prisoner's dilemma" the penalty for not intervening when

the other superpower intervenes (-20) is clearly worse than

the cost of double intervention (-10), It seems rational,

therefore, to intervene.

As it may already seem clear, the "prisoner's dilemma"

is much more appropriate than the game of "chicken" to the

real world situation where the United States and the Soviet

Union have to face the dilemma of whether or not to

intervene in a client-state war. To begin with, each of the

superpowers could make Immense political, diplomatic, and

strategic gains by intervening in a local conflict. This

remains so whether or not double intervention occurs.

Moreover, the benefits accruing to either or both of the

superpowers do not necessarily have to be restricted to the

conflict region as happens, for example, when a superpower's



support for a client leads to the latter's triumph and, as a

consequence, to the enhancement of that superpower's

position amongst the client, its allies and sympathizers.

Depending on the interventionary strategy pursued by a

superpower, intervention could lead to adjustments in that

superpower's position, either physically in another part of

the world, as could happen, for instance, if it couples one

issue of contention with another and settles for a

compromise with the other superpower over the latter issue,

or intangibly by changing the other superpower's perception

of its resolve and general credibility.

The second reason for the appropriateness of the

"prisoner's dilemma" version of game theory to real

superpowerinterventionary politics is that the cost of

double intervention may not be all that high, at least

initially. Where intervention takes a non-physical form

such as threats backed, perhaps, by minatory diplomacy,

there would still be plenty of room for maneuver before it

could lead to a superpower collision. Moreover, collision

need not necessarily lead to mutual superpower annihilation.

As Kissinger once concluded,

granted the development of-a rational and appropriatedoctrine of foreign policy... a future war between the

superpowers [is] not unavoidable; furthermore,... evenif it were to come, it need not be all-destructive,... in fact a limited nuclear conflict [is]

possible.28

The rationality of intervention under conditions of

strategic interaction does not, however, necessarily imply

that where a superpower refrains from intervention in a

client-state war, or intervenes on a substantially lesser

scale than the other superpower, it has behaved



irrationally.

Non-intervention and asymmetrical intervention

The prescription of the rational actor model for

superpower intervention in client-state wars inevitably

oversimplifies matters in that it overlooks the role of

variables other than the possibility of political and/or

strategic gain and the anticipated behaviour of

the main adversary in forming a superpower's decision on

whether and how to intervene in a client-state war. A

fuller anlaysis of superpower interventionary behaviour in

grey area wars which will both explain the otherwise

perplexing phenomena of unilateral and asymmetrical

interventions and have a greater potential for prediction,

will thus have to take the principal among those other

variables into consideration. These generally fall into

what may be called the "crisis situation, "'29 and affect the

ability of a superpower to intervene. The crisis situation

of a particular client-state war can be described in terms

of two sets of variables: the systemic context and the

interventionary milieu. These establish the fundamental

structure of a client-state war stimulated superpower

crisis, and produce for each superpower an incentive

structure, that is, a set of values or payoffs; a set of

alternatives; and a set of initial images about the other's

incentive structure and alternatives. 30 Given that the

incentive structures of the superpowers, the choice of moves

which each of them can make, and the beliefs which each

superpower holds about the other's incentive structure and



choice of moves are outcomes of the systemic context and the

interventionary milieu, it follows that those two sets of

variables also define the rationality of superpower

intervention in a particular client-state war. Thus, a

decision that would seem irrational from the perspective of

the rational actor model, such as non-intervention, might

appear as perfectly rational once these additional variables

are also taken into account.

Thesystemic context of a crisis comprises a wide

range of variables which may strongly influence the nature,

course, and outcome of a crisis. In the foremost of these

are the general structure of the system, the international

distribution of influence of, and support for, the United

States and the Soviet Union, and the U. S. -Soviet strategi

balance. 31 Thus, a superpower contemplating intervention

in a client-state war will not only have to consider the

probable strategy of the other superpower, but also the

various international political and strategic constraints on

defining its interests in operational terms and in pursuing

those interests.

The interventionary milieu of a client-state war

stimulated superpower crisis basically defines the available

capabilities and viable strategies at the disposal of the

superpowers. It includes such variables as the recent

inter-superpower and superpower-client relations, the

superpowers' comparative valuation of the interests at

stake, their relative military capabilities and subjective

fears of war, and their pre-crisis commitments. Also

included in the interventionary milieu are such inter-

superpower asymmetries as geographical distance from the



crisis region, which patron-client group is trying to

instigate and which is trying to prevent *change in the

status quo, domestic constraints and the superpowers' pre-

crisis "image" of all these variables, including,

consequently, their reciprocal perceptions of each other's

"resolve. "32 A significant asymmetry in any of these

variables will place a superpower at a disadvantage in a

crisis involving the other superpower and will,

consequently, act as a constraint on its behaviour in the

crisis.

Clearly then, a superpower that suffers disadvantages

in capabilities and viable strategies, and in the ability to

define and pursue interests without being unduly hindered by

domestic and international constraints, will be reluctant to

intervene in a client-state war even if it has substantial

gains to make from such intervention and even if the other

superpower's unilateral intervention in the crisis will

place it at a further political and strategic disadvantage.

Hence the occurrence of asymmetrical and unilateral

superpower interventions in regions of disputed or uncertain

interest symmetry.

Putative "rules of the game" in grey areas

The highly fluid nature of superpower competition in

grey areas can be said to have given rise to a tacit

acceptance by the superpowers of the use of intervention for

the purpose of apportioning their interests in these

regions. Hence Kissinger's remark that what the U. S.

cannot ask the Soviet Union to do as "a great power that is

in many parts of the world operating competitively with



us... is to keep itself from taking advantage of situations

in which, for whatever reasons, we do not do what is

required to maintain the balance... "33 Or, he might have

added, to establish a balance. This state of affairs

bestows a character upon U. S. -Soviet competition in grey

areas that is significantly different from that of

superpower competition in other types of region. This

character can be distinguished by at least five features

that are typical of what one writer has called "controlled

competition. "34 In this kind of competition, the

superpowers:

1. Explicitly or tacitly agree to accept each other's

presence in the region, and recognize that each other's

efforts to further their own interests are unavoidable

and should be firmly resisted only if direct

intervention is used to accomplish a rapid and drastic

change in the balance of power of the region,

2. Tacitly accept rules of behaviour which circumscribe

the methods by which they might advance their

unilateral interest,

3. Explicitly or tacitly agree to set up mechanisms for

communication in order to guarantee a credible system

of mutual expectations,

4. Explicitly or tacitly agree to maintain a system of

"tolerance thresholds, " thepenetration of which would

result in uncontrolled escalation. The actual

thresholds are defined by a mixture of different

factors such as the relative ratio of power between the

U. S. and the U. S. S. R. at any given time, the degree to



which interests under threat are vital to each

superpower, and the perceptions of each about the

importance of these interests to the other side,

5. Degree of control over their mutual relations is

greater than that over relations between the local

actors on the one hand and the United States and the

Soviet Union on the other. At the same time, the

extent of control over the latter is greater than the

degree of control exerted by the superpowers over

relations between and among the regional actors

themselves. 35

These characteristics of superpower controlled competition

in areas of disputed or uncertain interest symmetry suggest

several rules ofbehaviour for the United States

andthe

Soviet Union in these regions:

1. Each superpower shall endeavour to advance its politcal

and military Influence.

2. Actions. on the part of each superpower short of direct

intervention aimed at expelling the other are

permissable, but local actors may be encouraged to

expel the other superpower from a position of influence

within their own territory.

3. Local clients of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. receive

diplomatic and economic support and military aid from

theirpatrons,

while each of the superpowers tries to

maintain some degree of control and supervision over

the the behaviour of its client(s).

4. In crisis situations involving domestic instability

within a local client, the superpower allied with the

legitimate regime is permitted greater freedom to



maneuver and flexibility to intervene militarily than

the other superpower. Its threats of direct

intervention also carry greater credibility.

5. Deterrence behaviour involving either actions or

threats by a superpower against a military action by a

regional actor whose objective is the complete defeat

of another regional actor or its regime will normally

be effective. Counter-threats by the other superpower

will carry less credibility. 36

These rules naturally reflect the contentious or

uncertain. nature of superpower interests in grey areas.

Whilst they seek to control the escalation potential

inherent in crisis manipulation, they also facilitate the

use of crisis coercion for the purpose of ascertaining

Soviet-American regional interests.

The existence of putative U. S. -Soviet "rules of the

game" in areas of disputed or uncertain interest symmetry

underlines the superpowers' recognition of the serious risks

involved in crisis manipulation in these locales. The fact

that these rules permit the exercise of crisis coercion,

however, emphasizes the importance attached by the

superpowers to political and/or territorial change in grey

areas. That the United States and the Soviet Union

continue to exhibit a willingness to risk a direct clash in

order to establish themselves in positions of predominance

in these areas testifies to the significance of extra-bloc

territorial and political change for superpower security in

the age of stable nuclear deterrence. It is to this

ostensibly paradoxical relationship that the next chapter



Notes

1. R. Cohen, "Rules of the Game in International Politics, "International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1980,

pp. 130-131; A. George, Managing U. S. -Soviet Rivalry:Problems of Crisis Prevention (Westview Press, Boulder,Colorado, 1983), pp. 377-378.

2. Cohen, ibid., p. 132. See also idem, InternationalPolitics: the Rules of the Game (Longman, London, 1981).

3. See M. Willrich and J. B. Rhinelander (eds. ), SALT: TheMoscow Agreements and Beyond (Free Press, New York, 1974),Appendix 3, pp. 309-312.

4. See, for instance, George, op. cit., pp. 368-369.

5. T. M. Franck and E. Weisband, Word Politics: Verbal StrategyAmong the Superpowers (Oxford University Press, New York,1971), p. 129.

6. A. W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A PreliminaryStatement, " American Sociological Review, Vol. 25,1960, pp.161-178.

7. Franck and Weisband, op. cit., p. 121.8. Ibid., p. 131.9. Ibid., p. 6.10. R. Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict, " International Conflict

and Behavioral Science: The CraiRville Papers, ed. R.

Fisher (Basic Books, New York, 1964), p. 94. Also see D.Pruitt, "An Analysis of Responsiveness Between Nations, "Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1962, p. 10.

11. George, op. cit., pp. 380-381.12. The resulting typology is borrowed from George, ibid., pp.

380-388.13. R. S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American

Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984), p. 84;George, op. cit., p. 385.

14. George, ibid., p. 387.

15. Ibid., p. 388.16. E. Goffman, Strategic Interaction (Basil Blackwell, Oxford,

1970), pp. 100-101.17. These are discussed in ibid., pp. 94-96, and the following

passages are based on that discussion.18. See A. George, et al., Change in the International System

(Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1980).19. Goffman, op. cit., p. 95.20. O. R. Young, "Strategic Interaction and Bargaining, "

Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation, ed. O. R. Young(University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, London,

1975), pp. 12-13.21. Goffman, op. cit., p. 99.22. Young, op. cit.23. See ibid., pp. 15-19.24. T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University

Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960), p. 160.25. Young, op. cit., p. 17.26. Ibid., p. 10.27. Ibid., p. 17.28. H. A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New



York, 1957). Quoted in A. B. Ulam, The Rivals: America andRussia Since World War II (The Viking Press, New York,1971), p. 283.

29. Compare and contrast with G. H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining, "

International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research,

ed. C. F. Hermann (Free Press, New York, 1972), p. 219.30. Ibid., pp. 219,221-222.31. Cf. ibid., pp. 219-220.32. Cf. ibid., p. 221.33. USIS Press Release, May 7,1975. The remark was made in a

television interview broadcast on May 5,1975. Quoted inLitwak, op. cit., p. 175.

34. Y. Evron, "Great Powers' Military Intervention in the MiddleEast, " Great Power Intervention in the Middle East, ed. M.Leitenberg and G. Sheffer (Pergamon Press, New York, 1979).

35. Cf. ibid., p. 22.36. Cf. ibid., p. 23. Also see Cohen, op. cit., pp. 144-145; N.

Matheson, The "Rules of the Game" of Superpower MilitaryIntervention in the Third World 1975-1980 (University Press

of America, Washington, 1982), pp. 65,99; O. R. Young,"Intermediaries and Interventionists: Third Parties in theMiddle East Crisis, " International Journal Vol. 23, Pt. 1,1971, pp. 59-60; R. E. Osgood and R. W. Tucker, Force, Order.

and Justice (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967), p. 149;J. M. McConnell, "The 'Rules of the Game"': A Theory and thePractice of Superpower Naval Diplomacy", Soviet Naval

Diplomacy, ed. B. Dismukes and J. McConnell (Pergamon Press,New York, 1979), pp. 249,276-277.



CHAPTER 4: INTERVENTION AND SUPERPOWER SECURITY

The persistence of Soviet and American intervention in

client-state wars is a phenomenon that is best understood

through a perspective of superpower security which can

explain the role of territorial and political change in the

strategic considerations of the United States and the Soviet

Union. The preoccupation of great powers with the

acquisition of territory and political influence abroad is,

of course, nothing new, and has in the past been motivated

by a variety of factors ranging from political prestige to

the safeguarding of the sources and routes of raw materials.

However, the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. have often intervened in

areas either where they had no obvious material interests at

stake or where the threat that may have been posed to

whatever interests they did have did not seem to warrant the

risk of jeopardizing their mutual relations through

intervention or the danger that such intervention might

escalate into a conflagration involving, perhaps, nuclear

weapons. What is even more intriguing is that, since the

possession by the two superpowers of a devastating arsenal

of nuclear weapons, and the immensity of the economic and

conventional military gap between these two countries and

any possible third states have seemingly rendered political

and territorial alignments of minor strategic consequence,

the United States and the Soviet Union have still seen it

fit to invoke reasons of national security to excuse their

Interventions in client-state wars. Indeed, the assumption

of an inextricable link between territorial and/or political





client has been able to confer a competitive advantage to

its own superpower patron over the other superpower through

the provision of important strategic assets. In return,

the client receives a host of "security transfers" that may

include weapons and military equipment, training, and

guarantees of direct assistance in the event of a threat to

its survival. The eruption of war involving clients of

this nature often provides sufficient cause for a superpower

to intervene either to protect for itself or to deny to, or

seize from, the other superpower important strategic assets

in the region in question through the manipulation of crisis.

However, Soviet and American intervention on behalf of

clients sometimes carries risks that seem totally out of

proportion with the geostrategic or any other visible

interests at stake for the superpowers. This is especially

so in the case of intervention in support of clients from

which the superpower patron derives minor or non-strategic

benefits such as international solidarity or ideological

support. The paradox in this is that, by manipulating the

risk of nuclear war in order to achieve certain strategic,

political, or ideological goals, the superpower which

intervenes on behalf of a protege in a client-state war,

logically, bestows upon these goals a value commensurable

with the cost of nuclear war by proceeding as if the defeat

of its client would have a serious influence on the future

conduct and, eventually, the outcome of its global

competition with the other superpower.' In strict military

terms, this is unlikely to be the case. The dominance of a

loyal client in a highly strategic area might confer its



superpower patron with an edge over the other superpower in

the event of a crisis or limited war between the U. S. and

the U. S. S. R. But, in the ultimate analysis, the

geographical configuration of whatever degree of direct or

indirect superpower hegemony would constitute only one of

several variables which could affect the outcome of any such

war or crisis. Of these, perhaps the most important is the

relative ability of each superpower to convince the other of

its willingness to escalate the confrontation, if necessary,

to the point of general war. As Schelling has pointed out,

contemporary issues of contention between East and West are

decided "not by who can bring the most force to bear in a

locality, or on a particular issue, but by who is eventually

willing to bring more force to bear or able to make it

appear that more is forthcoming. 2

This points to the other role of political and

territorial change in the strategic considerations of the

United States and the Soviet Union---that of an index to the

relative credibility and resolve of the superpowers. The

fateof a client

ina client-stage war and,

by implication,

the relative position of its superpower patron in the

region, is significant not only in geostrategic and

geopolitical terms, but also because it could have a strong

bearing on the resolve reputation and the credibility of the

superpower's commitments. In an age where the possession

by the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. of "overkill" capabilities,

together with the basic "uselessness" of nuclear weapons as

rational instruments of policy have rendered physical

comparisons of nuclear arsenals beyond the attainment of

second strike capabilities somewhat meaningless, assessment



of the credibility and the resolve aspects of a superpower's

character have become decisive in determining the strategic

balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The precise impact of the course of a client-state war on

each of the superpower's images of resolve and credibility

is likely to vary according to the region and the nature of

the patron-client relationships in question. That is to

say, it will depend primarily upon how the perceived

significance of the clients to the Soviet-American global

competition, the extent of their respective alignments to

the superpowers, and of the latter's commitments to them

compare to the relative parts played by the superpowers in

determining the outcome of the war. Thus, in locales where

the balance of U. S. -Soviet interests is tilted, the failure

of the superpower with the relatively greater interests to

prevent the defeat of a closely-aligned protege in a client-

state war would almost certainly adversely affect its image

of resolve and credibility in favour of the other

superpower. How adverse the effect would be, and how much

credit will go to the other superpower will depend upon,

among other things, the extent of the client's defeat and of

its own and the other superpower's intervention in the war.

However, the defeat of a client in a region where its

superpower patron has relatively minor interests would not

necessarily tarnish the latter's images of resolve and

credibility unless, of course, it had intervened extensively

on behalf of the client but was out-maneuvered by the other

superpower. This is because the expectation of superpower

intervention in client-state wars is something which depends



mainly on the calculation of the relative interests of the

superpowers at stake. In other words, the resolve or risk-

taking propensity of a superpower in a particular region is

principally a function of inter alia the balance of U. S. -

Soviet interests in that region.

The implication of this for the role of grey area

political and territorial change in the strategic

considerations of the superpowers is of crucial importance

for understanding Soviet and American crisis behaviour in

those areas. Both the United States and the Soviet Union

have been prone to taking extremely high risks in their

mutual endeavour to manipulate client-state wars to their

own advantage. Although this propensity for high risk-

taking could be more understandable in regions of high

interest symmetry, its occurrence in grey areas may seem

somewhat perplexing in view of the ambiguous nature of

superpower interests in those areas. However, it can be

argued that, whilst in regions where the balance of U. S. -

Soviet interests is disputed each superpower may feel

impelled to take high risk activities in order to safeguard

what it considers to be its vital interests, in locales of

uncertain interest symmetry the very ambiguity of superpower

interests may be sufficient to stimulate high risk-taking

because each superpower may feel that the danger of

escalation is less likely or more acceptable than any

residual doubt about its resolve that mayensue either from

inactivity or from a more cautious posture.

Clearly then, a perspective which poses the role of

political and territorial change in the formation of the

superpowers' images of resolve as the vital link between





strategic importance. The first of these characteristics

is the relative permanence of enemy and ally

identifications. In a multipolar system the comparative

fluidity and uncertainty on the part of a great power in the

identification of other states as friends or enemies meant

that a show of weakness towards a particular antagonist

would not necessarily be indicative of weakness towards all

possible opponents. Since, in this type of system, a

state's resolve in crisis or war is highly contingent upon

the degree to which its allies backed it, its previous

demonstrations of strength or weakness would not be very

reliable indices to its resoluteness. Under these

circumstances, rather than signifying general weakness,

concessions incrisis

or war which actually subtract from

the physical capability of a state through the transfer of

strategic territory to an opponent or the abandonment of a

client may be intended-simply as a prelude to realignment

with an erstwhile foe. 3 However, in the contemporary

system of bipolarity, the overwhelming predominance---at

least in the military field---of two powers, the United

States and the Soviet Union, coupled with the

ideological element in their global contest for influence

and their attachment to each other by a "hostility of

position, "4 rule out the sort of alignment that is

conceivable between the principal actors in a multipolar

system and, thus, make enemy and ally identifications

relatively permanent. Moreover, the existence of mutually,

albeit tacitly, recognized superpower spheres of influence

and the ubiquity of Soviet and American client-states

throughout the world serve to strengthen this perception of



permanence because relations between members of the two

adversary blocs tend to be generally defined by the

parameters set by the U. S. -Soviet competition. Since,

therefore, in this system the enemy of today is also likely

to be the enemy of the foreseeable future, current

superpower behaviour over certain issues carries great

significance for the expectation of future resolve over

other issues.

This prospect is furthered by another characteristic of

the bipolar system, the independence of superpower resolve

from the whims of allied support. In a multipolar system,

a show of weakness on the part of a principal actor can be

attributed to an intra-mural dispute or, as mentioned above,

may be part of a pre-realignment maneuvering, and does not,

therefore, necessarily indicate a general lack of

resoluteness on the part of the actor concerned. In

bipolarity, however, the contribution of alliance relations

to the capability and, therefore, to the resolve of the

principal actors in crisis or war is relatively peripheral.

Indeed, in this system, the superpowers need their allies

much less than the latter need them; an asymmetry that is

underlined by the fact that, unlike multipolarity,

realignment does not provide a realistic option for the main

allies. 5 Consequently, superpower behaviour. in crisis has a

direct bearing on assessment of the relative U. S. -Soviet

resolve; a demonstration of weakness by a superpower is

very likely to be taken as an index to its resoluteness.

Rather than being dependent on the vagaries of allies,

the resolve of the principal actors during crisis or war in



the present bipolar system is generally determined by

the "systemic context" and the "interventionary milieu" of

the conflict in question (see Chapter 3). Within these

categories, four different factors can be singled out as of

particular importance in the determination of United States

and Soviet resolve. The first of these is the perceived

global and, especially, the regional superpower balance of

forces. 6 Although, in theory, the attainment by the U. S.

and the U. S. S. R. of second strike capabilities should have

rendered any differential in their "overkill" capacities

irrelevant to their crisis bargaining power, in practice, it

seems that numerical superiority does constitute a

bargaining asset in crises and thereby acts to bolster the

superior power's resolve. Its value in this respect

appears to depend on how valuable decision makers believe it

to be and on their perception of how others, particularly

the adversary, believe it is. 7 However, it is, the regional

Soviet-American balance of forces which is of more direct

and greater significance in the formulation of superpower

resolve in crisis. Thus, United States local superiority

in conventional strength seems to have been strongly

related to its successes in the Cuban missile crisis, the

Quemoy-Matsu crisis, and the Syria-Jordan crisis of 1970.

Conversely, Western local inferiority in the Berlin crises

of 1948 and 1958-1961 contributed to Western bargaining

weakness, although, in the final analysis, it did not lead

to a Soviet triumph. 8

The second and third factors in the shaping of

superpower resolve determine their strength of motivation in

relation to different issues of contention and are thus





can be thought of as an inner drive for assertion. In the

case of the United States and the Soviet Union, it manifests

itself in the tenaciouspursuit of

competitiveadvantage.

This area of resolve is determined by such components of a

superpower's national psychic as its historical experience,

cultural proclivity, subjective fear of war, and operational

code.

One of the outcomes of the linkage of superpower images

of resolve to their crisis behaviour which has been

stimulated by the present bipolar system has been the

assumption by international relations of a competition in

risk taking characterized more by tests of nerves than by

contests of force. The particular shape that has been

taken by thiscompetition

hasnot only

distinguished it from

previous great power competitions but has also been a

principal hallmark of the postwar system of bipolarity.

Amongst the features of this competition, two have served to

promote the principal actors' images of resolve to a pivotal

place in the calculation of the U. S. -Soviet balance of

power. These are the longevity and the scope of the

superpower conflict. Unlike pre-war great power

competitions, the conflict between the United States and the

Soviet Union is both global and all-embracing. In previous

eras, competitions between great powers were generally

confinedin

scope andduration by their

relativelylimited

economic and, especially, military capabilities, by the need

to preserve alliances, and by the fluctuating nature of

alliance relationships. Above all, they were circumscribed

by the great powers' own comparatively limited security

interests. These usually ranged from their immediate



neighbours to the general balance of power throughout the

European continent, and in the case of the colonial empires

they sometimes also included certain overseas acquisitions

and their environs, sea lanes leading to them, strategic

points at straits, and so on. Even so, as already

mentioned, it rarely mattered whether a piece of territory

overseas was lost, gained, or exchanged for another. What

was important for great power security was, basically, the

"maintenance of a certain, relatively stable, balanced

status quo, its protection from disturbance by more

aggressive or expansionist units, and in exceptional

cases... a usually moderate revision of a status in regards

to the respective units. "12 This state of affairs

contrasts sharply with the present superpower conflict.

The United States and the Soviet Union, unlike great powers

of the past, can rely in their competition with each other

on their ability to muster a considerable amount of their

relatively immense economic resources towards this end.

The removal of this impediment to wider competition is

paralleled by the gigantic expansion of their military

machines, as manifested by their acquirement of invulnerable

nuclear capabilites and of conventional military forces able

to reach most parts of the world. Given that the

disappearance of these two constraints occurred almost

simultaneously as the international system was undergoing a

process of extension with the involvement of the whole world

and not Just Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union

in the system, one of its outcomes was to increase

considerably the superpowers' security interests. In



contrast to previous great power competitions, the U. S. and

the U. S. S. R. compete in an area spanning virtually the

entire globe which each regards as its "security area" and

in which whatever happened concerned its security

interest. 13 Consequently, it is seldom possible for one

party to take measures which it might deem necessary to

protect its security but which do not appear to the other

party as evidence of aggressive, hostile, or expansionist

intentions. Any influence or control that might be gained

by one party would be considered lost by the other. In

this way, the potential effect of events in any part of the

world on the power position of one superpower, especially if

these are related in some way to the activities of the other

superpower, tends to stimulate mutual superpower concern

about conflicts in all corners of the world, be it strife in

Ethiopia, conflict in south east Asia, or war in southern

Africa.

The main outcome of the prolongation and the extension

of the scope of the Soviet-American competition has thus

been the perception of this competition as a general global

confrontation or "supergame" in which specific crises are

linked episodes or "subgames. " As one writer has pointed

out, rather than being considered as an isolated event, each

issue or international incident in this supergame is seen,

and thus tends to become, part of a large total

confrontation, nation-to-nation; an integral component of

an overall contest between "freedom" and "communism, " or

between N. A. T. O. and the Warsaw Pact countries.14. In view

of the identification of the superpowers' images of resolve

to their crisis behaviour, this linkage of individual crises



to the overall Soviet-American confrontation has generated a

general disposition to extrapolate demonstrated strength or

irresolution on the part of a superpower from one situation

to another. In this way, the impact of the superpowers'

behaviour in one crisis on their relative bargaining power

in subsequent crises ultimately affects the outcome of the

supergame. Hence the notion of the "interdependence" or

"integrity" of superpower commitments which underlies such

commitments as those of the United States to the security of

places like Taiwan, West Berlin, and South Korea. As

Schelling summarized it, "[e]ssentially we tell the Soviets

that we have to react here because, if we do not, they would

not believe us when we say we will react there... "15

Thesimple,

fundamental logicunderlying

thisnotion

is

that the revelation of weakness by a superpower in a crisis

inevitably-stimulates the long-term " balance of resolve" to

tilt against it. As a result, the other superpower, in

anticipation of future irresolution, becomes, more willing to

challenge and stand firm in the next crisis. The first

superpower finds it more difficult to credibly communicate

determination the next time, and, in recognition of the

other's increased resolve, may be compelled to,, retreat once

more with further damage to its resolve image, and so on

through a sequence of losses. Alternatively, if at some

point the disadvantaged superpower is determined to stand

its ground, the over-confident opponent may precipitate war

by "miscalculation. "16

Amongst the ramifications of this dynamic, the one for

the stability or the balance of superpower deterrence is



undoubtedly the most important. The increase in the

significance of the "resolve"' in relation to the

"capabilities" component of the U. S.

-Soviet

balance of power

that has come about with the superimposition of nuclear

weapons on the bipolar structure of the international system

has meant that reciprocal superpower perceptions of resolve

to take risks have become more determining than physical

comparisons of nuclear stockpiles. In the words of Aron,

the balance of deterrence, or the capacity of the U. S. and

the U. S. S. R. to deter direct aggression or extreme

provocation

does not depend merely on the instruments which each ofthe players possess, but also on the move to resist,the willingness to run risks, the art of making peopletake an improbable threat seriously. Since deterrence

is a relation between two wills, the balance of

deterrence is a psycho-technological equilibrium. 17

Although in this equilibrium the equality or otherwise of

the instruments of deterrence can, to some extent, be

observed, the expectation of what will actually happen when

it comes to the test would be moulded largely by previous

patterns of behaviour.

The implication of the notion of interdependence of

commitments for the role of grey area political and/or

territorial change as an index to the relative credibility

and resolve of the superpowers may seem a little ambiguous.

The problem arises from the question of whether a

superpower's degree of resolve in crisis is related to the

more tangible stakes at issue, and, if it is, whether any

valid inferences can be made about its resoluteness from its

behaviour in crises in which it had different levels of

interest. On the one hand, it could be argued that the



United States and the Soviet Union regard their general

reputations for resolve as both much more important than,

and relatively independent of, their more tactual interest

at stake; that is, that the game of "balance of resolve"

is very much an autonomous game. Thus, "weakness is

weakness"; retreating on any issue will reinforce the

opponent's expectation that one will yield on other issues

regardless of the degree of intrinsic interest involved. 18

However, whilst statesmen may indeed feel anxious about

the possible effect on their resolve of yielding in any

crisis, it seems somewhat more plausible to argue that the

extent of a superpower's commitment and, therefore, its

resolve in a particular crisis will depend on the value of

its "interests" at stake, and that the intensity of these

interests will vary across issues. It is doubtful, for

example, if the U. S. would be as committed in a crisis

involving Somalia or Zaire as it would in ones in which the

survival of Israel or South Korea was at stake. The

leaders of each superpower, it seems legitimate to assume,

perceive those of the other as having a hierarchy of

interests, ranging from the vital, through the moderately

important, to the peripheral. If such perceptions are

confidently held, then the logic of the balance of resolve

thesis becomes more complex. Under these circumstances, a

superpower which yielded on one issue would be expected to

retreat again when confronted with a similar level of risk

on issues at the same level or lower in its hierarchy of

interests. Nevertheless, no reliable inferences could

therefrom be made about its probable resolve on interests

which are perceived as of greater importance to it.





extent of the other superpower's involvement: the greater

the latter's involvement, the more apt would be the first to

stand its ground in order to protect its reputation.

Unless, of course, both superpowers decide to de-escalate,

or disengage from the crisis simultaneously. In either

type of grey area, therefore, a demonstration of weakness in

crisis on the part of a superpower is more likely than not

to have an adverse impact on its general image of resolve,

especially if the crisis ends with the defeat of a close

protege.

The erosion of bipolarity: implication for the "balance of

resolve" thesis

The globalization of the scope of the Soviet-American

competition and the consequent assumption by international

politics of a zero-sum character are, perhaps, the most

glaring manifestations of the "tight" bipolar structure

which crystallized in the wake of World War II. This

structure, however, has been undergoing a gradual process of

erosion, as evidenced by, for example, the decline in the

superpowers' hegemony over their respective alliances, the

proliferation of non-aligned states,the appearance of new

issues to change the East-West focus of international

affairs, and the emergence of new actors to diminish the

importance of nation-states in the international system.20

Consequently, it might seem that the "balance of resolve"

thesis has also become restricted in its application in

that, as the world becomes increasingly depolarized,

political and territorial change outside the formal East-

West alliance blocs can occur without affecting either of

103+.



the superpowers' image of resolve.

Although the bipolar structure of the international

system has indeed witnessed some erosion and could be more

accurately described as a "loose" bipolar system, this does

not alter the relevance of the balance of resolve thesis.

This is basically because the erosion of bipolarity has not

reduced the world-wide nature of the scope of the Soviet-

American security area. Nor has it altered the fact that

the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. still retain military power on a

scale vastly disproportionate to that of all other units in

the international system, and that most other significant

military actors are in some critical way militarily reliant'

on one or the other of them. 21 The fact is that each

superpower is as concerned now as at any other time in the

postwar era with the impact on its resolve image of

territorial and/or political gains which the other might

make at the expense of itself, especially if such gain takes

place in spite of its own efforts. Hence, for example,

President Ford's claim in 1976 that American acceptance of

Soviet-assisted Cuban intervention in Angola "will send a

message of irresolution not only to the leaders of African

nations but also to the United States allies and friends

throughout the world. "22 Thus, the impact of territorial

and/or political change on the "overarching stability" is

not solely a function of whether such change takes the form

of a transfer from one superpower's system to that of the

other. Extra-bloc changes could also affect this stability

through their impact on perceptions of the balance of

resolve. Indeed, there would seem to be little chance of

104



escape from the association of such change with this

balance: whether it occurs at the instigation of one

superpower and in spite of the efforts of the other or

whether it takes place without a Soviet-American struggle,

it would almost certainly adversely affect the resolve image

of the non-benefitting superpower. Because the security

boundary of the United States and the Soviet Union is

generally perceived to encapsulate virtually the entire

globe, any attempt by one superpower to make unilateral

advantage at the expense of the other is likely to be

perceived as a challenge and expected to be met with at

least equal vigour by the other superpower, or else the

latter's image of resolve would suffer. Even in the case

of spontaneous change, that is, change which stems from, and

is generally understood by others in terms of, local

conditions rather than the dominant power and resolve of one

superpower or the other, the association with the balance of

Soviet-American resolve has become an increasingly recurrent

feature of international affairs.23 This is mainly

because, in their mutual endeavour to manipulate

developments in many corners of the world, the superpowers,

particularly the United States, have frequently resorted to

the tactic of linking these developments to their own

security interests. As Jervis has pointed out, the extent

to which, in the past,

the outcome of struggles in the Thirld World has beentaken for indices of American resolve has been

increased bythe

Americanstatements coupling theseevents, and the superpowers' behaviour concerning them,

to other events in the Third World and even to how the

superpowers would react in other areas of conflict.24

105



The interdependence of superpower commitments and the

linkage of centre-periphery stability

This tendency is most evident in the concern of

successive U. S. administrations over the impact of

instability at the outline of the American security area on

the stability of the core, or, in other words, on the

general credibility and the resolve reputations of the

United States. Such instability has been basically

associated with and/or assumed to favour the Soviet Union.

Thus, in introducing what became known as the Truman

Doctrine, which heralded the beginning of the United States'

"containment" policy, President Truman stressed the

essentiality for U. S. survival of maintaining a world based

on the Western political and economic model, and warned that

to permit the spread of the Soviet model to other countries

to go on unchecked would "undermine the foundations of

international peace and hence the security of the United

States. "25 The same theme had underlain the Eisenhower

Administration's more assertive policies of "liberation" and

"massive retaliation. " Whilst accepting the Truman

Doctrine's belief in the intertwinement of centre-periphery

stability, Eisenhower and Dulles feared that the basically

reactive nature of containment would saddle the U. S. with

organising resistance on all fronts26 and eventually lead to

"grave budgetary, economic, and social consequences, "27 as

underlined by the Korean war. In their view, what was

needed was a more positive policy which would both give the

strategic initiative to the West and also allow it, in the

event of aggression, "to retaliate instantly, by means and

106



at places of [its] own choosing, " thereby producing "maximum

protection at bearable cost. "28 Consequently, they

advocated the doctrine of massive retaliation, and opted for

a policy of expansion which, though designed to "roll back"

the U. S. S. R. from its newly acquired satellites in Eastern

Europe, 29 found concrete expression in the Third World.

Therein it took the form of covert operations to overthrow

governments suspected of promoting, intentionally or

otherwise,what

the Americans claimed to be the Interests of

"international communism; "30 of vigorous efforts in support

of anti-communist regimes; and, most importantly, of

attempts to establish a world-wide network of N. A. T. O. -style

multilateral defence pacts aimed at safeguarding clients

against external and domestic revolution.31 The presumed

link between the security of the United States and that of

its clients was most evident in the words of the Esienhower

doctrine of 1957. This, in effect, declared that the U. S.

considered the existence of pro-Western regimes in the

Middle East vital to American security, and that it was

prepared to directly intervene to protect such regimes from

internalor external

threats inspired by oremanating

from

"any country controlled by international Communism, " a term

which included states with close bonds to the U. S. S. R. 32

It was, nevertheless, during the Nixon era that the

linkage of centre-periphery stability received its most

forceful expression in the views and efforts of the

Presidentand

his National Security Adviser-come-Secretary

of State, Henry Kissinger. As Nixon himself reaffirmed in

reference to his Administration's view of the importance of

107



Vietnam in terms of the impact of peripheral developments on

the centre and the maintenance of U. S. stability,

In the event that one country like North Vietnam,

massively assisted with the most modern technicalweapons by two Communist superpowers... is able toinvade another country and conquer it, you can see how

the pattern would be repeated in other countriesthroughout the world---in the Mideast, in Europe, andin others as well. If, on the other hand, that kind

of aggression is stopped in Vietnam and fails there,

then it will be discouraged in other parts of the

world. Putting it quite directly then, what is online in Vietnam is not just peace for Vietnam, but

peace in the Mideast, peace in Europe, and peace notjust for the years immediately ahead of us, but

possibly for a long time in the future... What is reallyon the line here... is the position of the United

States... as the strongest free world power, as a

constructive force for peace in the world.33

Underlying this new emphasis on the link between the

stability of the periphery and centre was the

Administration's continuing and overriding preoccupation

with the credibility and resolve image of the United States.

These were considered as vital prerequisites to the

implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. This sought the

preservation of centre-periphery stability through the

maintenance of global and regional balances of power which,

in turn, were to form the basis of the "emerging structure

of peace. "34 Conceived mainly in reaction to the over-

extension of the previous two decades and the failure of

direct intervention in Vietnam, this Doctrine upheld both

the long-standing global perspective to problems, such as

political change in the Third World which was seen in terms

of competition with the Soviet Union, and the established

view that instability in client regimes favoured the

U. S. S. R. 35 However, whilst not ruling out the options of

indirect and, as a last resort, direct U. S. intervention to

maintain commitments to local clients, it advocated a two-

108 5





Most importantly, the U. S. S. R. had to be certain of the

penalty for encouraging or taking advantage of instabilities

at the periphery.

A series of events which included the communist

victories in Cambodia and Vietnam, the Soviet and allied

interventions in the Ethio-Somali war, the Soviet-assisted

Cuban intervention in Angola, the fall of the Shah in Iran,

and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan inevitably cast

doubt on the efficacy of the Nixon Doctrine and led to the

resumption by the United States of a more direct

responsibility for the stability of the periphery. This

shift was manifested in two ways. The first of these took

the form of the establishment of the so-called "Rapid

Deployment Force" during the latter period of the Carter

Administration, and the creation of a string of staging

posts in countries such as Egypt, Kenya, Bahrein, Somalia,

and the United Arab Emirates to enable this Force to quickly

respond to instability which threatened U. S. interests in

the Middle East. The second arm of the new, more direct

posture consisted of both overt and covert action aimed at

ousting governments which allegedly promoted instability at

the periphery and replacing them with pro-American client-

regimes. It also consisted of intervening in civil

conflicts in order to determine the outcome of such wars in

America's favour. Hence the abortive attempt to subvert

the radical regime of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, 37 the

incessant economic and military pressure employed by the

Reagan administration in an effort to destabilize the

Gaddafi regime in Libya, the covert aid extended to rebels

fighting Angola's left wing government,38

and the

110



interventions in the Chadian and Lebanese civil wars.

The relative paucity of Soviet clients or even of

potentiallySoviet-inclined

regimes outsideEastern Europe

has meant that the notion of centre-periphery stability

constituted less of a preoccupation for the Soviet Union

than it has for the United States. In any case, until

quite recently, there was relatively little that the

U. S. S. R. could do in order to credibly safeguard its resolve

image on the periphery of its security area. For whilst it

has competed globally with the United States since 1945 and

has indirectly intervened on behalf of threatened clients

since at least the mid-1950's, it was only in the 1970's

that it actually acquired the means to project military

power at long distance outside its own surroundings.

Consequently, it is arguable that the U. S. S. R., which has

for long before claimed to be a superpower of equal weight

to the United States, suffers a disadvantage in'the balance

of resolve with that country due to its inability or

unwillingness to live up to its claim by coming to the aid

of important clients. This has repeatedly been the case in

the Middle East, an area of major strategic importance to

the Soviet Union as well as to the United States but where,

in contrast, the latter's commitments to its own clients has

carried much greater credibility.39

Nevertheless, the U. S. S. R. has exhibited an increasing

proclivity to defend its commitments and to consolidate its

position at the periphery. This has been demonstrated by

its much firmer support for Egypt and Syria during the 1973

war with Israel, its decisive backing for the M. P. L. A. in

111



their war against the F. N. L. A. and U. N. I. T. A. who were being

aided covertly by the American C. I. A. and directly by South

African troops, 40 its co-optation of Ethiopia and its

subsequent intervention on behalf of that country during its

war with Somalia, and its intervention in support of its

beleaguered client-regime in Afghanistan. Indeed, Soviet

concern over the stability of its periphery was evident, in

the Kremlin's hope that detente would usher the recognition

and enactment in international documents of "a kind of code

of rules for honest and fair relations between countries,

which erect a legal and a moral and political barrier in the

way of those given to military. gambles...,41 It was also

evident from its disenchantment with the United States'

efforts to use detente as a lever to prevent the Soviet

Union from coming to the aid of its clients abroad, a

practice which the U. S. for long claimed to be vital for its

general credibility and resolve images. Washington's double

standards in this respect were unambiguously proven. For

although it had made it clear on a large number of occasions

that it "will resist any attempt to exploit a policy of

detente to weaken our alliances, " and "will react if

relaxation of tension is used as a cover to exacerbate local

conflicts in international trouble spots, " 42 it had few

qualms during its 1974 "incursion" into Cambodia about

warning the U. S. S. R. and China against linking U. S.

behaviour in that country with the development of bilateral

relations. 43 Hence Ponomarev's comment that "the

policy of 'antidetente' and neocolonialist revenge are

profoundly interlinked. "44 The problem for the U. S. S. R.

112



was that whilst it could certainly couple American behaviour

at the periphery to bilateral relations, such a strategy

would be unlikelyto have the desired

effectof restraining

the United States. This is because the American conception

of detente as a lever with which to moderate Soviet

activities and thereby, theoretically, safeguard the

stability of the U. S. periphery had been underlain by the

uneven and irregular nature of the development of Soviet

power. The United States had thus hoped to achieve its

ends through the adroit exploitation of the asymmetries

which existed between the two countries. By the same

token, however, the reverse was not possible for the Soviet

Union. For whereas the United States, despite its major

political and psychologicalsetback in south east Asia,

retained an impressive panoply of power, the U. S. S. R. 's

status as a superpower was based almost completely on its

military capability.45

The passing of detente amid mutual Soviet-American

recriminations, as each power sought to blame the other for

its demise, is perhaps the best illustration of the

persistence of bipolarity and the relevance of political

and/or territorial change for superpower security in the

nuclear ages. The failure of detente and the oncoming of

the "Second Cold War" have often been attributed to the

"aggressive" or interventionist turn taken by Soviet foreign

policy during the 1970's. Indeed, the growth of Soviet

power during this period was accompanied by an unprecedented

degree of assertiveness as the U. S. S. R. acquired the means

to preserve and consolidate the stability of its periphery,



in much the same way as the United States has been doing

since 1945. Thus, the course followed by the Soviet Union

at the outline of its security area during the 1970's can,

in many respects, be described as a "mirror image" of the

one pursued by the U. S. throughout the postwar period. The

fact that Washington found this similarity to its own

behaviour so objectionable does not so much illustrate its

hypocrisy as it demonstrates the supergame nature of the

Soviet-American global rivalry and the continued relevance

of the balance of resolve thesis within it.



Notes

1. R. Aron, Peace and War: A theory of International

Relations, trans. R. Howard and A. B. Fox (Weidenfeld and

Nicolson, London, 1966), pp. 779-780.

2. T. C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press,

New Haven and London, 1966), p. 94.

3. G. H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining, " International Crises:

Insights from Behavioral Research, ed. C. F. Hermann (Free

Press, New York, 1972), p. 233.

4. Aron, op. cit., p. 544.

5. Snyder, op. cit., pp. 220-221.

6. J. M. McConnell, "The 'Rules of the Game': A Theory on the

Practice of Superpower Naval Diplomacy, " Soviet Naval

Diplomacy, ed. B. Dismukes and J. McConnell (Pergamon Press,

New York, 1979), p. 242.

7. G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing, Conflict Among Nations:

Bargaining, Decision Making. and System Structure in

International Crises (Princeton University Press, Princeton,

New Jersey, 1977), p. 462.

8. Ibid., p. 458.

9. McConnell, op. cit., p. 245.

10. Ibid., pp. 245,248-249.

11. Ibid., p. 244.12. I. H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age

(Columbia University Press, New York, 1959), pp. 238-239.

13. Ibid., pp. 239-240.

14. R. Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict, " International Conflict

and Behavioral Science: The Craigville Papers ed. idem

(Basic Books, New York, 1964), pp. 91-92.

15. Schelling, op. cit., pp. 55,56. Also see Aron, op. cit., p.

774; J. L. Payne, The American Threat: the Fear of War as

an Instrument of Foreign Policy (Markham Publishing Company,

Chicago, 1970), esp. p. 127; T. M. Franck and E. Weisband,

Word Politics:Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers

(Oxford University Press, New York, 1971), esp. p. 120.

16. Snyder, op cit., p. 232. Also see O. R. Young, The Politics

of Force: Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton

University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1968) pp. 25,35.

17. Aron, op. cit., p. 681. Also see Schelling, op. cit., pp.

55,56; R. E. Osgood and R. W. Tucker, Force. Order, and

Justice (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967), p. 148; Y.

Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace (Ma'arachot, Tel

Aviv, 1964), pp. 9-40. "18. Snyder, op. cit., p. 232.

19.Ibid.

20. L. T. Caldwell, "The Future of Soviet-American Relations, "

Soviet-American Relations in the 1980's: Superpower

Politics and East-West Trade, L. T. Caldwell and W. Diebold

Jr. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1981), pp. 24-25.

21. Ibid., p. 25.

22. Quoted in N. Matheson, The "Rules of the Game" of Superpower

Military Intervention in the Third World 1975-1980

(University Press of America, Washington, 1982), p. 67.

23. cf. R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, multipolarity, and the



future, " The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X, 1966,

pp. 314-327, esp. p. 316.

24. R. Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations

(Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970),

p. 247.25. Quoted in J. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World

War II, 8th ed. (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), p. 28.Also see Z. Brzezinski, "How the Cold War was Played, "Foreign Affairs, October 1972, pp. 184-187; R. S. Litwak,Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy andthe Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976 (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 1984), pp. 11-14; J. L. Gaddis, Russia.the Soviet Union and the United States: An InterpretiveHistory (John Wiley, New York, 1978), pp. 180-188; A.Rapoport, The Big Two: Soviet-American Perceptions of

Foreign Policy (Pegasus, New York, 1971), pp. 9-10,84;A. B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World WarII (The Viking Press, New York, 1971), p. 114.

26. Gaddis, ibid., p. 209.27. Ulam, op. cit., p. 211.28. Gaddis, op. cit., p. 209.29. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 187.30. The U. S. endeavoured, through the Central Intelligence

Agency, at least four major covert operations againstforeign regimes during the Eisenhower Administration.These were the successful overthrow of Premier Mohamed

Mossaddeq in Iran in August 1953; the ousting of PresidentJacobo Arbenz's left-wing regime in Guatemala in June 1954;

an unsuccessful effort to undermine the government ofPresident Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958; and the abortive

attempt to concoct a rebellion against Fidel Castro's

revolutionary government in Cuba, planned during the final

months of Eisenhower's term, but actually executed in April1961, three months into the Kennedy Administration. See

Geddis, op. cit., p. 219.31. Ibid., p. 218. This network of pacts comprised the South

East Asia Treaty of 1954, the Formosa Treaty of 1955, and

the Baghdad Pact, with which the U. S. was closelyassociated. By 1958, the Americans had taken on explicitobligations to defend some 43 countries against attack.Ibid., p. 221.

32. Spanier, op. cit., p. 87.33. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 8, No. 19

(April 30,1972), pp. 810-811. Quoted in Litwak, op. cit.,

pp. 106-107.34. Litwak, ibid., pp. 95-96.35. Matheson, op. cit., pp. 37-38.36. Litwak, op. cit., p. 96.

37. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXI, September 1985,p. 33829.

38. See, for example, The Guardian, February 2,1987.39. Compare, for instance the absence of Soviet support for the

Arats during the 1967 war, a war for which the Kremlin is atleast partly responsible, with the U. S. ' open commitment toIsrael, its direct intervention on behalf of Jordan duringthe latter's conflagration with Syria in 1971, and its othersubstantial commitments to the conservative regimes of theArabian Peninsula.



40. The U. S. had provided these groups with at least $32 million

in covert aid before the Soviet-assisted Cuban intervention

on behalf of the M. P. L. A. even took place. See D. K. Simes,

"Detente. Russian Style, " Foreign Policy No. 32,1978, p.

52.41. Brezhne v at the 60th Anniver sary of the October

1977. Quoted i n Matheson, op. cit., p. 50.

42. Henry Kissinger, Department of State Bulletin,

Quoted in ibid., p. 39.43. Litwak, op. cit., p. 105.

44. Quoted in Mathes on, op. cit., p. 50.

45. Litwak, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

Revolution,

1973, p. 528.

117



PART II;

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS



SECTION A;

ASSYMETRICAL INTERVENTION;

THE KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

Until the outbreak of hostilities in the summer of

1950, the Korean peninsula could have been cited as a

classical example of an area of uncertain superpower

interest symmetry. Despite its proximity to the Soviet

naval port of Vladivostok, its location at the command of

the main passages linking the Sea of Japan to the Pacific

Ocean, and its closeness to Japan and China, it seems to

have been discounted by American policy makers as a valuable

asset in the politico-strategic competition between the

superpowers. Indeed, the United States' modest valuation

of its own and perhaps even the Soviet Union's interests in

Korea is borne out by the improvised and hurried way with

which it set about drawing a demarcation line to define

Soviet and American spheres of occupation in Korea, and by

its belated and hitherto unplanned occupation of the

southern portion of the peninsula which took place almost

one month after Soviet troops had occupied most of northern

Korea.

However, the eruption of war on June 25,1950, suddenly

transformed the status of Korea, as far as the United

States' assessment of its secondary interests in South Korea

were concerned. During the period preceding the outbreak

of hostilities, American decision makers seemed hardly

anxious about the possibility that their pronounced lack of

interest in that country might actually encourage the Soviet



Union to attempt, through its North Korean client, to

consolidate or increase its influence on the Korean

peninsula. Nevertheless, the outstanding progress made by

the advancing North Korean forces and the prospect of South

Korea being totally overrun by the armed forces of a Soviet

client generated acute fears within American circles

regarding the possible impact on the United States'

credibility and resolve images, and thus rapidlyand

substantially increased the stakes for the U. S. and led to

its intervention in the war, in a sequence that has since

become typical of the way the superpowers respond to crises

in areas of low or uncertain Soviet-American interest

symmetry. As the North Korean offensive began to collapse

in the face of American might, the United States, impelled

by a variety of factors ranging from the momentum of its

military success to domestic political pressures, began to

commit itself to the elimination of the communist regime in

North Korea and the forcible re-unification of the peninsula

under the auspices of'the United Nations. In the event,

the intervention of China managed to save North Korea as a

political entity and to confine American forces below the

38th Parallel, which divided Korea into two states. Their

presence there ever since has become a symbol of the

increased stature of South Korea in the strategic assessment

of the United States.

The proximity of the Korean peninsula to the U. S. S. R.,

especially to Vladivostok which serves as headquarters to

the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and its closeness to China as well

as to Japan, a country which, even without its U. S. military



bases, was viewed with apprehension in Moscow, made it of

greater strategic and political significance to the Soviet

Union than it was to the United States. This importance

was, however, reflected more in the economic and military

aid extended by the U. S. S. R. to North Korea prior to the

outbreak of hostilities and in the deep Soviet penetration

of the regime of Kim 11-sung than in the intensity or form

of intervention chosen by the Soviet Union on behalf of

North Korea, even when the latter's existence as a political

entity was under serious threat from the United States and

its allies. Nevertheless, rather than being a

manifestation of the dispensability of North Korea to the

Kremlin, the relative inactivity of the Soviet Union in the

face of the impending occupation of the whole of North Korea

by the U. S. and its allies could be explained, in the first

instance, with reference to the prospect of Chinese counter-

intervention. Given that the presence of American troops

on the Yalu River, and the possibility of a pro-Western

regime in a re-united Korea would pose a grave threat to the

new communist regime in China, the Soviet leadership might

have counted on the probability that, in the final analysis,

the Chinese would be impelled or persuaded to intervene on

behalf of Kim 11-sung and save the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea from political obliteration. Such a

reliance on the expectation of Chinese intervention to save

a Soviet client-state could only have been encouraged by

Moscow's apparent desire not to be seen as having instigated

the' North Korean military venture, a desire that was

underlain by a reluctance to be embroiled in a conflict with

the United States for which the Soviet Union was hardly

120



prepared either politically, strategically, or economically.

Thus, whilst radically differing in mode and intensity,

the responses of the United States and the Soviet Union to

the plight of their respective clients appear to have been

shaped by similar forces. For both powers, their

interventionary strategy throughout the war was determined

less by their primary interest in the Korean peninsula than

by the systemic context and the interventionary milieu of

the crisis situation. As far as the United States was

concerned, the overriding consideration underlying its

direct intervention in defence of South Korea was its

preoccupation with its credibility and resolve images; its

fear, that is, that the fall of South Korea might produce a

chain reaction along the periphery of its security area and,

eventually, lead to a third world war. The resulting

inclination towards direct military intervention was

reinforced and facilitated by other factors within the

systemic context and the interventionary milieu which, on

the whole, tended to favour the U. S. Throughout the

duration of the Korean War, the Americans enjoyed a large

nuclear superiority over the U. S. S. R. which permitted them

to use a wide range of coercive tactics against the North

Koreans and the Chinese without undue fear of Soviet

retaliation. This strategic asymmetry in favour of the

United States was matched by an equally supportive

international political environment which was generally

hostile to the Soviet Union and its allies, as witnessed,

,for instance, by the United Nations' virtually unanimous

backing for American policies. Even in terms of

121



conventional military capability and proximity to the crisis

area, the United States' relative inferiority vis-a-vis the

Soviet Union seems to have been more than compensated for by

its superiority in almost all other aspects of the crisis

situation which, in effect, served to neutralize the

U. S. S. R. 's regional advantages.

Soviet operational flexibility, on the other hand, was

seriously hampered by a highly unfavourable crisis

situation. The primary interests of the Soviet Union in

Korea were, on balance, greater than those of the United

States, and in terms of secondary interests, the U. S. S. R.

had almost as much at stake in the Korean war as did the

United States. However, the Soviet Union's tactical and

strategic options were enormously restricted by the

hostility of the international political environment which

was compounded in this instance by the U. S. S. R. 's ostensible

implication in the apparent attempt by North Korea to

forcibly alter the postwar status quo in East Asia. Soviet

options were also restricted by an adverse strategic nuclear

balance and a strong aversion to war underlined by a

reluctance to risk the kind of devastation only recently

experienced at the hands of Hitler's Germany.

Consequently, the Soviet Union was unable to credibly

exploit its local superiority over the United States and its

allies either to deter their initial intervention or to

prevent them from crossing the 38th Parallel in an effort to

occupy the entire Korean peninsula. Instead, it had to

rely on the prospect of Chinese intervention to save North

Korea from political extinction, something for which, of

course, the Kremlin neither obtained nor expected any credit

122



since China had its own compelling reasons for entering the

war.

123



CHAPTER 5: THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS

The significance of the Korean peninsula to the Soviet-

American global rivalry during the late 1940's and early

1950's derived basically from its potential geopolitical and

geostrategic value to the Soviet Union and, arguably, by

implication, to the United States.

Korea in the spectrum of Soviet interests and goals in the

Far East, 1945-1950

Viewed with reference to Soviet interests and goals in

the Far East at that time, Korea occupied a pivotal place.

Its primacy in this respect could, perhaps, be best

described by assessing the importance of Soviet political

and strategic interests in the region during the period

immediately following World War II in terms of a concentric

circle in which Korea constituted the core.1 At the outer

layer of this circle, which comprises the former colonial

nations of India and South East Asia, the interests of the

U. S. S. R. were only of an indirect and limited nature.

Although communism represented a powerful force in the area,

this was due more to the attractions of Marxism-Leninism to

national liberation movements striving for independence from

colonialism in that part of the region and to impulses

generated during the Comintern period, than to Stalin's

concern for it, which was minimal.2

The next layer in the concentric circle consisted of

Japan. The interest of the Soviet Union in that country

was illustrated by the fact that, despite its acquirement of

124





previous February concerning Soviet desires, as a

precondition for the entry of the U. S. S. R. into the Pacific

War. 5 Indeed, at Yalta, the Western allies had recognized

the Soviet Union's aspirations in China when they conceded

to the internationalization of the warm-water port at

Dairen, with the "pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union

in this part being safeguarded, " the lease of Port Arthur as

a naval base, as well as to the joint Soviet-Chinese

administration of the strategic railways in Manchuria. 6

All that was needed to legitimize these concessions and thus

pave the way for Soviet participation in the war against

Japan was the conclusion of a formal agreement with China,

which Stalin hoped could be facilitated with the help of

American persuasion of their-Chinese friends.

However, the long-term utility of the concessions

granted to the Soviet Union in China was mitigated by the

presence in the country of a strong, militant, and

ideologically autonomous Communist Party, by the long-

running conflict between this Party and the Nationalist

regime of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, and by the support

for the latter provided by the United States.?

Ironically, Soviet interests in China were, perhaps, best

served by a weak Nationalist regime which was more likely

than the Communists to tolerate Soviet use of the naval

bases at Dairen and Port Arthur. A victorious, triumphant,

and powerful Communist Party, on the other hand, could be

expected to demand the return of these facilites to full

Chinese control, something which the Soviet Union could

hardly refuse in view of the importance it attributed to the

appearance of international communist harmony. 8 Indeed,

126



Stalin seems to have recognized this as a probability.

Thus, sensing the inevitable, he decided to tip the balance

of military power in China between the Kuomintang and the

Communists in favour of the latter by ordering the Soviet

Army in Manchuria to turn over to the Chinese Communist

forces most of the arms and equipment it had captured from

the Japanese Kwantung army, and also to delay the entry of

the Nationalist armies into Manchuria until the Communists

had established firm control in the province. At the same

time, he ordered his troops in Manchuria to systematically

strip the province of the industrial plant left by the

Japanese in order to minimize whatever threat any postwar

Chinese government might pose to Soviet power in the Far

East. 9 As it turned out, following the victory of the

Chinese Communists, Mao Tse-tung did demand the return of

the Manchurian ports to China, a fact that was provided for

in the Sino-Soviet agreements of February 14,1950, but

which, due to the outbreak of war in Korea, was not met

until 1955.10

The inherent limitations on the pursuit of Soviet goals

in Japan and China could only have served to promote the

status of Korea within Soviet strategic calculations. Its

significance in terms of the warm water ports in the

southern part of the country was recognized by Russian

statesmen at least as far back as the late 19th century

when, for instance, Nicholas II wrote in 1895 of the

absolute necessity that Russia "should have a port which is

free and open during the entire year. " Such a port,

he stipulated, "must be on the mainland (southeastern Korea)

127



and must be connected with our existing possessions by a

strip of land. "11 It had also underlain the Russo-Japanese

war of 1905 which was partly "the result of Russia's refusal

to moderate its ambition to achieve a position of dominance

in Korea and control of the warm-water ports of southern

Korea. "12 Coupled with the peninsula's strategic location

vis-a-vis both China and Japan, this factor placed Korea at

the heart of Soviet interests in the Far East.

The political and strategic significance of Korea to the

superpowers 1945-1950

Theoretically, in terms of the superpower global

rivalry, the potential value of Korea as a political and

strategic asset to the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar

period bestowed it with a commensurate importance to the

United States. To be sure, in this context, the Korean

peninsula owed some of its significance to its contiguity

to China in the north, especially to the hydro-electric

power complex along the Yalu River. However, by 1949 not

only was the northern portion of the peninsula secured

within the communist fold, but China itself had become a

communist state with the victory of the Communist Party over

the Kuomintang. Nevertheless, the proximity of Korea to

both the Soviet Union and the then new People's Republic of

China, and its strategic location vis-a-vis Japan, with its

American military bases and installations, placed it well

within the scope of United States as well as Soviet

interests in the region.

Geostrateeic

Strategically, domination of the Korean peninsula by

128



the U. S. or the U. S. S. R. would have been of more or less

equal usefulness to either superpower, although its

contiguity to China and the Soviet Union made it of greater

importance to the latter two. The division of the country

along the 38th Parallel probably satisfied the defensive

needs of each superpower since the northern part was

adjacent to the Sino-Soviet borders and the southern portion

was nearestto the American power base of Japan. Thus,

whilst in conjunction with Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands,

the presence of North Korea within the Sino-Soviet camp

completed a sort of "defence perimeter" which provided a

forward shield protecting the industrial centre of

Manchuria, the political centre of northern China, 13and

the Soviet ports to the east of the Sikhote Alin mountains,

the preservation of South Korea as a Western entity served

as an advanced strategic cover for Japan. Offensively,

however, it was necessary for either superpower to obtain

control over the entire Korean peninsula in order to gain a

pre-eminent position. As far as the United States was

concerned, the domination of North Korea would give it

tremendous advantages vis-a-vis both China and the U. S. S. R.

In the case of China, it would bring American forces to the

door step of the strategic hydro-electric power complex

along the Yalu and within striking distance from the

industrial heartland of Manchuria, and it would threaten the

sea lanes connecting Peking and other important centres such

as Tangshan, Anshan, and Luda to the Pacific Ocean by

improving the U. S. ability to control Bo Hai bay. Equally

threatening, American domination of North Korea would open



the prospect of Chinese Nationalist forces appearing along a

second front to fulfil Chiang Kai-shek's dream of launching

a serious campaignto topple the

new communistregime in

Peking. As for the Soviet Union, the threat that would be

posed to China through the conquest of North Korea would be

compounded by the spectre of American troops massing along

its border and being within easy reach of the naval port of

Vladivostok. Conquest of North Korea would also provide

the U. S. with a potentially valuable base for the gathering

of intelligence from the U. S. S. R.

From the Soviet angle, domination of South Korea would

substantially enhance the U. S. S. R. 's offensive capability by

providing it with advance bases for controlling the Sea of

Japan and the East China Sea, and it would bring Soviet

forces within easy striking distance of Japan and expose

Okinawa and Taiwan to attacks from two sides.14 Moreover,

it would provide the U. S. S. R. with access to the warm water

port of Pusan, amongst others, which is merely 100 miles

from Kyushu, the southern-most island of Japan. Thus,

since the Soviet Union already held Sakhalin Just to the

north of Hokkaido, the northern-most island of Japan, and

South Korea was close to Kyushu, Soviet domination over that

section of the Korean peninsula would put Japan "between the

upper and lower jaws of the Russian bear"---or, in Dulles'

more heinous metaphor, the Soviet Union would point a dagger

right at the heart of Japan. 15

The offensive and defensive significance of South Korea

to the Soviet Union and the United States respectively was

given especial poignancy by developments in Japan towards

the end of the 1940's. The first of these developments`



consisted of a change in the policies of General MacArthur,

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, towards Japanese

industry and trade union activity. This was manifested in

an alteration from the restriction to the rehabilitation of

the former, accompanied by a turn from the encouragement to

the restriction of the latter. Given the prevailing

attitude in the Soviet Union and China which tended to

associate Japanese industrial interests with military

expansionism, and in view of the postwar increase of left

wing influence in Japanese trade unions, this about-face in

MacArthur's policies naturally gave rise to concern in the

Soviet Union as well as in China. 16 The second development

concerned the apparent readiness of the Western powers in

1949 to conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan which

would not only exclude the U. S. S. R. but also provide for

long-term United States leases of air, land, and naval bases

in the country.17 Juxtaposed to the establishment of

N. A. T. O. in April of that year, this prospect could only

have stimulated the impression of an American-inspired

attempt to lay siege to the Soviet Union and its allies.

