The 307th BSB and Iraqi Army Logistics

Expanding Logistics CapacitySustainment Lessons Learned

From Combined Joint Task Force-82

Sustainment Brigade Medical Operations

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.PB700–11–03Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy

MAY–JUNE 2011

WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG

Tips From Sustainment

Brigade Commanders

UsingKnowledgeNetworkstoLearn,Act,andAdapt —MajorGeneralJamesL.Hodge

TipsFromSustainmentBrigadeCommanders —LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson

UsingaBrigadeSupportMedicalCompany ontheCurrentBattlefield —CaptainCarlaA.Berger

SustainmentBrigadeMedicalOperations —MasterSergeantGregoryC.Thorn

MedicalLogisticsOperations ontheKoreanPeninsulaDuringKeyResolve2010 —MajorWilliamTudorandSaraSchubert

ExpandingLogisticsCapacity —LieutenantColonelMatthewP.Shatzkin

The307thBSBandIraqiArmyLogistics —CaptainKyleW.Brown

LessonsinAdaptation:TheICTContheNonlinearBattlefield —CaptainNicholasG.Catechis

SustainmentLessonsLearnedFromCombinedJointTaskForce-82 —ColonelMichaelC.Lopez

SpecialOperationsLogisticsSupport:SustainingVictory —CaptainCiscoJ.Fuller

WhyShouldIStudyMilitaryHistory?—MajorJamesJ.Godfrey

LessonsLearnedFromtheFirstYearofActivating aBrigadeSupportBattalion—LieutenantColonelLeonG.Plummer andMajorEricA.McCoy

WhyLogisticiansFailatKnowledgeManagement —MajorJimBunyak

RadioFrequencyIdentificationTagsinModern DistributionProcesses—PatriciaKellyandCatherineRobertello

PB700–11–03VOLUME43ISSUE3MAY–JUNE2011www.alu.army.mil/alog

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Cover:Healthservicesupportandforcehealthprotectionhavebecomeimportantaspectsofsustainment.Thearticlesbeginningonpages6, 10, 13, and 36,lookattheactivitiesofbrigadesupportmedicalcompanies,asustainmentbrigade’sbrigadesurgeonsection,andtheU.S.ArmyMedicalMaterielCenter,Korea.ForcehealthprotectionseekstoimproveSoldierhealth,casualtyprevention,andcasualtycare.OftenthefirstcarethatwoundedSoldiersreceiveisfromfellowSoldiersonthebattlefieldwhohavereceivedcombatlifesavertraining.Inthecoverphoto,Soldiersfromthe1stSustainmentBrigadeprovidemedicalaidduringthehands-onportionoftheCombatLifesaverCourse. (Photo by SSG Matthew Veasley)

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LINES OF COMMUNICATION

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RetoolingLeaderDevelopmentintheFinancial ManagementSchool—Dr.DennisK.Davis

TheArmyOutofBalance—Dr.RomualdA.Stone

Commentary:ProspectingtheFrontiersofLogisticsResearch —Dr.ChristopherR.PaparoneandGeorgeL.Topic

Writingfor Army Sustainment

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1106617

BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman

Major General James L. HodgeCommander

ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand

MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy

Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy

totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology

Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral

ArmyMaterielCommand

Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget

AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller

Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral

Ex OfficioColonel (P) Gwendolyn Bingham

TheQuartermasterGeneral

Colonel (P) Clark W. LeMasters, Jr.ChiefofOrdnance

Brigadier General Edward F. Dorman IIIChiefofTransportation

Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander

ArmySoldierSupportInstitute

Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral

ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand

Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral

ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand

ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY

Colonel Mark A. McCormickPresident

STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor

Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor

Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant

GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.

ThismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdisseminationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelop-mentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirprofessionaldevelopment.

ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:

GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy

ChiefofStaff

Official:

Army Sustainment(ISSN2153–5973)isabimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.

Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.

Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede

officialArmypublications.Themasculinepro-nounmayrefertoeithergender.

Reprints:ArticlesmaybereprintedwithcredittoArmy Sustainmentandtheauthor(s),exceptwhencopyrightisindicated.

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LINES OF COMMUNICATION

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HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

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UsingKnowledgeNetworkstoLearn,Act,andAdapt by Major General jaMes l. HodGe

incebeginningmytenureascommanderofthe ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand (CASCOM),Ihavebeenimpressedbythecommit-mentofourprofessionalstoremainontheleadingedgeofknowledgemanagementinsupportofourSoldiersandleadersalike.Ittakesanetworkofdedicatedandhighlycapableprofessionalstoenvision,buildandenhance,andcommunicatetheinformationrequiredtomaintainthebesttraining,education,andultimately,“reachback”opportunitiesforoursustainmentcommunity.

WeperformthismissioninthecontextoftheArmyOperatingConcept,whichoutlinesfourkeytrendsinthecurrentandfutureoperatingenvironment:uncertainty,paceofchange,competitiveness,anddecentralization.Thesetrendsrequireustoproduceleaderswithahighdegreeofoperationaladaptability—criticalthinkerswhoarecomfortablewithambiguityanddecentralizationandcapableofmakingrapiddecisionsunderconditionsofuncertaintyandchange.

Tothisend,CASCOMisimplementingtheprinciplesoftheArmyLeaderDevelopmentStrategy,theArmyTrainingStrategy,andtheArmyLearningConceptbylaunchinginitiativesdesignedtoachieveablended,career-longcontinuumoflearning.Theseeffortsadoptalearner-centricapproach,builtonthepillarsoftraining,education,andexperience,withafocusonoptimizingmultifacetedlearningcapabilitieswithininstitutional,organizational,andself-developmentdomains.

Theintentistoincreasethequality,relevance,andeffectivenessofresidenttrainingandeducationbyexpandinglearningopportunitiesbothwithinandbeyondthe“brickandmortar”schoolhouse,deliveringlearningtothepointofneed—whereverthatmightbe—whilesimultaneouslyleveragingtheexperientiallearningofSoldiers,civilians,andleadersthroughouttheforce.

ThekeytorealizingthefullvalueofthisubiquitouslearningenvironmentistoharnessthecollaborativepoweroftheSustainmentKnowledgeNetwork(SKN)inordertostimulate,enable,andsustainadaptabilityandinnovationwithinourSoldiers,civilians,andleaders,withinourtrainingdevelopmentanddeliverysystems,andwithinourorganizationalculture.

SKNisanenterpriseknowledgemanagementandcol-laborationplatformthatlinksallaspectsoftheCASCOMmissionacrossthefullspectrumoftheArmy’soperation-alconstructandprovidesthemeanstorapidlyproduce,share,andrespondtothecriticalknowledgeneedsofourSoldierswheneverandwhereverneeded.AsstatedbyGeneralMartinE.Dempsey,thecommandinggeneraloftheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC),“Knowledgemanagementisatoolthatwillenableustomoreeffectivelydealwithuncertaintyandtherapidpaceofchange...toprevailinthecompetitivelearning

environmentandultimatelyadaptmorequicklythanouradversaries.”

Throughitsglobalreach,SKNisalearningenablerwithinourtraining,education,andleaderdevelopmentprocessthatcoincideswiththepreferencesofdigital-agelearnersenteringtheArmy.Withthisinmind,CASCOMisalreadyachievingmajormilestones,andwhilethefol-lowingexamplesareonlyapartofCASCOM’soverarch-ingknowledgemanagementstrategy,theyareclearlybestpracticeswithinbothTRADOCandtheArmy.

Ofthe449,000ActiveandReservecomponentSol-diers,DepartmentoftheArmycivilians,andsupportingcontractorswhomakeuptheglobalArmysustainmentcommunity,over113,000areregisteredinSKNprofes-sionalforums.Theygenerateapproximately14,500“knowledgetransactions”aweek—learningfromeachothereverydaybysharingexpertiseandexperience,Sol-diertoSoldier,stafftostaff,andbetweenorganizations.

TheCASCOMstaffisactivelyengagedinleading,contributing,andrespondingtoquestionsanddiscus-sionsgeneratedintheseforums.SustainmentCenterofExcellenceschoolsareimplementingstrategiestoensureinitialmilitarytrainingSoldiersareintroducedtoSKNasareachbacktotheirproponentbranches,andprofessionalmilitaryeducation(PME)studentsareactivelyusingSKN’scapabilitiesintheclassroomtocollaborateandlearnwiththeirpeersintheoperationalforce.

TheCASCOMDirectorateofLessonsLearned/Qual-ityAssuranceroutinelyusestheSKNWarfighters’Forumtobroadcastandsharetheobservations,bestpractices,andlessonslearnedraisedbyleadersreturningfromoperationaldeployments.Thisprovidesameanstorap-idlyshare,discuss,andexpandupontopicsimportanttoallwithintheSustainmentcommunity.

EffortsareunderwaytoextendSKNproductsandser-vicestotablets,smartphones,andothermobiledevices,toincludeprovidingreliableenterpriseaccesstomobileappli-cationsbeingproducedbyourCASCOMTrainingTechnolo-gyDivisionandotherArmyorganizationsparticipatingintheConnectSoldierstoDigitalApplications(CSDA)program.

CASCOMcommandstheArmy’sSustainmentCenterofExcellence—apremierteamofcommittedandinno-vativeprofessionalsonwhomIrelytoactivelyuseandenhanceSKNcapabilitiestobetterprepareandsupportsustainmentSoldiers,civilians,andleadersinthe21stcentury.Optimizingoursustainmentintellectualcapitalisateamsport,oursustainmentwarfightersdependonit,andIlookforwardtosharingyourfuturesuccessstorieswithleadersthroughouttheArmy.SupportStartsHere!

Major General jaMes l. HodGe is tHe coMMandinG General of tHe arMy coMbined arMs support coMMand and sustainMent center of excellence at fort lee, VirGinia.

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fromthehigherheadquarters.Whennotdeployingwithadivisionheadquartersyouarestationedwithandsupportingarrison,itiscriticalthatadditionalTDY[temporaryduty]dollarsbeallocatedtoallowpartici-pationinthevarioustrain-upexercisesandculminat-ingtrainingeventsforthesesupportedheadquarters.”

EngagementColonel Mark Barbosa(7thSustainmentBrigade):

“MyfocusingoingtoBSB[brigadesupportbattalion]commanderswastoseehowtheywereholdingupandthenfocusonwhereIneededtoenablehimorher.Wewouldgoovertheirconceptofsupportforanyupcom-ingmajoroperationorjustthegeneralsupportwewereproviding.Iwasabletopickuponalotofthingsyoujustdon’tgetinareportoranemail.SinceweweretiedincloselywiththeG−4/G−2,weknewwheretoinjectourselves.

“Themonthlydivisioncommander’sconferenceswereagreattimetoengagewiththebrigadecombatteamcommandersoutsideoftheirforwardoperatingbases.WeweresotiedinwiththedivisionandtheirBSBs[that]theythoughtwewerepartofthedivi-sion.Ibelievenonesawthesustainmentbrigadeasanencroachmenttotheirauthority;weenjoyedunrestrict-ed,routineaccessanddialog,andviceversa.”

Colonel Daly:“Wedevelopedanengagementplantoensureweweresupportingaswellasshaping,influ-encing,synchronizing,teaching,andcoaching.Over-all,therewere67differentorganizations—tacticaltostrategic—thatwewereengagingonaregularbasis.Routinebattlefieldcirculationandengagementswerekey.

“Wetookeveryopportunitytomeetwithallstra-tegicpartners—AMC[ArmyMaterielCommand],ASC[ArmySustainmentCommand],DLA[DefenseLogisticsAgency],ASA(ALT)[AssistantSecretaryoftheArmy(Acquisition,Logistics,andTechnology)],SDDC[MilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCommand],DCMA[DefenseContractManagementAgency],LOGCAP[LogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram]—sotheseorganizationsknewourrequire-mentsandwheretheycouldassist.

omeofyoumayrecallthearticleIpennedin theSeptember−October2007issueofArmy Logisticianentitled“ThoughtsforSustainmentBrigadeCommanders.”NowthatmanyofourActiveandReservecomponentsustainmentbrigadeshavedeployedtoIraqorAfghanistan(andperformedbril-liantly,Imightadd),Ithoughtitwouldbeusefultoask:Whathasmadethemsosuccessful?Whatleader-shipskillshelpedwhen,likeclockwork,theyenabledthedrawdownofnearly100,000combattroopsandtheirequipmentoutofIraqlastyearandwhenweadded60,000moretroopsinAfghanistanoverthepast2years?Andwhatleadershipstrategiesaretheynowemployingtobesuccessful?

So,Iaskedthem.Andhere’swhattheytoldme,pro-vidingverysageadvicetothosewhocommandsus-tainmentbrigades.Withtheirtremendousamountoftheaterexperience,theyknowwhatworks.You’llseeafairamountofsimilaritytowhatIwrote3½yearsago,butthat’sOK—itjustvalidatesthatweareontherighttrack!

Pre-DeploymentColonel Ed Daly(43dSustainmentBrigade):“We

startedourtrainingapproachingarrison.Our‘traintofight’and‘fighttoberelevant’approachpaidhugedividendswhendeployed.NCOs[noncommissionedofficers],officers,andSoldiersunderstoodtheimpor-tanceofusingeveryopportunitytoengagewithsup-portunitsandleverageourcapabilitiesacrossthebattlespace.

“Thisapproachtaughtthestaffthatintelligencedrivesoperationsandoperationsdictatesustainment.Wehadtounderstandwhatwasoccurringoperation-allyinordertomaketherightadjustmentstoourcon-ceptofsupport.Itwasalsoimportanttomeetandtrainwithallsupportedunits,whenpossible,inordertobeginbuildingrelationshipsevenbeforedeployment.”

Colonel Michael Peterman (101stSustainmentBri-gade):“The101stSustainmentBrigadewasveryluckytodeploywiththedivisionfromourhomestation.Wewereprovidedanopportunity,aswepreparedfordeployment,toleveragetrainingdollarsandacademics

TipsFromSustainmentBrigadeCommanders

by lieutenant General MitcHell H. stevenson(and several forMer sustainMent briGade coMManders!)

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What makes a successful sustainment brigade commander? The Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, G−4, asked commanders with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan for their insights.

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“Ipersonallyattendedregionalcommanders’con-ferencesandbriefedweeklyasIwantedtheseniorbattlespaceleadershiptoknowthatIunderstoodtheoperationalcommander’sintent,mycommander’scriti-calinformationrequirements(CCIR)werenestedwiththeregionalcommanders,andmystaffandIhadagoodunderstandingandvisualizationoffutureopera-tionsandupcomingdecisionpoints.”

NestingBrigadier General Andre Piggee(15thSustainment

Brigade):“Worktobepartofyoursupporteddivisioncommander’sdailybattlerhythm;participateinthedivision’sdailycommander’supdatewithquick,hard-hittinglogactionsandsolutions.Collaboratedailywiththedivision’sG−4,andconvincethedeputycommand-inggeneralthatyouarehisseniorlogadviserforalllogissuesregardlessofwho’sresponsiblefortheaction.Iwouldcheckinwithmydeputycommandinggeneraleverydayeitherinperson,byphone(preferred),oremail.Iwouldinvitethedivisioncommandertovisitmyunitsandaskhimtoparticipateinceremonies.Lethimknowyourunitsarepartofhisteam.”

Brigadier General Steve Lyons(82dSustainmentBrigade):“Thisisallabouteffects—ensuringevery-thingwedointhelogisticscommunityisalignedwiththedesiredcampaignoutcomeofwinning.Thisoftenrequiresthinkingoutofthebox.Thebestlogis-ticiansunderstandoperations—sometimesbetterthanoperators.We’vecomeanincrediblylongwayinthisregard.

“Itisparamount[that]thesus-tainmentbrigadealignitsbattlerhythmtothedecisioncycleofthesupportedcommander.Inadditiontobeing‘onthenet,’itisequallyimportanttobe‘insidethewire’withtheliaisonofficernetwork.Itisimportant[that]liaisonofficersinsideofdivisionheadquartersbeactiveplannersinshapingoutcomes.Thisaffordssustainmentbrigadestheabilitytoanticipateandlinkthesup-portedcommander’sintentwiththerealityofthephysicsoflogis-tics.Italsoprovidesimportanttop-coverandleadtimeforSol-diersandcompany-levelleaderswhoactuallyexecutetasksonthebattlefield.”

Colonel Barbosa:“Thecom-mandsergeantmajorandIcirculatedthebattlefieldconstantly.Itgaveusachancetositdownwiththebri-gadecombatteamcommanderandthebrigadesupportbattalioncommander.Italsoallowedustoengagewithourfolkswhowereontheroad,operatingfromafor-wardbaseorthemayor/installationstaffwesupported.

“Weembeddedliaisonofficersinthebrigadesup-portbattalionstafforinaforwardoperatingbasewhenabrigadecombatteamwasn’tthere.Manytimes,wesupportedmorethanthebrigadecombatteamonthesameforwardoperatingbase.WealsoplacedasmallteamofliaisonofficerswiththedivisionG−4,andineverycasetheyprovedtheywereworththeirweightingold.Thisalwayskeptustwostepsaheadofanyissueandfocusedourbattlefieldcirculationvisits.”

Brigadier General Gus Perna (4thSustainmentBrigade):“Besidesdevelopingstrongrelationshipswiththedeputycommandinggeneralsyousupport,Irecommendyoumakeanefforttogetinsidethechiefofstaff’sroutine.Walkthedivisionhallwaysweekly.Also,makesureyourstaffunderstandsthe[division]G−4andstaffhavefreeaccesstoyourheadquarters.Theyhavetoknowyouarealwaysavailabletobrain-storm,assist,orjusttalk.”

Brigadier General Darrell Williams (3dSustain-mentBrigade):“Thesustainmentbrigademustbethebiggestteamplayeronthebattlefield,andgettingthejobdoneisallaboutpositiverelationshipsandbuild-ingtrustup,down,andlaterally.Therecanbenolightbetweenthesustainmentbrigade,supportedbrigades,supportedbrigadesupportbattalions,supportedavia-tionsupportbattalions,thedivisionG−4/G−1,andthesustainmentcommandyouworkfor.

“EveryplanthedivisionG−3/G−4/G−1eventhinksaboutdevelopingbaseduponthedivisioncommander’s

The 43d Sustainment Brigade and Regional Command South conduct a sustainment rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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guidancemustautomaticallyincludethesupportingsustainmentbrigade.Ifthatdoesn’thappen,you’realreadytoolate.

“Theengineersectionisamongthemostcriticalenablersonthesustainmentbrigadestaff,especiallyinactiveIED[improvisedexplosivedevice]areas.Thesustainmentbrigadeengineer’srelationshipwiththesectordivisionengineers,engineerbrigade,andlocalrouteclearanceteamsisliterallyalifesaver.Therelationshipisvitaltosector-widesupportandkeepingconvoysprotectedandmoving.

“Alsoensureyoursupportedunitsknowthatyouareresponsibleforhumanresourceandfinancesup-portfunctions.Manyofthemstilldon’tknowtheycancometothesustainmentbrigadeforhelpintheseareas.HavegoodCCIRinplaceforthesefunctions,andtreatthemjustasimportantasyoudoothersus-tainmentfunctions.”

Colonel Daly:“Ourstaffattendedover75meetingseachweek—ahighprice,butwellworththeinvest-menttodrivesustainmentanddemonstratethatwewereteamplayers.Wedevelopedanestedsustainmentactionplanwith5linesofeffort/operationand93sus-tainmentmeasuresofeffectiveness.”

Colonel Peterman:“Theimportanceofnestingwithyourhigherheadquartersisessential.Buildingrelationshipswiththeseunits,beingtiedintotrainingevents,andknowinghowthecommanderandhisstaffoperatewillallowthesustainmentbrigadetheabilitytobeproactivewithprovidingtheanticipatedsupport,understandingtheirmissions,aswellasleveragingthecapabilitiestheybringtothefight.Theregionalcom-mandhasownershipoftheassetsandcombatmultipli-ersnecessaryforasustainmentbrigade’ssuccess.

