Sustaining sustainable agriculture: The rise and fall of the Fund for Rural America

Agriculture and Human Values17: 267–277, 2000.© 2000Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Sustaining sustainable agriculture: The rise and fall of the Fund for RuralAmerica

Andrew MarshallDepartment of Environmental Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, California, USA

Accepted in revised form February 18, 2000

Abstract. Sustainable agriculture has lately made significant inroads into US agricultural policy discourse. Anexamination of the “life cycle” of the Fund for Rural America, a component of the 1996 farm bill, providesan example of the complex and contested ways in which the goals of sustainable agriculture are advocated,negotiated, and implemented at the level of national policy, in the context of the evolving political and insti-tutional arrangements of American agricultural policy. The Fund, with its relatively large endowment of $100million annually, and its explicit emphasis on alternative agriculture research, is emblematic of both the growingpolitical effectiveness of the alternative agriculture movement and the increasing institutionalization of alternativeagriculture representatives in Federal agencies. The untimely demise of the Fund in the appropriations process,however, illustrates the extent to which certain key spaces within the state remain outside sustainable agriculture’sbroadening sphere of influence. This suggests that while some aspects of the movement’s organizing strategy areindeed effective, some may need to be rethought in light of the experience with the FRA.

Key words: Agricultural research, Fund for Rural America, Sustainable agriculture, US agricultural policy

Andrew Marshall is a graduate student in Environmental Studies at the University of California, SantaCruz interested in political and social struggles to realize just and ecologically rational agrifood systems.

Introduction

If we can agree with Buttel (1997) that “underadvanced capitalism, the general achievement of sus-tainability must inherently be a direct or indirect stateregulatory practice” (351), then we must look to theregulatory/policymaking sphere as the primary andmost consequential locus of struggles for a sustain-able agriculture. Struggles taking place in this arenareflect the growing diversity of voices being heardabout what constitutes good agricultural policy. Provi-sions, both proposed and adopted, that more explicitlysupport alternative agriculture are becoming increas-ingly common, as policies enacted during the lastthree Farm Bill cycles, such as the Sustainable Agri-culture Research and Education program (SARE) andthe National Organic Plan, illustrate. Yet the systemicconstraints to achieving genuine and lasting regulatorysupport for alternative agriculture remain formidable.

This paper chronicles the legislative and admin-istrative “life cycle” of the Fund for Rural America,an initiative included in the 1996 Federal Agricul-ture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR, or the farmbill). As an example of a recent initiative for legis-lative support of alternative agriculture, the Fund (orFRA) is an illuminating and useful case study for a

number of reasons: first, it had an explicit emphasison sustainable rural development and an innovative,inclusive, and multidisciplinary approach to agricul-tural research. Second, with an original authorizationof $300 million over three years, it is by far the largestsingle allocation of funding for sustainable agricul-ture from Federal coffers to date.1 Third, its passagewas substantially due to the influence of a newly-constituted coalition of groups that brought togethera diverse spectrum of interests and priorities fromsustainable agriculture, rural development, environ-mentalism, and conservationism. Fourth, the altern-ative spirit of the Fund was maintained and refinedinside the USDA, an agency that is often character-ized as “captured” by agribusiness interests. Fifth –and perhaps most consequentially – despite this strongpolitical support from the grassroots and the admin-istration, and despite the groundswell of excitementits programs generated, the FRA was quickly andquietly abandoned in subsequent appropriations pro-cesses. Eighteen months after the enactment of FAIR,for all practical purposes it was defunct. Only a relat-ively insignificant fraction of its authorization was evermade available.

Many commentators critical of the ecological andsocial irrationality of the current agrifood system

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look to social movements as an important, if not theprimary, mechanism for negotiating change. Thoughthe constituents of what has come to be calledthe sustainable agriculture movement are acknow-ledgedly highly diverse and at times have pursuedconflicting agendas, the story of the Fund reflects atrend toward political coalition-building among thesediverse constituents, who are increasingly findingcommon ground in the “ongoing struggle to definea place for nonmarket social and environmental con-cerns that are threatened by an increasing emphasis onagricultural competitiveness in global markets” (Bar-ham, 1997: 239). Thus the inclusion of the Fund in the1996 farm bill supports Henderson’s (1998) assertionthat “from a scattering of isolated individuals prac-ticing alternative farming methods and small, localorganizations, sustainable agriculture is swelling intoa significant social movement with a national networkand an effective policy wing” (113).