The anxiety generated within the Soviet and Chinese

leaderships in respect of these developments was indicated

by the U. S. S. R. 's increased criticism of the Yoshida

government, its demand that Emperor Hirohito be tried as a

war criminal, its sudden inauguration of trials of captive

Japanese officers on charges of bacteriological warfare, and

by the Cominform's instruction of the hitherto independent

Japanese Communist Party to supplement peaceful

parliamentary tactics with a militant assault on imperialism



and capitalism, in the streets and in the press.18. Most

importantly, Soviet and Chinese concern over the possibility

of aJapanese-American

alignment was manifestedin the Sino-

Soviet Treaty of Alliance of February 14,1950. This was

specifically aimed at "the revival of Japanese imperialism

and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any

other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan in

acts of aggression. "19

Political

The potential effect of U. S. policies vis-a-vis Japan

on the political and strategic status of South Korea could

have been quite profound. From the American point of view,

the increased stake in Japan that was signified by the moves

to make that country play an active role in the Western

alliance theoretically also enhanced the general importance

of South Korea in the light of its proximity to Japan and

the possible impact of developments within it on the

Japanese political scene. By the same token, Soviet

concern over the prospect of U. S. -Japanese alignment could

only have served to bolster the potential significance of

South Korea since it provided one of the few avenues through

which the U. S. S. R. could influence events in Japan. In

this respect, the impact of the overwhelming presence of

Soviet power that could be generated through Soviet

domination of the entire Korean peninsula might have been

sufficient to strengthen Japanese neutralist opinion and to

instil in the Yoshida government a sense of realism and

moderation that might impel it to pursue a more independent

line of the Americans. 20 Conversely, in the event of Japan

falling even deeper into the arms of the United States as a



result of Soviet h

the inclusion of

Sino-Soviet fold

politico-strategic

therefore, South

U. S. S. R.

egemony over the entire Korean peninsula,

the southern portion of Korea into the

would serve to somewhat redress the

balance in the region. Either way,

Korea would be a valuable asset to the

Initialsuperpower interest in Korea 1943-1945

The strategic and political significance of the Korean

peninsula in the postwar superpower competition seems to

have been fully anticipated by the Soviet leadership during

the period leading up to the entry of the U. S. S. R. into the

war against Japanand

thesubsequent occupation and

division

of the country into Soviet and American spheres. This

seems hardly surprising in view of the fact that, as

preparations for the final onslaught against Japan got

underway, it became increasingly clear that the United

States was determined to exclude the U. S. S. R. from any

significant role in the running of postwar Japan which, in

effect, was to become an exclusive American preserve. This

effectively left-the

Soviet Union with the one option of

establishing a foothold in Korea to counter-balance United

States power in Japan. The attractiveness of this option

may have been boosted by the apparent Western laxity towards

Korea at the time and by the fact that the potential of

China as an alternative power base for the U. S. S. R. in the

region was severly restricted by the ongoing struggle

between the Kuomintang and the powerful and ideologically

autonomous Chinese Communist Party.



The question of Korea's future had been the subject of

intermittent Allied-Soviet discussions from 1943 until the

Soviet entry into the Pacific War in August 1945. However,

in spite of the apparent overlap of superpower political and

strategic interests on the peninsula, at no time during that

period did either superpower explicitly press for any

particular or exclusive rights in Korea. Indeed, the issue

of that country's futurenever

becamea contentious one, a

fact the significance of which, as will be seen, can be

interpreted in more than one way.

The topic of Korea's future was first broached in

discussions between Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek, and

Churchill at the Cairo Conference of November 1943, wherein

the three leaders agreed that, in view "of the enslavement

of the people of Korea, " the latter should become "in due

course ..free and independent. " The proviso seemed to

reflect Roosevelt's opinion that the Koreans should first be

"educated in democracy, " American-style perhaps, by a

trusteeship of the great powers.21 Soviet participation in

the planning of Korea's future soon followed when, at the

Tehran Conference of November/December of that year, Stalin

conveyed to Roosevelt his thorough approval of the Cairo

Declaration and "all its contents, " and stated that it was

right that Korea should be independent, adding that the

Koreans would require a period of "apprenticeship, " perhaps

40 years, before full independence might be achieved. 22

The stances adopted at Cairo and Tehran were to

constitute the basis of all subsequent great power

discussions concerning the postwar future of Korea. Whilst



the consensus over the notion of a trusteeship leading to

eventual independence may have represented a sincere desire

to lay the foundations of self-determination for the Korean

people, tentative evidence suggests that concurrence in this

idea was achieved mainly because each of the United States

and, especially, the Soviet Union intended to manipulate the

trusteeship period to produce in Korea a political system

modelled in its own image, and thereby facilitate the co-

optation of the entire peninsula into its own domain after

the achievement of independence. This interpretation is

borne out in the case of both superpowers by the policies

which each of them pursued in its own portion of Korea in

the aftermath of the Japanese surrender. These policies

basically sought to promote sympathetic political groups and

to exclude from the planning of the country's future those

forces with a potential affinity to the other superpower.

However, the relatively higher priority that seems to have

been accorded to Korea by the Soviet leadership was

manifested in several additional ways during the period

leading up to the entry of the U. S. S. R. into the war against

Japan. Though by no means conclusive, these point to the

possibility that the U. S. S. R. may have intended to exploit

the opportunity afforded by the apparent absence of plans on

the part of the U. S. for the occupation of Korea by lulling

the Americans into thinking that it had no special ambitions

in the country whilst simultaneously preparing to

unilaterally fill in the vacuum left by the surrendering

Japanese forces, and thus present the Allies with a fait

accompli. If successful, such a plan would have produced,

at best, a trusteeship under the supervision of the Soviet



Union and, at worst, a trusteeship with the U. S. S. R. acting

as primus inter pares.

This interpretation of Soviet intentions is premised on

the assumption that the conspicuous absence of Soviet

demands for concessions in Korea was purposely intended to

obscure a desire on the part of the U. S. S. R. to achieve

dominance in Korea. Indeed, in view of the strategic and

politicalsignificance of

thepeninsula

to the Soviet Union,

this apparent indifference seems a little perplexing. The

Kremlin's modesty in this connection was evident right from

its first participation in the planning for Korea's future.

Thus during the Tehran Conference, the Soviet leader did not

once mention Korea as a candidate for Soviet aspirations, in

spite of what one writer has termed as "deliberate prodding"

by Churchill who allegedly sought to "stimulate Stalin's

appetite for the acquisition of warm-water ports. "

Instead, the conversation revolved around the possible use

by the U. S. S. R. of Chinese port facilities at Dairen and

Port Arthur. 23 Indeed, the absence of discord between the

Soviet Union and the Western powers over the subject of

Korea was illustrated by Roosevelt's report to the Pacific

War Council in which he claimed that Stalin "saw 'eye to

eye' with him on all major problems of the Pacific. "24

The impression of Soviet disinterest in respect of

Korea that was given by Stalin at Tehran was again in

evidence in December 1944. On that occasion, the peninsula

failed to obtain a mention in the list which Stalin

submitted to U. S. Ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman, as

regards the concessions the U. S. S. R. would require as a quid





trusteeship period and/or the introduction of foreign troops

into the country. But, taken in conjunction with sentiments

aired at the time and which, in retrospect, have turned out

to be correct, they begin to carry quite a different

meaning. This, in turn, lends further credence to the view

that the U. S. S. R. had, indeed, intended to achieve dominance

in Korea.

The first sign of suspicion as regards Soviet

intentions in Korea came from Dr. Chu Hein-ming, head of the

Soviet department in the Chinese Ministry of Information, on

May 20,1945. He suspected that the U. S. S. R. had plans to

make use of Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry to help it

manipulate the trusteeship period to its own advantage.

These people, many of whom had escaped from the Japanese

occupation in Korea, had been withdrawn by the Soviet

authorities from border regions to more remote provinces in

Turkestan during the purge of 1937-1938, but had since been

"thoroughly trained and incorporated into the Soviet

administration. " Dr. Chu feared that their administrative

experience, together with the military and political

prestige of their Soviet sponsors, might enable the U. S. S. R.

to exploit the trusteeship scheme to acquire control over

the political situation in Korea. 29 A similar suspicion of

Soviet intentions towards Korea was voiced by Soong

following his meeting with Stalin on June 30,1945. Like

Chu, he believed that the U. S. S. R. would make use in Korea

of Soviet-trained Korean political and administrative

personnel. In addition, he also believed that these would

be supplemented by up to two Korean divisions trained in the



Soviet Union which would be left in Korea after the Soviet

military withdrawal. Thus, he feared that, even with a

four-power trusteeship, the U. S. S. R. would achieve dominance

of Korean affairs, in that once a Korean provisional

government was formed under the auspices of the trustee

states, these Soviet-trained personnel, together with native

communists and other Koreans returning from Manchuria, would

have a favourable chance of winning power.30 In the event,

whatever plans the U. S. S. R. may have had in this respect

were forestalled by the failure of the trusteeship scheme to

materialize, a fact which eventually led to the division of

Korea. However, it is known that the Soviet Union did

indeed make use of Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry in its

own portion of the peninsula, and that Soviet-trained Korean

military personnel, some of whom had fought alongside the

Red Army against Hitler's Germany, were brought back into

northern Korea and subsequently came to form the nucleus of

the North Korean People's Army.

The probability that the U. S. S. R. had planned to use

Soviet-citizens of Korean ancestry and other Korean military

personnel trained in the Soviet Union to manipulate the

trusteeship to its own advantage does not, in itself, prove

that Moscow's interest in Korea was greater than that of

Washington. After all, the United States may also have had

similar plans to use pro-American elements to mould the

political situation in the country to its own taste.

Indeed, following its belated occupation of southern Korea

in September 1945, the U. S. military authorities relied a

great deal on Japanese personnel, collaborators, and other

reactionary and extreme right wing Koreans to help it





Korea. 32 In fact, at this stage, the U. S. military felt

quite free to disclose that they had no plans for the

occupation of Korea. This was clear from a meeting held

on July 24,1945, between senior officers of the United

States, Britain, and the U. S. S. R. to coordinate their

strategy in the Far East in preparation for the Soviet

Union's entry into the war against Japan. In what may have

been intended as a probe of the Western Allies' plans for

Korea, General Antonov, the Soviet chief of staff, asked his

American counterpart "if it would be possible for the U. S.

forces to operate against the shores of Korea in

coordination with the Russian forces that would be making an

offensive against the peninsula, " to which General Marshall

replied that "such amphibious operations hadnot

been

contemplated, and particularly not in the near future. "33

Fearing "an embittered last-ditch Japanese defense of

Korea, " the American general thought it necessary first to

set up airfields in Kyushu, from which Korea could be

controlled. 34 Thus, when Soviet and American military

officers met again on July 26, "[t]here was no discussion of

any zones for ground operations or for occupation (in Korea)

for it was not expected that either Soviet or American

ground troops would enter Korea in the immediate future. "35

During the meeting, agreement was reached on lines to

demarcate "areas of operations for the respective air and

naval forces, " which "ran generally from the northern tip of

Japan across extreme northern Korea. "36 However, according

to Truman, "[n]o lines were set up for land operations since

it was not anticipated by our military leaders that we would

carry out operations in Korea. "37



In spite or, perhaps, because of this, once the Soviet

Union formally endorsed the Potsdam Declaration on August 8,

and thereby entered the war against Japan, it immediately

embarked upon its military campaign against Japanese forces

in Manchuria as well as in Korea. Amphibious landings took

place in Korea on August 10, and on the following day Soviet

marines, with the support of the Pacific Fleet, captured the

naval base of Rashin in the north of the peninsula. 38 By

that time, most of northern Korea was in Soviet hands, a

fact the rapid accomplishment of which not only took the

Americans completely by surprise, but also served to

emphasize the significance of the peninsula in Soviet

strategic considerations.

The response of the United States to the rapid Soviet

military advance in Korea was the hurried improvisation of a

demarcation line near the 38th parallel, so that American

commanders could take the Japanese surrender south of this

line whilst their Soviet counterparts did so to the north of

it. 39 This line was worked out in the U. S. War Department

on the night of August 10-11, without consultation with the

U. S. S. R., with a view to include in the American sector the

ports of Inchon and Pusan which were considered as the

minimum necessary to sustain any future United States'

occupation force in Korea. It was then incorporated into

the draft of General Order No. 1, the Allied document for

the surrender of Japanese forces, and sent to Stalin for

consideration. 40 Although in his reply the Soviet leader

made no mention of the division of Korea into Soviet and

American sectors along the 38th parallel, he did request



that provision should be made for the surrender of Japanese

forces in northern Hokkaido to a Soviet commander. Thus,

perhaps still hoping for an occupation zone in Japan,

he tacitly accepted United States control over southern

Korea, 41and was content to confine Soviet power to the

northern part of the peninsula.

Division and consolidation: superpower policies in Korea

1945-1950

The U. S. S. R. 's drive into northern Korea landed the

Americans with the task of ensuring that southern Korea did

not also come under Soviet sway, at least until arrangements

were made for the implementation of the trusteeship scheme.

However, the tentative division of the peninsula into U. S.

and Soviet spheres of occupation seems to have doomed, right

from the start, the prospect of that scheme ever coming into

operation. If the original intention of the superpowers

was to manipulate the trusteeship period to their own

liking, then the exclusive control each of them exercised

over the northern and southern portions of the peninsula

afforded them the opportunity of satisfying at least their

defensive needs. Admittedly, this implied that they would

forego the offensive advantages that would be gained through

dominance over the entire peninsula. But given that such a

pre-eminent position could never be guaranteed after the

expiry of the trusteeship period anyway, the certainty of

total domination over one half of Korea might have appeared

more attractive than the uncertain possibility of complete

or partial hegemony over the entire peninsula. Indeed, the



authorities in their respective zones were hardly in the

spirit of the trusteeship scheme which, after all, was

supposed to "apprentice" or "educate" the Korean people in

"democracy. " Whilst in northern Korea the U. S. S. R. subtly

ensured that communists, especially pro-Soviet ones, would

control the administrative apparatus, in the southern part

of the peninsula the United States Military Government in

Korea (U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K. ) went about suppressing all

political activities with which it disapproved.

Although the tenacity of Soviet policies in northern

Korea is understandable in view of the strategic and

political significance of the peninsula to the U. S. S. R., the

rationale underlying the readiness with which the United

States seemed prepared to abandon, in practice if not in

principle, the notion of self-determination for the people

of Korea in favour of a separate American client-state in

southern Korea is more tenuous. Basically, the switch in

American attitude from an ostensible willingness to share

the supervision of the independence process in Korea with

other great powers, notably the Soviet Union, to a

preference for exclusive dominance of a separate state in

the south of the country seems to have been more a

consequence of the interest displayed by the U. S. S. R. in the

peninsula as it entered the war against Japan rather than an

outcome ofa pre-existing

assessment of concrete U. S.

interests in Korea. Indeed, the transience of the basis of

American policy in southern Korea at this stage was to be

reflected in the circumscription of the U. S. commitment to

the Syngman Rhee regime, and in the reluctance on the part



of Washington to couple the security of the United States

with that of South Korea. This disinclination to

completelyidentify

withthe Republic

ofKorea

was

compounded by the emergent strategic doctrine in the United

States which gave priority to preparations for a total

nuclear-conventional war and in which, it would seem, Korea

did not figure very highly.

The division of Korea into Soviet and American client-

states has commonly been attributed to the failure of the

U. S. S. R. to live up to the spirit of the Moscow Conference

of December 1945. This gathering, consisting of the

foreign ministers of the U. S., Britain, and the Soviet

Union, formally endorsed the trusteeship proposal (without

consulting the Koreans) and also made provision for a joint

commission representing the two occupying commands. The

purpose of this commission was to make recommendations for

an all-Korean provisional government on the basis of

consultation with democractic Korean political parties and

groups.42 However,, after a series of long, unproductive,

and ultimately sterile meetings, the commission foundered

over the criteria according to which a given Korean party or

political group would qualify as "democratic" and thus be

eligible for consultation by the joint commission. Whilst

the United States "held that freedom of opinion should be

respected and that any Korean could have his own opinion for

or against the trusteeship, " the Soviet Union "insisted that

all political and social organization which expressed their

opposition to trusteeship should be excluded from

consultation with the Joint Commission and consequently from

the provisional government. "43



The commendability of the U. S. position in this respect

was, nevertheless, offset by the policies of the

U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K. in southern Korea which, in practice,

tended to "mirror-image" the stance adopted by the Soviet

Union at the joint commission. In spite of Washington's

official adherence at that forum to the principle of respect

for freedom of opinion in Korea, American policy in the

southern part of the peninsula at this stage was basically

one of suppression of independent liberal and radical groups

and support for those elements most likely to accept United

States influence. The overall effect, if not the

intention, of this policy was to pave the way for the

establishment of a fully-fledged client-state in that part

of the country. Thus, one of the first acts of the U. S.

military authority in southern Korea was to by-pass the

indigenous governmental structure that had sprung up

throughout the peninsula out of the nation-wide resistance

movement which had been organized to fight Japanese

occupation. This movement had set up revolutionary

committees all over the country in the wake of Japan's

capitulation, and on September 6,1945, a representative

assembly of these committees convened in Seoul and formed a

national government with Jurisdiction over the whole of

Korea. According to one writer,

Although Communists were members of nearly all of these

committees (they were the only party with a nation-wide

membership),the

committeesthemselves

containedrepresentatives of all groups. In the important

province of Cholla Nam Do, the committee was headed by

a pro-American Christian pastor.44

However, on arrival in southern Korea, the United States

146



military authority totally ignored the "People's Republic

Government" and chose to make use instead of "Japanese and

quisling elements."45 Hence,

onOctober 5,1945,

General

Hodge, the head of the American occupation force, appointed

an Advisory Council which, according to E. Grant Meade who

was a member of the U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K., contained many "well

known collaborators.,46 Five days later, the United States

military government proclaimed itself to be the only

government in southern Korea and urged an end to the

pronouncements of "irresponsible political groups. " When,

during a meeting on November 20, a Congress of the People's

Republic refused to dissolve itself, Hodge declared its

activities unlawful. Having outlawed the only indigenous

and independent organization capable of performing therole

of a provisional government, the U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K. took

up sponsorship of a "Representative Democratic Council" on

February 14,1946. This council, headed by the recently-

returned Syngman Rhee, who had spent over half of his life

in the United States, was of the extreme right. It was

generally based on the landlords, capitalists, and other

conservative elements, and leading liberals refused to

associate themselves with it. 47 By May 1946, whilst

Soviet-American discussions within the joint commission were

reaching deadlock, the jails in the United States sector of

Korea were being "filled to the rafters" with opponents of

the Rhee regime.48

The clear determination of the United States government

to set up a client-regime in southern Korea was not,

however, matched by a proportionate willingness to make a

fully-fledged commitment to its newly-established protege in



Seoul. Amongst the early indications of this was

Washington's delegation of responsibility for the formal

creation of a state in southern Korea to the Western-

dominated United Nations. As the U. S. -Soviet joint

commission ground to a halt, in September 1947 the Americans

presented the question of Korea to the U. N. General

Assembly, in spite of Soviet objections. Although in doing

so the United States may have hoped to confer international

legitimacy upon the client-state that was to emerge in

southern Korea, in retrospect it would seem that it was

motivated at least as much by a reluctance to assume long-

term political, economic, or military responsibility for the

prospective state in the south of the peninsula. On

November 14, the General Assembly set up a Temporary

Commission on Korea to accomplish its independence.

Predictably, the U. S. S. R. refused this Commission permission

to enter northern Korea, and, in spite of strong

objections from the Australian and Canadian representatives,

aswell as

frommoderate and

leftistgroups

insouthern

Korea, it was eventually decided to hold an election in that

part of the country alone.49 The rightists, under the

leadership of Syngman Rhee, won a landslide victory, and on

December 12,1948, the U. N. General Assembly declared

the Rhee Government as the only lawful authority in southern

Korea. 50. This was followed in short order by the formal

establishment of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea

in the north of the peninsula. Hence, the division of

Korea became a concrete political fact.

Having gone to great lengths to mould the political



situation in southern Korea to its own taste, and thereby

forge a client-regime in an environment that was least

conducive to one, the United States began to show increasing

signs of ambiguity in respect of its hitherto implicit

commitment to that part of the Korean peninsula. Thus, as

early as May 1947, before the final collapse of the Soviet-

American joint commission, Secretary of War, Robert

Patterson, called upon the State Department to consider the

withdrawal of United States forces from Korea, a proposal in

which his Army's chief planner, General Wedemeyer,

concurred, adding that a South Korean defence force should

be built up to meet whatever threat might emanate from the

Soviet-controlled north after the American departure. 51

Patterson'sstance was

laterendorsed

bythe Joint Chiefs of

Staff when, in a report of September 1947, they concluded

that "from the standpoint of military security, the United

States las little strategic interest in maintaining the

present troops and bases in Korea. "52 This conclusion,

which was reached in a political vacuum, was based upon the

significance of South Korea in a total war, in terms of

which the defence of that country (as well as Taiwan) was

thought to be a strategic liability. 53 As Joseph and

Stewart Alsop reported at the time, under these

circumstances, "Okinawa, and the Japanese islands are

positions of equal, if not greatervalue.

"54 By 1949,even

General MacArthur, who tended to have an inflated view of

the significance of Asia for Western security, cast doubt

about the strategic significance of Korea. At the same

time as he was embarking upon the process of integrating

Japan into the Western alliance system, he implicitly



excluded Korea from the American defence perimeter. This

he did by announcing that the United States' line of defence

runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast ofAsia. It starts from the Philippines and continuesthrough the Ryukyu archipelago which includes its broad

main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back throughJapan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska. 55

The process of decoupling South Korea's security from that

of the United States was finally capped by Secretary of

State Dean Acheson'soften-quoted statement of

January 12,

1950. In a speech to the National Press Club in

Washington,_he

basically reiterated what MacArthur had said

before him by outlining the U. S. 's defence perimeter in the

Pacific as including "the Aleutions, Japan, the Ryukyus, and

the Philippines. " As for the military security of other

areas in the Pacific, presumably including South Korea, he

went on to say that "no person can guarantee these areas

against military attack.... Should such an attack occur... the

initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it

and then upon the commitments of the entire world under the

Charterof the

United Nations. "56

Although the United States did not wish to assume

direct responsibility for the security of South Korea,

neither was it prepared to abandon it altogether. In a

way, the Republic of Korea was assigned to the position of a

second rate client-state; its main value was the negative

one of denying the U. S. S. R. the strategic advantages of

controlling the entire Korean peninsula. As far as its

security was concerned, this meant that the U. S. would only

assume indirect responsibility in that it would help it to

defend itself. This status contrasted with that given to



Taiwan, which has often been erroneously placed in the same

strategic category as South Korea. Washington's position

on the latter's security was made clear by Truman onJanuary

5,1950, when, in a written statement to his press

conference, he said that his country would not give

"military aid or advice" to Chiang Kai-shek and that it

would not "pursue a course which would lead to involvement

in the civil conflicts in China. "57 However, in the case

of South Korea, the indirect commitment of the United States

was illustrated by the fact that, even whilst they were

disavowing direct responsibility for the security of the

country, the Americans initiated a massive economic and

military aid programme designed to consolidate the external

security and domestic stability of their newly-established

client-regime. This programme included a share in the $27

or so million worth of military aid authorized by Truman on

October 6,1949, for Iran and the Philippines, 58and at

least $250 million worth of economic assistance approved

between July 1949 and June 1950.59 In terms of military

aid, the United States had been involved in training South

Korea's 98,000-strong army for some time before that

country's formal independence in August 1948. Up to 500

American military advisers were assigned to South Korean

units "down to regimental and sometimes battalion level" and

charged with the task of training the South Korean army.60

Washington's military ties with the Syngman Rhee regime were

finally sealed on January 26,1950, when the United States

and the Republic of Korea concluded an "Agreement for Joint

Defense and Mutual Assistance. "61



concern in its portion of Korea following the capitulation

of Japanese forces was to promote a political environment

conducive to its own interests. Translated into specific

objectives in northern Korea, this meant, basically, the

consolidation of communism and, specifically, the triumph of

pro-Soviet over pro-Chinese communists.

Once the chances of the trusteeship scheme ever coming

intooperation

began to lookslim with

the failureof

the

joint commission to make any progress, Soviet objectives

expanded to include the formation of a competent armed

force, the construction of heavy industry, and, eventually,

the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country.62 All in

all, whilst it is difficult to gain an insight into the

U. S. S. R. 's evaluation of the strategic significance of

northern Korea, what is clear is that it sought to create a

militarily and economically powerful, and, above all,

politically loyal client-state.

However, in contrast to the U. S. A. M. I. G. I. K. policy in

thesouth of the peninsula,

the Sovietmilitary authority

took "extreme care" to keep as low a profile as possible,

making use instead of the native Korean Government whilst

simultaneously ensuring "that the Communist wings within the

government councils would be able to establish their

control. "63 In doing so, the U. S. S. R. was somewhat aided

by its reservoir of Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry who

were installed in office, "often as vice ministers under

local figures with nominal power, " presumably as trusted

supporters of the Soviet Union. 64 A government was set up

under the leadership of Kim 11-sung, a prominent Korean



Communist and revolutionist against Japanese occupation.

One of the first acts to be undertaken by this government

was a land reform which divided one half of the existing

land between 725,000 landless peasants,65

a fact which

generated a feeling of loyalty for the regime and, by

implication, contributed towards the entrenchment of Soviet

influence in the country.

Whilst overseeing the consolidation of communist power

in northern Korea, the U. S. S. R. made every effort to promote

its own proteges within the communist movement at the

expense of those with Maoist leanings. Thus, in 1946,

members of the Korean Independence Alliance, who were mostly

Korean Communists from Yenan, managed to win only secondary

positionsin the

newKorean Labour Party. Even

so, many of

those who did win were subsequently ejected in the purges

and demotions of the following years.66 The attempt by the

Soviet Union to deepen its influence in Korea at the expense

of the Chinese Communist Party also affected the nascent

North Korean military establishment, the Peace Preservation

Corp which was set up by the U. S. S. R. in the country as a

nucleus armed force. Therein, a fierce internal power-

struggle developed during 1946 and 1947 between those who

had been in the Soviet Union during the war and those who

had been in China. However, when the Korean People's

Liberation Army was formed in 1949, the pro-Soviet faction,

with the support of Kim 11-sung, was given the leading

role.67

Amongst the indications of the significance that seems

to have been attached to northern Korea by the Kremlin was

the degree to which the Soviet Union penetrated the country.



For this purpose, the U. S. S. R. was aided by a large embassy

in Pyongyang with specialists in military, cultural, and

economic affairs. These were supplemented by

representatives of several Soviet economic ministries.

According to one writer, advisers from this mission were

placed throughout the North Korean government, including the

cabinet, the National Planning Commission, and the Ministry

of Defence. 68 In some sectors of the economy such as

shipping and oil, Soviet control came more directly through

joint-stock companies.69

Another measure of the importance accorded to North

Korea by the Soviet leadership is the enthusiasm with which

it set about to build a powerful armed force there.

Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not

appear to have concluded a mutual defence pact with the

U. S. S. R., the latter maintained a large military mission of

over 3,000 men, the purpose of which was to establish

training centres, and to give instruction and advice to the

North Korean military. The work of this mission was

supplemented by an additional training programme according

to which some 10,000 Koreans were despatched to the U. S. S. R.

between 1946 and 1950 for specialist military training. 70

In terms of hardware, the 135,000-strong North Korean ground

forces were entirely Soviet-equipped, with T-34 tanks, heavy

artillery, and self-propelled guns included in their

arsenal. 71

On the whole, by the time the U. S. S. R. withdrew its

troops from the country in 1949, North Korea was placed

securely within the Soviet sphere of influence in the Far



East. Not only was Communism the dominant force in the

country, but within the ruling party and the state apparatus

pro-Soviet elements occupied most of theimportant

positions. The close ties between the two countries were

formalized on March 17,1949, in a 10-year agreement for

"economic and cultural collaboration" which provided for

trade, technical assistance, and credit arrangements.72

Thus, on the eve of the Korean War, the U. S. S. R.

displayed a certainty as regards its interests in North

Korea that was not, however, reflected in a similar United

States assessment of its interests in South Korea. Whilst

the Soviet Union did not succeed in extending its influence

over the entire Korean peninsula---if that indeed had been

its real intention---the Americans were content with denying

the U. S. S. R. the strategic advantages of doing so.

Consequently, since the U. S. interest in South Korea was of

a negative kind, Washington was not prepared to give its

South Korean protege the status of a first rate client, a

status which would entail the assumption by the United

States of direct responsibility for South Korea's security.

As it turned out, the greater significance that seems to

have been accorded to North Korea by the Kremlin was not

reflected in a commitment to its security that is worthy of

note, a matter to which Chapters 6 and 7 will now turn.

a



Notes

1. The layers of this circle correspond to Slusser's four zonesof Soviet interests in the Far East. See R. M. Slusser,"Stalin's Goals in Korea, " The Origins of the Cold War inAsia, eds. Y. Nagai and A. Iriya (Columbia University Press,New York, 1977), pp. 125-127.

2. Ibid., 'p. 125.3. Ibid., pp. 125-126.4. Ibid., pp. 128-129.5. Ibid., p. 132.6. Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1951 (Oxford

University Press, London, 1953),p.

25. Cited in ibid.,

p. 126.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 141-142.9. Ibid., p. 126.10. Ibid., pp. 142-143.11. Krasnyj archiv 52(1932), p. 76. Quoted in ibid, n. 12, p.

143.

12. Ibid., p. 127.13. A. S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter

the Korean War (Macmillan, New York, 1960), p. 38.14. Ibid., H. S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953

(Hodder and Stoughton, New York, 1956), p. 355.15. "A Militaristic Experiment, " State Department Bulletin XXIII

(July 10,1950), p. 50 Cited in J. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Harvard UniversityPress, 1959), p. 25. Also see A. L. George, "AmericanPolicy Making and the North Korean Aggression, " WorldPolitics, January 1955, pp. 211-215.

16. Whiting, op. cit., pp. 35-36.17. Ibid., p. 36.18. Ibid., p. 37; Slusser, op. cit., pp. 125-126.19. Quoted in Whiting, op. cit., p. 37.

20. Ibid; A. B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia SinceWorld War II (The Viking Press, New York, 19-71),

p. 171.21. D. Rees, Korea: The Limited War (Macmillan, London; St.

Martin's Press, New York, 1964), pp. 8-9; Truman, op. cit.,p. 333.

22. Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences atCairo and Teheran, 1943, p. 566. Cited in Slusser, op. cit.,p. 128. Also see Truman, op. cit., p. 333.

23. Slusser, op. cit., p. 129.24. Foreign Relations of the United States, op. cit., p. 869.

Cited in ibid.

25. Beloff, op. cit., pp. 23-24. Also see W. Averell Harrimanand Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946 (Random House, New York, 1975), pp. 379-380. Both citedin Slusser, op. cit., p. 130.

26. Slusser, op. cit., p. 130.27. Ibid., Truman, op. cit., pp. 333-334; Rees, op. cit., p. 9.28. Slusser, op. cit., p. 132.29. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, VII, p. 872.

Quoted in ibid., p. 131.30. Slusser, op. cit., P. 132.



31. Ibid., p. 130.32. Ibid., p. 131.33. Foreign Relations of the United States, Potsdam Conference,

II, p. 351. Quoted in ibid., p. 134.

34. Slusser, op. cit., p. 134.35. H. S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2 (Doubleday, Garden City, 1956),

p. 317. Quoted in ibid., p. 135.

36. Truman, Memoirs Vol. 1, p. 383. Quoted in Slusser, op cit.,

p. 135.37. Ibid.

38. Slusser, op. cit., p. 136.39. Ibid.

40. Rees, op. cit., pp. 9-10.41. Slusser, op. cit., p. 137.

42. Ibid., p. 139.

43. T.H.

Yoo, The KoreanWar

andthe United Nations: A Legal

and Diplomatic Historical Study (Librairie Desbarax [Anc. ],

Louvain, 1965), p. 17.

44. D. Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A critique ofAmerican foreign policy in the cold war (MacGibbon and Kee,

London, 1965), p. 115.

45. Ibid.

46. E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea, 1951,

pp. 59-62. Quoted in ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 116.48. Mark Gayn, Japan Diary, 1948, p. 431. Quoted in ibid.

49. Ibid.,p.

117.

50. Ibid.

51. Rees, op. cit., pp. 13-14.52. Quoted in Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, op. cit., p. 343.

53. R. E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American

Strategy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957), pp.163-164.

54. August 30,1948. See J. and S. Alsop, The Reporter's Trade

(Reynal, New York, 1958), p. 125.

55. Quoted in The New York Times, March 2,1949.

56. Quoted in Whiting, op. cit., p. 39.

57. Quoted in I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War

(Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1952), p. 20.58. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 7-14,1950, p.

10450.59. Ibid., September 10-17,1949, p. 10221 and June 3-10,1950,

p. 10748.60. Walter Sullivan, The New York Times. Quoted in W. G.

Burchett, Again Korea (International Publishers, New York,

1968), p. 126.61. Ibid., p. 125.62. Yoo, op. cit., p. 26.63. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 116.

64. Whiting, op. cit., p. 42.65. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 116.66. Whiting, op. cit., p. 43.

67. Ibid.; E. O'Ballance, Korea: 1950-1953 (Faber and Faber,

London, 1969), p. 24.68. Whiting, op. cit., p. 42.69. Ibid.70. O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 24.71. Whiting, op. cit., pp. 42-43; Rees, op. cit., p. 17.72. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, April 2-9,1949, p. 9914.



CHAPTER 6: THE BALANCE OF RESPONSES

The responses of the United States and the Soviet Union

to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25,1950,

can be described as paradoxical. Of the two superpowers,

it was with the U. S. S. R. that Korea seemed to rank highest

as a political and strategic asset. That much was clear

from the fact that whilst the U. S. had apparently made no

plans for the military occupation of the country once Japan

was defeated, the Soviet Union evidently hoped to exploit

this opportunity to achieve dominance over the entire Korean

peninsula by rapidly filling in the vacuum left by the

Japanese. The hurried response of the United States in

drawing up a demarcation line near the 38th oparallel and

taking responsibility for the southern portion of Korea thus

frustrated Soviet ambitions. Once the proposed trusteeship

scheme failed to materialize and the Korean peninsula was

divided between Soviet and American client regimes, the

relatively greater interest of the Soviet Union in the

country was again in evidence. Whilst the United States,

having thwarted the possibility of Soviet control over the

whole of Korea, began to decommit itself from direct

responsibility for the security of South Korea in favour of

a more indirect association, the Soviet Union

enthusiastically embarked upon a programme aimed at turning

North Korea into an economically and militarily powerful,

and politically loyal client-state,, and made no attempt to

dissociate itself from the regime in Pyongyang.

Seen from this angle, the eruption of war in Korea





38th parallel, the Soviet Union could have used the

opportunity to affect, through crisis manipulation, a cease-

fire on communist terms by extracting physical and political

concessions from the United States and its South Korean

client. Had it chosen to pursue that course, then no doubt

it would have been aided by the precedent set by the

Americans during the previous stage of the conflict when

they renounced the division of Korea and explicitly

committed themselves to the forceful re-unification of the

country.

Nevertheless, in spite of the geostrategic and

geopolitical significance of the Korean peninsula to the

Soviet Union, the latter opted for an almost totally passive

role throughout the Koreanwar.

Evenwhen

North Koreawas

virtually on the brink of political extinction, the U. S. S. R

remained quiescent, despite its obvious identification with

the regime of Kim 11-sung and the impact which a United-

States victory in Korea would probably have on its images of

credibility and resolve.

The reluctance of the Soviet leadership to play the

game in Korea meant that the war there did not take place

within the context of a superpower crisis. Soviet non-

intervention, in effect, gave the United States and its

followers a free hand to accomplish their constantly

fluctuating goals on the peninsula by direct military means.

As far as their goals were concerned, the North Korean

military venture completely changed Washington's assessment

of the strategic significance of South Korea. As one

writer has commented, "[w]hat Korea showed was that

interests once considered peripheral could become vital if



attacked, that victories for communism in peripheral areas

could undermine self-confidence in vital areas, unless

resisted. "1 However, as the U. S. -led military campaign

gained momentum, American goals in Korea expanded to

include, first, the pursuit and destruction of communist

forces north of the 38th parallel, and then the forcible re-

unification of Korea. Although this self-indulgence was

ultimately brought toan end

by the interventionof

China,

the revised status of South Korea in the strategic

calculations of the United States was to become a permanent

outcome of the Korean war.

The superpowers on the eve of the Korean war


to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea were clearly at

variance with their relative primary interests in, and the

degree of political and strategic significance which they

seem to have accorded to, the peninsula over the preceding

seven or so years. With the eruption of open warfare, the

United States was apparently taken completely by surprise

and decided, over a number of stages, to intervene directly

and on a massive scale on behalf of its client in South

Korea. The Soviet Union, too, did not exhibit any signs of

preparation or anticipation prior to the outbreak of

hostilities but, once the war was in progress, refrained

from making any moves worth mentioning in aid of its North

Korean client.

The notion that the outbreak of hostilities in Korea

came as a surprise to either of the superpowers is more



interesting than axiomatic. To begin with, the Korean

peninsula had been the scene of a steadily rising level of

tension, as each of the northern and southern regimes

indulged in provocations and threats of war. Since neither

Korean government had ever come to terms with the division

of the peninsula, the possibility of violent conflict was

never out of sight. In this respect, it was South Korea

that was most vociferous in its call for the destruction of

the Demoratic People's Republic of Korea and the forcible

re-unification of the country. This was as much a product

of the increasing precariousness of the regime in Seoul as

it was a means of exciting right wing pressure in the U. S.

on the Truman Administration in order to compel it to re-

evaluate its policy and commitment to South Korea. Hence,

barely four months after the formal establishment of the

Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee boasted that his army "could

defeat North Korea within two weeks, "2 and on October 7,

1949, he announced his "firm conviction" that his troops

"can occupy Pyongyang within three days, " because to defend

Korea "on the borders of Manchuria... would be easier than

defending it along the 38th Parallel... "3 These sentiments

were repeated three weeks later when, during a "purely

social call" on General MacArther, Supreme Commander for the

Allied Powers, Captain Sihu Sung Mo, Rhee's Defence

Minister, declared the readiness of his armed forces to

drive into North Korea, saying that "[w]e are strong enough

to march up and take Pyangyang within a few days. "4

Again, in a New Year's message to the Korean people, Rhee

promised on December 31 to "regain the lost territory" and

unify southern and northern Korea "by our own strength"



during the oncoming year,5

and two months later he announced

that the hour of unification was approaching. 6 By June

1950, in the face of a deteriorating domestic political

situation, as demonstrated by the decisive defeat of his

supporters during the May 30 general elections,? Rhee

became increasingly warlike, so much so that American

Secretary of State Dean Acheson "never was quite sure that

Rheedid not provoke the Red attack of 1950. "8 One

measure, perhaps of the South Korean regime's desperation at

this time was the arrest and possible murder of three North

Korean envoys who had been sent to Seoul on June 11 to

discuss unification. 9

The Republic of Korea's warlike verbiage was more than

matched by no less bellicose deeds on the part of its

northern counterpart. These mainly consisted of frequent,

albeit minor, forays across the 38th parallel, but in June

1949 North Korean forces invaded South Korean territory in

force and succeeded in retaining parts of the Ongjin

Peninsula

untilthe following

month, an actthat

was

repeated in August. At about the same time, the southern

city of Kaesong was attacked by communist infantry and

artillery, and in May 1950 the same city was again

bombarded. 10 Much more serious, however, were the growing

signs of mobilization and preparation for war by North

Korea, of which the regime in Seoul was fully aware but had

been strangely silent in the days immediately preceding the

outbreak of hostilities. Thus, ironically, almost

simultaneously as Rhee and his associates were boasting

about their alleged ability to occupy Pyongyang "within a



few days, " South Korean officials began disclosing to

members of the United Nations Commission on Korea their

anxiety in respect of North Korea's capabilities and reputed

intentions. These disclsoures were subsequently made

public in a report published by the Commission on September

14,1950.11 This report reveals, for instance, that in

January 1950 the South Korean Army's Chief of Staff feared

"the aggressive plans of the North Korean authorities to be

mature, and that it was only a matter of time before they

would be put into action. "12 It further reveals that in

May "the attention of the Commission" was drawn to a

statement made by the South Korean Defence Minister on the

10th of that month in which he declared "that North Korean

troopswere moving

in force toward the 38th Paralleland

that there was imminent danger of invasion from the North. 13

That same message was repeated when, during a subsequent

meeting with the Commission, the South Korean Deputy Chief

of Staff and his army's chief of intelligence gave

"important and detailed information, " which pointed to an

extensive build-up of forces and equipment on the 38th

parallel.14 Undoubtedly, these disclosures were at least

partly motivated by the desire to stimulate additional U. S.

military aid for South Korea. This was clear from the

South Korean Chief of Staff's emphasis to the U. N.

Commission

onthe qualitative and quantitative superiority

of North Korean weapons and military equipment over those of

the South. 15 It was also clear from Rhee's May appeal for

combat aircraft which, he claimed, were urgently needed

because "May and June may be the crucial period in the life

of our nations. "16 Neverhteless, this ulterior motive



should not be allowed to blur the fact that Seoul's fears

and predictions turned out to be surprisingly accurate and

must, therefore, have been based on sound evidence.

Admittedly, having sounded the alarm bells, the South

Korean government ceased, after May 10, to draw any further

attention either to developments north of the 38th parallel

or to the inadequacy of its military arsenal, of which it

had hitherto frequently complained. Its silence in this

respect seems all the more striking because, as one writer

has pointed out, the Rhee regime was faced with a political

problem far more serious than the military problem, which

was "the question of how far the United States would support

the South in war with the North. "17 However, the calm that

suddenly descended upon Seoul during the seven or so weeks

prior to the outbreak of hostilities could hardly have

concealed from the superpowers the by then well advanced

North Korean preparations for war. The continuing

supineness of the United States and the Soviet Union under

the circumstances, especially in view of their respective

associations with the protagonist Korean regimes is,

therefore, a matter that deserves further investigation.

The quiescence of the United States on the eve of the

war in Korea can be attributed to a combination of genuine

and devious or manipulative misinterpretation of

developments along the 38th parallel. In this respect, it

would seem that whilst some American officials might have

miscalculated Pyongyang's intentions and, as a result,

misinterpreted the significance of the prevailing tension or

the meaning of the North Korean military build-up, others



may have wanted to encourage or even provoke a communist

invasion in order to force a re-assessment of the Truman

Administration'spolicies and commitments

in the Far East.

Thus, from the perspective of the latter group, the eruption

of war in Korea would be the catalyst for changing a Status

quo which, though acceptable to the authorities in

Washington, was seen as detrimental to the strategic and

political interests of the United States. In this sense,

therefore, these revisionists were completely identified

with the Rhee regime.

Despite the existence of a steadily rising level of

tension along the 38th parallel during the year or so prior

to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the overall

situation on the peninsula appears to have been sufficiently

ambiguous to lend credence to more than one assessment of

the most likely course of events between the two Korean

states. Thus, on the one hand, whilst the capability of

North Korean forces to invade South Korea was acknowledged

and their activities along the 38th Parallel was of such a

nature as to give cause for concern, there was evidence to

indicate that outright invasion was not necessarily the most

probable option to be chosen by Pyongyang in the immediate

future. To begin with, although the gradual North Korean

military build-up along the border with South Korea was

known to the United States, its seriousness was somewhat

extenuated by the fact that the North Korean armed forces

had -never carried out their mobilization plan, right up to

the commencement of hostilities on June 25. This plan

called for the preparedness of 13 to 15 divisions, but when

the war began only six full divisions had been ready for



combat. 18 Moreover, given the absence of an effective air

force, North Korea may have seemed to American officials as

rather inadequately equipped to carry out a full-scale

invasion at that time. 19 Together, these realities served

to reinforce the view held by many U. S. officials that

Pyongyang was more likely to try to obtain its objectives

through guerilla and psychological warfare, political

pressure, andintimidation than

via overt militaryforce. 20

Such a view could only have been underlined by the decisive

defeat delivered to Rhee in the May 30 elections---merely

three weeks prior to the eruption of war---which gave

independents at least 128 of the 210 seats in the

legislature and left the Korean ruler with only 45 assumed

supporters. 21 As one writer has pointed out, these

election results raised doubts as to why North Korea should

want to attack a regime which might soon be transformed from

within into one willing to negotiate unification.22 These

doubts may have been strengthened by the Soviet boycott of

the Security Council at that time which removed the only

obstacle against any attempt to mobilize the United Nations

against North Korea should the latter invade its southern

counterpart.23 Last but not least, the perceived

improbability of an outright North Korean invasion of South

Korea was doubtless reinforced by the United States'

obsession at the time with global war and its consequent

failure to conceptualize limited war. As Ridgway has

pointed out, all American planning, official statements, and

military decisions derived essentially from the belief that

the next war involving the U. S. would be a world war "in



which Korea would be of relatively minor importance and, in

any event, indefensible. "24 The concept of limited

warfare, he continues, was totally alien to American

policy makers, "except in the sense that all wars are limited

by the willingness of the participants to pay the price

required. "25

From this perspective it is not too hard to understand

why Washington was apparently caught unawares by the North

Korean offensive. What is, however, rather more difficult

to comprehend is how such a gross misinterpretation of

Pyongyang's intentions could have persisted right up to the

day of the outbreak of hostilities in view of the scale of

the North Korean invasion and the time which it must have

taken toprepare.

As Gunther, MacArthur's biographer, has

noted, to assemble the force involved, arm and equip it, and

have it prepared to wheel into precalculated action over a

wide front with perfect synchronization, on the appointed

date, must have taken at least a month.26 However,

although Gunther claims that MacArthur's headquarters in

Tokyo as well as the South Koreans and U. S. military

personnel in South Korea were completely surprised by the

North Korean attack, it would seem that, during the three or

so weeks preceding the outbreak of hostilities, growing

intelligence reports of the size and scale of Communist

military preparations north of the 38th parallel did ring

some alarm bells within certain American quarters in respect

of Pyongyang's intentions. The fact that such suspicions

were never relayed to Washington was the sole responsibility

of General MacArthur who, along with his associates, chose

to downplay the significance of the North Korean military



build-up and to discount warnings of the possible imminence

of a Communist invasion.

Although the capability of North Korea to strike

southwards had long been recognized, a series of

intelligence reports began to cast doubt, from early June,

1950, onwards, on the hitherto accepted view that the

northern regime was more likely to try to accomplish its

objectives through guerilla activities and psychological

warfare than via overt military action. For example,

according to Hanson Baldwin, the United States' leading

military commentator at the time and "a trusted confidant at

the Pentagon, " the rapid build-up of North Korean forces

along the 38th parallel in what might well be preparation

for an offensive war described in a Central Intelligence

Agency (C. I. A. ) bulletin of June 9 and substantiated on June

13.27 Six days later, a C. I. A. field agency reported

"extensive troop movements" north of the parallel, couple

with

evacuation of all residents from the Northern side of

the parallel to a depth of two kilometres; suspensionof civilian freight service from Wonsan to Chorwon andreservation of this line for transporting military

supplies only; movement of armed units to border

areas; and movement of large shipments of ordnance and

ammunition to border areas....28

These and other intelligence reports, according to C. I. A.

director Hillenkoetter, constituted an unmistakable warning

of the imminence of North Korean invasion29 and were

distributed, through existing channels, to those persons in

the U. S. government authorized to see them. 30

Nevertheless, the significance of this warning was

undoubtedly reduced by MacArthur's insistence that, in spite



of the Communist military build-up and the frantic

activities of the North Korean People's Army north of the

parallel, Pyongyang was most unlikely to resort to war as a

means of accomplishing its objectives. Since it was the

General's duty to deal with security matters in Japan and

its surroundings, it was also his responsibility to evaluate

C. I. A. and South Korean information regarding Communist

military preparations. If his headquarters in Tokyo

assessed this information as important, that assessment

would have alerted Washington, and if it discounted it as

unreliable or unimportant, "no subordinate official in

Washington would dare insist that it might mean war. "31

This goes a long way towards explaining why all the ominous

signs of war failed to dislodge the prevalent belief within

the Truman Administration that North Korea was unlikely to

resort to open warfare. For, at least from early spring

1950 onwards, MacArthur's headquarters brushed aside almost

every intelligence report warning against the possibilty of

a Communist invasion in the immediate future. Thus, for

instance, in a comment attached to a report of March 10,

which stated that North Korea "will attack South Korea in

June 1950, " Major General Willoughby, chief of MacArthur's

intelligence unit, G-2, stated that it was more likely that

"the People's Army will be prepared to invade South Korea by

fall," but, that, even if "future reports bear out the

present indications, " the Communists "probably will be

content to wait a while longer and let South Korea ripen for

future harvest. "32 A similar assessment was sent by

Willoughby's office to Washington fifteen days later to

complement an actual G-2 bulletin which the



summer of 1950 as possible dates for an invasion of South

Korea. 33 Indeed, even the C. I. A. 's June 19 report of

North Korean war preparations "was not used as a basis for

ani conclusion by G-2... and it was forwarded to Washington

in a routine fashion, "34 along with an interpretative report

which stated that, in view of the recent serious reverses of

the guerilla campaign in South Korea, "Soviet advisers

believe thatnow

is theopportune

time toattempt

to

subjugate the South Korean government by political

means... "35 The possibility that these reverses of the

guerilla campaign in the South might have stimulated a

change of tactics on the part of Pyongyang and,

consequently, underlain the military build-up along the

parallel was, ironically, never mentioned. Such an

omission is all the more perplexing given the widely-

acknowledged scale of Communist war preparations.

Whilst the possibility that MacArthur's headquarters

might have genuinely misinterpreted Pyongyang's intentions

in the crucial months preceding the outbreak of hostilities

cannot be entirely ruled out, its persistence in doing so in

the face of an overwhelming mass of evidence to the contrary

suggests otherwise. Indeed, the proposition that such

miscalculations might have been deliberate and stimulated by

ulterior motives would solve some important riddles. The

first of these is Seoul's silence, from May 10,1950,

onwards, over Communist preparations for war. This stood

in sharp contrast to its vociferous and repeated warnings to

the U. N. Commission during the preceding four or so months of

an impending aggression from the North. The second riddle



is the U. N. Commission's June 27 report to the Security

Council that the South Koreans "were taken completely by

surprise as they had no reason to believe from intelligence

sources that invasion was imminents. "36 In view of

information already in the Commission's possession but not

made public until September 14, this was patently untrue.

Moreover, it somewhat contradicted its own report of June

24, which was not sent to the Security Council until five

days later. This clearly indicated increased North Korean

military activities, including the occupation of salients

south of the parallel and the evacuation of civilians from

areas contiguous to the border to depths of between four to

eight kilometres northwards.37 It would be stretching the

limits of credibility to claim that this sort of activity,

particularly when taken in conjunction with other evidence

of Communist preparations for war, failed to alert the South

Koreans and their American friends to the possibility of an

imminent invasion, no matter how incompetent or complacent

they might have been.

The answer to these riddles, it would seem reasonable

to surmise, lies in the frustration and dissatisfaction of

certain U. S. circles, including MacArthur and Dulles, with

the Truman Administrations's policy in the Far East,

especially its decommitment from South Korea and Taiwan.

As far as these quarters were concerned, it may have

appeared that the only way through which the administration

could be made to re-commit itself to the political and

territorial status quo in the region, and perhaps even

reverse some recent losses, would be to encourage or provoke

a communist invasion a pro-Western in the



In this respect, South Korea provided the ideal arena since,

in contrast to Taiwan which seems to have been entirely

written off by the Truman Administration, it enjoyed the

status of a second class client-state. Indeed, as Dulles

ominously alluded on June 22,1950, in respect of

Washington's commitment to Taiwan, United States foreign

policies "are constantly under review, taking account of

changing situations... "38 Three days later, the "changing

situations" which did reverse the policy on Taiwan were

created by the eruption of hostilities in Korea. Thus, in

view of Washington's unresponsiveness to Seoul's earlier

warnings of the danger from the North, it is not unlikely

that the South Korean leadership might have been advised by

such revisionists within the U. S. Administration as

MacArthur and Dulles that it might be wiser to invite or

provoke an invasion, and then trust to the impact on

American public opinion to alter United States policy in

the Far East. 39 This would explain not only South Korea's

silence from May 10 onwards, which may well have been at the

instigation of MacArthur's headquarters, but also the

persistent downplaying of the possibility of a North Korean

attack by the General and his associates in the face of

overwhelming evidence to the contrary, and their often-

repeated and, ultimately, unfounded assurances over the

ability of South Korea to defend itself. 40 It would also

explain Washington's apparent unpreparedness for the North

Korean attack.

The notion that seems to have been held by revisionists

within the Truman Administration of encouraging a Communist



invasion of South Korea as a means of affecting desirable

change is most unlikely to have-been shared by anyone within

the Kremlin. Like Washington, the Soviet Unionremained

totally quiescent throughout the period leading up to the

outbreak of hostilities in Korea. But, in contrast to the

Americans, the Kremlin is, not very likely to have been

misguided as to Pyongyang's intentions, given its generally

good relations with, and deep penetration of, the regime of

Kim 11-sung. This should not be taken to imply that the

Soviet leadership must have, therefore, encouraged or

approved of North Korea's decision to invade its southern

counterpart. For if such encouragement or approval had

been granted, then surely the U. S. S. R. would have taken

every step toensure

that North Korea wasadequately

equipped and had all the strategic backing it needed to

successfully accomplish its objectives. However, not only

did the Kremlin fail to provide the North Koreans with such

essential prerequisites for success as aircraft,41 but, once

hostilities got underway, it showed few, if any, signs of

preparedness or willingness to give its Korean allies the

political or strategic support they needed.

The failure of the Soviet leadership to underwrite the

North Korean offensive is most intriguing in view of its

previous ambitions over the Korean peninsula. Admittedly,

there were many reasons for it to disapproveof a

full-scale

invasion at that particular time. In the first place,

given the acute political problems faced by the Rhee regime,

an 'outright military invasion may have seemed rather

inappropriate and "adventuristic" when the same objective of

bringing that regime down could have been achieved through



an exacerbation of the guerilla struggle in the South. 42

In addition, there was the United Nations factor. An

outright military invasion of South Korea would be in clear

breach of the U. N. Charter and would, therefore, pit

virtually the entire U. N., which mainly consisted of pro-

American states, against North Korea and the Soviet Union.

Moreover, given the Soviet boycott of the Security Council

at the time, it would open up the option of concerted U. N.

action against North Korea. Of course, the U. S. S. R. could

end its boycott and veto any such action, but to return to

the Security Council just before the North Korean onslaught

would somewhat implicate the Soviet Union in the Korean

move. 43 In any case, even if the U. S. S. R. were to exercise

its right of veto against sanctions, that would not have

necessarily prevented concerted U. N. action against North

Korea because the issue would probably have been transferred

by a non-vetoable procedural vote from the Security Council

to the General Assembly. 44 Nevertheless, no matter how

strongly the Soviet Union might have disapproved of the

North Korean offensive, it is highly improbable that it

withheld its support at this stage as a measure of its

displeasure at Pyonyang's military venture, for to pursue a

policy of non-intervention as punishment for disobedience

would risk encouraging American intervention and thereby

endanger North- Korea and, by implication, the general

reputation of the U. S. S. R. as a reliable ally. Indeed,

given the United States' downplaying of the politico-

strategic importance of South Korea, its gradual

disengagement from the country, and the likelihood of an



initially rapid North Korean sweep across the South, a small

amount of cautious muscle-flexing by the Soviet Union might

have appeared sufficient from the Kremlin's angle, to deter

a U. S. that was in any case preoccupied with a concept of

total war in which Korea was not a central element. Thus,

a moderate risk might bring tremendous political and

strategic advantages for the U. S. S. R.

An alternative explanation of the Soviet Union's stance

during this time sees the absence of any hint of preparation

to provide strategic or political backing for North Korea as

being intended to remove any pretext for American

intervention, on the grounds that the war in Korea was a

civil conflict from which external powers should keep out.

Indeed, since one of the first responses of the Kremlin to

the hostilities in the peninsula was to invoke the doctrine

of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other

countries, this may well have contributed to Soviet

passivity at this stage of the conflict. However, given

that the U. S. S. R. remained quiescent even after the

intervention of the United States and its allies, this

explanation of Soviet inactivity in the period immediately

preceding the outbreak of hostilities in Korea seems barely

plausible.

This leaves one more possible interpretation of the

posture adopted by the U. S. S. R. at theoutset and,

indeed,

throughout the Korean war. This is, although the Soviet

Union was most probably aware of North Korean plans for an

offensive, it was not in a position either to underwrite or

to manipulate such an offensive and, consequently, did not

approve of its initiation. ' Or, as a former United States



military governer in South Korea commented at the time, the

Soviets in Korea were "like men who have a lion by the tail

and can't let go. "45 Under these circumstances, the Soviet

leadership may have felt that it had no effective choice but

to distance itself from the prospective North Korean

offensive. Initially, it may have also hoped that, by

doing so, the U. S. would also choose not to intervene.

The outbreak of war: U. S. recommitment and Soviet inaction

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea provided the

revisionists within the Truman Administration with their

long sought-after opportunity to change U. S. policy in the

Far East. The problem thereafter was to get the

Administration to respond to the North Korean invasion in a

desirable fashion. As far as Washington was concerned,

given that South Korea was still associated with the United

States, a response had to be made in order to preserve the

credibility and resolve images of the U. S. In this sense,

the Communist attack significantly changed Washington's

assessment of its strategic interests in Korea, in that it

had to make a move to protect its reputation in an area

where it was not expected to be so overtly challenged.

However, the issue at this stage was not to use the war as

an alibi for decisively tilting the regional superpower

balance of interests in its own favour, as the revisiQnists

would have liked, but to prevent a Communist victory in a

way that would not drag it into a direct confrontation with

the Soviet Union. Since, from the Truman Administration's

point of view, the status quo ante bellum in the Far East

was considered acceptable, there was no urge, initially, to



risk a conflict with the U. S. S. R. by using the North Korea

onslaught as a pretext for making advances in, say, northern

Korea and/or China. After all, both Korea and Taiwan had

already been assigned a very minor position in America's

strategic calculations. Indeed, though signalling a strong

determination not to abandon South Korea to its fate,

Washington's immediate reaction to the Communist invasion

was conspicuous by its avoidance of direct involvement in

the Korea war, at least whilst the. Soviet Union's stance

remained unclear. As the New York Times commented on

Truman's June 25 decision to lend logistical support to the

South Korean's46 the tendency "appeared to be to keep South

Korea supplied with all the arms that... MacArthur could

rush... but to avoid any semblance of direct military

intervention by this country. "47 Nevertheless, faced with

a rapidly deteriorating situation in southern Korea, and in

the absence of any hint on the part of the U. S. S. R. to adopt

a strategy of deterring U. S. intervention, Truman decided on

June 27 to drastically raise the level of American

intervention in the war by ordering United States air and

sea units to provide cover and support for South Korean

forces. 48 Moreover, in an apparent effort to prevent the

conflict in Korea from overlapping with the Communist-

Nationalist Chinese struggle over Taiwan, and perhaps also

at the behest of MacArthur, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet

to be deployed in the Formosa Strait so that it could repel

Communist Chinese attacks on Nationalist forces and vice

versa. This action effectively ended Washington's policy

of non-interference in the civil strife in China. 49



As the North Korean march into the South continued

unabated, the United States came under increasing pressure

to raise the level of its intervention, especially since it

had already committed itself to repelling the Communist

invasion. But, first, it had to ascertain the Soviet

position in order to find out the risks entailed by a

greater intervention. Thus, whilst directing American

forces into Korea, Washington dispatched a note on June 27

requesting the Soviet leadership to disavow responsibility

for the North Korean offensive, and asking it to use its

influence with Pyongyang to persuade it to withdraw its

forces from South Korea. According to some U. S. officials,

the purpose of this note was to "give Russia an opportunity

to retire gracefully from the chessboard. "50 The Soviet

reply, which came two days later, suggested that the

Kremlin, although unwilling or unable to stop its North

Korean friend, would not intervene in Korea against U. S.

forces. It stated that the U. S. S. R. considered the events

in Korea to be part of the internal affairs of Korea, and it

declared the Kremlin's opposition to foreign intervention in

the domestic concerns of other countries.51 In Washington,

this reply opened up the way for the direct intervention of

American ground forces on behalf of South Korea, for it

drastically reduced the danger that such intervention might

precipitate a superpower confrontation. 52 Indeed,on

the

following day, Truman approved a MacArthur request to use

one regimental combat team in South Korea, and he also

authorized him to bomb "specific military targets in

Northern Korea, " and to blockade the entire Korean coast. 53

Shortly thereafter the General was given full authority "to



use all the ground forces under his command" against North

Korean forces. 54

By invoking the doctrine of non-intervention in the

internal affairs of other states, the U. S. S. R. thus

forfeited a valuable opportunity to try to extend its

influence over the entire Korean peninsula. It also doomed

the North Korean offensive to failure, for it seems unlikely

that the U. S. would have taken the interventionary measures

it had resorted to had the Soviet Union demonstrated some

willingness to provide deterrence cover for its North Korean

client. Indeed, given the relative strategic

insignificance accorded to South Korea by the Americans, it

appears improbable that Washington would have risked a

superpower crisis had the U. S. S. R. resolved to deter the

initial United States moves by manipulating the risk of a

direct confrontation. This seems especially so in view of

Washington's suspicion at the time that the North Korean

invasion might be a Soviet ploy to tie American forces down

in order to initiate aggression in some other, strategically'

more important part of the world.

With the United States firmly and directly committed to

aborting the North Korean offensive, the extent of the

Kremlin's unwillingness to manipulate the Korean war in

any way to its own advantage became clear. Thus, in its

first full official statement on the Korean war, the Soviet

leadership reiterated on July 5,1950, its adherence to the

principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of

other nations, and gave no indication that the U. S. S. R.

proposed to take any action with regard to the conflict.55



Even after MacArthur's ominous declaration on July 13 of his

intention to destroy the North Korean forces and to occupy

all of Korea, 56 the Soviet Union continued on its

extraorinarily conciliatory path. This was exemplified at

this stage by its introduction on August 4 of a resolution

in the U. N. Security Council in which it proposed to invite

delegates from Communist China, North, and South Korea to

discuss the Korean problem. Although the insertion of the

People's Republic of China may have been intended to pave

the way for that country's participation in the Security

Council and/or in the Korean war, the reference to the

northern as well as the southern Korean regimes as

"representatives of the Korean people" represented a very

significant Soviet concession in that, for the first time,

it accorded Seoul equal status with Pyongyang. 57

The Soviet Union's rather placid stance at the

diplomatic level was matched by an almost total detachment

from the North Korean military effort. Not only did the

U. S. S. R. refrain from any kind of direct intervention in

support of its ally,58 but, in spite of MacArthur's

allegations which seem to have been aimed at pushing the

U. S. into escalating the war,59 it also failed to replenish

vital Communist Korean losses in tanks and aircraft.