“RelationshipswithbattlespaceownersensurethatwhenourSoldiersrequireassistance,we’reabletogotothesourcedirectlyandconductcoordinationfortherequiredassets.Forexample,wecovermultiplebat-tlespacesdeliveringcommoditiesbuthavezeroorganicintelassets.Onceaconvoyleavesaforwardoperatingbase,they’reinsomeoneelse’sbattlespace.”

Brigadier General Lyons: “Thereisnosubstitutionforbattlefieldcirculation.Itisimperativetodeveloporreinforcenetworks,enablebattlefieldvisualiza-tion,andfacilitateearly-onproblemidentificationandresolution.”

MentoringColonel Barbosa: “Ournightlyreportstotheexpe-

ditionarysustainmentcommandwereconcisebutthorough.Wesharedthesewithourorganiccombatsustainmentsupportbattalionandallofthebrigadesupportbattalions.Ibelieveitgavethecommandersabroadlookatthelogisticspreparationsgoingoninandoutofthedivision’ssector.Manyofthecommandersthenadoptedourformatastheirown,sharingwithus

whattheyweresharingwiththeircommanders.”Brigadier General Williams: “Continuetomen-

torbrigadeandaviationsupportbattalioncommand-ers.Youmustbeavailableforoversight,personalandprofessionalcounsel,andadvice.Reachoutandhaveadirectrelationshipwitheachbrigadecombatteam.Theymustknowtheycancallyoupersonallyanytime,dayornight,andgetresults.Supportoperationsoffi-cersworkout90percentofthecriticalsupportissues,butoftenincrucial,time-compressedsituations,andsometimescommanderswanttospeaktoafellowcommander.”

Brigadier General Perna: “Govisityoursupportedbrigadesupportbattalions.Manydon’tknowwhattheyneedorwhatcapacityyoubring.Youdon’thavetoownthemtoinfluencethem.HavetheCSSBs[combatsustainmentsupportbattalions],BSBs,andAFSBns[Armyfieldsupportbattalions]conductcapabilitytourswitheachother,andtogethertheywillfigureouthowtofillseemsandgaps.”

FinalTipBrigadier General Lyons: “Doingmoreisnotalways

better.Themostimportantdecisionsyoumakearewhatyouarewillingnottodoinordertoensurelimitedresourcesareallocatedtothemostimportanttasks.”

Well,thereyouhaveit—somereallyvaluableadvicefromcommanderswhohavebeenthereanddonethat.Duetospaceconstraints,Ididnotincludeallthattheseformercommanderssentme,butallofwhattheysentisavailablefromtheArmyCombinedArmsSup-portCommand’s(CASCOM’s)DirectorateofLessonsLearnedandQualityAssurance.

AndIhaveatipofmyown.Ithastodowithsup-plysupportactivity(SSA)managementandoversight.GiventhelimitedautomatedmaterielmanagementcapabilityresidentontheBSBsandCSSBs,thesus-tainmentbrigadereallyhastostepforwardandprovideoversight—monitoringperformanceoftheSSAsinthesupportedareaofresponsibilityandenlistingthehelpofAMC’sExpertAuthorizedStockageListReviewTeamattheLogisticsSupportActivity(LOGSA)asrequired.Ithinkifyoutalktothosewhocontributedtheadviceabove,andanyothersuccessfulsustainmentbrigadecommander,they’dalltellyouthattheydidthis—itwasjustanotherkeytotheirsuccess.

Ihopeallofyououttherewhoaspiretocommandoursustainmentbrigadessavethisarticleandreferbacktoitfromtimetotime.Ifyouhavetipstoadd,pleasesendthemintoCASCOMsootherscanlearnfromyourexperience!ArmyLogistics—AlwaysThere,AlwaysReady!

lieutenant General MitcHell H. steVenson is tHe deputy cHief of staff, G−4, departMent of tHe arMy.

6 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

iththecurrentuseofforwardsurgicalteams andcombatsupporthospitalsonthebattle- field,wheredoesthemedicalcompanyofabrigadecombatteamfallintotheoperationplan?Thebrigadesupportmedicalcompany(BSMC)ismorerobustthanarole1facility,butitisnotabletopro-videasmanyservicesasarole3facility.[Role1isunit-levelfirstmedicalcare.Role3isthelevelofcareprovidedbyacombatsupporthospital.]Inessence,theBSMCis“themiddlechild,”whoalwaysseemstoget“leftout.”SowheredoestheBSMCfallinthespec-trumofArmymedicalsupport?

Officersaretaughtthecorrectwaytoconductsup-portoperationsassetindoctrine.Inthecurrentwaronterrorism,however,doctrinehastobeusedasastart-ingpointforwhataunitdoes.Thekeyisforaunittomaintainflexibility.

BSMCshavebeenusedfordif-ferentmissionsthroughoutthe9yearsofOperationEnduringFree-dom.Theyhavebeenusedtorundetaineeholdingfacilitiesand

provideforwardoperatingbase(FOB)securityandFOBdetails,andtheyhavebeenbrokenupintosmallerpiecesandtaskedtoperformasorganicrole1facilities.Theseareallwaystocarryoutthemission.ButwhenCCompany,402dBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB),deployedtoAfghanistanwiththe5thStrykerBrigadeCombatTeam,2dInfantryDivision,fromJointBaseLewis-McChord,Washington,itfoundthattheBSMCisstrongerasawholethanwhenitisbro-kenintoseparatepieces.

OperatinginTwoLocationsAfterCCompanyarrivedinanundevelopedthea-

terinAfghanistan,itsetupafirst-aidstationina10-by12-footbuildingwithoneexamroom.Thiswasatemporarysolutionthatprovidedmedicalcaretoover5,000Soldiersfor30days.

This photo shows the inside of the

initial C Company first aid station at

Kandahar Airfield. The aid station

was shared with the mayor’s cell

and had only one exam room, but the medics were able to support

over 5,000 Soldiers assigned to the

brigade.

UsingaBrigadeSupportMedicalCompanyontheCurrentBattlefield

by captain carla a. berGer

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A brigade support medical company deployed to Afghanistan found that flexibility was the key to providing support to a widely dispersed force.

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Thecompanywasthensplitbetweentwomainlo-cations.Evacuationteamsfromthecompanypushedouttotherole1facilitiestoincreasecoverageandalsotobringfemalemedicsupporttoeachinfantrybattalion.

HalfofthecompanywasstationedwiththeBSBtacticaloperationscenter(TOC)andthebrigadeTOC.Thisaidstationhadbetween20and30Soldiersatanygiventime.Alongwiththecombatmedicsandonemedicalprovider,thephysicaltherapist,theden-talteam,thepreventivemedicineteam,thebrigademedicalsupportofficer,thepatientadministrativetechnician,andthecompanysupplysection,theSol-diersbuilttheirnewhomefromgroundup.Theysup-portedover800SoldiersstationedatthislocationandprovidedcaretoSoldierspassingthroughfromthefrontlines.Thissectionprovidedcaretoover3,000Soldiers,whichwasmorethananyotheraidstationwithinthebrigade’sareaofoperation.

Alongwithprovidingcareonadailybasis,theSol-diersatthislocationwereassignedtoprovidemedicalcareonallBSBlogisticsconvoystooutlyingFOBs.Theteamsweremadeupofthreemedics:oneseniormedicasthetankcommander(whositsasapassengerinthefrontseatandactsastheleaderofthevehicle),onedriver,andonedismountedmedic(whocanexitthevehicletoprovidecareatamoment’snotice).Withtwotothreeconvoymissionsperweek,theaidstationwasoftenleftwithonlyfourmedicstoattendtosickcallpatients.

Tomakethebestuseofhisskills,theonlyphysicaltherapistassignedtotheBSMCwouldspendaweekataFOB,travelbacktotheaidstationtorefitandprovidecare,andthenheadtoanewlocation.Hewasabletohiteachlocation,onaverage,every6weeks.Theneedforphysicaltherapywassogreatatsomelocationsthathewouldoftenbepushedouttoacombatoutpost(COP)

A medic cares for a wounded Soldier after an indirect hit on a forward operating base.

8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

wherehewouldseeupto20newpatientswithina24-hourperiod.Toprovidecontinuouscare,hisphysi-caltherapytechnician,across-trainedSoldierinmili-taryoccupationalspecialty68W(healthcarespecialist),wouldstayattheaidstationtomakesurethatallpatientsreceivedthehighestlevelofcare.

Thepersonnelofthepreventivemedicinesectionalsospentmostoftheirdeploymentontheroadvisit-ingeachmajorFOBmonthly.TheyalsotraveledtoeachCOPtomakesureallSoldierswerelivingandworkinginhealthyconditions.Notonlydidtheypro-videcaretoAmericanSoldiers;theywereoftenusedtoprovideSWEAT[sewer,water,electricity,aca-demics,andtrash]assessmentsinlocalvillagesandAfghanNationalArmycompounds.

Becauseofthelargeamountofdentalequipment,itslackofmobility,anditsrequirementsforpower,thedentalteamwaspermanentlyassignedtotheaidstation.Duringthelast6monthsofthedeployment,theteamdidbegintotravel,withlimitedtools,toprovideclassIVexamsforSoldiersandobtainaclearerpictureofhowmanySoldierswouldberede-ployingasclassIII.[UnderDepartmentofDefensedentalfitnessclassifications,aclassIVSoldierisnondeployableifhehasnodentalexaminationrecordedinthelast12months.AclassIIISoldiercanbedeployedonlyifhereceivestreatmentforcondi-tionslikelytocauseadentalemergencywithinthenext12months.]

Onlyonepatientadministrativetechnicianwasre-sponsiblefortrackingtheentirebrigade’swoundedinactionandkilledinactionpersonnel,sohebecameborrowedmilitarymanpowertotherole3facility.Hewasoncall24hoursaday,7daysaweek,andhewascalledintoeverymedicalevacuation(medevac)thatinvolveda5thStrykerBrigadeCombatTeamSoldier.Allinformationthatwasgatheredwouldbepushedtothebrigadesurgeoncellsoitcouldbepushedtoallcommanderswithinthebrigade.

SupportingForwardThesecondhalfofthecompanywaspushedtoan

outlyingFOBsothattheinfantryelementscouldpushtheirprovidersandmedicstotheoutliningCOPs.Withx-ray,laboratory,patientholding,andcombatstresstreatmentcapabilities,thisaidstationprovidedcaretomorepatientsthanallrole1facilitiescombined.

Havingthex-rayandlaboratorycapabilitiesclosertothefightenabledSoldierstotravelbacktotheFOBinsteadofhavingtotravelbacktotherole3facilitytoreceivetreatmentofminorinjuries.ThisenabledSol-dierstostayinthefight.

Thepatientholdingsectionmadeanimportantcon-tributiontotheforwardfight.Beingcolocatedwithacombatstressteam,thesectionwasabletoprovideawatchforsuicidalordepressedpatients24hoursaday,

Above, the inside of the aid station located by the brigade support battalion tactical operations center.Below, the environmental science officer collects water samples from a forward operating base to transfer for testing.

MAY–jUNE 2011 9

The dental team provides care to a patient. The team was mobile but could only provide limited services.

7daysaweek.Withoutthiscapability,theseSoldierswouldhavebeenevacuatedtoahigherlevelofcare,tak-ingthemoffthelineforatleastaweekfortraveltimealone,nottomentionthetimeneededfortreatment.

Tocompensateforthelimitedcapabilityofthecombatstressteam,theorganiccombatstresstechni-cianwasmobileandcouldbeatanylocationwithin24hoursofanevent.HewouldtravelthroughouttheareaofoperationstoensurethatallSoldiers’mentalhealthneedswerecaredforonadailybasisinthehighlystressfulenvironment.

Beingcolocatedwiththeaeromedevaccapabilitiesincreasedcommunicationbetweenthetwomedicalelements.CategoryB(urgentsurgical)andcategoryC(priority)patientscouldbeflownstraighttotherole2facilityandgivencarewithinminutes.[Role2isdivision-levelcare,addingdental,x-ray,laboratory,andpatient-holdingcapabilitiestorole1care.]Iftherole2facilityhadnotbeenlocatedasfarforwardwithinthebattlespaceasitwas,thiscapabilitywouldnothaveexistedandallmedevacpatientswouldhavehadtobeflowntoarole3hospital,wheretheywouldhavebeenthelasttobeseenbecauseofthelargenumberofcategoryA(urgent)patients.Inthatsitua-tion,assoonasthepatientwasdischarged,hewould

havehadtoseekouthisbattalionliaisonofficertoarrangetransportationbacktotheunitinsteadofbeingwithindrivingdistanceofhiscompany.

Evenwithrunningtwoaidstations,CCompanywasstillflexibleenoughtosupporttheentirebrigade.Thisrangedfromprovidingspecializedprovidersandtreat-mentteamsattherole1facilitiesforbattalion-levelmissionstoprovidingfemalemedicsupportasfarforwardaspossibletoprovidecaretowoundedlocalfemalesaswellasfemalesearchcapability.

DoesthecurrentmakeupofaBSMCsupportthebattlefield?No.Thedoctrinalcompositionofanevac-uation,treatment,andheadquartersplatoondoesnotsupportcurrentoperations.ButhavingacommandthatenablesthecompanytobeflexibleandagileprovidesastrongermedicalelementtosupportallSoldiers.

captain carla a. berGer is tHe coMMander of c coMpany, 402d briGade support battalion, 5tH stryker briGade coMbat teaM, 2d infantry diVision, at joint base lewis-MccHord, wasH-inGton. sHe Has a bacHelor’s deGree in psycHoloGy and recreation tHerapy froM pittsburG state uniVersity. sHe is a Graduate of tHe HealtH Materiel officer course and tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course.

10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

he43dSustainmentBrigadehadresponsibilityfor thesouthernandwesternregionsofAfghanistan, providingsustainmenttosupportthesurgeofU.S.forcesduringOperationEnduringFreedom09–11.Thebrigadesurgeonandstaffcoordinatedandsynchronizedmedicaloperationsinconjunctionwiththebrigade’soperationalsustainmentsupportplan.Coordinationandsupportforthebrigade’smedicaltreatmentfacilities(MTFs)andmedicalsupportforthebrigade’slogis-ticsconvoysrequirednetworkingbeforedeployingtoAfghanistan.

BrigadeSurgeonSectionThebrigadesurgeonisaspecialstaffofficerwho

reportsdirectlytothebrigadecommander.Thebri-gadesurgeon’sdutiesincludecoordinatingwiththenext-highercommandsurgeonandthemedicalbri-gadecommandersforArmyHealthSystemsupportofsustainmentbrigadehealthservicesupport(HSS)andforcehealthprotection(FHP).

WhilepreparingtodeploytoAfghanistan,muchofthebrigadesurgeonsection(BSS)workconsistedofdevelopingandcoordinatingArmyHealthSystemsupportbyinitiatingnetworkcontactswiththesustain-mentunitsinAfghanistanthatalreadyhadmedicalsupport.TheBSSintegratedmedicalsupporttosyn-chronizewiththe43dSustainmentBrigadeoperationalsupportplan.Thebrigade’slargeareaofresponsibility

requiredmuchcoordinationtomeetallofitsneedsforHSSandFHPinthesouthernhalfofAfghanistan.

MissionPreparationMedicalcoordinationandsup-

portfromthealready-in-place575thAreaSupportMedicalCompany(ASMC),30thMedicalCommand,andthelaterarriving62dMedicalCommandbeganwhilethe43dSustainmentBrigadeheadquarterswasstillstateside.DeterminingthecurrentlevelsofcareandmedicalevacuationassetsavailablewasessentialtothesurgeofU.S.forcesexpectedintheregion.

Beforedeploying,thebrigadesurgeonandstaffdiligentlyworkedtosynchronizeandinte-gratepropermedicalsupportwithinthebrigade’soperationalsupportplan.Beforethebrigade’sarrivalincountry,initialcontact

SustainmentBrigadeMedicalOperations

by Master serGeant GreGory c. tHorn

T

The brigade surgeon section is key in planning and implementing effective healthcare for a sustainment brigade. This was demonstrated by the 43d Sustainment Brigade’s brigade surgeon section during its deployment to Afghanistan.

In preparation for setting up their consolidated role 1 aid station, 43d Sustainment Brigade medics inventory the medical platoon’s medical equipment after downloading it from its containers.

MAY–jUNE 2011 11

wasmadewithalready-in-placeunitstocoordi-nateandplanthebrigade’srequiredHSSandFHPneedsforitsexpansiveroleinsouthernandwesternAfghanistan.

Duringthebrigade’sfirst60daysinAfghanistan,theprimaryconcernwasestablishingtherole1MTFwhileplanningandcoordinatingthebrigade’smedicalsupport.Doctrinalmanningofsustainmentbrigadeswithmedicsandprovidersonlysupportsthebrigadeheadquarterselement.The43dSustainmentBrigade’ssustainmentexpansionintosouthernandwesternAfghanistanmeanttheBSSneededadditionalmedicstosupportthebrigade’slogisticsconvoys.

UponarrivalinAfghanistan,thebrigadesurgeonfocusedonpatientmanagementandtreatmentthatrequiredout-of-theatermedicalevaluationsandtreat-ments.Processingauthorizationsforaeromedevacsandmedevacsthroughthepatientadministrationsergeantefficientlymovedpatientsforcontinuedcare.TheBSSdevelopedandcoordinatedaneffectivemasscasualty(MASCAL)planthatcomplementedthebase-wideemergencyplan.

MTFLevelsThreelevelsofmedicalcareareavailableinthe

southernhalfofAfghanistan.ThelevelsusetheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)designationsreferredtoas“roles,”whicharedifferentfromtheAmericanCollegeofSurgeons“levels”thatareusedbyU.S.traumacenters.Themilitaryrolesdesignatedifferencesincapabilitiesandnotthequalityofcare.

Medicalcapabilitiesincreasewitheachrolestep;eachhigherrolehasthecapabilitiesoftherolebelowitinadditiontoexpandedcapabilities.ThemostforwardroleMTFpossibleworkstoreturntroopstodutyafterminortreatmentforminorinjuriesorill-nesses.TroopsrequiringexpandedmedicalcarearepreparedandevacuatedwithenroutemedicalcaretothenexthigherroleMTFtoreceivethemoreexten-sivetreatment.

Role 1 MTF.Role1MTFsprovideinitialtriage,medicaltreatment,andevacuationasneeded.Staffingattherole1MTFsincludesmedicsandeitherafieldsurgeonoraphysicianassistant.Role1MTFsarethefirstlevelofcareprovidedbyadoctororphysi-cianassistantandofferinitiallife-savingtreatmentofcasualties,primarydiseaseprevention,nonbattle-injuryprevention,androutinesickcallhealthcare.Role1MTFshavenopatient-holdingfacilities.

Role 2 MTF. ThesouthernandwesternAfghanistanrole2MTFscontinuebasicandemergencytreatment,includingbasicprimarycare.Theyprovideanincreasedmedicalcapabilitywiththeadditionofx-ray,laboratory,combatoperationalstresscontrol,anddentalservicesandhavelimitedinpatientbedspace(approximately20to40cots)forholdingpatientsupto72hours.

The575thASMCprovidedKandaharAirfieldwithaU.S.Armyrole2MTFbutwithoutthepatientholdingbecauseofitsproximitytotheKandaharrole3MTF.

Role 3 MTF.The43dSustainmentBrigadehead-quarters,basedonthelargemultinationalNATOKan-daharAirfield,hasanestablishedNATOrole3MTF.TheKandaharrole3MTFprovidesthehighestlevelofcarewithinthetheaterandalsohasexpandedinpatientcapacity.Itprovidesoutpatientservicesorhospital-izationforalltypesofin-theaterpatients,furnishingdefinitivemedicalcareorstabilizingformedicalevac-uationoutofthecombattheater.