Yet, many in the movement still regard govern-ment agencies as “black boxes” in which movementinfluence is attenuated. Merrigan (1993), for example,claims “battles over implementation are fought behindthe scenes at USDA where grassroots power – thestrength of the sustainable agriculture movement – isneutralized” (158). How the Fund was handled insidethe USDA and by Congressional appropriators onceit was enacted becomes, then, an important – andcomplex – component of its story. My exploration ofcertain aspects of these implementation battles, focus-ing on the development and implementation of theFund’s competitive grants provisions, and the ulti-mate defunding of the FRA during the appropriationsprocess, complicates this claim. Indeed, inside theUSDA, the Fund’s spirit as an innovative programin support of alternative approaches to agriculturalresearch was championed and defended by a groupof newcomers to the agency, appointed by PresidentClinton and Secretary Glickman, who were themselves“movement people” and who effectively representedthe interests of sustainable agriculture and were com-mitted to alternative agriculture and community-basedrural development. As sustainable agriculture hasbecome increasingly institutionalized, greater numbersof these “movement people” have found themselveson the inside. Their ability to present potentially rad-ical ideas in politically acceptable terms and their rolesas practical actors in the implementation of programssuch as the FRA and as allies of the alternative agricul-ture movement represents a significant opportunity forthe movement to pry open the black boxes and to illu-minate their workings. Yet, as the demise of the FRAin the appropriations process demonstrates, certainkey spaces within the state remain outside sustainableagriculture’s broadening sphere of influence.

Building coalition: The constitution of thesustainable agriculture movement in the 1990s

Modern perspectives on agrifood systems illustratethat agricultural development in the United Statesis the product of a series of deliberate and specificpolitical-historical choices that have borne profoundeconomic, social, and ecological repercussions forrural communities. Rural sociologists, geographers,agroecologists, political economists, and others havedocumented and struggled with the rural transform-ation and social change engendered by increasingintensification, concentration, capitalization, corporat-ization, and globalization of agriculture caused by his-torical state pursuit of these specific agrarian policies(see, for example, Goldschmidt, 1947; Buttel andNewby, 1980; FitzSimmons, 1990; Friedmann, 1982;Goodman and Redclift, 1991; Goodman and Watts,1994; Friedland et al., 1991; Munton, 1992).

Those who mount the most comprehensive and fun-damental critiques of the effects of modern policy onthe structure of US agriculture often do so in the nameof sustainability. Indeed, sustainable agriculture haslately gained a firm foothold in the political landscapeof agricultural policy, and has had a significant prac-tical effect on the policy environment. Reports suchas the National Research Council’s (1989) influen-tial Alternative Agricultureand the USDA’s (1980)Report and Recommendations on Organic Farmingevidence policymakers’ increasing attention. Recentfarm bill cycles have seen the adoption and increasingfunding of programs such as the Sustainable Agricul-ture Research and Education program, the IntegratedFarm Management program, and the National OrganicProgram.

The growing popularity of sustainability as botha discursive device and a policy goal, however, hasbrought the danger of its co-optation. While, as Young-berg et al. (1993) observe, “as an abstract symbol,sustainability has become agriculture’s central goaland rallying cry – its predominant ideology” (296),its popularity as a symbol has effectively robbed sus-tainability of any unifying vision. Because, of course,“[n]o one wants anunsustainable agriculture” (Ikerd,1997: 1), the goal of sustainable agriculture hasbecome co-opted by “virtually every constituency withan interest in agriculture” (Youngberg et al., 1993:295) and has assumed so many meanings as to becomepractically meaningless. Currently, prescriptions formaking agriculture more sustainable run the gamutfrom technocratic to luddite, and from Marxist tomarket-oriented. In short, agricultural sustainabilityhas become a buzz-phrase.

Despite a vague recognition that “[t]he very decent-ralization and lack of hierarchical leaders that has

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impeded the convergence of the movement is, at thesame time, the source of its great populist vitality”(Henderson, 1998: 113), the confusion overwhatsus-tainable agriculture means and how it can and shouldbe achieved has plagued and frustrated movement act-ivists. An excellent example is the 1990 farm billnegotiations, in which sustainable agriculture activistsfelt hamstrung by the fact that their own lack of com-munication, coalition, and coherent vision among thediverse groups advocating alternatives prevented themfrom effectively communicating with policymakers,and hence from translating much of their agenda intopolicy. As Merrigan (1993) recounts,

This lack of a single, unifying image caused manyproblems . . . a prime example being the infamousSenate floor debate over the LISA[SARE] program.When Senator Grassley proposed deleting much ofthis popular program, a handful of Senators stoodup in its defense. But it was clear that no one fullygrasped the meaning or definition of sustainableagriculture; Senators on both sides were grapplingfor ways to express their vague notions of what wasimportant (158).