Indeed, by the end of July, 1950, the hitherto well-equipped

North Korean forces were relying on a wide assortment of

weapons, including World War I rifles.60

With the prospect of Soviet intervention in support of

Pyongyang being rather slim, the Truman Administration

apparently felt free to respond to the revisionists' wish to

escalate the conflict. Thus, on August 12, American border

181



bombings commenced, and four days later, the first of a

series of huge "saturation" raids by heavy bombers was made

on North Korean installations, including the port of Rashin,

merely 17 miles from the U. S. S. R. 61 Much more significant,

however, was the U. S. warning on August 17 of its intention

to forcibly re-unify Korea, that is, to politically

obliterate North Korea. 62 This represented a drastic

extension of the original aim of the American intervention,

which was merely to drive back the invading North Korean

forces and restore the status quo ante bellum.

The turning point: U. S. escalation and Soviet abandonment

of North Korea

The announcement of Washington's new goal of re-

unifying Korea ushered in a new phase in the war;

henceforth the purpose of the United States' intervention

was not solely to preserve the territorial integrity of a

client-state but to reverse a postwar reality. For the

Soviet Union, this created an entirely new situation. With

the U. S. declaring its intention to forcibly re-unify Korea,

Soviet intervention in the war could no longer be regarded

as revisionist or as being part of an aggressive design, but

could only be seen as an attempt to preserve the postwar

status quo in the region, just as the Americans had been

hitherto doing. Moreover, the threat to the actual

survival of a Soviet client-state that was implied in the

U. S. announcement of its intention to re-unify Korea

constituted a direct challenge to the U. S. S. R. and a threat

to its credibility and resolve image. The United States,



in other words, was putting the Soviet Union in a position

where it could choose either to sacrifice its image of

resolve and its reputation as a credible ally or to accept

the American challenge and risk a direct superpower

confrontation. Given its strong association with North

Korea, the Soviet Union had no third option.

Nevertheless, in spite of the American announcement,

the U. S. S. R. persisted in its relatively conciliative

behaviour. To be sure, in what may have been a reference

to the possibility of Chinese counter-intervention, the

Kremlin warned on August 22 that continuation of hostilities

"will lead inevitably to a widening of the conflict with

consequences, the responsibility for which will lie with the

United States... "63 By September 1, however, the Soviet

leadership returned to its more decorous tone when, once

again, it proposed that the Security Council invite China

and "representatives of the Korean people, i. e., the

representatives of North and South Korea, " to discuss the

situation in the peninsula.64 This proposal amounted to a

further Soviet concession in that it raised to thelevel

of

formal diplomacy the concept of parity between North and

South Korea first introduced on August 4 during the Soviet

delegate's commentary upon the resolution.

In the absence of a decisive Soviet response to the

United States announcement of its intention to forcibly re-

unify Korea, the Truman Administration proceeded with

measures to try to achieve this new, expanded goal. Thus,

on September 15,1950, the day on which U. N. forces landed

at Inchon, MacArthur was issued with a directive to "extend

his operations north of the parallel and to make plans for



the occupation of North Korea" on condition that "there was

no indication or threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese

Communist elements in force. "65 Although the rapid advance

of U. N. forces elicited a warning from Peking that China

"did not intend to sit back with with folded hands and let

the Americans come up to [its] border, "66 the United States

seemed undeterred. On September 27, in light of the

success of the Inchon landing and the progress of the

ensuing U. N. offensive, MacArthur was further authorized to

destroy the North Korean armed forces within the peninsula,

on the same condition as the previous directive. He was,

however, prohibited from utilizing non-Korean ground forces

in the provinces along the northern border and from using

air or naval action against China or the U. S. S. R. 67 By

September 30, with the North Koreans in full retreat, U. N.

forces reached the 38th parallel from where, on the

following day, units of the South Korean army under

MacArthur's command began to pour into North Korea. 68

Whilst the imminence of a U. N. crossing of the 38th

parallel failed to stimulate any deterrence action by the

U. S. S. R. in defence of its Communist client, the Chinese

were sufficiently aroused to issue a series of high level

warnings against the introduction of U. S. troops into North

Korea. Indeed, although the Kim 11-sung regime was much

closer to Moscow than to Peking, the collapse of North Korea

as a political entity would jeopardize the Chinese Communist

Party's position both at home and abroad, and the presence

of American troops in the north of the peninsula would

present the People's Republic with potentially very serious



security problems. Consequently, on September 30,1950,

Foreign Minister Chou En-lai warned that the "Chinese people

willnot supinely

tolerateseeing

theirneighbours

being

savagely invaded by the imperialists. "69 On the following

day, he further warned through the Indian ambassador in

Peking that, though China considered the South Korean

advance as inconsequential, any crossing by U. S. forces of

the 39th parallel would constitute a casus be11i70

According to Truman, similar reports had been received from

Moscow, Stockholm, and New Delhi. 71 Nevertheless, partly

because Washington distrusted India's ambassador in Peking,

and partly because it suspected that China was merely trying

to blackmail the U. N. General Assembly into accepting a

Soviet-sponsored resolution to solve the Korean problem,

Chou's warnings were not taken seriously.72

Thus, on October 7,1950, American troops began

crossing the 38th parallel. Two days later MacArthur was

authorized to continue operations in North Korea in the

event of Chinese intervention, on condition that such

operations offered "a reasonable chance of success. "73 It

would seem that, at this stage, the Truman Administration

did not appreciate the apprehension with which Peking viewed

the prospect of ahostile regime in Korea, and thought that

a demonstration of resolve would eventually prevent any

Chinese incursion from developing into a full-scale

intervention. Consequently, in spite of a further warning

of intervention from Peking on October 10,74 the Americans

proceded with their march northwards. This continued even

when Chinese preparations for a massive counter-intervention



the probable scale of such action is doubtless the work of

MacArthur who persisted in minimizing the probability of a

full-scale intervention by China. 75 As in the period

preceding the outbreak of the Korean war, the General seems

to have had ulterior motives. Indeed, as far as he was

concerned, China's intervention "could be utilized in the

United States to raise Chiang from an inconvenient dependent

toa

fullally, while

theneed

to hold Formosaas an

American base would be made undeniable by the logic of

war... "76 Moreover, as MacArthur's successor has pointed

out, it would provide a pretext for the implementation of

MacArthur's programme, which included

destroying the air bases and industrial complex inManchuria;

blockadingCommunist China's

seacoast;demolishing its industrial centers; providing allnecessary support to Chiang's invasion of the mainland;and the transportation of the Nationalist Chinese

troops to Korea to beef up our ground forces there... 77

Consequently, on October 17,1950, in spite of growing

evidence of the infiltration of large numbers of Chinese

troops into North Korea, 78 MacArthur ordered his forces to

advance to within 40 to 60 miles of the Manchurian border. 79

Five weeks later, with Pyongyang already in U. N. hands, he

deliberately disobeyed Truman's directive of September 27

and ordered the removal of all prohibitions against the

utilization of non-Korean troops near the Chinese border. 80

Thevirtual extinction of

North Koreaas a political

entity hardly elicited any decisive responses from the

U. S. S. R. which as late as October 13,1950, was still hoping

that the Americans would give up the "get tough" policy and

return to wartime cooperation.81 To be sure, towards the

end of November, the Kremlin undertook



which included large-scale maneuvers and the consolidation

of its Siberian forces under a single, unified command. 82

However, these were probably intended more as a precaution

against the approaching U. N. forces than as a last minute

warning against the total occupation of the entire Korean

peninsula. In the final analysis, it was Chinese Communist

action, which culminated in the massive offensive of

November 26-27, that saved the Soviet client-state in North

Korea from political obliteration and sent the U. N. forces

into full retreat.83

China's counter-intervention: U. S. retreat and the return

to the status quo ante bellum

The direct intervention of China in the Korean war

presented the superpowers with an entirely new situation.

For the United States, the mere scale of the Chinese move

rendered the pursuit of the objective of Korean re-

unification by military means virtually impossible without

an extension of the war effort and a risk of total war out

of proportion to the objective's importance. Since, in

Washington's eyes, a war with China over Korea would be the

wrong war with the wrong enemy, it was decided to revert to

the original aim of the American intervention, which was the

restoration of the status quo ante bellum. Indeed, given

that the goal of a united Korea was pursued primarily

because of its risklessness in view of Soviet inaction, it

would have made no sense to enter into a war with China in

order to accomplish something that was sought in the first

place merely because it happened to present itself for



seizure.

The unwillingness of the Truman Administration to

engage in war with China over the issue of North Korea's

existence is evident from an N. S. C. meeting of November 28

at which the President, along with Defence Secretary

Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J. C. S. ) were all

"agreed of the necessity for avoiding war with China... "85

However, as far as South Korea was concerned, it would seem

that the Administration retained its uprated assessment of

the country's strategic and political significance following

North Korea's invasion of June 1950. Consequently,

Communist occupation was considered as a casus bells with

China. Thus, as Chinese forces advanced southwards in the

wake of the retreating U. N. forces, Washington began to

allude to the possibility of a nuclear showdown with China

and even with the U. S. S. R., 86 which was seen as

masterminding the Chinese-North Korean effort. By December

29,1950, with the prospect of a massive Chinese onslaught

against South Korea looming over the horizon, the J. C. S.

instructed MacArthur to evacuate all of his forces in Korea

to Japan should his military position become untenable.87

Although this move was motivated by the desire to ensure

the safety of the vastly out-numbered U. N. forces, it did

not mean that the U. S.. was ultimately willing to write off

South Korea. On the contrary, given that the United States

was not in a position to reinforce its forces in Korea

without rendering its position elsewhere vulnerable, the

order to prepare forevacuation was a

further indicationof

Washington's readiness for launching a different type of war

against China.

188 q1' p



The intervention of China in the Korean war and the

subsequent retreat of U. N. forces to South Korea presented

the Soviet Union with a golden opportunity torecoup recent

losses. With the Americans endeavouring to check the

Chinese-North Korean advance by threats of nuclear

bombardment, the U. S. S. R. could have counter-balanced those

threats and thus facilitated the continuation of the

Communist advance. In other words, by manipulating the

risk of a nuclearconfrontation with

the United States,the

Soviet Union might have been able to open the way for a

clear-cut Communist victory and thereby bolster.

its

credibility and resolve images. Whilst, by that time, the

U. S. may well have preferred to take the risk of a nuclear

war than abandon South Korea altogether, it is not

inconceivable that itmay

have beenwilling to settle for a

South Korea somewhat smaller than the pre-June 1950 one, had

the pressure been there for it to do so.

However, as in previous stages of the Korean war, the

Soviet Union refrained from providing any form of strategic

backing for the Communists in Korea, and confined itself to

efforts to bring about a favourable resolution to the Korean

problem through the United Nations. Consequently, during

the truce talks which lasted, intermittently, from July 10,

1951, until July 27,1953, the United States was able to

exercise enormous pressure on the North Koreans and their

Chinese allies to accept its terms for a cease-fire and an

exchange of war prisoners. Thus, on May 18,1951,

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared that the

U. S. recognized Chiang Kai-shek because he "more

189



authentically represents the views of the... people of China"

and would assist them if they attempted to get rid of

Communist "tyranny. "88 Two years later,on

February 2,

1953, Eisenhower authorized the removal of the Seventh Fleet

from the Formosa Strait, a move that opened the way for

Chiang to attack the Chinese mainland.89 In the meantime,

Washington maintained a constant stream of increasingly

serious threats and warnings to extend the Korean war into

China and to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese. 90 For

example, in February 1953 it was deliberately leaked to the

Communists that the U. S. would not be restricted in the use

of any weapons it possessed in the war in Korea. 91 Three

months later, during talks with Nehru in India, Dulles said

that the United States "couldnot

be heldresponsible

for

failing to use atomic weapons if a truce could not be

arranged. "92 Indeed, to back up its threats and warnings,

in the spring of 1953 the U. S. moved atomic missiles to the

Japanese island of Okinawa. 93 Whilst, in the final

analysis, the truce agreement of July 27,1953, may have

been a fair representation of the balance of air and ground

forces between China and the United States in Korea, it is

clear that what the American threats did was to deprive the

Communists of using their greatest asset, which was their

ability to prolong the conflict beyond the ability of the

U. S. to hold its position without having topay a price

disproportionate to its interest at stake.

The paradoxicality of the Korean war lies in the fact

that the responses of the superpowers were inversely

proportionate to their primary interests and ambitions in

the peninsula. Had the imminence of hostilities been



detected in Washington at all, then it may have been

possible for the United States to prevent the North Korean

invasion from taking place. However, given that the

prospect of a Communist attack on South Korea presented

American revisionists with an opportunity to force a change

in the Truman Administration's policy in the Far East, all

the tell-tale signs of war were skillfully concealed from

Washington, lest they prompt it to undertake any deterrence

action. With the outbreak of full-scale warfare and the

rapid advance of North Korean forces into South Korea, the

United States felt impelled to come to the aid of its

client-state in order to protect its own reputation as a

credible ally. Initially, whilst the U. S. S. R. 's readiness

to support its North Korean client was uncertain, it took

care not to react too drastically and to escalate its

intervention gradually and over a number of stages, so as to

test the extent of the Soviet Union's commitment to

Pyongyang's effort and, at the same time, minimize the risk

of a direct superpower confrontation over Korea. But, once

it became clear that the U. S. S. R. did not intend to become

directly involved on behalf of North Korea, the danger of a

superpower crisis as a result of American intervention

substantially dwindled. Accordingly, the U. S. felt it safe

to intervene on a massive scale and also to extend its

commitment to include the destruction of the North Korean

armed forces and the forcible re-unification of Korea.

The Soviet Union's inaction throughout the Korean

conflict is more perplexing. Of the two superpowers, it

had comparatively greater interests in Korea, and its



association with North Korea was closer than that of the

United States to South Korea. However, not only did the

U. S. S. R. refrain from providing strategic cover for the

North Korean offensive during its initial successful stages

in order to deter U. S. intervention, but, when the U. S. took

the military initiative from the Communists and pushed the

war right into the heart of North Korea, it seemed quite

indifferent to the prospect of its client's total political

extinction. Moreover, as China's counter-intervention

forced U. N. troops well to the south of the 38th parallel,

the Soviet Union still refrained from playing a more direct

part in support of its friends. Even when the United

States resorted to threatening China with nuclear weapons

during the political and military stalemate of 1951-1953,

the U. S. S. R. persisted in its apparent indifference.

Whilst this peripheral role chosen by the Soviet leadership

can hardly be explained with reference to its primary or

secondary interests in the peninsula, it can be accounted

for by looking at the political and strategic context of the

Korean war as it relates to the superpowers.



Notes

1. J. L. Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States:

An Interpretive History (John Wiley, New York, 1978), p.

204.

2. Quoted in B. Rees, Korea: The Limited War (Macmillan,

London; St. Martin's Press, New York, 1964), p. 16.

3. Quoted in W. G. Burchett, Again Korea (International

Publishers, New York, 1968), p. 64.

4. Quoted in The New York Herald Tribune, November 1,1949.

Cited in I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War

(Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1952), p. 64.

5. Quoted in Burchett,op. cit.,

p. 125.

6. Rees, op. cit., p. 16.

7. See Stone, op. cit., p. 18.

8. Holmes Alexander. Quoted in D. Horowitz, The Free World

Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold

War (MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1965), p. 120.

9. Ibid., p. 122.

10. M. B. Ridgeway, The Korean War'(Doubleday, New York, 1967),

p. 15.

11. The text of the U. N. Commission's disclosure is in The New

York Times, September 15,1950. The quotes and citations

here, however, are taken from Stone, op. cit.

12. Quoted in Stone, op. cit., p. 8.13. Quoted in ibid.

14. Quoted in ibid., p. 9.

15. February 1949, ibid., p. 8.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 11.

18. Walter Sullivan, The New York Times, July 31,1950. Quoted

in ibid., p. 66.

19. Joseph Alsop, The New York Herald Tribune, September 29,

1950. Cf. Walter Lippmann, New York Herald Tribune, October

5,1950, for similar views. See Horowitz, op'. cit., p. 122.

20. Senate, U. S. 82 Congress,First Session, Military Situation

in the Far East: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed

Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations: To Conduct

an Inquiry Into the Military Situation in the Far East and

the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army

Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in that Area, May

1951, p. 1992. (Hereinafter referred to as Senate. ) See

Stone, op. cit., p. 65. Also see Ridgway, op. cit., p. 14.

21. U. S. News and'World Report, July 7,1950, p. 29. Cited in

Horowitz, op. cit., p. 120. Also see Stone, op. cit., p. 18.

22. Stone, ibid., p. 65.

23. Ibid.

24. Ridgway, op. cit. p. 11.25. Ibid., p. 12.26. J. Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur: Japan. Korea and the

Far East (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1951).

27. The New York Times, June 28,1950. Cited In Stone, op. cit.,

p. 16.28. Quoted in Ridgway, 02-cit., pp. 13-14.

29. The New York Times, June 26,1950. Cited in Stone, op. cit.,



p. 2.

30. The New York Times, June 28,1950. Cited in ibid., p. 16.31. Stone, ibid., pp. 5-6.

32. Quoted in A. M. Schlesinger and R. H. Rovere, The General andthe President, and the Future of American Foreign Policy

(William Heinemann, London, 1952), p. 101.

33. Ibid., J. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and theKorean War (Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 22.

34. Ridgeway, op. cit., p. 14.35. Quoted in ibid.36. Stone, op. cit., p. 8.

37. Department of State, "United States Policy in the Korean

Crisis, " Publication 3922, Far Eastern Series 34, July 20,1950 (Document 14), p. 22. (Hereinafter referred to asState. ) Cited in ibid., p. 11.

38. The New York Times, June 23,1950. Quoted in ibid., p. 20.39. Stone, ibid., p. 13.

40. As regards this latter point, see ibid., pp. 7-8;Schlesinger and Rovere, op. cit., p. 102; H. S. Truman, Years

of Trial and Hope 1946-1953 (Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), p.347.

41. According to Soviet Army defector Colonel CyrilDimitrievitch Kalinov, the Kremlin refused an appeal by theCentral Committee of the Korean Communist Party for an airforce. He claims that General Zakharov had explained tohim that the Soviet Union feared that, if supplied with

planes, the North Koreans might attack Japan and drag theU. S. S. R. into war with the U. S. See C. D. Kalinov, "I Saw

the North Korean Army Organized, " France-Soar, August 4,1950. Cited in Stone, ibid., pp. 62,63. Also seeHorowitz, op. cit. p. 122.

42. Horowitz, ibid., p. 121; Spanier, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

43. A. S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yaln: The Decision to Enterthe Korean War (Macmillan, New York, 1960), p. 182, n. 10.

44. F. H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations (Macmillan New York,

1967), p. 385.45. Quoted in Stone, op. cit., p. 85.46. Ibid., pp. 68-60; Truman, op. cit., p. 352.

47. New York Times., June 27,1950. Quoted in Stone, ibid., p.69.

48. Stone, ibid., p. 70; Truman, op. cit., p. 352; Horowitz,op. cit., p. 124.

49. Stone, ibid; Truman, ibid; Horowitz, ibid; A. B. Ulam,

The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II (VikingPress, New York, 1971), p. 174.

50. Albert Werner, "How the Korean Decision Was Made, " Harpers'Magazine, June 1951, p. 104. Quoted in Spanier, op. cit., pp.32-33. Also see Rees, op. cit., p. 26; Stone, ibid., pp. 71,86.

51. Spanier, ibid., p. 33; Rees, ibid., pp. 26,33; Stone,ibid., p. 87.

52. Rees, ibid.,p.

26; Truman,op. cit., p.

360.53. Stone, op. cit., p. 77; Ridgway, op. cit., 23.54. Truman, op. cit., pp. 361,362.55. Security Council 5th year, Supplement for June. July and

August, 1950, pp. 83-89. Cited in M. Beloff, Soviet Policyin the Far East, 1944-1951 (Oxford University Press, London,1953), pp. 186-187,

56. Rees, op. cit., p. 98.

194



57. Beloff, op. cit., p. 110; Whiting, op. cit., pp. 69,74-75,

76; R. Leckie, The Korean War (Barrie and Rockliffe with

Pall Mall Press, London, 1962), p. 155.

58. The New York Times, July 26,1950. Cited in Stone, op. cit.,

p. 83.

59. The New York Times, July 26 and 27,1950. Cited in Stone,

ibid., pp. 82-84.60. The New York Times., July 27 and 30,1950. Cited in Stone,

ibid., pp. 83-84,85.

61. Stone, ibid., p. 90; E. O'Ballance, Korea: 1950-1953

(Faber, London, 1969), p. 42.

62. Leckie, op. cit., p. 155; Rees, op. cit., p. 99; Whiting,

op. cit., pp. 78-79.

63. U. N. Security Council, 489th meeting, August 22,1950, No.

31. Quoted in Whiting, ibid., p. 79.

64. U. N. Security Council, 495th meeting, September 1,1950, No.

36, p. 6. See Whiting, ibid., p. 102.

65.Truman,

op. cit., p.380.

66. Quoted in K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a

Diplomat (Allen and Unwin, London, 1955), p. 108. This

warning was given impetus by an acknowledgement, two days

earlier, that Korean veterans of the Chinese Red armies were

fighting in Korea. See Stone, op. cit., p. 125.

67. Truman, op. cit., pp. 381-382.

68. Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 125,126; Stone, op. cit., pp. 128-

129,

69. Quoted in Whiting, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

70. Panikkar, op. cit., p. 110.

71. Truman, op. cit., p. 383.

72. Leckie, op. cit., pp. 162-163.73. Truman, op. cit., p. 383.

74. Rees, op. cit., p. 109.

75. Ridgway, op. cit., p. 47; Truman, op. cit., pp. 387-388,395-

396; Stone, op. cit., pp. 152,156,158,160,161.

76. Stone, ibid., p. 151.77. Ridgway, op. cit., p. 145.

78. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 131; Rees, op. cit., pp. 109-110;

Truman, op. cit., p. 395; Stone, op. cit., p. 154.

79. Ridgway, op. cit., p. 49.

80. Ibid., p. 61; Stone, op. cit., p. 155.

81. The New York Times, October 14,1950. Cited in Stone, ibid.,

p. 137.

82. Truman, op. cit., pp. 413,414.

83. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 133; Stone, op. cit., pp. 209-229.

84. R. E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American

Strategy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957), pp.

172-173; Rees, op. cit., pp. xii-xiii, 169.

85. Rees, ibid., p. 166.

86. Ibid., pp. 166-167,170; Horowitz, op. cit., p. 133; J.

Alsop and S. Alsop, The Reporter". R Trade (Reynal, New York,

1958), p. 160.87. Rees, ibid., p. 180; Ridgway, op. cit., p. 83; Leckie,

op. cit., pp. 245-246.88. Quoted in The New York Times, May 19,1951. Cited in Stone,

op. cit., p. 278. Four days later, Secretary of State Acheson

refrained from disavowing Rusk's declaration. Idem, pp. 278-

279.89. R. J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (Harper, New

York, 1956), p. 28.

195



90. See, for instance, Leckie, op. cit., p. 369; Rees, op. cit.,425; Stone, op. cit., pp. 282-283.

91. O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 132.

92. S. Adams, First-Hand Report: The Inside Story of the

Eisenhower Administration (Hutchinson, London, 1962, p. 55.

Also see Donovan, op. cit., p. 118; D. D. Eisenhower, Mandate

for Change. 1953-1956 (Heinemann, London, 1963), p. 181.93. Adams, ibid., p. 55.

196



CHAPTER 7: THE CRISIS SITUATION


to the outbreak and evolution of the war in Korea clearly

illustrate the importance of the crisis situation in shaping

superpower intervention in grey area wars. In terms of its

primary interests in the peninsula, the massive intervention

of the U. S. in the war was nothing less than a gross over-

reaction, and when its post-1946 assessment of the strategic

significance of South Korea is also taken into

consideration, then the scale of the intervention could only

be described as paradoxical, if not irrational. Even more

paradoxical was the absence of any attempt by the U. S. S. R.

either to exploit the opportunities afforded, firstly, by

the initial North Korean onslaught and, secondly, by the

joint North Korean-Chinese advance of 1950-1951 in order to

extend its influence in the peninsula, or to deter the

United States from endeavouring to forcibly re-unite Korea

under United Nations auspices. In view of its primary

interests in North Koreaas well

as its ambitions over the

peninsula, the relatively passive and rather detached stance

adopted by the Soviet Union throughout the Korean war may

seem very perplexing.

However, the reactions of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. to

the hostilities in Korea were determined not so. much by

their primary interests in the peninsula as by the crisis

situation of the Korean war. In this respect, whilst the

balance of superpower primary interests may have been tilted

towards the Soviet Union, the Kremlin had to operate against

197



the background of a systemic context and interventionary

milieu that were, in aggregate, biased towards the United

States. Thus, as far as the first of these sets of

variables was concerned, although the U. S. S. R. enjoyed an

overall conventional military superiority over the U. S. and

its allies, it lagged far behind these powers in the sphere

of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, that is, long range

aircraft. This strategic inferiority was compounded by the

fact that the Soviet leadership had to contend with an

unfriendly, if not actively hostile, international political

environment. Consequently, since it was placed at a

tremendous disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States in terms

of its coercive bargaining position, the Soviet Union was

incapable of utilizing a relatively favourable

interventionarymilieu

inorder

tomanipulate

the

hostilities in Korea to its own advantage.

The overall bias of the crisis situation of the Korean

war towards the United States enabled the latter to

decisively intervene in the conflict. Indeed, the grave

threat that was posed to the survival of South Korea and, as

a corollary, to the secondary interests of its American

protege, made it imperative for the Truman Administration to

take immediate measures to guarantee the political

independence and territorial integrity of its Korean client-

state. But the United States was not completely

unrestrained in its conduct of the Korean war. To begin

with, once the status quo ante bellum was restored, the

entire crisis situation shifted against the continuation of

American intervention, which was now directed towards the

198 ;, I



re-unification of Korea. With the counter-intervention of

China in the latter part of 1950, the U. S. had to choose

between either abandoning the goal of re-unifying Korea and

reverting to the original aim of safeguarding South Korea,

or extending the war to China itself. Effectively,

however, it could only choose the first option, for to

pursue the second would have required not only the

interventionary milieu to remain conducive to the

continuation of U. S. intervention, but also a systemic

context that was overwhelmingly as opposed to relatively

favourable to the United States. In view of the

comparative conventional inferiority of the U. S. vis-a-vis

the Sino-Soviet alliance and the sensitivity of Western

Europe to excessive American risk-taking, the option of

waging war on China in order to re-unite Korea posed far too

many political and strategic dangers to make it worth while.

The systemic context

The ability of the 'superpowers to respond to

developments in Korea during 1950-1953 in a manner that is

most appropriate to their respective interests and ambitions

was fundamentally governed by the systemic context of the

conflict. At the heart of this context was the bipolar

structure that had emerged in the wake of World War II, and

left the United States and the Soviet Union pitted against

each other in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. By the time of

the Korean war, this structure had become even tighter with

the, integration of two plausible alternative centres of

power or "polars" into the American and Soviet blocs. In

Europe, ten states signed a treaty of alliance with the U. S.

199 (l Il



(the North Atlantic Treaty) and thus put an end to debate

about the policy which they should adopt vis-a-vis the

Soviet-American rivalry, and to suggestions that Western

Europe might be able to constitute a "neutral bloc" or a

"third force" in the international system. In the Far

East, the final victory of the Communists over the

Kuomintang in China was registered in the proclamation of

the establishment of a People's Republic, and this was

followed in short order by the conclusion of an alliance

treaty with the U. S. S. R. Admittedly, the international

system was beginning to witness important changes on the

periphery of the superpower competition which appeared to

promise a loosening of the bipolar structure. However,

these were still at a nascent stage in the early 1950's.

Thewave of

independence that was to sweep virtually all of

Europe's colonies had hardly begun; both Africa and the

Middle East were firmly in the grip of America's European

allies.

It was within the context of this distribution of power

that the United States and the Soviet Union had to decide on

how to deal with the war in Korea. Politically, although

the accession to power of,communist parties in Eastern

Europe and in China 'represented major bonuses to the

U. S. S. R., the nature of the bipolar system which

crystallized by 1950 was heavily skewed against the Soviet

Union. In view of Western Europe's domination of most of

the developing countries and the U. S. 's hegemony over Latin

America, bipolarization effectively meant politically

pitting the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and

200



China against virtually the whole world whenever there was a

fundamental East-West issue of contention. Under these

circumstances, the United States was able to mobilize

"world" opinion against the U. S. S. R. and its allies almost

at will. This was clearly evident during the Korean war,

where its efforts to that end were doubtless aided by a

distinctly anti-Soviet mood that had been created by the

coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the defection

of Yugoslavia, and the purge trials in Eastern Europe.

Thus, at the United Nations, the U. S. was able to muster

overwhelming support for every move it made in respect of

the war in Korea---irrespective of its merits---and, by the

same token, it was assured that every Soviet or even neutral

or third party proposal with which it disapproved would

suffer a decisive defeat. 1

The biasness of the international political environment

in favour of the United States during 1950-1953 put a heavy

price on any attempt the U. S. S. R. might make to manipulate

the war in Korea in order to advance its politico-strategic

position in the area. The Kremlin, in other words, had to

weigh up whatever gains it might make from providing

strategic backing for its Korean and Chinese allies against

the price it would most probably have to pay in terms of

cooperation with the West, and the possibility that such

support might, by stimulating fear and suspicion of Soviet

intentions, work to consolidate the Western alliance, rally

more states around the U. S., and thereby further isolate the

U. S. S. R. In this respect, the eruption of war in Korea

could hardly have occurred at a more inopportune time for

the Soviet Union. In view of its close links with the Kim

201





over such issues as nuclear weapons and the division of

Germany, not to mention the impact that it would have in

creating a more fervent anti-Soviet atmosphere amongst those

countries most vulnerable to sommunist take-overs and in

encouraging the hawks in the West who were pressing for

rearmament and a more assertive anti-Soviet policy. The

alternative option available to the Kremlin was the one that

was finally chosen, and that is to distance itself from the

North Korean invasion and hope for the best. In opting for

this strategy, the Soviet leadership may have initially

hoped that the United States would not intervene in the

Korean war,2

at least not to the extent that it -eventually

did. Once direct American intervention became a reality

and the survival of North Korea was seriously threatened, it

probably relied on the likelihood that the Chinese would be

sufficiently incensed by the presence of American troops in

an adjacent territory to counter-intervene and thus save

Communist Korea from political extinction. This strategy

also carried a heavy price: the near obliteration of a

Soviet client-state under the very eyes of its patron could

not but have adverse repercussions on the prestige,

credibility, and resolve images of the U. S. S. R. The fact

that the Kremlin considered this as more acceptable than the

cost of pursuing the first option is not only (or perhaps

necessarily) a measure of where its priorities lie, but also

a reflection of its military-strategic capability; of its

confidence in its ability to successfully confront the West

if need be.

The nature of the international political environment

during 1950-1953 also played a significant role in shaping

203



United States intervention in the Korean war. But, whereas

for the Soviet Union it constituted a constraint, in the

case of the U. S. it initially encouraged intervention by

providing incentives for escalation, and only afterwards,

following the Chinese counter-intervention, did it begin to

act as a restraint on American action. The impulsion for

escalation evolved around the positive impact which this

might have in sustaining the momentum of rearmament amongst

America's Europeanallies,

in facilitating therearming of

West Germany and its integration into the Western security

system, and in winning acceptance of a separate peace treaty

with Japan. In all three issue areas, the United States

was encountering serious difficulties during the early

1950's. As far as rearmament was concerned, the combined

burdens of the heavy cost of militarization and the rise in

the prices of raw materials during 1950 aroused fear in

Western Europe about living standards and stimulated doubt

in respect of a strategy which, by trying to build up

military strength, might allow communism in through the back

door of popular discontent. 3 The question of rearming West

Germany was even more troublesome, with the United States

pressing for a full German contribution to Western Europe's

defence, an idea which most Europeans, especially the

French, found extremely distasteful. 4 Disagreement over

this question was evident, for example, during a meeting of

the Atlantic alliance's "Big Three" foreign ministers on

September 16,1950, where the French as well as the British

were reportedly angered by the Americans' announcement of

the previous day of their desire to rearm West Germany, whom

204



they wanted to raise about ten divisions for a joint North

Atlantic command.5 Equally controversial were the U. S. 's

proposals, announced on September 15 and published on

November 24, for a peace treaty with Japan which, inter

alia, made provisions for that country to rearm.6 Apart

from being drafted without consulting either Japan's most

important neighbour, China, or the U. S. S. R., these were

opposed, to a greater or-lesser extent, by virtually all the

Asian and Pacific nations plundered by the Japanese, and

disliked by Britain, which feared the impact of a Japanese

economic revival on its markets in Asia and Africa.?

Clearly then, given the international political

environment of the early 1950's, escalating the war in Korea

may have appeared to the Truman Administration as a very

useful way by which it could win support for its foreign

policy. A settlement in Korea on the basis of a

restoration of the status quo ante bellum which, by the end

of September 1950, was perfectly achievable, would have

reduced fear of the Soviet Union, for it would have meant

the acquiescence of the U. S. S. R. in the defeat of a client

state, "the acceptance of a serious blow to Soviet prestige

for the sake of peace. "8 This, in turn, would have made it

difficult to sustain the momentum of rearmament, for the

passing of the fear of aggression would have made the task

of Justifying more guns and less butter a very hard one.

As Truman said on the eve of the arrival of U. N. forces at

the 38th parallel, the apparent total victory in South Korea

would stimulate "a sincere effort... to block the whole

mobilization and rearmament program, which has been

conceived for long-term preparedness against the threat of

205





merely defending the status quo. To be sure, even after

the North Korean offensive was repelled and U. N. forces

proceeded to reverse the status quo ante bellum, few

protests were raised and no political price was paid. This

can be attributed to the apparent risklessness of the

American venture: whilst the Soviet Union showed no signs

of doing anything, the imminence of Chinese counter-

intervention was skilfully concealed by MacArthur and

Peking's warnings were ignored by a complacent Washington.

However, once China entered the scene, the danger of a

general war involving the United States and the U. S. S. R.

grew as Washington began to consider implementing

MacArthur's dream of extending the Korean war into China. 11

Consequently, the U. S. came under immense pressure to

abandon the option of extending the war in Korea and to

confine its activities instead to the Korean peninsula. In

fact, since the entry of China into the' equation per se

carried the risk of a major escalation beyond the boundaries

of Korea, the political burden of sustaining the American

intervention in the conflict became increasingly heavy.

The United States, in effect, had to find a way of bringing

the Korean war to a prompt and honourable end.

Undoubtedly, the most important political constraint on

United States behaviour in Korea in the wake of China's

massive counter-intervention was Europe. Initially, almost

all of America's European allies stood as one behind

Washington by the fear that the invasion of South Korea may

signal the start of a general Communist campaign which might

manifest itself in similar moves at some other point(s)

along the line bounding the Soviet bloc, for example, in





local acts of aggression in widely scattered areas. '"14

With the rapid retreat of U. N. forces in the face of Chinese

troops, this meant that the U. S. had to maintain its

prohibition on military action beyond the Yalu and, most

importantly, to refrain from threatening or using nuclear

weapons against Chinsa. Accordingly, in advance of the

order for MacArthur to withdraw from Korea should his

position become untanable, Truman apparently assured British

Prime Minister Attlee on December 6,1950, that U. N. forces

would not evacuate from Korea unless they were actually

pushed into the sea. This implied that the General would

notbe given permission to bomb Manchuria, at least for the

time being. 15 Neverhteless, the despatch of MacArthur's

order on December 29 and the subsequent rapid retreat of

U. N. forces which, by January 4,1951, took them to the

south of Seoul, raised fears in Britain that the Truman-

Attlee agreement of the previous month might have been

unilaterally revised, and that the bombardment of Manchuria

and war with China might be imminent. These fears,

however, were soon allayed by Washington which on January 11

'assured London that U. N. troops would continue to fight and

"make every effort to establish a defence position on the

peninsula, "16 an assurance that was more or less adhered to

until the end of the war.

Although the world political situation was clearly an

important influence on the United States and the Soviet

Union's behaviour during the Korean war, its overall impact

was, nevertheless, contributory. It was the international

strategic environment which, in the ultimate analysis, seems

to have played a much more decisive role in shaping the



superpowers' interventionary strategies throughout the war.

In this respect, the nature of the military-strategic

balance between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. during 1950-1953

conferred each superpower with different capabilities and

vulnerabilities. During this period, the general position

was one where the Soviet Union enjoyed a steadily declining

conventional superiority that was somewhat offset by an

overwhelming and much more slowly decreasing American

supremacy in the sphere of atomic weapons and long range

aircraft. A precise assessment of Soviet conventional

military strength at that time is hard to come by; however,

it would seem that the total number of men under arms in the

direct service of the U. S. S. R. increased from about 2.8

million in 1947 to over four million by 1952, no doubt to

counter-balance any Western atomic threat. During the same

period, United States conventional forces witnessed an even

sharper increase in the number of combatants as a result of

the Korean war; from about 670,000 in 1947 to approximately

1.6 million by 1952.17 In the atomic field, the U. S.

disposed of about 600 bombs by 1951,18 whilst estimates of

the Soviet stockpile ranged from "about 40" to "over 100"

bombs19---considerably less than the United States'.

Indeed, the latter's superiority in the nuclear field was

not only quantitative but also qualitative, for, unlike the

U. S. S. R., it had, by November 1949,already

begun

development of the hydrogen bomb, alleged at the time to

have a destructive power about a thouand times greater than

that of its predecessor.20

Whilst the advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union in the



field of conventional military power raised many fears in

Western Europe and the United States, its actual usefulness

in terms of coercive diplomacy was very limited outside the

European arena, a fact that goes some way towards explaining

Soviet passivity during the Korean conflict. Indeed, even

in Europe, the inability of the U. S. S. R. to translate its

conventional superiority over the West into actual crisis

bargaining power was clearly demonstrated during the Berlin

blockade of 1948-1949, where it proved utterly incapable

of utilizing its overwhelming preponderance in order to

dislodge the Western powers from the city by manipulating

the risk of war. Basically, this shortcoming can be

attributed to the fact that, for political, economic, as

well as military reasons, the Soviet Union was at a general

disadvantage in relation to the West, and thus lacked both

the credibility and the resolve to manipulate the risk of

war by using its conventional superiority for any purpose

other than in defense of its vital security interests. To

begin with, there was the nature of the U. S. S. R. 's

conventional preponderance. Strategically, this derived

its significance mainly from the ability it conferred upon

the Soviet Union to hold Western Europe as a "hostage" in

the event of an East-West confrontation. Since Western

Europe was perceived by the U. S. and recognized by the

U. S. S. R. as a vital American security area, it follows that

the Soviet advantage on the ground bestowed the Kremlin wth

a bargaining power vis-s-vis Washington roughly

commensurable to the importance attached to Western Europe

by the United States. This power, however, was partly

offset by several asymmetries which counted against the



Soviet Union. They included weakensses in certain

important areas of the U. S. S. R. 's conventional armoury such

as air defence and strategic air cover, 21 a substantial

nuclear inferiority in relation to the West, a comparatively

weak economy which during the period under consideration

never surpassed being three-eighth that of the U. S. 22,and a

society that had hardly recovered from the exhaustion of

World War II. Needless to say, these asymmetries did not

bode well for the Soviet Union in the event of any

protracted conflict and, consequently, served to reduce its

coercive potential towards the United States. Moreover,

they were compounded by an additional inequality as regards

the relative abilities of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. to

directly inflict damage on each other. In this respect,

whereas the Soviet Union possessed a modest capability for

directly inflicting damage on the United States, the latter

had at its disposal the means, in terms of both nuclear

weapons and long range aircraft, to deliver a very

substantial,though

nota disabling, strike against the

U. S. S. R. This drastically reduced the incentives which the

Soviet leadership would have considered worthwhile for it to

manipulate the risk of war in order to make gains or

forestall losses, for, under these circumstances, the

potential cost of war, though enormous for Western Europe,

would have been far greater for the Soviet Union than for

the U. S.

In view of its strategic limitations, the failure of

the Soviet Union to use the Korean war as a vehicle for

consolidating its position in the Far East seems much less



paradoxical. Indeed, to have attempted to play an active

part in support of its North Korean and, subsequently,

Chinese allies would have been very imprudent. Given the

nature of the superpower strategic balance during 1950-1953

---an American nuclear superiority that was partly offset by

a qualified Soviet conventional preponderance---a more

active Soviet posture would have required the U. S. S. R. to

play a game of brinkmanship with the United States where the

risks for each country were not of equal weight. The

Kremlin, in other words, had to be prepared to manipulate

the risk of war which amounted to, for the Soviet Union, a

devastating nuclear blow coupled-with the possibility of

protracted hostilities in Europe, and for the U. S., a much

more modest nuclear strike together with the prospect of a

Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Although such a risk

might have been acceptable had the issues at stake been seen

as vital to the security of the U. S. S. R., the costs and

benefits to the Soviet Union of the issues at stake in the

Korean war, though substantial, were not of a magnitude that

warranted the manipulation of the risk of war with the

United States at that time. As once writer summed it up,

In retrospect, it seems extremely doubtful that the

Russians---especially before they had acquired great

air-atomic capabilities---would have taken anything

less than a direct attack upon their immediate sphere

of control as the occasion for deliberately

preciptating a total war. Total war would have meant

the devastation of their homeland and the forfeiting of

many less risky and more profitable opportunities for

gaining Soviet objectives... Therefore, it seems quite

improbable that the Kremlin would have deliberately

-intervenedin such a way as to cause total war... as

long as it believed that the U. N. command coveted no

territorial objectives beyond Korea...

24

Although the conventional military might and the modest

nuclear capability of the Soviet Union seem to have been



deemed as insufficient by the Kremlin for the purposes of

either preventing or controlling the level of American

intervention in the Korean war, Soviet power, especially

conventional power, appears to have acted as a major

constraint on the United States' behaviour during the

conflict. Whilst the superiority of the U. S. in the

nuclear field seems to have cancelled out the U. S. S. R.; s

superiority in the conventional sphere, and thereby

facilitated the American intervention in the Korean war, it

also placed, by its mere existence, a limit on the extent to

which it was prudent for the United States to escalate the

conflict in the peninsula. Indeed, with about 80 per cent

of its effective armed forces engaged in Korea, and with its

military operations sustained on a dangerously thin

logistical line, 25 the U. S. felt constrained in its conduct

of the war not only by the vulnerability of its military

effort to potential Soviet or Chinese interdiction, but

also, and much more importantly, by the possibility that the

depletion of its defences elsewhere might permit or

encourage the U. S. S. R. to strike at any one of a number of

other areas of potential confrontation. Thus, in the wake

of China's counter-intervention, Secretary of State Acheson

expressed his fear on November 28,1950, that should the

United States escalate the conflict by retaliating against

the airfields in Manchuria, where there were at least 300

warplanes which could threaten American air bases in Korea

and Japan, then the Soviet Union would enter the war.

Likewise, it was generally feared by the Truman

Administration that the introduction of Nationalist Chinese



troops into the conflict might lead to a similar outcome.26

In this respect, it was argued that to extend the war into

mainland China would compel the U. S. S. R. to intervene in

defence of its self-interest, prestige, and, most of all, in

fulfilment of its obligations under the Sino-Soviet

treaty. 27 The prospect of Soviet intervention as a

constraint on American behaviour applied even to activities

inside Korea. For instance, following the U. S. bombing of

the North Korean port of Rashin inAugust 1950, it

was

feared by the State Department as well as by the United

States' allies that, in view of the proximity of the port to

the Soviet Union, a repeat of the attack might provoke some

form of Soviet retaliation.28

It would seem that amongst the vital elements in the

United States' perception of Soviet power as a constraint on

American action was the belief that the North Korean attack

was a diversionary ploy inspired by the Kremlin with the aim

of distracting the U. S. or tying it down in Korea. This

belief was upheld by Acheson, amongst others, who thought

that the U. S. S. R. "was behind every one of theChinese

and

North Korean Moves, " and that its aim was to dissipate as

much of the United States' strength as possible whilst its

own forces "remained free for future use. "29 It was also

upheld by Truman who, from the very beginning of the Korean

action, had looked upon it as a "Russian maneuver, as part

of the Kremlin plan. "30 Underlying the belief that the

Korean war was a Soviet plot to wear down the U. S. was, of

course, the presumption which attributed world-wide

aggressive motives to the Soviet Union. This was implicit

in many of Truman's views which tended to portray, the



U. S. S. R. as a scheming power, waiting for a pretext, any

pretext, to challenge the West. Thus, the Communist

invasionof

South Korea was feared to be the prelude to a

general Soviet onslaught against the Western world, or to a

more selected attack in an area directly or indirectly under

the hegemony of the United States. In the words of Truman,

in considering how to respond to China's counter-

intervention, the U. S. had to keep in mind that whether in

Berlin, West Germany, Japan, - Indo-China,Yugoslavia,

or

Iran, "a minor incident could easily be created which would

give the Russians an excuse for open intervention. Even

without that, pressure could be increased at a rate that

might seriously endanger the Western position. ', 31

Consequently, for the United States to escalate the Korean

war would not only be to fall into the presumed Soviet trap,

but might also precipitate a general war. As Truman has

pointed out,

[e]very decision I made in connection with the Korean

conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third

world war and the terrible destruction it would bring

to the civilized world. This meant that we should not

do anything that would provide the excuse to the

Soviets and plunge the free nations into full-scale

all-out war. 32

The possibility that the U. S. S. R. might have chosen to

respond to an extension of the war into China in a way other

than by launching an immediate full-scale intervention was

precluded from Washington's calculations by its

preoccupation with total war. For instance, the Soviet

Union could have undertaken measures of a limited and covert

nature such as the despatch of equipment and aircraft to

Korea and perhaps even the resort to submarine and air

216



attacks against U. S. naval units, ostensibly by the Chinese.

Admittedly, such limited measures might have led to a

general war by successive steps of retaliation and counter-

retaliation, particularly if the Americans had concluded

that bombing Manchurian bases was not sufficient to contain

Chinese troops and that the U. S. S. R. constituted a much more

formidable "privileged sanctuary" than China. But, had

that course of action been considered, then the United

States might have been less constrained by the Soviet

Union's conventional preponderance in its conduct of the

Korean war.33 The fact that it was not considered was a

reflection not only of the U. S. 's obsession with total war,

but also of its lack of confidence that its nuclear

superiority could deter Soviet aggression. This, in turn,

can be ascribed to the limitations of the United States'

nuclear forces, which were not of a sufficient magnitude to

neutralize the U. S. S. R. 's war-making capability and,

consequently, to prevent it from embarking upon a wholesale

assault against the West.

The interventionary milieu

In contrast to the systemic context, the

interventionary milieu of the Korean war was, on the whole,

relatively more favourable to the Soviet Union. Yet,

although the systemic context defined the parameters of each

superpower's response to the conflict, the interventionary

milieu seems to have played a far more pronounced role in

shaping the response of the United States than that of the

U. S. S. R. In fact, whilst the interventionary milieu

provided the impetus for the U. S. to intervene in the first



place, its relative conduciveness to Soviet intervention,

especially after U. N. forces began to march into North

Korea, appears to have been more than counter-balanced by

the unfavourability of the systemic context, which rendered

it imprudent for the U. S. S. R. to effectively intervene in

support of its proteges in the war.

The endeavour of North Korea to change the regional

status quo by military means created an environment which,

initially, encouraged the United States to intervene on a

scale that was obviously out of all proportion to its

primary interests in Korea. By the same token, the

association of the Soviet Union with revisionist North Korea

placed the onus against Soviet intervention, in spite of the

advantages enjoyed by theU. S. S. R. by

virtue ofits

proximity to the Korean peninsula and its local military

superiority over the U. S. In other words, Soviet

intervention in support of North Korea would have amounted

to an attempt to change, not only the local territorial and

political status quo, but also the status quo in the

regional superpower balance, and this in itself would have

put the U. S. S. R. at a tremendous disadvantage as regards the

balance of resolve with the United States in the event of a

superpower crisis. Indeed, for the U. S. S. R. to

successfully challenge the status quo in the regional

superpower balance by providing strategic backing for the

North Korean offensive would have required it to enjoy an

overwhelmingly favourable crisis situation which, in 1950,

it did not. Thus, whilst working against the prospect of

intervention by the Soviet Union in support ofthe Korean



Communist invasion, the inertia of the status quo, or the

"fact of possession, " made it easier for the United States,

as the defender of the status quo, to intervene on behalf of

South Korea.

It was, however, the superpowers'comparative valuation

of their secondary interests at stake in the Korean war

which constituted the most important element in establishing

an interventionary milieu that was initially biased towards

the United States.Since the North Korean

attack was aimed

at the destruction of an American client-state, it impinged

upon the secondary interests of the U. S. to a far greater

extent than those of the Soviet Union. As long as the

survival of North Korea was not at stake, the secondary

interests of the U. S. S. R. were not as seriously affected.

Although the Soviet Union had everything to gain from North

Korea's endeavour to change the status quo, it did not stand

to lose as much from its failure as did the United States

from its success and, consequently, was under no urgent

compulsion to support it. Whilst the U. S., on the other

hand, had very little tolose that

was ofintrinsic value to

its rivalry with the U. S. S. R., its secondary interests at

stake were monumental, and these, more than anything else,

prompted the decision to intervene in defence of South

Korea. Given Communist Korea's close links with the Soviet

Union and the presumption in Washington that the invasion of

June 25,1950, was a Soviet maneuver, what were seen to be

on the line in Korea were nothing less than the credibility

of the United States as a reliable ally and its image of

resolve.

The United States' perception of the North Korean



invasion as a challenge to its credibility as an ally

stemmed from the fear that a Communist victory in the

peninsula would have a political domino effect or chain

reaction in the region and, eventually, in the rest of the

world. The conquest of South Korea, it was thought, would

confirm to "millions of people throughout the free world, "

that "Russian power was in fact invincible, " and

that "American big-talk was a shameless bluff. "34

Consequently, "a NorthKorean

victory might encourage other

states to feel that they had no option but to succumb to

Soviet might and "rush to come to terms with Communism on

whatever terms they can get. "35 As Truman put it, "[ilf

the Communists were permitted to force their way into the

Republic of Korea without opposition from the Free World, no

small nation would have the courage to resist threats and

aggression by stronger Communist neighbours. "36 It was,

therefore, felt that it was imperative for the U. S. "to

demonstrate to the world that the friendship of the

United States is of inestimable value in time of

adversity. "37 And what better opportunity was there for it

to do so than in Korea? In the words of Truman, a

successful intervention in the peninsula would "lend

resolution to many countries not only in Asia but also in

Europe and the Middle East who are now living within the

shadow of Communist power. "38

Likewise, the North Korean invasion was also seen in

Washington as a test of the United States' response, a

challenge to its resolve. Resting on the assumption that

the Soviet Union bore the main responsibility for

220



Pyongyang's actions, this notion posited the Communist

attack as an endeavour on the part of the Kremlin to test

the will of the U. S. and to demonstrate Soviet strength and

American weakness.39 Consequently, it was feared that

unless the United States responded decisively, its image of

resolve would be gravely tarnished, its prestige would be

jeopardized, and the precarious balance of power in Asia

would be dangerously undermined.40 The

,U. S. S. R., as a

result, wouldbe

encouragedto "feel out" or probe for

additional soft spots elsewhere,41

such as in Iran,

Yugoslavia, Indo-China, Burma, or Indonesia. 42 This, it

was further feared, would eventually lead to another world

war. As Truman put it,

... what was developing in Korea seemed... like a

repetition on a larger scale of what had happened in

Berlin. The Reds were probing for weakness in our

armour; we had to meet their thrust without getting

embroiled in a world-wide war.43

It was, therefore, of paramount importance for the United

States to "draw the line" in Korea44 by massively and

decisively intervening to defend its client-state and ensure

the failure of the Korean Communist offensive.

With the restoration of the status quo ante bellum in

Korea, the interventionary milieu ceased to be conducive to

the continuation of American military action. Having not

only secured, but also enhanced its credibility as an ally,

its prestige, and its image of resolve by successfully

defending South Korea, the United States had no compelling

reason to continue its intervention in the peninsula.

However, for a variety of factors including the momentum of

its military success and, especially, domestic political

pressures which equated a failure to cross the 38th parallel



with appeasement of the Soviet Union, 45 the U. S. committed

itself to the destruction of North Korea as a political

entity and to the forcible reunifaction of the peninsula.

By doing so, it posed a threat to the secondary interests of

the U. S. S. R. and to China that was even more serious than

that constituted by the North Korean invasion.

As with the North Korean venture vis-a-vis the United

States, the American advance into Communist Korea challenged

the credibility and the resolve of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, since it was affected with actual U. S. forces, it

gave the Kremlin a far greater cause for concern and,

arguably, a more Justifiable reason for intervention than

did the North Korean attack for the Americans. However,

lacking the necessary strategic capability to be able to

successfully confront the United States in a crisis, the

U. S. S. R was unable to exploit a favourable interventionary

milieu to coerce the U. S. out of North Korea.

In deciding not to risk a confrontation with the United

States over the fate of North Korea, the Soviet leadership

may have relied on the probability that the presence of

hostile forces in an adjacent territory would be

sufficiently threatening for China to intervene and thereby

save North Korea for reasons of self-defence, if for nothing

else. In fact, haunted by Tanaka's dictum that "to conquer

theworld, one must

first conquer Asia; toconquer

Asia,

once must first conquer China; to conquer China, one must

first conquer Korea and Taiwan, "46 the Chinese had every

reason to be concerned. As one writer summed it up,

American aid to China under the China Aid Act, General

MacArthur's visit to China soon after the outbreak of



war in Korea, the crossing of the 38th Parallel by the

Americans... and their approach to the Yalu River, the

open debate on American strategic interests in the

Pacific islands and on the possibility of a return by

Chiang to the mainland---all these combined to

alert... Peking and persuade it that the Americansintended an anti-communist campaign like the similar,

albeit unsuccessful, anti-communist interventions in

Russia after the 1917 revolution...47

Admittedly, the Kremlin could hardly have expected China's

independent and timely counter-intervention to counteract

whatever harm may have befallen its own credibility and

resolve images as a result of its inaction. Nevertheless,

it may have hoped that, in view of the Western, especially

the American conception of China's intervention as Soviet

intervention by proxy,48

some of the credit for saving North

Korea would be passed on to the U. S. S. R.



Notes

1. Virtually all United States-introduced or approved

resolutions during the Korean war were passed by a ratio of

about 7 to 1 at the General Assembly. Eastern bloc

resolutions, or other resolutions not approved by the U. S.

were defeated by the same ratio. See, for example, R.

Leckie, The Korean War (Barrie and Rockliffe and Pall Mall

Press, London, 1962), pp. 161-162,253,254,255; D.

Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American

Foreign Policy in the Cold War (MacGibbon and Kee, London,

1965), pp. 124,134; D. Rees, Korea: The Limited War

(Macmillan, London; St.Martin's Press, New York, 1964),

p.108; I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the KOrean War

(Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1952, p. 252;

A. S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter

the Korean War (Macmillan, New York, 1960), pp. 102,112.

2. J. Spanier, The Truman-MacArther Controversy and the Korean

War (Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 24; A. B. Ulam, The

Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II (Viking

Press, New York, 1971), p. 171.

3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey ofInternational Affairs, 1951, ed. P. Calvocoressi (Oxford

UniversityPress,

London, 1953),p.

2 (Hereinafterreferredto as Survey. )

4. Ibid., 1952, p. 7.

5. The New York Times, September 17,1950. Cited in Stone,

op. cit., pp. 102-102.6. Stone, ibid., pp. 102,200.

7. Ibid., pp. 300-301.8. Ibid., p. 102.9. The New York Times, September 29,1950. Quoted in ibid., p. 105.

10. Quoted in Stone, ibid., p. 103.

11. MacArthur's programme of over-running China and, if

necessary,fighting the Soviet Union

was, apparently,given

very serious and careful consideration by the "highest

echelons of the United States government. " See M. B.

Ridgway, The Korean War (Doubleday and Co., New York, 1967),

p. 146.12. The New York Times., November 14,1950; New York Herald

Tribune, November 16,17,1950. Cited in Horowitz, op. cit.,

.p. 132.

13. Ridway, op. cit., p. 148. Also see R. E. Osgood, Limited War:

The Challenge to American Strategy (University of Chicago

Press, Chicago, 1957), p. 170.

14. H. S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953 (Hodder andStoughton, 1956), pp. 444-445. For the Soviet leadership's

perceptions of the potentialities for weakening the Western

alliance, see Survey, 1952, op. cit., especially pp. 1,174-

176,178,185-186.15. The-New York Times, December 7,1950. Cited in Stone, op. cit.,

572E-9.

16. The New York Times, January 12,1951. Also see the London Daily

Mail (Paris edition), January 12,1951. Both cited in Stone,

ibid., p. 244.



17. Z. Brzezinski, "How the Cold War was Played, " Foreign

Affairs, October, 1972, pp. 183,185-186. Also see Survey,

1949-1950, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

18. Brzezinski, ibid., p. 186.

19. Survey, 1949-1950, op. cit., p. 87.

20. Ibid., p. 89.21. Ibid., p. 88.

22. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 185.

23. Ibid., p. 184.24. Osgood, op. cit., p. 180.25. Ibid., p. 183.26. Ibid., pp. 175,183; Rees, op. cit., pp. 166-167.

27. Osgood, ibid., pp. 175-176.


29. Ibid., pp. 410,446.

30. Ibid., p. 446.

31. Ibid. Also see p. 458.32. Quoted in Osgood, op. cit., p. 169.

33. Ibid., pp. 180-182.

34. A. M. Schlesinger and R. H. Rovere, The General and the

President. and the Future of American Foreign Policy

(William Heinemann, London, 1952), pp. 91-92.

35. Truman. Quoted in Leckie, op. cit., p. 251.


37. Truman. Quoted in Leckie, op. cit., p. 251.

38. Quoted in ibid.39. A. L. George, "American Policy Making and the North Korean

Aggression, " World Politics., January 1955, pp. 211-215.40. F. H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, 3rd ed. (Macmillan,

New York, 1967), p. 391.41. George, op. cit., pp. 211-215.42. Whiting, op. cit., pp. 40,41.

43. Truman, op. cit., p. 355.44. Ibid., p. 353.45. Rees, op. cit., p. 100.

46. Chinese spokesman at the U. N., November 28,1950. Quoted in

Spanier, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

47. P. Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945,3rd ed.

(Longman, London and New York, 1977), pp.56-57.

48. See, for example, Stone, op. cit., pp. 206-207; Truman

op. cit., pp. 421-422; Whiting, op. cit., pp. 187 n. 38,90,

152-154; T. Yoo The Korean War and the United Nations: A

Legal and Diplomatic Hostorical Study (Librarie Desbarax

(Anc. ), Louvain, 1965), p. 48.





resultant Soviet and American commitments in the area

naturally enhanced its stature as a locale of disputed

superpower interest symmetry.

Thus, with the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war

the United States and the Soviet Union had almost as much at

stake in terms of primary and, especially, secondary

interests. As far as the latter were concerned, the war

soon became a testing ground for the superpowers'

credibility and resolve. For the U. S., although the

territorial status quo ante bellum was never recognized as

either legitimate or desirable, the Syrian-Egyptian attack

was perceived as a direct Soviet challenge to its regional

position and a threat to its general reputation which had to

be met at all costs. The U. S. S. R., on the other hand, had

even more at stake. The failure of Soviet arms and

patronage to prevent the defeat of 1967 and, thereafter, six

years of political and military stagnation had left its Arab

clients deeply frustrated and disenchanted with their patron

and posed a very serious threat to the position of the

U. S. S. R. in the entire Middle East. In this respect, the

outbreak of hostilities in 1973 provided the Kremlin with an

opportunity to consolidate its position and to recoup its

dented prestige by facilitating a limited Arab victory.

The concurrence of Soviet and American interests in the

Middle East at the time of the 1973 war was reflected in the

type and intensity of their intervention on behalf of their

respective clients in the conflict. In contrast to Korea,

these followed a similar pattern. For the United States,

the basic task was to thwart Egyptian and Syrian aims by



enabling Israel to rapidly restore the status quo ante

bellum, but without inflicting a humiliating defeat on the

Arabs. To this end, it initiated a massive re-supply

operation in aid of the Zionist State and employed a range

of coercive tactics in order to minimize Soviet intervention

on behalf of Egypt and Syria. Conversely, the U. S. S. R.

sought to facilitate a limited Arab victory and,

consequently, from the very first moments, launched an air-

and sealift of arms and military equipmentto Egypt

and

Syria. Once the tables were turned and the Israelis began

to gain the initiative, the Soviet Union engaged in displays

of minatory diplomacy as a warning against 1967-type

excesses. These displays reached a climax on October 24

when the U. S. S. R. threatened to unilaterally intervene

directly unless Israel ceased to advance on the Egyptian

front.

The ability and willingness of the U. S. S. R. to

intervene in accordance with its interests in the Middle

East was facilitated by a crisis situation which, in

contrast to the Korean war, was almost as conducive to

Soviet as it was to American intervention. At the systemic

level, the expansion of the international system, the

decline of the political cohesion of the Western alliance,

and the attainment of strategic parity with the United

States permitted the U. S. S. R. a degree of maneuver that it

could not enjoy in the early 1950's. The contribution of

these developments to its ability to meet its commitments to

client-states was complemented with an interventionary

milieu which, due to the widely perceived illegitimacy of

the territorial status quo ante bellum In the Middle East,



the geographical proximity of the U. S. S. R. to the region,

and the extent to which the Kremlin's credibility and

resolveimages

were seento be

atstake in the war, enabled

the Soviets to match American intervention in the 1973

hostilities.

I




Perhaps more than any other area outside Europe, the

Middle East1 has been accorded a great deal of importance

since the end of World War II by each of the superpowers.

For the region itself, this is not a new development.

Historically, the Middle East has been of central importance

to virtually all powers with global aspirations, where,

since the time of the Phoenicians, the Mediterranean Sea has

served as an imperial sea route to the wealth of Africa and

Asia, and its hinterland provided the manpower and the

material resources of the Roman, Byzantine, Arab, and

Ottoman Empires, and permitted the outreach of the power of

Britain and France. The postwar importance attached to the

region by the United States and the Soviet Union, the global

powers of the nuclear age, is based on a number of factors.

One of these, which in the past also attracted the ancient

French, and British empires, is the goegraphical location of

the region.. This is of strategic, though somewhat

declining, importance to both the U. S. and its West European

allies on the one hand, and the U. S. S. R. on the other.

Another, of rapidly increasing significance for the

superpowers, is petroleum. Still other factors of more

recent origin but, perhaps, of paramount importance, relate

to thecommitments

incurred by each of the United States and

the Soviet Union in the region.

The importance of the Middle East to the superpowers

Geostrategic

A perennial attraction of the Middle East has been the



geographical location and features of the region. The

actual location of the Middle East has been considered

important for the security of both the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization and the Soviet Union by the Western powers and

the Kremlin respectively. For the Soviet Union, the

importance of the region for its security is underlined by

its geographical proximity to it. In contrast to the

United States, the U. S. S. R. actually shares a common border

with two Middle Eastern countries, Turkey and Iran, and is

much nearer to the Mediterranean Sea than is the U. S.