TheKandaharrole3MTFhasoperatingroomtablesforinitialtypesofsurgicalservicesthatincludegeneral,thoracic,orthopedic,neurosurgical,urologic,plusden-talandoromaxillofacial(whenthespecialtyproviderisavailable),withpost-operativecareinintensivecareunits,intermediatecarewards,andminimalcarewards.Aneuropsychiatricwardisalsoavailable.Additionallaboratory,x-ray,bloodbank,optometry,mortuary,andphysicaltherapyservicesareavailableintheKandaharrole3MTF.TheMTFalsohasanexpandedbehavioralhealthdepartment.Incomingandoutgoingpatientevac-uationtransportationsupportisanadditionalfeature,movingpatientstoandfromtherole3MTF.

SustainmentBrigadeMedicalOrganizationSustainmentbrigadesareauthorizedasmallmedical

platooncomposedofaheadquarterselement,atreatmentsquad,andanambulancesquad.Theheadquartersele-mentincludesafieldsurgeon(whoisalsoassignedasatreatment-squadprovider)andastaffsergeanthealthcaresergeantastheplatoonsergeant.Thetreatmentsquadincludesaphysicianassistant,twomedicaltreatmentser-geants,andfivemedics.Theambulancesquadincludestwoambulancemedicalsergeantsandfourmedics.

Themedicalplatoonisresponsibleforthebrigaderole1MTF,providingemergencytraumaandroutinemedicaltreatmentforthealmost300personnelinthebrigadeheadquartersandheadquarterscompany(HHC)plusapproximately1,700additionaltroopsfromtheothersubordinatesustainmentbrigadeunitswithintheHHCbaseoperatingarea.Onceitwassetup,theMTFimmediatelystartedprovidingmedicalcare,creatingacombinedaidstation(CAS)withitssurgeonperiodicallyassistingthe43dSustainmentBri-gade’sfieldsurgeonandphysicianassistant.

The43dSustainmentBrigadeprovidesallclassesofsupplytoU.S.andNATOforcesinsouthernandwesternAfghanistan.TheBSShelpswithacquiringadditionalmedicsandmedicalsupportforthelogisticsconvoysbecausethebrigade’smedicalplatoonhasonlyenoughmedicstosupportoneMTF.TherequestformoremedicsbroughtaugmentationfromtheAirForcewithmedicsforconvoysupport.TheAirForcemedicsalsoreplacedArmymedicsatonebasethatthe575thASMC

12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

wassupporting.Sincethe575thASMCwasredeployingbacktotheUnitedStates,logisticsconvoystooneofthebrigade’smajorlogisticsbasesinsouthernandwesternAfghanistanwouldnothavehadmedicalcoverage.

Whenthe575thASMCwithdrewfromsupportingthesustainmentbrigadeunits,the43dSustainmentBrigade’smedicsbegansupportingthelogisticscon-voysofoneofitssustainmentbattalions.Thisreducedthenumberofmedicsavailabletosupportthebrigade’srole1CASMTF,causingareductionintheMTF’soperatinghoursfromitsprevious24-hourschedule.

SettingUpOperationsUponarrivalinthe43dSustainmentBrigadearea

ofresponsibility,thebrigade’sprimaryconcernswereestablishingitsrole1MTFandcoordinatingthemedicaleffortforthebrigadetroops.Asthe43dSus-tainmentBrigade’sSoldiersarrivedatKandahar,thebrigadesurgeonimmediatelybeganreceivingpatientcareconsultsfrombrigadeproviders.

TheBSSbegancoordinatingandmanagingmedicalevacuationandtreatmentauthorizationsforindividualtroopstoleavethetheaterbyaeromedevacformoreadvancedtestsorproceduresunavailableintheaterattheNATOrole3MTF.Throughthepatientadministra-tionsergeant,theBSStrackedallbrigadetroopsonaeromedevacsandonurgentbutstablemedevacsthatleftthetheateruntiltheyreturnedtothetheaterorcontinuedtotheUnitedStates.

OncethebrigadearrivedinAfghanistan,thenextstepfortheBSSwastodevelopthe43dSustainmentBrigade’sMASCALplanandcoordinateitwiththemultinational,jointKandaharAirfieldMASCALplan.Thebrigade’sMASCALplanimplementedtheidentificationofcasualtycollectionareasandcasualtycollectionpointswheremedicalsupplyboxeswithlit-tersareplaced.Theplanalsoidentifiedthebrigade’ssubordinateunits’laborpool,communications,andsecurityresponsibilities—allofwhichdependonthelocationwithinthebrigade’sareaofresponsibilityonKandaharAirfield,whereaMASCALmayoccur.

MedicalSustainmentTheBSSmonitoredandtrackedmedicaloperations

withinthebrigadewiththeMedicalCommunicationsforCombatCasualtyCareSystemandprovidedtimelyinformationtothebrigadesurgeononmedicalcapabil-itiesandupdatedmedicalsituationalawarenessonthehealthofthecommand.Armedwiththisinformation,theBSSworkedwiththeMTFsunderitsresponsibilitytocontinuetoimprovethetroops’HSSandFHP.

Withinthebrigade’sfirst60daysinAfghanistan,thebrigademedicalaidstationsimprovedthebrigade’srequiredimmunizationscomplianceby23percent;thisimprovedthebrigade’smedicalreadinessbymorethan12percent.Thiscoordinationandmanagement

oftheclassVIII(medicalsupplies)wasmadepossiblebyworkinghand-in-handwiththebrigade’smedicallogisticsofficerinthecommoditiesmanagementcenter.Orderedandshipped,theclassVIIIwenttothebattal-ions’role1CASs.Fromthere,theprovidersandmedicsaggressivelyprovidedtheneededvaccinations,tests,andprofilemanagementtokeepthebrigade’smedicalreadinessatmorethan95percentduringthedeployment.

Medicaltrainingoccurredinthetheater,withtheBSScoordinatingwiththeKandaharAirfieldmedi-calsimulationtrainingcentertosupportthebrigade’sneedforcontinuedmedicandcombatlifesavertrain-ing.Thishelpedthebrigade’sSoldiersandmedicstoremainwell-trainedandconfidentintheirmedicalskillsandabilities.Theneedforsustainmenttrainingdevelopedbecauseofthenumberofbrigadelogisticsconvoystravelingondangerous,difficult,andlimitedroadsinsouthernandwesternAfghanistan.

Asthemedicalproviderswithinthebrigaderede-ployed,theBSScoordinatedwithothercommands,includingtheU.S.Navycommands,torequestreplace-mentsandensurethattheyarrived.Intheeventthatthereplacementproviderdidnotarriveuntiloveramonthafterthefirstproviderredeployed,atemporaryprovidercoveredtheoutlyingrole1aidstation’sprovidershortage.

Thebrigade’srole1CASincreaseditscapabilitiesandservicesbycoordinatingprimarydentalservices.Adentistanddentalassistantwiththeirgeneralfielddentalequipmentcolocatedintherole1CAStopro-videbasicdentalcareandhygieneservices.Consoli-datedcheck-inandprescriptiondispensingstreamlinedbothdentalandmedicalareasforbothpatienttypes.

TheBSStrackedandmonitoredmedicalopera-tionswithinthebrigadeandeffectivelymanagedmedicalsupplies.Theresultswereimprovedbrigadecompliancewithimmunizationandmedicalreadi-ness.Medicaltrainingwasalsoconductedtomaintainmedics’andSoldiers’medicalskillsandconfidence.Coordinatingthereplacementsforredeployingmedicalprovidershelpedmaintaintheoutlyingrole1MTFs’medicalcapabilities.Additionaldentalcareandservic-eswerealsocoordinated,expandingthebrigaderole1CAScapabilities.MedicalanalysisandflexibilitywithintheBSSallowedthe43dSustainmentBrigadetosustainthebuildupofU.S.forcesinsouthernandwesternAfghanistan.

Master serGeant GreGory c. tHorn is tHe senior Medical opera-tions noncoMMissioned officer for tHe 43d sustainMent briGade. He Holds an associate’s deGree in applied science froM wayland baptist uniVersity and a bacHelor’s deGree in HealtHcare serVices and a Master’s deGree in business adMinistration specializinG in HealtHcare ManaGeMent froM tHe uniVersity of pHoenix. He is a Graduate of tHe arMy battle staff course; tHe senior, adVanced, and warrior leader courses; and tHe Medical noncoMMissioned officer course.

MAY–jUNE 2011 13

nyonewhohasbeenaroundtheArmyMedical Departmenthasprobablyheard,“Havenofear; USAMMA[U.S.ArmyMedicalMaterielAgency]willwaveitsmagicwandandmedicalsup-plieswillbetherewhenyouneedthem.”However,asformerSecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeldsaid,“Yougotowarwiththearmyyouhave,notthearmyyoumightwant.”DuringKeyResolve2010(KR10),theU.S.ArmyMedicalMaterielCenter,Korea(USAMMC–K)exercisedfourscenariostoensurethatthemedicallogisticsthewarfightershaveinKoreaisthemedicallogisticstheywant.

ReorganizationinKoreaSupportingthewarfighterinoftenaustereandusu-

allyjointoperationsprovidesuniqueopportunitiestoshapemedicallogisticsorganizationsformissionsuc-cess.Themostsignificanttransformationwithinthelast3yearswastheactivationofUSAMMC–Ktoreplacethedeactivated16thMedicalLogistics(MEDLOG)Battalion.

For6decades,amedicallogisticsorganizationatCampCarroll,Korea,hassupportedtheKoreanpenin-sulaandpartsoftheU.S.PacificCommand(PACOM)areaofresponsibility.In2007,the16thMEDLOGBattalionwasslatedfordeactivation,creatingacriticalgapinmedicallogistics.

Overmanymonthsofintensediscussions,collabora-tiveeffortsamongPACOM;U.S.ForcesKorea(USFK);theOfficeoftheSurgeonGeneral;theDefenseLogis-ticsAgency(DLA),whichistheExecutiveAgentforMedicalMateriel;theArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand;the18thMedicalCommand(nowthe65thMedicalBrigade);andtheArmymedicallogisticscommunityresultedintheestablishmentofUSAMMC–Kasaprovisionalorganization.InOctober2008,USAMMC–Kassumedthemissionsofthe16th

MEDLOGBattalionandtheTheaterLeadAgentforMedicalMateriel-Korea(TLAMM–K).

USAMMC–KwasofficiallyactivatedinOctober2009.TheorganizationisadirectreportingunitundertheArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommandbutisundertheoperationalcontrolofthe65thMedi-calBrigade,whichwasactivatedinOctober2008asasubordinatecommandoftheEighthU.S.Army.

Duringthesametimeperiod,anothermedicallogisticstransformationwasoccurringinJapan.In2009,theAirForce’s18thMedicalGroupinOkinawawasdesignated

MedicalLogisticsOperationsontheKoreanPeninsulaDuringKeyResolve2010

by Major WilliaM tudor and sara scHubert

A

One of the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center, Korea’s missions is to ensure the medical logistics readiness of U.S. Forces Korea for transition to hostilities. This capability was tested using four medical logistics scenarios.

A U.S. Soldier, a ROK Soldier, and a Korean augmentee to the U.S. Army inventory medical supplies issued by USAMMC–K to a ROK hospital during exercise Key Resolve 2010.

14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

astheTheaterLeadAgentforMedicalMateriel-PACOM(TLAMM–P).TheunitbeganbysupportingOkinawa-basedunitsandachievedinitialoperatingcapabilityinOctober2010.WhenTLAMM–Preachesfulloperation-alcapability,itwillbeabletoprovidebackupmedicallogisticssupporttoTLAMM–K.

USAMMC–Kisanamalgamatedorganizationcon-sistingof—o USAMMC–Kmilitarypersonnel.o USAMMC–KDepartmentoftheArmycivilians.o BorrowedmilitarymanpowerfromtheHeadquar-

tersandHeadquartersCompany,65thMedicalBrigade,andtheHeadquartersandHeadquartersDetachment,168thMultifunctionalMedicalBattal-ion,andthe563dMedicalLogisticsCompany.

o KoreanAugmenteetoU.S.Armysoldiers.o Koreannationalemployees.o KoreanServiceCorpspersonnel.o ADLAplanner.o The19thSustainmentCommand(Expeditionary)

liaisonofficer.Despitethemixofpersonnel,USAMMC–Khas

jelledextremelywellasaworld-classorganization,aswasdisplayedduringKR10.

PlanningforKR10In2009,theUSFKsurgeonand65thMedicalBri-

gadecommanderinformedtheUSAMMC–Kcom-manderofhisintenttoexercisemedicallogisticscapabilitiesextensivelyduringtheupcomingexercise.Medicallogisticsofficersthroughoutthepeninsuladevelopedfourmedicallogisticsscenariosdesignedtochallengethemultipleechelonsofmedicallogis-ticssupportrequiredduringatransition-to-hostilitiesoperation.ThescenariosexercisedclassVIII(medicalmateriel)electronicorderinganddistributioninrealis-ticsituations.

Theobjectiveswereasfollows:o Assessmedicalsupplyelectronic-ordering

strengthsandchallenges.o Validatetheoperational“insupportof ”relation-

shipwiththeRepublicofKorea(ROK)forces.o Exercisetheforwarddistributionteammission

ofUSAMMC–Kandthe563dMedicalLogisticsCompany.

o ExercisetheTLAMM–PinsupportoftheTLAMM–Kconcept.

o AssessDefenseDistributionDepotKorea(DDDK)supportcapabilities.

Scenario1:Army-CentricClassVIIISupportTheconceptoftheArmy-centricoperationwasto

provideclassVIIItoataskforcewithamedicalcom-panythatbecametheclassVIIIsupplysupportactiv-ity(SSA).ThesupportedunitsthenreconfiguredtheirDMLSS(DefenseMedicalLogisticsStandardSupport)

CustomerAssistanceModule(DCAM)tosubmitorderstotheSSAusingacombatservicesupportverysmallapertureterminal(CSSVSAT),andtheSSAsubmittedtherequirementtoUSAMMC–KusingaCSSVSAT.

Multipleissuesaroseduringtheelectronicorder-ingofmedicalsupplies,preventingUSAMMC–Kfromexercisingtheprocessfully.ThesupportedunitsattendedseveraltrainingsessionsconductedbyMedi-calCommunicationsforCombatCasualtyCareandUSAMMC–KpersonneltohelpwithreconfiguringtheirDCAMsystems.Unfortunately,theDCAMreconfigura-tioncouldnotbeaccomplishedbecauseofhardware,software,andnetworkissues.Thesolutionwasforeachunittoorderseparately,usingDCAMovertheexist-inglocalareanetworktoUSAMMC–KandtheSSA’sDepartmentofDefenseactivityaddresscodeasasup-plementaladdressfordeliverytotheSSA.

MovementofsuppliesbeganatUSAMMC–Kwiththepalletizationandpreparationforrotary-wingdeliveryofclassVIII.TheCH–47Chinookhelicop-terpickedupthecargoatCampCarrollandmovedtheshipmenttoAreaI.Thedeliverywasmadelatethatafternoontoalandingzonewhereaforwarddistributionteam,consistingof563dMedicalLogis-ticsCompanyand560thMedicalCompany(GroundAmbulance)Soldiers,receivedtheclassVIIIsupplies.TheteamtransportedthesuppliestotheSSAandthenseparatedthesuppliesforeachcustomer.

Thefollowingday,partoftheclassVIIIshipmentreceivedwasslatedtobemovedbyfront-lineambu-lancebackhaultoasupportedunit.However,becauseofsevereroadconditions,thismovementwasdelayedforseveraldaysuntilicewasclearedfromtheroads.

Thesuccessofthismissioncanbeattributedinlargeparttothereconnaissancemissionsandplan-ningofthe563dMedicalLogisticsCompanyforwarddistributionteamandthe560thMedicalCompany.The2dCombatAviationBrigadeflightcrewalsodidanoutstandingjobofensuringthatthemissionwascom-pleteddespitedelayscausedbytheweather.

Scenario2:CombinedSupporttoROKForcesTheconceptofthisscenariowastoprovideemer-

gencyclassVIIIcombinedsupporttotheROKArmyinordertosupportKoreanhospitaloperations.ROKArmygroundassetspickedupclassVIIIatCampCar-rollandmovedthesuppliestoasupportedhospital.

ThemutuallogisticssupportagreementwasusedtoauthorizethetransferofsuppliesfromUSAMMC-KtotheROKArmy.ThesupplyrequestflowedfromtheROKunitthroughtheCombinedForcesCoordinationCenterandtheJointMedicalOperationsCentertoUSAMMC–K.Allcommunicationwasaccomplishedviaemail,tele-phone,and“click-to-meet”videoteleconference.

Althoughallsupplieswerenotional,eachboxwaspackedandmarkedasifitweretheactualclassVIII

MAY–jUNE 2011 15

materiel.Thetemperature-sensativeitemswerepackedtostandard,andajointinventorywasconductedofallitems.Thisprocess,althoughverysimple,hadneverbeenexercisedasfarbackasanyonecouldrecall.Thescenariowasasuccessbecauseitwaswellexecutedandexpandedthepossibilityforfuturescenarios.

AnotablediscoverywasthattheRepublicofKoreaandtheUnitedStatesusedifferentcatalognumberstoidentifyindividualitems.Bothpartiesagreedtoresearchcorrespondingcatalognumbersfortheir100high-demanditemstofacilitatefutureordering.

TheROKArmymedicallogisticscommunityper-formedcommendablyintheircoordinatingefforts,whichensuredmissionsuccess.

Scenario3:TLAMM–PSupporttoTLAMM–KInthisscenario,the18thMedicalGroup,basedat

KadenaAirBaseinOkinawa,servedastheTLAMM–PandsupportedtheJointSpecialOperationsTaskForce-PhilippinesandtheIIIMarineExpeditionaryForce.Inthisscenario,aMarineunitinKorearequestedemer-gencyresupply.USAMMC–Kcouldnotprovidesup-portwithcurrentstocksonhand;theTLAMM–Pwasabletosupporttherequirementwithitson-handstockthroughanaeromedevacflightbackhaul.

TheDefenseSupplyCenterPhiladelphiamedicallogisticsplanneratUSAMMC–KandtheUSAMMC–Ksupportoperationsofficervisitedthe18thMedicalGroupinFebruary2010toassistwithaTLAMM–Pplanningconference.Theserelationshipsprovedtobeinvaluableinexecutingtheoperation.

Becauseofsystemsincompatibility,themedi-calelectronicorderingwasaccomplishedbyemail.Inordertoeffectivelysupportfuturerequirements,USAMMC–KmustestablishanaccountwiththeTLAMM–Ponceitreachesfulloperationalcapacity.

TheclassVIIIshipmentwasflownfromtheTLAMM–PtoKoreabyfixed-wingaircraftfromthe18thMedicalGroupinOkinawaandthentransportedtotheportby2dCombatAviationBrigaderotary-wingassets.AstheTLAMM–Phasnotreachedfullopera-tionalcapability,theauthorizedmedicalallowancelistcontainersusedtosimulateclassVIIImovementwereempty.The18thMedicalGroupandtheaeromedevaccrewensuredthattheauthorizedmedicalallowancelistcontainerswereloadedontotheC–130airplaneandtransportedtoOsanAirBase.The3dCombatAviationBrigadecoordinatedjointlywiththeMarinesandtheROKNavytoguaranteedeliverytoaROKNavyport.

Aclearlessonlearnedfromthisscenariowasthatmedicalandlogisticsunitsunderstandtheimportanceofworkingjointlyandareevenbeginningtoembracemutualsupportrelationships.

ByfindingawaytogettheclassVIIIontotheair-plane,the18thMedicalGroupandtheaeromedevaccrewshowedtheir“cando”mindset.Theparticipation

and“Oorah!”attitudeoftheIIIMarineExpeditionaryForcestaffinOkinawaalsocontributedimmenselytothesuccessofthisscenario.