After the 1990 farm bill, organizations advoc-ating alternative agriculture on the national levelregrouped. With the lessons of the 1990 farm billin mind, the Midwest Sustainable Agriculture Work-ing Group (MSAWG), one of five regional SAWGsformed in the late 1980s and early 1990s to betternetwork regional and national alternative agricultureefforts, initiated an ambitious effort to build a trulypolitically powerful coalition with a relatively uni-fied and coherent vision. During 1992 and 1993,MSAWG and the other regional SAWGS organizedthe National Dialogue on Sustainable Agriculture,convening dozens of meetings, roundtables, and dis-cussions throughout the country in order to identifycommon ground among stakeholders (Henry WallaceInstitute, 1995; Henderson, 1998). This “highly par-ticipatory” and comprehensive process catalyzed awave of coalition-building that led to the formationin 1994 of the National Campaign for SustainableAgriculture (NCSA). This decentralized, loose affil-iation of over 500 activist and advocacy organiza-tions represents the diverse and at times conflictinginterests of family farmers, environmentalists, con-sumers, farmworkers, rural communities, food secur-ity groups, and minority farmers dedicated to reorient-ing national agricultural policy towards sustainability(NCSA, 1997). In anticipation of the 1996 farm bill,the NCSA and its affiliate organizations producedsubstantial and specific policy recommendations,including,

• foster family farms and increase farm income,• improve the status of minority farmers and farm-

workers,• advance new, locally-controlled marketing and

business opportunities,• support community-based food and nutrition ini-

tiatives,• create new farming opportunities (NCSA, n.d.;

1994a,b,c).

The excitement ensuing the formation of theNational Campaign was effervescent. To many in thealternative agriculture movement who had been strug-gling for years to bring an authoritative presence tothe national agricultural policy discourse, the NationalDialogue and the formation of the NCSA “marked anew and impressive level of organizational sophistica-tion and political potential within the alternative agri-culture movement” (Henry Wallace Institute, 1994:1):

The National Campaign includes broader constitu-ent and geographical diversity than ever before. Bycontinuing to build larger coalitions, this processhas had the ability to influence national agriculturallegislation and lead to a unified vision for a nationalfood system (Burns et al., 1994).

Like a vast jigsaw puzzle that someone dropped ina dark closet, the pieces have had to discover oneanother and figure out how to fit together. Many ofthe pieces have joined in the National Campaign forSustainable Agriculture (Henderson, 1998: 113).

Galvanized by this networking effort, the NationalCampaign set about in earnest to become a significantpresence in the upcoming farm bill debates.

The farm bill debates and the origin of the Fund

The 1996 farm bill was indeed an intensely negotiatedpiece of legislation. The protracted and hard-foughtdebates in Congress were dominated by two prevail-ing and interrelated political priorities. The first andmost influential was a bipartisan preoccupation withincreasing international agricultural competitivenessin the new global marketplace shaped by trade liber-alization initiatives such as GATT and NAFTA. Thesecond, trumpeted primarily by a newly-energized“revolutionary” Republican majority, was to balancethe Federal budget at seemingly any cost. In this con-text, it became clear very early that existing farmpolicy would be comprehensively restructured. Thenew farm bill was expected to reform US agriculturalpolicy to accommodate the increasing globalization of

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commodity and capital flows. New Deal farm pro-grams, fundamental to US agricultural policy for 60years, were noisily denounced by Republicans andDemocrats alike as impediments to the new free mar-ket/free trade paradigm. Committee hearings and floordebates were peppered with characterizations of NewDeal agricultural commodity programs and price sup-ports as “welfare for farmers,” as bloated relics ofbig government, as anachronistic interventionism, and,fundamentally, as incompatible with free trade (USCongress, Senate, 1995a,b; Hosansky, 1995, 1996a).As the Farm Bill took shape, this gospel of efficiencyand competitiveness increasingly dominated the dis-course. Even urban and suburban liberals, typicallyskeptical of free trade, attacked farm spending in anera when other social spending was being scaled backso drastically (Hosansky, 1995).

Defenders of the existing system of Federal farmsupport were allied more along geographical than partylines, representing areas still primarily economicallydependent on agriculture. They recognized the pro-found effects that phasing out traditional farm pay-ments would have on their constituents, and wereespecially opposed to the deep proposed cuts in theCommodity Credit Corporation:

We know that these cuts were not conceived in thecontext of any consideration to good farm policy.Rather, the decision to cut the very heart out of farmprograms is integral to the radical Republican policyof cutting $270 billion out of Medicare and provid-ing for a $245 billion tax cut (US Congress, House,1996b).