Consequently, certain parts of the Soviet Union, in

particular southern Russia, which includes the highly

industrialized Donets basin, are potentially vulnerable to

attacks from the Middle East and from naval forces operating

in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Although

it is highly doubtful whether the U. S. S. R. has confronted

any real threat from the Middle East during the postwar era,

or whether, in view of the superpower balance of terror and

the overwhelming military superiority of the Soviet Union

over any European or Middle Eastern power, it is likely to

confront such a threat in the foreseeable future, Soviet

leaders still consider the prospect of an attack from the

Middle East with some anxiety. The reason for this is

that, as one writer has pointed out,

For reasons of geography and history the Russians have

long been acutely sensitive over all matters ofsecurity, and the consequent instinctive concern aboutthe vulnerability of southern Russia may have been

reinforced by experience of threats to this section ofthe Soviet periphery during the Civil War, the Second

World War and the earlier stages of the Cold War... The

Middle East must (therefore] remain an area of concernto Soviet defence planners... simply because it is closeto the Soviet Union, because some Western forces



continue to operate there, and because it is unstable

and highly armed.2

This concern became all the greater with the deployment by

the United States of the Polaris nuclear missile-launching

submarine in the Mediterranean which, in addition to the

U. S. fleet of aircraft carriers, constituted a new threat to

the industrial centres of the U. S. S. R. 3 In recognition of

this, the Commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov,

pointed out that "defense of the country against an attack

from the sea assumes even more important significance for

our armed forces. This is... the result of submarines,

which in a number of navies are the main carriers of

strategic nuclear missiles. "4

In order to counter the potential threat from the

Middle East, the Soviet Union has undertaken a number of

measures over the years. During the immediate postwar

period and right up to the 1960's, these centred mainly on

Iran and Turkey. 5 Thus, in 1945 and 1946, Soviet forces

stationed in Iran under a 1942 treaty apparently fomented a

separatist movement in Azerbaidjan through the Communist

(Tudeh) Party in an effort to set up a pro-Soviet republic

in that region which borders the U. S. S. R., 6and during the

1950's and the early 1960's Moscow put some pressure on the

Tehran regime in an attempt to prevent too close an Iranian

alignment with the Americans. 7 In Turkey, Soviet anxiety

over a potential attack from that country manifested itself

in 1947 when Foreign Minister Molotov exerted intense

pressure on Ankara to surrender the contested areas of Kars

and Ardahan, 8and in 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis,

when Krushchev demanded that the United States withdraw its



Jupiter missiles from Turkey in return for the withdrawal of

Soviet missiles in Cuba. 9

By the late 1960's the U. S. S. R. was in possession of

sufficient military power to enable it to undertake

significant measures to counter the potential threat from

the Middle East. Thus, it began to extend the deployment

of its naval forces to the Mediterranean Sea in order to

neutralize the United States Sixth Fleet there, the object

of this being to gain a more favourable strategic position

vis-a-vis the access routes to the Soviet Union, and some

degree of protection against the newest type of nuclear

threat. 10

The entry of the Soviet fleet into the Mediterranean

created a need for both naval and, especially, air bases or

facilities and, therefore, increased the interest of the

U. S. S. R. in the Middle East. The attainment of naval bases

in the area would constitute an asset for the Soviet Union

in operating in the Mediterranean Sea as well as in the

Indian Ocean, in which the Soviet navy began to make a

substantial presence at about the same time as it began to

do so in the Mediterranean, by enhancing the flexibility and

staying power of the Soviet fleets in these areas.ll

Likewise, access to air bases in the Middle East would be of

immense value to the U. S. S. R. in view of the fact that, in

contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union had, during

the early 1970's, only one newly-launched aircraft carrier.

The availability of such bases, especially in the eastern or

southern Mediterranean, would go a long way towards giving

air cover to the exposed Soviet fleet there. Moreover,

access to air bases in the Middle East would serve as useful



refueling stops to the Soviets in flying either cargo or

military forces to their allies in the Horn of Africa,

Angola or Mozambique, should the need arise.12

The importance attached by the Soviet Union to gaining

naval and air bases in the Middle East has been evidenced by

its long and persistent efforts to this end, a fact that has

often led to friction between the Kremlin and many countries

of the area, particularly Egypt, 13 where it was finally

given access to naval facilities at Alexandria and Port Said

as well as to half a dozen military airfields.14 After the

October 1973 war, the U. S. S. R. had access only to the

relatively small Syrian ports of Tartous and Latakia, having

been deprived of the larger Egyptian ones by the Sadat

regime. On the Indian Ocean side of the Middle East, the

main Soviet naval facilities are in the People's Democratic

Republic of Yemen and in Ethiopia. These have been of

enormous help to the U. S. S. R. in its endeavour to establish

a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 15

The Soviet Union will probably continue to view the

Middle East as an area of importance toits

security,if

only for reasons of geographical proximity. However, this

importance may well decline, as the strategic threat posed

by the presence of Western forces in the Mediterranean

recedes to other areas. The process leading to this began

with the deployment of the more advanced Polaris submarines

and the Poseidon, and is likely to accelerate, as the new

6,000 mile range Trident submarine further shifts the

defence point of contact to the large seas, for example,

from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, amd as the



U. S. S. R. develops a fleet of aircraft carriers and thereby

reduces or even eliminates the need for land-based aircraft

to cover its naval forces. Nevertheless', these

technological developments will not entirely remove the

potential threat emanating from the Mediterranean. The

U. S. Sixth Fleet will continue to be deployed there for the

foreseeable future in protection of N. A. T. O. 's southern

flank and other American interests and commitments in the

region. Consequently, the Soviet Union will presumably

continue to deploy a significant Mediterranean fleet for the

purposes of basic defence and flexibility, and to protect

its interests and give credibility to its commitments in the

Middle East. 16

In contrast to the Soviet Union, the geographical

location of the Middle East does not bear a direct relevance

to the security of the United States; it is only of

indirect importance insofar as the prospect of a strong

hostile presence in the area would be seen to constitute a

potential threat to the southern flank of N. A. T. O.

Ironically, it is this very prospect which generated the

anxiety that led the U. S. S. R. to adopt a number of

protective measures in Iran, Turkey, and later on in the

Mediterranean area. The early Soviet moves in Iran and

Turkey, however, were interpreted by the Western powers as

evidence of the aggressive and expansionist designs of the

Soviet Union. Comingat

the timeof

the Communist threat

in Korea and the "apparent success of N. A. T. O. in

counteracting Russian power in Europe, " these moves may have

lent credence to the American belief that "Russia was

prepared to employ military aggression along its peripheries



whenever it was not opposed by adequate military force and,

therefore, it might be expected to seek to outflank N. A. T. O.

through the Middle East. "17 This realization prompted the

United States to endeavour throughout the 1950's to organize

a strategic consensus against the Soviet Union, first in the

form of the Middle East Defence Organization (M. E. D. O. ), and

then the Baghdad Pact and the Central Treaty Organization

(CENTO), and later to establish a permanent presence in the

Mediterranean Sea. But, in doing so, the United States

only reinforced Soviet fears and may have played a large

part in stimulating the Kremlin's decision to extend the

deployment of its navy to the Mediterranean Sea. Indeed,

given the "lead time" of a large ship, which is estimated to

be up to 10 years,18 the decision to do so seems to have

been taken some time between 1955, when the Soviet military

budget was increased by 12 per cent, and 1958. This, in

turn, fed Western fears of a threat to N. A. T. O's southern

flank. As Mangold has pointed out, the deployment in the

1960's of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean, and the

Soviet quest for a base infrastructure along its south-east

littoral, generated a feeling of encirclement among some of

the southern European members of N. A. T. O., and brought into

question the capability of the Sixth Fleet to reinforce

these countries in the event of war. It threatened to

weaken the credibility of the alliance's commitment to

Greece, Turkey, and, to some extent, Italy, and hence to

erode the whole of N. A. T. O. Even under normal peace-time

conditions, the air forces of these three countries were

considered to be out-matched by Soviet aircraft deployed in



Egypt and attached to units of the Warsaw Pact in Bulgaria.

At times of war or crisis, it was assumed that extra Soviet

aircraft could be repidly deployed to airfields in Egypt and

other friendly North African states, thereby offsetting the

advantage enjoyed by the American Sixth Fleet over the

Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean of an integral air

component, and necessitating the dilution of the Atlantic

alliance's limited air cover through the diversion of

aircraft from the northern and central to the southern

flank. 19 Thus, in a classic action-reaction cycle, the

Middle East assumed major strategic importance for the

N. A. T. O. alliance as well as for the Soviet Union.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the deployment by the United

States of a naval force in the Mediterranean Sea did not

necessitate a search for naval and air bases on the southern

Mediterranean. The U. S. Navy already had access to

facilities in Gaeta, Italy, and subsequently demonstrated

that it could maintain a permanent presence anywhere in the

Mediterranean, 20and the Air Force had at its disposal bases

in Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and, until 1970, the

Wheelus base near Tripoli, Libya, which was used by the

Strategic Air Command (S. A. C. ), as well as a formidable

fleet of aircraft carries. The question of bases, however,

assumed greater importance for the United States on the

Indian Ocean side of the Middle East where, in the absence

of naval facilities, it would be extremely difficult, if not

impossible, to maintain a permanent presence in the Indian

Ocean. 21 In that area, the U. S. has had access to naval

facilities on the island of Bahrein. These were suspended

at the time of the October War, but have since been

237



restored.

As with the U. S. S. R., the United States will most

probably continue to view the Middle East as an area of

military importance because several N. A. T. O. member states

are located on the northern shores of the Mediterranean Sea,

and because it constitutes a segment of the rimland of the

Soviet Union. But, apart from this, the general military

significance of the Middle Eat region has declined over the

years for much the same reasons as it has for the U. S. S. R.,

with improvements in the ranges of submarines and"submarine-

launched ballistic missiles substituting the Indian Ocean

for the Mediterranean as a major deployment area, and with

technological progress rendering obsolete the generation of

Anglo-American bombers and American missiles which had made

use of Middle Eastern bases in the 1950's and the early

19G0's. 22

The military importance of the geographical proximity

of the Middle East to the Soviet Union and Europe is not,

however, the only factor which makes the region of strategic

significance to the superpowers. As one writer has

succinctly described it, the Middle East is also

strategically important for its central place in

international communications:

Located at the hub of Europe, Asia, and Africa, theMiddle East is a crossroads and a bridge. It is

bounded by the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the

Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, theBlack Sea, and the Caspian Sea. This geographicalposition was of historical significance for land trade

routes and is of contemporary importance for land, sea,and air communications linking Western and EasternEurope with Eastern Africa, the Indian subcontinent,Southeast Asia, the Far East, and Australasia. 23



Although the land routes have diminished in importance,

the sea and air routes are of significance, and unimpeded

transit is an interest of both superpowers, particularly the

United States and its West European allies. Perhaps the

most important of the sea routes to the Western powers is

the Strait of Hormuz through which the vast majority of

Persian Gulf oil is shipped to Europe and Japan. To the

north-west of the Strait of Hormuz comes the Gulf of Agaba

which is of no direct importance to the United States but

which, by connecting both the Israeli port of Eilat and the

Jordanian port of Aqaba with the Red Sea and the Indian

Ocean, has an intrinsic value to Isreal and Jordan, two key

allies of the U. S. in the Middle East. Moreover, as Reich

points out, -the significance of the Gulf of Aqaba must also

"be judged in terms of the roleit

playedin the 1956

and

1967 Arab-Israeli wars. "24

Next in importance after the Strait of Hormuz comes the

Suez Canal which constitutes the shortest shipping route

between Western Europe and Asia, and a principal route for

the transport of Persian Gulf petroleum to Western Europe.

It is also an important route for the shipment of other

goods between Europe and the Indian and Pacific Ocean

areas.25 The Suez Canal is also of direct military

importance to the Americans, since it simplifies the task of

maintaining its Middle East Force, which has been stationed

in the Indian Ocean since World War II. While the Canal

was closed between June 1967 and June 1975, this force was

supplied from the United States east coast via a route of

nearly 11,000 nautical miles around the Cape of Good, Hope.

Through the Suez Canal this trip is shortened to about



6,600 nautical miles. Perhaps even more important, ships

could easily be rotated to and from the Sixth Fleet in the

Mediterranean if that were desirable. 26 The military

importance of the Canal, however, is somewhat diminished by

its vulnerability to air attack and blockage in times of

war.27 Of almost equal importance to the Suez Canal is Bab

al-Mandab which is situated at the southern end of the Red

Sea and separates the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of

Africa. The Bab constitutes the gate to the southern

approaches of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. 28

For the Soviet Union, the most important of the Middle

Eastern sea routes are the Turkish Straits29 which control

access between the Soviet Black Sea ports and the rest of

the world and through which reinforcements and supplies for

the U. S. S. R. 's naval fleets in the Mediterranean Sea, the

Indian as well as the Pacific Oceans pass.

The maintenance of these naval forces is made all that

much easier by the availability of the Suez Canal which,

therefore, constitutes another important, though not vital,

Soviet interestin

the region.In the

absence ofthe

Canal, the Indian Ocean is not readily accessible to the

U. S. S. R. First of all, Soviet Pacific ports are severely

handicapped by fog in spring and autumn and by ice in

winter. Furthermore, the south coast of Arabia is over

6,100 nautical miles from the nearest Soviet Pacific port.

From more favourable ports on the Black Sea, the scime

destination is nearly 11,500 nautical miles through the

Mediterranean-Gibralter-Cape of Good Hope route. Through

the Suez Canal, Soviet ships sailing from the Black : ea



would require only 3,200 nautical miles to reach the same

point. However, as pointed out earlier, account must

always be taken of the ease with which the Canal can be

blocked in emergency. 30

Another Soviet interest in the Suez Canal is an

economic one. As some writers have noted, the Canal

provides a route for goods in transport from Russia to the

Soviet Far East as well as to some Asian countries; the

alternative overland route, which consists mainly of one

major road and the Trans-Siberian Railway, is both about 50

per cent more expensive and is vulnerable to Chinese

interference: 31

Of somewhat less strategic importance than the sea

routes are the air routes of the Middle East, although, on

balance, these may be of more significance to the Soviet

Union that the West. They provide direct flight paths from

Europe to Asia and the Pacific area and offer good climatic

and geographical conditions.32 For the U. S. S. R., the

significance of these routes lies in the fact that they

provide direct flight paths from the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe to West Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique,

and the Horn of Africa. Thus, they would inevitably he

used in the event of a major conflagration in the Horn or in

Southern Africa which necessitates the assistance of the

U. S. S. R. to its allies and friends in those regions.

Petroleum

Perhaps the most important strategic asset of the

Middle East is petroleum. This is certainly the case for

the West, especially Western Europe and Japan, and



increasingly so for the Soviet Union. The strategic

significance of the region in this respect has been rapidly

growing over the years. Thus, between 1938 and 1963,

Middle East oil production rose from 16.2 million metric

tons, or 7.7 per cent of world production, to 390.4 million

tons, a figure representing 34.7 per cent of world

production. By 1973, the Middle East produced 1,210.2

million metric tons, which then represented 51.3 per cent of

world production. The importance of these numbers is

better appreciated when they are considered in the context

of the high rates of economic growth characteristic of the

1950's and 1960's, which to a large extent had been made

possible by the availability of cheap Middle East oil, and

also against the increasing use of petroleum as a source of

energy during the 1960's and early 1970's. Whereas in 1960

oil constituted 39 per cent of total energy consumption

in countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (O. E. C. D. ), in 1973 the figure was 53 per

cent. Moreover, the Middle East contained the bulk of the

world's proven oil reserves. In 1974, the figure was 60.85

per cent. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 24.2 per cent

of world proven oil reserves, whilst Kuwait accounted for

11.4 per cent and Iran for 9.2 per cent.33

For the United States, interest in Middle Eastern

petroleum was, until after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973,

largely indirect and hence relatively less important than

that of its Western European friends who imported most of

their oil from the region. Being for many years the world's

largest oil producer, the U. S. was only slightly dependent



on oil imports from the Middle East. These constituted 1.5

per cent of total American energy consumption in 1962, and a

mere 2 per cent ten years later. 34 However, by 1976 the

United States had become the world's largest oil importer,

and the proportion of its oil imports coming from Arab

countries had increased from 7 per cent in 1973 to 34 per

cent in 1975. The strategic-military significance of this

development was brought home by the fact that in January

1975 "it was officially estimated that in the event of

imported oil supplies being totally cut off, American oil

production would be inadequate to provide for even a wartime

economy, a development whose effect on national security was

described as 'immediate, ' 'direct' and 'adverse'. "35 This

point was appreciated a couple of years earlier when, as a

result of the Arab oil embargo, United States armed

services, like those of its European allies, were adversely

affected, "with pilots for some time afterwards being

restricted to short flight training and the number of

steaming days of front line warships drastically reduced. "36

As a consequence of the increasing recognition of the

strategic importance of Middle Eastern petroleum for the

United States, the need for the Americans to prevent any of

the main oil-producing countries from coming under Soviet

influence, and to pursue an even-handed policy towards the

Arabs and the Israelis so as to peacefully settle the Middle

East problem and avert another oil embargo was all the more

underlined.37

A lot has been made in the Western world of the

importance of Middle Eastern petroleum to the Soviet Union,

with much of the debate focusing on the U. S. S. R. 's



projected energy needs for the next few decades or so.38

In marked contrast to Western Europe and Japan and, to a

lesser extent, the United States, the Soviet Union "wants,

but does not need, limited quantities of Middle East oil. "

It had begun to import petroleum from the region only in

1967 when it concluded agreements with a number of

countries, the most important of which was Iraq which, by

the mid-1970's exported to the U. S. S. R. some two million

tonsof oil per annum, or the equivalent of a mere

0.4per

cent of the total annual Soviet petroleum prduction rate.39

More recently, the Soviet Union has started to import small

quantities of oil from some Arab Gulf States. 40

The main current economic benefit derived from these

imports lies in the area of Soviet exports, in particular

the freeing of the U. S. S. R. from the burden of supplying the

East European countries, thus providing increased Soviet oil

resources for export to hard currency areas. Indeed, on

the Kremlin's recommendation, several East European states

have concluded contracts for the provision of Middle East

petroleum, while the U. S. S. R. has increased its own exports

to the West. 41 Moreover, in view of the high

transportation costs of Sovit Far Eastern oil, it makes

economic sense for the U. S. S. R. to export this oil to Japan

and to import Middle Eastern oil for domestic

requirements. 42

However, the strategic significance of Middle Eastern

oil for the Soviet Union depends on when and to what extent

it may become a net oil importer. Currently, the Baku and

Volga-Urals areas are the principal sources of Soviet oil

244



production, but these are expected to decline rapidly in

importance before the end of the 1980's. The main

alternative source. is in the Far Eastern U. S. S. R., but, as

mentioned earlier, the transportation as well as drilling

and production costs do not make it a viable source of

energy for the industrial concentrations of western

U. S. S. R. 43 In order to narrow the gap between consumption

and exports, on the one hand, and production, on the other,

the Soviet Union would have to either import increasing

quantities of Middle Eastern petroleum, increase its own

production, or both. The second option may necessitate the

acquisition of Western technology through detente, such as

Soviet-American or Soviet-Japanese deals for cooperation in

oil extraction,44 by no means a foregone conclusion. The

Kremlin may, therefore, settle for a combination of

increased oil imports and increased production, a choice

which would inevitably make access to Middle Eastern oil an

important Soviet objective.

Political

Perhaps the most overlooked and somewhat underestimated

asset of the Middle East is its high political standing

among the non-aligned countries. As one writer has noted,

"Middle East states have enjoyed a level of prestige far

greater than that of much of the Third World. "45 For the

main part, this has revolved around two Arab states, Egypt

and Algeria, and is based upon a number of political,

cultural, and economic factors.

The political basis of the prestige of the Arab Middle

East amongst the developing nations is, to a large extent,

245





Third World has, to be sure, steadily declined, as memories

of Nasser and the Algerian War of `Independence have receded

into history. But, the prestige is still there, although

it is now sustained more by factors other than the political

one. One of these is religion. The Arab world, being the

birth place of Islam, and speaking the language in which the

Koran was written, has for a long time been the focus of

attention of Moslems all over the world, many of whom join

the annual pilgrimage in Mecca and attend the Islamic

universities of Azhar in Egypt and Zaytouna in Tunisia.

The international political importance of the religious

pillar of Arab prestige will always be limited, however, by

the fact that it can only influence the politically

insignificant non-Arab Moslem world.

A much more important factor for the prestige of the

Arabs is petroleum. The Middle East, as pointed out

earlier, contains over 60 per cent of the world's proven oil

reserves and, perhaps even more important than this at least

for the present, is the fact that the world's most

industrialized nations are dependent on Arab oil for their

energy supply. The mere impression of Western dependence

on Arab energy resources, superficial as this may be when

considered within the context of the Arab states' overall

pattern of trade with the West, can be a great boost to Arab

prestige amongst the developing countries. This prestige

can be even further enhanced by the lure/prospect of Arab

financial aid to these countries in return for the latter's

political support of Arab causes, for example, at the United

Nations General Assembly and other international

organizations.

247



Thus, on the whole, the Arab Middle East is perhaps the

most prestigious area in the underdeveloped world. This

makes it of utmost importance for the superpowers in their

contest for global influence. In the words of McLaurin,

"[i]f swaying the opinion of the developing areas is

important---and both superpowers, whether justified or not,

have acted as if it is---the prominence of the Middle East

states in these circles cannot be overlooked. "48

The Middle East and superpower security

In view of the preceding analysis, it is clear that,

due to its political and geostrategic importance, and its

enormous output and reserves of petroleum, the Middle East

occupies a very high position in the politico-strategic

calculations of the superpowers. This view was expressed

by, amongst others, David G. Nes, the United States charge

d'affairs in Cairo in 1967. Writing in August 1968, at the

height of the Vietnam war,-he

stated that the strategic

significance of the Middle East, even in the nuclear era,

"is far more importantin defence

ofWestern interests than

the area to which the United States has presently committed

more than half -a million fighting men.49 More than a

decade later, U. S. Ambassador-at-Large, Alfred Atherton,

pointed out that "there are few areas in the world today

where so many different and important American interests

come together. "50 A similar view was expressed by the

U. S. S. R. Supreme Soviet in July 1970, when it pointed out

that "[w]hat takes place in this area [the Middle East], at

the junction of the African and Asian continents, has a



direct relation to the fates of the peoples of all the

countries of Asia and Africa and to the fate of general

peace and security of peoples. "51

Whilst the value of the Middle East for its political

and geostrategic position and its large petroleum resources

entitles it to a special status in the global competition of

the superpowers and, therefore, explains their persistent

and at times intense interest in the region, it does not

mean that it is a vital component of the security of the

United States and the Soviet Union. For, perhaps with the

important exception of petroleum, on which the West

Europeans, the Japanese, to some extent, the Americans and,

potentially, the Soviet Union are highly dependent for their

energy supplies, it is difficult to see how, in the age of

mutually assured destruction, changes in the political

configuration of the region can significantly affect the

security of the superpowers. This remains true despite the

arguments pertaining to the potential Soviet threat to

N. A. T. O. 's flank, or the Western threat to southern Russia

should the Middle East come under the influence of either

the U. S. S. R. or the United States respectively. But the

petroleum factor was irrelevant to the circumstances under

which, during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, the

superpowers maneuvered themselves into a position whilst

defending their Middle Eastern clients where the risk of

direct conflict between them was quite substantial. On

neither of these occasions, it must be emphasized, was

either' the U. S. or the U. S. S. R. reacting to a real or

potential, long or short term threat to its

sources/potential sources of oil. Nevertheless. the



behaviour of the United States and the Soviet Union on those

occasions indicated that something rather vital for them was

at stake. In order to explain this and, therefore, the

relative importance of the Middle East for the security of

the superpowers, it is necessary to assess the significance

of American and Soviet commitments in the region.

In theory, Soviet or American domination of the Middle

East might give either the U. S. S. R. or the U. S. respectively

an edge over the other in the event of an outbreak of

limited war between N. A. T. O. and Warsaw Pact forces, but the

final outcome of such a war, if it does not immediately

escalate into a general nuclear conflict, is more likely to

depend, in the ultimate analysis, on the balance of resolve

between the two superpowers and, consequently, the

willingness of each to escalate the confrontation by, for

example, introducing different types of nuclear weapons,

than on the relative conventional military deployments of

the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. in the region. The balance of

resolve, in turn, is determined by the relative commitments

of the superpowersto those things which they perceive as

most relevant to their national interests (see Chapter 4).

In this context, a strong military presence in the region is

more important as a signal of the strength of a superpower's

resolve to defend a certain commitment by acting, for

instance, as a "trip wire, " than for any intrinsic military

value.

For the United States, the most important commitments

in the Middle East are to access to the petroleum resources

of the region, especially for its West European allies and



Japan, and to the security of its clients in the area, in

the foremost of which is the State of Israel. As will be

seen, these two commitments have inter-related purposes.

The importance to the West of access to Middle Eastern

oil has already been mentioned. The firm commitment of the

Americans to this goal has been demonstrated by the numerous

statements of U. S. officials to this effect; by the

presence of powerful naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea,

the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean whose functions are,

amongst other things, to serve as a trip wire against

possible Soviet intervention in the area, and as a warning

to local radicals of an anti-American orientation; and by

the creation of the so-called "Rapid Deployment Force"

which is designed specifically for intervention in the

Middle East tosafeguard vital

Western interests there.

Until the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the United States

commitment to access to Middle Eastern oil had not been put

to the test through an external threat to out off oil

supplies to the West by, for example, blockading the Strait

of Hormuz. The only challenge came from the Arabs

themselves when, during the October war, they put an embargo

on oil supplies to the United States and the Netherlands

pending a more balanced policy on the part of these two

countries towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Given the

circumnstances of the embargo, that is, the fact that it was

carried out by some of America's staunchest friends in the

region, Washington's response only served to emphasize its

commitment in this respect: time and again senior United

States' officials, including Secretary of State Kissinger

and Secretary of Defence Schlesinger, warned Arab oil

251



producers of the possibility of U. S. counter-measures,

including military ones, should they continue or accelerate

their oil embargo.52

The invocation of the threat of direct intervention in

order to protect Western interests in the Middle East is,

however, a rare occurrence on the part of the United States.

For the most part, particularly since the early 1960's,

Washington has relied on individual friendly Middle Eastern

States to protect its interests in the region.

Consequently, it became increasingly committed to their

security, especially from external threats. 53 In most

cases, these commitments neither did nor needed to be

manifested in anything more than assurance of a constant

flow of arms supplies and general cooperation and advice on

various matters relating to external as well as internal

security. This, for example, seems to be the case with

Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States. In other

instances, specifically that of Jordan and Israel, United

States commitments took a very different form, with promises

of direct American intervantion in the event of a serious

threat to either of these states. Thus, Washington invoked

the threat of direct intervention on behalf of Jordan's King

Hussein in the wake of Syria's armoured incursion into the

country in 1970 to aid Palestinian guerillas who were at war

with the Hashemite royal family.

However, by far the strongest and most consistent

United States commitments are to the security and well-

being of the State of Israel. These commitments have for a

long time been taken for granted as basic elements of





the Middle East problem, the United States gave Israel the

means which enabled it, not only to retain the 1967

conquests, but also to colonize substantial portions of

them, for example, the West Bank and the Syrian Golan

Heights, and to make any talk of repatriating Palestinian

refugees seem rather preposterous.

One reason for the rather open-ended nature of the

American commitment to Israel is the influence of the

wealthy and well-organized Zionist lobby in the United

States, especially in Congress. Another reason, more

directly related to U. S. security concerns, is that because

the Americans have politically invested so much in Israel

over the years, an interest has developed in the Zionist

State as a credibility element. In the words of Reich,

Israel is perceived by the Arab world and many of the

other members of the international community asbenefiting from a strong U. S. security commitment.This perception generates expectations. To ensure the

credibility of the United States as an ally (an

important security interest) the perceived commitmentto Israel must be maintained. Continued support for

Israel,... helps to reassure other American allies andto ensure the credibility of the U. S. role. Any U. S.

action that might be interpreted as backing away from

the widely identified commitment to Israel would likelyaffect and undermine the credibility of U. S.

commitments, not only to Israel but elsewhere as well.The argument suggests that should the United States

"abandon" Israel, the U. S. role in other situations

would be open to question.57

A major problem in this respect is that "abandonment" could

mean anything from the literal definition of the term, that

is, leaving Israel to the mercy or control of others, to, as

Tel Aviv would have it, any form of pressure by the United

States such as delays in the delivery to Israel of the

latest conventional military equipment.

In contrast to the United States, Soviet commitments in



the Middle East are rather hard to specify, and those that

can be more or less clearly defined give the impression of

being of a rather ambiguous nature.As

withthe Americans,

probably the only feature of the Middle East which may be of

importance to the vital security interests of the U. S. S. R.

is petroleum. But even here, the Soviet interest is of a

futuristic rather than current nature, and is likely to be

partial and not total. Besides, the position of the Soviet

Union vis-a-vis the Middle Eastern countries which own most

of -the world's proven oil reserves and supply most of the

world's energy needs is very different to that of the United

States. Virtually all of these coutnries, especially the

most important of them, Saudi Arabia, are ruled by fervently

anti-communist ultra-conservativeregimes which are closely

aligned to the United States and Western Europe. " For the

Americans, a commitment to the unimpeded flow of petroleum

from the Middle East to the West could be made as part of a

package deal or general understanding which could also

include guarantees against external or internal threats to

the oil suppliers. Such an arrangement would appear to be

in the mutual interest of both the United States and its

oil-rich friends and would, therefore, be more amenable to

the latter. But the Soviet leadership could make no such

arrangements. Instead, it could either formally commit

itself to the "right" to purchase Middle Eastern

petroleum by warning the suppliers of the consequences of

either withholding oil from, or discriminating in any way

against, the U. S. S. R.; or it could seek to improve its

relations with the conservative oil states; or it could



attempt to change the status quo by endeavouring to

undermine the rule of the Kings, princes, and tribal chiefs

who govern the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf States, as a

precondition to ensuring future petroleum supplies. None

of these options, however, offers a promising solution.

Whilst the first one would lack credibility and would not be

politically conceivable in view of the firm alignment of the

conservative oil states to the Americans, the scope

available for working towards the second and third

alternatives is extremely limited given the obsession of the

semi-feudal rulers of the Peninsula and Gulf with the so-

called "communist threat" and the almost complete absence of

radical secular opposition forces within those areas of the

Middle East. Thus, in the absence of radical political

changes in the oil-producing states, the Soviet Union would

have to make do with the hope that, should it one day need

to import substantial quantities of Middle Eastern

petroleum, no power would either prevent it from doing so or

contemplate using the threat of cutting off oil supplies to

it in the event of some sort of a confrontation on the basis

of a recognition of the common interest in non-interference

with energy supplies.

Undoubtedly the most important Soviet commitments in

the Middle East are to the security of client regimes from

external threats, particularly those emanating from states

not supported by the U. S. S. R. As it happened, all Soviet

client regimes in the Middle East have tended to be Arab,

and the principal external threat of this type to their

security has come from Israel, an American client.

Consequently, although initially the Kremlin had no desire



to become involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which it

considered as a national dispute of no direct concern to

itself, the high priority given to the struggle against

Israel by Arab client regimes led it to conclude that, in

the absence of substantial. assistance to the Arabs against

Israel, it would make very few inroads into the Arab

world.58

The extent to which the U. S. S. R. is seen to be

committed to its Arab clients has been considered by the

Soviets as important, especially with regard to their

contest with China for influence in the Third World. Thus,

military aid provided by the Soviet Union was considered

significant not only for allowing the so-called

"progressive" forces to withstand their Western-backed

enemy, but also for demonstrating "to restive elements in

the Near East and far beyond that the Soviet Union was an

exponent of 'national liberation'. "59

Despite this, however, the Soviet commitment to the

Arabs has never come anywhere near to resembling the rather

open-endedAmerican commitment to Israel. In contrast to

the latter, whose vagueness has turned out to be its main

strength, it seems to. be based on a policy of "sanctuaries"

delimited by "red lines. " A "sanctuary" can be either a

country, a town, or some prestigious project. In the case

of the Middle East, the U. S. S. R. has defined such places as

Cairo, Damascus, and the Aswan Dam as "sanctuaries" which

were not to be attacked in time of war.60 The concept of

"red lines" can be taken to refer either to the instance

of "a violent internal threat to an established regime" or



to a situation where "an established regime is facing

complete military collapse in a war with another regional

actor. "61 In this case, the U. S. S. R. has apparently made

it clear on a number of occasions in the past that it would

not permit Israel to cause the removal of what were termed

"progressive regimes" in either Egypt or Syria. 62 In

contrast to the United States' commitment to Israel, that of

the U. S. S. R. to the Arabs allowed Israel plenty of scope

within which to maneuver to fulfil its aims without

obliging the Kremlin to live up to its commitments and come

to the aid of its friends.

Nevertheless, the height of the threshold above with

the U. S. S. R. committed itself to intervene on behalf of its

clients did not'absolve the Soviet leadership from having to

threaten to fulfil its commitments, the accomplishment of

which came to be generally perceived as a test of the

credibility of the Soviet Union as an ally. This is

because, in almost all of its major conflicts with the Arab

states, Israel did not feel content without going right over

to the edge of the threshold beyond which the probability of

direct Soviet intervention was substantial. This was the

case during the 1967 war, the 1968-1970 "War of Attrition"

between Egypt and Israel, and the 1973 war. In two of

these instances, the 1967 and 1973 wars, the threat of

direct Soviet intervention was made only when Israeli

military activities presented a major threat to the regimes

in Syria (1967)63 orEgypt (1973),

andin the third

instance, the War of Attrition, the U. S. S. R. actually

undertook a limited form of direct intervention when Israel

embarked on a series of deep penetration air raids which

258



included the Egyptian capital, Cairo. 64

An important derivative of the commitments by each of

the superpowers toIsrael

andthe Arab

confrontation states

has been the virtual polarization of the pattern of arms

supplies to the Middle East, with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq

being armed almost exclusively with Soviet weapons, whilst

Israel receives a substantial proportion of its military

equipment from the United States and a smaller proportion

from West European countries. Consequently, at stake in

every round of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the prestige of

the suppliers from a military-technological standpoint.65

This has been an especially sensitive issue for the Soviet

Union because the almost continual defeat of Soviet-equipped

forces by American-equipped onesbetween 1967

and1970

reflected negatively on Soviet training and suggested that

in certain major areas of military technology the U. S. S. R.

lagged behind the United States. Such assessments had

serious implications for the central European theatre, and

created doubt in the developing countries on the

desirability of seeking Soviet in preference to American

military resources.66 Concern over this prospect prompted

the U. S. S. R. during that period to send vast quantities of

weapons to its Arab clients and to train, re-train and

reorganize the latter's armed forces in the most effective

manner possible.67

The Americans have been relatively less concerned over

the Issue of the implications for their prestige of the

performance of their military equipment in the Middle East

because their client in the region, Israel, has emerged



militarily victorious from all of its conflagrations with

the Soviet-equipped and trained Arab armies. Nevertheless,

the United States, like the U. S. S. R., is anxious that its

weapons should perform well vis-a-vis those supplied by the

adversary superpower. This anxiousness was demonstrated

shortly after the October war when, in an answer to a

question put forward by Sadat regarding what the U. S.

attitude would be if Egypt proceeded to liquidate the

Israeli salient on the west bank of the Suez Canal,

Kissinger allegedly said, "[tjhe Pentagon will strike at

you... for one reason: Soviet weapons have once before

defeated U. S. weapons and, in accordance with our global

strategy, we can't allow it to happen again. "68

The importance to the superpowers of preserving and

enhancingthe

prestige oftheir

militaryequipment

and

training as reflected in the perennial Arab-Israeli wars has

resulted in the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. being locked into an

exclusive relationship with their respective clients that

has served as a major cause for the supply of more and

better arms to the region.

The Middle East, as the preceding analysis has

endeavoured 'to show, is a region in which the superpowers

have a wide range of interests which are of near equal

importance to both. Its geographical proximity to the

U. S. S. R. and to southern Europe makes it of military

significance to the Soviet Union as well as to the United

States; its location at the hub of Europe, Asia, and Africa

makes it strategically important to both superpowers for its

central place in international communications; and its

political prestige amongst the developing nations makes it



of utmost importance to the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. in their

contest for global influence. The only thing which, on the

whole, makes the Middle East of greater importance to the

West than to the Soviet Union is the rather asymmetrical

nature of superpower commitments in the area. As pointed

out, the U. S. is apparently committed to client regimes in

the region to a greater extent than is the U. S. S. R. whose

commitments to its Arab clients is much narrower and

somewhat minimal. The credibility of American commitments

in the region is greatly enhanced by the petroleum factor on

which Western Europe, Japan, and, to some extent, the United

States, in contrast to the Soviet Union, are highly

dependent for their energy supplies. However, as has been

pointed out, the U. S. S. R. is likely to need to import

substantial quantities of Middle Eastern oil once its

economically viable deposits in the Baku and Volga-Urals

areas begin to be exhausted, perhaps during the 1990's.

All in all, this general concurrence of Soviet and American

interests in the Middle East was, as will be seen, reflected

in their interventionary strategiesduring

the war of

October 1973.



Notes

1. The term "Middle East" will be taken to refer to Egypt,

Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, the ArabGulf States, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen Arab Republic, and thePeople's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

2. P. Mangold, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East(Croom Helm, London, 1978, p. 22. See also M. Mackintosh,"The Impact of the Middle East Crisis on Super-powerRelations, " Adelphi Papers No. 114 (International Institutefor Strategic Studies, London, 1975), p. 2; R. D. McLaurin,

The Middle East in Soviet Policy (Lexington Books, D. D.,Heath

andCompany, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1975), p. 15.

3. G. Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and theMiddle East Crisis (Cambridge University Press, London,

1977), p. 5.

4. Pravda, July 28,1974. Quoted in ibid.5. Y. Evron, "Great Powers'- Military Intervention in the Middle

East, " Great Power Intervention in the Middle East, ed. M.Leitenberg and G. Sheffer (Pergamon Press, New York, 1979),

p. 20; D. Peretz, "Critique of 'The Middle East: ImposedSolutions or Imposed Problems? "' idem, p. 298.

6. Institute for the Study of Conflict (I. S. C. ), SovietObjectives in the Middle East (I. S. C., London, March 1974),

p. 6.7. Mangold, op. cit., p. 22.

8. I. S. C., op. cit., p. 6.

9. Mangold, op. cit., p. 22; G. T. Allison, Essence of Decision:Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little, Brown andCompany, Boston, 1971), p. 140.

10. Golan, op. cit., p. 5; D. Holloway, "Foreign and Defence

Policy, " The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev, 2nd

ed., ed. A. Brown and M. Kaser (Macmillan, London andBasingstoke, 1978), p. 55; L. T. Caldwell, "The Future ofSoviet-American Relations, " Soviet American Relations in the

1980's: Superpower Politics and East-West Trade, ed. L. T.Caldwell and W. Diebold Jr. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1981),

p. 168.

11. P. M. Dadant, "American and Soviet Defense Systems vis-a-visthe Middle East, " The Middle East: Quest for an American

Policy, ed. W. A. Beling (State University of New York Press,

Albany, 1973), p. 183.12. Ibid., pp. 182-183.13. See, for example, M. H. Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar: The

Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East

(Collins, London, 1978); A. Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the

Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship since theJune War (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,1977).

14. Ibid.15. See Dadant, op. cit., p. 183.16. Golan, op. cit., pp. 12-13.17. T. C. Bose, The Superpowers and the Middle East (Asia

Publishing House, Bombay, London, New York, 1972), pp. 16-17.



18. - See C. Bell, The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era

(Martin Robertson, London, 1977), esp. p. 77.

19. Mangold, op. cit., p. 16.20. Dadent, op. cit., pp. 183-184.

21. Ibid., p. 184.

22. Mangold, op. cit. pp. 15-16; Golan, loc. cit.23. B. Reich, "United States Interests in the Middle East, " The

Middle East and the United States: Perceptions andPolicies, ed. H. Shaked and I. Rabinovich (Transaction

Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1980), p. 59.

24. Ibid., p. 60.

25. Ibid., p. 59.

26. Dadent, op. cit., p. 182.

27. Reich, op. cit., p. 59.

28. Ibid., p. 60.

29. Ibid., McLaurin, op. cit., p. 15.

30. Dadant, op. cit., p. 181; Golan, op. cit., p.6; W. Z.

Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union

and the Middle East, 1958-1970 (Penguin Books, London,

1972), p. 10; Mangold, op. cit., p. 17; McLaurin, ibid.,

pp. 30-31.

31. Golan, ibid., p. 7; Mangold, ibid., McLaurin, ibid., p. 30.

32. Reich, op. cit., p. 60.

33. Mangold, op. cit., p. 14; Reich, ibid., p. 61.

34. Mangold, ibid., p. 21; Reich, ibid.

35. Memorandum by Secretary of Treasury William Simon, January

14,1975. Cited in Mangold, ibid., pp. 21-22.

36.Washington Post., November 18,1974. Cited in ibid.,

p.22.

37. W. B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the

Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (University of California

Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), p. 13; M. Sid-

Ahmed, After the Guns Fall Silent: Peace or Armageddon in

the Middle East (Croom Helm, London, 1974), p. 49; J. C.

Campbell, "The United States and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, "

World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, ed. R. O.

Freedman (Pergamon Press, New York, 1979), pp. 39-40;

Reich, op. cit., pp. 61-62; R. Rosecrance, "Objectives ofU. S. Middle East Policy, " Shaked and Rabinovich, op. cit., p.31.

38. See, for example, J. A. Berry, "Oil and Soviet Policy in the

Middle East, " Middle East Journal, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring

1972; D. A. Schmidt, Armageddon in the Middle East (The

John Doy Company, New York, 1974); McLaurin, op. cit.;Golan, op. cit., M. Riad, "A View from Cairo, " The Middle

East in World Politics, ed. M. Ayoob (Croom Helm, London,

1981); I. S. C. op. cit., Mangold, op. cit.39. Mangod, ibid., p. 23; Riad, ibid., p. 30.

40. Riad, ibid.41. Golan, op. cit., p. 8.

42. McLaurin, op. cit., p. 32; Berry, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

43. McLaurin, ibid., pp. 31-33; Berry, ibid., p. 150.44. Golan, op. cit., p. 8.45. McLaurin, op. cit., p. 16.

46. See, for example, A. I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World:

The Elements of Foreign Policy (The Macmillan Press, London

and Basingstoke, 1976), esp. pp. 103-104,125,126; R. H.

Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics

(University of London Press, London, 1971), esp. pp. 43,46-47.



47. See Gamal Abdel-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution

(National Publication House, Cairo, [1954]); T. Y. Ismail,The U. A. R. in Africa: Egypt's Policy Under Nasser

(Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1971).

48. McLaurin, op. cit., p. 16.

49. Article in Baltimore Sun,August

11,1968. Quoted in G.Lenczowski (ed. ) United States Interests in the Middle East

(American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,Washington, D. C., n. d. ). p. 2.

50. Pittsburgh, April 13,1979. Quoted in L. A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East (Facts on File, New York, 1980),

p. 5.51. "Zayavleniya verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, " Pravda, July 16,

1970. Quoted in J. D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The

Soviet Union and War in the Middle East (The Johns Hopkins

University Press, Baltimore and London, 1975), P. 84.

52. See M. R. Buheiry, U. S. Threatsof

Intervention Against ArabOil: 1973-1979 (Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut,1 880), esp. pp. 11,12.

53". See, for example, J. C. Campbell, "American Search forPartners, " Soviet American Rivalry in the Middle East, ed.J. C. Hurewitz (Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York

and London, 1969), esp. pp. 204-205.54. Dadant, op. cit., p. 184. See also Quandt, op. cit., p. 10.55. Op. cit., p. 2.

56. Op. cit., pp. 10-11. Also see Campbell (1979), op. cit., p.39; Rosecrance, op. cit., p. 31.

57. Op. cit., pp. 76-77. Also see G. H. Quester, "The Middle East:

Imposed Solutions or Imposed Problems, " Leitenberg andSheffer, op. cit., p. 262.

58. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 63-64. Also see Caldwell, op. cit. p.168.

59. Glassman, op. cit., p. 5. Also see Caldwell, ibid.

60. A. Sella, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Arab War aims, " FromJune to October: The Middle East between 1967 and 1973, ed.I. Rabinovich and H. Shaked (Transaction Books, NewBrunswick, New Jersey, 1978), pp. 88-89.

61. Evron, op. cit., p. 39.62. Sella, op. cit., p. 89.

63. See L. B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of thePresidency 1963-1969 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York,

1971).

64. See Heikal, op. cit.: Rubinstein, op. cit.65. P. Jabber, "Petrodollars, Arms Trade, and the Pattern of

Major Conflicts, " Oil, the Arab-Israel Dispute, and the

Industrial World, ed. J. C. Hurewitz (Westview Press,

Boulder, Colorado, 1976), pp. 159-160.

66. Mangold, op. cit., p. 19.67. Glassman, op. cit., p. 84; Quester, op. cit., p. 263.68. Quoted in el-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography

(Collins, London, 1978), pp. 268-269.




Unlike the case of Korea, the United States and the

Soviet Union intervened in the Arab-Israeli war of October

1973 in a manner that was consistent with their primary

interests in the Middle East. However, in spite of this,

the situations obtaining in both areas and the superpowers'

responses to the two conflictsbear

certain similarities.

To begin with, in both Korea and the Middle East the status

quo ante bellum was more favourable to the U. S. than to the

U. S. S. R. Whilst in Korea the division of the peninsula and

the setting up of an American client-state in the south

thwarted Soviet aspirations for hegemony over the entire

country, in the Middle East the persistent defeat,

humiliation, and the frustration of the ambitions of the

U. S. S. R. 's Arab clients at the hands of Israel, and the

consequent military dominance of that country in the region

safeguarded the interests and enhanced the prestige of the

United States to the detriment of the Soviet Union.

Admittedly, in view of the U. S. 's exclusive reliance on

Israel's military supremacy in maintaining the status quo,

and given the fact that the Soviet-Arab patron-client

relationships were based almost solely on security-related

factors, this state of affairs was also conducive to the

continued presence of the U. S. S. R. in the region. This

is because so long as the conflict with Israel remained

unresolved, the Soviet Union's Arab proteges were likely to

continue to need their patron's assistance in return for

political and military concessions, thereby ensuring the



U. S. S. R. a role in the Middle East. Such, however, is a

very precarious basis for a superpower to premise its policy

in a region as important as the Middle East and, in any

case, there was a point where, without a significant redress

of the balance vis-a-vis Israel, the Arabs were likely to

question the utility of their relationship with the Soviet

Union or, indeed, the practicability of the military option

itself, and perhaps even succumb to American and Israeli

pressures for political and territorial concessions as a

precondition for a settlement of their dispute with Israel.

By the same token, an Arab victory over Israel, even a

limited one, would greatly boost the U. S. S. R. 's political

and military prestige amongst its clients all over the

world. Thus, the Kremlin had much to gain from a forcible

change of the pre-October 1973 status quo in favour of the

Arabs and undertaken by virtue of Soviet arms. Indeed, as

in Korea, had Washington been aware of the imminence of

hostilities, then it would have probably taken preventive

steps. Nevertheless, like Korea, the incumbent

administration was caught unawares, though on this occasion,

not so much as a result of a deliberate ploy on the part of

an insubordinate such as MacArthur, but because of its own

preconception which underestimated the Arabs' ability to

force a change in the status quo; overestimated the ability

of Israel to resist such a change and, consequently, blinded

it to warnings of the impending war. Also as in Korea, the

U. S. S. R. seems to have known in advance of the oncoming war

in the Middle East, but this time it stood by its client,

albeit very cautiously.



With the outbreak of war, both the United States and

the Soviet Union decided to intervene on behalf of their

respective clients, and in doing so, embarked upon the path

of confrontation. For the U. S., the mere fact of the

eruption of hostilities demonstrated the inherent

instability of the status quo and underlined the need for a

more balanced regional approach which would satisfy the

needs of the Arabs as well as those of Israel and, thereby,

give allthe

parties concerned a stakein

maintaining

stability in the area under American auspices. In this

respect, the war provided the United States with an

opportunity to substantially increase its influence in the

Middle East in that, if successful, a more balanced approach

which resolved the Arab-Israel dispute would remove the

raison d'etre for the Soviet presence in the area. Since a

resolution of the conflict along those lines would be

credited to American diplomacy and not to Soviet arms, such

an approach stood a good chance of persuading the U. S. S. R. 's

clients of the wisdom of cooperating with Washington as

opposed to Moscow.

However, during the first three days of the war, when

the joint Egyptian-Syrian offensive was making steady

progress, U. S. intervention seemed paradoxically minimal..

Relying partly on incorrect Israeli bulletins which

portrayed a rosy picture and predicted an imminent victory

over the Arabs, and partly on its own intelligence reports

which were still chronically distorted by the pre-war image

of Israeli invincibility and Arab impotence, Washington

premised its interventionary strategy on the expectation of

a rapid Israeli victory. Consequently, whilst exhorting



Israel to return to the pre-October lines as quickly as

possible, the United States refrained from supplying it with

additional aircraft and tanks, lest Tel Aviv be encouraged

to strive for a wholesale Arab humiliation and thus

foreclose the possibility of a post-war Arab-American

rapprochement. At the same time, rather than exercising

some form of coercive pressure on the Soviet Union which, as

in Korea, was presumed to have had prior knowledge of its

clients' intentions, the U. S. merely sought Moscow's

cooperation at the United Nations. Nevertheless, once the

reality of the situation became known, the United States

decided to sharply escalate its intervention in the conflict

by greatly accelerating its re-supply operation so as to

help Israel regain the territorial status quo antebellum

as

quickly as popssible, and by resorting to various means of

coercion vis-a-vis the Kremlin in order to terminate or at

least minimize Soviet intervention on behalf of the Arabs.

In the meantime, it endeavoured to nurture a dialogue with

Egypt, which it hoped to coopt with the promise of a

separate political settlement with Israel after the war.

In contrast to the Americans, the U. S. S. R. was, from

the very first moments of the outbreak of hostilities, fully

aware of the real situation on the battlefield, and its

strategy was basically guided by the desire to draw the

maximum possible regional

benefits from the conflagration

within the parameters set by the crisis situation. As with

the United States, the October war provided the Soviet

leadership with an opportunity to make gains, in this case,

by recouping the lost prestige and dwindling political



influence incurred through successive Arab defeats at the

hands of an American client and the six years of political

and military stagnation which followed the 1967 war.

Consequently, right from the start, the Kremlin chose to put

as much of the U. S. S. R. 's weight behind the Arabs as the

crisis situation permitted. During the first three days of

the war, this meant replenishing as much of the Egyptian and

Syrian war machines as was necessary for them to accomplish

their objectives whilst the U. S. was still confused as to

what was really going on. As, first, the Syrians and,

then, the Egyptians began to suffer major reverses, the

Soviet Union gradually escalated its intervention by

intensifying its re-supply operations and by indulging in

displays of minatory diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States

and Israel. The extent of the Soviet leaderhip's

determination not to "lose out" to the Americans in the

Middle East was ultimately demonstrated beyond all doubt by

its apparent willingness to unilaterally intervene directly,

and thereby risk a direct clash with the U. S., in defence of

Damascus on October 12, and, especially, to halt the Israeli

advance on the Egyptian front, which was threatening the

destruction of an entire Egyptian army corp, on October 25.

The double intervention of the United States and the

Soviet Union in the October war created a situation, towards

the end of the conflict, where each superpower, especially

the U. S. S. R., endeavoured to manipulate the risk of adirect

confrontation, not only to support its client(s), but also

to set precedents which would eventually legitimize its

presence in the area and thus tilt the regional balance of

interests in its own favour. As it turned out, neither



superpower seemed willing to go right over to the brink of

war in order to force the other to back down. In this

sense, the October war canbe termed

as adraw between the

U. S. and the Soviet Union. However, given that it was the

latter's proteges who had miserably failed to accomplish the

minimum objectives for which they had begun the war and

were, in fact, on the verge of an ignominious defeat, the

U. S. S. R. appears to have emerged as the net loser in the

superpower crisis of October 1973.

The superpowers on the eve of the October 1973 war

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 occurred in a regional

politcal and strategic environment which, due to the Arab

humiliation of 1967, was highly biased in favour of one

superpower, the United States. Thus, in contrast to Korea,

where the status quo ante bellum satisfied the minimum

requirements of both superpowers, in the Middle East the

situation preceding the outbreak of hostilities was

perceived as intolerable by the U. S. S. R. 's clients; a

continuation of that situation, therefore, would have been

very detrimental to the position of the Soviet Union in the

entire region. This was clearly exemplified by President

Sadat's decision of July 1972 to expel 21,000 Soviet

military advisers from Egypt, which was taken in response to

the U. S. S. R. 's apparent endeavour to discourage the Arabs

from undertaking military action against Israel by

repeatedly defaulting on arms supply agreements.1 It was

further illustrated by the Egyptian ruler's public rebuke in

May 1973 of the Soviet leadership's emphasis on the need to



settle the Arab-Israeli dispute by political as opposed to

military means. Whilst this preference underlined the

Kremlin's desire not to jeopardize its growing relations

with the U. S., it also seriously threatened the position of

the U. S. S. R. in at least the most importnt Arab state, if

not in the whole of the Middle East. As Sadat pointed out

in his open address to the Soviet Union,

Our friends must know... that the continuation of the

cease-fire. .. serves Israel and serves US aims in the

end. Regarding a peaceful solution,... the Soviet

Union must know... that the peaceful solution, which theUnited States has been talking about, is fictitious...

Our friends in the Soviet Union continue to

believe in the forthcoming process of the peacefulsolution... We appreciate the attitude of our friends.

We may differ with them, but we do so honestly. 2

Although neither Egypt nor Syria was in a position to launch

an offensive against Israeli forces without the assured

backing of the Kremlin and, consequently, in the absence of

a promising formula for resolving the Arab-Israeli impasse

politically, were most unlikely to foreclose their military

option by terminating their special relationship with the

Soviet Union altogether, they were quite capable of

inflicting substantial political damage on the U. S. S. R.

should it persist in acquiescing in the post-1967 status

quo. As Sadat alluded in a warning to the Kremlin in July

1973, the Soviet Union's preoccupation with the improvement

of relations with the West could isolate it from the

"national liberation movement. "3 Given that the fourth

non-alignednations conference,

"where the Russians and

Chinese would be certain to compete again for the allegiance

of the developing nations" was barely a month away, this

warning was bound to strike a raw nerve in the Soviet

leadership. 4 The increasing precariousness of the



U. S. S. R. 's position in the Middle East during the period

preceding the outbreak of hostilities in October was further

underlined by growing dissatisfaction in Syria with the

quality of Soviet military supplies. This led to periodic

strains in relations between the two countries, the most

conspicuous of which occurred in September when President

Assad summoned the Soviet ambassador to demand that the

Kremlin provide Syria with aircraft to match those of

Israel. 5

To the extent that the "no war, no peace" stalemate in

the Middle East seemed to undermine the position of the

Soviet Union in the region, it suited the United States.

The incentive which this fact may have provided for

Washingtonto refrain

from initiatingany political

measures

that may alter this situation was doubtless reinforced by

its confidence in the inherent stablility of the status quo

in the area. This confidence stemmed mainly from an

overestimation of Israel's might, coupled with a negative

preconception of the Arabs which, in turn, led to the

conclusion that, without the active participation of the

U. S. S. R., the Arabs could not survive a single-handed

conflagration with the Zionist State. As to the

possibility that the Soviet Union might at least turn a

blind eye to an Arab attempt to end the Middle East deadlock

bymilitary means,

the Americans believed that Brezhnev had

"too much at stake in detente to put it at risk on behalf of

his... clients. " Moreover, as the U. S. S. R. was the sole

source of arms and military equipment for Egypt and Syria,

it was also assumed that it was "in a position to pull the





ticket out of the Middle East, as had been shown in July

1972.9.

Thus, in view of its satisfaction with the politico-

strategic setting in the Middle East, the United States, it

seems legitimate to assume, would have almost certainly

taken every step at its disposal to prevent the outbreak of

war in October 1973, had it been alert to the danger. By

the same token, the increasing precariousness of the Soviet

Union's position in the region left it with hardly any

option but to condone its clients' prospective military

venture, of which it knew in advance, even though by doing

so it seriously risked its relations with the U. S.

However, in spite of the abundant evidence, the United

States seemed quite oblivious to the danger of war in the

Middle East. So overwhelming were its preconceptions of

Israeli strength and Arab weakeness that it chose to

disregard what otherwise would have been interpreted as

unambiguous warnings of war.

Perhaps the most ominous of these were the "coincident"

Syrian-Egyptian military maneuvers which took place in May

1973 in the vicinity of the cease-fire lines, causing Israel

to mobilize some reserves.10 Coming soon after Sadat's

warning that "[t]he time has come for a shock, "11 these led

the normally sceptical King Hussein of Jordan to despatch a

message to the U. S. emphasizingthat Egyptian

andSyrian

maneuvers were this time too realistic to be considered as

merely maneuvers.12 By September, the most unequivocal

signals of the approaching war appeared when the Egyptian

and Syrian armed forces began conducting their annual autumn



military exercises. In many respects, these somewhat

differed from previous maneuvers. On the Egyptian side,

for instance, the exercises werebeing

carried out withfull

divisions and more ammunition and logistical support was

being stockpiled than ever before. Moreover, the Egyptians

were setting up a field communications system of a

complexity which by far exceeded the normal requirements of

military maneuvers, and on September 27 Egyptian army

engineers began bringing rubber rafts and bridging equipment

down to the Suez Canal's edge as part of the exercise. On

the Syrian side, army units were being redeployed from the

Jordanian border to the Golan Heights, and tanks were moved

out of their normal defensive positions into offensive

formations. On October 2, the Syrian government started a

general mobilization of reserves, and at about the same time

the Syrian as well as the Egyptian air defence systems were

put on alert. Finally, on the eve of the war Egypt

embarked on a major exercise towards the Suez Canal which,

on the following day, was to leave its troops beyond the

supposedly impenetrable Bar Lev line on the east bank of the

Canal. 13

.On the political front, the Arabs initiated a range of

measures which, to the open mind, could only have lent

poignancy to their military activities and, together, served

to alert everyone concerned to the real danger of war in the

Middle East. At the centre of these measures was the

endeavour to form a united Arab front against Israel. A

start was made on November 1972 when a conference of the

foreign and defence ministers of 12 Arab states as well as



the Palestine Liberation Organization (P. L. O. ) was convened

in Kuwait to discuss coordination of the Arab war effort.

This was followed by two further meetings. The first of

these was held on December 12 between the chiefs of staff of

18 Arab armies. Its purpose was apparently to lay down a

unified military plan. The second meeting was of the Arab

League's Joint Defence Council which was convened in Cairo

during January 27-29,1973.14 Amongst its known outcomes

wasthe

appointment of

Egypt's War Minister, General Ismail,

as commander-in-chief of the Jordanian, Syrian, and Egyptian

fronts. 15 But, most important, was the attempt to form an

axis consisting of Egypt and Syria, which were to launch a

coordinated offensive against Israeli forces in the occupied

Sinai desert and Golan Heights; Saudi Arabia, which had the

money with which to finance the Syrian and Egyptian war

machines and the petroleum with which to exert pressure on

Israel's Western allies; and Jordan, which though on the

periphery of the axis, was to protect Syria's flank and

relieve Israeli pressure on the Syrian forces by maintaining

a high state of military readiness and thereby tie down a

portion of Israel's army on the Jordanian border. These

efforts began in the spring of 1973 when Sadat embarked on a

series of intensive consultations with King Feisal of Saudi

Arabia and President Assad of Syria, and were concluded with

the mini-summit meeting of September 10 between Sadat,

Assad, and King Hussein, shortly after which both Egypt and

Syria. resumed diplomatic relations with Jordan. 16 As one

writer put it, they "clearly marked an important watershed

in intra-Arab relations"17 and constituted a plain warning

that something rather serious was in the offing.18



Nevertheless, as far as the United States was

concerned, the war clouds that were hovering over the Middle

Eastwere nothing more

thanan

Arabploy

to intensify

international pressure on Israel to make concessions.

Consequently, the Egyptian-Syrian offensive came as "a

classic of strategic and tactical surpise" not so much

because of background "noise" or deception, but because of

the deeply-ingrained U. S. and Israeli negative

preconceptions of the Arabs which created a highly distorted

vision of the situation in the Middle East. 19 As Kissinger

put it, "October 6 was the culmination of a failure of

political analysis on the part of its victims. "20 Thus,

through its own predilections, the United States permitted

Egyptand

Syria toshatter

the basis of the status quo on

which it had pinned its entire regionsl policy.

Unlike the Americans, the U. S. S. R. was apparently aware

of Arab plans for war and, though two decades of Arab

defeats at the hands of Israel may have led it to doubt the

extent to which its clients could successfully prosecute

such a war without it having to come to their salvation and

thus jeopardize its flourishing relations with the United

States, it had little choice but to sanction their efforts.