Scenario4:JointSupporttotheU.S.NavyThisscenariofocusedonajointoperationbetween

USAMMC–K,DDDK,andNavypersonnelfromtheUSSBlue Ridge.ANavyshipatportrequestedemer-gencymedicalsuppliesthroughUSAMMC–K,andUSAMMC–Kcoordinatedthedelivery.

Beforeenactingthescenario,theNavyestablishedanaccountwithUSAMMC–KtofacilitatetheclassVIIIorderingprocess.TheNavyusedNon-SecureInternetProtocolRouteremailtosubmitordersforclassVIIItoUSAMMC–KbecausetheonboardsystemandTheaterEnterprise-WideLogisticsSystemdonotinterface.

Afterreceivingtheorder,USAMMC–Kselected,packaged,andpreparedtherequestedmedicalsuppliesforshipment.ItalsocoordinatedwithDDDKandthe563dMedicalLogisticsCompanytodistributethesup-pliesandwiththeROKNavytoobtainaccesstotheirportforthedelivery.Ontheship,the563dMedicalLogisticsCompanyandtheNavyconductedajointinventoryofthemedicalsuppliesandthentransferredthemtotheNavy.

Ontheroadahead,USAMMC–Kmustdevelopcriticalitemslistrequirements,workwiththeROKtoimprovemedicallogisticscollaboration,refineoperationplansandexercises,anddemonstratetheimportanceofmedicallogisticssupportoperationstotheUSFKlead-ers.Toprojectrequirementsandidentifyshortfallsinthesupplypipeline,USAMMC–KwillworkwithUSFKandDLAtoensurethatappropriatemitigationactionsaretaken.ThesescenarioshavereinforcedthefactthatUSAMMC–KmustworkwithUSFK,theROKandDLAtocoordinatemedicallogisticsplanninginpeace-timeinordertofacilitatesuccessduringwar.

Major williaM tudor is a Medical loGistics ManaGeMent intern at tHe u.s. arMy Medical Materiel aGency at fort detrick, Maryland. in preVious assiGnMents, He was tHe support opera-tions officer for u.s. arMy Medical Materiel center-korea (usaMMc–k) and coMMander of tHe 563d Medical loGistics coMpany in soutH korea. He is a Graduate of tHe Medical loGis-tics course and tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course.

sara scHubert is tHe troop support planner for tHe defense loGistics aGency troop support Medical directorate at usaMMc–k. sHe Holds a bacHelor’s deGree in bioMedical enGi-neerinG froM rensseleaer polytecHnic institute.

tHe autHors tHank lieutenant colonel sHon-neil w. seVerns, coMMander of usaMMc–k, and Major Marco ocHa, usaMMc–k pHarMacy consultant, for tHeir contributions to tHis article.

16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heno-noticedeploymentlastyearofthe407thBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB),2dBrigadeCombatTeam(BCT),82dAirborneDivision,astheglobalresponseforcetoOperationUnifiedResponseinHaitiwasanexampleofhowtheArmyasanexpeditionaryforcedeploystoplacesthathavelittletonoinitiallogisticsinfrastructure.Astheinitialsupportforceontheground,the407thBSBhadtoestablishthesupportarchitecturewhilesupportingitsorganicunitsandotherunitsoperatingwithinthejointtheaterofoperations.

Unitsinevitablyexperienceagapbetweenthedeploymentoftheirowncapabilitiesandthearriv-alofunitswithhigher-levelsupportcapability.Althoughenduringthegap,whilepainful,isdoable,aunitcanreducethisgapbyfullyexpandingitscapacitybeforehand.

Expandingandretainingnewlogisticscapacityisnoteasy;itrequiresleaderswithconstantvigilance,creativity,andtenacity.Itbeginswiththedisciplinetomaintainsituationalawarenessofspecificunitstatusandcontinueswiththeinitiativetocreatechallengingtrainingscenariosthatwilltrulyvalidatethestrengthoftheunit’scapability.Expandinglogisticscapacitytooptimallevelsrequiredforcontingencyoperationsinimmaturetheatersrequiresknowingcurrentcapacity,refusingtobe“onedeep,”trainingbeyondyourforma-tion,andcontracting.

KnowCurrentCapacityBeforeexpandingcapacity,wemustfirstknowour

currentstatus.Weoftenassumewepossessacertaincapabilitywithouttrulyknowingourstrengthsandweaknesses.Indoingso,wemaynotrealizethatweactuallypossesslesscapacitythanweneed.

Therefore,wemustfullyunderstandtheextentofourlogisticscombatpower.Likecombatpower,logis-ticscombatpowerinvolvesacompleteunderstandingandassessmentofallcomponentsnecessary,includingthepeople,equipment,andtrainingrequiredtotrulyprovideacapability.

Forexample,alogisticsconvoyinvolvesmuchmorethanafullymission-capabletruck.Itmusthave

atrainedcrewthathasworkedtogether;thecrewmusthaveafullcomplementofnightvisionequipment,binoculars,ammunition,navigationaids,andrecoveryitems;andtheconvoymustbeabletoperformthemis-sionduringdayandnight.

Thepeople-equipment-tasks(PET)frameworkisextremelyusefulinidentifyingshortfallsandlimita-tionsandensuringthatwehavecoveredallthebasesinexaminingouron-handcapability.

Ineachcategory(people,equipment,andtasks),wemustaskquantity-andquality-orientedquestionstodetermineourcurrentstatus.Quantity-typeques-tionsaresimple;theyaddressifweareauthorizedtheitemsandifwehavethemonhand.However,quality-orientedquestionsbestdetermineourtruestatus:Areourpeopledeployable,doesourequipmentfunction,andarewereadytodeploy?

Assessingstatusineachsubcategoryentailsaskingaseriesofquestionsandprovidingastatusbasedontheanswers.

People. Herearesomesamplequestionsforassess-ingthepeoplecategory:o Ofthepeopleweareauthorized,howmanyare

onhand?o Ofthepeoplewehaveonhand,howmanycan

deploytoday?o Dowehavetheleadersweareauthorized?

Theanswerstothesequestionsdeterminethelevelofreadiness,whichcanbedefinedintermsofgold,green,amber,red,andblack.Tobegoldinthepeoplecategorymeansthatatleast95percentoftheauthorizedpeopleareonhand,95percentoftheleadersareonhand,andlessthan5percentofthepeoplearenondeployableoverall.

Tobegreeninthepeoplecategorymeansthat90to100percentofthepeopleauthorizedareonhand,90percentoftheleadersareonhand,andlessthan10percentofthepeoplearenondeployable.

Beingambermeansthat80to90percentofthepeo-pleauthorizedareonhand,80percentoftheleadersareonhand,and15percentofthepeoplearenondeployable.

Toberedmeansthat70to80percentofthepeopleauthorizedareonhand,70percentoftheleadersareonhand,and20percentofthepeoplearenondeployable.

T

ExpandingLogisticsCapacityby lieutenant colonel MattHeW p. sHatzkin

Logistics units preparing for expeditionary support operations must fully expand their support capabilities by knowing their on-hand capability and training to fill in the gaps.

MAY–jUNE 2011 17

Beingblackinthepeoplecategorymeansthatlessthan70percentoftheauthorizedpeopleareonhand,lessthan70percentoftheleadersareonhand,and30percentofthepeoplearenondeployable.

Equipment. Understandingequipmentextendsbeyondknowingwhatisonhandandifitworks.Par-ticularlyinourbusiness,wemustknowifwepossessallcomponentstoasysteminordertomakeitwork.Examplesofthosecomponentsarefilters,hoses,pumps,testkits,chemicals,gauges,lubricants,andothercriticalcomponentsthatconstitutesystems.Alackofcomponentsisanalogoustoaweaponwithoutammunition.Dowehavesufficientsparesandbackupsforthemostcriticalcomponents?

Tasks. Determiningourtaskstatusinvolvesunder-standingifwecanperformthetasksrequiredtopro-videaspecifiedcapability.Todeterminethisstatus,wemustfirstknowhowmanybattledrillscomprisethetaskandifourteamscanperformthemtothepre-scribedperformancemeasures.

AfterreturningfromOperationUnifiedResponse,the407thBSBtransformeditsbiweeklycommandandstaffmeetingintoareadinessreview.Duringthereadi-nessreview,eachcompanycommanderusedthePETframeworktocommunicateanddescribehiscurrent

capabilities.Thisdiscussionprovid-edameanstounderstandourshort-fallsbeforeano-noticecrisis.Wealsousedourmonthlyunitstatusreporttocommunicateoursignifi-cantlimitationsandchallenges.

RefusetoBeOneDeepForwardsupportcompanies

(FSCs)haveover30special-ties—asmanyastherearewithintheinfantrybattalionsthemselves.TheBSBandFSCbothhavedutypositionstowhichonlyonepersonisassigned(thespecialtyisonedeep),suchaspatientadministrator,small-armsrepairer,andenviron-mentalspecialist.Whenwereviewtheadditionaldutieswerequirefororganizationalsustainmentinanausteresetting(suchasarmorer,communicationsspecialist,fieldsanitationspecialist,carpenter,barber,andcombatlifesaver),wemayfindourselvesverythinonexpertise.

Wecanovercomethesevulnerabilitiesinseveralways.Forspecialtiesthatareonedeep,onaregularbasiswemustconductandcapturecross-trainingthatismeasuredagainstalevelofproficiency.Aftercross-training,unitsshouldcapturethenewcapabilitywithintheirPETassessment.Forexample,“people”couldbeexpandedtomeasurehowmanypeoplehavebeenformallycross-trainedandcertifiedinanareabeyondtheirprimaryspecialties.

Consideringthenumberoffunctionsneededtosustainacompany,alltroopsshouldbeassignedanadditionaldutyandshouldberoutinelytestedontheirabilitytoperformthoseadditionaldutiestostandard.

TrainBeyondYourFormationInanyexpeditionarymission,wewillvery

likelyhavetoperformmissionsoutofournormalmissionsetorsupportforcesbeyondournormalcus-tomerbase.Indoingso,weinevitablywillneedtooperateequipmentthatisnotonourmodifiedtableoforganizationandequipment.Theexpeditionaryorglobalresponseforceversionofpre-positionedequipmentmaybeabandonedequipmentthatwecanputintooperation.Therefore,wemusttrainbeyondourformation.

Forexample,whilesupportingrecoveryfromHurricaneKatrina,weusedforkliftsandrough-terraincontainerhandlers(RTCHs)onloanfromtheArmyMaterielCommandtocompleteourcontainerrecep-tionmission.Wealsohot-wiredastrayJohnDeere

The commander of the 407th Brigade Support Battalion diagrams the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, concept of support with another officer early during Operation Unified Response.

18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

forklifttofacilitaterepositioningacombatsupporthospital.

InHaiti,ourarrival/departureairfieldcontrolgroup(formedfromourmaintenancecompany)borrowedbaggagecartsfromtheinternationalairporttoexpeditepassengerreceptionandintegration.Ourmaintenancecompany,withelementsofFSCsfromthe2dBCT,received3vesselsanduploaded12toreceiveandeventuallyredeploytheBCT.

Trainingbeyondourcurrentformationbeginswithaskingthesequestionsthatassessourlogisticsagility:o CanweoperateaRTCHorcrane?Dowehavethe

licensedoperatorstodoso?o Canwehot-wireaRTCHorotherequipment?o Canwemaintainshotguns,sniperrifles,orforeign

weapons?(Oursupportedforcemaygainsuchweaponry,orwemaygainaforceinthetaskorga-nizationthatpossessessuchweaponry.)

o Canwemaintainmine-resistantambush-protectedvehiclesornonstandardcivilianpowergenerationequipment?(Powergenerationontoday’sbattlefieldisabsolutelycritical,whetheritbetosupportlandforcesorrestorepowertotheindigenouspopulation.)

o Canwepumpwaterverticallyfromwells?Ifso,howfar?(Pullingandpurifyingwaterfromwellscanbemoredifficultthanpullingwaterfromriversandlakes.)

o Canwerefuelrotary-wingaircraft?o Canwetestfuel?o Canwereceiveanddownloadvessels?o Canweoperatearailhead?o CanweconductclassI(subsistence)break-and-

issueoperations?(ThisisaBSBmissionthatisoftenoverlookeduntildeployment).

o Canwefabricateparts,hoses,andotheritemsthatarenotavailablebecauseofanimmaturesupply

During Operation Unified Response, the 407th Brigade Support Battalion completed 35 fabrication and welding jobs, including this security arm used to open a critical supply gate at Toussaint L’Ouverture International Airport.

MAY–jUNE 2011 19

chain?(Althoughweperformed35fabricationjobsinHaiti,BSBsarenotauthorizedfabricationtrailers,vans,lathes,oritemsnecessarytofabri-cateparts).

o Canweperformlow-cost,low-altitudeairdrop,con-tainerdeliverysystemairdrop,slingloadoperations,andothermethodsofairdistribution?Inseekinganswerstoquestionssuchasthese,we

assessoursupportagilityandidentifyourtrainingrequirements.Obviously,wemustassignprioritytothesetrainingrequirements,particularlyifwearenotfullytrainedonourorganiccapabilities.Butwecan-notdelayinexpandingourcapacityeither.Weshouldaddressbothourbaselinecapabilityandourcapabilitybeyondthebaselinesimultaneously.OnemethodistorewardandempowerspeciallyselectedSoldiersandsmallunitsbysendingthemtoadvancedtraining.

Trainingbeyondone’sformationdoesnotcomeeas-ily.Itrequiresagreatamountoftenacityandcreativityonthepartofleaders.Leadersmustdrawfrompastcontingencydeployments,identifyrequirements,andthenactivelypursuetheresourcesrequiredtobuildsuchcapabilities.UnitsbuildingcapabilitybeyondtheirformationshouldrecordthesecapabilitiesintheirPETstatus.

ContractOurcontractingneedshavechangedlittlefromcon-

flicttoconflict.DuringourOperationIraqiFreedomdeployment,wehadthesameneedsaswedidinHaiti.Whatchangedwasourabilitytocontractonourown.WhenwedeployedtoOperationUnifiedResponse,wedidnothavetrained,tested,andreadycontractingteamsatthecompanyandbattalionlevels.Wedidnotdeploywithbagsofmoney,draftperformanceworkstatements,ortrainedandreadycontractingteams.

Logisticians—particularlythoseservinginaquickresponse,no-noticecontingency—needtobecontractingexperts.Unitsperformingexpedition-arysupportoperationswillalwayshaveshortfallsincapacityuntilahigher-levellogisticsunitarrivesorapermanentcontractedsolutionisestablished;there-fore,logisticsunitsmustmaintaintrainedandreadycontractingteamsthatarepreparedtoenactcontractsimmediatelyuponarrival.

Whileallcompaniesmusthaveteamstrainedandreadytoenhanceorganizationalsustainment,thesup-portoperations(SPO)contractingteamisfocusedonexpandingthelogisticscapacityoftheBSBandFSCsthroughouttheBCTinordertolengthentheBCT’slogisticsreach.ThisSPOcontractingteammustcon-taininternalsecurity,translators,andapayagentorfieldorderingofficerteam.Itmusthavedraftperfor-manceworkstatementsready.

ThesupportcapabilitiesandservicesthatBSBsandFSCsinherentlylackshouldbemaintainedina

prioritized“hitlist”forthecontractingteamtosecure.Supportandservicesthatdirectlyexpandcapacityarebuses,container-handlingequipment,cranes,40-foottrailers,lowboysorheavyequipmenttransporters,landorwarehousespace,refrigerationvans,powergenera-tionequipment,forklifts,fuel,fuelstorage,andwatertransportanddelivery.

Thecontractingteamshouldtargetandsecureven-dorsthatcanprovideservicesthatindirectlyexpandandfacilitatesupportoperations,suchasfloodlights,gravel,andsupplementallabor.Hadwenotreceivedover50generalpurposetentsfromFortBragg,NorthCarolina,andGuantanamoBay,Cuba,toprotectourbrigade’sparatroopersfromHaiti’sunforgivingsunandrain,wewouldhavedesperatelysoughtasourceforfestival-styletents.WewerealsofortunatetofindvendorstoprovideplywoodtobuildtentflooringtoprotectthetroopsfromHaiti’sharshrainsandotherenvironmentalthreats.

TheBSBmusttrainandmaintainavalidatedcon-tractingcapabilitytoprocureandmanagecontractsbeyondsimplecertificationortheory.Theproperuseofthistypeofcontingencycontractingteamisnotonlyabattledrillwithintheteam,butaprocessthroughouttheBSBbattlestaff.TheBSBS–2mustprovideleadsforservicesthroughthelogisticsintelligenceprepara-tionofthebattlefield.

Inanonpermissiveenvironment,theBSBS–3maycoordinatewithbattlespace-owningsisterbattalionsforkeyleaderengagementstoprocureservices.TheBSBmustvalidatetheentireprocessthroughrealistichome-stationtrainingandcombattrainingcenterexercises.Oncetheunitestablishesitscontractingteams,itshouldintegrateandtrackthecontractingteamsinthePETanalysisofsupportcapabilities.

Tobefullypreparedforexpeditionarysupportoper-ations,logisticsunitsmustfullyexpandtheirsupportcapabilitiesaheadoftime,beginningfirstwithknow-ingtheiron-handcapabilityandcontinuingbytrain-ingonscenariosthatforcethemtouseallskillsets,performbeyondtheirmissions,andtapintocontractedsolutions.Logisticsunitsthatprepareinthismannerwillreapthebenefitsofincreasedlogisticsreadiness,agility,andoverallconfidencetoconqueranyausteresupportenvironment.

lieutenant colonel MattHew p. sHatzkin was tHe coMMander of tHe 407tH briGade support battalion, 2d briGade coMbat teaM, 82d airborne diVision. He Has deployed on tHree no-notice deploy-Ments witH tHe 82d airborne diVision. He is currently a pH.d. student in nortH dakota state uniVersity’s transportation and loGistics proGraM.

20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

nAugust2009,thelogisticiansofthe307thBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB),1stAdviseandAssistBrigade,82dAirborneDivision,deployedtoAlAnbarprovinceinIraqtoadviseandtrainIraqiSecurityForceslogisticsunits.

The307thBSBheadquarterswaslocatedatAlAsadAirBase,thehuboflogisticsinwesternAlAnbarandhometothe7thIraqiArmy(IA)Divisionhead-quarters.The307thBSBpushedlogisticssupportandtrainingteamsthroughoutAlAnbar,toincludeCampMejid,CampYasser,Baghdadi,CampHamza,AnNukhayb,CombatOutpost160K,Fallujah,Habbani-yah,andArRamadi.Ineachlocation,the307thBSBwaspartneredwithIAlogisticsunits.

Iwastheheadquartersandheadquarterscompanycommanderandtheofficer-in-chargeofdevelopingIAlogisticspartnershipsandtraining.Inadditiontocommandingthecompany,mydutiesweretoconductkeyleaderengagementswithIAlogisticscommanderstodeterminetrainingneedsandthenassignasuitable307thBSBtrainingteamtoeachIAunit.ItraveledtoIraq’snationallogisticssupplyandmaintenancedepotatCampTajitolearntheIAlogisticssystemfrombothIAleadersandtheirU.S.advisersfromtheIraqTrain-ingandAdvisoryMission-Army.

IANational-LevelLogisticsOrganizationTheMinistryofDefense(MoD)DeputyChiefof

StaffofLogistics(DCOSLOG)overseesallIAlogisticsfunctionalareas,includingplans,ordnance,supply,theTajiNationalDepot,transportationandprovisions,theDirectorateofElectricalandMechanicalEngineering(D–EME),logisticsandoperations,andthelocationcom-mands.HepublishedtheMoDDCOSLOGHandbookinbothArabicandEnglish,detailinghowthesystemworks.

ThethreemainfunctionalareaswithintheMoDDCOSLOGthatpertaindirectlytothepartnershipandlogisticstrainingofferedbythe307thBSBincludetheTajiNationalDepot,theD–EME,andthelocationcommands.