USDA also played a significant role in resisting themassive budget cuts, which represented a direct threatto the agency. Glickman and others in the adminis-tration took the attitude of “we’re just going to haveto do our best to minimize the damage” (quoted inHosansky, 1995: 1631).

Amidst this air of urgency, the original Fund forRural America was negotiated in the House Agri-culture Committee. As a political device, the Fundwas conceived as a way to recapture a significantfraction of the approximately $13 billion in budgetcuts that the early versions of the farm bill proposed(Meister, 9/17/99; Hoefner, 5/2/99). Its initial versionproposed an impressive $3.5 billion in funding over 7years for research and rural development activities toassist farmers in making the transition to more market-based farm policies (US Congress, House, 1996a).According to one committee member, the Fund would

. . . simply allow rural America to adjust to the chan-ging conditions in government spending that existtoday and that will be intensified with this and other

deficit reduction legislation. There is no other sectorof the budget that is taking this kind of devast-ating reduction. It is not hard to determine thatthese funds are desperately needed, even thoughthey will address only some of the critical needs (USCongress, House, 1996b).

While the original intent of the Fund was primarilyto maintain the flow of assistance to farmers in an eraof decreasing commodity supports, the developmentof the Fund’s specifics was significantly influencedby the efforts of the National Campaign for Sustain-able Agriculture, which singled out the FRA as its topagenda item in the farm bill. The NCSA saw in theFund’s development an opportunity to move beyond aformulaic commodity payment structure that rewardedlarge monocultures at the expense of small, diversifiedoperations. Early in the process, in consultation withallies at UDSA, the NCSA identified the FRA as a sig-nificant funding mechanism for the policy goals theyhad developed during the National Dialogue (Hoefner,5/2/99). In the words of one NCSA member, the Fundhad the potential to

. . . approach rural development in a much differ-ent way than traditional programs [by] funding awide range of projects, from farmworker housingto drinking water, and from assistance for begin-ning and minority farmers to direct marketing,value-added, and research initiatives supporting sus-tainable agriculture and family farm opportunities(Leval, 3/13/99).

By aggressively lobbying influential committeestaffers and USDA representatives, National Cam-paign lobbyists Ferd Hoefner and Kathleen Merriganworked to incorporate into the Fund crucial elementsof the NCSA agenda, including an explicit emphasison environmental sustainability; local, community-based development; and participatory, “outcome-oriented” research (Meister, 9/17/99; Hoefner, 5/2/99;US Congress, 1996).

The original $3.5 billion FRA, however, nevermade it out of the Republican-controlled HouseAgriculture Committee. Prioritized by vocal supportfrom President Clinton and Secretary Glickman, andsponsored by influential Agriculture Committee mem-bers Leahy (D-VT), Ford (D-TN), and Daschle (D-SD), it then reappeared, albeit in a much more modestincarnation, in floor debates in early February. Theinitial funding level of $3.5 billion requested in com-mittee had been cut roughly in half, but the intent of theFund to offset the phasing out of the CCC remained: inits first version introduced on the floor, the amendmentmandated that $250 million annually be transferreddirectly from the CCC to the FRA from 1996 through


2002. As the bill evolved and subsequent versions ofthe Fund reappeared on the floor throughout Febru-ary and March, its authorization was whittled down to$300 million over 3 years, and, importantly, the CCCwas no longer specified as the source of FRA funds.Finally, late on the night of March 28, a weary Sen-ate passed, by a hasty voice vote, the amendment thatincluded the Fund in FAIR (Hosansky, 1996c).

Though its Congressional sponsors were ultimatelyable to achieve only a fraction of the level of fundingthey had lobbied for, the Fund’s passage neverthelessgenerated considerable excitement among its support-ers. In his remarks on signing the FAIR, Clinton seizedupon the FRA as a symbol of his administration’scommitment to protecting family-scale agriculture. Hecharacterized the Fund as one of the few bright spots inan otherwise misguided bill that did not do enough toprotect family farms, and as an important tool to mit-igate the effects of the weakened safety net (Clinton,1996).

Rural leaders and alternative agriculture advocateswere excited as well by the potential of such a rel-atively large endowment set aside for purposes thatresonated with the goals of sustainable agriculture:

Many . . . are looking at implementation of the newfarm bill with an anticipation similar to that of chil-dren in a toy store: they just can’t wait. The reasonfor the anticipation is the Fund for Rural America(Stotts, 1996: n.p.).