For the Soviet Union, the expulsion of its military advisers

from Egypt compelled it to turn its attention to the

grievances of its proteges in the Middle East. These had

been increasingly subordinated to its interest in preserving

and consolidating detente with the U. S. The sudden

eviction of Soviet advisers, however, served as a warning to

the Kremlin of the probable consequences of any attempt





also concluded a new one billion roubles arms agreement

mainly for the provision of anti-tank and anti-aircraft

missiles.26

This, it seems, was uncharacteristically

substantially honoured. As Heikel has pointed out,

SAM-3 and SAM-6 missiles, the latest anti-aircraft andanti-tank weapons (Strellas and Molutkas), tanks withinfra-red ranging devices, bridging equipment, all

started pouring into Egyptian ports in vast quantities.It was, as Sadat said, as if all taps had been fully

turned on. "It looks as if they want to push me into

a battle, " he added.27

Soviet arms supplies to Egypt continued right up to the

outbreak of war on October 6. Amongst the weapons that are

known to have been delivered in the two to three months

preceding the war are about 100 T-62 tanks which at the time

were the best available in the U. S. S. R. 's armoury, aircraft,

and ground-to-air missiles including SAM-6's.28

The

Egyptians were also reported to have received about 20 SCUD

missile launchers on September 12 or thereabout, 29which

were apparently part of the February arms deal. 30

Likewise with Syria, from mid-1972 onwards, the

U. S. S. R. maintained a steady flow of arms, reportedly part

of a $700 million agreement concluded sometime during that

year. 31 As part of this agreement, the Soviet Union was

to supply Syria with SAM-3 missiles, some of which were

apparently included in the highly publicized airlift of air

defence components to Damascus following the massive Israeli

air raids on bases in Syria and Lebanon in the autumn of

1972.32 Admittedly, there were certain categories of

weapons such as the MIG-23 and MIG-25 aircraft, and the. SCUD

surface-to-surface missile which the Kremlin continued to

withhold from the Syrians. However, as from June 1973, the



Soviets massively accelerated their arms supplies to Syria

which included, for the first time, T-62 tanks,

sophisticated anti-tank missiles, SAM's, and MIG-21

fighters. 33

The extent to which the Soviet Union was willing during

the period of July 1972-October 1973 to publicly endorse

Arab military action against Israel was, nevertheless,

somewhat ambiguous, and tended to reflect the Kremlin's

concern for its relationship with the United States. Thus,

whilst providing the Arabs with the means to fight Israel,

the U. S. S. R. persisted "in the view that a military battle

must be ruled out and that the question (of hostilites) must

await a peaceful solution. "34 Hence the Soviet call of

April 14,1973, for a resumption of the Jarring mission to

the Middle East and for consultations between the permanent

members of the Security Council with a view to promoting a

"peaceful settlement" in the region.35 Such persistence

tended to evoke fears amongst the U. S. S. R. 's clients in the

Middle East lest the Kremlin acquiesce in the freeze of the

status quo in the region, as evidenced by Sadat's public

rebuke of May 1973 and his subsequent warning on the eve of

the non-aligned states conference. However, in *spite of

its proclamations in favour of a political solution, the

Soviet leadership also signalled to the Arabs its

amenability to an alternative, military answer. Thus, in a

communique marking the end of a visit by Egypt's Prime

Minister, Sidqi, to Moscow in July 1972, the Soviet side

affirmed the right of the Arabs "to use all means at their

disposal" for the liberation of their occupied

territories. 36 Similarly, in another communique issued at



the close of a trip by Sadat's National Security Adviser,

Hafez Ismail, to Moscow in February 1973, the U. S. S. R.

refrained from making any referencesto

a peaceful

settlement, and in a politically significant move, agreed

with Egypt that a partial Israeli withdrawal from the

occupied territories, as proposed by the Americans, was

unacceptable.37 This has been interpreted by some as

tantamount to a Soviet commitment "to assist an Egyptian

military effort against the Israelis. "38 Further

indications of the Kremlin's possible acquiescence in the

Arab intention to forcibly break out of the "no war, no

peace" situation in the Middle East were in evidence

throughout the few months preceding the outbreak of

hostilities. Ofparticular

importance in this respect was

the communique issued at the conclusion of the July 30-31,

1973, gathering of the heads of Communist Parties of the

Warsaw Pact countries. Without mention of a political

settlement, this referred to the Arab-Isreali conflict as

one of the "sharpest problems" of world affairs, which can

be solved only by "full withdrawal of Israeli forces from

the occupied Arab territories. "39 In the opinion of one

writer, "[i]t was clear that the Soviets, if not endorsing

Egyptian resort to war, were not actively opposing it. "40

Indeed, the impression left in Cairo at the time was "that

the [Soviet] military, backed by Brezhnev, wanted to make it

possible for Egypt to embark on a limited war. "41

Once the Soviet leadership was officially informed by

the Egyptians and the Syrians of the imminence of

hostilities, 42 its response must have been encouraging to



both. On October 4, Brezhnev despatched a message to Sadat

in which he "expressed the view that the decision when to

fight must be for Sadat alone to take and... that the Soviet

Union would give him the support of a friend. "43 A similar

message was delivered to Syria's President Assad on the same

day. 44 To be sure, the Soviet leader also requested

permission to fly his country's civilian advisers and their

dependents out of Egypt on the following day, October 5.45

This has been interpreted as an attempt on the part of the

Kremlin to warn the United States of the imminence of war

and thereby either force the Arabs to delay their military

operation or sabotage their war plans by depriving them of

the element of surprise. A more plausible explanation,

however, is that by evacuating its civilian nationals, the

Soviet leadership was taking a calculated risk in order "to

maintain a certain diplomatic distance from the attack: it

wanted to be sufficiently aloof so that when war broke out

it would not be accused by the United States of complicity,

thereby endangering the advantages it gained from

detente. "46

The outbreak of war: U. S. misperception and Soviet caution

The eruption of hostilities on October 6,1973, came as

a shattering blow for United States policy in the Middle

East. For the Americans, the immediate shock was that a

massive, well-coordinated Egyptian-Syrian offensive could

take them almost completely by surprise with no more than

two hours' prior warning. Indeed, even whilst military

operations were clearly under way, the U. S. intelligence

community was still estimating the chances of a full-scale



war as being extremely thin. 47 Once the true picture of

what had occurred began to emerge, the shock gave way to the

necessary reappraisal of American policy in the region. In

the process, many of the assumptions upon which U. S. policy

had rested since at least 1971---the assumption of Israeli

invincibility, of Arab impotence, of ultimate Soviet control

over Arab choices, and of the U. S. S. R. 's global and regional

priorities---had to be eschewed so that, by the end of the

war, the huge gap that had separated Washington's

perceptions from the reality of the Middle East situation

was virtually closed.

Naturally, the first American assumption to crumble was

that of the inherent stability of the "no war, no peace"

situation in the Middle East and its corollaries concerning

Arab weakness, Soviet control over Egypt and Syria, and/or

the U. S. S. R. 's global and regional priorities. After

several hours of fighting, it emerged that the Arabs had

embarked on something much more substantial than "a raid or

other small-scale action; "48 the fact that they had the

capability and self-confidence to do so was in itself

sufficient proof of the shakiness of the pre-war

environment. With the status quo thus shattered "it was

plain that the diplomatic stalemate would be broken. "49

The problem for the United States was that whatever

political progress might subsequently be made was going to

be attributed, not to the ingenuity of its diplomacy but, on

the contrary, to the shortsightedness and bankruptcy of its

policy in the Middle East, to the sacrifices of two Soviet

client-states, and to the success of Soviet arms. Since



this was likely to be the case whether or not the Arabs

managed to fully achieve their military objectives, the

first task which the Nixon Administration set for itself

immediately following the outbreak of hostilities was to

demonstrate the futility of military action undertaken by

virtue of Soviet arms and Soviet diplomatic support. This

was to be done by allowing or helping Israel to defeat but

not to humiliate Egypt and Syria. Only after this was

accomplished wouldthe U. S., in recognition of the

inevitable instability that would characterize a return to

the situation preceding the outbreak of war, endeavour to

establish some foundations for a political solution to the

Arab-Israeli dispute by persuading the Arabs to "abandon

reliance on Soviet pressure and seek goals 'through

cooperation with the United States. "50 It was with these

tasks in mind that American Secretary of State Kissinger

outlined on October 25 the objectives of his country's

diplomacy in the Middle East as being "[f]irst, to end

hostilities as quickly as possible---but secondly, to end

hostilities ina manner

thatwould enable us

to make a major

contribution to removing the conditions that have produced

four wars between Arabs and Israelis in the last 25

years. "51 According to some commentators, this meant that

the United States "wanted a limited Israeli defeat"52 to

pave the way for post-war peace negotiations. However,

taken in conjunction with Kissinger's conception of the

dilemma which confronted the U. S. in trying to implement its

two tasks, it seems that the Secretary of State meant

something quite different. As he later outlined in his

memoirs, the problem was that



If Israel won overwhelmingly---as we first expected--wehad to avoid becoming the focal point of all Arab

resentments. We had to keep the Soviet Union from

emerging as the Arabs' saviour, which it would do

eitherby

pretendingthat its bluster

stoppedthe

Israeli advance or by involving itself directly in the

war. If the unexpected happened and Israel was indifficulty, we would have to do what was necessary to

save it. We could not permit Soviet clients to defeata traditional friend. But once having demonstratedthe futility of the military option, we would then haveto use this to give impetus to the search for peace.[Emphasis added. ]53

Thus, a "limited Israeli defeat" would have to mean "a

victory less than overwhelming, " and ending the hostilities

in a manner that would promote a permanent settlement could

only have meant defeating but not completely destroying the

Arab armies and then, after demonstrating that resort to

Soviet weapons would not be allowed to redress Egyptian and

Syrian grievances, embarking on a search for a political

settlement. In this way, the war could actually be

utilized as a means of excluding the U. S. S. R. from any

significant role in the Middle East and thereby turning the

region into an exclusive American preserve.

However, for the first three days of hostilities, the

response of the United States to the situation in the Middle

East was determined by its expectation of a rapid Israeli

victory that would push the Arabs back to or even beyond the

pre-October 6 cease-fire lines. This was a logical

corollary of Washington's assumptions of the Arabs and the

Israelis, and in the first 72 hours of the war it was

reinforced by a stream of highly inaccurate reports on the

course of the 'war by American and Israeli intelligence

sources. These spoke of an imminent Arab rout54 at a time

when Egyptian forces were still advancing into the Sinai





successful, such a strategy would also drive a wedge between

the U. S. S. R. and its clients which, as in 1972, would

perceivethe Kremlin as giving priority to its ties with the

U. S. Thus, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities,

Kissinger endeavoured to force the Soviets into co-

sponsoring with the United States a resolution in the

Security Council calling for a cease-fire based on a return

to pre-war lines. To underline the costs of rejecting the

American offer, he warned the Soviets that if the U. S. S. R.

"acted irresponsibly" the United States would have no choice

but "to let nature take its course, " that is, to "simply

await the inevitable Israeli victory. " "That, " said the

Secretary of State, "will affect a lot of our

relationships. "60 Even Soviet support for an Egyptian

appeal to the Security Council, warned Kissinger, would

"destroy everything that it has taken us three years to

build up. "61 When the Kremlin refrained from giving a

definitive answer Kissinger sharpened up his warning, which

began to sound more like a threat against the Arabs. As

the first day of the war drew to a close, he told Soviet

ambassador Dobrynin,

Our reading of the situation is that the Arab attack

has been totally contained, that now they are going to

be pushed back and this process will accelerate as the

[Israeli] mobilization is completed which will be nolater than [October 81 and after that we will see what

we have seen before. 6L

To remind the Soviet leadership that, unless it had second

thoughts about a joint superpower initiative to restore the

status quo ante bellum, the U. S. could yet take steps to

devastate the Arab armies, Kissinger reportedly told

Dobrynin on October 8 "that he was all but alone in holding



back the 'Israeli shadow government' in Washington from

ordering a massive resupply to enable the Israelis to launch

a crushing counteroffensive. "63 He also reminded the

Kremlin that the special relationships was still at stake by

warning it that "[d]etente cannot survive irresponsibility

in any area, including the Middle East. "64

In contrast to the United States, the U. S. S. R. was

apparently fully aware of the real situation in the Middle

East from the first moments of the outbreak of hostilities,

and thus its response was more appropriate to the attainment

of its objectives than was the U. S. 's. These objectives

were basically to draw the maximum possible benefits from

theconflagration for the promotion of Soviet interests in

the region without jeopardizing the U. S. S. R. 's extra-

regional interests. Consequently, the first official

Soviet reaction to the outbreak of war was one of cautious

support for the Arabs. In a statement of October 7 the

Kremlin laid full responsibility for the eruption of war on

Israel whose "reckless aggressive actions constantly

fomented tension in the Middle East" and prevented the

achievement of a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli

dispute. 65 In the absence of such a settlement, Defence

Minister Grechko later added, the "peoples of the Arab

countries had to take up arms to defend their national

independence in a just struggle. "66 The Kremlin's

statement was concluded with a warning that "[i]f the

government of Israel should remain deaf to the voice of

reason this might cost dear the people of Israel. The



full responsibility for the consequences of such a reckless

course. "67 At this stage of the conflict, however, neither

the United States nor the "West" were mentioned

specifically; the indictment was only of "those external

reactionary circles which have encouraged Israel in its

aggressive ambitions. "68 This restraint, according to one

writer, "could and has been interpreted as an attempt to

preserve detente, or at the very least an effort to preserve

the localizednature of

the conflict---avoiding the danger

of a superpower confrontation. "69 Indeed, so long as the

Arabs were making steady progress and the Americans were

keeping a low profile, the U. S. S. R. had no compelling reason

to raise the ante.

Thus, at this stage of the conflict, Soviet intervention

was confined to re-supplying the Egyptians and Syrians with

the hardward to enable them to sustain their offensive.

Although the Kremlin's "fears that victory might be allowed

to slip from Arab hands, or even be turned into defeat,

were ... acute"70 and led it to propose to its clients a

cease-fire-in-place,71 it was not prepared to press the

issue. Consequently, once it became clear that the Arabs

would not entertain any thoughts of a cease-fire-in-situ

whilst they were still advancing, the U. S. S. R. informed

Sadat on October 7 that it intended to immediately airlift

ammunition and military equipment to Egypt. 72 Similarly,

the Soviet Union suggested that, as the delay in shipping

new tanks from Odessa to Latakia would be considerable, the

Syrians should replenish their depleted tank force from Iraq

which, in turn, would be re-supplied by the U. S. S. R. at a

later date. 73 Indeed, the first Soviet vessels carrying



war material to the Arabs left Odessa on October 7,74 and

two days later reports began reaching Washington of "an

increase in the number of supply ships steaming towards

Syrian and Egyptian ports. "75

The turning point: Israel's recovery and the

intensification of superpower intervention

By that time, a combination of developments led to a

serious deepening of the superpowers'Involvement in the

war. First came the disclosure by Israel of the real

military situation in the Middle East. In an urgent

meeting with Kissinger on October 9, Israeli ambassador to

Washington Dinitz and military attache Gur revealed that,

although the Syrian advance had been halted, the Israelis

were still sustaining very heavy tank losses, and that on

the southern front all of Israel's counter-attacks had ended

in disaster. The Egyptians had either smashed or encircled

all of the Bar-Lev line and had more than 20,000 troops and

400 tanks in Sinai, digging in and consolidating their

positions. All in all, Kissinger was told, Israel had lost

49 aircraft and 500 tanks, of which 400 were destroyed on

the Egyptian front. 76

These staggering revelations prompted Kissinger "to

question his own rosy assumptions about a quick Israeli

counterattack and victory. "77 He, therefore, immediately

began to reorient theUnited States' interventionary

strategy towards the rapid achievement of a limited Israeli

victory by urgently providing Israel with the wherewithal to

restore the pre-October 6 cease-fire lines. Consequently,

290



on the afternoon of October 9 the White House decided to

speed up the supply of ammunition, air defence electronic

equipment, and aircraft to Israel, and to guarantee the

replacement of all Israeli tank losses so as to permit

Israel to draw upon its exorbitant reserve stocks.78 With

the additional supplies and the use of reserve stocks of

armour and artillery, Kissinger expected the Israelis to

turn the military balance and at least restore the status

quo ante bellum by October 13 at the latest.

However, the failure of Israel to make any progress on

the Suez front by that date coupled with the rejection by

Sadat of the notion of a standstill cease-fire79 impelled

the United States on a course that was to complete the

transformation of the fourth Arab-Israeli war into a

superpower confrontation. As far as Kissinger was

concerned, these two developments and the consequent spectre

of a protracted war of attrition which Israel could not

withstand made matters reach "a point where maneuverability

would be suicidal and hesitation disastrous, " and left the

U. S. no option, said the Secretary of State, but to "pour in

supplies, " and "risk confrontation, " and "nottalk

again

until there was no longer any doubt that no settlement could

be imposed. "80 This conclusion was probably inevitable,

for the failure of Israel to dislodge the Egyptians from

Sinai and Sadat's rejection of the idea of a cease-fire in

situ happened to coincide with a sudden massive increase in

the level of Soviet intervention on behalf of the Arabs.

By midnight, October 12, the U. S. S. R. was re-supplying Egypt

and Syria at a rate of 18 transport planes laden with arms

and military equipment per hour, or a total of 60 flights

291



over the previous 21 hours. 81 Clearly, matters were

reaching such a level that some relatively dramatic American

response was perhaps necessary in order to preserve the

credibilty and resolve images of the United States.

For the Soviet Union, the principal stimulus which

brought matters to a head was the steady advance by the

Israelis beyond the pre-war cease-fire lines with Syria

following their recapture of the Golan Heights on October

10. By mid-day October 13, Israel had occupied a salient

beyond the pre-October 6 positions 11 kilometres deep and 12

kilometres wide. Forward Israeli positions were merely 35

kilometres (or 20 miles) from Damascus. In the process,

the Syrians lost 900 tanks, thousands of other vehicles, and

hundreds of guns.82 With the prospect of the collapse of a

Soviet client-regime at the hands of an American protege

looming over the horizon, the Kremlin had little choice but

to come down firmly on the side of Syria if the U. S. S. R. 's

position in the Middle East and its general credibility and

image of resolve were to be kept intact. This was clearly

reflected in its massive re-supply effort which began on

October 10 with the despatch of 20 giant military transport

planes to the Syrian capital.83 Once it became clear that

this initial infusion of arms was having little effect in

halting the Israeli advance towards Damascus, the Soviet

airlift was intensified. New aircraft were flown in to

help prop up the Syrian air force, and additional tanks were

shipped to the port of Latakia. By mid-day October 13,

when the Israeli offensive finally came to a halt, the

Soviet commitment to the Syrians had virtually "spiralled

292



out of control. "84

Whilst the replenishment of the Syrian war machine was

under way, the Kremlin correctly estimated that with the

depletion of the offensive capability of the Syrian armed

forces and the occupation of an additional strip of Syrian

territory beyond the Golan Heights, the Israelis would

switch their efforts to the southern front in preparation

for a crushing offensive against the Egyptians. 85 Thus,

simultaneously with its airlift to the Syrians, the Soviet

Union began to supplement its sealift to the Egyptians with

a substantial airlift, to begin with, mainly of ammunition

and other consumables.86 This further irritated the

Americans who interpreted it as an encouragement of Egypt to

resume its offensive in Sinai.

The firmness of the Soviet response to the Israeli

advance towards Damascus was also reflected in the Kremlin's

endeavours to coerce the Americans into restraining Israel.

This first began to take shape with the substantial

enhancement on October 9 of the Soviet fleet in the

Mediterranean. 87 On the following day, it was further

reported that the U. S. S. R. had placed three of its airborne

divisions in Eastern Eorope on a high state of alert which,

in addition to three divisions that were alerted on October

8 when the Syrians began to lose the military initiative,

brought the total number of Soviet airborne divisions on

alert to six.88 This, coupled with reports that part of

the headquarters staff of a Soviet division was already in

Damascus, lent credence to speculation that the U. S. S. R. was

preparing for some sort of airborne intervention to help

defend the Syrian capital.89 By October 12, the first

293



threat of direct Soviet intervention on behalf of Syria was

made when the U. S. S. R. 's ambassador to Washington, Dobrynin,

emphasized to Kissinger that the Soviet Union could not be

indifferent to threats to Damascus and that if the Israeli

advance continued, matters might get out of hand. 90

As far as the United States was concerned, however, the

basically defensive motives that stimulated the

intensification of Soviet intervention on behalf of the

Arabs during October 10-13 were more or less irrelevant.

What was considered of paramount importance was the

intervention per se which was seen not only as an obstacle

to the attainment of a limited Arab defeat, but also as a

direct challenge to the United States to be countered at any

cost. As one writer has pointed out, to Kissinger, the

Arab-Israeli war was henceforth no longer "a conflict

between Jews and Arabs; it was a test of wills between

Washington and the Kremlin. In this, [he] reverted to his

(and Nixon's) chronic obsession-that Russian guns must never

be permitted to prevail over the guns of the United States. "

He was, therefore, resolved "to teach the Russians a hard

lesson" by proving to them and to the rest of the world

"America's physical capacity in crisis and the peril of

seeking to challenge the United States in the Middle East or

anywhere. "91 Consequently, on October 13 the White House

decided to launch a massive, direct airlift of arms and

ammunition to Israel using American military aircraft, and

to provide the Israelis with an initial consignment of 10

Phantom fighter-bombers, a figure that was to swell up to 24

aircraft by the following day. Already by that time the

294



U. S. had out-matched what the U. S. S. R. had provided the

Syrians, Egyptians, and Iraqis combined in all of the

previous days. 92 By October 16, the United States was

airlifting to Israel an average of 1,000 tons of armaments

daily, or about 50 tons per hour. When the re-supply

operation was concluded in mid-November, it had provided

Israel with some 50,000 tons of military hardware, and a

total of 108 fighter-bombers. 93

The climax: Israel's incursion and the superpower

confrontation

The third and final stage of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war

began to unfold on October 14 when, in a belated response to

Israeli pressure on Syria, Sadat ordered his army to advance

eastwardstowards the Sinai passes. Unfortunately for

Egypt, by that time Israel had already called off its

northern offensive and was, therefore, able to concentrate

its full might against the Egyptian forces. Consequently,

by the end of the day, the Egyptians were forced to retreat,

leaving behind them more than 250 destroyed tanks. This

paved the way for a massive Israeli counter-offensive which

began on October 15. After much heavy fighting, the

Israelis were able to cross the Suez Canal by passing

through a gap between the Egyptian Second Army, which was in

control of the northern sector of the Canal, and the Third

Army, deployed around the southern parts of the Canal. By

October 20, more than 10,000 Israeli troops with 200 tanks

were up to 20 miles west of the Suez Canal destroying

Egyptian SAM sites and engaging in other disruptive

activities. Almost overnight the Soviet Union's worst

295



fears were becoming true. 94

Israel's incursion across the Suez Canal prompted an

intensification of indirect Soviet intervention on behalf of

Egypt. Thus, on October 16, the airlift to Cairo and

Damascus was increased to some 70 to 80 flights per day, 95

most of them going to Egypt. In addition, the U. S. S. R.

provided Egypt with a present of 250 tanks and proceeded to

encourage other friendly governments to make similar

contributions.96 At the same time the Soviets began to

alert and reinforce their forces in and around the

Mediterranean, as a warning to the United States and Israel

that unless restraint was exercised, some form of direct

Soviet intervention might be forthcoming. Thus, during

October 15-19, the U. S. S. R. 's Mediterranean fleet was

increased from 23 to 29surface vessels.

Moreover,a

number of amphibious landing craft began to concentrate off

the Egyptian coast, and on October 17 or 18 U. S.

intelligence picked up signals that Soviet airborne

divisions had been placed on alert.97

These measures, in turn, stimulated the United States

to accelerate its re-supply of Israel so that its own

operation would be at least 25 per cent ahead of the Soviet

re-supply of the Arabs. The Americans also decided to

continue their airlift "until the cease-fire was

established, " and to speed up the sealift so that the U. S.

and its client "would not be caught short by a sudden cease-

fire and the Soviets would not encourage their Arab proteges

to embark on a war of attrition. "98 Furthermore, to

demonstrate its resolve not to be intimidated into

296



restraining Israel, the United States responded on October

18 to the despatch by the U. S. S. R. of landing ships to the

Mediterranean with a warning that if Soviet forces entered

the Middle East the issue of U. S. military personnel would

have to be "rethought. 1"99

The problem at this stage, however, was not to come

from the Soviet Union but from Israel, which was about to

overstep itself. By October 19/20, it had become clear to

the United States that Egypt would never order the

withdrawal of its troops from Sinai, and that the only way

to dislodge them was either to destroy them in battle or to

force their surrender through a long siege. This the U. S.

was unwilling to endorse, for to do so would humiliate the

Arabs to such an extent that the prospect of a dominant

American role in post-war negotiations, if indeed such

negotiations could at all be possible, would almost

certainly be doomed. For this reason, Kissinger was

prepared to modify his objectives and accept a cease-fire

which left the Egyptians in control of much of the east bank

of the Suez Canal; he was satisfied that the presence of

the Israeli army on the western^shores of the Canal would

suffice to demonstrate to the Arabs the futility of the

military option undertaken by virtue of Soviet support.

But Israel had different thoughts. These were outlined by

its air force commander, Major-General Peled, who said on

October 21 that his country's objective was to "bring the

enemy to the point where we candictate the terms

of a

cease-fire. ""100 Thus, when the Security Council passed

cease-fire Resolution 338, Israel had no intention of

observing it. Although it ceased firing for a couple of

297



hours after the cease-fire was supposed to come into effect,

it never terminated other military activities, such as the

build-up of men, supplies, ammunition, and armour, as

required by the Resolution. 101 When these violations

provoked an artillery bombardment from the Egyptian army,

Israel used the opportunity to start a major offensive.

This continued right up to October 27, in spite of the issue

of two further Security Council cease-fire orders

(Resolutions 339 and 340 of October 23 and 25 respectively)

and enabled the Israelis to completely surround the Egyptian

Third Army and threaten a similar fate for the Second

Army. 102

These violations compelled Sadat to call for direct

external intervention to force Israel to respect the cease-

fire. The first such call came in a message to Nixon on

October 23 in which the Egyptian ruler urged the U. S. to

"intervene effectively, even if that necessitates the use of

force, in order to guarantee the full implementation of the

cease-fire resolution in accordance with the US-USSR

agreement. "103 This was followed by another request on the

following day. 104 When, however, the Americansshowed no

signs of restraining Israel, Egypt called upon the Soviet

Union to directly intervene Jointly with the United

States. 105

Israel's violations of the cease-fire on the Egyptian

front clearly contravened the interests of both superpowers.

For the United States, it threatened to put its Middle East

strategy in jeopardy, and for the Soviet Union, it once

again challenged its credibility as an ally. Both

298



superpowers, therefore, had a mutual interest in putting an

end to Israel's transgression. Yet, in spite of this, they

did not act jointly. Admittedly,, the U. S. S. R. was only too

eager to join the U. S. in policing the cease-fire, for this

would amount to an American recognition of the legitimacy of

its presence in the region and it would enhance its prestige

and credibility. The U. S. however, was unwilling to even

consider the possibility of joint superpower intervention

for precisely the same reason. Nevertheless, the

superpower which stood to lose most from Israel's violations

was the Soviet Union because the destruction of the Egyptian

army would have incalculable adverse consequences for its

international standing. Thus, when Israel cut the Suez-

Cairo road and thereby completely surrounded the Third Army,

the U. S. S. R. urged the United States to join it in sending

military contingents to Egypt in order to enforce the cease-

fire and warned that, should the U. S. decline to do so, then

the Soviet Union "should be faced with the necessity

urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate

steps unilaterally. '"106 To give credibility to its

warning, the U. S. S. R. engaged in an impressive exercise in

minatory diplomacy. This began on the evening of October

23, after Israel's violation of Security Council Resolution

339, when the Americans detected a sudden and sharp decline

in the number of Soviet aircraft carrying military supplies

to Egypt and Syria---from about 75 per day to six---as well

as signals from the Ukraine indicating that three Soviet

army and logistical units had been alerted. This gave rise

to speculation that the U. S. S. R. was preparing to fly some

troops to Egypt. By the morning of October 24 it was

299



further learnt that four more divisions of Soviet airborne

troops had been put on alert, and that five or six Soviet

transport ships had entered the Mediterranean, bringing the

total number of Soviet vessels in that sea to an

unprecedented 85.107 So, when Brezhnev warned on the

evening of October 24 that the U. S. S. R. might unilaterally

intervene to enforce the cease-fire on the Suez front his

warning did not lack credibility.

The Soviet challenge of October 24 flung the United

States into a state of crisis. Although it immediately

began to exercise restraint on Israel, 108 it had to make

some sort of a tough response to Brezhnev's warning, if only

to demonstrate its resolve and determination to prevent the

introduction of Soviet combat forces into the conflict zone.

Consequently, Kissinger responded to Breshnev's warning by

putting U. S. forces, including the Strategic Air Command, on

a Defence Condition Three alert109 and by warning both the

Egyptian and Soviet leaderships that the United States would

not under any circumstances tolerate the presence of Soviet

troops in the Middle East. 110 Having thus made his point,

Kissinger proceeded to de-escalate the superpower

confrontation by showing the Kremlin a way out.

Accordingly, on October 25 he stated that the United States

was "not asking the Soviet Union to pull back from anything

that it has done, " and that the measures that had

been undertaken by the U. S. on the previous day "were

precautionary in nature. " Since they were "not directed at

any actions that had already been taken, " Kissinger reasoned

that "there is no reason for any country to back off

300



anything that it has done... "ill On the following day, the

Defence Condition Three alert was called off.112

Nevertheless, the Soviet warning of October 24 had one

desirable effect in that it forced the United States to put

an end to Israel's transgression. Thus, on October 26 the

Israelis were given an ultimatum which warned that unless

they permitted non-military supplies to the beleaguered

Egyptian Third Army within nine hours, the U. S. would

support aU. N.

resolution"that will deal with the

enforcement of [Resolutions] 338 and 339. "113 Faced with

this daunting prospect, Tel Aviv had no real alternative but

to comply, which it duly did thus ending the fourth Arab-

Israeli war.



Notes

1. A. el-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography

(Collins, London, 1978), esp. pp. 229-230; M. Heikal,

Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence

in the Middle East (Collins, London, 1978). Both these

books are replete with examples of Soviet defaults on arms

supply agreements with Egypt during the period 1967-1973.

2. Radio Cairo, May 1,1973. Quoted in G. Golan, Yom Kippur andAfter: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis

(Cambridge University Press, London, 1977), pp. 45-45.

3. Cairo Radio, July 22,1973. Cited in R. O. Freeman, Soviet

Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, rev. ed. (Praeger

Publishers, New York, 1978), p. 128.

4. Ibid.

5. Golan, op. cit., p. 64.

6. S. Brown, The Crisis of Power: An Interpretation of United

States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years (Columbia

University Press, New York, 1979), pp. 88-89.

7. H. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Weidenfeld and Nicolson and

Michael Joseph, London, 1982), p. 206.

8. Ibid., p. 214.

9. The favourability of the "no war, no peace" situation in the

Middle East to the United States was illustrated by a

computer exercise carried out in Cairo in May 1973 toevaluate the extent to which various countries benefitted

from the status quo. All the relevant considerations werefed into the computer, and the result awarded Israel 420

- points, the United States 380 points, and the Soviet Union

110 points. See M. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (Collins,

London, 1975), p. 164.

10. G. Rafael, Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli

Foreign Policy---A Personal Memoir (Weidenfeld and Nicolson,

London, 1981), p. 280.

11. Interview to Arnaud de Borchgrane, senior diplomatic

correspondent of the American Newsweek magazine, publishedon April 9,1973. During the interview, Sadat declared:

The time has come for a shock... All West Europeans are

telling us that everybody has fallen asleep over the

Middle East crisis. But they will soon wake up to the

fact that America has left us no other way out. The

resumption of the hostilities is the only way out.Everything in this country is now being mobilized... for

the resumption of the battle which is now inevitable.

12. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 461.

13. Brown, op. cit., p. 90; L. L. Whetten, "The Arab-Israeli

Dispute: Great Power Behaviour, " Adelphi Papers No. 128(International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,1977), p. 28.

14. Golan, op. cit., p. 38.


16. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (K. C. A. ), Vol. XIX, 1973, p.26158.

17. J. D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and Warin the Middle East (Johns Hopkins University Press,



Baltimore and London, 1975), p. 119.18. Brown, op. cit., pp. 89-90.19. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 459.20. Ibid.21. Heikal (1978), op. cit., p. 253.22. Golan,

op. cit., p.39.

23. Whetten, op. cit., p. 25; Brown, op. cit., p. 89.24. Sadat's, interview to Arnaud de Borchgrave, Newsweek, April

9,1973.25. Ibid.

26. General Ahmed Ismail's interview to Al-Hawadess, August 16,1974. Cited in Golan, op. cit., p. 39.

27. Heikal (1978), op. cit., pp. 253-254. Indeed, in the sameinterview to Arnaud de Borchgrave in which he warned that"[t]he time has come for a shock, " Sadat also declared that"[t]he Russians are providing us now with everything that'spossible for them to supply. And I am now quitesatisfied. " See Newsweek, April 9,1973.

28. D. A. Schmidt, Armageddon in the Middle East (John DayCompany, New York, 1974), p. 219.

29. Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 22, November 5,1973.

30. G. Golan, "Soviet Aims in the Middle East War, " Survival,Vol. 16, No. 3, May-June 1974, p. 106, n. 4; Glassman,op. cit., pp. 101-102; Schmidt, ibid.

31. Golan (1977), op. cit., pp. 43,57.32. Glassman, op. cit., pp. 96-97.33. Brown, op. cit., p. 90.

34. Middle East News Agency, April 3,1973.35. Pravda, April 22,1973. Quoted in Golan (1977), op. cit., p.

46.

36. TASS, July 14,1972. Quoted in ibid., p. 23.37. Pravda, February 11,1973. Quoted in ibid., p. 40.38. Glassman, op. cit., pp 98-99.39. Izvestia', August 1,1973. Quoted in ibid., p. 101.40. Glassman, ibid.41. Heikal (1978), op. cit., p. 254.42. According to Heikal, the U. S. S. R. was officialy informed by

Egypt of the imminence of hostilities on October 1,1973.

Sadat, however, contends that Moscow was not told untilOctober 3. In any case, on October 4, Syria formallynotified the Soviet Union of the exact date on whichhostilities were to commence. See Heikal (1975) op. cit.,pp. 24,208; el-Sadat, op. cit., p. 246.

43. Heikal, ibid., p. 34. Also see General Ahmed Ismail'sinterview to Al Akhbar, September 15,1974. Cited in Golan(1977), op. cit., p. 69.

44. Heikal, ibid., pp. 208-209.45. Ibid., p. 34; el-Sadat, op. cit., 247.46. A. Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian

Influence Relationship Since the June War (PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977), p. 261.

47. According to Kissinger,Even with military operations clearly taking place, theagreed estimate repeated what had been the position allweek long, that the chance of a deliberate full scalewar was low:"We [the intelligence agencies] can find no hardevidence of a major coordinated Egyptian/Syrian



offensive across the Canal and in the Golan Heights

area. Rather, the weight of evidence indicates an

action-reaction situation where a series of responsesby each side to perceived threats created anincreasingly dangerous potential for confrontation.

The current hostilities are apparently a result of thatsituation, although we are not in a position to clarifythe sequence of events. It is possible that the

Egyptians or Syrians, particularly the latter, may havebeen preparing a raid or other small-scale action. "

See Kissinger, op. cit., p. 458.48. Ibid.49. Ibid., p. 468.50. Ibid.

51. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1794 (November 12,1973),

69: pp. 583-94. Quoted in Brown, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

52.Sunday Times Insight Team,

Insighton

the Middle East War

(Andre Deutsch, London, 1974), p. 132.53. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 468.

54. L. A. Sobel (ed. ), Israel and the Arabs: The October 1973War (Facts on File, New York, 1974), pp. 91,92; Kissinger,

ibid., pp. 477,485,488,490.55. N. Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978),

pp. 291,299.56. Ibid pp. 296,298,300; Sobel, op. cit., p. 93.

57. Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 480,485-486.58. R. Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and

American Foreign Policy (Harper and Row, New York, 1977), p.255.


60. Ibid., p. 492.61. Ibid., p. 472. Shortly afterwards, Kissinger told ambassador

Dobrynin that the United States would consider a General

Assembly debate a "frivolous act, " and that "[i]f it turnsinto a General Assembly debate, then we will let it take its

course. We are certain it will turn out to be a military

victory for the Israelis. Then everyone witll come to us.If it turns nasty we will shut off communications for a

while. Idem, p. 473.62. Ibid., p. 474.63. Morris, op. cit., p. 255. Also see M. Kalb and B. Kalb,

Kissinger (Little, Brown and Co., Boston, Toronto, 1974), p.466; M. Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger:

Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East, trans. Ruth Geyra

and Sol Stern (Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., New York,

1976), pp. 46-47.64. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 491.65. Quoted in W. Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and

World Politics (Wildwood House, London, 1974), pp. 166-167.

66. Pravda, October, 8,1973. Quoted in ibid., p. 166.67. Quoted in Laqueur, ibid., p. 167.

68. Pravda, October 8,1973. Quoted in K. Dawisha, Soviet

Foreign Policy Towards Egypt (Macmillan, London andBasingstoke, 1979), p. 67.

69. Golan (1977), op. cit., p. 79.70. Heikal (1978), op. cit., pp. 256-257.71. Ibid., pp. 208-209,212,213; idem (1978), op. cit. pp. 256-

257; el-Sadat, op. cit., pp. 252-253; Whetten, op. cit., p. 30.



72. el-Sadat, ibid., pp. 253-254.

73. Heikal (1975), op. cit., p. 212.

74. Glassman, op. cit., p. 130.

75. Kalb and Kalb, op. cit., p. 467.

76. Ibid., p. 468;Kissinger,

op. cit., pp.490-491; Sunday

Times Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War (Andre Deutsch, New

York, 1975), p. 273.

77. Kalb and Kalb, ibid.

78. Ibid., p. 467; Kissinger, op. cit., p. 495; M. Golan,

op. cit; p. 49; R. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon

(Grosset and Dunlop, New York, 1978), p. 922.

79. Kissinger, ibid., pp. 517-518.

80. Ibid., p. 518.

81. Sunday Times Insight Team (1974), op. cit. p. 134.

82. Safran, op. cit., p. 300.83. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 497. Also see Whetten, op. cit., p.

29; G. Golan, op. cit. p. 85; Glassman, op. cit, p. 130;

Kalb and Kalb, op. cit., pp. 468; Schmidt, op. cit., p. 218.

84. Sunday Times Insight Team (1975), op. cit. p. 277.

85. Ibid., pp. 226-227.

86. Ibid (1974), p. 134; G. Golan, op. cit., p. 85; Glassman,

op. cit., p. 130; Kalb and Kalb, op. cit., pp. 467-470;

Schmidt, op. cit., p. 218.

87. Kalb and Kalb, ibid., p. 467.

88. Ibid., pp. 470-471; P. Mangold, Superpower Intervention in

the Middle East (Croom Helm, London, 1978), p. 128;

Whetten, op. cit., p. 31; M. Golan, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

89. Mangold, ibid. pp. 128-129.90. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 508.

91. E. R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger: A

Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East

(Reader's Digest Press, New York, 1976), p. 34. Also see

Mangold, op. cit., p. 33; Kissinger, ibid., pp. 515,521.

92. Kissinger, ibid., p. 525.

93. Mangold, op. cit., p. 152; Schmidt, op. cit., 219. Also see

Glassman, op. cit., p. 131; Laqueur, op. cit., p. 149;

Nixon, op. cit., pp. 927-928. For other aspects of the

airlift, see Heikal (1975), op. cit., 244; Kalb and Kalb,

op. cit., pp. 477-479; Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 148-149; M.Golan, op. cit., p. 61; Rafael, op. cit., p. 306.

94. Sobel, op. cit., pp. 106-107. Also see Safran, op. cit., pp.

304-311; Kissinger, op. cit., p. 525; Heikal (1975), ibid.,

p. 247; Sunday Times Insight Team (1974), op. cit., p. 183.

95. Golan, op. cit., p. 108.

96. Heikel (1978), op. cit., p 259.

97. Mangold, op. cit., p. 128; Golan, op. cit., p. 108;

Glassman, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

98. Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 531,542.

99. New York Times., October, 19,1973. Cited in Golan, pp-cit.,

pp. 108-109.100. The International Herald Tribune, October 23,1973. Quoted

in Whetten, op. cit., p. 31.

101. Sunday Times Insight Team (1974), op. cit., p. 198.

102. Whetten, op. cit., p. 30; Laqueur, op. cit., p. 173; M.

Golan, op. cit., pp. 87-88; Heikal (1975), op. cit., pp. 249-

250; Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 568-569,575,601,604.

103. Kissinger, ibid., pp. 573-574.

104. Ibid., p. 576.



105. Ibid., pp. 579,583; Kalb and Kalb. op. cit.., p. 489;

Nixon, op. cit., p. 937; Sunday Times Insight Team (1974),

op. cit., p. 204.106. Quoted in Kissinger ibid., p. 583. Also see Kalb and Kalb,

ibid., pp. 489-490.

107. Kalb and Kalb, ibid., p. 488.108. See Kissinger, op. cit., p. 576.

109. Ibid., pp. 587-589; Kalb and Kalb, op. cit., pp. 491-492.

110. Kissinger, ibid., pp. 588,591; Kalb and Kalb, op. cit., pp.492,495-496.

111. Kissinger, ibid., p. 595.

112. Kalb and Kalb, op. cit., p. 497.

113. Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 608-609. According to some reports,Kissinger warned that in order to pre-empt a possible Soviet

supply operation, which would seriously weaken American

prestige in the Middle East, the U. S. would itself supply

the Third Army unless Israel permitted the Egyptians to sendit non-military supplies. This warning, it is claimed, was

underlined by the diversion of U. S. transport planes from

the Israeli airlift to European bases in preparation for a

possible airdrop. See Mangold, op. cit., p. 153; Sheehan,

op. cit., p. 371; Glassman, op. cit., pp. 164-165; Laqueur,

op. cit., p. 187. However, neither Kissinger, Kalb and Kalb,

nor Nixon make any mention of this.




As in Korea, the role of the superpowers in the October

1973 Arab-Israeli war was significantly moulded by the

crisis situation of the conflict. In the Korean war, the

crisis situation in general, and in particular its systemic

component, was highly unfavourable to the Soviet Union and

thus effectively prevented the Kremlin from responding to

the conflict in a manner consistent with the primary

interests and ambitions of the U. S. S. R. in the peninsula.

By the same token, it permitted the United States to

intervene in the war virtually with impunity. However, in

contrast, the crisis situation of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war

was approximately congruent to both superpowers and,

consequently, allowed them to intervene in accordance with

their primary interests in the area.

Thus, unlike the case of Korea, the Arab-Israeli war of

1973 occurred within a systemic context and interventionary

milieu which,together,

were more orless as conducive to

American as they were to Soviet intervention in the

conflict, and which imposed similar constraints on the

activities of each of these superpowers. To begin with,

whereas in Korea the international political environment was

almost overwhelmingly hostile to communism and to the

U. S. S. R., in the Middle East the world political setting of

the 1973 war was generally quite favourable to the Arab

cause. Consequently, the Soviet Union was able to

intervene on behalf of Egypt and Syria without having to

worry about the political cost of doing so. To be sure,



the U. S. S. R. had to take into account the possible adverse

effects of intervention on detente, which it needed far more

than the United States, and this seems to have imbued its

behaviour during the war with a certain degree of caution.

Nevertheless, in view of the impulsions of a rather

propitious interventionary milieu, the Kremlin stood to lose

much less from putting its weight behind its Arab clients

than it did from sacrificing them on the altar of detente,

and that, indeed, appears to have won the order of the day.

The resulting inclination to intervene was doubtless

encouraged by an international strategic environment that

sharply contrasted with that of the Korean war. Unlike the

early 1950's, in 1973 The Soviet Union enjoyed strategic

nuclear parity with the U. S. and this certainly enhanced its

crisis bargaining power vis-a-vis the Americans.

Admittedly, in the Middle East the U. S. S. R. did not possess

the advantage of contiguity to its proteges which it held in

Korea. However, it was still closer to the conflict zone

than was the United States and, in any case, it disposed of

an impressive capability for long-range intervention which

somewhat compensated for the disadvantage of distance.

The crisis situation of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was

likewise conducive to United States intervention on behalf

of Israel. But to the extent that it was at least as

favourable to intervention by the Soviet Union, it was

obviously less conducive to the U. S. than it had been during

the Korean war. Nevertheless, for one thing, in spite of

an increasingly adverse international political environment

that had grown weary of Israel's intransigence and



disenchanted with the United States' indifference to its

client's occupation of Arab territories, the Israelis and

their American patron retained a hard core of followers in

Latin America, Western Europe, and the Pacific area upon

whose instrumental support they could count for almost

anything. In addition, the U. S. found in detente a useful

lever with which to moderate Soviet involvement in aid of

Egypt and Syria. Furthermore, whilst the United States was

no longer in the strategically superior position vis-a-vis

the U. S. S. R. which it had enjoyed in the early 1950's, it

was still able to project military power on a scale and at a

distance far greater than the Soviet Union. The

credibility which this conferred upon its posture during the

conflict was undoubtedly enhanced by an interventionary

milieu that remained fairly 'sympathetic to American

involvement on the side of Israel.


In contrast to the Korean case, the Arab-Israeli war of

1973 tookplace

ina

systemic context which, due to a

widespread redistribution of political and military power

during the interjacent period, had become nearly as tolerant

of Soviet as it had been of United States interventions in,

and manipulations of,. grey area conflicts. At the centre

of this change was a certain restructuring of the

international system which by 1973 had become far less

tightly polarized than it had been during the early 1950's.

The impetus for this shift was provided by two principal

developments which, together, served to lessen the U. S. 's

overall influence over international affairs and thereby



free the U. S. S. R. from the political isolation that had

pitted it against virtually the entire world at the time of

the Koreanwar.

The first of these was the wave of

independence that swept Africa and Asia during the late

1950's and the 1960's and which, by the early 1970's,

produced a not insubstantial lobby of pro-Soviet states as

well as a sizeable group of non-aligned nations at the

United Nations and other international forums. Amongst the

effects of this was a partial redress of the world political

balance away from the Americans. Consequently, the United

States could no longer guarantee international backing for

itself and opprobrium for the Soviet Union whenever it came

to a client-state war stimulated superpower confrontation,

as had been the case in the immediate postwar period.

Increasingly, such confrontations began to be judged

according to the merits of the local issues at stake in the

client-state war rather than in purely East-West terms.

Although in theory this development marked a reduction

in the superpowers' sway over world affairs, in reality it

set the scene for the U. S. S. R. to challenge and to stand up

to the U. S. in areas of disputed or uncertain interest

symmetry without being accused of having aggressive motives.

Thus, whereas in Korea the Communist offensive was

successfully portrayed by the Americans and their followers

as Soviet expansionism by proxy and not as a national

dispute over the legitimate exercise of government authority,

in the Middle East the Arabs' endeavour to regain their

captured territories from Israel was seen mostly for what it

was. Admittedly, the political and ideological affinity of



North Korea to the Soviet Union was immensely greater than

that of Egypt, Syria or, indeed, any other Arab country, and

this undoubtedly contributed to the contrasting perceptions

of the two wars. Nevertheless, in politico-strategic

terms, a clear-cut Arab victory over Israel would have

amounted to as much of a Soviet gain vis-a-vis the United

States as a Communist triumph in Korea would have, as shown

by Kissinger's determination during the 1973 war to

demonstrate to Egypt and Syria the futility of military

action undertaken by virtue of Soviet arms and diplomatic

support. However, in spite of this, the change in the

world political environment permitted the Arabs to win

massive international support for their effort from

countries of varying political persuasion, both from amongst

the non-aligned as well as those with connections to either

superpower. This is no better illustrated than by the fact

that between September and November 1973 22 sub-Saharan

African states severed or suspended their relations with

Israel, 1many of which gave unequivocal backing to Egypt and

Syria during the October war. As far as these countries

were concerned, the superpower dimension of the war was

nothing but an inconsequential aspect of a conflict the

essence of which had come to be seen nearly as significant

as its implications for their increasingly important

relations with the petroleum-rich Arab countries.

Consequently, the involvement and intervention of the

United States and the U. S. S. R. on the side of Israel and the

Arabs respectively never clouded the fundamental issues and

the possible ramifications of the outcome of the war for

other countries, as had been the case with the superpowers'



association with the protagonists in Korea. Indeed, the

Soviet Union's unprecedented high profile intervention on

behalf of Egypt and Suria may well have boosted its prestige

even amongst those of the U. S. 's clients who decided to back

the Arabs.

The proliferation of non-aligned and other newly

independent states and the resulting gradual acceptance of

Soviet involvement in grey area wars naturally eroded the

United States' monopoly over the right to intervene in such

conflicts. Nevertheless, in spite of this shift, the

international political environment was still relatively

more amenable to American than to Soviet intervention. To

begin with, the U. S., being the successor to the imperial

powers ofWestern Europe,

enjoyed afar

more extensive

network of client- and dependent-states than did the

U. S. S. R. and was, therefore, assured of a substantial,

albeit increasingly unreliable, minimum amount of support

for its international activities. Moreoever, in contrast

to the Soviet Union whose superpower status was based almost

completely on its military capability, the United States

disposed of an impressive array of power, especially

economic power, and, consequently, was able to exercise

considerable influence over not only non-aligned but also

Soviet-inclined regimes, particularly in the developing

world. As a result, American intervention, even on behalf

of such pariah states as Israel, was never liable to quite

the same level of international censure as Soviet

intervention in support of proteges a decade earlier.

Thus, with the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war,



the international political environment was not such as to

constitute a serious impediment to United States

intervention on behalf of Israel. Admittedly, the U. S. had

to contend with a United Nations membership which, in

contrast to the Korean situation, was as supportive of the

Arab cause as it was disillusioned with American policy

towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. Hence Kissinger's

. strenuous efforts during the 1973 war to avoid a U. N. debate

on the Middle East problem which, he feared, would have

meant either "a diatribe of the nonaligned in support of

the...Arab position with the Soviets acting as the Arabs'

lawyer, " or an introduction of a resolution in the Security

Council by "the Soviets, or a proxy of theirs, " in support

of the Arabs programme, thereby compelling the United States

to veto it and undermine its position with the Arab

"moderates. "2 However, whatever resentment American

support for Israel could engender within the international

community was, most unlikely to transcend the stage of

rhetoric and develop into substantive action, for not only

was there little of consequencethat

most countriescould do

to seriously influence U. S. policy in the Middle East, but,

more importantly, the latter's general clout was so great as

to render any significant coercive action of a political or

economic nature on behalf of the Arabs somewhat imprudent.

Moreover, the United States and Israel were still able to

count on a hard core of followers in Latin America, Western

Europe, and amongst influential circles within those West

European states which were tending towards a more even-

handed approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute to uphold the

Anglo-Saxon-inspired belief in the moral rectitude of



standing by Israel, almost irrespective of the latter's

behaviour, and thereby confer a minimum degree of

respectability upon U. S. intervention in support of the

Zionist State. Consequently, although United States

support for Israel during the October 1973 war certainly

disappointed many countries that had entertained hopes that

this latest round of hostilities would bring an end to

Israel's occupation of Arab territories and, therefore,

remove a major obstacle to peace in the Middle East, it

nevertheless met with the same silence that had

characterized the U. S. 's stances during previous Arab-

Israeli wars. The only notable, albeit very important,

exception was the Arab oil boycott, but that was undertaken

by states which had chosen to put theirlot behind Egypt

and

Syria and were, therefore, part and parcel of the Arab

confrontation axis.

However, whilst the international political environment

of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was not sufficiently

unfavourable to the United States as to form a serious

deterrent to its intervention in support of Israel, it was

significantly less responsive to punitive American action

than it had been during the Korean war. The erosion which,

in the meantime, had afflicted Washington's flexibility to

.intervene with impunity in grey area client-state wars was

hastened bya

further development, which was the decline in

the political cohesion of the Western alliance. Unlike the

Korean war, which came at a time when Eruope and the United

States were united by the fear of Soviet aggression, the

October 1973 war found these allies in a state of division



and mutual recrimination. For one thing, the U. S. 's

singlehanded pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union, in

particular its failure to keep its European allies informed

of the 1972/1973 secret negotiations with the U. S. S. R. that

led to the June 1973 Brezhnev-Nixon agreement,3

produced

second thoughts about the desirability of detente and raised

serious doubts concerning the future of the American

commitment to Europe. 4 This difference in approach, of

which the varying perceptions of detente were but one

manifestation, was also evident in respect of regional

disputes such as the Arab-Israeli one. On the one hand,

the United States, being a superpower, looked upon such

disputes from a predominantly global perspective which, more

often than not, overlooked the essence of these disputes.

West Eruopeans, on the other hand, were more concerned with

the political and, especially the economic repercussions of

international conflicts on themselves. Being an economic

rather than a military colossus that was, nevertheless,

highly dependent on the international system for its well

being, Western Europe was more inclined to adopt a regional

stance towards problems in the Middle East and elsewhere

which focused on the intrinsic nature of these problems and

gave secondary importance to their implications for the

Soviet-American rivalry.

The impact of these differences on the amenability of

the international political environment to United States

intervention in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was quite

momdntous. In sharp contrast to the Korean war, all of the

U. S. 's European allies except Portugal refused to provide

facilities for the American airlift to Israel. Greece and



Spain declared their neutrality in the Middle East conflict,

thereby preventing the use of United States bases there for

the re-supply of Israel; Turkey went even further by

granting over-flight rights to the Soviet airlift to the

Arabs, and on October 26 West Germany refused to consent to

additional shipments of military supplies to Israel from

German ports.5 Whilst the U. S. saw the Arab-Israeli war in

purely East-West terms and thus interpreted the lack of West

European cooperation as indicative of a break-down of the

North Atlantic alliance, the Europeans perceived the war as

a local affair and not one entitling the Americans to invoke

loyalty from members of N. A. T. O. Moreover, for some West

European states, the war was due basically to Washington's

failure since 1967 to exert the necessary pressure on Israel

to make it withdraw from the occupied territories, so as to

achieve a political settlement with the Arabs, 6rather than

to an atttempt by the U. S. S. R. to tilt the regional

superpower balance of interests in its own favour.

Consequently, although in the final analysis, the United

States persisted in its intervention on behalf of Israel

regardless of the sentiments of its allies and, in fact,

managed to exceed the Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria, its

actions came out clearly as isolated American ones and not

as a joint Western response to a perceived common threat, as

was the case in Korea.

This perception was most evident in the readiness of

West European states to accept the Soviet Union's

intervention on behalf of Egypt and Syria as a local as

opposed to an East-West affair. Whereas a decade earlier



such involvement on the part of the U. S. S. R. in a client-

state war would probably have been more than sufficient to

rally most N. A. T. O. countries behind the United States in a

common effort to combat what would have been seen as "Soviet

expansionism by proxy, " in 1973 the intervention of the

Soviet Union was more or less interpreted in the context of

the Arab-Israeli dispute rather than that of the superpower

competition. Thus, the image of Egypt and Syria as Soviet

satellites, coloured red on the world map, which was widely

diffused in the late 1950's and early 1960's, was largely

shunned in favour of the notion which ascribed these

countries' status as Soviet clients to their need to

resolve their dispute with Israel. A resolution of the

Arab-Israeli problem was, consequently, seen as the key to

preventing the Middle East from turning into an area of high

superpower interest symmetry, in which the presence of the

U. S. S. R. would assume an aura of legitimacy and permanence,

or indeed into a locale of pronounced Soviet interest

asymmetry. From this viewpoint, the United States'

disposition to allow the fact of Soviet intervention in aid

of Egypt and Syria to determine its response to the 1973

Arab-Israeli war which, thereafter, was directed towards the

counteraction of Soviet involvement by whole-heartedly

intervening on behalf of Israel, was seen as tackling, a

symptom rather than the cause of the problem. The overall

impact of the American approach, it was feared, would be to

polarize the Middle East into pro-and anti-Soviet camps and

that, it was believed, would do nothing but consolidate the

position of the U. S. S. R. in the region.

Although this conception of superpower involvement in



the Middle East seemed more appropriate to the medium- and

long-term regional interests of the West than that of the

United States, its immediate impact during the 1973 war was

to somewhat increase the amenability of the international

political environment to Soviet intervention in the

conflict. This is because to the extent that West

European states resented the U. S. 's uncompromising support

of Israel on the grounds that it was detrimental to Western

interests in the Middle East, they can be said to have

contributed to the conduciveness of the world political

setting to the intervention of the U. S. S. R. on behalf of the

Arabs by presenting an image of support for Israel as

basically isolated American action, at a time when Soviet

help for the Arabs was passed on as an essentially ephemeral

phenomenon the impact of which was to disappear with the

resolution of the Middle East dispute. Coupled with the

general support of the non-aligned community for the Arab

cause, this must have encouraged the Kremlin in its

unprecedented backing of Egypt and Syria during the 1973

war.

Undoubtedly, the one aspect of the international

politcal environment of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that

clearly constituted a net asset for the United States and a

constraint for the Soviet Union was detente. In contrast

to the early 1950's where the superpowers were in a state of

intense suspicion and hostility, the existence of detente or

the special bilateral relationship between the U. S. and the

U. S. S. R. during the 1973 war provided the Americans with a

useful instrument with which to confine Soviet behaviour and



also induced the Kremlin on to a course of' self-imposed

moderation. In view of the U. S. S. R. 's relatively closer

attachment to the special relationship with the United

States, which is underlined by, inter alia, its need to gain

direct access to American capital and "know-how, " the

overall effect of detente during the 1973 Middle East war

was to place the U. S. S. R. at a disadvantage in respect of

its bargaining position vis-a-vis the U. S. To be sure,

the exigencies of the domestic political situation in the

United States at the time rendered the success of the

special relationship with the Soviet Union as much of a

political necessity for Washington as it was an economic

bonus for Moscow, and this may have impaired its utility as

a lever for bargaining with the Kremlin. Thus, as the

Nixon Administration sank ever deeper into the Watergate

scandal, with the President himself becoming increasingly

implicated in the affair, the White House became more and

more inclined to emphasize detente with the U. S. S. R., on the

grounds that, whatever Nixon's failings at home, he and his

adviser,Kissinger,

were provenmasters of diplomacy.?

However, to decouple detente from Soviet behaviour during

the Arab-Israeli war, when that behaviour was constantly and

publicly denounced by the United States as contrary to the

spirit, if not the letter, of the May 1972 and the June 1973

agreements, would have created an impression of White House

weakness and irresolution and, therefore, compounded the

domestic position of Nixon and his associates.

Consequently, the United States made an issue of what it saw

as the incompatibility of detente with the U. S. S. R. 's

intervention on behalf of Egypt and Syria and sought, by



stressing the inseparability of one from the other, to

terminate or at least minimize Soviet support for the Arabs.

Hence Kissinger'swarning

to the Soviet Union on October 8,

1973, in which he pledged that the U. S.

will react if relaxation of tensions is used as a coverto exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots.The Soviet Union cannot disregard these principles [of

detente] in any area of the world without imperilling

its entire relationship with the United

States... Coexistence to us continues to have a very

precise meaning: we will oppose the attempt of any

country to achieve a position of predominance either

globally or regionally. 8

Nevertheless, the actual impact of detente and the

American threats to link it to the U. S. S. R's regional

behaviour on the Kremlin's policy during the October 1973

war should not be over-estimated. Admittedly, the Soviet

leadership initially took care to distance itself from the

Arab attack, and throughout the war the public utterances of

Soviet officials and propaganda organs were scrupulously

devoid of polemics or invective, stressing instead the

continuing importance of detente with the United States.

However, at the end of the day, the requirements of the

situation in the Middle East, namely, the precariousness of

the U. S. S. R. 's regional position and the consequent need to

restore its credibility and prestige in the area, were more

of a compelling force for the Kremlin than the risk of

jeopardizing the special reältionship with the U. S. As one

commentator put it, the Soviet Union, like the United

States, "was too deeply committed to allow its friends to be

sacrificed for the spirit of detente. Concrete local

interests won out over global abstractions when put to the

test. "9



As in the Korean war, the role of the world political

setting in shaping the responses of the United States and

the Soviet Union to the 1975 Arab-Israeli war was mainly

complementary; the nature and contrast of those responses,

in particular the ability of the U. S. S. R. to intervene in

the conflict in accordance with its primary interests in the

Middle East, was principally determined by the international

strategic environment. However, unlike the early 1950's

where the U. S. 's nuclear preponderance placed the Soviet

Union at a considerable strategic disadvantage, the 1973 war

came at the outset of the new era of conventional and

nuclear parity between the two superpowers. In the

intervening period, the U. S. S. R. had evolved from a

significant regional power to a superpower more or less

equal to the United States. Admittedly, in some respects

it still lagged behind the U. S., for example, it lacked the

capability to launch and sustain a large intervention in

very distant places and was out-numbered by the Americans in

terms of strategic bombers and nuclear warheads. 10

Nevertheless, it-disposed of an impressive airlift

capability and most importantly, shared with the United

States the power for mutually assured destruction. Indeed,

the new strategic relationship between the two countries was

acknowledged by Washington as early as January 1969, when

Nixon referred for the first time to the doctrine of

strategic sufficiency, "thus in effect renouncing the

American claim to strategic superiority over the Soviet

Union"11 and accepting the notion of strategic symmetry.

For the U. S. S. R., this state of affairs permitted it, in the

words of one Soviet commentator, "to half imperialistic



efforts to achieve its objectives by nuclear blackmail. "

It became quite clear, he goes on "that nothing would come

of the attempts of the imperialist rulers to settle

international issues by force of arms, or that nuclear war

would spell suicide for those who ventured to start it. "12

This newly-found confidence led to a widening of the Soviet

security perspective. In contrast to the early 1950's, the

task of the Soviet armed forces was seen as not only "to

protect the socialist commonwealth, " but also to limit "the

actions of the imperialists in other regions of the

globe. "13 This new attitude was neatly summarized by a

Soviet foreign ministry official who, referring to the

advent of strategic parity between the superpowers, urged

the United States to shun the illusion of grandeur and come

to terms with reality:

You still assign to yourself a global role and to us a

very limited regional sphere of influence. Well,

you'll have to get over that notion. It's outdated

and unjust. We too are now a global power, and wehave the right to compete with you on a global

14scale.

That is only fair if we are truly your equals.

Thus,unlike

theearly

1950's,where

the U. S. S. R. found

itself incapable of credibly utilizing its conventional

superiority in crisis bargaining with an atomically

preponderant United States, by the late 1960's/early 1970's

the U. S. had to reckon with the same strategic constraints

imposed by the risk of nuclear war which for so long had

restricted effective Soviet intervention to the U. S. S. R's

immediate sphere of influence. Consequently, the Soviet

Union was able to assume a foreign/defence policy activism

which was unprecedented outside Eastern Europe. This first

became evident in Egypt in 1970 when Soviet pilots were





greater proximity to the Middle East is somewhat offset by

the larger capacity and longer range of the American airlift

fleet, as shown during the 1973 war.

Likewise, differences in the relative abilities of the

United States and the Soviet Union to launch and sustain a

large-scale direct intervention in the Middle East during

the 1973 Arab-Israeli war tended to approximately cancel

each other out. Admittedly, an assessment of these

abilities involves comparisons of so many non-quantifiable

and unpredictable factors that it is almost impossible to

make a meaningful overall evaluation. Consequently, to say

that the various asymmetries between the interventionary

capabilities of the superpowers tended to offset each other

is simply another way of saying that there were advantages

and disadvantages on both sides. For the U. S., the

principal advantages were the integrated nature of its

substantial, well-developed and highly trained potential

interventionary force, the marines, and the presence in the

Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean of carrier groups

which could be called upon to provide air cover and fire

power in the event of a major intervention. Needless to

say, the main disadvantage was that of distance, which would

have meant a very long and highly vulnerable logistical

"tail" in the event of hostilities. The principal Soviet

advantage, on the other hand, was that of proximity to the

conflict zone and the main disadvantages were those of a

potential interventionary force, the airborne troops, which

lacked combat experience, organic fire power, and air cover.

Nevertheless, in view of its closeness to the Middle East

the U. S. S. R. was in a fairly good position to reinforce its



airborne units, which would have been used to spearhead an

intervention, with forces better suited to the battlefield

conditions of the Middle East, in the event of a prolonged

intervention here.

The role of the inertia of the status quo, or the "fact

of possession" of the interest in dispute during the 1973

Arab-Israeli war on the interventionary milieu of the

conflict is a little more complex than in the case of the

Korean war. In strict terms, it was the Soviet Union's

Arab clients which endeavoured to forcibly change the status

quo, namely by trying to regain the territories captured by

Israel during the 1967 war. To the extent that their

target, Israel, was closely associated with the U. S., their

attempt canbe

saidto have had

seriousimplications for the

regional superpower balance and, therefore, for the relative

strength of motivation of the United States and the U. S. S. R.

Indeed, in view of the intimate nature of the American-

Israeli patron-client relationship, even a limited defeat of

Israel at the hands of Egypt and Syria would have amounted

to a serious blow for the prestige and resolve images of the

United States, and in this respect the "fact of possession"

may have influenced the interventionary milieu in favour of

the U. S. However, the status quo which the Arabs were

trying to reverse had never been recognized either by the

United States or by the overwhelming majority of the

international community as legitimate or permanent. In

fact, whilst the Americans had always conceded in principle

the need for Israel to withdraw from the territories

occupied during the 1967 war, most members of the United



Nations deplored Israel's continued occupation of Arab

territories and a very substantial minority supported the

right of the Arabs to regain these territores by force.

Consequently, whatever impetus the "fact of possession" may

have given to Washington's strength of motivation during the

1973 war was probably counter-balanced by the widespread

perception of the illegitimacy of the status quo which the

Arabs were trying to change. By the same token, any

debilitation of Soviet strength of motivation that might

have been incurred by the fact that the U. S. S. R. 's proteges

were trying to reverse the territorial status quo was

probably offset by the prevalent world recognition of

Egyptian and Syrian sovereignty over the occupied Sinai

desert and Golan Heights respectively and rejection of

Israel's occupation and partial colonization of these areas.