TheTajiNationalDepot,locatedatCampTajiinBaghdad,housesthehighestlevelofmaintenanceintheIA.Itisknownasafourth-linemaintenanceorganiza-tion,anditiswheretheIAconductswheeledandtrackedvehiclerestorationandrepair.

ThedepotalsohousestheJointRepairPartsCom-mand(JRPC),whichcarriesoutfourth-linesupply.JRPCistheIraqicentralizednationalsupplyanddistributionfacility.IthasnumerouswarehousesandopenlotswhereJRPCreceives,organizes,anddistributesallclassIX(repairparts)andnewcombatandnontacticalvehicles.

D–EMEisthefinalapprovalauthorityforvehiclecode-outsandissueofheavyindustrialsupplies,whichtheIraqiscallthe“bigfive”items:engines,transmis-sions,tires,batteries,anddifferentials.D–EMEmustprovidedirectauthorizationtoJRPCtoallowthereleaseofheavyindustrialsuppliestothethird-linemaintenanceunits,calledmediumworkshops.

Themediumworkshopsarethehighestlevelofvehiclerepairandrefurbishmentattheregionallevel.The307thBSBwasdirectlypartneredwithtwoofthe13workshops:theAlAsadmediumworkshop,whichcoverswesternAlAnbarprovincetoincludethe7thIADivisionareaofoperation;andtheHabbaniyahmediumworkshop,whichcoverseasternAlAnbarandmainlycaterstothe1stIADivision.

The307thBSBandIraqiArmyLogisticsby captain kyle W. broWn

I

This article shares lessons learned by the 307th Brigade Support Battalion about the Iraqi Army logistics system and recommendations for U.S. forces that are partnered with Iraqi units.

The Al Asad medium workshop commander works with the commander of the 7th Iraqi Army Division Motor Trans-portation Regiment maintenance company and the Al Asad medium workshop operations officer.

MAY–jUNE 2011 21

OfmajorimportancetothemediumworkshopsistheIraqiAssetManagementProgram(IAMP),anInternet-basedportalthatprovidesreal-timework-ordersubmission,informationonreplacement-partsavailabilityatJRPC,replacement-partsorderingandtracking,andtechnicalmanualstranslatedintoArabicfordownload.

IAMPwasoriginallydevelopedin2006byacon-tractornamedAnham,LLC,whichwasawardedthenationalmaintenancecontractforsettingupwhathasbecomethemediumworkshops.Anhambroughtinitsownmechanicsandprocuredpartsthroughitsownlogisticschannels.ThroughoutIraqduring2007and2008,AnhampartneredwithgroupsofU.S.mechanicadvisersknownaslogisticstrainingadvisoryteamsandconductedvehiclemaintenanceandrepairtrainingwithIAmechanics.

In2009,Anhamwithdrewfromallmediumwork-shopstomanageIAMPfromJRPCatCampTaji.Soonthereafter,MoDpurchasedtheIAMPsoftwarepro-gram,shiftingAnham’sroletotrainingtheIAinhowtorunIAMPthemselves.Workordersandreplace-ment-partsrequestsenteredintoIAMPbymediumworkshopsarenowreviewedandtrackedbyJRPCtomanagenationalcombatreadinessandtrackpartsavailabilityanddemand.

IAMPissimilartotheU.S.Army’sStandardArmyMaintenanceSystemEnhanced(SAMS–E),makingiteasyforSAMS–EtechnicianstolearnIAMPandassisttheirIraqipartners.The307thBSBemployedaspecialIAMPadministratoraccountwithview-onlyaccesstoreviewtheIAMPaccountsofall13mediumworkshopsinIraq.Theinformationwasusedtogener-atediscussionswithmediumworkshopcommandersconcerningspecificvehiclesthattheyhaddifficultyrepairing.Theinformationwasalsousedtoassistwiththedevelopmentofmaintenancetrainingplansandtoshadow-trackpartsrequeststoJRPCandD–EME.

Thelastmajorfunctionalareathatpertainedtothe307thBSBwasthelocationcommands.Thelocationcommands,incoordinationwiththebaseengineer,runfacilitiesandinstallationlifesupportforIAbases.Theymaintainpowergenerationstations,buildings,andfuelstorageandretailsites.Theyalsorundiningfacilitiesandensurethatthebaseshavecleanrunningwater,propersewagewaterdisposal,andsuitablegatesecurity.

Thelocationcommandsarepartneredwiththelogisticsmilitaryadvisoryteams(LMATs),whicharepartoftheIraqTrainingAdvisoryMission-Armypro-gram.TheLMATisdesignedtoadviseandassistthelocationcommandswiththeirfacilitiesmanagement.AspartofthedrawdownofU.S.forces,theCampMejidLMAT,composedoffiveU.S.Navypersonnel,relocatedtoArRamadiandconsolidatedwiththeHab-baniyahLMAT,leavingroomforthe7thIADivision

militarytransitionteam(MiTT)(aMarineCorpsunit)andthe307thBSBtostepinandassist.

IADivision-LevelLogisticsOrganizationIAdivisionshavetwolinesofmaintenance:the

motortransportationregiment(MTR)andthefieldfactoryworkshop(FFW),whichfacilitatefirst-andsecond-linemaintenance,respectively.AtCampMejid,the7thIADivisionMTRfacilitatesfirst-linemainte-nanceforthe7thIADivisionheadquartersanddistrib-utessuppliestoitsfourbrigades.

ThesizeofwesternAlAnbarprovince,stretchingtothebordersofSyria,Jordan,andSaudiArabia,presentssignificantchallengestothe7thIADivision’sabilitytodeliversuppliesandtocurbmaintenanceandreplace-ment-partsrequirements.Inaddition,eachbrigadehasitsownfirst-linemaintenanceandsupplyplatoonthattheIraqiscalltherepairplatoon.The307thBSBmain-tenancecompanypartneredwiththeMTRandconduct-ednumerouskey-leaderengagementswithitslogisticsofficersandprovidedwheeledvehiclerepairandweld-ingtrainingtoitsmaintenancecompany.

Ifthefirst-linemaintenanceunit(theMTRorrepairplatoon)isunabletomaketherepairsordoesnothavethenecessaryrepairparts,brokenvehiclesandreplacement-partrequestsgotothesecondline.Thesecondlineofmaintenanceisconductedbythe7thIADivisionFFWlocatedatCampMejid.

TheFFWusesIAMPofflinetoinputworkordersandreplacement-partrequests.PersonnelthencopytheinformationonacomputerdiskanduploadittotheonlineJRPCnationaldatabaseatthemediumworkshop.IftheFFWisunabletomakethenecessaryrepairsordoesnothavetherepairparts,itescalatestheissuetothethird-linemediumworkshop,alsoknownasthegarrisonsupportunit.The307thBSBwaspart-neredwithandconductedbothIAMPandmaintenancetrainingwiththeFFWandthemediumworkshop.

Atthedivisionlevel,theIraqisalsohaveasecond-linesupplyunitnamedthe7thIADivisionOrdnancePark(OD).TheODhandlesallclassesofsupplyotherthanclassIX,whichishandledbytheFFW.TheODusesthe7thIADivision’ssupplyofficer(G–4)toroutesupplyrequestsupthechainofcommand.ThedivisionG–4,withapprovalfromthe7thIADivisioncom-mander,routesthesupplyrequestthroughtheregionalsupportunit(RSU),locatedatHabbaniyah.TheRSUsupportstheentireAlAnbarprovince,includingboththe1stand7thIADivisions.The307thBSB’sdistri-butioncompanywaspartneredwiththeOD.

TheAdvisoryandAssistanceMissionTypically,arrivingU.S.militaryunitsconducta

relief-in-placeandtransferofauthority(RIP/TOA)withoutgoingunitsofsimilarsizeandcapability,sologisticsunitswouldswapoutwithotherlogistics

22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

units.However,inAlAnbarprovince,the307thBSBwasdeployingintoaMarineCorpsareaofoperations.Thecross-servicetransferaddedthechallengeofdif-feringranks,counterparts,andcultures.

The307thBSB,beingpartofthefirst“productionmodel”adviseandassistbrigadethattheU.S.Armyhaddevelopedordeployed,waswithoutadirectunittoconducttheRIP/TOA.Therefore,webeganourpartneringmissionbycontactingthe7thIADivisionMiTT,asmallMarineCorpsteam.

The307thBSBquicklydiscoveredthattheMiTTwasnotdesignedtoconductadvisory,assistance,andtrainingmissionstoadivision-sizedunit.Therefore,the307thBSB’shighly-trainedandwell-equippedlogisticians,includingarmamenttechnicians,ammuni-tionspecialists,fuelexperts,lightandheavywheeledvehiclemechanics,welders,medics,doctors,andware-housespecialists,movedforwardwithacomprehen-sivetrainingplan.

Initially,theplanwasbasedontheneedsandrequestsidentifiedduringkey-leaderengagements,butwithinafewmonths,thepartnershipandtrainingbecamesorobustthatittookthecombinedeffortsofthe307thBSBcompanycommanders,trainingteams,supportoperationsfunctionalexperts,andoperationsshoptocoordinate,prioritize,andexecutetrainingandassistancerequests.

TheIAhasalotofrespectfortheknowledgeandcapabilitiesoftheU.S.Armyandwasveryrecep-tivetotrainingopportunities.IAsoldiersknowthatatrulysuccessfularmyisnotjustmeasuredbyitsabilitytoshoot,move,andcommunicatebut,mostimportantly,byitsabilitytosustaincombatpoweroveraprolongedperiodwithitsownlogisticsunitsandsupplies.TheyacknowledgethatU.S.forcesaredepartingsoonandtheymustlearncriticalsustain-mentknowledgequickly.

The307thBSBembraceditsIAcounterpartsandcreatedanactivepartnershipandtrainingprogram.TofacilitatereachingoutacrossAlAnbarprovincetothe27th,28th,and29thInfantryBrigadesofthe7thIADivisionandtoengagethe1stIADivision,includingtheHabanniyahmediumworkshop,the307thBSBdevelopedamobiletrainingteam.Themobiletrain-ingteamhadalogisticsexpertfromeachofthe307thBSB’smilitaryoccupationalspecialtiestoassesstheIAsoldiers’knowledgeandspecificchallengesateachlocationandtoconductprescribedtraining.

Basedonrequestsfromthe7thIADivisioncom-mander,IdevelopedatrainingprogramspecificallydesignedforIAlogisticslieutenantsandcaptains.TheprogramisbasedonMoDlogisticsdoctrineandincludeslessonslearnedfromtheTajiNationalDepot(fourth-linemaintenance),theJRPC(fourth-linesup-ply),theD–EMEquarterlyconferences,LMATsandlogisticstrainingadvisoryteams,andworkingwithtop

IAlogisticsleadersfromtheMoDleveldowntothejuniorofficers.

ThetrainingprogramwasconductedinbothArabicandEnglish.EachIAofficerstudentreceivedcompactdiscsthatcontainedMoDdoctrine,coursepresenta-tions,IAmodifiedtablesoforganizationandequip-mentforeachofitsunits,andallpublishedlogisticstechnicalmanualstranslatedintoArabic.

TheIA’sMajorObstaclesThe307thBSBidentifiedfacilitiesmanagement,

replacementparts,andmedicalcareastheIA’sgreatestchallenges.

Facilitiesaremanagedbythelocationcommandsincoordinationwiththebaseengineerandincludepowergenerationstations,waterpumpingandtreatmentplants,wastewaterdisposalfacilities,andfuelstorageanddistributionfacilities.AtCampMejid,homeofthe7thIADivisionheadquarters,LMATadvisersspentover$11milliontobuildanindustrial-sizedpowergenerationanddistributionstationthatincludes101.1-kilovoltgenerators.

Atonepoint,8ofthe10generatorswerenotoper-atingandthemainswitchwasblown.Fixingthepowergenerationproblemwascostlyandtimeconsuming.Theproblemleft7thIADivisionsoldierswithoutpowerforseveralhoursadayandscramblingforsmallgeneratorstopowerindividualheating,ventilation,andair-conditioningunitsand,insomecases,makingfirestokeepwarm.

The307thBSB’swatertestsfoundthatCampMejid’spotablewaterdrawnfromanearbyoasiswellwascontaminatedwithE. colibacteriaandwasunfitforhumanconsumption.ThisforcedtheIraqistoshippotablewaterfromAlBaghdadi(whichalsotestedpositiveforcontaminants).Furthermore,the4.4-mil-lion-literfuelpumpingstationatCampMejidwasdevoidoffuelfilters,fuelwaterseparators,andafuelcirculationsystem.

TheIAmaintenanceunitsalsostrugglewithcom-puterandelectrical-basedrepairs.Forexample,theU.S.-madeM1114high-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicleadoptedbytheIAasitsmaincombatvehicleisasophisticatedpieceofmachineryinvolvingacomput-er-basedoperatingsystem.TheIraqimechanicsfindthewiringandcomputer-chipreplacementsdifficulttounderstandandrepair.

TheyhavealsoresistedtheadoptionofIAMP,areal-timeonlinesupplyorderingdatabaseandcombatpowertrackingsystemthatquicklyallowsJRPCtounderstandwhichreplacementpartsareinthehighestdemand.IftheIAstopsusingIAMP,theywillmovebackwardtoapen-and-paperledgersystem,thwartingprogressintothedigitalageanddramaticallyslowinganalreadypainfullyslowreplacement-partsordering,approval,anddeliveryprocess.

MAY–jUNE 2011 23

ThethirdmajorobstaclefacedbytheIAismedicalanddentalcare.The307thBSBmedicalpartnershipexpertconductedmedicaltrainingandassessmentsattheCampMejidmedicalclinicmanytimes.Shefoundmedicalofficerswhowerebiologistsandchemists,butnonewhowereschool-traineddoctors.

The7thIADivisiondoesnothaveadoctor,physi-cianassistant,ordentist.Themedicalstaffdoesnotincludeaschool-trainednurseordentalhygienist.TheIA’sfewmedicsscarcelyhavetheknowledgeofatypi-calU.S.Army-trainedcombatlifesaver.(Thecombatlifesavercourseisa40-hourblockofmedicaltrainingprovidedtomostU.S.ArmySoldiers.)Alackoftrain-ingleadstoalackofunderstandingofhowthehumanbodyworksand,therefore,misdiagnosis.

AnothermajorobstacletheIraqismustovercomeisalackofformaleducationandtraining.AccordingtoaUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammestudycon-ductedin2003,Iraqisthe6thmostilliteratecountryintheworld,with59.6percentofitspopulationunabletowriteashort,simplestatementoneverydaylife.

SaddamHusseinmadeeducationfreetoallIraqis,buthispoliciesalsodirectedagainsttheuseoftelevi-sions,cellphones,ortheInternetandstifledIraqis’abil-itytokeepupwiththeoutsideworld.TechnologyandopportunityopenedwhenIraqwasliberatedin2003.Iraqquicklyembracedwhattheworldhadtoofferintermsoftechnology,butitwilltaketimeandmodern-izededucationsystemstofullyharnessthetechnologies.

OnecourseofactionmightbefortheUnitedStatestoasktheUnitedNationsonbehalfofIraqtoassistwithfundinganddevelopingaplantoenergizeIraq’snationaleducationsystemateverylevel.Theplancouldincludetrainingforskilledtrades;civil,electrical,andcomputerengineering;andmedicalprofessionsofalltypes.ThroughdevelopingIraq’seducationalsystem,tradeandprofessionalskillsetsorganictoIraqwillallowIraqistothriveinamodernera.

AmuchsmallerbutmuchmorequicklyachievablestepthatU.S.forcescantakeduringpartnershipandtrainingeventsistoprovidepapercopiesoftechnicalmanualstranslatedintoArabicandreinforcepreven-tivemaintenancechecksandservicesasapartofthedailyroutine.

RecommendationsforanAdviseandAssistBrigadeIfavailable,dedicateapartnershipcellwithinthe

BSBoperationssectionthatincludesacaptain,lieu-tenant,andsergeantfirstclassorabove.ThecellwillrequireatleasttwocategoryIIinterpreters,preferablyU.S.citizens.Thenoncommissionedofficerinyourpartnershipcellshouldcentrallymanageallinterpret-ersacrossthebattalion.EnsurethecellstudiesIraqicultureandlanguagepriortodeployment.AbookworthreadingbeforearrivalisUnderstanding IraqbyWilliamR.Polk.

ContactU.S.adviserswhoarepartoftheIraqTrain-ingandAdvisoryMission-ArmytoschedulepersonneltoattendtheCounterinsurgencyStabilityOperationsCourseLogisticsConference,visittheTajiNationalDepot(includingtheJRPC),anddownloadandstudytheMoDDCOSLOGHandbook.

Finally,obtainpoint-of-contactinformationforthetrainersoftheIAMPfromtheIraqTrainingandAdvi-soryMission-Army.Eachmemberofthepartnershipcellshouldattendthe5-dayIAMPcourse.

ThisarticleisanoverviewoftheIAlogisticssys-tem,thechallengesitfaces,andthehumblerecom-mendationsofthe307thBSB.Wetrained,advised,assisted,andbefriendedhundredsofIAsoldiersandtheirseniorleadersthroughoutAlAnbarprovince.Wehopethattheeffortsofthe307thBSBwillenableourIraqipartnersandfollow-onU.S.forcestotakethenextstepstowardthelong-termself-sustainabilityoftheIraqiSecurityForces.

captain kyle w. brown is currently attendinG tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course. He Has a bacHelor’s deGree in business adMinistration froM tHe uniVersity of colorado at boulder and a Master of business adMinistration deGree froM baylor uniVersity. He is a Graduate of tHe air force officer traininG scHool, air force Medical serVice adMinistration scHool, arMor officer basic course, scout leaders course, airborne scHool, reconnaissance surVeillance leaders course, and juMpMaster scHool.

The supply officer of the 7th Iraqi Army (IA) Division mili-tary transition team (U.S. Marine Corps), the commander of the 7th IA Division Motor Transportation Regiment (MTR), the commander of the 307th Brigade Support Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and the com-mander of the 7th IA Division MTR maintenance company stand together in November 2009.

24 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heterm“globalwar”referstomorethanjustbattlespacemaneuvers;itconnotestherequire-mentsofagloballythinkinglogisticschain.Thatlogisticschainiswheretheinlandcargotransfercom-pany(ICTC)isideallysuitedforuse.Fromrailheadstoportoperations,throughreceiving,staging,andonwardintegrationfunctionsandconvoymovement,theICTCisperhapsthemostadaptablelogisticsfor-mationintheArmy.ManylessonsinmanagementcanbelearnedfromtheeffectiveemploymentofanICTC.

AnalyzingtheSupportProcessArmylogisticianshavelongbeenstudentsofthe

conceptsandprinciplesassociatedwiththequestion,“Howcanwebetterservethewarfighter?”Themereideaofapplyingexpertiseandprofessionalskillsintheserviceofwarfightersoftenleadslogisticianstooveranalyzethedoctrinalintricaciesoftheirsupportedcombatunits.Thecomplexandelaboratemissionsetsofmaneuverunitsdetermineourapproachtosupportingeneral,butwemustnotfallshortinidentifyingthecomplexmissionsetsinourownformations.

Asimportantastheendstateis,wemustnotlosesightoftheprocess.Wetypicallysummarizeasustainmentunit’sdeploymentinnumbersofitemsorintonsofsup-pliesmoved;however,rarelydoinnovationandsensibleprocessimprovementpersist.Ontheotherhand,focusingonprocesseswithoutregardtotheoutcomesuggestsirre-sponsibilityonthepartofleadersatalllevels.

OperationalDemandDuringthepast6years(andpossiblylonger),many

ICTCshavesupportedOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)withfewadaptationstotaskorganization.Howev-er,thedemandforresourcespersistentlychanges.Asourcustomerunitsadapttothechangingfaceoftheenemy,oursupportconceptshouldadaptaswell.AsICTCassetsaremovedtothefarthestreachesofthebattlespace,thetaskorganizationofthoseassetsshouldadjusttoalignwiththeprocessofmanagingthesupplychain.