Illuminating the black box: Development andimplementation of the competitive grants initiative

The fate of recent Federal initiatives in support ofalternative agriculture (of which the Fund is exem-plary) have demonstrated that the major challenges ineffecting change lie not necessarily in getting policyand programs enacted, but instead inmaintainingtheiroriginal integrity and keeping them funded and oper-ational once they enter the twin “black boxes” ofUSDA and appropriations. Indeed, following throughon policy enacted has been a perennial obstacle formovements whose strengths lie primarily at the grass-roots level, while corporate agribusiness interests havetraditionally enjoyed wide avenues of opportunity toinfluence this phase of the regulatory process.

Since its authorizing language was somewhatvague in reference to the nature, intent, and scopeof the Fund (US Congress, 1996), it left signific-ant room for interpretation, and set the stage for astruggle over the definition of funding priorities. Theconceptualization and implementation of the Fund’scompetitive research grants component is exemplary

of both the increasing penetration of sustainable agri-culture interests into the state, and the extent to whichthis penetration remains fragile at certain places in theprocess.

The Federal agricultural research establishment hasbeen indicted for both its methodology and its focus(McConnell, 1959; Hightower, 1973; Busch and Lacy,1983; Strange, 1991; Bird, 1991; Thompson andStout, 1991; Lockeretz and Anderson, 1993; Stauber,1994). Public research has been consistently criticizedfor encouraging abstract, reductionist, technological,monodisciplinary approaches to problem-solving, andfor disproportionately serving the needs of the largestand best-capitalized farmers, and therefore activelycontributing to the uneven development that charac-terizes the American farm sector. Consequently, bothalternative forms of research and research focusedon alternative forms of agriculture have gone largelyunsupported. The nearly total neglect of the researchand education needs of organic farmers is a partic-ularly egregious example (Lipson, 1997). As Bird(1991) notes, “[t]hese criticisms have been suppor-ted by scholars whose work has shown that agricul-tural research is not neutral or value-free, but ratherexpresses a social and environmental agenda” (i).

Importantly, the Fund’s competitive grants pro-gram became, in many ways, an internalization of andresponse to existing critiques of USDA research pri-orities and a clear attempt to set the Fund apart fromthe traditional agricultural research paradigm. Thisis largely due to a coterie of Clinton and Glickmanappointees in USDA with a specific and enthusiasticvision for alternative agricultural development. Theseappointments reflect certain alternative agriculture andrural development networks within the movement thathad been “on the outside” and had been invited insidewith Clinton’s ascendancy.2 Two USDA newcomers,Karl Stauber and Barbara Meister, are representativeof this group of “movement people.”

Appointed in 1994 as the USDA’s undersecret-ary for Research, Extension, and Education, Stauberoversaw the development and implementation pro-cess of the FRA. Stauber came to USDA from thevice presidency of the Northwest Areas Foundation,a grantmaking organization serving the northern GreatPlains. He had been, and remains, a longtime and act-ive participant in alternative agriculture dialogue at theregional and national level, and a participant in theNational Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture. In a1994 article inAmerican Journal of Alternative Agri-culture, Stauber expounded his “treadmill of decliningpolitical effectiveness” theory: “Public research andeducation institutions, blindly following the belief inincreased production efficiency as a social goal, helpput more and more farmers out of business” (1994:

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14). This approach to agricultural development is ana-chronistic and dangerous, according to Stauber, sinceit no longer serves the “Common Good.” In contrast,Stauber brought to the USDA a vision for the role ofthe Federal research and education system that wasfounded on what he called an “ecocentric” approach:to promote an agriculture that “optimizes the balancebetween human needs and the health of the ecosystem”(13). Ecocentric agriculture could provide a “renewedjustification for a changed land-grant university sys-tem” (14).

As Stauber’s confidential assistant, Barbara Mei-ster was the primary actor in the day-to-day devel-opment of the Fund’s competitive grants program.Meister, too, is a longtime and committed advoc-ate for alternative agriculture. Her credentials includeworking under Jim Hightower, a well-known agrarianpopulist and strident critic of the large-scale bias ofFederal research priorities, during his tenure as TexasAgriculture Commissioner.