As in the Korean conflict, it was the superpowers'

comparative valuation of their interests at stake which

constituted the most important element in establishing the

interventionary milieu of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. As

one writer has put it, at issue in the conflict

were the credibility of commitments---the willingness

and the ability of Washington and Moscow to supporttheir clients. These were essential psychological

components of the East-West balance of power, and were

closely monitored in the two superpower capitals for

indications about the adversary's mood, determination

and future intentions, and for the implications aboutthese which might be drawn by others. The latter was

a point of particular sensitivity, and one which lent

itself to over-reaction.16

Indeed, in view of the depth and longevity of the United

Statesand the Soviet Union's involvement on behalf of

Israeland the Arabs respectively, the Middle East became a

testingground and a major gauge of the superpowers' resolve



and credibility. As Kissinger once pointed out, what the

U. S. had to bear in mind was that the U. S. S. R. would judge

it by the general purposefulness of its performance

everywhere. "What they are doing in the Middle East, " he

stressed, "poses the gravest threats... for Western Europe

and Japan and therefore for the U. S. "17 Thus, with the

outbreak of hostilities in October 1973, parallels were soon

drawn between Israeli and European dependence for survival

onthe Americans, in that the

outcome ofthe hostilities

"seemed to depend on which side's protector would ensure

that it had the military means to stay in the field. "18

Hence Kissinger's dictum that the United States could not

allow Soviet arms to achieve a victory, no matter how

limited, over American arms.19 Consequently, in spite of

Washington's recognition, following the eruption of war, of

the need to arrive at a political settlement of the Arab-

Israel dispute that was acceptable to the Arabs as well as

to the Israelis, it felt it imperative to extend every

possible assistance short of direct intervention to Israel,

even though that clearly contradicted its ultimate

political objectives in the Middle East.

As with the United States, the Kremlin probably

conceived of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 as a testing

ground in which its performance on behalf of Egypt and Syria

would be taken as an important gauge of its credibility and

resolve in crises. Indeed, a repetition of the 1967

debacle, after which the credibility and prestige of the

Soviet Union in the Middle East plummeted as never before,

would have had disastrous consequences for the image of the

U. S. S. R. as a superpower of equal weight to the U. S. and as



a protector of those in the Arab world and elsewhere who

were seeking to fight "imperialism. " Consequently, the

1973 war had much more than just a regional significance for

the Soviet Union. At the regional level, the implications

of a less than resolute Soviet stance during the conflict

would probably have been even more serious. In view of the

widespread doubts that had grown during the period 1967-1973

in respect of the credibility and resolve of the U. S. S. R.

when it comes to the risk of a direct confrontation with the

United States, a failure to resolutely support Egypt and

Syria in their effort to regain their lost territories could

well have meant the total eviction of the Soviet Union from

the Middle East. Thus, of the two superpowers, the

U. S. S. R. seems to have had much more at stake in terms of

its credibility and image of resolve during the 1973 war

than did the U. S. Given the disastrous performance of its

clients in previous confrontations with Israel, the onus was

firmly placed on Moscow to demonstrate-the worthiness of

its patronage. This may go some way towards explaining

that, in spite of the wider United States commitment to the

Israelis compared to that of the U. S. S. R. to the Arabs,

Soviet intervention on behalf of Egypt and Syria during the

1973 war for the first time matched that of the U. S. to

Israel.



Notes

1. In all, 27 sub-Saharan African states broke off or suspended

their relations with Israel during 1973. See International

Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1973,

(International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,

1973), pp. 9,103. (Hereinafter referred to as Strategic

Survey). Also see G. Rafael, Destination Peace: Three

Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy---A Personal Memoir

(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1981), p. 279.

2. H. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Weidenfeld and Nicolson andMichael Joseph, London, 1982), p. 471.

3. These pledged the United States and the Soviet Union toreach a second strategic Arms Limitation agreement in 1974

and to consult together whenever there was a danger of

nuclear war. See Survival, September/October 1973, pp.243-244.

4. Strategic Survey 1973, pp. 63-64.

5. Ibid., pp. 4,62.6. Ibid., p. 61.7. Ibid., p. 3.8. Ibid., p. 30.9. W. B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward

the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-1976 (University ofCalifornia Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), p. 201.

10. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World

Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook 1974 (MIT Press,

Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London; Almgvist and Wiksell,

Stockholm, 1974), pp. 106-107. (Hereinafter referred to as

SIPRI Yearbook).

11. R. Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1973: The Paradox

of Super Power (Oxford University Press, London, 1975), p.

79.12. N. I. Lebedev, A New Stage in International Relations, trans.

D. Ya. Skirvsky and V. M. Scheierson (Pergamon,Oxford

andNew York, 1978), p. 37.

13. D. Holloway, "Foreign and Defence Policy, " The Soviet Union

Since the Fall of Khrushchev, 2nd ed., ed. A. Brown and M.

Kaser (Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1978), pp. 56-57.

14. Quoted in Time, June 23,1980, p. 29. Also see V. V.

Aspaturian, "The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, " World

Politics: An Introduction, ed. J. Rosenau, et al. (Free

Press, New York, 1976), esp. p. 62; L. Whetten,

"Bilateralism and the Political Utility of Soviet Military

Power, " The Political Implications of Soviet Military Power,

ed. idem (Macdonald andJane's, London, 1977),

esp. p.9.

15. H. Adomeit, "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour: From

Confrontation to Coexistence? ", Adelphi Papers No. 101


1973), p. 14.16. P. Mangold, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East

(Croom Helm, London, 1978), p. 18.

17. Background briefing, San Clemente, June 26,1970. Quoted in

E. Ahmad, "What Washington Wants, " Middle East Crucible:

Studies in he Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, ed. N. Aruri



(Medina Universty Press International, Wilmette, Illinois,

1975), p. 241.

18. The Economist, November 3,1973.19. See, for instance, Sunday Times Insight Team, Insight on the

Middle East War (Andre Deutsch, London, 1974), p. 238.



SECTION C:

UNILATERAL INTERVENTION:

THE ETHIO-SOMALI WAR 1977-1978

In spite of its geographical proximity to the Middle

East, the Horn of Africa's status within the superpower

global contest onthe

eve ofthe Ethio-Somali

war was

somewhat uncertain. In this respect, it resembled the

Korean peninsula in the period immediately preceding the

outbreak of war.

However, in contrast to Korea, the strategic and

political significance of the Horn of Africa was explicitly

acknowledged by either the United States and/or the Soviet

Union at one time or the other. In terms of geostrategic

value, the Horn derives much of its importance from its

closeness to the Middle East and its oil deposits, to the

international shipping lanes connecting Europe with Asia,

and to the Indian Ocean, as well as from its location at the

hub of Asia and Africa. Politically, the region owes its

significance to the distinctiveness of its two principal

countries, Ethiopia and Somalia; the former being the

oldest state in sub-Saharan Africa and host to the

headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (O. A. U. ),

whilst the latter constitutes the only state south of the

Sahara which is ethnically homogeneous.

Nevertheless, in contrast to the Middle East, the

superpowers' relative perceptions of the strategic and

political significance of the Horn of Africa at the time of



the Ethio-Somali war were rather unequal. For the United

States, the development of satellite technology, the lease

from Britain in 1971of

the Indian Ocean island of Diego

Garcia, and the growth of the U. S. navy's capability in

afloat support permitted it to largely dispense with its

communications and naval facilities in its traditional

protege in the region, Ethiopia. In addition, the demise

of the Haile Selassie regime and its replacement by a

Marxist-oriented military junta served to lessen Ethiopia's

political value to Washington and consequently, to distance

it even further from Addis Ababa. In contrast, the Soviet

Union's interest and involvement in the Horn of Africa

witnessed a steady development, firstly, with the advent in

1969 of the Barre regime in Somalia, with which it concluded

a friendship treaty in 1974, and, secondly, with the

emergence in 1974 of the military Junta in Ethiopia.

Indeed, the oncoming of the military regime in Addis Ababa,

with its Marxist rhetoric and radical socio-economic

programme, raised the prospect in Moscow of an additional

client in the Horn's most important country, and eventually

encouraged it to provide Ethiopia with political and

military support.

Thus, with the imminence of hostilities in July 1977,

the superpowers' commitments in the Horn of Africa were

anything but on a par. Although, since the rise of the

Mengistu faction within the ruling clique in Ethiopia in

February 1977, the United States had been exploring the

possibility of establishing a patron-client relationship

with the Somali Republic, it soon relented once the latter



embarked on a fully-fledged effort to capture the Somali-

inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia. This left the

U. S. S. R. as the pre-eminent superpower in the area, and for

a while after the outbreak of open warfare the Kremlin

endeavoured to use its military and political leverage over

Mogadishu and Addis Ababa in an attempt to find a modus

vivendi between the two capitals as a step towards the

establishment of a Pax Sovietica in the Horn of Africa.

Once this policy began to antagonize Somalia as well as

Ethiopia and thereby threaten the U. S. S. R. 's position in

both countries, the Kremlin decided to vouch for the latter.

Consequently, it embarked upon a massive air- and sealift of

arms and military equipment and facilitated the direct

intervention of Cuban and other Soviet bloc military

personnel to Ethiopia. The mode, scale, and the success of

the U. S. S. R. 's Intervention Inevitably generated anxieties

in Washington and amongst West Eutopeans in respect of the

possible impact on the United States' images of credibility

and resolve. But, lacking a firm commitment in the region,

the U. S. was unable to counter-intervene atthe same level

and scale as the U. S. S. R. Instead, it responded solely at

the superpower' level by terminating the Indian Ocean

Disarmament Talks with the Soviet Union, by threatening to

link other issues such as detente and arms control to Soviet

behaviour in the Horn, and by engaging in displays of

minatory diplomacy. However, whilst this strategy may have

helped its general image amongst its allies and friends, it

lacked the credibility and also came too late to have a

significant effect on Soviet behaviour in the Horn of

Africa.



The alternatives available to the United States during

the Ethio-Somali war were severely circumscribed by a highly

unfavourable crisis situation. Although, other things

being equal, the systemic context of the conflict was as

conducive in 1977 as it had been during the 1973 Arab-

Israeli war, the blatant violation by Somalia of Ethiopia's

internationally-recognized borders created a regional

political setting which strongly discouraged support for

Mogadishu and encouraged intervention on behalf of Ethiopia.

In addition, the interventionary milieu of the war was also

unfavourable to U. S. intervention in aid of either side.

For one thing, although the United States had disengaged

itself from Ethiopia, it had not had time to establish

compensatory linkages with Somalia, and thus had no

commitment to either side in the war. Moreover, whilst the

inertia of the status quo clearly discouraged support for

Somali revanchism, the U. S. was constrained by Addis Ababa's

human rights violations, Marxist rhetoric, and radical

socio-economic programmeto keep its distance from Ethiopia.

Thirdly, the United States was also at a disadvantage vis-a-

vis the U. S. S. R. in terms of relative local interventionary

capability, in that it did not have available a surrogate

force able and willing to intervene on the same scale as the

Cubans were in Ethiopia.

Thecrisis situation

of the Ethio-Somali war was, in

contrast, very conducive to Soviet intervention. As with

the United States, the regional political setting acted as a

constraint against Soviet support for Somalia but, by the

same token, it encouraged intervention in defence of



Ethiopia. With a different operational code from that of

the U. S., the U. S. S. R. consequently chose to forego Its pre-

eminent position in Somalia and intervene on behalf of

Ethiopia which, in terms of ideology, geostrategic, and

political significance, seemed a much better bargain. In

doing so, it was aided by other elements of the

interventionary milieu such as the inertia of a status quo

that was widely recognized as legitimate and the

availability of a surrogateforce in the form

ofCuba.

a




The origins of superpower alignments in the Horn of Africa

When hostilities broke out between Ethiopian troops and

the forces of the Somali-backed Western Somali Liberation

Front (W. S. L. F. ) in late spring/early summer 1977, the

United States and the Soviet Union had been involved in the

Horn of Africa for 25 years and14

years respectively,that

is, longer than the period between the first serious U. S.

and Soviet involvement in the Middle East and the- outbreak

of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. American interest in

the Horn began in earnest in 1953 when on May 23 two

agreements were concluded with the Ethiopian regime. These

were to define the nature of the U. S. involvement and

commitment in the region for the next two and a half

decades. The first was a military assistance agreement

that catered for American aid in training and equipping the

Ethiopian armed forces. The second agreement was a sort of

quid pro quo for the first; it provided for the

establishment of a U. S. communications base at Asmara, known

as Kagnew. 1 As one writer has pointed out, this was at the

time considered to be a very valuable facility; its

distance from the northern and southern magnetic poles, and

its location in a zone comparatively free of magnetic storms

made it ideally situated for the U. S. 's global radio

communications network. From 1953 until its closure in

1977 the Kagnew base constituted part of a world-wide

circuit running from Arlington, Virginia, through the

American bases in Morocco to Asmara, and then on to the



Philippines. 2

In contrast to the United States Soviet involvement in

the Horn of Africa reflects a long-standingRussian

interest. Alexis and Peter the Great in the 17th century,

Paul I and Catherine the Great in the mid-18th century, and

Slarophile officials under Czar Alexander III in the 19th

century, all pursued the notion of setting up "blue sea

ports" in. the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, the latter to

the extent of establishing a Russian colony in the present

state of Djibouti in 1889.3 More recently, in 1945 and

1946, Stalin endeavoured to acquire a United Nations'

trusteeship over Italian Somalia or the colony of Eritrea,

but his efforts were thwarted by the Western-dominated U. N.

which kept the territories within the Western sphere of

influence. 4 With the death of Stalin and the advent of

Khrushchev, Soviet interest in the Horn, as in the rest of

the newly-independent developing states, was revived with

unprecedented vigour. This was initially reflected in the

U. S. S. R. 's early flirtations with Ethiopia. Thus, in 1956

embassies were exchanged and in 1959 Haile Selassie paid a

visit to Moscow, the first sub-Saharan African head of state

to do so.5 In that same year, the U. S. S. R. also granted

the Ethiopians a loan of $102m and by the early 1960's it

took charge of constructing the country's only refinery at

Assab, which was completed in 1967.6 Nevertheless, this

initial interest in Ethiopia was never translated into

political influence. As Halliday and Molyneux point out,

despite its economic assistance and Its acknowledgement of

Ethiopia's place in African politics, the Kremlin was unable



to persuade Haile Selassi either to opt for a non-aligned

posture or to criticize U. S. policies in Vietnam.? Indeed,

until his demise in 1974, the Emperor remained firmly wedded

to his alliance with the United States.

It was not until 1963 that the Soviet interest in the

Horn of Africa began to develop Into relatively more regular

linkages. The pretext for this was the young Somali

Republic's quest for military assistance and the genesis of

the Soviet involvement was, asin the

case ofEgypt

eight

years earlier, by default. Following their independence in

1960, the Somalis turned to the Western bloc for assistance

in building a standing army of 20,000 men. However, the

United States, Italy, and West Germany responded with a $10

million offer to provide for the creation of a 5,000-6,000-

men internal security force on condition that Mogadishu

pledged not to accept military assistances from other

sources. For the Americans and their allies, the

conditional and limited nature of the offer was necessary to

ensure against the forcible implementtion of Somalia's

ambition tore-unite

with the Somali-inhabited regions of

Kenya and Ethiopia and the then French Territory of the

Afars and Issas (which later became Djibouti). 8 But as far

as Somalia was concerned, the restrictions were an affront

and an impingement on its independence, an insult added to

the injury caused by the colonial powers' division of the

Somali nation. It was at this point that the U. S. S. R.

stepped, in with the attractive offer of $32 million worth of

military aid, most of which would be treated as a grant

whilst the remainder was to be repaid over a 20-year period.

The programme was to cover the training and equipping of a



10,000-man armed force, including a small air force using

jet aircraft.9 The Soviet offer, which was readily

accepted by Magadishu, defined the type of relationship

which the two countries were to maintain for the next six

years. After 1969, Soviet-Somali relations entered a new

qualitative phase with the U. S. S. R substantially increasing

its military and economic assistance to Somalia in return

for naval and air facilities and, perhaps, political support.

The attraction of the Horn of Africa to the superpowers

As in the case of the Middle East, the initial desire

of the superpowers to penetrate the Horn of Africa, and

their subsequent rivalry in the area, can be explained

basically in terms of the geostrategic, political, and, to a

much lower extent, potential economic importance of the

region to each of them.

Geostrategic

The geostrategic importance of the Horn of Africa owes

a lot to its geographical proximity to the MiddleEast

and

is, therefore, underlined by many of the factors that drew

the interest of the United States and the Soviet Union to

that region: its closeness to the petroleum deposits of the

Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, to the international

shipping lanes linking Europe with south- and south-west

Asia, and to the Indian Ocean, as well as to its location at

the junction of Asia and Africa. This point was succinctly

put by V. Sofinsky, head of the press department of the

U. S. S. R. Foreign Ministry, who stated on February 3,1978,



that

The Horn of Africa is first and foremost of military,

political and economic significance. The importance

of the area lies in its location at the junction of the

two continents of Asia and Africa. There are a lot ofgood seaports in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Moreover, there are sea-lanes which link oil-producing

countries with America and Europe. 10

Like the Middle East, it is the proximity of the Horn

of Africa to the petroleum-exporting countries of the

Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula which, it will be

recalled, constitute the principal source of Western

Europe and Japan's oil supplies, and, especially, its

location at the route linking the petroleum-producing states

with America's European partners, that on balance make the

region of greater importance to the U. S. than to the

U. S. S. R. which, until now, has been largely self-sufficient

in oil. This point was implicitly acknowledged by one

Soviet writer who explained the U. S. interest in the Horn in

terms of the fact that

The most important sea-lanes from the Mediterranean

through the Suez Canal and into the Indian Ocean pass

through the Red Sea. Each year up to 20,000 ships

pass through this sea. The countries on the eastern

shore of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, possess

nearly two-thirds of the proven petroleum reserves inthe capitalist world, which provide the US with one-fourth of the oil it consumes. Colossal American

capital investment measured in tens of billions ofdollars are concentrated there. All this is behind

Washington's military activity in the area...11

However, the Horn of Africa's place in international

communications is also of some importance to the Soviet

Union. For one thing, the U. S. S. R. is, as pointed out in

Chapter 8, a potential importer of Middle Eastern oil and so

a degree of balance between the superpowers in the Red Sea

region is perhaps necessary to guarantee future access to

the petroleum resources of the area. In addition to this,



the Horn of Africa has also been of increasing importance to

the Soviet Union in view of the latter's expanding shipping

business in the developing world which, amongst other things,

brings it much-needed foreign exchange. It is also a

potential source of pressure on such countries as Egypt

which obtain a substantial proportion of their external

revenue from tolls imposed on ships passing through

waterways like the Suez Canal. 12

The closeness of the Horn of Africa to the petroleum

deposits of the Middle East and its location at the centre

of the sea-lanes linking these deposits to the Western world

has naturally stimulated anxiety and interest on the part of

the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. respectively and for more or less

the opposite reasons. For the Americans and their allies,

the main fear has been of the prospect of the Soviet Union

gaining a strategic position from which it would be able to

threaten the interruption of the vital shipping lanes of the

Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the Cape of Good Hope. 13

Conversely, one of the lures of the Horn of Africa for the

U. S. S. R. has presumably been the possibility of obtaining a

position from which it could threaten the lifelines of the

West. As one writer has pointed out, although a well-

established Soviet naval presence in the area is most

unlikely to interdict Western petroleum supplies except at

the immediate risk of provoking war, it would, nevertheless,

provide a threat against which the N. A. T. O. states would

have to guard and would, therefore, complicate Western

defence planning.14

As well as its location at the route linking the Middle



Eastern oil fields to Western Europe, the Horn of Africa has

also been of increasing geostrategic importance due to its

proximity to the Indian Ocean. As noted in Chapter 8, with

such technological developments as the lengthening of the

range of nuclear submarine-laucnhed ballistic missiles

(S. S. B. N. 's) and the consequent movement of the defense

point of contact away from relatively confined areas like

the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean has been assuming

ever greater strategic relevance to the superpowers.This

is particularly the case for the Soviet Union whose

vulnerability to S. S. B. N. 's launched from submarines

stationed in the Ocean has been rapidly growing, first with

the development of the Polaris A3 to which, from a site in

the Arabian Sea, much of the U. S. S. R. becomes vulnerable;

then, with the deployment of Trident I whose 4,000-mile

range missile puts Moscow in jeopardy from much of the

Indian Ocean basin, and now, with the development of Trident

II, which carries a missile with a range of 6,000 miles,

even greater stretches of the U. S. S. R. would be vulnerable

froma

largerarea of

the Ocean. 15 To be sure, since the

Soviet Union is also vulnerable from many other parts of

the world, it can be, therefore, surmised that "the prospect

of US submarines in the Indian Ocean cannot be that

terrifying to the U. S. S. R... "16 However, as in the case

of a Soviet presence within striking distance of the West's

petroleum routes, an American presence in the Indian Ocean

may Indeed not be that terrifying to the Kremlin in

peacetime but it would, nevertheless, serve, inter alia, to

complicate Soviet military planning.

Indeed, evidence of the Soviet Union's concern over the



presence of Western naval units in the Indian Ocean has been

of long-standing. Thus, not long after the Americans began

to deploy the Polaris A3 in the Pacific Ocean, the Soviet

government included in a memorandum presented to the United

Nations on December 7,1964, a proposal that the Indian

Ocean be declared a nuclear-free zone. Although at that

time the U. S. did not indicate a desire to deploy any of its

ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean, the

Kremlin clearly sought to preclude that prospect.17 By

1968, Soviet concern about the potential threat from the

Indian Ocean manifested itself more concretely when units of

the U. S. S. R. 's navy for the first time began to patrol the

region, a phenomenon which subsequently became a permanent

feature. The presence of theSoviet

navyin the Ocean

apparently played a part in initiating and, in any case,

strengthened the position of the U. S. S. R. in the U. S. -Soviet

Indian Ocean disarmament talks which began in the latter

part of the 1970's. These are now suspended, but an

escalated Soviet naval presence in the area may still be

useful in that it could lead either to new negotiations on

the subject or to some form of a regional great power self-

denying ordnance, for example, excluding aircraft carriers,

that would be to the advantage of the U. S. S. R. 18 Even if

neither of these possibilities materializes, "[f]rom purely

military considerations, even if there is no breakthrough in

undersea surveillance technology in the next decade, the

Soviets... may feel that something, however ineffectual, must

be done in the Indian Ocean to counter the Trident... "19

Thus, for the time being, the Indian Ocean is likely to



remain of strategic-military interest to the U. S. S. R.

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to the

United States is clearly not as great as it is to the Soviet

Union which is geographically much closer to it. However,

it is of sufficient importance to warrant American interest.

For one thing, it is within striking distance of the

shipping lanes linking Western, Europe with the Arabian

Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. In addition to this, it is

adjacent to those sea-routes which connectthe

rest of the

U. S. and Japan with south-west Asia and, in the case of the

latter country, with Europe. Moreover, it is also not far

off other Western allies and friends in the area such as

Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines,

and Pakistan. For the U. S., the Indian Ocean is, therefore,

a relevant arena for the protection of important Western

interests, a fact that has probably contributed to the

increasing American naval interest in the region.

A third factor which makes the Horn of Africa of

geostrategic importance to the superpowers derives from its

locationat

the junction of Asia and Africa. This has in

the past been exploited by other states, the most recent of

which is Libya, which has sought influence first in Somalia

and then in Ethiopia in order to exert pressure at one time

or another on the Sudan, Egypt, Tanzania, and Uganda in

Africa, and on Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and North

Yemen in south-west Asia via Ethiopia and South Yemen.

The location of the Horn of Africa at the junction of

Asia and Africa can, therefore, no doubt be used, perhaps

much more effectively, by the United States and the Soviet

Union. The influence of either of the superpowers in the



region could, especially If it is supplemented by a military

presence, enable it to both protect and consolidate client

regimes and undermine the position of the other superpower

in the area. It could also enable it to spread its

Influence Into other parts of the continent and its

surroundings. This aspect of the geographical location of

the Horn is perhaps of greater interest to the U. S. S. R. than

to the U. S. in view of the proliferation of pro-Western

regimes in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. A strong

Soviet presence in north-eastern Africa could, for example,

enable the U. S. S. R. to undermine or put pressure on unstable

or potentially unstable pro-Western regimes in countries

like Kenya, Egypt, and the Sudan as well as Saudi Arabia,

the Gulf sheikhdoms and North Yemen.20

It could, moreover,

make it possible for the U. S. S. R. to "link up with the

Soviet-backed liberation wars in central and southern

Africa and direct the final confrontation over ...South

Africa... "21 In addition, it would also enable the Soviets

to support such friendly regimes as those in Angola,

Mozambique, the Congo, and, perhaps, Zimbabwe by providing a

staging post for military and other types of assistance.22

Likewise, an American presence in the Horn of Africa

would make It easier for the United States to protect its

clients and friends in Africa and south-west Asia, and to

undermine or pressurize such pro-Soviet states as Angola,

Mozambique, and South Yemen.

Political

Unlike the Middle East, the Horn of Africa is not an



area that is noted for its international political prestige,

its component states neither having played an outstanding

part in the Thid World's struggle for independence

comparable to Egypt's vanguard role in setting up the

movement of non-aligned nations and its fervent support for

national liberation movements, nor possessing the wealth

which enables the Arab oil-producing states to exert some

pressure on the West and to buy support of poorer nations.

However the Horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia is invested

with certain characteristics which make it politically more

significant than most other sub-Saharan African regions.

In the first place, the two principal countries in the Horn,

Ethiopia and Somalia, are distinguished from the rest of

Africa by virtue of the fact that whilst the former

constitutes the oldest state in black Africa and, moreover

has been subjected to no more than five years (1936-1941) of

foreign domination, the latter, Somalia, is the only sub-

Saharan African state which is ethnically homogeneous.

But, unfortunately for the Somalis, the prestige that is

consequent upon this fact has been more than offsetby

the

country's abject poverty, its sparse population, and its

Irredentist ambitions which have put it at loggerheads with

most other African states.

This has left Ethiopia, a potentially rich country

which is almost twice as large as Somalia and with a

population of 30 million inhabitants making it virtually

nine times as populous as Somalia, as the main political

force in the Horn of Africa. At least until the demise of

Haile Selassie in 1974, Ethiopia's attraction was reinforced

by its position as host to the headquarters of the



O. A. U. This made it a strong base from which to influence

other African and Middle Eastern states. However, it also

endowed the Somalis with a political advantage. As

Ethiopia's traditional adversary, Somalia offered the

logical base from which to exercise some sort of leverage

and influence over the ethnically-divided Ethiopia.

Through Somalia, an external power seeking influence over

Ethiopia could exercise a great amount of pressure over the

latter by, for example, persuading Mogadishu to press its

claims over the Ogaden or to foment domestic trouble for

Addis Ababa by aiding some of Ethiopia's numerous

secessionist movements and then promising to restrain the

Somalis in return for some political favours from Ethiopia.

An element of this scenario was present when Soviet

officials reportedly assured Halle Selassie during his visit

to Moscow in October 1973 that Somalia would not attack

Ethiopia unless Addis Ababa made a bilateral agreement with

France to annex the French Territory of the Afars and Issas

(F. T. A. I. ) upon the French's departure. The Soviet

position at the time was that the future of the Territory

should be determined neither by France nor by Ethiopia but

be referred to the United Nations. 23

Economic

The Horn of Africa is a

its poverty, a fact that is

Somalia's perennial famines

aid. However, the region

insignificant potential for

region which is renownedfor

underlined by Ethiopia and

and appeals for international

does appear to have a not

economic wealth. To begin



with, it is in the vicinity of some $3.4 billion (in 1975

values) worth of copper, zinc, lead, silver, and gold that

are said to lie at the bottom of the Red Sea. 24 In

addition to this, there are the reportedly vast deposits of

raw materials that are awaiting exploitation in Somalia and,

especially, Ethiopia. According to one account, Somalia is

the site of one of the world's largest uranium mines, where

the American company, Westinghouse, has been granted

virtually monopoly rights to work.

25

However, it is Ethiopia which has the greatest economic

potential. For one thing, it reportedly contains a wide

range of raw materials which includes deposits of gold and

platinum and, possibly, petroleum and natural gas, of which

traces have been found in the Ogaden desert. Moreover,

Eritrea is endowed with salt, potash, copper, and, perhaps,

iron ore and zinc, with the possibility of offshore oil near

the port of Massawa. 26 But perhaps the most promising

economic prospects for Ethiopia lie in its undoubted

agricultural potential. As one writer has pointed out,

"[w]ith proper investment and management, Ethiopia can feed

its people and still maintain a decent level of agricultural

exports... "27 Together with its size and population,

Ethiopia's untapped mineral and agriculatural resources

convey upon it a credible potential for economic growth and

development, with a large market for products, and with the

potential to repay foreign investments, particularly in the

long-run. 28 This is probably of greater importance to the

United States than to the Soviet Union which not only does

not need Ethiopia's agricultural, mostly coffee, exports but

is unable to satisfy the country's demand for consumer



goods and whose "vast resource base... makes the 'raw

material imperialism' of the classic kind unnecessary even

if it was ideologically possible. "29

The prospects of economic growth and development for

Ethiopia and Somalia, however long-term they might be,

should not be seen in isolation from the extent of their

abject poverty and instability, which make them unattractive

targets for external investment, and the huge amount of

funds that would be required to exploit their mineral and

agricultural resources. As for Ethiopia, the most

promising of the two countries, its enormous potential for

growth and development is somewhat offset by the fact that

its "great size, diversity, and poverty [increase] the

chance for failure and [multiply] theinvestment

required

for rapid social and economic transformation. "30 In view

of this, the economic importance of the Horn of Africa

probably played at best a very subordinate part in

influencing the superpowers' initial endeavour to try to

penetrate the region.

Soviet and American commitments to Somalia and Ethiopia

The gradual development of a commitment on the part of

the United States and the Soviet Union to Ethiopia and

Somalia respectively and the consequent conversion of these

states intocredibility

elements for the superpowers was

perhaps inevitable in view of the narrow, military basis of

the American-Ethiopian and Soviet-Somali patron-client

relationships. As pointed out in a previous section, both

the Ethiopians and the Somalis looked to the superpowers in



order to satisfy their security needs. The Ethiopians,

traditionally fearful of the predominantly Moslem world to

their north, east, and west, wanted a stable source of

political and military support and thus offered the

Americans use of the valuable military communications base

at Kagnew in return for U. S. aid. With the eruption of the

Eritrean rebellion and the establishment of the Somali

Republic in the early 1960's, Ethiopia's traditional self-

image as a Christian island surrounded by a hostile sea of

Moslems was further reinforced. This provided it with

another incentive to strengthen its ties with the United

States. The Somalis, on the other hand, turned to the

Soviet Union for military assistance, as noted earlier, only

after the West had refused to provide them with the arms

which they thought were necessary to enable them to defend

themselves against their hostile neighbour, Ethiopia and,

presumably, to work towards the re-unification of the "lost

territories, " that is, the Somali-inhabited territories of

Ethiopia, ' Kenya, and the then F. T. A. I. The superpowers,

fortheir part, responded to the

Ethiopianand

Somali

requests also for security-related reasons: to obtain

military facilities and political influence in an important

region of the world in accordance with the logic of the

U. S. -Soviet global competition.

The nature of the stimuli which elicited the superpower

responses, however, that is, the fact that they emanated

from a sense of insecurity on the part of the Ethiopians and

the Somalis, contained a natural imperative for further

Soviet and American involvement in the Horn of Africa, and

for a firmer commitment to the regimes in Addis Ababa and



Mogadishu. As Halliday and Molyneux point out,

...Outside involvement has been brought about not

merely through the use by local forces of materialsupplied from the outside, but also because of the

ongoing political commitments to the local states that

such supplies have engendered. The presence inSomalia and Ethiopia, at different times, of American,Cuban and Soviet personnel deemed necessary to assistlocal forces has been one clear index of this. 31

Thus, in order to maintain a presence in the Horn of Africa,

it was necessary for the superpowers not only to respond to

the demands of their clients for military and other types of

assistance, but also to guarantee the security of these

clients either through some form of "trip-wire" such as the

presence of military units on or near their territory, or by

a promise to intervene on their behalf whenever necessary.

This was perhaps most evident in the case of the U. S. -

Ethiopian relationship. To begin with, there were the

regular and, generally, relatively extensive amounts of

American economic and military aid to the regime of Haile

Selassie and also to that of its successors during its first

two or so years. Thus, between 1951 and 1976, the

Ethiopians reportedly received over $350 million in economic

aid and a further $279 million in military aid from the

United States, making them by far the largest recipients of

American aid in black Africa. A substantial part of the

military aid programme was spent on training Ethiopian

military personnel, of whom 3,744 were trained in the U. S.

between 1953 and 1976. This made the Ethiopian armed

forces the best trained in sub-Saharan Africa. 32

American military assistance to Ethiopia continued even

after the ousting of Haile Selassie. To be sure, aid, as



opposed to sales deliveries, remained more or less constant

until 1975-1976 and then sharply declined. However, after

a three-months' suspension in retaliation for the

Provisional Military Administrative Council's (P. M. A. C. or

Dergue) execution of 52 leading former civilian and military

officials of the Haile Selassie regime, in March 1975 the

U. S. decided to resume arms deliveries to Ethiopia, and in

that year the Ethiopians received their largest American

arms sales credit. This amounted'to $135 milllion and was

used to purchase M-60 tanks and F-5E aircraft. In addition

to this, Congress authorized an extra $53 million of

equipment over a two-year period and approved the transfer

to Ethiopia of a squadron of old F-5A fighters from Iran.

Washington's intention to continue to supply the Ethiopian

armed forces with military equipment was further confirmed

in January 1976 when U. S. sources in Addis Ababa attempted

to reconcile the continuation of American military

assistance to some of the Dergue's objectionable actions and

utterances by arguing that since so much of Ethiopia's

current equipment was of Korean war vintage, a replacement

programme was now long-overdue and did not represent any new

policy. Accordingly, in the same month, the U. S.

Government expanded its arms commitment by acquiescing in

the provision of new equipment, mainly tanks, fighter

planes, coastal patrol craft, and more advanced infantry

weapons, to the value of $22 million. By the end of the

year, American military sales to Ethiopia during 1976-1977

totalled $79 million. Finally, a relatively large

proportion of the Ethiopian military personnel trained in

the United States since 1953 received their training between



1974 and 1976. This amounted to some 469 or over 12 per

cent of a total of 3,744.33

As well as providing the bulk of the equipment of the

Ethiopian armed forces and training almost all of its

personnel, the United States also undertook a number of

additional measures to guarantee the country's security and

territorial integrity. Thus, as early as 1950 it supported

the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia and facilitated the

passage of a resolution to that effect through the United

Nations. 34 Henceforth, it firmly endorsed the territorial

integrity of Ethiopia and refused to countenance any demand

for Eritrean separation, as evidenced by its lack of

protest at the forced amalgamation of Eritrea with Ethiopia

in 1962.35 This endorsement took a more formal shape with

the conclusion in 1960 of a new military agreement between

Ethiopia and the United States. Although the precise terms

of the accord were only partly revealed, it is known that it

emphasized the U. S. 's commitment to the territorial

integrity of Ethiopia but, as in the case of the U. S.

commitment to Israel, without committing the Americans to

direct intervention in the event of a threat to this

integrity. Nevertheless, in accordance with the spirit

of the deal, as well as with previous, unwritten,

commitments, the United States worked energetically to

minimize this threat. Consequently, not only did it stand

behind Addis Ababa in times of need such as after the

attempted coup against Haile Selassis in 1960, and deny the

Somalis the means to threaten Ethiopia, 36 but it also

engaged in some sort of front-line involvement against the



main threat to Ethiopia's integrity, the Eritrean guerillas.

As one source has pointed out, although on the whole the

U. S. has tended to leave the main counter-insurgency work to

the Israelis, in 1966, three years after the eruption of the

Eritrean uprising, the Americans sent to Ethiopia over a

hundred counter-insurgency "experts" for a period of two to

three years under a scheme known as "Plan Delta. "37

The credibility of the United States' commitment to the

Ethiopians, as manifestedby its

economic and military aid

and guarantees of the country's security and territorial

integrity, was very much affected by perceptions of the

importance of the Ethiopian connection to Washington. A

number of factors indicated that U. S. -Ethiopian friendship

was indeed held in high regard by the-Americans. To begin

with, Ethiopia was second only to Israel in its affinity to

the United States in all of Africa and the Middle East, and,

moreover, until about 1977/1978 maintained a close

relationship with the Zionist State. This, in conjunction

with Ethiopia's prestige and place in African politics as

host to the headquarters ofthe O. A. U.,

madeit

seemto the

Department of State that support for Addis Ababa "had a

number of benefits vis-a-vis both the Middle East and

Africa. "38 More concretely, there was, as noted above, the

despatch by the U. S. In 1966 and possibly also on other

occasions of couter-insurgency "advisers" to help put down

the Eritrean uprising, and the consequent willingness to

risk being stuck in a Vietnam-type quagmire. This was

illustrative of the strength of the American commitment to

Ethiopia's security and territorial integrity. However,

perhaps the most credible indicator of the importance of



the Ethiopian connection to the United States was, as noted

elsewhere, the role that was occupied by Ethiopia in

American strategic planning due to the country's

geographical location and, more specifically, its provision

to the U. S. of extensive military and naval communications

and intelligence facilities in the form of the Kagnew

station at Asmara. The value that was attached by the

United States to this facility should not be underestimated.

As the American Ambassador to Ethiopia during the period of

1963-1967 later pointed out,

The US interest in Ethiopia was simple then for

Washington. The Government defined it as "the

unhampered use of Kagnew station. " The facility wasdeemed then to be "strategically vital" to the United

States, the only such military installation in Black

Africa. We had 1,800 officers, men and civilians

working there, plus 800 dependents; a total of 2,500with plans well advanced during my briefing period to

raise that number to 3,500 within a year, as did

occur.39

Finally, there was the presence of U. S. naval units in the

Red and Arabian Seas and in the Indian Ocean. Although

these were deployed mainly for other reasons connected with

the Soviet Union and with American interests in south- and

south-west Asia, their existence in the area is also likely

to have served other purposes such as to underline the

credibility of the U. S. commitment to the regime in Addis

Ababa whenever necessary.

As with the American-Ethiopian connection, the

principal indicator of the commitment of the U. S. S. R. to

Somalia has been the regular and, until 1976/1977,

increasing inputs of Soviet economic and military aid into

the country. Although in absolute terms this was not as

large as that of the United States to Ethiopia, its



significance must be seen with reference to the shorter time

period during which the Soviets were involved with Somalia,

as well as to the size of the latter's population, which is

nearly ten times as small as that of Ethiopia, and its

comparatively small absorptive capacity. Indeed, judging

by the standards of Soviet assistance to sub-Saharan Africa,

the contribution of the U. S. S. R. to the economic and

military development of Somalia was quite substantial.

On the economic front, Soviet assistance to Somalia

during the period of 1963-1973 totalled some $87 million.

These were invested in a wide range of projects which

included secondary schools, a fish cannery, two hospitals, a

printing plant, fishing enterprises, a radio station, a

milk-processing plant, a meat-packing plant, and a variety

of agricultural programmes.40 This was supplemented in

1975 when the U. S. S. R. provided the Somalis with $63 million

in economic credits and grants (out of $67 million for all

of Africa) for project development such as milk and meat

factories, port-dredging operations, and the infamous "Giuba

Dam" scheme, as well as for additional assistancee to help

re-settle drought victims.41 Soviet assistance, including

direct participation, in the latter effort did much to raise

the prestige of the U. S. S. R. in Somalia and to reinforce

perceptions of the strength of the Soviet-Somali connection.

As one source described it, "the land for the new collective

farms was cleared with Russian equipment and the famine

victims brought to the sites in Russian aircraft. A fleet

of 165 vehicles, including ambulances and tankers, was also

used in the operation and afterwards donated to the Somali



people. "42 Soviet economic assistance to Somalia continued

into 1976 when in July a new technical and economic

agreement was signed with the Somalis. 43 All in all, as

one writer has pointed out, the U. S. S. R. 's investment in

Somalia "far overshadowed that of the other interested

powers, particularly the United States, which was involved

only in dredging the harbor at Kismayu and one or two minor

efforts. " Although China did make available the

substantial sum of $109 million in credits, the Somalis

never drew upon these. 44

However, by far the biggest and perhaps the most

important Soviet contribution to Somalia was in the military

sphere. As noted in a previous section, this began with

the 1963 offer of a $32 million loan to train and equip an

army of 10,000 men, and from that date until the military

coup d'etat of 1969 the U. S. S. R. remained virtually the sole

supplier of the Somali armed forces. With the ascension to

power of Siad Barre in 1969, Soviet military aid to Somalia

dramatically increased in response to the growing requests

of the newSomali leadership

whose promiseto

governthe

country by the principle of "scientific socialism" won it a

sympathetic ear in Moscow. Thus, between 1969 and 1972,

the U. S. S. R. provided Somalia with $10 million worth of

military equipment which included several IL-28 bombers,

MiG-15 fighters, P-6 torpedo boats, armoured personnel

carriers, and anti-aircraft artillery. 45 Soviet military

assistance to Somalia was further increased after February

1972 in the wake of the visit to Mogadishu by the U. S. S. R.

Minister of Defence, Marshall Grechko. Consequently,

between that time and 1974 the Soviets supplied the Somalis



for the first time with such sophisticated weapons as the

MiG-21 interceptor and the SA-2 surface-to-air missile

system.46

By 1975, the Soviet military aid programme had

enabled the Somalis to muster an army of some 20,000 men

equipped with 52 combat aircraft, including 24 MiG-21's;

250 T-34, T-54, and T-55 tanks; 300 armoured personnel

carriers; 200 coastal batteries, and a variety of field

artillery and anti-aircraft weapons.47 Some 60 per cent

of Somali officers were trained by the U. S. S. R. 48 The

military significance of Soviet assistance can be

illustrated by the fact that in many categories the Somali

armed forces surpassed the corresponding inventory of those

of Ethiopia which were twice their size.49

As in thecase of

the U. S.commitment

to Ethiopia, the

credibility of the Soviet commitment to Somalia was coloured

by perceptions of the value of Soviet-Somali relations to

the Soviet Union, and, like the American-Ethiopian

connection, several factors pointed to the importance of

Somalia's friendship with the U. S. S. R. First of all, there

was the role or potential role of Somalia in the Soviet

Union's global strategic-military planning. The

establishment and consolidation of Soviet-Somali relations,

especially after the advent of Barre, took place at a time

when the U. S. S. R. was beginning to assume an assertive

foreign policy characterized by a growing willingness and

ability to use military power as an instrument of foreign

policy in accordance with changes which occurred in Soviet

politico-military thinking during the mid-1950's. Amongst

the most important of these was the development of what



subsequently came to be known as the "Gorshkov naval

doctrine, " which stressed that a key to the defence of the

U. S. S. R. was the creation of a modern, nuclear missile

carrying navy "capable of dealing with the latest

innovations in the enemy camp in any part of the globe. `"50

The adoption of this doctrine by Khrushchev, and its

implementation during the latter part of the 1960's raised

the question of Soviet military facilities in countries

adjacent to the paths and deployment areas of the Soviet

fleets. 51 The acquisition of such facilities was

considered important for three reasons. Firstly, it would

greatly enhance the flexibility and staying power of the

Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the acquisition of

air facilities would provide Soviet fleets with the much-

needed air cover that was abundantly available to their

American counterparts which enjoyed the protection of the

powerful U. S. carrier force. Thirdly, in the words of

Gorshkov, the importance of obtaining naval facilities in

friendlycountries around

theworld

lay in the "vivid"

demonstration of "the economic and military power of a

country beyond its own borders" and in the deterrent value

against potential enemies "by the perfection of the

equipment being exhibited, to undermine them, to intimidate

them, but also to support friendly states. "52 Given the

geostrategic, political, and potential economic importance

of the Horn of Africa, it is'not difficult to see where

Somalia fits into Gorshkov's strategy.

With the advent of the leftist, Soviet-oriented regime

of Siad Barre in October 1969, the U. S. S. R. got the



opportunity to basically realize its strategic ambitions in

the Horn of Africa, and so give concrete expression to its

interest in, and commitment to, its then principal client in

the region, Somalia. The new government in Mogadishu

requested and, as mentioned above, was granted much more

extensive aid than its civilian predecessor. As a quid pro

quo, it was prepared to provide the Soviets with air and

naval facilities. Thus, during Grechko's February 1972

trip to Somalia, an agreement was signed whereby the Soviet

Union would modernize the port and airfield of Berbera in

return for future access to the new facilities. By the

mid-1970's, the Berbera complex allegedly consisted of a

deep-water port, accommodation for approximately 1,500

people, a communications facility, storagefacilities

for an

estimated 175,000 barrels of fuel, an airstrip eventually to

have 13,000 to 15,000 feet of surfaced runway, and a

facility for the handling and storage of tactical

missiles. 53 In addition to this, it was claimed in

February 1976 that the Soviets were doing a similar job to

the southern port of Kismayu. 54 Although both the Kremlin

and the Somalis consistently denied that the U. S. S. R. was

making use of military installations in Somalia, 55 fairly

conclusive evidence has pointed to the contrary. On one

occasion in June 1975, for instance, the Somalis invited an

Arab and international party of journalists in order to

verify its denials of the existence of Soviet military

facilities in the country, and although the parties declared

that they had seen no installations of the kind alleged,

some of the journalists complained that they had been denied



access to one military building. The suspicions

consequently raised were later reinforced when an American

delegation headed by Senator Dewey Bartlett, a member of the

Senate Armed Forces Committee, which was also Invited by the

Somalis to verify their denials of the presence of Soviet

military installations, actually confirmed the existence of

a suspected Soviet missile base. 56 In addition to these

allusions, there was the revelation by U. S. Secretary of

Defence Schlesinger of aerial photographs of the extensive

military complex in Berbera which many thought far exceeded

Somalia's own needs.57

The importance to the U. S. S. R. of naval and air

facilities in Somalia has been underlined by many

commentators amongst the most emphatic of whom has

been Schlesinger who, in a testimony to the Senate's Armed

Forces Committee on June 10,1975, claimed that Soviet

military facilities in Somalia "could threaten the military

balance in the Indian Ocean. "58 Although many of those

assessments have been exaggerated in order to justify

Western intrusions in the area, especially the expropriation

of funds to maintain and enlarge the American base at Diego

Garcia, there can be little doubt that military facilities

in Somalia were of great political and strategic value to

the Soviet Union. As one writer has pointed out, for the

U. S. S. R. access to Berbera

would be a considerable improvement on the existing

arrangement of naval auxiliaries stationed off theSouth Yemeni island of Socotra in the Gulf of Aden andnear Mauritius. For the first time the Soviet navy

' would have a home in the Indian Ocea, although Berbera

would not be a Soviet base under Soviet control andoffer much than traditional docking privileges grantedin Aden and elsewhere.

59





military personnel---a considerable number in view of the

size of the Somali population and its armed forces. 61

Whilst most of the civilians operated on Soviet-sponsored

development projects, the military personnel were engaged

either in the construction and operation of the Berbera

military complex or in training the Somali armed forces and

helping them to maintain their Soviet-built equipment.

Their presence on Somali soil in such considerable numbers

had its advantages and disadvantages for both Somalia and

the Soviet Union. On the one hand, it gave the U. S. S. R. a

degree of control over Somali freedom of action especially

as regards the conflict with Ethiopia, which Moscow was

always anxious to avert, but at the same time it increased

the riskof

Soviet implication inadventures undertaken

by

the Somalis with the help of Soviet equipment and in

contravention of the desire and interests of the U. S. S. R.

On the other hand, whilst the large-scale presence of Soviet

personnel probably did constrain Somali freedom, it also

reinforced perceptions of the strength of Soviet-Somali

ties, thus generating an impression of Somalia as a

credibility element for the U. S. S. R. and, consequently,

impelling the latter to stand by Somalia even under

circumstances where it would normally rather not do so.

Whatever credibility was given to the U. S. S. R. 's

commitment to Somalia by the latter's role in Soviet

politico-strategic planning, and the presence of large

numbers of Soviet advisers in the country, is likely to have

been confirmed and strengthened by the conclusion in July

1974 of the Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and



Cooperation. This basically pledged the continued

association of the two countries by laying "a firm

foundation for the further development of friendly relations

between the U. S. S. R. and the S. D. R. [Somali Democratic

Republic], and [making] a contribution to the joint struggle

against imperialism and colonialism and for peace, national

liberation and social progress. "63 Its importance, as one

writer has pointed out, lay in that it was the first signed

by the Soviet Union with a black African state. 64

Finally, as in the case of the American-Ethiopian

connection, the credibility of the Soviet commitment to

Somalia is likely to have been strengthened by the permanent

presence of the Soviet navy in the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean

area which served, amongst other things, as a reassurance to

the regime in Mogadishu and as a warning to its opponents in

the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere in the region against

taking any hostile acts.

The decommitment and realignment of the superpowers in the

Hornof Africa

The influx of U. S. and Soviet economic and military aid

to Ethiopia and Somalia, coupled with the superpowers'

political backing of those countries obviously played an

important part in sustaining the regimes in Addis Ababa and

Mogadishu and in turning the Ethiopian and Somali armed

forces into two of the most powerful in black Africa.

However, at least an equally important outcome of the

superpowers' support for Ethiopia and Somalia has been the

conversion of the regimes in those countries, at different

times, into credibility elements for each of the U. S. S. R.



and the U. S. As in the case of the American and Soviet

involvement in the Middle East, the long-standing support of

the superpowers for the opponents in the Horn of Africa can

be said to have generated a general perception of those

opponents as benefitting from a strong security commitment

on the part of Washington and Moscow. This perception, as

noted in Chapters 8 and 10 in reference to the U. S.

commitment to Israel, generates expectations and,

consequently, in order to maintain the superpowers'

credibility as allies, impels them to back their clients in

times of need. Thus, had the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-

1978 occurred earlier on during the 1970's, say in 1973,

that is, after Grechko's trip to Mogadishu but before the

United States began its decommitment from Ethiopia, then it

would be reasonable to assume that both the U. S. and the

U. S. S. R. would have more or less stood by their respective

clients in the region. The war, however, took place at a

time when both the United States and the Soviet Union were

at different stages of a process of decommitment and

realignment in the Horn of Africa, a fact that clearly

differentiates between the case of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war

and that of the Ethio-Somali conflict, and goes a long way

towards explaining the responses of the superpowers during

the latter hostilities.

Decommitment

The decommitment of the United States from Ethiopia

began as early as 1970-1972 and can be explained with

reference to a number of factors. Perhaps the most



important of these was the decline of the strategic

importance of Ethiopia. First of all, with the development

of satellite communications and the lease from Britain in

1971 of the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, the U. S.

was able to enjoy both qualitatively superior military

facilities and an indefinite security of tenure that was not

subject to potential denial by a littoral state, as were the

facilities in Ethiopia. Consequently, the significance of

the Kagnew stationand

its location to the Americansrapidly

declined, and by about 1971 the decision was reached in

Washington to phase out the U. S. dependence on the station.

Accordingly, the number of American military personnel at

Kagnew fell from a peak of over 3,000 in 1971 to a mere 35

in 1976 in readiness for complete withdrawal from the

facility in the following year. 66 A second factor which

contributed to the decline of the strategic importance of

Ethiopia to the U. S. was the increasing dispensability of

American naval facilities there. This was due to the

growth of the United States navy's already substantial

capability in afloat support which allows it to operate at

greater distances for longer periods of time without shore

support than its Soviet counterpart,67

as well as to the

development of alternative naval facilities at Diego

Garcia. In addition to these factors there was the

weakening of the Ethiopian-Israeli connection as

characterized by Haile Selassie's severance of diplomatic

relations with the Zionist State in October 1973. As some

have observed, "[i]t was now no longer so feasible for

officials in Washington to argue for aid to Ethiopia on the

grounds that the country was important for Israel's



strategic posture. "68 A fourth and related factor

underlying the reduction of the strategic value of Ethiopia

to the United States was the general decline of its role in

offsetting Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa. As

Legum has pointed out, the importance of Ethiopia to the

Americans had steadily declined as the U. S. interest in

maintaining a balance of power in the Horn in the face of

the Soviet arms build-up in Somalia was "overtaken by the

determination of the immediate Red Sea community,

particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan---with Israel

looking on encouragingly---to keep Russian influence in

particular, and Communist influence in general, to a minimum

in the region. "69

In addition to the decline in the strategic value of

Ethiopia to the United States, a second factor which appears

to have stimulated the American decommitment was the growing

uncertainty over Ethiopia's political future due to the

increasing precariousness of the Haile Selassie regime7° as

illustrated by the steady progress of the Eritrean guerilla

campaign and, especially, the gross incompetence of Addis

Ababa in dealing with the disaster of the 1972-1973 famine.

As Halliday and Molyneux put it,

... the immediate factor discouraging Washington from

support for Haile Selassie was the manifest crisisthrough which his country was passing in 1972-3: thefamine and the regime's inability to face up to thedisaster. An upheaval

was evidentlylooming in

Ethiopia, of a kind that would sweep Haile Selassie

away. It was thereofore in Washington's interests totake its distance from the Ethio ian regime and to waitfor events to run their course. 7ý

The anxiety generated by the famine crisis was

compounded by an increase in the activities of the Eritrean



Liberation Front (E. L. F. ) which by the end of 1970 reached

their zenith. The E. L. F., at the same time, purposely

initiated an anti-American propaganda campaign which, as

expected, prompted Journalists and politicians in the United

States to call for the evacuation of the Kagnew station and

the termination of military aid to Ethiopia in an effort to

avoid entanglement in a Vietnam-type quagmire in the Horn of

Africa. 72

The detachment of the United States from Ethiopia

became clearly visible even before the downfall of Haile

Selassie. Thus as early as May 1973 the Americans refused

Ethiopian requests for the supply of new fighter aircraft

and M-60 tanks, although they agreed to provide them with

surface-to-air missiles and a new brigade of armoured

cars.73 A further indication of Washington's attempt to

distance itself from Ethiopia towards the end of Haile

Selassie's reign was its reluctance to post an ambassador to

Addis Ababa during the crucial months after January 1974.

Instead, it was represented by a mere charge d'affaires. 74

With the overthrow of the Haile Selassie regime in

1974-1975, the United States lost one of the few remaining

rationales for its continued support of Ethiopia: having

already decided to phase out Its military presence in the

country, it could now no longer even assume Addis Ababa's

"moderate leadership in African affairs, "75 particularly in

view of the new military rulers' apparently radical

proclivities and rhetoric. To be sure, at least initially,

both Washington and the Dergue had good reasons to want to

maintain a cordial relationship. For the Ethiopians, the

obvious reason was military supplies: they had to keep up



with the growing Soviet arms build-up in Somalia and the

increasing military threat from the Eritrean guerillas;

ensure the delivery of some $40 million of U. S. equipment

already paid for, and maintain the flow of spare parts for

their U. S. weapons.76 The Americans, on the other hand,

wished to maintain friendly relations with the Dergue for a

number of reasons, in the foremost of which were the desire

to avoid the loss of credibility with other clients that

would probably result from too quick an abandonment of a

long-time ally;77 the desire to counter Soviet influence in

Somalia by maintaining some influence of their own in

Ethiopia, 78and the desire to prevent Eritrean independence

and, ' therefore, possible Arab control of the entire Red Sea

littoral,and to avoid the blame of

blackAfrican states for

allowing the bifurcation of an African state and thereby

indirectly assisting in the contravention of a cardinal

principal of the O. A. U., that of the inviolability of

colonial boundaries. 79 Nevertheless, by 1976 the

incentives for the United States to continue its support for

the Dergue had more or less disappeared or had been out-

weighed by disincentives. To begin with, it had become

increasingly aware of its diminishing ability to influence

the Dergue's behaviour. The execution of Aman Andom in

November 1974 and Habte Sisai in July 1976 had removed what

contacts Washington had with the new military rulers

and,80

even worst, the rise of Mengistu Haile Mariam to

the chairmanship of the P. M: A. C. in Fabruary 1977 had

effectively placed Ethiopia on a collision course with the

U. S. As one source has pointed out,



...The manner of Mengistu's consolidation of power was

bloody; his new policies opened the way to closer ties

with the SovietUnion

and removed some of the doubtsthe Russians had till then harboured. For these two

reasons... it would have been more difficult for the

previous relationship [between Ethiopia and the UnitedStates] to have been maintained.

81

In addition to its inability to influence the policies of

the P. M. A. C., a further reason which encouraged Washington

to discontinue its support for the Ethiopians was the

growing opposition of the conservative Arab regimes,

especially those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, to

American support for Ethiopia. Since "[i]n any elementary

tabulation of its economic and strategic interests, it was

obvious that the U. S. A. had more reason to align with the

Arab states now increasingly opposed to Ethiopia than with

the beleaguered Derg"82 the Americans naturally chose to

give greater weight to the wish of the Arab conservatives

than to that of the military junta in Addis Ababa.

The first indication that, as one writer put it, "the

marriage of convenience" between the US and the Dergue was

approaching an end83 appeared in May 1976 when the Americans

warned that arms deliveries would be affected if the Dergue

went ahead with the planned "peasant march" against the

Eritrean guerillas.84 Six months later the Americans

launched their strongest yet criticism of the Dergue when on

August 6 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

William Schaufele described it as "unstable, prone to

violations of human rights, incapable of managing Ethiopia's

deteriorating economy, and beset by insurgencies and

incipient insurgencies. " He also went on to warn that the



United States would reconsider its cooperation with Addis

Ababa if the regime there took an anti-American turn. 85

However, it was in "human rights" that the U. S. found the

ideal pretext for attacking the Mengistu regime and

completing the process of decommitment from Ethiopia.

Thus, in October 1976 Ethiopia was one of 19 countries

listed by the American Senate and House committees that

violated human rights to an extent which rendered them

ineligible for U. S. assistance-86 Accordingly, on February

25,1977, U. S. Secretary of State Vance announced that

American foreign aid to Ethiopia, amongst others, was being

reduced ostensibly because of its allegedly consistent

violations of human rights, although it would probably still

be eligible to receive $10 million in military sales

credits.

87

It is, however, possible or even probable that

the announcement was more in response to knowledge of an

alleged Ethiopian-Soviet arms deal of December 1976, backed

by reports of Ethiopian military purchases from

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia than to the human rights

issue88 The February announcement was followed by a

decision, formally communicated to the Ethiopian government

on April 22, to close down the Kagnew station before

September 1977 and to reduce the U. S. Military Assistance

Advisory Group (M. A. A. G. ) by half "in compliance with the

congressionally mandated worldwide reduction. "89

The announcements of February and April set in motion

an action-reaction process that finally destroyed what was

left of the American-Ethiopian connection and completed the

decommitment of the U. S. from the country which began at

least four years earlier. Thus, in response to the

371



American moves, on April 23,1977, the Dergue announced the

immediate closure of five United States Government

facilities---the M. A. A. G., the Kagnewcommunications

station, the Naval Medical Research Unit (N. M. R. U. ), the

United States Information Service (U. S. I. S. ), and the U. S.

Consulate-General in Asmara---and ordered their personnel to

leave the country within four days. 90 This, in turn, led

the Americans to retaliate by suspending on April 27 the

delivery to Ethiopia of nearly $100 million worth of arms,

including F-5E jet fighters, M-60 tanks, and ammunition;91

a

move that probably encouraged Mengistu's outburst during his

May 4-8 trip to Moscow that "(t]he tutor, coordinator and

leader of [Ethiopia's internal and external enemies] is the

sworn enemy of oppressed peoples---imperialism, especially

American imperialism. "92 The downward drift in U. S. -

Ethiopian relations continued when on May 28 the Dergue

ordered the closure of the American military attache's

office in Addis Ababa, the reduction by 50 per cent of the

United States Embassy staff, and the departure of two-thirds

of themarine guards at

the Embassy. 93 This was followed

up four days later by a decision to recall home the last 81

Ethiopian military personnel training in the United

States. 94 Thus, by the beginning of summer, 1977,

virtually all military/security ties between the United

States and Ethiopia had been severed.

Unlike the case of the United States and Ethiopia, the

decommitment of the Soviet Union from Somalia did not really

begin until after the start of hostilities in the Horn, and

was not premeditated on the part of the U. S. S. R., in the



sense that the Soviets would have preferred to maintain the

friendship of, and their influential position in, Somalia,

in addition to their increasingly close ties with the

Dergue. The fact that the decommitment did in the end take

place was due in large part to Somalia's resentment at the

Soviet Union's increasing political and, especially,

military cooperation with the military regime in Addis

Ababa. A full, examination of the reasons behind the

willingness of the U. S. S. R. to dispense with its position in

Somalia must, therefore, await the analysis in the following

section of the realignment of the superpowers in the Horn of

Africa. However, even before the U. S. S. R. began to

seriously attempt to coopt the new rulers of Ethiopia, a

number of factors prevented it from becoming sufficiently

close to the Somalis either to substantially satisfy

Mogadishu's desire for political, economic, and military

assistance or to allay Moscow's suspicions of the genuinness

and reliability of Somalia's friendship gesture towards the

U. S. S. R. A consideration of these factors is thus

necessary in order to explain both the initial response of

the Soviet Union to the outbreak of hostilities in the Horn,

and its subsequent willingness, later on during the war, to

turn its back on the Soamlis and throw its lot in with the

Ethiopians, the traditional clients of the United States in

the region.

Perhaps the most serious of these factors is the

Irredentist determination of Somali foreign policy, that is,

Somalia's preoccupation with regaining the so-called "lost

territories, " especially the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. As



The one really simple fact of life in the tangled

politics of the Horn of Africa... is that Somalia's

foreign policy is written by events in the Ogaden. No

Foreign Minister in Mogadishu since independence in

1960---and for that matter noPresident---has

everhad

the freedom of movement to take any otherconsiderations very much into account... There is

probably no principle that Somalia would not sacrificeif by doing so it could "unite the nation"---win back

the Ogaden from Ethiopia; certainly there is no

allegiance that it would hesitate to make or break in

furtherance of this cause ...95

This fact presumably created tremendous uncertainties in the

minds of Soviet decision-makers as regards the wisdom of too

close a connection with Somalia. To begin with, in view of

the essentially military basis of the Soviet-Somali patron-

client relationship, it must have been apparent to the

U. S. S. R. that a consolidation or even continuation of these

relations under the quickly-changing circumstances of the

Horn of Africa very much depended on, firstly, the Somalis'

desire for substantial quantities of advanced military

equipment which presumably would continue to be as long

as Somalia felt threatened by and had ambitions on, its

neighbours; secondly, the willingness of the U. S. S. R. to

satisfy this desire and, thirdly, the availability of

alternative sources of arms to Somalia. Given the absence

of the latter option, the onus was placed on the Kremlin as

to whether and to what extent it wished its relationship

with Mogadishu to continue. This put it on the horns of a

dilemma. On the one hand, it could attempt to moderate

Somali irredentistambitions

byreducing

thesupply of arms

to Somalia and thus avoid the prospect of an embarrassing

Somali military adventure against a neighbour,

but at the same time risking Mogadishu's displeasure and,

consequently, the position of the U. S. S. R. in Somalia. The



alternative option was for the Soviets to provide Somalia

with all the hardware it wanted and thus encourage the

prospect of a military adventure undertaken with Soviet

weapons and, by implication, blessing, and, as a result,

risk the antagonism of almost all of the African states

which would likely blame the U. S. S. R. for helping Somalia to

contravene a cardinal principal of the O. A. U., that of the

inviolability of colonial boundaries. Prior to about

1975/1976, the Soviet Union managed to temporarily solve

this dilemma by leaning more towards the latter option, that

is, by supplying Somalia with substantial quantities of

arms,96

whilst hoping that such control mechanisms as

restrictions on the supply of petroleum and spare parts,97

the presence of Soviet military advisers in Somalia, in

addition to the presence and firm commitment of the United

States to Ethiopia, would discourage the Somalis from

undertaking any rash military moves against the Ethiopians.