Maneuvercommanderscontinuouslyevaluatetheirareasofoperationtobestdeterminethemeansinwhichtheywillmaximizetheirassetsagainsttheopposition.Thisfartoooftenrequiressacrificestobemadeinonearea—speed,forexample—inordertopreservecombat

power.Speedmightbesacrificedbychoosingaforma-tionorterrainthatismoreadvantageoustoprotectingtheforce.Thesameconceptholdstrueforsustainmentunits.

PlanningWhenassessingtherequirementsforassetsatmul-

tipleforwardoperatingbases(FOBs),keyplanningtasksmustbeconsciouslycenteredonestablishingequilibriumamongmissioncommand,administrativefunctions,andmaintenancefunctions.

Decisionpointsforthisplanningmodelfocusoncurrentmissionstatementsandcoresupportobjectivessetbythesupportedunitcommander,aswellasonforecastedunitmovementsandthepresenceofU.S.unitsinotherwiseunoccupiedlocations.Whileplan-ning,anICTCcommanderwillmediatebetweentheorganizationalobjectivesofeachsupportedFOBandthoseofthedirecthighercommandelement.

Generally,unclearandunderdefinedscopesofrespon-sibilityexistthroughouttheranksoftheICTC’sparentechelons.Forthisreason,establishingabaselineofopera-tionalcontrolattheICTCcommandlevelisimperative.

OrganizationTheArmyhasappliedmodularitytonearlyevery

organizationalstructuredowntothecompanylevel.TheICTCisanidealcandidateforthedownwardpushofthemodularconceptbeyondthecompany,andevenpla-toon,level.Thispushdoesnotnecessarilycallfordrasticadjustmentstothepersonnelandequipmentstructureofthecompany,butitdoesrequireamorethoroughassess-mentofmissionrequirementsduringthesourcingfordeploymentinordertomeetspecificmissionobjectives.

AlthoughithasbecomecommontodeploytheICTCasaseriesofdetachments,thedetachmentsarenotalignedwiththemissionsetsofeachsupportedunit.Onceintheater,theseunitsareforcedtoreorga-nizeintosmallteamsforthepurposeofsupportingalargernumberofFOBs.

Thesediminutivepersonnelsupportpackagesaredeterminedsolelybytheneedforaparticularexpertise.IftheICTCisdeployedjusttoprovideexperiencedmaterials-handlingequipment(MHE)operators,thentheunit’scompetenciesareclearlynotunderstoodanditscapabilitiesandeffectsaredegradedexponentially.

LessonsinAdaptation:TheICTContheNonlinearBattlefield

by captain nicHolas G. catecHis

T

The author provides insights in leadership and management from his case study of an inland cargo transfer company in Operation Enduring Freedom.

MAY–jUNE 2011 25

TheICTC’staskorganizationmustbecenteredoncap-italizingonitsorganic88-seriesmilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)Soldiers.

LeadershipintheICTCmustbedecentralizeddowntothesquadlevel,andoftentheteamlevel,tomaximizeitscapabilities.Thecommandcellmustcolocatewiththebattalionheadquartersnotonlytobenefitfrommorecen-tralizedadministrativeandmaintenancesupportbutalsotoengageactivelywiththesupportoperationssection.

Perhapsthemostimportantallywithwhichtomain-tainanopenrapportisthejointtransportationoffice(JTO).Thisentityexiststopursueandreportallunitmovements,includingpersonnelandtransportationofcargoandmaterials.Movementinformationiskeytopredictingpersonnelandequipmentassetsneededateachcriticallogisticshub.

ThesecondbenefitofapartnershipwiththeJTOisthatcommandersatalllevels,fromoperationaltostrategic,canreceivevalidinformationthatallowsforamorelegitimateandjustifiablesustainmentforcepackagewhencreatingtherequestforforcesduringthesourcingphaseofunitdeploymentscreenings.Athoughthistypeofpreparationandplanningisnotnecessarilyavailabletothemajorityofcommandersattheuserlevel,itisimportanttotakenoteofthoseenablerswhoseinfluenceiswellwithinreach.

Themovementcontrolteam(MCT)ispresentlythemostprobableconsumerofICTCassetsinadirectsupportingrelationship.TherelationshipbetweentheMCTandtheICTCisoneofoperationalcontrol.Inthisrelationship,theICTCcommandermaintainsabsolutecontrolofalladministrativeandmaintenancefunctionsandtheMCTcommanderprovidesmission-relatedguidance.Thedirectionofalladministrativeandmaintenance-relatedactivitiesshouldbehandledbytheICTCheadquarterselement.

Organizingeachimbeddedteamtoresembleoneanotheristhemosteffectiveuseofresources.How-ever,personnelalignmentisnotabsolutewithaprede-terminedmodel,andifitwere,itwouldlikelyhindereffortstomeetthecommander’sintent.

Thesuggesteddesignofateamshouldrelatetotheactualmissionsetandkeytasksof,forexample,theMCT.Oncetheseareidentifiedandcommunicated,thecommanderwillthenhavepositiveinfluenceandcontroloverhowhisassetsareengaged.Butinorderforthistooccur,commandersmusttakefulladvantageoftherelief-in-place/transfer-of-authorityprocess,notonlytocommunicateadministrativepoliciesbutalsotoamendtaskorganization.

Currentoperationalconfigurationsmustbefullycommunicatedtotheincomingcommandonlyafterathoroughmissionanalysishasbeenconductedwiththeapprovalofthenexthigherlevelofcommand.Theidealmodelforforwardcargotransferoperationsconsistsofaheavyconcentrationofcargospecialists,oneortwo

transportationmanagementcoordinators,andoneortwomotortransportoperators.Maintenancepersonnelwouldbepredeterminedaswell,basedonthetypeandamountofequipmentandwithconsiderationfortheratioofcontractedversusgovernmentMHE.

EquipmentTheaterpre-positionedequipmentisbasically

exhaustedbecauseoftheoperationaldemandplacedonitoverthepast9years.ThecurrentconfigurationofsuchequipmentinRegionalCommandEastcon-sistsofacombinationofcivilian-contractedMHEandgovernment-owneditems.

WhiletheICTCcommandermaintainsownershipoftheequipment,theMCTcommander’sinvolvementisadecisivefactorinmissionsuccess.EveniftheICTCdirectsupportmaintenanceteamislocatedfarawayatanotherFOB,theMCTheadquarterssectionmustmaintainresponsibilityforestablishingmaintenancesupportateachrespectiveFOB.

InformationTechnologyWhenitcomestoinformationtechnologyandsignal

capabilities,theICTCprovidesthenecessarycomputersandotherautomatedequipmentandtheMCTprovidestechnicalsupport.TheICTCshouldformulateacompli-anceteamwiththeassistanceofthebattalionstaff.ThisteamwillfrequentlyconductsitevisitstoeachofthesupportedFOBstomaintainfriendlyandprofessionalrelationships,whicharebestmadeinperson.

MaintenancereadinessreportingisnotpossiblethroughtheICTC’sStandardArmyMaintenanceSystem(SAMS)“box”foreachFOB.Thesupport-ingmaintenanceunitsareresponsibleforloadingtheinformationintotheirSAMSboxesandfororderingpartsasneeded.ThispracticecansignificantlyskewtheICTCcommander’soperationalreadinessrate,however,becauseonlyMHEinformationislocatedwiththeheadquarterselement.

Thiscasestudyonleadershipandthemanagementofresourcesisdesignedwiththeintentoffosteringadiscussionofprocessesandplanningimprovements.Commandersarecertainlynottoapproachtheseconceptsandtheorieswithexpectationsofachievingself-actualizationorenlightenment;however,whenadvancedemphasisisplacedonthevalueofadapta-tion,thebenefitswillbeoverwhelming.

captain nicHolas G. catecHis is tHe coMpany coMMander of tHe 453d inland carGo transfer coMpany. He Has a bacHelor’s deGree in HealtHcare adMinistration froM texas state uniVersity and a Master’s deGree in HuMan relations froM tHe uniVersity of oklaHoMa, and He Holds adjunct professorsHips at botH tHe uniVersity of Houston and central texas colleGe. He is a Graduate of tHe field artillery offi-cer basic course and tHe ManeuVer captains career course.

26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

SustainmentLessonsLearnedFromCombinedJointTaskForce-82

by colonel MicHael c. lopez

servedasCJ–4,DirectorofLogistics,forCom- binedJointTaskForce-82(CJTF–82)inRegional CommandEastinAfghanistanfromMay2009toJune2010.This13-monthdeploymenttoOperationEnduringFreedomwiththe82dAirborneDivisionpro-videdmanysustainmentlessonslearned.Thisarticlediscussescoalitionandjointstaffsustainmentopera-tionsandprovidesrecommendationsfortransitioningtacticallogisticsdivisionstaffsintooperationalsustain-mentcoalitionandjointteams,developingasystemsapproachtosustainmentoperations,andtransmittinghistoricalknowledgeamongstaffs.

TheCJTF–82CJ–4TheCJTF–82headquarterswaslocatedatBagram

Airfield,Afghanistan,and,inpartnershipwiththe201stand203dAfghanNationalArmy(ANA)Corps,providedcombinedmissioncommandofRegionalCommandEast.TheCJ–4staffconsistedof44coali-tion,joint,interagency,andcontractorpersonnel.

Thestaffwasorganizedintothefollowingcells:administration,supplyandservices,maintenance,transportation,operations,plans,liaisonofficers,andstaffembeddedwiththe201stand203dANACorps.Thestaff’smissionwastodevelopsustainmentplansandpoliciesandprovideproceduraloversightforbri-gadetaskforcesandenablerstosustaincivil-militarycounterinsurgencyoperations,maintaincombatpower,andextendoperationalreach.

PredeploymentTrainingTheroadtoAfghanistanbeganatFortBragg,

NorthCarolina,inJune2008.The82dAirborneDivi-sion’sfocuswassplitbetweengettingbrigadecombatteamsmanned,equipped,andtrainedforprogrammeddeploymentstoIraqandAfghanistanandpreparingthedivisionstafffordeploymentasaCJTF.

Division-levelstafftrainingconsistedofindividualcombatskillstraining,staff-specifictraining,profes-sionaldevelopmentcoursessponsoredbytheLeaderDevelopmentandEducationforSustainedPeace

I program,staffcertificationtrainingsponsoredbytheBattleCommandTrainingProgramandtheU.S.JointForcesCommand’sJointWarfightingCenter,andaseriesofpredeploymentsitesurveys(PDSSs)inAfghanistan.

ThedivisionchiefofstaffhadeachstaffsectiondevelopPDSSobjectivespriortodepartureandcom-pleteatripreportuponreturn.ThisrequirementwaseffectiveinfocusingthestaffonthetaskandpurposeofthePDSSvisit.TheG–4sectionusedthisprocesstogeneraterunningstaffestimatestodefinehowsustainmentoperationsworkedinRegionalCom-mandEast.Asthesectionfocusedondefininganddiscussinghowprocessesworked,thefocusshiftedtomappingtheprocess,includinginputs,outputs,anddesiredoutcomes.

ProcessmapsweremeasuredagainstFieldManual3–24,Counterinsurgency;FieldManual4–0,Sustain-ment;JointPublication4–0,JointLogistics;andJointPublication4–08,JointDoctrineforLogisticSupportofMultinationalOperations.Thedoctrinalreviewprovidedtheintellectualfoundationtounderstandstaffroles,U.S.CodeTitle10responsibilities,andthefunctionsofcombined-jointboards,bureaus,centers,cells,andworkinggroups(B2C2WGs).Anassess-mentofmultiplePDSSsindicatedasystemsapproachwasthecriticalpathtoprovidingsustainmentattheoperationallevel.

TheCJ–4’sfirstpriorityduringdivisionandhigherstaff-leveltrainingwastodefinethecoresustainmentB2C2WGs,refinetheprocess,andquantifyhowtheoutputaffectedthebottomline,whichwastosustaincounterinsurgencyoperations,maintaincombatpower,andextendoperationalreach.Thesecondprioritywastoidentifycross-staffandexternalCJTFrelationshipsthatwouldbedevelopedtofacilitatesynchronized,integratedactions.Thethirdprioritywastodevelopaneffectiveprocesstomanageanddisseminateinforma-tionacrossastaffthatwouldhavetoendureacombatbattlerhythm,anonstopstringofemail,andaportal-basedinformationmanagementprocess.

Combined Joint Task Force-82 developed plans and oversaw operations for sustaining civil-military counterinsurgency operations in Regional Command East in Afghanistan. The author shares lessons learned from that deployment.

MAY–jUNE 2011 27

SystemsApproachtoSustainmentThe82dAirborneDivisiontookoverthetransitionof

authorityforcoalitionandjointforcesinRegionalCom-mandEaston3June2009andrelinquishedthatauthor-ityon14June2010.TheCJTF–82counterinsurgencystrategywasbasedonfourlinesofoperation:informa-tion,governance,development,andsecurity.Thisstrat-egywasimplementedthroughacoalition,Afghan,andinteragencyteamintegratedfromtheinfantrybattaliontaskforcelevelthroughtheCJTFlevel.ThestrategywasfocusedondevelopingaunifiedeffortatalllevelsandacrossalllinesofoperationtobuildandenhancethelegitimacyofAfghanistan’sgovernment.

Operationalsustainmentsupportedthelinesofoperationbyinstitutingateamapproachtosolveprob-lemsanddevelopasustainmentB2C2WGprocessthataddressedtheareasofforceflow,sustainment,mainte-nance,contractservices,andAfghanNationalSecurityForces(ANSF)development.Theteamwascoinedthe“LogNation”andconsistedofjoint,coalition,andcontractlogisticians.

Theteam’smembersincludedrepresentativesfromtheCJTFstaff,the45thand82dSustainmentBrigades,the401stArmyFieldSupportBrigade(AFSB),thebrigadesupportbattalions,the455thExpeditionaryAerialPortSquadron(EAPS),adeploymentdistributionteamfromthe831stDeploy-mentDistributionSupportBattalion,theDefenseLogisticsAgency,theDefenseContractManagementAgency(DCMA),theNationalGuardBureau,theLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram(LOGCAP),theJointContractingCommand-Afghanistan(JCC–A),RegionalSupportTeam-East(RST–E),ANSFDevelopmentSupport-East(ADS–E),andthe201stand203dANACorpsG–4.

ForceFlowTheforceflowwasmanagedthroughaweekly

portal-basedAdobeConnectcoalitionandjointrecep-tion,staging,onwardmovement,andintegrationworkinggroupandboard.ThisprocessexistedbeforeCJTF–82’srotationbutwasenhanced.TheworkinggroupwaschairedbytheCJ–4,theboardwaschairedbythedeputycommandinggeneralforsupport(DCG–S),andtheprocesswashostedbytheCJ–4transportationofficer.

TheboardmembersincludedtheCJTFstaffweath-erofficer,theCJTFCJ–3forcemanager,theCJ–4transportationofficer,aliaisonofficerfromManasAirBase,Kyrgyzstan,coalitionandU.S.brigademobilityofficers,aNationalGuardBureaurepresen-tative,theBagramAirfieldbaseoperationssupportintegrator,adeploymentdistributionteamfromthe831stDeploymentDistributionSupportBattalion,andrepresentativesfromtheBagram455thEAPSandthe45thand82dSustainmentBrigades.

Thegroup’sfocuswastotracktheonwardmove-mentofcommander’scriticalitemsandsensitive-itemscargo,theonwardmovementofpersonnel,andtheinboundandoutboundmovementofgroundcargothroughvariousnodesintheregion.Performancewasmeasuredintermsoflatestarrivaldates,commanders’requireddeliverydates,groundlinesofcommunicationtransittimes,portcalls,vesselsaildates,andcontainerpilferagereports.

Theresultwasanimprovedabilitytoseetheregion-aldistributionsystem,assessperformanceacrosstheregionandtheater,forecastdelays,andcoordinatewiththeU.S.CentralCommandDeploymentDistributionOperationsCenterandtheMilitarySurfaceDeploy-mentandDistributionCommandforsuitablealterna-tivecoursesofactions.

SustainmentSustainmentwasmanagedthroughaweeklyportal-

basedAdobeConnectprocesscalledthecombinedactionfacilitiesexpansion(CAFÉ)workinggroupandboardandaquarterlyportal-basedAdobeConnectlogisticsreadinesscouncil.

TheCAFÉworkinggroupwasanewprocessdevelopedasameanstomanageforceexpansionbaseconstructionprojectsatforwardoperatingbasesandcombatoutposts.Thelogisticsreadinesscouncilwasamodificationofanexistingprocess.

TheCAFÉworkinggroupwaschairedbytheCJ–4,CJ–7,andRST–E,andtheboardwaschairedbytheDCG–S.Theboardmembersincludedrepre-sentativesfromthe45thand82dSustainmentBri-gades,coalitionandU.S.brigadelogisticsofficers,abrigade-levelLOGCAPsupportoperationsofficer,LOGCAPqualityassurancerepresentatives,andassistantcontractingofficers.

TheCJ–4focusedoncoordinatingtheprocurementandsustainmentofbaseconstructionandfacilitiesexpansionprojectsinsupportofU.S.forcesacrosstheregionandintegratingtheeffortsoftheRST–EforprocurementandsustainmentsupporttoANAforces.UnitsprocuredmaterielthroughacombinationoftheFederalsupplysystem,JCC–Ahost-nationcontracts,andLOGCAPservicecontracts.Thecontractingteam,onbehalfoftheunits,resourcedsustainmentthroughJCC–AorLOGCAPservicecontracts.ContractswereapprovedthroughacoalitionjointacquisitionreviewboardthatincludedtheCJ–1,CJ–3,CJ–4,CJ–7,CJ–8,andstaffjudgeadvocate.TheCJ–4providedlogisticssupporttocoalitionpartnersthroughanacquisitionandcross-servicingagreement.

TheCJ–7focusedoncoordinatingconstructionprojectsinsupportofU.S.forces,whileRST–Ecoor-dinatedprocurement,sustainment,andconstructionprojectsinsupportofANAforcesacrosstheregion.Constructionprojectswereapprovedthroughacoali-

28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

tionjointfacilitiesutilizationboardchairedbytheCJ–7.Theresultwasanincreasedabilitytoplanbas-ingrequirementsholistically,manageprojectsfromaresourcingandconstructionperspective,andmanageexpectations.TheCAFÉwasaregionalapplicationofthecombatantcommanderlogisticsprocurementsup-portboard.

Threelessonswerelearnedfromthisprocess:o Integratetheregionalcontractingoffice,aLOGCAP

supportofficer,anassistantcontractingofficer,andaqualityassurancerepresentativeintothebrigadetaskforcesustainmentteamtoassistwithdevelop-mentofperformanceworkstatements.

o ImplementtheCAFÉworkinggroupatthebrigadetaskforceleveltosynchronizefacilitiesconstruc-tionprojectsforthecompaniesandplatoons.

o Focusonthecriticalresourcingpathandjointprocesses—realestateapproval,thejointfacilitiesutilizationboard,andthejointacquisitionreviewboard—forrealestateandfacilitiesdevelopment,buildingmaterials,labor,materials-handlingequipment,wasteremoval,operations,andmainte-nanceservices.Thelogisticsreadinesscouncilwaschairedbythe

DCG–SandhostedbytheCJ–4supplyandservicechief.Councilmembersincludedrepresentativesfromthe45thand82dSustainmentBrigades,the401stAFSB,U.S.brigadelogisticsteams,theJCC–A,LOGCAP,andDCMA.Theprimarypurposeofthequarterlymeetingwasforthebrigadetaskforcestoforecastresourcerequirementsovera90-dayperi-odintheareasofredeploymentsanddeployments,newequipmentfielding,LOGCAPnewworkproj-ects,servicecontractrenewals,contractingofficer’srepresentativetransitions,andperformanceevalu-ationboards(PEBs).APEBisaforumtodiscuss,evaluate,anddocumentcontractorperformance.