The design and implementation of the competit-ive grants program became the responsibility of thenewly created National Agricultural Research, Exten-sion, Education, and Economics Advisory Board, andwas undertaken during Fall 1996. The 30-memberBoard was a product of the streamlining and restructur-ing of the Department mandated by FAIR. It consistedof appointees nominated by diverse stakeholders andselected by Glickman. This group, under the direc-tion of Meister, evolved and refined the vision ofthe Fund as an alternative approach to research andrural development. In their inaugural meeting, theBoard emphasized the need to “open the Fund to awider pool of possible recipients” (NAREEE AdvisoryBoard, 1996) than the USDA’s “usual suspects.” Theyinterpreted the role of the Fund to be to address thegaps in existing programs, particularly the NationalResearch Initiative (NRI), the USDA’s flagship com-petitive grants program, recognizing that “the peerreview process which characterizes selections for theNRI grants does not necessarily take full advantage ofthe nation’s diversity of institutions” (NAREEE Advis-ory Board, 1996). They gave priority to the allocationof FRA grants to chronically underfunded institutions,such as the historically African-American 1890 LandGrant colleges.

The conception of the Fund as unique and innov-ative is best articulated in the competitive grants pro-gram’s Request for Proposals, released in late January1997. The RFP was developed by a USDA Inter-agency Working Group, also under the guidance ofBarbara Meister. It clearly reflected Meister’s (andStauber’s) commitment to innovation, collaboration,and problem-solving research in the pursuit of agricul-tural sustainability. Recognizing that “[t]he creation of

the Fund coincides with fundamental reforms to Fed-eral farm programs” that will “shift price and incomerisk management away from government programsto farmers themselves” (US GPO, 1997: 4384), theauthors of the RFP envisaged the FRA as

. . . a new and distinct element in USDA’s portfolio ofresearch, education, and extension programs [that]can mobilize the agricultural knowledge system torespond to the emerging problems faced by agricul-tural producers and rural communities during thistime of change (ibid.).

The RFP solicited projects that sought “systems-oriented approaches to systems-based problems,” andendeavored to “integrate the findings or knowledge ofmultiple disciplines in order to gain the comprehens-ive understanding needed to solve complex problems”(ibid.). Applicants were encouraged to apply a

. . . broad rather than reductionistic view . . . toresearch, extension, and education activities thatexplicitly recognize, account for, and enhance inter-actions among agricultural activities, environmentalquality, and economic or community well-being(ibid., 4386).

When the RFP was released in late January 1997,it generated a groundswell of interest and excitementamong rural leaders, NGOs, and alternative agricul-ture researchers. Response was overwhelming, as thecompetitive grants program received over 3000 pro-posals in its first year. This response is a testamentto the latent demand for funding for such researchand is indicative of the increasing attention paid byrural communities to the viability of alternative eco-nomic strategies based on principles of sustainableagriculture, and implies a growing recognition withinthese communities of the compatibility of sustainableagriculture and rural development agendas.

The review process falters

Despite the rhetorical claims of many in the Admin-istration and in Congress that the FRA representedthe future of agricultural research and development(US Congress, House, 1997), significant practical andideological problems arose during the review process.Although several very innovative and interdisciplinaryprojects were awarded grants (see Table 1), there ismuch evidence that the more holistic and inclusiveapproach to research prescribed by the Fund causeda host of interpretation problems for the reviewers,the majority of whom were themselves embedded inthe traditional Land Grant University funding mat-rix/hierarchy, which informed their own notions of


Table 1. Selected FRA grants awarded.

Project title Region Description

Maintaining Land and Community:Center on minority land loss andrecovery

South Improve land security among minoritygroups in rural US

Center for Biologically Based PestManagement

Northeast Increase the application of least-toxic pestmanagement in rural areas

Small Farm Center Appalachia Research, education and extension toserve the needs of small, limited resource,and minority farmers

Center for Sustainable Agriculture andEnvironmental Stewardship

Intermountain West Identify and initiate strategies to enhancesustainable agriculture

Center for Community AgriculturalDevelopment

Northeast/Great Lakes Establish collaborations between agri-cultural, environmental, and consumergroups, to promote development of localfood systems

Increasing Adoption of sustainableagriculture and positive communityimpacts

California Expand the adoption of biologically-based farming systems and strengthentheir positive influences on the socialand economic health of rural Californiacommunities

Community-based livestock integratedresource management

Colorado Improve the economic and environmentalhealth of rural Western communities byimproving the competitive position andsustainability of independent livestockproducers

Market development for organic agri-culture products

National Analyze the market for organic productsand evaluate the effects of nationalorganic standards and labeling on organicproduct markets

Community food sourcing to facilitaterural economic development

Minnesota Integrate technical capacities to increasethe incomes of hundreds of sustainablelivestock producers through direct mar-keting, while expanding employment bysupporting small, rural businesses

Native American model of ecologicalrestoration and community enhance-ment

Northeast Create a program of education, extension,and research to empower Native Amer-ican communities in undertaking environ-mental stewardship projects on their ownlands using the foundation of their owncultural traditions

Leveraging community and industry-wide resources to foster biointensiveIPM

Wisconsin Advance the development and adoption ofbiointensive integrated pest managementsystems in high-value vegetable produc-tion

Source:http://www.reeusda.gov/fra/.