However, by the mid-1970's the process of U. S. decommitment

from Ethiopia was well underway and, as has been shown, by

early summer 1977 Washington's relations with Addis Ababa

were all but broken. Added to the chaos prevailing in

Ethiopia at that time due to the dozen or so domestic

uprisings and the Dergue's endeavour to quickly and forcibly

implement Ja thorough and wide-ranging socio-economic

programme, this provided the Somalis with a golden

opportunity to try and seize the long-sought Somali-

inhabited areas of Ethiopia. It was henceforth clear to

the U. S. S. R. that if it maintained a presence in, and

continued to be too strongly associated with, Somalia, it



would willy nilly be involved or at least implicated in a

possible Somali military adventure in the Ogaden which it

might be able to prevent but only at the cost of ensuring

expulsion from Somalia and, in the absence of firm

connections with the Dergue, without guaranteeing a

compensatory presence and influence elsewhere in the Horn.

Thus, almost certainly by spring/early summer 1977 the

option of decommitment from Somalia and a possible

realignment with Ethiopia must have been increasingly

lurking in the back of Soviet decision-makers' minds.98

Indeed, as early as 1976, when war clouds started to gather

over the Ethiopian-Somali border and Mogadishu began to give

greater attention to the organization of the Western Somali

Liberation Front (W. S. L. F. ), the U. S. S. R. reportedly began

to reassess many of its economic commitments to Somalia. 99

The anxiety generated in the Kremlin by Somali

irredentism and the prospect in 1977 that this might find

expression in a military adventure against Ethiopia, is

likely to have been compounded by additional uncertainties

concerning the reliability of the Mogadishu regime as a

friend of the U. S. S. R. and, therefore, the status of the

Soviet position in Somalia. The sources of these

uncertainties were basically the Islamic background and the

instinctive Western orientation100 of the Somali leadership

which as early as 1974, the year of the Soviet-Somali Treaty

of Friendship and Cooperation, had led President Barre to

embark on a series of wheelings and dealings'with a number

of Arab states, particularly the arch-conservative Saudi

Arabia, as well as with several Western countries. 101

These culminated in Somalia's entry to the Arab League



in February 1974 and in Barre's offer to the United States

eight months later of naval facilities at the southern port

ofKismayu

tobalance

theSoviet facilities

atBerbera in

the north.102 A third though relatively less serious source

of uncertainty for the Kremlin was Somalia's apparently

excellent relations with China, "whose aid projects were

considered very successful. " A reminder of this came in

January 1977, at about the same time as Mogadishu was

beginning to accelerate its flirtations with Arab

conservatives and with the West, when Barre sent a

congratulatory message to Chairman Hua saying that "the

militant friendly relations and bonds of co-operation and

understanding between Somalia and China would without doubt

be further consolidated. '"103 Thus, the problem for the

Soviets was that they had to compete for Somali loyalty

against the West, the conservative Arab States, and, to a

lesser extent, China. Although in one sense this was

healthy for the Soviet-Somali connection since, by giving

the Somalis an added leverage in their dealings with

U. S. S. R., it may have increased their self-confidence and

sense of equality with their giant partner, it also

threatened an ultimate break. As one writer has pointed

out, once the Somali's manage to capture the Ogaden, and if

this coincided with the truncation of Ethiopia or its

degeneration into virtual anarchy, the Soviet connection

would lose much of its attraction. "Since the Arab states

could' easily match Soviet largesse on the economic side,

with the importance of military assistance diminished, the

Arab temptation could prove overwhelming. "104 Even without



the capture of the Ogaden, the truncation of Ethiopia, and

the diminution of the importance of military assistance, the

Kremlin could never really be sure "when the Somalis would

exercise their option of accepting Saudi Arabian support in

exchange for expelling the Soviet presence from the Red Sea-

an option that the Somalis have toyed with for some

time. "105 This prospect must have been particularly

worrying for the Soviet leadership during the spring/early

summer, 1977, when the Americans completed their

decommitment from Ethiopia and, as will be seen, began

signalling the possibility of supplying Somalia with arms.

Realignment

The decommitment of the superpowers from their

traditional clients in the Horn of Africa was accompanied by

attempts at, and a certain degree of, realignment as the

United States sought to compensate for its loss of influence

in Ethiopia by making some inroads into Somalia at the

expense of the Soviet Union, and as the latter initially

tried to maximize its influence in the region by coopting

Ethiopia, in addition to Somalia, under its guardianship and

then, having failed to reconcile the Somalis with their

traditional adversaries, the Ethiopians, threw its lot

behind Addis Ababa.

The stimulus for this realignment can perhaps be traced

to as far backas

1972-1973, when the U. S. began tomove

towards decommitting itself from Ethiopia, thus paving the

way for the U. S. S. R. to try to achieve what it had failed to

do during the 1950's and 1960's. However it was not until

the advent of the Dergue, which at least symbolized a break



from Ethiopia's past with its post-World War II Western

connections, that the Soviet Union began to probe the

possibility of replacing the United States as Ethiopia's

patron. Thus, as early as September 1974, before the

Dergue had fully ousted Haile Selassie and began to steer

the country in a revolutionary direction, the Soviets

reportedly offered to supply Ethiopia with arms provided

the new regime terminated its ties with the Americans. 106

This offer was apparently rejected by the Dergue because of

the U. S. S. R. 's then continuing military support of its

principal enemy, Somalia. 107 Despite this, however, for

the next couple of years a number of factors impelled both

the Ethiopians and the Soviets towards each other and

culminated in their alignment by late 1976/early 1977. To

begin with, on the Ethiopian side, there was a need, once

Haile Selassie was fully ousted and the Dergue began to

implement a radical socio-economic policy, to lessen the

country's dependence on the chief benefactor of the imperial

regime and the world's leading capitalist power, if only to

cloak and rationalize in ideological rhetoric the

decommitment process that was initiated by the United States

and which was by then well underway, and thus give a sense

of consistency and planning to the P. M. A. C. 's overall

internal and external policies. Related to this was the

fact that the orientation and ideology of the U. S. S. R.

appeared more compatible with the proclivities of the rising

faction within the Dergue led by Mengistu. This was intent

on drastic land reform and the continuation of terror which

was deemed necessary for the survival of the revolution.



The Soviet Union, it was presumably thought, was much more

likely to accept the goals and methods advocated by Mengistu

and his colleagues than either the United States or any of

its West European allies; a switch to the East was,

therefore, propitious particularly in view of the rebellious

situation inside Ethiopia and the threat from Somalia, both

of which called for a reliable source of external support.

A third factor which may have encouraged the Dergue to move

towards the Soviet bloc throughout 1975-1976 was the desire-

to undercut Warsaw Pact and radical support for the Eritrean

guerillas and to provide the opportunity of getting the

Soviets to restrain their client in Somalia. Finally,

perhaps the most important single factor that prompted

Ethiopia's increasingly pro-Soviet stance was the P. M. A. C. 's

growing dissatisfaction with the record of American support,

especially with the rapid drop in U. S. weapons deliveries

which, as has been shown, was coupled with increasing

criticism of the Dergue's domestic and foreign polciies. 108

The growing disposition of the Dergue towards an

alignment with the U. S. S. R. was met with enthusiasm in Moscow

which, for its part, had a number of reasons for forging a

new connection with the Ethiopian regime. As briefly

mentioned above, from its inception, the Soviet Union saw in

the Ethiopian revolution a unique opportunity to try to

supplement its influence in Somalia by adding under its

umbrella in the Horn a country that not only was of far

greater importance politically, diplomatically, and

strategically109 than Somalia but also had once been the

most important American ally in black Africa. A successful

cooptation of Ethiopia was, therefore, presumably seen as a



way of winning influence in the Horn at the expense of

rivals, especially the 'United States and, to a lesser

extent, China, and of gaining a major voice in African

affairs, and'as a first step towards the establishment of a

strategic foothold in the area. 110 This initially

favourable assessment of the advantages to be gained from

promoting ties with the Dergue was subsequently reinforced

by a number of additional developments. Perhaps amongst the

most important of these were the increasingly leftward

orientation and policies of the military regime, especially

after the rise of Mengistu to the chairmanship of the

P. M. A. C. in February 1977, and the rapid deterioration in

U. S. -Ethiopian relations which by April-May of the same year

were all but broken. Whilst the first of these

developments gave the Ethiopian revolution more of a Marxist

character than perhpas any other in Africa, the second,

though very welcome to the U. S. S. R., threatened the imminent

downfall of the beleagured Dergue and the possibility of the

truncation of Ethiopia. Consequently, in accordance with

its "international duty to assist progressive revolutionary

movements, "111 the Soviet Union decided to extend its

support for Ethiopia particularly since "its people had

started to implement their national and democratic

revolution, the struggle to liquidate feudalism and oppose

foreign domination of the country. "112 This, of course,

meant risking the U. S. S. R. 's relations with Ethiopia's

traditional adversary and the Soviet Union's then principal

client in the region, Somlia. However, in deciding to

support the Ethiopians, the Soviets were apparently deluded



by their failure to fully appreciate the strength and

predominance of nationalistic feelings in the Horn of Africa

into thinking that the incompatibility of backing the

Ethiopians and the Somalis simultaneously could be solved by

inducing the regimes in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to

subordinate their traditional enmity to their ostensibly

common Marxist ideology. 113 Hence the endeavour in March

and April 1977 to confederate Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti,

and South Yemen. This, however, was also in response to

the mounting tension along the Ethio-Somali border, and so

will be dealt with in the following chapter.

The Kremlin's decision to try to bring Ethiopia into

its bloc of friends in the Horn began to manifest itself

from the beginning of 1975 onwards in the form of numerous

statements of support and solidarity114 and in a wide range

of economic, technical, cultural, scientific, political,115

and military agreements. Thus, one of the first

significant indications of the Soviet shift came on December

4,1975, when TASS published a long interview with

Lieutenant-General Banti, then the P. M. A. C. 's Chairman, in

which he set out at considerable detail the Ethiopian case

on. Eritrea and during which he displayed a great deal of

hostility towards the U. S. S. R. 's main client in the Horn,

Somalia. 116 This was followed up in June 1976 by an

official endorsement of the Dergue's nine-point peace plan

for what was termed the "administrative region" of

Eritrea, 117 the independence of which the U. S. S. R. had

hitherto indirectly supported. However, undoubtedly the

most important sign of the Kremlin's shift towards Ethiopia

was its readiness to supply the Ethiopian regime with



substantial quantities of weapons and military equipment.

Thus, it was reported that an influential Ethiopian military

delegation which visited Moscow in December 1976 had

negotiated a military assistance agreement according to

which the Soviet Union is said to have agreed to supply the

P. M. A. C. with arms and military equipment worth between $100

million and $385 million. This was apparently ratified by

Mengistu during his May trip to the U. S. S. R. The evidence

for this first Ethio-Soviet military deal came from French

intelligence sources in Djibouti, which claimed that at the

start of May 1977 several consignments of T-34 and T-54

tanks as well as armoured cars were delivered at the port

and had been transported to Ethiopia along the Djibouti-

Addis Ababarailway.

118 Reportsof the

Secret Ethio-Soviet

military agreement were later confirmed when in February

1977 the Vice-Chairman of the P. M. A. C., Major Abate,

announced that Ethiopia had begun to obtain weapons from the

Soviet-bloc, thus terminating its total dependence on the

United States. 119 Henceforth, signs of an increase in the

security commitment of the U. S. S. R. to Ethiopia began to

rapidly proliferate, especially after Mengistu's momentous

trip of May 4-8,1977, to the U. S. S. R. During this visit,

he managed to obtain general Soviet approval of his external

and internal policies,120 including his policy towards the

Eritreans; 121reportedly signed a new military agreement

with the Kremlin, 122 and adopted a "Declaration on

Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation" between

the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. This "Declaration, " inter

alia, pledged Moscow and Addis Ababa to "strive for regular



exchanges of opinion with one another on important

international questions of mutual interest, as well as on

questions of bilateral relations, " and, in a veiled

reference to the Eritrean rebellion and to Somali

irridentist claims on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia,

reaffirmed the two countries' belief that

interstate relations should be based, in particular, onsuch principles as renunciation of the use of force orthe threat of its use, respect for sovereignty, theterritorial integrity of states and the inviolability

of state boundaries, noninterference in internalaffairs and the settlement of disputed questions by

peaceful means.123

Allegations of increased Soviet military support for

Ethiopia continued right until the opening stages of the

Ethio-Somali war. Thus, in June an Eritrean separatist

leader, Osman Sabbe accused the U. S. S. R. of providing

Ethiopian government troops with 100,000 weapons "under the

pretext of safeguarding Ethiopia's socialist revolution from

counter-revolutionaries, "124 and by July it was reported

that Soviet arms deliveries to the Dergue had reached the

rate of five planeloads per week125 and that Soviet military

advisers had begun to arrive in Addis Ababa, sometimes

tactlessly flown there directly from Mogadishu. 126

The increasing shift, of the U. S. S. R. towards Ethiopia

naturally infuriated the Somalis whose concern over the

Kremlin's actions grew in proportion to Soviet support for

the Ethiopian regime. Thus, on May 16,1977, President

Barre stated that, although he had not protested to the-

U. S. S. R. against its decision to supply Ethiopia with

weapons, he had informed it of Somalia's concern. 127 This

statement was followed by reports that he had sent his

Defence Minister, Samatar, to Moscow on May 25 to seek



assurances from the Kremlin that it was not planning to arm

Ethiopia. 128 By late June the tone of Somali warnings to

the U. S. S. R. had substantially hardened when Barre said that

his government would make "a historic decision" if the

U. S. S. R. continued to arm Ethiopia. "We would not, " he

stated, "be able to remain idle in the face of the danger of

the Soviet Union's arming of Ethiopia. "129 In addition to

warning the U. S. S. R. about arming the Ethiopians, the

Somalis are also known to have expressed their concern to

the Kremlin over the Soviet press's support for the

P. M. A. C. 's terms for a settlement of the Eritrean problem,

and its portrayal of the Council as "a truly revolutionary

movement. "130

Sovietsupport

for the Derguealso rang alarm

bells in

Washington and eventually re-stimulated American interest in

the Horn of Africa, thus sowing the seeds for the re-

internationalization of the Ethio-Somali dispute, this time

with each superpower supporting the other's erstwhile

traditional client in the region. Initially, some Carter

Administration officials feared that the Soviets might

succeed in maintaining patron-client relationships with

Ethiopia and Somalia simultaneously, thereby scoring a major

victory in a strategic region at the expense of the U. S. 131

However, it soon became evident from the apparent

determination of the U. S. S. R. to stand by the Dergue and the

refusal of the Somalis to come to terms with this, that the

prospect of a Pax Sovietica in the Horn of Africa was rather

slim.132 Nevertheless, this did not pull the situation

back to where it was during 1974/1975 when the United States



was decommitting itself from Ethiopia whilst being content

to let the U. S. S. R. remain in Somalia. This is because the

quantity and quality of Soviet support for the Dergue

threatened to entrench the U. S. S. R. in a potentially

powerful country in a region from which the U. S. had

excluded itself, and thus to greatly enhance the prestige of

the Soviet Union at the expense of that of the United

States, which for the time being was not in a position to

counteract Soviet moves on anywhere nearthe

same scale.

For this reason it was apparently decided, probably sometime

during the early spring of 1977, to try to lure Somalia away

from the U. S. S. R. and to establish with it a type of patron-

client relationship so as to be able to counter Soviet

influence in Ethiopia. One of the first indications of

this came in April 1977 when President Carter was reported

as having instructed his Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, Vance, his National Security Adviser, Brzezinski,

and his Vice-President, Mondale, "to move in every possible

way to get Somalia to be our friend. "133 In the following

May, America's European allies, probably at the behest of

Washington, signalled for the first time in years their

willingness to sell arms to Somalia, 134and on June 11

Carter claimed that his Administration was not only seeking

to improve its relations with Somalia, but was also "trying

to understand the Eritrean movement in Ethiopia. '"135 He

also indicated that his "own inclination... is to

aggressively challenge, in a peaceful way... the Soviet Union

and'others for influence in areas of the world that we feel

are crucial to us now or potentially crucial 15 to 20 years

from now. " Amongst the countries where he thought such a



challenge was possible was Somalia. 136 Such overtures

proved too appetizing for the Somalis who immediately put

out feelers about the possibility of receiving British and

American arms,137

presumably in return for a reduction or

elimination of Soviet influence in Somalia.



Notes

1. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (VersoEditions and NLB, London, 1981), pp. 215-216.

2. Ibid.

3. C. Legum, "Angola and the Horn of Africa, " Diplomacy ofPower: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, ed.S. S. Kaplan (The Brookings Institute, Washington, D. C.,1981), pp. 609-610; G. D. Payton, "Soviet Military PresenceAbroad: The Lessons of Somalia, " Military Review, Vol. 59,No. 1, January 1979, pp. 68-69.

4. Payton, ibid., p. 69.5. Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 239.

6. Ibid.,pp.

239-240; R. Lyons, "The USSR, China and the Horn

of Africa, " Review of African Political Economy, No. 12,May-August 1978, p. 9.

7. Ibid.

8. Payton, op. cit., p. 69; S. David, "Realignment in the Horn:

The Soviet Advantage, " International Security, Vol. 4, No.2, Fall 1979, p. 72.

9. T. J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening

Storm, 2nd, rev. ed. (Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, New York and Washington, D. C., 1979), p. 115; J. B.

Bell, "Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence inSomalia, "Orbis, summer 1975, p. 403; B. Crozier, "Soviet

Presence in Somalia, "Conflict Studies, February 1975, p. 4;Payton, ibid.

10. Quoted in Keesing's Contemporary Archives (K. C. A. ), Vol.XXIV, 1978, p. 28992. Also see V. Kudryavtsev, "Imperialist

Moves in Red Sea Assailed, " Izvestia, April 16,1977, p. 4,in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (C. D. S. P. ), Vol.XXIX, No. 15, May 11,1977, pp. 5,13.

11. G. Afanasyev, "'Gunboat Diplomacy' in the Red Sea, " Za

rubezhom, No. 9, February 24-March 2,1978, p. 7, inC. D. S. P., Vol. XXX, No. 9, March 29,1978, p. 7.

12. Lyons, op. cit., p. 17.

13. See, for example, D. Chaplin, "Somalia and the Developmentof Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean, "Military Review,July 1975, p. 6; C. Legum and B. Lee, The Horn of Africa inContinuing Crisis (Africana Publishing Company, New York,1979), p. 6; P. Vanneman and M. James, "Soviet thrust into

the Horn of Africa: The Next Targets, "Strategic Review,

Spring, 1978, p. 34.14. C. Clapham, "The Soviet Experience in the Horn of Africa, "

The Soviet Union and the Third World, ed. E. J. Feuchtwanger

and P. Nailor (Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1981), pp.215-216. Also see Bell, op. cit., p. 408.

15. Bell, ibid., p. 409.16. Chaplin, op. cit., p. 5.17. Bell, op. cit., p. 409.18. Ibid. Also see Chaplin, op. cit., p. 5; J. Valenta,

"Soviet-Cuban Intervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact

and Lessons, " Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No.2, Fall/Winter 1980/1981, pp. 355-356.

19. Bell, ibid.20. Legum and Lee, op. cit., p. 6; Vanneman and James, op. cit.,



p. 34. Also see D. E. Albright, "Soviet Policy, " Problems ofCommunism, Vol. XXVII, January-February 1978, p. 33; C.Legum, "The African Environment, " idem., p. 1.

21. Legum and Lee, ibid.

22. Legum (1978), op. cit., p. 1; Albright, op. cit., pp. 31,32;

Valenta, op. cit., pp. 355-356.23. Crozier, op. cit., p. 15.


25. Nairobi Times, December 12,1977, Quoted by TASS, in Pravda,

December 13,1977, p. 5, C. D. S. P., Vol. XXIX, No. 50,January 11,1978, p. 21.


27. Farer, op. cit., p. 135.

28. Ibid., Valenta, op. cit., pp. 359-360.


30. Farer, op. cit., p. 135. Also see Clapham, op. cit., p. 215.

31.op. cit., p.

213.

32. Ibid., p. 215; David, op. cit., p. 71.33. David, ibid., p. 74; United States Arms Policies in the

Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, pp. 172,175. Cited inHolliday and Molyneux, ibid., p. 221, C. Crooker, "TheAfrican Dimension of Indian Ocean Policy, " Orbis., Fall,

1976, pp. 658-659. Clapham, op. cit., pp. 211,212; AfricanContemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, Vol. 8,

1975-1976 (A. C. R. ), ed. C. Legum (Rex Collings, London,

1976), pp. B190, B205; A. C. R., Vol. 9,1976-1977, p. B211;K. C. A.., Vol. XXII, 1976, p. 27653.

34. Cao-Huy-Thuan, "Les Etats-Unis et la question erythreene, "

in Alain Fenet, Cao-Huy-Thuan, and Tran-Van-Minh, La

question de l'Erythree (Paris, 1979). Cited in Halliday andMolyneux, ibid., p. 217.

35. Halliday and Molyneux, ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 216.37. Ibid., p. 217.38. Ibid. p. 216.

'39. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa (Washington, 1976), p. 36.

Quoted in ibid., pp. 217-218. See also n. 2 above; Crocker,

op. cit., p. 658; David, op. cit., p. 71.

40. Bell, op cit., p. 403.41. United States Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist Aid to

the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976, " ER77-10296 (Washington, August 1977), p. 12. Cited in D. D.Laitin, "The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad'sRole in Somali History, " The Journal of Modern AfricanStudies., Vol. 17, No. 1,1979, p. 99.

42. A. C. R., 1975-1976, op. cit., p. B308.43. Ibid., 1976-1977, p. B332

-44.Bell, op. cit., p. 403.

45. Ibid., p. 405. Also see David, op. cit., p. 72;

Farer, op. cit., p. 116.46. Crozier, op. cit., pp. 4-5; Payton, op. cit., pp. 69-70.47. David, op. cit., p. 73; Laitin, op. cit., p. 99; Crocker,

op. cit., p. 653, Farer, op. cit., p. 116.48. Bell, op. cit., p. 405; Laitin, ibid.49. David, op. cit., p. 73; Crozier, op. cit., p. 4.50. Quoted in Lyons, op. cit., p. 14. Also see Legum (1981),

op. cit., p. 610.51. See, for example. Albright, op. cit., p. 29; Legum (1978),



op. cit., p. 1-2.52. Quoted in Lyons, op. cit., pp. 14-15. Also see Bell, op. cit.,

p. 408; Chaplin, op. cit., p. 6.

53. Albright, op. cit., p. 30. Also see Bell, ibid., pp. 403-404;

Payton, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

54. A. C. R., 1975-1976, op. cit., p. B308. Also see David,op. cit., p. 72.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. 'Dewey F. Bartlett, "The Soviet Presence in Somalia, "Sino-

Soviet Intervention in Africa., ed. R. Pearson (Council onAmerican Affairs, Washington, D. C., 1977), p. 76. Cited in

Payton, op. cit., p. 70.

58. A. C. R., 1975-1976, op. cit., p. B308; Payton, ibid., pp. 70-

71.

59. Bell, op. cit., p. 404.

60. Op.cit., p.

31. Alsosee

Valenta, op cit., p. 356; Payton,

op. cit., p. 68; Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 242.

61. Crozier, op. cit., p. 4. Also see Payton, ibid., p. 70;

Laitin, op. cit., p. 99.

62. On this issue see, for example, Payton, ibid., p. 73; R. B.

Remneck, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision

to Intervene, " The Soviet Union in The Third World:

Successes and Failures, ed. R. H. Donaldson (Westview Press,

Boulder, Colorado, Croom Helm, London, England, 1981), p.136; H. Desfosses, "Considerations of Naval and Arab Power

in Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa, " Soviet and Chinese

Aid to African Nations, ed. W. Weinstein and T. H. Henriksen

(Praeger, New York, 1980), p. 36.63. Soviet-Somali communique, Pravda, July 13,1974, pp. 1,4,

in C. D. S. P., Vol. XXVI, No. 28, August 7,1974, p. 14.

64. Payton, op. cit., p. 70.

65. To be precise, Somalia was not generally perceived as a

client of, and by implication, a credibility element for,

the Soviet Union until after the completion of the Berbera

military complex and the conclusion of the Soviet-Somali

Friendship and cooperation Treaty. After about that date,

the impression of Somalia as a client of the U. S. S. R. began

to take a firm root. In March 1975, for instance, the

B. B. C. Somali service reported the findings of a report bythe London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict which,inter alia, concluded that Somalia was on the way to

becoming a "Soviet satellite". Cited in A. C. R., 1975-1976,

op. cit., pp. B307-B308.

66. A. C. R., 1976-1977, op. cit., p. 8211; B. Oudes, "View

Point, " Africa Report, May 1971; The Times., February 26,

1971; Ha'aretz (Israel), January 19,1971. " Cited in M.

Abir, "Red Sea Politics, " Adelphi Papers No. 93

(International Institute for Strategic Studies, ' London,

December 1972), p. 26; Crocker, op. cit., pp. 658-659;

Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 219.67. Crocker, ibid., p. 659.

68. Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 219.

69. A. C. R., 1976-1977, op. cit., p. B211.

70. Crocker, op. cit., p. 658.71. Op. cit., p. 219.72. Oudes, op. cit; J. F. Campbell, "Rumblings along the Red

Sea, " Foreign Affairs, April 1970. Cited in Abir, op. cit.,

p. 26. Also see Crocker, ibid., p. 658.



73. Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 219.

74. Ibid.75. Crocker, op. cit., p. 658.76. Ibid., Clapham, op. cit., p. 211; David, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

77. Clapham. ibid. 178. David,

op. cit., pp.74-75; Halliday

andMolyneux,

op. cit.,p. 220; A. C. R.; 1976-1977, op. cit., p. B211.79. Halliday and Molyneux, ibid.

80. Ibid., p. 222.81. Ibid, p. 224. Also see A. C. R., 1976-1977, op. cit., p. B211.82. Halliday and Molyneux, ibid., p. 222.

83. Legum, A. C. R., 1976-1977, op. cit., p. B210.84. K. C. A., Vol. XXII, p. 27912B.85. A. C. R., 1976-1977, op. cit., pp. B210-211.

86. Ibid., p. 211.87. Ibid., p. 210; Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 223;

Legum and Lee, op. cit., p. 52.

88. Lyons, op. cit., p. 11; David, op. cit. p. 75.89. The New York Times, April 24,1977, p. AS.

90. Ibid., pp. Al, A5.91. Ibid., April 28,1977, p. A3. Also see Halliday and

Molyneux, op. cit., p. 223; Legum and Lee, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

92. Pravda, May 5,1977, p. 4, in C. D. S. P., Vol. XXIX, No. 18,June 1,1977, p. 9.

93. The New York Times, May 29,1977, p. A7.

94. Ibid., June 2,1977, p. A8.95. Graham Hancock writing in MEED Arab Report, February 28,

-, 1979. Quoted in A. C. R., Vol. 11,1978-1979, ed. C. Legum(Holmes and Meier, New York and London, 1980), p. B383.

96. A. C. R., 1975-1976, op. cit., p. B206; idem, 1976-1977,

op. cit., p. B209.97. Crozier, op. cit., p. 72; Payton, op. cit., p. 73.98. Legum (1981), op. cit., p. 629; C. Legum and B. Lee, "Crisis

in the Horn of Africa: International Dimensions of theSomali-Ethiopian Conflict, " A. C. R., Vol. 10,1977-1978, ed.C. Legum (Holmes and Meier, New York and London, 1979), pp.A34-A35.

99. D. Ottaway, Washington Post, February 10,1976. Cited in

Laitin, op. cit., p. 100.100. Farer, op. cit., p. 135.101. Lyons, op. cit., pp. 15-16; Valenta, op. cit., p. 360.102. Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 224.

103. Quoted in Lyons, op. cit., p. 15.104. Farer, op. cit., pp. 134-135.105. Legum, (1981), op. cit., p. 629. Also see Crozier, op. cit.

p. 4.

106. Legum, ibid., p. 627; A. C. R., 1975-1976, op. cit., p. B205.107. Legum, ibid., p. 613. According to Halliday and Molyneux

and to Yodfat, it was the Ethiopians who requested

substantial Soviet military aid in September 1974, which theRussians were not prepared to give because of their initial

suspicions of the nature of the new military regime, andtheir desire not to antagonize the Arabs, who dislikedEthiopia's connections with Israel, and Somalia, with whomthey had just signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.However, in view of the subsequent Soviet willingness, from1975 onwards, to provide Ethiopia with some militaryassistance despite the risk of antagonizing the Arabs and



the Somalis, it seems more likely that it was the Russians

who first probed the possibility of supplying Ethiopia witharms. See Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., pp. 244-245; A.Yodfat, "The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa, " NortheastAfrican Studies, Part II, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1980, p. 32.

108. David, op. cit., p 74.109. On the realtively greater strategic importance of Ethiopia

compared to Somalia, see, for example, Farer, op. cit., pp.140-142; Legum (1981), op. cit., p. 629.

110. Valenta, op. cit., p. 357.; Albright, op. cit., p. 35.111. Radio Moscow, December 29,1978. Quoted in Legum (1981),

op. cit., p. 630.112. V. Kudryavtsev, Radio Moscow, in French, December 28,1978,

and in English, December 29,1978. Quoted in ibid.113. David, op. cit., p. 77; Valenta, op. cit., p. 358.

114. See, for example. A. C. R., 1975-1976, op. cit., p. B205;

idem, 1976-1977,op. cit., p.

B211; idem, 1977-1978,

op. cit., pp. B244-B245; Legum and Lee, op. cit., pp. 50-51;D. Morison, "Soviet and Chinese Policies in Africa, " A. C. R.,

1977-1978, op. cit., p. A97; Pravda, May 5,1977, p. 4, inC. D. S. P., Vol. XXIX, No. 18, June 1,1977, p. 9; idem., May9,1977, pp. 1,4, in C. D. S. P., Vol. XXIX, No. 18, June 1,1977, pp. 9,10,11.

115. See, for example, A. C. R., 1975-1976, ibid., p. B205; idem,

1976-1977, ibid., p. B211; idem, 1977-1978, ibid., p. B245;

Pravda, May 9,1977, in C. D. S. P., Vol. XXIX, No. 18, June1,1977, p. 10; The New York Times, May 7,1977, p. A3.

116. A. C. R., 1975-1976, ibid., p. B205.

117. Legum and Lee (1979), op. cit., p. 50.118. David, op. cit., p. 74; Legum (1981), op. cit., p. 615;

idem, "Realities of the Ethiopian Revolution, " The World

Today., Vol. 33, No. 8, August 1977, pp. 311-312; Legum andLee, op. cit., p. 51; Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p.245; Lyons, op. cit., p. 11; Laitin, op. cit., p. 100;Albright, op. cit., pp. 20,32-33; The New York Times, April25,1977, p. A3; K. C. A., Vol. XXIII, 1977, p. 28423.

119. A. C. R., 1976-1977, op. cit., p. B207; The Times, February

14,1977, p. 5.120. Pravda, May 9,1977, p. 4, in C. D. S. P., Vol. XXIX, No. 18,

June 1,1977, p. 10; Morison, op. cit., p. A97.121. Pravda., ibid., Morison, ibid.122. Legum and Lee (1979), op. cit. p. 13.

123. Pravda, May 9,1977, pp. It 4, in C. D. S. P.., Vol. XXIX, No.

18, June 1,1977, pp. 10,11.124. The Times, June 24,1977, p. 7.

125. Legum (1981), op. cit., p. 615.

126. Clapham, op. cit., p. 213.127. K. C. A., Vol. XXIII, 1977, p. 28423; The Times, May 20,

1977, p. 8.128. The Washington Post, July 22,1977. Cited in Legum (1981),

op. cit., p. 616.129. Al-Yagza [Al-Yagathal, June 27,1977. Quoted in Legum,

ibid., and in Legum and Lee (1979), op. cit. p. 75. Also seeK. C. A., Vol. XXIII, 1977, p. 28636; A. C. R., 1976-1977,

op. cit., p. B332; Legum (1978), op. cit., p. 17.130. A. C. R., ibid.131. The New York Times, March 23,1977, p. A3.132. Some Carter Administration officials had argued all along

that the depth of the Ethio-Somali dispute did not allow for



the creation of a Pax Sovietica or anything else of thatsort in the Horn of Africa. See ibid., The Times, May 26,1977, p. 1.

133. The Sunday Times., April 17,1977. Quoted in Halliday andMolyneux, op. cit., p. 226. Also see B. Oudes, "The UnitedStates' Year in

Africa," A. C. R., 1977-1978,

op. cit., p. A74;Laitin, op. cit., p. 106.

-134. Halliday and Molyneux, ibid.135. International Herald-Tribune, June 13,1977. Quoted in

ibid., pp. 226-227.136. The New York Times, June 12,1977, p. 1. Also see

International Herald-Tribune, June 13,1977, in Halliday andMolyneux, ibid., p. 226.

137. The Times, July 28,1977, p. 6.





to the Ethio-Somali war of 1977-1978 resemble their pattern

of behaviour during the Korean conflict more closely than

that during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, albeit in reverse.

As in the Korean peninsula, the primary interests of the

superpowers in the Horn of Africa were roughly equal, though

the proximity of the region to the petroleum fields of the

Middle East made it of marginally greater importance to the

U. S. Whilst this approximate, albeit disputed, parity of

interests would have been expected to elicit a symmetrical

type of superpower intervention in the war, the nature of

the superpowers' commitments in the area at that particular

time, together with a crisis situation that was generally

unfavourable to the United States, culminated in unilateral

intervention by the U. S. S. R.

Unlike both Korea and the Middle East, the immediate

status quo ante bellum in the Horn of Africa was more

congenial to the Soviet Union than to the U. S. The

replacement of the pro-Western monarchy in Ethiopia by a

radical, Marxist-inclined regime deprived the United States

of an influential client in the area and provided the

U. S. S. R. with an opportunity to significantly tilt the

regional superpower balance to its own advantage by adding

Ethiopia to its traditional protege in the Horn, Somalia.

Although the Soviet attempt to entice the Ethiopians was

bound to antagonize the latter's long-time adversaries, the



Somalis, and so risk the position of the U. S. S. R. in the

Somali Republic, that risk seems to have been considered by

the Kremlin as worth taking, doubtless because of Ethiopia's

relatively greater political and strategic importance. At

the same time, Somalia's irredentism and its comparative

weakness placed serious limits on its attractiveness as an

alternative client of the Americans. Consequently, whilst

prior to the outbreak of open warfare the United States

endeavoured to compensate for its loss of influence in

Ethiopia by establishing some linkages with Somalia, once

the latter became clearly implicated in the W. S. L. F. 's war

in the Ogaden, the U. S. was quick to keep its distance in

fear that it might antagonize other African states sensitive

about their own ethnic minorities and about the implications

for themselves of flagrant violations of colonial boundaries

in the continent.

Nevertheless, the outbreak of hostilities in the summer

of 1977 presented each superpower, and not just the Soviet

Union, with an opportunity to consolidate its position in

the Horn of Africa and undermine that of the other.

Admittedly, in view of the Kremlin's status at the time as

patron to Somalia and its affinity and willingness to

provide the Dergue with political support and military

assistance, the difficulty of such a task could hardly be

underestimated. Even so, given the fluidity of the

superpowers' relations with the protagonists at that

juncture and the fact that, in spite of the deterioration of

American-Ethiopian relations, the U. S. still maintained

important ties with Addis Ababa, the United States could

have utilized the conflict to prevent the U. S. S. R. from



making a significant advancement, as well as to enhance its

own position in the region. For one thing, the U. S. could

have taken effective coercive measures in order to deter the

scale of Soviet bloc intervention which eventually took

place but without identifying itself with Somalia's attempt

to capture the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. This could have

been done by decoupling Somalia's Irredentist venture from

the issue of Soviet intervention and singling out the latter

as the target of United States deterrence/compellance

efforts. If successful, by depriving Ethiopia from much-

needed Soviet support, such a policy could have put Addis

Ababa in a position in which it may have been forced to

approach the U. S. for an end to its predicament. An

alternative and somewhatless

attractive option would have

been for the United States to risk the wrath of Africa as it

had risked Arab indignation in the Middle East and counter

Soviet intervention in Ethiopia by putting its full weight

behind Somalia and then, after frustrating Soviet designs,

using its influence with Mogadishu as leverage to affect a

political settlement of the Ethio-Somali dispute. Although

in the long-term Somalia's limited military potential

rendered it a bad bargain, in the short run it was quite

capable of inflicting a substantial defeat on strife-torn

Ethiopia. Consequently, as with Egypt in the Middle East,

the latter might subsequently have been persuaded, with the

aid of American enticements, to look to Washington for an

acceptable solution. A third and politically less

unattractive option would have been for the United States to

try to outflank the U. S. S. R. by intervening in support. of



Ethiopia. To be sure, this would have been difficult to

contemplate in light of the P. M. A. C. 's anti-American

rhetoric and would have certainly enraged Somalia's

conservative Arab backers. However, the fact that the

Dergue had been careful, despite its growing links with the

U. S. S. R., to maintain ties with the United States and had

indeed always welcomed American overtures indicated its

amenability to U. S. influence and "moderation. " In this

respect, the United States' economic edge over the Soviet

Union would have conferred it with an important advantage

over the latter in the event of a superpower scramble for

Ethiopia. As for the conservative Arab factor, the general

impotence of Saudi Arabia and other Arab conservatives in

the face of persistent U. S. support for Israel shows that

any anger over American backing for Ethiopia would have been

very short-lived. Indeed, in view of the gradual and

initially cautious nature of the U. S. S. R. 's intervention in

aid of Ethiopia, it would have been perfectly possible for

the United States to significantly undermine Soviet strategy

in the Horn of Africa by throwing in its lot behind

Ethiopia.

However, with the outbreak of full-scale war on July

23/24,1977, the United States immediately took steps to

disengage itself from the situation by instituting an arms

embargo on both Somalia and Ethiopia. This remained in

force throughout the hostilities and in spite of the massive

intervention of the U. S. S. R. on the side of Ethiopia. The

Soviet Union, on the other hand, pursued an interventionary

strategy right from the start of the war; to begin with, by

assisting both protagonists. At the same time, it adopted



a public stance in support of Ethiopia and endeavoured to

use its influence with the warring parties in an attempt to

bring them to the negotiating table under Soviet auspices

and thereby-establish a Pax Sovietica in the Horn of Africa.

Once this policy failed to produce the required results and

in fact began to antagonize the Somalis as well as the

Ethiopians, the U. S. S. R. decided to put its full weight

behind Ethiopia, firstly, by accelerating its supply of arms

and military equipment, and subsequently by assuming

direction of the Ethiopian war effort and facilitating the

direct intervention of Cuban and other Soviet bloc forces.

The level and mode of Soviet intervention on behalf of

Ethiopia ultimately assumed such a character as to seriously

threatenthe credibility and resolve

imagesof the U. S.

This compelled Washington, in the final stages of the war,

to undertake coercive measures directly against the U. S. S. R.

with the aim of restraining and eventually reducing the

level of Soviet and allied intervention in the region in

order to safeguard its reputation. But, by that time, the

intervention of the U. S. S. R. and its allies had already had

its impact on the ground, and though the U. S. 's use of

linkage politics may have helped its image amongst its

friends and allies, it hardly restored its position vis-a-

vis the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa.

The superpowers on the eve of the 1977-1978 Ethio-Somali war

In contrast to the cases of Korea and the Middle East,

both Washington and Moscow seem to have been well aware of

the imminence of hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia.



Indeed, as soon as tension between the two countries began

to take the form of sporadic violence, each superpower

endeavoured to manipulate the situation in order to

consolidate its own and undermine the position of the other.

Perhaps the first serious warning of the impending war

in the Horn of Africa came in February 1977, when it was

alleged that Somalia had sent up to 1,500 uniformed troops

along with tanks on a "search and destroy" mission against

Ethiopian outposts in the disputed Ogaden desert.1

After a

relatively brief lull, tension along the Ethio-Somali border

picked up again in the following May amid reports that

between 3,000 and 6,000 troops of the W. S. L. F. had

infiltrated the Ogaden region from Somalia, capturing one

important town after another. Although the Somali

government insisted at the time that it had no direct

involvement in the W. S. L. F. 's adventures and that the

fighting was being done entirely by the Ogaden's Somalis,

quite substantial evidence pointed to considerable support

for the Front's operations by Soviet-built tanks and

artillery which could onlyhave been

supplied either by

Somalia or by some of the Arab states which backed Somalia,

such as Syria and Iraq, via Somalia. 2 On May 31, the

signal for an all-out offensive by the W. S. L. F. and its

Somali patron came when the Front succeeded in blowing up

five bridges on the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, thus

cutting Ethiopia's main lifeline to the sea and forcing it

to shift its import-export trade as well as Soviet arms

supplies from the port of Djibouti to Assab, itself

separated from Addis Ababa by stretches of Eritrean

guerilla-held territory across which traffic could move only



under armed -escort.3 By mid-June, the W. S. L. F. was

claiming to control 60 per cent of what it termed as the

"Somali territory under Ethiopian occupation, " and towards

the end of the month the Ethiopians accused the Somali

Republic of sending additional uniformed troops into the

Ogaden to fight alongside the W. S. L. F., whilst reports from

Kenya alleged that some 3,000 regular Somali troops had

attacked one of its border police posts on their way to

infiltrate the Ogaden. 4

The response of the Soviet Union to this initial spate

of hostilities, was to try and alleviate the possibility of

full-scale war between Somalia and Ethiopia and thereby give

itself additional time to work out a formula whereby it

could consolidateits

positionin Ethiopia

but without

jeopardizing its patron-client relationship with Somalia.

Thus, its first reaction was to attempt to persuade Addis

Ababa and Mogadishu to join the prospective Republic of

Djibouti and South Yemen and establish a confederation in

which Eritrea and the disputed Ogaden desert would have

autonomous status. Accordingly, at about the same time as

the Somalis were engaged in a "search and destroy" mission

against Ethiopia, and whilst Somali President Barre was

loudly proclaiming that his country could no longer accept

Ethiopia's "continued colonization of Somali

territory, "5 the Cuban leader, Castro, began a visit to

the Horn of Africa in an effort to advance the notion of a

"progressive" confederation. This visit was followed in

April by a similar endeavour, this time by the Soviet

President, Podgorny. 6



Not surprisingly, this rather too ambitious scheme

foundered on the rejection of the Somalis. Nevertheless,

this failure did not lead to an immediate change in Soviet

policy in the Horn since the Kremlin continued to call for

the solidarity of, and the peaceful settlement of disputes

between, progressive forces in the region and persisted in

supplying arms to both Ethiopia and Somalia. However, the

still-birth of the confederation scheme, together with the

mounting hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia were

probably seen as ushering the beginning of the end of any

hope for the setting up of a Pax Sovietica in the Horn, in

that they indicated a certain loss of control on the part of

the U. S. S. R. over events in that region. It was, therefore,

probably about that time that the notion of a substantial

Soviet tilt towards Ethiopia as a means of gaining

additional influence over Mogadishu and Addis Ababa began to

float around the Kremlin.

In contrast to the Soviet Union, the response of the

United States to the increasing violence along the Ethio-

Somali border was, initially, to add fuel to the fire in an

effort to coopt Somalia and thereby establish a

countervailing presence in the Horn of Africa by expressing

approval of Mogadishu's involvement in the W. S. L. F. 's Ogaden

campaign and hinting at the possibility of U. S. arms for

Somalia. Thus, in mid-June 1977 the Carter Administration

reportedly despatched a certain Dr. Kevin Cahill, a longtime

Personal physician and close friend of President Barre, with

a tessage which allegedly came from "the very top" and

indicated that Washington was "not averse to further

guerilla pressure in the Ogaden. " The same emissary is



also said to have told the Somali ruler that the United

States was willing to consider sympathetically Somalia's

defence needs and assured him that in the event of a Somali

advance in the Ogaden desert the U. S. would not resume

military supplies to Ethiopia.? The messages were given

some credence by the Somali ambassador to Washington, Addou,

who reportedly conferred with Carter twice and then assured

Barre that Cahill's words were authoritative.8 Although

reports of the Cahill affair were subsequently denied by

Western diplomats in Mogadishu, 9, they are, however,

consistent with official United States statements made at

the time concerning the position of the Carter

Administration vis-a-vis the issue of arms supplies to

Somalia. For instance, in reference to what he termed as

the dangers of growing conflict in the Horn of Africa,

Secretary of State Vance stated on July 1 that the United

States would consider sympathetically appeals for assistance

from states in the area threatened by a build-up of foreign

military equipment and advisers on their borders. 10 Not

long afterwards, the U. S. officially announced that it was

willing "in principle" to provide Somalia with defensive

weapons, 11an offer that was immediately accepted by the

Somalis who claimed that they "could not remain indifferent

if Soviet-provided arms were used by Ethiopia against

Somalia. "12 This sort of response could not but have been

welcomed in Washington, which is said to have accompanied

its offers to Mogadishu with a thinly-veiled condition that

the latter ended its friendship with the Soviet Union. 13

At the superpower level, the United States endeavoured



to press the U. S. S. R. into curtailing its intervention in

the Horn region by hinting at a possible linkage of Soviet

activities in the area with the then ongoing Indian Ocean

Demilitarization Talks between the superpowers. Thus, on

March 24,1977, Carter declared that

We're going to try to move towardIndian Ocean..

. and we're going to

about the future of Africa and askjoin ith us in removing from that

outside interference which might coin the countries involved... 14

demilitarizing the

express our concernthe Soviet Union to

troubled continentDntribute to warfare

However, in view of the absence of a strong U. S. commitment

in the Horn of Africa at that particular juncture, the

Carter Administration seems to have found it difficult to

justify wrecking the Indian Ocean talks for the sake of

confining Soviet behaviour in the Horn, especially when such

a move was unlikely to have the required effect on the

Kremlin. Consequently, the issue of Soviet intervention in

the region was not allowed to develop into a superpower

crisis, at least at this stage of the Ethio-Somali conflict.

The outbreak of war: U. S. detachment and the Soviet tilt

towards Ethiopia

With the outbreak of full-scale, open warfare between

Ethiopia and Somalia on July 23/24,1977, and the rapid

progress of the Somali-assisted W. S. L. F. 's campaign which,

by October, seriously threatened the Somali-inhabited areas

ofEthiopia

with total seizure,

15

theUnited States

abandoned its attempt to woo the Barre regime with arms and

strategic cover and, consequently, its effort to countervail

the growing Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa. Thus,

as early as August 4, the U. S. announced a freeze on its



plan to supply Somalia with arms. In explaining this move,

State Department officials contended that the White House

had to reverse its July decision because only eight days

after it was made public the Somali army began its incursion

into the Ogaden. Although the United States knew that

W. S. L. F. guerillas were operating inside Ethiopia, they

said, it had not foreseen that the regular army of the

Somali Republic would also be committed, and was not

prepared to support such action-16 By thebeginning

of

September, this initial freeze was transformed into a

definite reversal when State Department spokesman Hodding

Carter III announced that "[wle have decided that providing

arms at this time would add fuel to a fire we are more

interested in putting out. "17 At the same time, the

Americans made it clear that they would not approve the

transfer of any U. S. -supplied weapons to Somalia from third

countries. 18 The reversal of the United States decision to

provide Somalia with arms "coincided" with a similar one

from Britain, which said that it was withdrawing a previous

offer of "defensive arms" pending an end to the Ogaden

fighting, and France, which placed its offer of military

assistance under "continuing study. "19

The U. S. detachment from Somalia was not, however,

compensated for by any effort to coopt Ethiopia and thereby

outflank the Soviet Union. Thus, in spite of repeated

Ethiopian

gestures, especiallyduring September and early

October, 20 the Americans chose to maintain their strict

embargo on arms to Ethiopia. For instance, in response to

an Ethiopian request for United States military assistance

announced by Mengistu personally on September 18,1977,21



U. S. officials reportedly stated that their country would

not supply Ethiopia with any weapons nor reconcile itself

with the Dergue as long as Mengistu remained in power.22

This was partly confirmed on October 6 when a State

Department spokesman said that the United States did not

intend to supply arms to either side in the Horn conflict

until a cease-fire was accepted by them. 23 Indeed, the

extent to which the Americans were prepared to go to ensure

this was illustrated by their protest in the summer of 1977

against Yugoslavia's decision to pass on to the Ethiopians a

few U. S. -built M-47 tanks that had been supplied to Belgrade

in the 1950's. 24

The disengagement of the United States from the Ethio-

Somali war left the Soviet Union free to manipulate the

conflict by intervening solely at a regional level, that is,

without having to interact with the Americans.

Accordingly, it responded to the outbreak of hostilities by

persisting in its efforts to find a way by which both

Ethiopia and Somalia would coexist under its umbrella.

Consequently, for some time after the W. S. L. F. 's successes

in the Ogaden and Somalia's implication in the Front's

campaign became common knowledge, the Soviet Union continued

to provide both protagonists with arms, albeit in different

quantities. The principal aim of this policy was

presumably to acquire sufficient leverage for it to be able

to persuade Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to acquiesce in a

Kremlin-sponsored settlement and thereby lay the foundations

for the establishment of a Pax Sovietica in the region.

Thus, throughout the first three months of hostilities, the



U. S. S. R. not only kept to its military agreements with the

Somali Republic "if a little behind schedule, " but also

maintained its 3,000-6,000 military and technical advisers

in the country.25 At the same time, the Soviet Union

supplied Ethiopia with a wide range of weapons which

included T-54 tanks, AK-47 self-loading rifles, machine

pistols, light machine guns, anti-tank missiles, and

bazookas, 26 though deliveries during the crucial first few

weeks of theSomali

assault were reportedly slow and

limited. 27 The main Soviet boost of the Ethiopian war

machine during this stage of the conflict came in late

August/early September when the Kremlin reportedly concluded

with Addis Ababa a $385 million arms deal, according to

which they undertook to provide for the delivery of 48

advanced MiG-21 interceptors, almost 200 T-54 and T-55

tanks, an unknown number of SAM-3 and SAM-7 surface-to-air

missiles, and wire-guided anti-tank missiles.28

At the same time, the Kremlin continued to press for a

political settlement of the Ethio-Somali dispute on the

basis of Somali withdrawal from Ethiopian territory and

mutual respect for sovereignty, political independence, and

territorial integrity. 29 The way it allegedly tried to

translate this conception of a political solution to the

conflict into reality indicates that, as during the period

immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, it still

harboured

ambitionsto set up a Pax Sovietica in the Horn of

Africa. Thus, according to diplomatic sources, the Soviet

leadership proposed to President Barre during his August 30-

31,1977, visit to Moscow the convening of an Ethio-Somali

meeting under Soviet auspices to discuss the future of the





not only violating one's principles, but also tantamount to

complicity with the reactionary Mogadicio regime. ""34

The turning point:-

total Soviet alignment with Ethiopia

and the recapture of the Ogaden desert

This state of affairs, with its inherent threat to the

position of the U. S. S. R. in the Horn of Africa, prompted the

Soviet leadership to opt for a strategy of total alignment

with Ethiopia. From the latter's point of view, this shift

could not have come at a more opportune moment. For one

thing, it came at a time when the Ethiopians were at the

start of what promised to be a gruelling stalemate which

left a large proportion of their army pinned against some

40,000Eritrean fighters

in thenorth and

theremainder

split between defending Harar, which the Somalis had just

made one large but abortive attempt to capture, and parts of

the provinces of Bale, Sidamo, and Arussi. This situation

increased the chance of mutinies in the country's large but

disaffected army and, consequently the vulnerability of the

already shaky Mengistu regime. The Soviet swing was also

timely hecause it came at a moment when it could take

advantage of the already over-stretched Somali

communications lines, which were based in the northern

Somali city of Hargeisa, 225 kilometres east of Harar. 35

Thus, with the United States firmly entrenched in its

position of neutrality, the U. S. S. R., together with its East

European allies, began to pour all types of weapons into

Ethiopia. These included tanks, rocket artillery, air

defence equipment, and, most importantly, large numbers of



advanced aircraft.36 Reports of the latter deliveries

began to circulate almost immediately after Mengistu

expressed his discontent with Soviet policy towards the

Ethio-Somali conflict. 37 The sudden influx of Soviet

military supplies to Ethiopia coincided with further reports

of a large presence of Soviet, Cuban, and South Yemeni

military personnel in the Ogaden and other parts of the

country. Indeed, by late September 1977 Western

intelligence sources were claiming that many Cubans were

actually fighting with the Ethiopians in Soviet-built tanks

and operating heavy artillery.38

The Kremlin's move towards total alignment with

Ethiopia was also manifested in the decision, announced on

October 19,1977, to "officially and formally" end its arms

supplies to Somalia.39

This was reportedlyfollowed

by a

message threatening the Somalis with "grave consequences for

Soviet-Somali relations" unless they ended their

"interference in the internal affairs of Ethiopia. ^40

Rather than intimidate the Somalis, however, these actions

prompted them into taking decisive measures. Thus, on

November 13,1977, it was announced in Mogadishu that all

Soviet military and civilian advisers were to be expelled;

that the use of all Somali air, land, and sea facilities by

the U. S. S. R. was to cease; that the 1974 treaty of

friendship between the two states was to be abrogated, and

that the staff of the Soviet embassy in the Somali capital

was to be reduced to the size of that of the Somali embassy

in Moscow. 41 Moreover, the Somalis also announced that

they had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba

and to expel within 48 hours all Cubans working in the

409



country because of Havana's "brazen decision to commit its

troops on the side of the Ethiopian Government and its

propaganda against Somalia. "42

Somalia's actions rendered the position of the Soviet

Union in the Horn of Africa entirely dependent on Ethiopia,

and in particular on the fate of the Mengistu regime.

Consequently, with the United States still showing no signs

of counteracting the growing Soviet intervention in the

Ethio-Somaliconflict,

the U. S. S. R. decided to put its full

weight behind Ethiopia, to an extent which would enable the

latter to inflict a major defeat on Somalia. Thus,

beginning around November 26-28,1977, the Soviet Union

embarked upon the biggest air-and sea-lift of arms and

military equipment since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. By the

time the airlift ended in mid-January 1978,it

was estimated

that some 225 planes, or about 12 per cent of the entire

Soviet transport fleet, had participated in the operation.

The bulk of Soviet military supplies, however, was

transported by sea where it is said that the U. S. S. R. and

its allies utilized between 30 and 50 ships during the

period June 1977-January 1978.43 All in all, an estimated

$1.5 billion worth of weapons was transported to the

Ethiopians during this period. In terms of hardware, this

amounted to about 550 T-54/55 tanks, several thousand other

armoured vehicles, about 100 rocket launchers, 60 MiG-21 and

40 MiG-23 fighters, and approximately 200,000 AK-47 rifles

and other small arms. 44

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the extent to

which the U. S. S. R. was prepared to intervene on behalf of

410



the Ethiopians was its direct assumption of the counter-

offensive in the Ogaden, and the spearheading of this by

Cuban combat forces and other Soviet bloc military

personnel.45 Thus, between November 1977 and February

1978, the number of Cubans in Ethiopia swelled from 400 to

10-15,000.46 These came under the overall direction of

General Vasily Ivanovich Petrov, first deputy commander-in-

chief of Soviet ground forces, who was allegedly in "direct

command" of military operations in the Harar region,47

and

General Grigory Barisov, who had previously been in charge

of Soviet military aid to Somalia. 48

The impact on the ground of the Soviet bloc

intervention on behalf of Ethiopia soon became clear. The

first Ethiopian counter-offensive was launched on January

21/22,1978, and on February 3a second counter-offensive

spearheaded by three Cuban armoured and motor-rifle brigades

was launched north of Dire Dawa and east of Harar. In less

than three days this had succeeded in destroying Somali

forces encircling Harar, who lost some 3,000 dead. On

February 25, the Franco-Ethiopian Railway Company announced

the reopening of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line,

which was cut by the W. S. L. F. nine months earlier, and on

March 5 Ethiopia announced that it had recaptured the

strategic town of Jijiga. The recapture of this town came

after two days of fierce fighting in which Cuban forces

played a leading role and effectively marked the collapse of

the Somali campaign in the Ogaden. 49 Thus, on March 9 the

Somt1lis ammounced that they had begun to withdraw their

forces from the Ogaden, 50a process that was completed by

March 14/15, when the United States State Department

411



confirmed the cessation of hostilities in the Horn of

Africa. 51

The aftermath: U. S. anxiety and linkage politics

The implications of the unilateral Soviet bloc

intervention in the Ethio-Somali war for the United States'

credibility and image of resolve raised serious anxieties in

Washington and, consequently, threatened to produce a

backlash and thereby transform the aftermath of the conflict

into a superpower crisis. The danger of this happening had

been recognized by the U. S. S. R., which took measures to both

deter Western counter-action and relieve American and

European fears in respect of Soviet intentions in the Horn

of Africa. On the deterrence side, as the Soviet airlift

got underway, the Kremlin summoned its top military leaders

from their commands in Central Europe and the Far East to

the Ministry of Defence in Moscow and ordered them to

maintain their forces at the highest level of combat

readiness,52

presumably in preparation for a possible

augmentation ofSoviet bloc forces in Ethiopia should the

need arise. Simultaneously, the U. S. S. R. increased its

Indian Ocean squadron by 50 per cent, a large proportion of

which was concentrated in the Red Sea. 53

These measures, however, were hardly likely to reduce

Western anxieties; whilst emphasizing the U. S. S. R. 's

resolve to defend Ethiopia's territorial integrity, they

also stressed the possible adverse consequences for the

United States of an unopposed Soviet intervention in the

Horn of Africa. Consequently, the Kremlin endeavoured to

412



confirmed the cessation of hostilities in the Horn of

Africa. 51

The aftermath: U. S. anxiety and linkage politics

The implications of the unilateral Soviet bloc

intervention in the Ethio-Somali war for the United States'

credibility and image of resolve raised serious anxieties in

Washington and, consequently, threatened to produce a

backlash and thereby transform the aftermath of the conflict

into a superpower crisis. The danger of this happening had

been recognized by the U. S. S. R., which took measures to both

deter Western counter-action and relieve American and

European fears in respect of Soviet intentions in the Horn

of Africa. On the deterrence side, as the Soviet airlift

got underway, the Kremlin summoned its top military leaders

from their commands in Central Europe and the Far East to

the Ministry of Defence in Moscow and ordered them to

maintain their forces at the highest level of combat

readiness,52

presumably in preparation for a possible

augmentation of Soviet bloc forces in Ethiopia should the

need arise. Simultaneously, the U. S. S. R. increased its

Indian Ocean squadron by 50 per cent, a large proportion of

which was concentrated in the Red Sea. 53

These measures, however, were hardly likely to reduce

Western anxieties; whilst emphasizing the U. S. S. R. 's

resolve to defend Ethiopia's territorial integrity, they

also stressed the possible adverse consequences for the

United States of an unopposed Soviet intervention in the

Horn of Africa. Consequently, the Kremlin endeavoured to

412



to the long-term interests of the Western alliance.58 A

similar view was voiced by National Security Adviser

Brzezinskion

May 28when

he contended that the Soviet bloc

intervention in the Horn was causing "strategic concerns. "59

One of these concerns was underlined by the Shah of Iran a

few weeks later when he criticized American inactivity in

the Horn of Africa and expressed his fears that one day Iran

might be surrounded by hostile forces if Soviet influence in

the area continued unchecked. 60 Amongst the biggest

American worries, however, was the possibility that the

Soviet Union might be using a form of linkage politics by

pressing for political gains around the globe whilst the

United States was politically neutralized by its interest in

concluding a new strategic arms agreement with Moscow. It

is perhaps this problem of linkage-in-reverse which Carter

was referring to when he declared that, as far as the

U. S. S. R. was concerned, "detente seems to mean a continuing

aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased

influence in a variety of ways. "61,

Nevertheless, in spite of these worries, the United

States did not alter its non-interventionay stance towards

the Ethio-Somali war. Indeed, even at the height of the

Soviet bloc intervention in the Horn, American officials

repeatedly and unambiguously stated their country's

unwillingness to interject itself into the conflict.62 To

be sure, upon the completion of Somalia's withdrawal from

the Ogaden on March 15,1978, the U. S. resumed discussions

with Mogadishu over the possible supply of "defensive"

weapons.63 These, however, were terminated towards the end

414



of June in view of the continued fighting in the Ogaden

between Ethiopia and the W. S. L. F., and the involvement of

Somalia in the Front's activities,64 despite American

warnings. 65

Instead, the United States sought to satisfy the need

to be seen to be doing something, and thereby recoup its

tarnished image, by opting for a mixture of minatory

diplomacy and linkage politics. Thus, on February 7,1978,

the U. S. navy despatched a frigate to the Red Sea "on an

urgent basis, " ostensibly to render "moral support" to

Somalia, 66and in April N. A. T. O. forces began naval

maneuvers off the Ethiopian coast. In the latter

exercises, a total of 14 warships, including seven missile-

launching cruisers and two destroyers took part and worked

on joint action with air units and ground troops.67

The most important type of American action in terms of

impact on U. S. image, however, emerged in the form of

linkage politics. This involved the coupling of Soviet

behaviour in the Horn of Africa with other aspects of

superpower relations in an effort to exploit asymmetries in

the latter to influence the former. To begin with, the

United States endeavoured to couple or link Soviet

intervention in the Horn with the superpower detente. Thus,

on January 25,1978, Carter informed Soviet Communist Party

secretary Ponomarev that relations between the U. S. and the

U. S. S. R. could not improve unless the latter reduced its

growing military involvement in the Horn of Africa. 68 A

couple of weeks later,. Vance pointed out that whilst not

suggesting "any direct linkage, " the Soviet bloc

intervention on behalf of Ethiopia "affects the political

415





As with the subjects of detente and the Indian Ocean talks,

Brzezinski claimed that the Administration is "not imposing

linkages... but linkages may be imposed by unwarranted

exploitation of local conflicts for larger international

purposes. "74 These utterances were echoed by Carter on

March 2, when he declared that the U. S. does not

initiate any... policy that has a linkage between the

Soviet involvement in Ethiopia... on the one hand, and

S. A. L. T., or the comprehensive test ban negotiations,

on the other. Obviously, any negotiations, if

concluded successfully at the executive level would

have to be ratified by the Congress who would beheavily influenced by opinion of the American people.

75

Whether or not the Carter Administration actually had a

policy of "linkages, " by claiming that linkages are imposed

rather than devised it certainly enhanced its bargaining

position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union since it could plead

that it hadno control

over the public opinion and the

Congressmen whom it said were "imposing" the linkages.

Nevertheless, the fact that Washington also claimed that it

had no policy of linking the Indian Ocean talks to Soviet

behaviour in the Horn but proceeded to terminate these talks

anyway indicates that it probably did have a policy of

linkages.

In any case, though Washington's use of linkage

politics may have helped its image amongst its friends and

allies by making it seem "tough" with the Soviet Union, it

did nothing to alter Soviet behaviour or the situation in

the Horn of Africa. Consequently, the U. S. S. R. emerged at

the end of the Ethio-Somali conflict as the dominant

superpower in the Horn of Africa.

417



Notes

1. African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents,

Vol. 10,1977-1978, ed. C. Legum (Holme and Meier, New Yorkand London, 1979), p. B212. (Hereinafter referred to asA. C. R.

2. Keeping's Contemporary Archives., Vol. XXIII, 1977, p.28633. (Hereinafter referred to as K. C. A. )

3. Ibid.4. C. Legum and B. Lee, The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis

(African Publishing Company, New York, 1979), p. 32.

5. Ibid., p. 69.

6. J. Valenta, "Soviet-Cuban Intervention in the Horn ofAfrica: Impact and Lessons, " Journal of International

Affairs, Vol. 34, No.2, Fall/Winter, 1980/81,

p.358; C.