Thequarterlymeetinghelpedtocreatethebaselinedocumenttotransferhistoricalknowledgebetweenbri-gadetaskforcesduringrelief-in-placeandtransferofauthorityoperations.

MaintenanceMaintenancewasmanagedthroughaweekly

portal-basedAdobeConnectprocesssimplycalledthemaintenanceworkinggroup.Thiswasnotanewprocess,butitwastheonlymaintenancemeetingattendedbyageneralofficerinRegionalCommandEast.TheworkinggroupwaschairedbytheDCG–SandtheprocesswashostedbytheCJ–4maintenanceofficer.Attendeesincludedrepresentativesfromthe45thand82dSustainmentBrigadesand401stAFSB,coalitionandU.S.brigademaintenanceofficers,andtheANAG–4.

Themeeting’sfocuswasonthereadinessofrotary-wingaircraft,mine-resistantambush-protected

(MRAP)vehicles,andcoalitioncombatsystems.Thediscussionofrotary-wingsystemreadinessincor-poratedanoverviewoftheaviationthreat,militaryrotary-wingoperatingtempoandhours,andcontractairhours.

TheMRAPsystemreadinessdiscussioninvolvedbattledamageassessmentandoperationaltrendanal-ysis,systemretrograde,repairtimelines,andthenewequipmentfieldingschedule.Theresultofthediscus-sionwastheabilitytoassessandmeasureperfor-mance,forecastreadiness,identifyoperationaltrends,andengagetheAFSB.

OneoftheinnovativeprocessesusedtomeasureMRAPreadinesswastherepair-to-damageratio.Thissimpleratiocomparedthenumberofsystemsrepairedtothenumberofsystemsdamagedincom-batforagivenperiod.Itprovidedthecommandwithaclearassessmentofwhetherthemaintenancepro-gramwasexceeding,maintaining,orfallingbehindexpectations.

ContractServicesContractservicesweremanagedthrougha

bimonthlyportal-basedAdobeConnectsessioncalledtheLOGCAPworkinggroup,whichwasanewprocess.TheworkinggroupwaschairedandhostedbytheCJ–4LOGCAPofficer.WorkinggroupmembersincludedcontractserviceprovidersandrepresentativesfromLOGCAP,theJCC–A,andbrigadelogisticsteams.

Thiswasaforumtoaddresscontractorcom-pliance,sharebestpractices,providedirectiontocontractors,discusscontractofficer’srepresentativeandqualityassuranceofficeraudits,identifyperfor-mancetrends,andprepareformonthlyaudits,quar-terlyPEBs,andsemiannualawardfeeevaluationboards(AFEBs).

TheAFEBissimilartoaPEBinstructureexceptthatthepurposeoftheboardistoawardabonusbasedonperformance.ItwouldbebesttoconducttheLOGCAPworkinggroupinadvanceofthequar-terlyPEBandsemiannualAFEBtoadequatelypre-parefortheseforums.

ANALogisticsDevelopment

ANAlogisticsdevelopmentwasmanagedthroughaweeklyportal-basedAdobeConnectsessioncalledtheANAlogisticssynchronizationsession.Theforum,anewprocess,waschairedandhostedbytheCJ–4ANAofficer.Thesynchronizationsession(attheregionallevel)complementedthecommandandstaffpartnershipsatthecompany,battalion,brigade,andcorpslevels.

Theboardmembersincludedembeddedlogisticsstafffromthe201stand203dANACorps,RST–E,ADS–E,andcoalitionandU.S.sustainmentunits.This

MAY–jUNE 2011 29

SpecializedToolsShouldBeaPriorityforMovement

Iamanactive-dutyArmyaviationmajor,andIspentthemajorityofmypast5yearsmanagingavia-tionmaintenanceinbothIraqandAfghanistan.Ijustwantedtopointoutamorerecentlessonlearnedfrommytimeasanaviationunitmaintenance(AVUM)companycommanderatBagramAirbaseinAfghani-stanthatIthoughtwouldbeapplicableacrossthemaintenancespectrum.

Allmaintainersofgroundoraviationequipmentfacesthenever-endingordealofkeepingtheirspe-cializedtoolsandtestequipmentwithinTMDE(test,measurement,anddiagnosticequipment)standardsandavailableatmultiplelocationsduringsplit-basedoperations.Iwouldhighlyencourageanymainte-nancecommanderorNCO[noncommissionedoffi-cer]facinganupcomingdeploymenttotakeacarefullookatwhichtoolsarethehardesttoreplaceandwill

beneededonthegroundimmediatelyupontheunit’sarrival.

Thesespecializedtoolsshouldbemadeapriorityforairmovementintotheaterinsteadofbeingmovedbyshipandthenground.ThisisespeciallytrueforanydeploymenttoAfghanistan,whereallyourMIL-VANs[military-owneddemountablecontainers]willbetransportedusingcontractorsvialinehaulthroughPakistan.

Ipersonallysaw5ofmy20MILVANspilfereden-route,tothetuneofalmostahalf-milliondollarsinlosses.OneoftheseMILVANsalsohadcriticaltestequipmentneededforCH−47maintenanceandtookalmostafullmonthtoreplace.

Don’tmakemymistake!Getyourhighvalueandcriticaltoolsmovedbyairsotheyareavailableonday1.

Major ted reaM

fort leavenWortH, kansas

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

processwaseffectiveatthetacticalandoperationallevels,butitcouldhavebeenimprovedbyincorporat-ingANAcapitalregionlogisticians(locatedinKabul)intotheprocesstofacilitateanend-to-endintegratedlogisticsprocesslinkingtactical-levellogisticsexecu-tionwithstrategic-levellogisticsplanning.

TheCJTF–82CJ–4teamwassuccessfulbecauseit—o ReviewedArmyandjointsustainmentdoctrineto

understandTitle10responsibilitiesandthepur-poseandfunctionsofcombined-jointB2C2WGs.

o Developedateamapproachtosustainmentincorporatingcoalition,DepartmentofDefense,DepartmentoftheArmy,andcontractagencies.

o Usedportal-basedtechnologytoshareinformation.o Usedasystemsapproachtosustainmentbasedon

thecoreB2C2WGstoeffectsustainmentattheoperationallevelandsupportthecommander’sintentandoperationalpriorities.Thenextlogicalsteptoimprovinglong-term

sustainmentinRegionalCommandEastwouldhavebeentobegintheprocessofsharingresponsibilityandauthorityforsustainmentoperationswiththe201stand203dANACorps,settingtheconditionsforeventualtransferofauthority.

Supportingstrategieswouldneedtobedevel-opedtotransferbaseservicesoncombined-actionforwardoperatingbasesandcombatoutpostsfromLOGCAPcontractstohost-nationregionalcon-tracts.Strategiesfordevelopingregionaltradeskillsinplumbing,electricity,carpentry,andmasonryshouldcomplementthestrategiesfortransferringselectbases,facilities,andpropertytoAfghanistan’s

government.TheprocessesusedtotransfercontrolinIraqshouldformagoodbaseline.

ThechallengeofsuchatransitionwillbethedevelopmentofalocalAfghanvendorbasetocre-atejobsandemployalocalAfghanlaborforcethatmeetsanagreed-uponstandardofperformance.Thiseffortwillhavetobemanagedthrougharegional,interagency,combinedapproachinwhichtheacquisi-tionandprocurementprocesswillplayapart.ThegoalwillbetotransitionthisprocessattheprovincialanddistrictlevelstoafunctionalAfghangovernment.

ThebenefitsofdevelopingalocalAfghanven-dorbasewillbethecreationofaskilledworkforce,retentionofincomeslocally,creationoflocaljobs(whichshouldhelptoreduceincentivesforviolence),developmentofanenduringprocessforatransitionofauthority,andestablishmentofalocalindustrialbase.Thesebenefitswillenablethetimelywithdraw-alofU.S.andcoalitionforcesinaccordancewiththeNationalCommandAuthority’sobjectives.

colonel MicHael c. lopez is currently attendinG tHe industrial colleGe of tHe arMed forces. after Graduation, He will assuMe coMMand of tHe 403d arMy field support briGade in korea. He serVed as tHe 82d airborne diVision G–4 froM 2008 to 2009 and as tHe coMbined joint task force-82 cj–4 froM 2009 to 2010. He Has a preVious coMbat deployMent to afGHanistan and two coMbat deployMents to iraq. He is a Graduate of tHe infan-try officer basic course, ordnance officer adVanced course, coMbined arMs and serVices staff scHool, support operations course, arMy coMMand and General staff colleGe, and scHool of adVanced Military studies.

30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

themaximumcombatpoweravailableatalltimes.Thelogisticiansofthesupportcompany’sservicedetach-mentsmusthelptoensurethatODAscanremainfocusedonpressuringenemynetworksandconductingtheirwartimemission.

TheorganicbattalionsupportcompanyinaSpe-cialForcesbattalionhasfourmaindetachments:headquarters,militaryintelligence,signal,andser-vice.Theprimarylogisticsarmofthecompanyistheservicedetachment,whichistaskedtoprovidethebattalionwithimmediatedirectlogisticssup-port,includingallaspectsofdeployment,redeploy-

SpecialOperationsLogisticsSupport:SustainingVictorycaptain cisco j. fuller

S upportingoperationaldetachmentsalpha (ODAs)attheSpecialOperationstaskforce (SOTF)levelinatheaterofoperationsrequiresefficiencyandspeed.ODAsdonothavetimeforthelogisticshierarchytorunitscourse.ThesupportcompanyorganictotheSpecialForcesbattalionmustbeabletoexploit“BigArmy”systemsandmustbeproficientinprocuringlocalhost-nationsupportbecauselogisticsfunctionsalwayshavetooutrunoperations.

AccuratelyforecastingfuturerequirementswillensurethattheSpecialForcesbattalionleadershave

The nature of a Special Forces unit makes providing its logistics support a unique challenge.

MAY–jUNE 2011 31

Special Operations Task Force 52 riggers prepare to hook up an M1151 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle to a direct support CH–47 Chinook helicopter at Joint Base Balad.

ment,transportation,andmaintenance.Theservicedetachment’sresponsibilitiesincludecoordinatingthedeliveryofallclassesofsupplytothebattalion’s3operationaldetachmentsbravoand16ODAs.

ServiceDetachmentOrganizationTheservicedetachmenthasfivesections:aerial

delivery,foodservice,transportation,fieldmainte-nance,andelectronicmaintenance.ThedetachmentprovidesdirectsustainmentsupportfortheentireSpecialForcesbattalionanditsattachedelements.Insomecases,thesupportbattalionoftheSpecial

Forcesgroupwillaugmenttheservicedetach-ment’smission.Themissionloadfortheservicedetachmentinatheaterofoperationsdependsonanumberoffactors,includingthetheater’slevelofdevelopment,theoperatingtempooftheoperationaldetachmentsbravoandODAs,andtheavailabilityofcontractsupport.

Theservicedetachmentdoesnothaveanorganicline-haulcapability,soitmustrelyheavilyonthetheatersupportcommand,sustainmentbrigade,groupsupportbattalion,orcontractedlocal-nationalsupporttogetthingsmoved.Whenthetheatersup-

32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

portcommand,sustainmentbrigade,orgroupsup-portbattalionareinclosegeographicproximitytotheSOTF,coordinatingtransportationassetsissimple.

However,asthedistancefromtheseentitiestotheSOTFincreases,coordinatingmovementbecomesmuchmorearduous.AstheSOTFspreadsoutfar-therfromitsheadquarters,thecombinedjointspe-cialoperationstaskforceheadquarters,itbecomesmoreimportantfortheservicedetachmentstobeabletousealternatemethodsofprocurement,suchasP2(conventionalArmysustainmentfunds),P11(sustainmentfundsforspecialoperations),andsole-sourcecontractingforlogisticssupport.

ServiceDetachmentManningBasedonthefiscalyear2010modifiedtableof

organizationandequipment,aSpecialForcesbat-talionservicedetachmentisauthorized42Soldiers.Theservicedetachmentcommanderisdesignatedasafunctionalarea90Alogisticsofficer.Thedetach-mentsergeantisslottedasamilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)92Y4S,sergeantfirstclassunitsupplyspecialist,withaSpecialForcesadditionalskillidentifier.

Asprimarylogisticsadviserstothebattalionsup-portcompanycommanderandfirstsergeant,theservicedetachmentcommanderanddetachmentsergeantmustbeproficientincomplexlogisticsfunctions.Theservicedetachmentincludes3offi-cers,5sergeantsfirstclass,3staffsergeants,and31Soldiersintheranksofsergeantandbelow.Criticalmanningpositionsareseenthroughouteachsection.

Theservicedetachmentmissionismultifunc-tional.Theunithasparachuteriggers,small-armsrepairmen,cooks,fuelhandlers,waterpurificationspecialists,andvariousotherskillsetsthatkeepthegearsofaSpecialForcesbattalionmoving.

A Special Operations Task Force 52 convoy support team stages for movement in the International Zone in downtown Baghdad, Iraq.

A Special Operations Task Force 52 service detachment conducts redeployment operations

at Baghdad International Airport.

MAY–jUNE 2011 33

Theseskillsetsenablethebattaliontocompleteitscombatmission.Althoughmostoftherequiredskillsetsareincludedinthecurrentmodifiedtableoforganizationandequipment,itdoeshavesomeglaringshortfalls.

Theservicedetachmentwouldbemuchmorecapableofaccomplishingitsmissionifitwereaug-mentedwithsomeMOS88Mwheeledvehicleopera-torsandMOS88Nmovementcontrolspecialists.AlthoughtheSpecialForcesbattalionhasone88NassignedtotheS–4,thebattalionwouldbebetterservedbyhavingthreeorfour88Nsintheservicedetachmentwhereallmovementiscoordinated.TheconstantdeploymentsandmovementsoftheSpecialForcesbattalionbringsthespotlighttothosemove-mentspecialists.Thisincreasedcapabilitywouldallowmorestreamlinedprocessesforsubmittingtime-phaseddeploymentdataandphysicallymovingcargotoandfromtheatersofoperations.

DuringOperationIraqiFreedom09–11,SOTF–52’sservicedetachmentprovidedcriticalsustain-mentsupportacrossallofsouthernIraq.Inadditiontoitscorecompetencies,thedetachmentcompleted12,500milesofline-haulconvoysupportdelivering

criticalgoodsandsuppliestothebattalion’sODAsandtoNavySEAL(sea,air,andland)platoons.

Theaerialdeliverysectionmoved350tonsofequipmentviasling-loadoperations.Thetrans-portationsectioncoordinatedforthemovementofmorethan500piecesofequipmentthroughthelocalcentralreceivingandshippingpointandmovementcontrolteam.ThefoodservicesectionfacilitatedtheacquisitionofclassI(subsistence)suppliesforadiningfacilitythatserved1,000ser-vicemembersdaily.Thesupplyelementoftheser-vicedetachmentturnedinover$10millionworthofexcesspropertyaspartoftheresponsibledraw-downofforcesinIraq.

Alloftheseactions,althoughusuallytranspar-enttothewarfighter,makeadifference.TheservicedetachmentoftheSpecialForcesbattalionprovidesthebattalion’sleaderswithacriticalservicethatshouldneverbeoverlooked.

captain cisco j. fuller is tHe s–4 for tHe 3d battalion, 4tH special forces Group. He is a Graduate of tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course, tHe aerial deliVery (riGGer) course, and tHe juMpMaster course.

Special Operations Task Force 52 service detachment Soldiers use a civilian contracted crane to download a 6,000-pound rough-terrain forklift at Forward Operating Base Zulu, Iraq.

34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

tisimportantthatmilitaryprofessionalsintoday’sArmystudymilitaryhistory.Studyingmilitaryhistorywillnotprovidethemilitaryprofessionalwithanexacttemplateonhowtoconductwarfare;however,Ibelievethatitdoesofferopportunitiestoexplorethethoughtprocessesandthedecisionsofcommandersfacedwithdifficultcircumstances.Whenaleaderisconfrontedwithuncertainty,itisimportantthathebecapableofcreativethoughtandingenuitytodefeattheenemy.

Thisarticlewillexploretherelevanceofstudyingmili-taryhistoryforthemodernmilitaryprofessionalandthevitalrolelogisticsplaysinultimatesuccessorfailureonthebattlefield.Specifically,itwilldiscusstheuseoftherailroadandthelessonslearnedfromtheCivilWarthatcanprovidevaluablelessonsfortoday’slogisticians.

WhyShouldIStudyMilitaryHistory?by Major jaMes j. Godfrey

I

Studying military history may not provide an exact blueprint for what to do in every situation. But the lessons learned from past experiences can encourage innovative thinking.

TheLessonsofthePastWarfarerequiresinnovativethinkingandingenuity.

Theenemyisalwaysadaptingtotacticsusedonthebattlefield.Itisimportantthatthecommanderonthegroundbeperceptiveandbeabletoapplycriticalthoughtnotonlytohisactionsbutalsototheenemy’sresponses.

AsJayLuvaasnotedinhisarticle,“MilitaryHis-tory:IsItStillPracticable?”intheMarch1982issueofParameters,duringWorldWarIItheGermansusedlessonslearnedfromthewesternfrontandappliedthemunchangedinthebattleagainsttheSovietUnion.Later,aGermangeneralremarked,“NotonlydidthismisapplicationofexperienceinfluencetheoperationalplanagainstRussia,italsocontributedtothefinaldisappointment.”Onecandeducethatmanyfactorsinfluencedthelackofsuccessofthesameplanwithadifferentenemy—factorsthatthecommanderonthegrounddidnottakeintoconsideration.

Manymissionvariablesneedtobeconsideredwhenapplyingalessonfromhistory.Studyingtheevents,situations,orcircumstancesfacingthecommanderat

thetimeiswhatprovidesthetruelessons.Howdoesthatcommanderusetheterrainortheweathertohisadvantage?Thethoughtprocessortheeventsthatledtothedecisionareimportanttounderstand.

Napoleonstudiedhistoryandmadeuseofitslessons.Hisapplica-tionofthoselessonsisevidentinhisactionsin1806,whenhisarmywasinItaly.Hehadwithhimahis-toryofacampaignconductedinthesametheaterbytheFrenchMar-shalMailleboisoverhalfacenturybefore.Inbothcases,theobjectwastoseparatethealliesandbeatthemindetail.Inbothcases,thesamepassesthroughtheMaritimeAlpswereused.Andinbothcases,thefirstobjectiveswerethesame.

HistoryservedNapoleonwellnotsomuchbecauseitprovidedamodeltofollowbutbecauseitofferedwaystocapitalizeonwhat

The Genl. J. C. Robinson, a locomotive of the U.S. Mili-tary Railroad, builds up steam at the huge Union Army supply depot at City Point, Virginia. The Union Army’s mastery of how to use railroads to support operations gave it an advantage over the Confederate armies.

MAY–jUNE 2011 35

othersbeforehimhadexperienced.Napoleonsawthetruebenefitofstudyinghistory.Heknewthathewasonterrainthathadbeenusedtowagewarinthepast.Ifacommanderisnotwellreadorknowledgeableofeventsfromthepast,hemaymissopportunitiestousethoselessonsinthepresent.NapoleoncapitalizedonthisconceptinhiscampaigninItaly.

TheCaseofRailroadsintheCivilWarAsalogistician,Icanlearnagreatdealfromhis-

tory.Theprocessbywhichwarfarehasbeensustainedhaschangeddrasticallyovertheyears.Armiesnolongeruseanimalswithcartstotransportsuppliesandtroopsacrossthebattlefield.Thepre-positioningofsuppliesandtheabilitytogetthosesuppliesstockedisvitaltomissionsuccess.Applicationsofsuccessfullogisticscanbefoundthroughouthistory,ascanthedemiseofarmiesunabletosustaintheirmovements.