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what constituted good research.3 For example, all FRAgrants awarded in California were channeled to UCDavis, already the largest and best-financed agricul-tural research institution in the state. Cornell, anothertop grant-winner in the LGU establishment, was also amajor beneficiary (USDA CSREES, 1997). This sug-gests that although the intention of the FRA designerswas to establish a more inclusive competitive grantsprogram supportive of research activities of a largerscope and qualitatively different from those usuallyundertaken by the dominant LGUs, this was lost onthe reviewers, who were caught up in the institu-tional inertia of LGU culture and traditional fundingpriorities.

Similar constraints arose on the rural developmentprovisions of the FRA, frustrating the hopes of thosewho had advocated a more innovative and progressiverole for these funds – that is, support for programsand projects that explicitly linked the concerns of mar-ginalized and subordinated groups and the economicsecurity of rural communities to the adoption of altern-ative and sustainable agricultural practices.4 In fact,the reduced funding that was eventually made avail-able was largely channeled into the massive backlogof projects within established programs (US Congress,House, 1997). Because rural development programshave been so devastated in recent budget cycles, as oneSenator put it, “the FRA has sort of become this placeeverybody is told to go for money” (ibid.).

The capping of the program

Ultimately, of the $300 million originally authorizedfor the Fund, only a very small fraction was everappropriated.5 In 1997, in what was to be the first yearof the Fund’s implementation, one-third of FRA fund-ing was diverted from the competitive grants programby emergency appropriations to flood relief for theUpper Mississippi. Thereafter, money for the Fund’sadministration was “capped” by appropriations bills inboth FY1998 and 1999. In effect, the capping of legis-latively authorized funds prevents money from beingspent on program administration. Thus the FRA stillofficially exists, complete with a still-operable inform-ational web page and electronic mailing list, but withno means to administer the program, it is paralyzed.At this point, while efforts persist in USDA to unlocka fraction of these funds, it is unlikely that the FRAwill be resuscitated during the present farm bill cycle.

Why was the FRA left undefended?

The appropriations process is extremely contested andcomplex, and interpretations of the FRA’s defunding

are various. Agriculture programs of all stripes havebeen under enormous pressure from budget cutterslately, and for programs perceived as experimental oralternative, the pressure is even greater. During thefarm bill process, the Fund was the darling of Glick-man and Clinton. Yet less than a year later, it hadall but disappeared from the Administration’s budgetpriorities. Indeed, Clinton’s track record for followingthrough on sustainable rural development initiativesis poor: Woods (1998) tells the story of the LowerMississippi Delta Development Commission, a failedredevelopment attempt aimed at the poorest, predom-inantly black regions of the Mississippi Delta headedby then-governor Clinton that is eerily reminiscent ofthe story of the FRA.

Since its inception, special interests had lobbiedaggressively for the Fund’s research to concentrate onareas that served their own priorities. In the absenceof strong support of the Fund by the Administration,the critical mass of enthusiasm for the Fund appears tohave been displaced during the appropriations processonto a competing program, the Initiative for FutureAgriculture and Food Systems, established as part ofa 1998 agricultural research bill (USDA CSREES,1998). With its focus primarily on biotechnology, gen-omic research, and precision agriculture, the Initiativeis much more explicitly supportive of the agenda ofcapital-intensive corporate agriculture.6