Legum, "Realities of the Ehiopian Revolution, " The World

Today, Vol. 33, No. 8, August 1977, p. 311; R. Lyons, "The

USSR, China and the Horn of Africa, " Review of African

Political Economy, No. 12, May-August 1978, p. 15.

7. A. de Borchgrave, "Cross Wires, " Newsweek, September 26,

1977. Also see W. S. Thompson, "The African-American Nexus in

Soviet Strategy, " Africa and International Communism, ed.D. E. Albright (Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1980), pp.200-201; B. H. Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the

Horn of Africa (Monthly Review Press, New York and London,

1980), p. 140; D. D. Laitin, "The War in the Ogaden:

Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali History, " TheJournal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1,1979, p.106.

S. B. Oudes, "The United States' Year in Africa, A. C. R. 1977-

1978, op. cit., p. A74.

9. The New York Times, November 18,1977, p. A4.

10. The Times, July 2,1977, p. 4; The New York Times, July 28,

1977, p. 5.11. The New York Times., July 27,1977, p. A3 and July 28,1977,

p. Al; The Times, July 27,1977, p. 7 and July 28,1977, p.6.

12.The Times,

July 29,1977, p.7.

13. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (Verso

Editions and NLB, London, 1981), p. 223; Laitin, op. cit.,

p. 106; J. Mayall, "The battle for the Horn: Somali

irredentism and international diplomacy, " The World Today,

Vol. 34, No. 9, September 1978, p. 340.

14. Statement at news conference preceding Vance's visit to

Moscow. The New York Times, March 25,1977, pp. Al, A10.

15. See A. C. R. 1977-1978, op. cit., p. B216; K. C. A. 1977,

op. cit., pp. 28633,28634; Legum and Lee, op. cit., pp. 32-

34; Lyons, op. cit., p. 11; D. E. Albright, "Soviet Policy, "

Problems of Communism, Vol. XXVII, January-February 1978, p.

37; S. David, "Realignment in the Horn: The SovietAdvantage, " International Security, Vol. 4, No. 2, Fall

1979, p. 78; C. Legum, "Angola and the Horn of Africa, "Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a PoliticalInstrument, ed. S. S. Kaplan (Brookings Institute,Washington, D. C. 1981), p. 617.

16. Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 227. Also see The New

418



York Times., October 3,1977, p. A3; The Times, July 28,

19 77, p. 6.17. The New York Times., September 2,1977, p. A2.

18. Legum and Lee, op. cit., p. 78; Oudes, op. cit., p. A74.

19. The Times, September 3,1977, p. 4; Legum and Lee, ibid.

20. For example, following the appointment of Ato Ayalew

Mandefro as Ethiopia's ambassador to Washington in September1977, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Feleke

.stated in an

interview with The Washington Post that his country wished

to become "a kind of Yugoslavia in this region (of Africa)

and have the same kind of relations which the United States

has with that country. " See K. C. A. 1977, op. cit., p. 28636.

Also see The New York Times, October 3,1977, p. A3.

21. K. C. A., ibid., p. 28635.

22. Ibid., Vol. XXIV, 1978, p. 28761; The Times, September 30,

1977, p. 9.

23. K. C. A., ibid.

24. Dudes, op. cit., pp. A73-A74.

25. The Times, September 30,1977, p. 9; The New York Times.,

September 16,1977, p. 193.


27. The Washington Post., August 12,1977, p. 21. Cited in R. B.

Remnek, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision

to Intervene, "The Soviet Union in the Third World:

Successes and Failures., ed. R. H. Donaldson (Westview Press,

Boulder, Colorado; Croom Helm, London, 1987), p. 137.

28. The New York Times., September 2,1977, p. A2.

29. See for instance, Pravda, August 14,1977, p. 4, in The

Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIX, No. 33,

September 14,1977, p. 6. [Hereinafter referred to asC. D. S. P. ] Also see K. C. A: 1977, op. cit., p. 28636; V.

Kudryavtsev, "Put Out the Fire, " Izvestia., August 17,1977,

p. 3, in C. D. S. P., ibid.

30. K. C. A., ibid.

31. The Times, September 8,1977, p. 6.

32. Speech in Mogadishu, September 14,1977. Quoted in The New

York Times, September 15,1977, p. A3.

33. K. C. A., 1977, op. cit., p. 28635.

34. The Washington Post, September 27,1977, p. -A14.Quoted in

Remnek, op. cit., p. 138. Also see David, op. cit., p. 79, and

K. C. A., ibid.

35. Legum (1981), op. cit., p. 620; Legum and Lee, op. cit., pp.34,72; K. C. A. 1978, op. cit., p. 28761.

36. The Times., October 6,1977, p. 8, and October 13,1977, p.

9; Legum, ibid., p. 616; Lyons, op. cit., p. 12; Remnek,

op. cit., p. 138; Valenta, op. cit., p. 363.

37. The Times., September 22,1977, p. 6; The Economist.,

October 8,1977; Legum, ibid.

38. Legum, ibid., pp. 617-618; Legum and Lee, op. cit., p. 14.

39. Legum, ibid., p. 618; Remnek, op. cit., p. 138.

40. Afrigue-Asie (Paris), November 28,1977. Quoted in Legum andLee, op. cit., p. 77.

41. K. C. A. 1978, op. cit., p. 28760; David, op. cit., p.79;

Legum (1981), op. cit., p. 618; Legum and Lee, ibid., p. 76.

42. K. C. A., ibid.; Legum and Lee, ibid., pp. 76-77.

43. The New York Times, December 14,1977, p. Al; The Times,

January 25,1978, p. 9; K. C. A, ibid., p. 28991; Albright,

op. cit., p. 37; Halliday and Molyneux, op. cit., p. 246;

Legum and Lee, ibid., p. 13; Legum (1981), op. cit., pp.

419



620-622; Mayall, op. cit., p. 341; Remnek, op. cit., p. 139;

Valenta, op. cit., p. 362.

44. Patrick Gilkes (B. B. C. Africa Service), at a talk at the

Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, April 3,

1979. Cited in C. Clapham, "The Soviet Experience in the

Horn of Africa, " The Soviet Union and the Third World, ed.

E. J. Feuchtwanger and P. Nailor (Macmillan, London andBasingstoke, 1981), p. 213. Also see, amongst others,Halliday and Molyneux, ibid., p. 247; Valenta, ibid., p.363.

45. The Daily Telegraph, March 1,1978. Cited in Legum (1981),

op. cit., p. 624; The Times, December 7,1977, p. B.

46. K. C. A. 1978, op. cit., pp. 28991-28992; Legum, ibid., p.620; Legum and Lee, op. cit., p. 14; Lyons, op. cit., p. 12;Remnek, op. cit., p. 139.

47. International Herald-Tribune, February 27,1978. Cited in

Legum, ibid., pp. 623-624.

48. The Guardian, February 11,1978. Cited in Legum, ibid.

49. k. C. A. 1978, op. cit., p. 28989; Legum an Lee, op. cit., pp.35,73-74; Valenta, op. cit. p. 363.

50. The Times, March 10,1978, p. 11; The New York Times, March

10,1978, p. All; Legum (1981) op. cit.; Legum and Lee,

ibid.; Mayall, op. cit., p. 344.

51. The New York Times, March 15,1978, p. A2; The Times, March

16,1978, p. 9; A. C. R. Vol. 11,1978-1979, ed. C. Legum

(Holmes and Meier, New York and London, 1980), p. B219.

52. The New York Times, November 25,1977, p. A8.

53. D. L. Morison, "Soviet and Chinese Policies in Africa in1978, " A. C. R. 1978-1979, op. cit., p. A. 75; Valenta,

op. cit., p. 363.54. The Times, February 11,1978, p. 4; The New York Times,

February 11,1978, p. Al, March 3,1978, p. A10; Pravda,

February 12,1978. Cited in Morison, ibid., p. A74.

55. The New York Times, March 11,1978, p. Al; Legum (1981),

op. cit., p. 625.56. Charles Douglas-Home, "How Africa became a question of

American credibility, " The Times, June 14,1978, p. 16.

57. The Times, March 18,1978, p. 5; The New York Times, March

18,1978, p. A9.58. The New York Times, May 31,1978, p. A14.59. Ibid., May 29,1978,

p.A4.

60. Ibid., June 19,1978, p. A8.61. Ibid., June 8,1978, p. A22.62. Legum and Lee, op. cit., p. 11; K. C. A. 1978, op. cit., pp.

28760,28989; The New York Times, March 10,1978, p. D12;

The Times, March 10,1978, p. 11. The U. S. also warnedEgypt and Israel not to supply arms or military equipment toSomalia and Ethiopia respectively. See The New York Times,

February 8,1978, p. A4; The Times, February 8,1978, p. 7.

63. The Times, March 15,1978, p. 5, March 21,1978, p. 5, June15,1978, p. 8; The New York Times, March 17,1978, p. A7,June 2,1978, p. A9.

64. K. C. A. 1978, op. cit., p. 20350; A. C. R. 1978-1979, op. cit.,p. B385.

65. The Times, June 8,1978, p. 5; The New York Times, June 21,1978, p. A6; A. C. R., ibid., p. B220.

66. The Times, February 8,1978; Izvestia, February 7,1978, p.4, in C. D. S. P., Vol. XXX, No. 6, March 8,1978, p. 19.

67. A. Maslennikov, "Provocational Action, " Pravda, April 6,

420



1978, p. 5, in C. D. S. P., Vol. XXX, No. 14, May 3,1978, p.17.

68. The New York Times, January 26, '1978, p. A3.

69. Ibid., February 11,1978, p. A3.

70. Ibid., June 1,1978, p. Al; The Times, June 1,1978, p. 1.

Also see The New York Times, February 26,1978, p. Al, March

5,1978, p. A21, May 7,1978, p. Al, May 18,1978, pp. Al,A9, May 31,1978, p. A12; The Times, March 18,1978, p. 5,

May 15,1978, p. 6; Mayall, op. cit., p. 342; Legum and

Lee, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

71. The New York Times, February 10,1978, p. A8.

72. Legum (1981), op. cit., p. 633. Also see K. C. A. 1978,

op. cit., p. 28989; The New York Times, March 12,, 1978, p.E3.

73. The New York Times, March 2,1978, p. A6; The Times, March

2,1978, p. 6.

74. Ibid.

75. The New York Times, March 3,1978, p. A10. Also see the

issues of May 26,1978, p. A10, and June 8,1978, p. A22.

a

421




The occurrence of the Ethio-Somali conflict so soon

after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war rendered it liable to many

of the influences that had moulded the crisis situation of

the hostilities in the Middle East. Indeed, in the

interiacent period, hardly- any of the international

structural, political, or strategic factors that made up the

systemic context of the Arab-Israeli war had altered

sufficiently as to make a significant impact on the scope

available for the United States and the Soviet Union to

intervene in the conflict. Politically, the international

distribution of influence of, and support for, the

superpowers was virtuallythe

same asit had been in the

early 1970's. Admittedly, the Soviet-assisted Cuban rescue

of the Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola from

the South African-aided onslaught in 1975 had helped to

enhance the U. S. S. R. 's prestige amongst certain quarters in

Africa and had also set a precedent for future involvement

by the Soviet Union and its friends in intra-African

conflicts. However, the Soviet-Cuban venture also

generated a degree of weariness, as evidenced by General

Obasanjo of Nigeria's warning in July 1978 that whilst the

U. S. S. R. and Cuba should help African states "to stand on

their own, " nevertheless "they should not overstay their

welcome. "1 Strategically, both the United States and the

Soviet Union made more or less equal advances in the period

since the latest Arab-Israeli war and thus were in a similar

position in relation to each other in 1977 as they had been

422



in 1973.2

Yet, in spite of this and of the approximate equality

of superpower primaryinterests

and commitmentsin the Horn

of Africa, only the U. S. S. R. intervened once the Ethio-

Somali dispute erupted into open warfare in July 1977.

Indeed, whilst the primary interests and the commitments of

the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. in the area, and the international

political and strategic environments of the Ethio-Somali

conflict may have been conducive to double superpower

intervention, the nature of the regional political setting

of the war, the importance ascribed to this by both

Washington and Moscow, and the interventionary milieu of the

conflict were all heavily skewed against intervention by the

United States. Unlike either the Korean or the Arab-

Israeil wars, the regional implications of the attempt to

change the status quo in the Horn of Africa were of nothing

less than a cataclysmic magnitude. In the case of the

Ethio-Somali conflict, the achievement of Somalia's

irredentist objectives would have set a dangerous precedent

by encouraging other ethnic groups in Africa to call into

question the remainder of the continent's arbitrarily drawn

boundaries. Consequently, despite the sanguinary style and

the Marxist rhetoric of the Ethiopian regime, the Somali

Republic's endeavour to capture the Ogaden desert was met

with total opprobrium throughout sub-Saharan Africa and

rallied many a conservative pro-Western state such as Kenya

around "Socialist" Ethiopia.

This state of affairs naturally rendered the political

environment of the Ethio-Somali war unfavourable to

423



intervention by either superpower in aid of Somalia. As

far as the United States was concerned, the constraint

imposed by the regional political setting on its flexibility

to manipulate the Horn conflict was reinforced by additional

variables, from within the interventionary milieu, which, in

aggregate, combined to produce a policy of non-intervention.

The first of these was the inertia of the status quo, or the

"fact of possession; " whereas in the Middle East the

illegitimacy of the territorial status quo ante bellum

debilitated much of the potency of this variable as an

obstacle to intervention on behalf of the Arabs, in the

Ethio-Somali conflict the widespread perception of Somalia

as an aggressor served to make it into a significant

impediment to American involvement in aid of Mogadishu.

Furthermore, therewas

the totalabsence

of a prior U. S.

commitment to, or patron-client relationship with, the

Somali Republic. Had such a credibility element been

involved, then Washington could well have chosen to ignore

the adverse regional political setting, risk African

indignation, and intervene on behalf of the Somalis on the

grounds that its images of reliability and resolve were at

stake. Indeed, the lack of a United States commitment in

the Horn seems to have also taken the force out of any

compulsion to outflank the U. S. S. R. by intervening in aid of

Ethiopia. In addition to these variables, the U. S. was

constrained by an operational code which prevented it from

intervening on behalf of Ethiopia on the grounds of the

latter's human rights violations and radical socio-economic

programme and which, by emphasizing the African political

setting, discouraged aiding Somalia.

424



In contrast to the United States, the U. S. S. R. was far

less constrained by the crisis situation of the Ethio-Somali

war.To be

sure,the insurmountable problem

ofreconciling

Somali revanchism with the overwhelming sentiment of African

opinion imposed a restriction on the extent to which it

could seek to utilize the war in order to establish a Pax

Sovietica in the region without alienating the rest of the

continent. However, in view of the Kremlin's more flexible

operational code and its ideological affinity to the Dergue,

this hardly posed an impossible dilemma for the Soviet

leadership which, in any case, found Ethiopia's relatively

greater geostrategic and political significance sufficient

for it to abandon Somalia and put its full weight behind

Addis Ababa. In this respect, the Soviet Union was aided

by other elements of the interventionary milieu which helped

to facilitate its massive intervention on the side of

Ethiopia. These included its generally perceived strong

association with the Dergue, the fact that the Ethiopians

were fighting to defend the territorial status quo, the

availability of a large pool of Cuban combat troops in not

too distant Angola which could be used as proxies, and the

relative proximity of the U. S. S. R. to the conflict zone.


Unlike the cases of either the Korean or the Arab-

Isreali wars, the relative amenabilty of the systemic

context of the Ethio-Somali conflict to intervention by the

United States and the Soviet Union was defined less by the

distribution of political and military power between the

425



superpowers than by the regional political setting of the

hostilities. Admittedly, the regional contexts of the wars

in Korea and the Middle East also played an important role

in shaping the political environments of, and the responses

of the U. S. and/or the U. S. S. R. to, those conflicts. In

Korea, concern about the potential impact of a communist

victory on other countries in the Far East was one of the

principal factors behind Washington's determination to deal

a crushing blow to the northern regime. During the Arab-

Israeli war of 1973, the United States' desire to promote

its influence within the Arab world and to ensure the

enthusiastic allegiance of its Arab clients encouraged it to

act as a restraint on Israel, whilst the Soviet Union's fear

for its reputation and position in the area prompted it

into, firstly,allowing

the Arabattack

to takeplace and,

secondly, massively intervening on behalf of Egypt and Syria

soon after the outbreak of hostilities. But in neither of

these earlier cases was the regional political setting a

decisive factor in moulding the pattern of U. S. -Soviet

responses to the conflicts in question. Whereas in Korea

the asymmetry of the superpowers' reaction to the war was

mainly due to the lopsidedness of the international

political and strategic balance in favour of the United

States, in the Middle East the approximate parity of the

U. S. and Soviet interventions was principally a derivative

of a crisis situation that was roughly equally conducive to

the United States and the U. S. S. R. However, in the Horn of

Afnica, the 'balance between the superpowers at the

international political and strategic levels, together with

the fluidity of their relationships with the protagonists,

426



in particular the absence of a firm Soviet or American

commitment in the area, rendered the regional political

milieu a source of major influence on the superpowers'

consideration of how best to respond to the Ehio-Somali

hostilities.

This was especially the case with the United States

whose antipathy to the Dergue, particularly since the rise

of Mengistu in February 1977, effectively left it with the

choice of either to support Somalia or to pursue a policy of

non-intervention in the Horn conflict. The resultant

dilemma divided the Carter Administration into two camps,

with the so-called "globalists, " led by Brzezinski,

favouring assistance for Somalia, and the "regionalists, "

who included U. S. representative at the U. N. Security

Souncil Young and Secretary of State Vance, pressing for a

policy of non-intervention.3 For the globalists, the

Ethio-Somali war was basically seen in terms of general

competitive superpower relations. The involvement of the

Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, as in the rest of the

continent, was accordingly perceived as a consequence of a

policy whose objective is to undermine Western influence,

and Africa and the Horn are the board on which the game is

played, both because they offer the ripest opportunities for

political and strateguc advancement and because of Africa's

apparently growing intrinsic importance. The Kremlin's

search for influence in Africa had to be seen, therefore, in

view of such interests as access to bases, the continent's

proximity to Western shipping lanes, the desire to exploit

the racial conflict in southern Africa at the expense of the

427



West, to deny mineral resources to the latter by promoting

Marxist and radical regimes, and to develop a reputation as

the only reliable and credible champion of African causes.4

Thus, according to the globalists, United States policy

towards the Ethio-Somali conflict should be to counter

Soviet aid to Ethiopia by intervening on behalf of Somalia

and thereby frustrate the Kremlin's plans, protect Western

political, economic, and strategic interests, and

demonstrate the resolve of the U. S. and its credibility as

an ally. Such a policy, in their view, would yield better

and more lasting gains and earn the respect of allies and

friends world-wide than the negative one of staying on the

sidelines and giving the U. S. S. R. a free hand in the Horn

for the sake of not alienating African states.

Pitted against the globalists were the regionalists who

saw the Ethio-Somali war as one between conflicting

nationalisms rather than as a superpower confrontation. by

proxy, and gave primacy to the regional political setting of

the hostilities. For this faction within the Carter

Administration, what the United States had to do was to

respond to the Horn conflict in a manner that made sense in

a regional as well as in global terms. Thus, since Somalia

was not a traditional American ally, was an aggressor and

seen to be so in Africa, and, militarily, was a bad bargain,

it was not, in their view, in the best interests of the U. S.

to support it in its war against Ethiopia. United States

support for Somalia, the regionalists argued, would only

result in the alienation of such close American friends as

Kenya, 5as well as most of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa

without yielding any concrete gains. As for the threat of

428



Soviet advancement in the Horn, the regionalists believed

that the strength of African, especially Ethiopian,

nationalism would prevent the U. S. S. R. from establishing a

permanent zone of influence in the area; any gains the

Soviets might make would thus only be temporary.

Therefore, according to this line of argument, the best

response for the United States to the Ethio-Somali conflict

would be not to intervene. 6

Had the conflict in question been in, say, the Middle

East where the United States has a strong commitment to the

security of Israel and to the stability of conservative Arab

client-states, then the globalists within the Carter

Administration might have held sway, since the danger of

unilateral Soviet intervention for the U. S. 's images of

credibility and resolve would have been too great to risk.

However, whilst the absence of any form of American

commitment to Somalia diluted the argument for involvement

in the Ethio-Somali war, the virtual unanimity of black

African opposition to Mogadishu's cause provided a powerful

disincentive against United States intervention on behalf of

Somalia. Thus, after some consideration, the White House

opted for a policy of non-intervention in the Ogaden war, in

spite of the growing involvement of the U. S. S. R. in Ethiopia

and its continuing military ties with the Somali Republic.

Instead, the United States premised its policy in the Horn

on the regionalists' assumption that the Kremlin's efforts

were bound to fail and that the Dergue, like Nimeiry of

Sudan before it, would sooner or later be compelled to

"moderate" its polciies and rhetoric and return to the

429



American fold.

The nature of the regional political setting of the

Ethio-Somali war provided a most appropriate background for

the Soviet Union to intervene on the side of Addis Ababa,

once it decided to eschew the notion of a "progressive"

confederation in the Horn of Africa. Whilst the decisive

factors in the Kremlin's decision to totally align itself

with Ethiopia seem to have been geostrategic and political,

the conduciveness of the local political milieu to

intervention on behalf of Ethiopia was doubtless of immense

help, both indirectly and directly, in facilitating the

final shift on October 19,1977. To begin with, to the

extent that the regional political setting weighed heavily

against the prospect of a countervailing United States

involvement with Somalia, it made the option of massive

Soviet intervention on behalf of Ethiopia appear that much

less risky and, therefore, more attractive to the leadership

in Moscow. By the same token, it positively encouraged

support for Ethiopia by increasing the likelihood that such

a course of action would be met with approval in Africa.

Indeed, Soviet intervention in aid of Ethiopia would give

the Kremlin an added advantage by allowing it to claim that

it was acting in accordance with both its international

obligation to help sovereign states defend themselves

against aggression and the O. A. U. 's principle of non-

violability of colonial boundaries in Africa. It would

also enable it to escape some of the responsibility for its

contribution in facilitating Somalia's aggression in the

first place by arming and training the Republic's modern

army of 20,000 men.7

430



The conduciveness of the regional political setting of

the Ogaden war to intervention in support of Ethiopia also

providedthe Soviet Union

withan opportunity to acquire a

diplomatic status in the Horn of Africa similar to that

enjoyed by the United States in the Middle East. As one

writer has pointed out, in view of the U. S. 's ability to

attract the interest of the Arab states partly because of

its influence over a militarily dominant Israel, the Kremlin

might have hoped that in the event of Soviet influence over

an Ethiopian state restored to its traditional place of

local-hegemony, a renewal of friendship with Somalia would

be likely to appeal to Mogadishu. 8 The materialization of

such a situation would, of course, greatly pave the way for

the creation of a Soviet bloc in the region. In this

respect, the direct involvement of Soviet, East European,

and Cuban military personnel in the conflict would give the

U. S. S. R. a degree of control over the whole dispute which

the U. S. did not have in the Middle East. In particular,

it would put it in a position where it would be able to

restrain Ethiopia from invading Somalia proper and inhibit

Ethiopian reprisals against Ogadeni tribesmen after the

inevitable defeat of the Somali armed forces. Moreover, it

would discourage possible future Somali attacks, and it

would give the U. S. S. R. significant potential leverage in

future dealings with Mogadishu. 9

The interventionary milieu

In contrast to either the Korean or the Arab-Israeli

wars, the interventionary milieu of the Ethio-Somali

431



conflict was heavily biased in favour of one superpower, the

Soviet Union. Admittedly, there were some elements of this

set of variables that were hardly different from the

interventionary context of the 1973 Middle East war and thus

could not account for the difference in the patterns of

superpower responses to the two conflicts. For instance,

in terms of geographical proximity and relative national

capability for intervention, the comparative position of the

United States and the Soviet Union during the Arab-Israeli

war of 1973 and the Ethio-Somali conflict was very similar.

Nevertheless, in the latter case, the U. S. S. R. did enjoy

important advantages over the U. S. In respect of its

relative ability to intervene effectively in that particular

conflict, and whilst this does not explain the final pattern

of Soviet and American responses to the outbreak of

hostilities in the Horn, it is likely to have reinforced the

dictations of the regional political setting on Washington

and Moscow's choice preferences.

Undoubtedly, amongst the most important of these

advantages was the presence of a large reserve of Cuban

troops in not too distant Angola, the willingness of Havana

to use them in aid of Ethiopia, and the readiness of the

U. S. S. R. to provide these forces with logistical and

transport facilities and with protection from potentially

hostile external forces. By mid-1978, some 17,000 Cuban

troops were operating in Ethiopia. Although some of these

were transferred directly from Angola, a large number was

flown from Cuba by Soviet and Cuban passenger aircraft.

Thus, by the time of the official Somali withdrawal from the

Ogaden in March 1978, Cuba maintained over 40,000 troops in

432



Africa. The Cuban contingent in the Horn of Africa was

supported during the Ethio-Somali conflict by a substantial

Soviet air-and sea-based logistical effort and protected by

units of the Soviet navy, which were involved in denial and

interposition missions and provided a discreet screen to the

sealift forces. 10 The availability of Cuban troops enabled

the U. S. S. R. to intervene directly in the Ogaden war without

prompting a regional or global confrontation with the United

States. As a result, the onus of initiating a superpower

confrontation was firmly placed with the Americans who,

consequently, were put at a distinct bargaining disadvantage

vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 11

Admittedly, the Unted States could have counter-

intervened at a similar level of risk by utilizing a

surrogate force of its own, such as Morocco. Indeed,

Rabat's willingness to act as a proxy for other countries

had already been demonstrated in April 1977, when it

despatched some 1,500 troops on behalf of Paris and

Washington to help Zaire's Mobutu quell rebel forces in the

provinceof

Shaba. However, even if King Hassanwere

willing to fight in the Horn of Africa, the U. S. would have

had to operate from a position of inferiority in relation to

the Soviet Union, which is probably why it does not seem to

have contemplated a counter-intervention by proxy. To

begin with, in contrast to the U. S. S. R., the intervention of

which was in defence of the regional territorial status quo,

the use by the United States of surrogate forces against

Ethiopia and its allies would not only have had to overcome

the inertia of a status quo that was widely accepted as

433



legitimate, but also would have been tantamount to support

for Somali revanchism and aggression and that, in turn,

would have seriously impaired the resolve of the American

side in the event of a major escalation of the war. In

addition to this, due to the nature of the local military

balance, any intervention by proxy on behalf of Somalia

would have had to be on a much more massive scale than the

Soviet bloc intervention in Ethiopia, if it were to have a

significant impact on the battlefield. For, whilst Cuban

and other Soviet bloc personnel played the leading part in

Ethiopia's counter-offensive, they were backed by an

Ethiopian army and para-military forces which totalled some

84,000 men. In contrast, Somalia's total military strength

did not exceed 43,500 men, and in terms of hardware, was far

less betterequipped

than Ethiopia. 12 Aneffective

direct

counter-intervention in aid of Somalia, therefore, would

have had to be on a scale at least double that of Cuba in

terms of both men and equipment, and that would have been

extremely difficult to either affect or justify,

particularly in view of Somalia's role as an aggressor.

Moreover, given Ethiopia's overwhelming military-strategic

superiority over Somalia, such counter-intervention would

have carried a very serious risk of escalation in the event

of prolonged hostilities. Unlike the Somalis, the

Ethiopians enjoyed a relatively advanced technical and

administrative capacity which enabled them to absorb a large

quantity of Soviet ordnance in a rather short period of

time, in spite of their American training. Furthermore,

the Dergue had already demonstrated an amazing ability to

mobilize a substantial number of peasants for military

434



service. The Somalis, on the other hand, were in a vastly

inferior position in respect of population, absorptive

capacity, and geography, and were also deeply dependent on

Soviet material and, reputedly, on direct Soviet

participation in logistics. Consequently, whilst incapable

of striking at the Ethiopian heartland, the Somali Republic

was itself vulnerable to a sustained Ethiopian attack which

could ignore the wastes of the Ogaden and press right into

important Somali territory. 13 Should such an attack occur

in retaliation for the participation of surrogates in the

Ogaden fighting, then Somalia would become totally dependent

on direct foreign intervention for the preservation of its

territorial integrity, since it was inherently incapable of

either significantly expanding its armed forces or absorbing

large quantities of United States military hardware. This,

in turn, would both stimulate a cycle of escalation and pave

the way for an endless and exhausting war of attrition.

The biasness of the interventionary milieu against the

United States at the local level was compounded by an

imbalanceof superpower

regional commitments in favour of

the U. S. S. R. To be sure, the relationships of the U. S. and

the Soviet Union with the protagonists were very much in a

state of flux, at least until early autumn, 1977. However,

increasingly, and at any rate by about October/November, the

U. S. S. R. had become strongly identified with the Mengistu

regime in Ethiopia, whilst no similar connection was made

between the United States and the Somali Republic.

Consequently, the credibility of the Soviet Union as an ally

became at stake in Ethiopia. An Ethiopian defeat, or even

435



a stalemate in the Ogaden, would have put the Mengistu

regime in danger of being toppled, and this would have

almost certainly Jeopardized the prestige and credibility of

its patron, especially in view of the fact that Ethiopia was

fighting American-supported Saudi Arabian policies in the

Horn of Africa. 14 These, as one Soviet commentator put it,

were aimed at turning the Red Sea into a reactionary "Arab

lake. "15

Last but not least, in contrast to the Soviet Union,

the ability and willingness of the United States to

intervene in the Ethio-Somali war was severely confined by

domestic constraints. To begin with, by emphasizing "human

rights" as a criteria according to which foreign policy

should be conducted and other countries' performance judged,

the Carter Administration automatically precluded the option

of U. S. support for Ethiopia as an alternative to

intervention in aid of Somalia. Thus, although the

regionalists in the administration rightly argued that, in

spite of its acute difficulties, Ethiopia still remained the

most important country in the Horn of Africa, 16, it was

apparently concluded that the Mengistu regime's human

rights record, its radical, pro-Soviet proclivities, and its

chronic instability, were sufficient reasons for not re-

establishing patron-client relations with Addis Ababa and

thereby outflanking the U. S. S. R. whilst simultaneously

posing as defenders of the O. A. U. 's principles. The

general inhibition against an active posture torwards the

Ethio-Somali war was, moreover, probably reinforced by the

post-Vietnam, post-Watergate mood prevailing in the United

States at the time 17which questioned the utility of

436



intervention as an instrument of foreign policy and was

somewhat sceptical of the executive's ability to keep it

under control.

437



Notes

1. Quoted in the International Institute for Strategic Studies,

Strategic Survey 1978 (International Institute forStrategic Studies, London, 1979), p. 4. (Hereinafter

referred to as Strategic Survey. )

2. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, TheMilitary Balance 1973-1974---1977-1978 (International

Institute for Strategic Studies, London). (Hereinafter

referred to as The Military Balance. )3. See H. Bienen, Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in

Africa, "Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 1, Spring1980, pp. 29-42, esp. pp. 29-34.

4. B. H. Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn ofAfrica (Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1980), p.125.

5. See F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution

(Verso Editions and N. L. B, London, 1981), p. 227. Also seeD. D. Laitin, "The War in the Ogaden: Implications for

Siyaad's Role in Somali History, " The Journal of Modern

African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1,1979, p. 106; The Times,

July 28,1977, p. 6; The New York Times, October 3,1977,

p. A3.

6. Selassie, op. cit.; Bienen, op. cit.7. C. Legum, "Angola

andthe Horn

ofAfrica, " Diplomacy

ofPower: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, ed.S. S. Kaplan (Brookings Institute, Washington, D. C., 1981),

pp. 629-630; J. Valenta, "Soviet-Cuban Intervention in theHorn of Africa: Impact and Lessons, " Journal ofInternational Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2, Fall/Winter

1980/1981, p. 359; P. Vanneman and M. James, "Soviet Thrust

into the Horn of Africa: The Next Targets, " Strategic

Review, Spring 1978, p. 34.

8. T. J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening

Storm, 2nd, Rev. Ed. (Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, New York and Washington, D. C., 1979), p. 132.

9. R. B. Remnek, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: TheDecision to Intervene, " The Soviet Union in the Third World:

Successes and Failures, ed. R. H. Donaldson (Westview Press,

Boulder, Colorado; Croom Helm, London, 1981), p. 140.

10. Strategic Survey 1978, pp. 13-14.

11. Ibid., p. 14.12. The Military Balance, 1977-1978, pp. 44,46-47.

13. Farer, op. cit., pp. 133-134.14. Valenta, op. cit., p. 357.15. V. Kudryavtsev, "The Colonialists' Strategy, " Izvestia,

August 2,1977, p. 4, in The Current Digest of the SovietPress, Vol. XXIX, No. 31, August 31,1977, p. 18.

16. The New York Times, October 3,1977, p. A3.

17. Valenta, op. cit., p. 361. Also see C. Legum and B. Lee, TheHorn of Africa in Continuing Crisis (Africans Publishing

Company, New York, 1979), p. 6; The New York Times, March23,1977, p. A3.

438



PART III



CHAPTER 14: CONCLUSION

Thepurpose of

thisstudy

has been to investigate the

phenomenon of United States and Soviet intervention in

client-state wars which occur in areas of disputed or

uncertain superpower interest symmetry. The stimulus for

this task was provided by the apparent paradox posed by the

persistence of such intervention in an era of stable nuclear

deterrence where political and territorial change per se,

and especiallly in regions on the periphery of the U. S. and

the U. S. S. R. 's alliance blocs, has ostensibly become

irrelevant to the security of the superpowers. As pointed

out in Chapter 1, to some international relations theorists,

the notion of an inextricable link between political and/or

territorial change on the one hand and superpower security

on the other seems rather outdated. Consequently, from

that perspective, the continued interest of the United

States and the Soviet Union in affecting or preventing

change in grey areas through intervention in client-state

wars is an anomaly that is more appropriate in a non-nuclear

international system where the security of great powers can

be defined in tangible, territorial terms.

This work, however, set out from the opposite angle by

seeking to explore the link between intervention by the U. S.

and the U. S. S. R. in grey areas and superpower security in

the nuclear age. A model of superpower intervention in

client-state wars was constructed using four propositions.

These were then elaborated in depth in three theoretical

chapters, and can be summarized as follows:

439



The outbreak of hostilities between clients of the

United States and the Soviet Union in areas of disputed

or uncertain superpower interest symmetry generates adisposition on the part of each of the U. S. and the

U. S. S. R. to intervene on behalf of its respective

protege(s) in the war. Underlying this inclination

are, firstly, the prospect of achieving regional

political or strategic gains at the expense of the

other superpower, secondly, the need to safeguard

against the possibility that the second superpower

might intervene and, consequently, accomplish such

gains alone and, most importantly, the general

perception of regional political and/or territorial

change as an index to the relative credibility of, andbalance of resolve between, the United States and the

Soviet Union (Propositions 1 and 2). Given that, in

this type of area, "rules of the game" permit the U. S.and the U. S. S. R. to seek the expulsion of each other by

indirect means, intervention becomes the rational

option for a superpower to pursue during a client-state

war, and as both superpowers are equally rational, such

wars entail a relatively high risk of Soviet-American

collision and, perhaps, nuclear war. As a result, the

outbreak of a client-state war in a grey area tends to

create an aura of crisis between the United States andthe Soviet Union as each superpower anticipates the

actions of the other with measures of its own. Since,

under these circumstances, the danger of collision.through misperception, miscommunication, or the

accumulation of incremental moves is very great, the

eruption of a client-state war stimulated superpower

crisis provides each of the-U. S. and the U. S. S. R. with

an opportunity to instigate or prevent political and/orterritorial change in the grey area through the

manipulation. of the risk of war, and thereby to protect

or enhance its images of credibility and resolve(Proposition 3). From this perspective, the incidence

of non- or assymetrical intervention can be explainedin terms of an adverse crisis situation, which would

render an interventionary response irrational(Proposition 4).

For the purpose of this conclusion, it would be convenient

to consider this model in the light of the empirical

analysis undertaken in Part II of this study in two separate

sections. The first section, encapsulating the subject

matters of Propositions 1,2, and 4, will deal with the

relationship between intervention, political and territorial

change in grey areas, and superpower security in the nuclear

age. The second section, comprising the theme of

440



Proposition 3, will focus on the relevance of the concept of

crisis as a means by which the superpowers instigate or

prevent change in areas of disputed or uncertain interest

symmetry.

Intervention, change, and superpower security

It seems clear from the case material analyzed in this

work that, in spite of being bound by a relationship of*

stable nuclear deterrence, the United States and the Soviet

Unionstill

consider territorial and political change

outside their alliance blocs as of direct relevance to their

vital security interests. As with great powers in the pre-

nuclear age, the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. have been

sufficiently concerned about developments in areas outside

their immediate spheres of interest to exert huge efforts in

terms of economic and military assistance, as well as more

direct security transfers such as political commitments to

client-regimes and to the territorial integrity of the

states they represented in order to establish positions of

predominance in those areas. Underlying this concern have

been many of the geostrategic and political factors that had

preoccupied global powers in the past.

Admittedly, in the case of Korea, the United States'

development of an atomic/nuclear capability, its consequent

preoccupation with the notion of total, global war, and the

resulting failure to conceptualize or foresee a future for a

more limited form of warfare between the superpowers

prompted it during the late 1940's and early 1950's to

assign a second rate status to the peninsula, which was

denied any significant strategic value, and to embark upon a

441



degree of decommitment from its client-state in the south.

This attitude contrasted with that of the Kremlin, whose

interest in Korea continued to manifest itself even after

the U. S. S. R. had exploded its first atomic bomb. For the

Soviet Union, the primary significance of the Korean

peninsula lay in its proximity to Japan, its contiguity to

China's strategic hydro-electric power complex along the

Yalu River, and its endowment with warm water ports. These

geostrategic factors appear to have driven the Kremlin to

try to achieve some form of hegemony over the entire

country. Its ambitions in this respect were first

articulated during discussions with the United States in the

period preceding the war against Japan when Stalin is said

to have insisted that the U. S. S. R. 's position in the Far

East should be re-established as it existed prior to the

Russo-Japanese war of 1905,1 which partly resulted from

Russia's imperialistic designs over Korea. 2 With the

formal entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan

on August 8,1945, the Kremlin wasted no time in extending

its control over as much of Korea as possible. Thus, on

August 10 it began to land troops on the peninsula, and by

the following day most of the northern portion of the

country was in Soviet hands.

Although the Soviet Union's assumption of direct

custody of, andits

subsequent entrenchmentin,

northernKorea, prompted the Americans to secure the southern portion

of the peninsula, where they eventually established a

client-state, it was not until the outbreak of war in June

1950 that the United States began to impute major strategic



significance to its protege in South Korea. This was not

due to some sort of a reconsideration of the country's

geostrategic or geopolitical value, or even to a

reassessment of the U. S. 's strategic-military doctrine, but

to a perception in Washington that the invasion by North

Korea posed a considerable threat to the credibility of the

United States as a reliable ally and to its image of

resolve. As one source put it, to have allowed the

Communists to force their way into South Korea without

opposition from the U. S. would have confirmed to the rest of

the world that "Russian power was in fact invincible, " and

that "American big-talk was a shameless bluff. "3

Consequently, the United States committed itself

unequivocally to the defence of South Korea and, to that

end, directly intervened on a scale which, at the time, was

second only to Its involvement in World War II and which,

even now, is rivalled only by its intervention in the long

Vietnam war.

In view of the Soviet Union's leading role in setting

up the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the

subsequent establishment of a strong Soviet-North Korean

patron-client relationship, the U. S. S. R. 's credibility and

resolve images were also at stake in the Korean war. This

remains so even if it has to be assumed that the Kremlin

neither encouraged nor approved of Pyongyang's decision to

invade South Korea. To be sure, whilst Korean Communist

forces were fighting on South Korean territory, Soviet

reputaion was not as involved in the conflict as was that of

the United States since, firstly, North Korea was not in any

direct danger and, secondly, the U. S. S. R. was not

443



necessarily committed to its client's military venture.

However, once the U. S. /U. N. counter-offensive extended into

Communist Korea and, in particular, once the Americans

declared their war objectives as the total destruction of

the North Korean armed forces and the forcible re-

unification of Korea, the credibility and resolve images of

the Soviet Union became very much implicated in the

conflict. Indeed, the possibility that amongst the motives

underlying the United States' northward drive was the desire

to tarnish the U. S. S. R. 's reputation as a reliable ally and

a resolute power could not be entirely ruled out.

Nevertheless, in spite of this, the Soviet Union

refrained from countervailing American actions with measures

of its own. Admittedly, as U. N. troops approached the

Chinese border, the U. S. S. R. began to visibly prepare for

military action, but this was probably intended more as a

precaution against the oncoming U. N. forces than as muscle-

flexing to ward off the annihilation of North Korea as a

political entity. In the final analysis, it was the direct

intervention of China and not the Soviet Union which

prevented the removal of Communist Korea from the world map.

However, this does not mean that the Kremlin was indifferent

to the political extinction of North Korea. Indeed, it

seems doubtful that China could have stood its ground

against American forces in Korea without the commitment and

support of the U. S. S. R. The fact that the latter largely

kept itself aloof from the war in the peninsula should be

seen in the context of the crisis situation of the conflict

where, from an international-political and military-

444



strategic standpoint, the Soviet Union was at a considerable

disadvantage in relation to the United States. As a

consequence, the U. S. S. R. could not have effectively

intervened in defence of North Korea without creating a risk

of general war with the U. S. which the Americans were in a

far better position to credibly manipulate. Thus, the fact

that the presence of U. N. forces along the Manchurian border

happened to incense the new Communist regime in Peking came

as ablessing for the Soviets, in that it gave them an

opportunity to save their client-regime in North Korea

without embroiling themselves ina confrontation with the

United States for which they were ill-prepared.

The significance of political and territorial change in

the strategic considerations of the superpowers was somewhat

better illustrated during the Arab-Israeli war of October

1973. Geostrategically, politcally, and economically, the

Middle East was far more important to the United States and

the Soviet Union in 1973 than was the Korean peninsula in

the early 1950's or at any other time since World War II.

In the case of the U. S., this importance is perhaps best

illustrated by its commitment to Israeli superiority over

all foreseeable combinations of Arab power, and for the

U. S. S. R. it is testified to by the Kremlin's readiness in

1973 to jeopardize its flourishing relationship with the

United States by acquiescing in Egypt and Syria's plans for

warin

orderto

avoid afurther weakening of its regional

position. Moreoever, by the time of the 1973 war, the U. S.

and the Soviet Union were far more deeply committed to, and

identified with, Israel and the Arabs respectively than they

were in the case of the protagonists during the Korean war.



As a consequnce, the credibility and resolve images of the

superpowers were much more tied to the fortunes of the

warring parties in the Middle East than they were to those

of the opponents in-the Korean peninsula. This point was

emphasized time and again by United States Secretary of

State Kissinger who perceived the Arab-Israeli war as a

"test of wills" between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. 4 in which

Soviet arms must not be allowed to prevail over those of the

United States.5

However, in contrast to the Korean war, the crisis

situaion of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was more or less as

favourable to Soviet as it was to United States

intervention. Consequently, both superpowers were able to

intervene in the conflict in a manner that was consistent

with their primary interests in the Middle East. Hence,

the mode and intensity of the Soviet and American

interventions can be taken as measures of Washington and

Moscow's assessments of the significance of change in the

region to their vital security interests. In this respect,

both superpowers rushed to intervene in support of their

respective client(s) as soon as the need arose, and both

were equally as ready to sacrifice detente and risk a head-

on collision for the sake of their respective positions in

the Middle East. Thus, merely a day after the eruption of

hostilities, the U. S. S. R. began to despatch war material to

Egyptand

Syria, in spite of American threats against

everything that has taken the U. S. and the Soviet Union

three years to build up.6 As the Syrian advance in the

Golan Heights was reversed and the Israelis began to march

446



towards Damascus, the Soviet Union launched a huge airlift

of arms and military equipment to help replenish the rapidly

depleting Syrian war machine, and also initiated a number of

coercive measures which included alerting its airborne

troops, augmenting its Mediterranean fleet, and threatening

to directly intervene in defence of the Syrian capital.

Similar, albeit more drastic, steps were undertaken as

fortunes were reversed on the Egyptian front when the

Israelis crossed the Suez Canal, cut off the Third Army, and

threatened a similar fate for the Second Army, both of which

were deployed on the east bank of the Canal and surviving on

a perilously vulnerable logistical line. On that occasion,

the U. S. S. R. not only increased its airlift to its

beleaguered client to an unprecedented level, but also

threatened to directly intervenein

orderto

put an end to

Israeli activities, and backed up its threat by alerting its

airborne forces and further reinforcing its ships in the

adjacent seas.

Although, with the possible exception of the first

three days of the war, Israel was never confronted with a

similar plight to that of its Arab adversaries during the

latter stages of the hostilities, the United States

exhibited at least as much willingness as the Soviet Union

to risk a superpower collision by injecting itself into the

conflict. Being accustomed to the position of regional

supremacy of its Zionist client that the U. S. S. R. could only

have dreamt of in respect of its own proteges, the U. S.

feared that anything less than an unambiguous (though not

overwhelming) Israeli victory over the Arabs would do untold

harm to its credibility and image of resolve. This fear

447



was compounded by the presumption held in Washington that

Egypt and Syria could not have embarked on such large-scale

military action as theydid

without the prior acquiescence

or at least the foreknowledge of the Soviet Union, and by

the U. S. S. R. 's prompt support for its clients soon after the

hostilities started. Hence Kissinger's determination "to

teach the Russians a hard lesson" by demonstrating to them

and to the rest of the world "America's physical capacity in

crisis and the peril of seeking to challenge the United

States in the Middle East or anywhere. "7 Consequently, as

soon as the U. S. learnt of Israel's initial reverses, it

resolved to "pour in supplies, " and "risk confrontation, "

and "not talk again until there was no longer any doubt that

no settlement could be imposed" by virtue of Soviet arms and

diplomatic support.8 Even when all such doubt had

evaporated as Israel regained the initiative and was on the

verge of inflicting a humiliating defeat on Egypt, the

Americans continued to accelerate their re-supply of the

Zionist State with the aim of achieving a 25 per cent edge

over the total Soviet re-supply of the Arabs, 9which was in

fact aimed at nothing more than avoiding a military disaster

for Egypt and Syria. Indeed, the significance of

developments in the Middle East for the vital security

Interests of the United States, and Washington's perception

of the potential impact of unilateral Soviet intervention on

its images of credibility and resolve were brought out in

full relief with its nuclear alert of October 24. Though

the Soviet threat to unilaterally intervene directly which

stimulated the alert was defensive in nature, the U. S. still

448



felt compelled to raise the ante, but then proceeded to do

what the Kremlin had intended in the first place, which was

to force an end to Israel's violation of the cease-fire on

the Suez front. Thus, it would seem that not only did

Washington suspect that failure to meet the Soviet challenge

would tarnish its reputaion, but that it also feared that

Israeli compliance under Soviet as opposed to American

pressure would have a similar effect.

The preoccupation of the United States and the Soviet

Union with the potential impact of political and territorial

change on their credibility and images of resolve was not as

explicit during the Ethio-Somali war of 1977-1978 as it had

been at the time of the Arab-Israeli war four years earlier.

Indeed, although the Horn of Africa shares much of the

geostrategic significance of the Middle East and enjoys a

special political status within sub-Saharan Africa, the war

between Ethiopia and Somalia came at a time when the

superpowers' relationship with the protagonists were in a

high state of flux. As a consequence, the credibility and

resolve images of the U. S. S. R. and, in particular, the U. S.

which had almost completely disengaged itself from the

region, were not as deeply implicated in the conflict as

they were in either Korea or the Middle East. Thus, with

the outbreak of open hostilities, the Americans immediately

assumed a position of strict neutrality in the conflict.

That they were able to do so without fear for their

reputation was facilitated by the fact that whilst Ethiopia

nd longer enjoyed the patronage of the United States and

was, indeed, beginning to be seen as a Soviet protege, the

Somali Republic was still perceived as a client-state of the

449



U. S. S. R.

Nevertheless, the potential impact of events in the

Horn of Africa on the superpowers'images

of credibility and

resolve did play a role in determining some of Moscow and

Washington's responses to developments during the Ethio-

Somali war. For the Soviet Union, once the attempt to

persuade Somalia and Ethiopia to accept a Kremlin-inspired

modus vivendi came to nothing, it became imperative to

choose between one of its two warring clients. Since, by

that time, the Mengistu regime had become strongly

identified with the U. S. S. R. whilst relations between the

latter and the Somali Republic had reached a very low ebb,

the credibility and decisiveness of the Soviet Union as an

ally became at stake. An Ethiopian defeat or a stalemate

which left most of the Ogaden in Somali hands would have

seriously endangered the regime in Addis Ababa, risked the

credibility and prestige of its patron, and almost certainly

jeopardized the entire position of the U. S. S. R. in the Horn

of Africa. As a consequence, the Soviet Union decided to

terminate all military supplies to Somalia and to massively

intervene on the side of Ethiopia.

Although the United States chose not to intervene in

the Ethio-Somali war in full knowledge that the Soviet Union

was arming both protagonists in the region, it does not seem

to have anticipated the scale of Soviet intervention in the

conflict. Thus, once the U. S. S. R. embarked upon its huge

interventionary effort in aid of Ethiopia in November 1977,

fears were immediately evoked in Washington in respect of

the possible impact on the credibility and resolve

450



reputation of the U. S., amid growing doubts amongst West

European states over whether the Americans "would stand up

to the Soviet Union anywhere else. "10 As a consequence,

from about February 1978 onwards, the U. S. undertook a range

of coercive measures against the U. S. S. R. in order to

improve its general image amongst foes and friends alike.

These included the use of minatory diplomacy and threats to

link detente, S. A. L. T., and other aspects of superpower

relations to Sovietbehaviour in Africa. Whilst this

more

assertive stance on the part of the U. S. came too late to

influence Soviet policy in the Horn, it did fulfil the need

to be seen to be "doing something, " and in this respect it

may have served to repair Washington's images of

credibility and resolve.

The preoccupation of the United States and the Soviet

Union with political and territorial change in grey areas is

clearly as intense in the age of stable nuclear deterrence

as it has been during the pre-nuclear era. To be sure, the

great powers of the nuclear age do not fight in order to

achieve positions of predominance in distant grey areas as

their counterparts had done before the advent of weapons of

mass destruction. However, they have been no less

reluctant to jeopardize their relations and to risk nuclear

war than their previous counterparts have been to actually

engage in war in order to attain or defend such positions.

Butwhereas

theglobal powers

of the past fought to control

grey areas because of the value of such places in terms of

raw materials and transport routes, the U. S. and the

U. S. S. R. are more concerned with the symbolic significance

of retaining or achieving control over locales of disputed



or uncertain interest symmetry as an index to their

credibility as allies and to their resolve as superpowers.

Given that, in the age of "overkill, " the balance of

deterrence, or the capacity of the United States and the

Soviet Union to deter aggression or extreme provocation

depends more on reciprocal superpower perceptions of resolve

to take risks than on physical comparisons of their nuclear

stockpiles, maintaining a good image of credibility and

resolve is perhaps more vital to the security of the U. S.

and the U. S. S. R. than was real estate to that of the pre-

nuclear great powers. In this respect, it would make more

sense to conclude that the superpowers continue to be

interested in territorial and/or political change in grey

areas because of, and not despite, the fact of being bound

by a relationship of stable nuclear deterrence.

Crisis as a mechanism of change or change by proxy?

This raises the question of whether superpower crisis

has become a substitute for war, a means by which either the

U. S. or the U. S. S. R. could seek to improve its strategic

position vis-a-vis the other by. changing mutual superpower

perceptions of resolve to take risks through the

manipulation of the danger of nuclear war. In the case of

client-state war stimulated Soviet-American crisis, such

danger arises from the possibility of double intervention

and the consequent risk of collision through misperception,

miscalculation, or the accumulation of incremental moves.

Given that the imperial powers of the past often resorted to

war as a means of achieving or defending a position of



predominance somewhere abroad, then is it not the case that

the global powers of the nuclear age use the uncertainty of

client-state war stimulated crisis to accomplish equivalent

goals in grey areas by manipulating the risk of superpower

war?

Of the three conflicts examined in this work, the risk

of Soviet-American collision was undoubtedly greatest during

the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. For one thing, the 1973 war

was the only one where the superpowers intervened both

symmetrically and simultaneously. In addition, the

commitments of the superpowers to their clients in the

Middle East were much stronger than to those in either Korea

or the Horn of Africa. Moreover, unlike the latter two

cases, the status quo ante bellum in the Middle East was

becoming very detrimental to the continuing presence in the

region of one of the superpowers, namely, the Soviet Union.

Admittedly, in Korea, the status quo ante bellum was not as

the U. S. S. R. would have liked, in that the division of the

peninsula and the setting up of an American client-state in

the south thwarted the Kremlin's aspirations for hegemony

over the entire country. Likewise, in the Horn of Africa,

the situation preceding the outbreak of hostilities was far

more conduciveto the interests

ofthe U. S. S. R. than to

those of the U. S., which had excluded itself from Ethiopia

and was discouraged from establishing compensatory linkages

with Somalia by the latter's Irredentist policies.

However, whereas in Korea the partition of the peninsula

satisfied the minimum needs of the superpowers, in the Horn

of Africa the exclusion of the United States was at least

partly the result of a conscious assessment by the Americans

453



of the implications for their wider interests of regional

political developments that were largely beyond their

control. In contrast, in the Middle East, the predicament

of the Soviet Union was not only acute and politically and

strategically very serious, but also ameliorable. Indeed,

being the product of six years during which the Kremlin's

clients in the region had to suffer the humiliation of the

consequences of the 1967 war, the vulnerability of the

U. S. S. R. was mainly due to the reluctance of the Soviet

leadership to jeopardize its relationship with the U. S. and

risk a superpower confrontation by providing Egypt and Syria

with the means to forcibly break out of the "no war, no

peace" situation in the area.

Thus, once the Soviet leadership was officially

notified by Cairo and Damascus of the imminence of

hostilities, it resolved to support them and, indeed, almost

immediately after the outbreak of war, Soviet ships and

aircraft were despatched to Egypt and Syria with arms and

military equipment. Even though this initial intervention

was both indirect and relatively low profile, the mere fact

that it occurred, especially as Arab forces were still

advancing, raised the prospect of superpower confrontation

and collision. Nevertheless, given that in the first two

or so days of the hostilities Egypt was still making steady

progress, Syria was managing to hold its ground, and the

United States was very confused and keeping a low key, the

U. S. S. R. obviously had no compelling reason to raise the

ante by using crisis coercion against either Israel or the

U. S. In this respect, from a superpower perspective,

454



change in the status quo of the Middle East and, by

implication, in the regional Soviet-American balance of

power was being implemented by proxy, that is, through

client-states of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. who were fighting

to resolve a purely local dispute.

Once the United States was apprised of the real

military situation in the Middle East on October 9, it too

began to despatch arms, ammunition, and other military

equipment to Israel, thus "mirror-imaging" the pattern of

Soviet intervention in the war and significantly increasing

the probability of a superpower confrontation. The

subsequent inability of Israel to make any progress against

the Egyptians whilst simultaneously advancing beyond the

pre-October cease-fire lines on the Syrian front set the

scene for such a confrontation. Indeed, as Israeli forces

continued to march towards Damascus, the U. S. S. R. resorted

to crisis coercion in order to avoid a serious setback in

Syria. Additional warships were sent to the Mediterranean,

airborne units were alerted, the headquarters staff of a

Soviet division were reportedly moved to Damascus, and the

Kremlin warned the Americans that it could not be

indifferent to the fate of Syria. Although, not long

afterwards, the Israeli advance on the Syrian front was

called off, it is not precisely clear whether this was due

more to Soviet crisis coercion or to the fear in Tel Aviv of

a prolonged war of attrition, for by about October 11/12

substantial reinforcements from Iraq, Jordan, and other Arab

countries had reached the battlefield and began fighting

alongside the Syrians. What is clear is that the Americans

perceived the Soviet moves as a challenge which had to be



met if their credibility and resolve images were to be

maintained and, as a result, intensified their indirect

intervention on the side ofIsrael.

Thus, when the final stage of the 1973 war unfolded

with the failure of the resumed Egyptian offensive in Sinai

on October 15 and the subsequent Israeli incursion across

the Suez Canal, the level of tension and suspicion between

the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. was very high. The resulting

risk of superpower collision was further increased as first

the Soviet Union and then the United States massively

accelerated its re-supply effort to its client(s) in the

conflict. Under these circumstances, as the Israeli

advance on the west bank of the Canal continued unabatedly,

the U. S. S. R. began to engage in coercive activities by

reinforcing its navy in and around the Mediterranean and by

alerting its airborne forces as a warning to the U. S. and

Isreal that if restraint is not exercised, some form of

direct intervention might materialize. But, rather than

respond in the desired manner, the U. S. simply reciprocated

the Soviet moves.

However, the continuation of the Israeli advance on the

west bank of the Suez Canal and, in particular, the

severance of the Suez-Cairo road and the consequent cutting

off of the Third Army in Sinai posed an extremely serious

threat to the entire military position of Egypt and a

challenge to the credibility of the U. S. S. R. As a result,

in response to an Egyptian request, the Kremlin gave notice

of its intention to unilaterally intervene directly on

behalf of Egypt, and backed its warning by further



reinforcing its Mediterranean fleet and putting additional

airborne units in a state of readiness. Although the

United States responded by placing its armed forces on a

Defence Condition Three alert, it also exercised immediate

and effective restraint on Israel, which was not only forced

to stop violating the cease-fire but also made to allow non-

military supplies to go through to the beleaguered Third

Army. To be sure, it could be argued that Washington's

restraint of the Zionist State was only affected because the

latter's endeavour to humiliate Egypt was contravening U. S.

interests and objectives in the Middle East. However,

Israel's effort to that end began in earnest some days

earlier, when it violated U. N. Security Council Resolution

338, but the Americans did nothing to stop it then. The

fact that Washington chose to end Tel Aviv's transgression

on October 26 can, therefore, be reasonably attributed to

the manipulation by the Soviet leadership of the risk of a

direct collision with the United States. Since Egypt, a

Soviet client-state, seemed on the verge of ignominy, the

Soviet warning appeared highly credible and the Americans,

whose client had made substantial territorial gains, decided

to heed it. In this respect, it can be said that the use

of crisis coercion enabled the U. S. S. R. to avoid an Egyptian

defeat, to allow Egypt to preserve some of the gains it had

made in the initial phase of the war, and thereby to uphold

its own regional position, its credibility as an ally and

its image of resolve as a superpower without having to

actually fight.

The outlines of the picture which emerges from the

Middle East, whereby change was implemented by proxy but

457



serious loss avoided through crisis coercion were also

evident during the Korean war and, to a much lesser extent,

the Ethio-Somali conflict.Admittedly, in the

caseof

Korea, the U. S. S. R. does not seem to have given its northern

client the go ahead to force a change in the regional status

quo as it had done with Egypt and Syria in 1973. However,

in view of the intimate nature of the Moscow-Pyongyang

patron-client relationship, then the territorial and

political change which Communist Korea would have

undoubtedly accomplished had not the Americans intervened

to defend South Korea would have rebounded to the benefit of

the Soviet Union. In other words, change in the regional

Soviet-American balance of power would have been implemented

by proxy, even though the U. S. S. R. appears not to have

approved of the North Korean attack.

In contrast to the Middle East where the U. S. S. R.

avoided serious loss by manipulating the risk of war with

the United States, in Korea the U. S. did so by directly

intervening on a massive scale. Although the reluctance of

the Kremlin to assume a more assertive posture enabled the

Americans to intervene and thereby recoup their losses

without a serious risk of collision with the Soviet Union,

elements of such a risk were, nevertheless, present. But,

because of the unfavourability of the crisis situation to

the U. S. S. R., these elements served to deter Soviet

counteraction and, as a consequence, permitted the U.S.

not

only to recover its position but also to go on the offensive

and occupy most of North Korea, actions which otherwise

would have almost certainly triggered a superpower

458



confrontation. Once China counter-intervened and forced

the Americans and their allies south of the 38th parallel,

the reverse logic worked. For the United States to have

been able to retain North Korea, it would have been

necessary to extend the war into China itself. However,

since that entailed a very serious risk of collision with

the U. S. S. R., it had to make do with the restoration of the

status quo ante bellum in the peninsula. Thus, whilst the

Soviet Union did not manipulate the risk of war with the

U. S. in order to determine developments during the third

stage of the Korean war, the latent presence of that risk,

or the probability that the Kremlin would take decisive

action in the event of an attack on China, sufficed to

constrain the United States.

Thepolitical position of

the U. S. S. R. in the Horn of

Africa at the outset of the Ethio-Somali war rendered any

forcible revision of the territorial status quo in the

region detrimental to Soviet interests. This is because

the Kremlin, long-time patron to Somali, the country that

was trying to force such a revision, was trying to coopt

Ethiopia, the target of Somali irredentist ambitions.

However, had the U. S. S. R. permitted Somalia to retain those

parts of the Ogaden that it had occupied, then the change

that would have been accomplished in the territorial

configuration of the Horn of Africa would have qualified as

change by proxy. To be sure, had the Soviet Union done so,

then it would have certainly forfeited the opportunity of

befriending Ethiopia, and also would have alienated the

remainder of sub-Saharan Africa. But, at the same time, it

would have tremendously consolidated its position in the

459



Somali Republic at the expense of a country which, not so

long before, had been the closest American client in the

entire African continent.

The non-intervention of the United States in the Ethio-

Somali war opened the way for the Soviet Union to massively

intervene, with the help of surrogate forces, on the side of

Ethiopia. Consequently, the latter was enabled to regain

the captured parts of the Ogaden desert from Somali forces,

who were decisively defeated. Given that the U. S. had no

commitment to Somalia, whose irredentism it had condemned

time and again, it was unwilling to confront the U. S. S. R. in

order to confine its interventionary activities in the Horn

of Africa. In fact, Washington's repeated public avowals

not to help Somalia in its war against Ethiopia meant that

no superpower crisis was generated by the Ethio-Somali war.

However, as the massive Soviet and allied intervention got

underway, the United States, out of nervousness over the

possible impact of the Soviet bloc effort on its credibility

and resolve images, began to engage in a range of coercive

activities, which included naval maneuvers off the Ethiopian

coast. Whilst these activities were neither intended to

reverse the outcome of Soviet intervention in, the war, nor

of an intensity or level that could have ignited a

superpower crisis, they did serve the purpose of indicating

the limits of American tolerance in the Horn and elsewhere

in Africa. Thus, they may have succeeded in deterring

further attempts on the part of the U. S. S. R. to consolidate

its position in the continent.

All in all, it would seem that military intervention is

460



as important an instrument for the United States and the

Soviet Union as it had been for the global powers of the

pre-nuclear age. In view of the widespread commitments of

the superpowers to client-states in many grey areas of the

world, the role of political and territorial change in these

areas as an index to the credibility and resolve images of

the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., and the significance of these

images to the credibility of the superpowers' deterrence

postures, intervention has become an indispensible means by

which the, United States and the SovietUnion

seek to

preserve the stability of deterrence. Where such an effort

requires a change in the political and/or territorial

status quo of a grey area, the tendency is for the U. S. and

the U. S. S. R. to use intervention as a means of encouragement

and support for client-states that wish, for their own,

independent reasons, to accomplish the change, whichis,

therefore, implemented by proxy. The use of intervention

as an instrument for the manipulation of client-state war

stimulated superpower crisis seems, on the other hand, to be

most effective when it is intended to restore or to prevent

drastic change in a regional status quo.

461





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