Ultimately, however, according to those who wit-nessed the demise of the Fund, it fell victim to the“perpetual turf battle between authorizers and appro-priators” (Hoefner, 5/2/99). The farm bill is largelynegotiated and written in the agriculture committees,where sustainable agriculture interests were relativelywell represented, but appropriations for agriculturalprograms are negotiated in an autonomous appropri-ations committee with its own agenda and balanceof power. This committee tends to mirror the largerCongress, which is increasingly composed of repres-entatives with overwhelmingly urban and suburbanconstituencies, and must accommodate a significantlylarger range of interests and agendas. Consequently,supporters of progressive agricultural programs, withtheir shrinking agrarian constituencies, are left with ashrinking share of the budget to work with. The man-datory authorization given to the Fund was an attempt,then, to stake out guaranteed funding for alternativeagriculture. In essence, however, the attempt back-fired because the appropriators, a wholly different setof actors, were apparently resentful of what they per-ceived to be an inappropriate allocation of scarce funds(Meister, 9/17/99). Since much of the money allocatedto the competitive grants program had not been spentpending the writing of the RFP and the completion ofthe review process, and with no-one to speak on its


behalf in the Appropriations Committee negotiations,the Fund became an attractive and convenient tar-get for rankled and budget-wary appropriators (Leval,3/13/99; Hoefner, 5/2/99; Meister, 9/17/99).

Conclusion: How best to sustain the sustainabilitymovement?

The Fund for Rural America arose in the context ofa 1996 Farm Bill debate that was pervaded by theinstrumental rationality of efficiency, productivity, andcompetitiveness in the context of trade liberalizationand its emerging effects on the global reorganization ofagricultural policy. The most important “outside” actorto the creation of the FRA, the National Campaignfor Sustainable Agriculture, was able to successfullychannel the immense but historically anarchic energyof sustainable agriculture interests into a relativelycoherent vision. An important part of this vision wascodified in the FRA. Thus in many important respects,the Fund for Rural America is emblematic of the typeof coalition-building and broadening of its base thatmany who attempt to theorize the alternative agri-culture movement identify as essential to its success(Buttel, 1993, 1997; Barham, 1997; Henderson, 1998).

This trend is continuing with the growth of theNational Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture. Since1995, the National Campaign has quadrupled to over2000 member organizations. Its policy dialogue hasentered a new phase with the Wallace AgriculturalPolicy Project (WAGPOL), an initiative adopted in1997 and intended to carry on what the National Dia-logue started in the early 1990s. As they prepare forthe 2002 farm bill, many in the movement expect thatthe sustainable agriculture agenda will benefit signi-ficantly from the organization and vision created bythe National Campaign. They assert that at no timehas the movement been stronger or more unified, orits challenges more easily discernible (Henry WallaceInstitute, 1996, 1997, 1998; NCSA, 1997, 1999). TheFRA remains among the Campaign’s top priorities(NCSA, 1998).

The story of the Fund for Rural America offers aglimpse of the evolving political alliances that repres-ent alternatives to technoscientific productivist agricul-ture in the US regulatory arena, and their potential rolein realizing an approach to agricultural research thatis more broadly inclusive – or, as in Stauber’s vision,that better serves the Common Good. As the sustain-able agriculture movement continues to coalesce andto engage the state increasingly effectively, we canexpect to see growing numbers of “movement people”welcomed into government positions. This representsan important and fertile opportunity.

Examining the life-cycle of the Fund also, how-ever, highlights the nature of the systemic constraintsfacing those – in government and in the movement– who accept Buttel’s challenge to engage the stateregulatory practice and to confront the staunchly hege-monic vision of American agricultural development.However daunting, accepting Buttel’s challenge is animportant starting point for building a genuinely sus-tainable agrifood system. Doing so requires furtherstudy into where in the regulatory structure the effortsand influence of alternative agriculture advocates aremost significantly attenuated, and how the organizingstrategy of the movement might be rethought in lightof these gaps.

Notes

1. Compare this to a well-known and celebrated programlike the Federal Sustainable Agriculture Research and Edu-cation program (SARE), for example, which is typicallyfunded at approximately $8 million annually.

2. The details of this process of the “greening” of USDA arebeyond the scope of this paper, but would be an importantavenue for future research.

3. According to Barbara Meister (9/17/99), although nomin-ations for reviewers were solicited from diverse stakehold-ers, very few “sustainable ag types” were chosen.

4. Such provisions included a Minority Farmer OutreachProgram, a low-interest loan program for disadvantagedfarmers, and farmworker housing improvement grants.

5. Precisely how much of the Fund was spent remains an elu-sive question, and one that this researcher, as a neophytestudent of the labyrinthine appropriations process, has beenunable to answer.

6. Indeed, in early 2000, much of the funds authorizedfor the FRA were transferred into the Initiative’s coffers.While the politics surrounding this seem clear enough, thelegal mechanism by which it happened remains somewhatmysterious at the time of this writing.

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Address for correspondence:Andrew Marshall, Department ofEnvironmental Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz,CA 95064, USAPhone: +1-831-459-3235; Fax: +1-831-459-4015;E-mail: [email protected]