TheuseoftherailroadduringtheAmericanCivilWarisanexcellentexampleofusingeffectivelogisticstoinfluencetheoutcome.TheUnionArmygainedasignificantadvantagefromitsabilitytocapitalizeontheuseofrailroads.Inpreviousconflicts,theArmyhadtocarryallthatitwouldneedforacam-paign.TheuseoftherailroadenabledtheUnionArmytocarrymoresuppliesandtransporttroopstodesig-natedlocations.

Theuseoftherailroadwasnotaneasyprocesstomaster;conflictshadtobemitigated.TheUnionArmymasteredthisearlyon,andthatsuccessprovedtobeatippingpointforthesuccessfulemploymentofthiscriticalasset.AsChristopherR.Gabelobservedinhisstudy,“RailroadGeneralship:FoundationsofCivilWarStrategy,”publishedbytheCombatStud-iesInstitutein1983,mostrailroadsinthe1860swerestillsmall-scale,localenterprises,somovementstypi-callyinvolvedcoordinationamongmultiplecorporateentities.Inordertoestablishpriorityandstillallowtherailroadstomakeaprofit,theU.S.Governmentenactedlegislationguaranteeingmilitaryprioritiesandconcludedaninformalagreementwiththerailroadsallowingthemtoturnafairprofit.

Thisactwasimportant,butthebrillianceofthisarrangementcamefromemployingrailroadmanagerstooverseeandsynchronizerailroadoperations.TheUnionrealizedtheimportanceofusingindividualswhohadavastknowledgeofthesystemandwhatitcoulddowhenemployedeffectively.Theeffectivenessofthisstrategywasrealizedon25September1863,whentheUnionArmymovedtheXIandXIICorpsfromVirginiatoTennessee.Thetransportationdepart-mentoftheBaltimoreandOhioRailroad,nottheWarDepartment,plannedandcoordinatedwiththefiveothercivilianrailroadsinvolved.

TheConfederateswerenotassuccessfulincapital-izingontheopportunitiestherailroadoffered.The

SouthdidnotassertitselfaseffectivelyastheNorthinestablishingthatthemilitaryhadpriorityofmovement.Formostofthewar,militarytrafficmovedonlyatthediscretionofcivilianrailroadmanagers.AnexampleofthenegativeimpactofthissystemwasthesupportprovidedtoGeneralRobertE.Lee’sArmyofNorthernVirginia.Lee’stroopssufferedfromhungerbecause,eventhoughtheyhadadirect,30-mileraillinktothenationalcapital,wheresupplieswereavailable,theywereunabletogetthosesuppliestothefront.

DuringtheCivilWar,therailroadtendedtorestrictmaneuver.AlthoughtheArmycouldmovemenandsuppliesinnumbersthatwereunheardofbeforetheuseoftherailroad,fieldarmiestendedtobunchuparoundtheirrailheads.Thenewproblemthusbecamesecondarymovement,andthiswasnottakenintoconsideration.

TheUnioneventuallydefeatedtheConfederacyinlargepartbecauseofitsabilitytomanagetherailsystemtoitsadvantage.TheUnion’sabilitytosyn-chronizemovementsandcoordinateeffortsearlyinitsuseoftherailroadwaskeytoitssuccess.TheConfed-erates’inabilitytoestablishthepriorityofmovementsandthensynchronizethoseeffortswastheirdownfall.SuccessfullyestablishinglogisticslinesofeffortisclearlyevidentwhendiscussingtheroleoftherailroadintheCivilWar.

Theuseoftherailroadisavaluableexampletoalogistician.Theneedtodeconflictmovementsched-ules,establishpriorities,andunderstandthetacticalpictureareallapplicableontoday’sbattlefield.

ThetacticiancanalsolearnalessonfromtheuseoftherailroadintheCivilWar.Logisticscanaffectoperationalreach,eitherbyreinforcingitorcompro-misingit.

Theseareafewexamplesofhowunderstandingthereasonsfordecisionsoractionsmadebyleadersinthepastcanprovidevaluablelessonsfortoday’smilitaryprofessional.Historywillnotprovidethemilitaryprofessionalaplaybookfromwhichtocon-ductwarfarebutratheralessonbookthatprovidesinnovativesolutionstocomplexproblems.Themili-taryprofessionalcananalyzethecontextofthebattleandthedecisionsthatfacedthecommanderonthegroundatthattime.

Whenhistoryisusedinthismanner,itteachesthemilitaryprofessionalhowtothinkandnotwhattothink.Ultimately,thecommanderneedstobecapableofcreativethoughtandingenuitytodefeattheenemy.

Major jaMes j. Godfrey is tHe deputy diVision cHief for arMy and Marine corps industrial support at tHe defense loGistics aGency land and MaritiMe in coluMbus, oHio. He Holds a Master’s deGree froM webster uniVersity and is a Graduate of tHe arMy coMMand and General staff colleGe.

36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

LessonsLearnedFromtheFirstYearofActivatingaBrigadeSupportBattalion

by lieutenant colonel leon G. pluMMer and Major eric a. Mccoy

anyArmylogisticianswhohaveservedsincethestartofOperationsEnduringFreedomandIraqiFreedomhaveobservedfirsthandtheArmy’schallengeofgrowingcapabilitytorespondtoafullspectrumofcontingencyoperations.InordertoincreasedwelltimeandbringtheArmyintocompli-ancewiththeArmyForceGenerationprocess,seniorArmyleadersdecidedtoincreasethenumberofbrigadecombatteams(BCTs)andsupportbrigadesinboththeActiveandReservecomponents.

On16August2009,ourbrigade,the3dInfantryBCT(IBCT),1stArmoredDivision,wasactivatedatFortBliss,Texas.Manycoursesofactionweredis-cussedattheArmy’sstrategicandoperationallevelsconcerningtheunit’sstructureandwhatfuturemis-sionsitwouldundertake.

AlthoughwewerescheduledtobecometheArmy’sfirstunitequippedwithFutureCombatSystems(FCS),theseniorleadersofourbrigadefocusedontheorganizationbeingproperlymanned,equipped,andtrainedforfull-spectrumoperationssothatwewouldbeavailabletosupportanycontingencymission.Thiswasespeciallyimportantbecausethe3dIBCTwasoneofthefirstnewlyactivatedunitsinrecenthistorythatdidnotdeploywithinayearofitsactivation,allowingseniorArmyleaderstoobservetheeffectivenessoftheArmyForceGenerationprocessasitwasoriginallymodeledforActivecomponentunits.

Thefollowinglessonslearnedweregatheredfromtheseniorleadersofthe125thBrigadeSupportBat-talion(BSB)andaredesignedtoeducatelogisticiansonthechallengesweexperiencedandthestepsformitigatingtheseproblems.Theserecommendationsaremeanttomaximizetheabilityoflogisticianstoprovidesustainmentandforcehealthprotectionsupporttothewarfighter.

SupplyDistributionOperationsAfterexperiencingthechallengesofactivatingthe

3dIBCT,thedistributioncompanygatheredsupplydis-tributionlessonslearnedthatmaybehelpfulforfutureBCTactivations.

M ThefirstrecommendationistohavevalidDepart-mentofDefenseactivityaddresscodes(DODAACs)inplace1yearbeforetheeffectivedateforstandinguptheunit.Second,theseniorpropertybookofficerandsupplysupportactivity(SSA)seniorwarrantofficershouldarriveattheinstallation9monthsbeforetheeffectivedateoftheunit’sactivation.Third,theSSAlocationshouldbeidentifiedandpreparedforunitactivation6monthsbeforetheeffectivedate.

WhenhearrivedatFortBlissinJanuary2009toserveastheinterim3dIBCTS–4,ourdistributioncompanycommanderquicklylearnedthattheunithadnotbeenassignedvalidDODAACstoallowittoplaceordersforequipment.The3dIBCThadaneffectivedateof14August2009.Thatmeantthelogisticianswhowereonthegroundhadonly8monthstopreparefortheinfluxofmaterielandpersonnel.

TheseniorpropertybookofficerstartedworkingontheissueofDODAACsinFebruary,andthe3dIBCTwasnotissuedaDODAACuntilJune.Oncethe

Soldiers of B Company, 125th Brigade Support Battalion, pull parts from their forward repair system to repair

a disabled vehicle. (Photo by CPT Jimmy Deer, 125th Brigade Support Battalion)

MAY–jUNE 2011 37

DODAACswereassigned,welearnedthattheywereactuallystillinusebyaresetunit.Therefore,wewereonstandbyandcouldnotordersuppliesandequipmentuntiltheresetunit’sequipmentclearedorweweregivendifferentDODAACs.

The3dIBCTwasallocated$6milliontostanduptheunit.However,withnowaytoorderequipmentorsupplies,thelogisticiansonthegroundcouldnotpre-parefortheuniteffectivedate.TemporaryDODAACswereissuedtotheunit,buttemporaryDODAACsareonlyvaliduntil180dayspriortoactivation,andthentheunittransitionstopermanentDODAACs.

The3dIBCThadnooperatingDODAACs,nocomputersystemsforplacingorders,andnoSSAavailabletoreceivesupplies.Bythetimethebrigadehadfoughtthroughthedebateonwhetherornotcen-tralreceivingatFortBlisscouldaccommodatetheflowofordersfromanIBCT,theeffectivedatehadarrived.Basedonthisexperience,unitsshouldensurethattheDODAACisactive1yearbeforetheeffec-tivedateandthattheseniorpropertybookofficerandSSAwarrantofficersareonsitenolaterthan9monthspriortotheeffectivedate.

SSAOperationsItissaidthat“logisticsisthelifebloodofwar.”

Ifthatphilosophyistrue,thentheSSAistheheartofanyunit.Unfortunately,anSSAwasnotincludedin

theinitialplansforthe3dIBCT.Eventually,thebrigadeplannedtohaveanSSAbuilt,butnotuntiltheendof2011orthebeginningof2012.The3dIBCTwouldhavetocolocatewithtwoexistingSSAsinordertobeginshippingandreceiv-ingprocedures.SelectinganSSAsitelargeenoughtoaccommodateinboundcargoinvolvedmonthsofdebatebetweentheadvancepartyandinstallationpersonnel.

Themostimportantconsider-ationwasthesecurityofthesite.BecausethreeSSAsweresharingthesamebuilding,fencingandmemorandumsofagreementwerenecessary.Inadditiontotheship-pingandreceivingofsupplies,thestorageoftheauthorizedstock-agelist(ASL)wasaparamountissuefortheSSAwarrantofficer.BecauseofthedelayinselectinganSSAlocationandtheinabilitytostoreanyASLthatcouldbedelivered,theASLforthe3dIBCTdidnotarriveuntilnearly8monthsaftertheunit’sformalactivation.

StoragecontainersfortheASLwereanotherchal-lengebecausethe3dIBCTwasnotwithinanimmedi-atedeploymentwindow.Theunitleadersdraftedandsubmittedanoperationalneedsstatementtopurchasetherequiredcontainers,whicharrivedshortlybeforeMay2010.Toavoidthisproblem,theSSAwarrantofficershouldbeonthegroundnolessthan9monthsbeforetheunit’seffectivedate,andeffectiveinfrastruc-tureandsupportingresourcesshouldbeinplacetoaccommodateearlyreceiptoftheASLsothatunitscanbegincollectivetrainingatthefirstopportunity.

The125thBSB’sdistributioncompanywasthenexusforalllogisticsforthefirst180daysafterthebrigade’seffectivedate.InadditiontoacquiringanSSAlocation,requisitioningequipment,andsecuringonhandcargo,thedistributioncompanyprovideddirectsupportfortheentire3dIBCTsothattheforwardsup-portcompanies(FSCs)hadtimetoobtaintherequiredmanningandtraining.

AutomationThebackboneoftheBCT’sStandardArmyMan-

agementInformationSystems(STAMISs)includeseightverysmallapertureterminals(VSATs)andtheCombatServiceSupportAutomatedInformationSys-temsInterface(CAISI).AVSATiseasytoinstallandprovidesthebrigade’sFSCswithNon-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork(NIPRNET)accessanywhereintheworld.TheCAISIprovidesanextensionofthelocalareanetwork,enablingunitstoaccesstheVSATfromupto32milesaway.

DuringtheSTAMISfielding,werealizedthatitisimperativethattheoperations(S–3),supportoperations,andsustainmentautomationsupportmanagementoffice(SASMO)sectionscoordinatetodeployindividualsys-temsinthepropersequence.Thenewequipmentfield-ingteamsdidanexcellentjobofhandlingourrequestsforfieldingequipmentintheproperorder.Theirexperi-enceinfieldingthesesystemsallowedthebrigadetocommunicatetheneedforthisorder.

VSATswerefieldedfirsttoprovidetheNIPRNETconnectivitythatwasneededforallthesystemstobeinstalled.WiththeVSATsinplace,theStandardArmyRetailSupplySystem(SARSS),whichisthecentralpointinthelogisticsnetwork,couldbeinstalled.WiththeSARSSconnectedtotheVSATnetwork,anylogis-ticssystemthatneededtointerfacewithSARSScouldnowbeinstalled.

WiththeSARSSinstallationcomplete,PropertyBookUnitSupplyEnhanced(PBUSE)wasinstalledandcouldbeusedtosubmitsupplyrequeststotheSARSSserver.CloseontheheelsofPBUSE,theStandardArmyMaintenanceSystemEnhancedwasfielded.

Newequipmentfieldingwasalwaysaccompaniedbynewequipmenttraining.Thistrainingprovided

38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

supportpersonnelandoperatorswithasolidfounda-tioninthefundamentalsofsupportingandoperatingthenewequipment.Bothclassroominstructionandover-the-shoulder,on-the-jobtrainingwereprovidedforthemajorityofthefielding.Theover-the-shouldertrainingprovedinvaluableforbothsupportpersonnelandoperators,sinceproblemsortasksthatwerenotcoveredinclassaroseoften.

TheSASMOistheprimarysupportsectionforallSTAMISequipment.Thissectioncomprisesasig-nalwarrantofficer,computertechnicians,materielmanagementspecialists,andasupplyspecialist.ThismixtureofjobspecialtiesprovidesabroadrangeoflogisticsandsignalabilitiesthatallowtheSASMOtosupportmanylogisticssupportfunctions.

OnelessonlearnedintheSASMOsectionistheimportanceofslowingthepaceoffieldingwhenpossi-ble.OneofthechallengesofstandingupanewBCTisthatnewpersonnelandequipmentareflowinginsimul-taneously.Thisparallelflowdoesnotworkwellwhenpersonnelskillsmustbematchedwithequipment;thisisespeciallytrueinthecaseofSASMOdutiessincemanySoldiersmaynotbefullytrainedontroubleshootingSTAMISsystems.Giventimetoidentifythetrueskillsetsoftheirpersonnel,leaderscanputthemintrainingthatbettersuitseachindividual’scapabilities.

Slowingthefieldingprocesswouldallownotonlyforbettertrainingofpersonnelbutalsoforbetterselectionofsupportpersonnelforthesesystems.OneofthecurrentproblemsthattheArmyfacesisthattheSASMOsection,althoughnotnewtotheArmy,isnewtomostSoldiers.Withmoretimetoidentifythemoreexperiencedsignalandlogisticstroops,theSASMOcouldbestaffedwithSoldierswhocansupporttheSTAMISarchitecturewithminimaltraining.Thefield-ingprocessbelongstotheunit;theemphasisshouldnotbeputonspeedbutontheabilityofthepersonneltofieldandemploytheequipment.

TheSTAMISnetworkcomprisesmanysystemsthattogethersupportacomplexbutintuitivelogisticsarchi-tecture.Withthecorrectfieldingscheduleandperson-nel,thelogisticsnetworkcanbeinstalledquicklyandwillfunctionwithminimalmaintenanceordowntime.Trainingandpersonnelarethekeystoinstallingandmaintainingaqualitylogisticsnetwork.Propercoordi-nationwithallplayersinvolvedinfieldingandtrainingforequipmentisimportanttomakingoperatorsandsupportpersonnelsuccessfulintheoperationoftheBCT’slogisticssystem.

ForceHealthProtectionThebrigadesupportmedicalcompanyintheBSB

providesmedicalsupportandsuppliesforthe3dIBCT.Basedonalackofhealthcareprovidersandtheinfluxofnewpersonneltothebrigade,aconsciousdecisionwasmadetoconsolidateresourcesandpersonnelto

staffaconsolidatedbrigadeaidstationandoperateaconsolidatedcombatlifesaveracademy.

Executingthesecoursesofactionrequiredmuchfromourleadersintermsofplanningandresources.Despiteinitialdifficulties,theconsolidatedaidstationhasgreatlyincreasedthequalityofcarethatSoldiersreceive,reducedpatientloadatthetroopmedicalclin-ic,andhelpedtokeepSoldiersavailablefortraining.

MedicalcareisanecessityforallSoldiers,andtheaidstationmustbeincloseproximityforsickcallsothosewhodonothavetransportationwillbeabletogowithoutanyhassles.ThebuildingselectedastheaidstationmusthaveInternetconnectivitysothatthehealthcareproviderswillbeabletologpatientsintothemedicalsystemandinputprescriptionsfromtheaidstation.Thebuildingalsoneedstobelargeenoughtoprotectpatientprivacy.

Thesewereinitialchallengesbasedonthecapabili-tiesofthetransientfacilitiesthatourBCTwasinitiallyusing.Allthemedicsinthebrigadeshouldbeincludedinthe90-dayrotationplantoworkattheconsolidatedaidstationsothatthepatientworkloadisevenlydistrib-utedamongallmedicsinthebrigade.AdequateclassVIII(medicalmateriel)suppliesareneeded,includingthermometers,pulseoximeters,stethoscopes,bloodpressurecuffs,andothersuppliesthatthephysicianassistantdeemsnecessaryforuseattheaidstation.

Thestand-upcostsformedicalsuppliesshouldbebuiltintotheactivationbudgetsofBCTssothatadequatecapabilityisinplaceattheeffectivedate.Thebrigademedicalsupplysectionmusthaveanestab-lishedaccountdesignatedonlyforclassVIII.Alltrans-actionsshouldgothroughthataccount,andallordersforthebrigadeshouldgothroughthemedicalsupplywarehouseandauthorizedvendors.Themedicalsup-plyprocessesneedtobebuiltearlierintotheadvancepartyprocesssothatproperoversightprocedurescanbeinplacebeforeunitactivation.

Atrackingsystemshouldbedevelopedearlytoensureproperordering,receipt,issue,andaccountabil-ityofmedicalsupplies.Astandingoperatingproceduremustbepublishedinorderfortheunitstoknowtheproperprocedurefororderingmedicalsupplies.

Facilitiesandtechnologymustbeconsideredbyinstallationplanners,especiallywhenbuildingnewunitsoninstallationswithlimitedpermanentinfrastructure.Adequatespaceisrequiredinthebrigademedicalsup-plywarehouseforstoringmedicalsupplies.Activatedcomputersystemsneedtobeinplaceinthewarehousetotrackorders.Shelvesandpalletsmustbeplacedinthewarehouseaccordingtomedicalsupplyregulations.

TheArmyCombatLifesaverProgramTheArmy’scombatlifesaver(CLS)programtrains

nonmedicalpersonnelonlifesavingskillstoimprovetheirchancesofsavingfellowSoldiersonthebattle-

MAY–jUNE 2011 39

field.Thecourseteachesthebasicskillsneededtosus-tainlifeinanemergencysituationbeforeawoundedSoldiercanbeevacuatedtoamedicaltreatmentfacil-ity.TheCLScertificationis40hoursandincludesclassroominstructionandhands-ontraining.

Intheclassroom,theCLSstudentsareinstructedonbasicfirstaidtheory,advancedlifesavingmea-sures,andthereasonsbehindgivinginitialcareonthebattlefield.IftheSoldierspassawrittentest,theywillbeevaluatedinthesecondpartoftheclass,whichfocusesonhands-onskillsinthefield.Inthefield,tacticalcombatcasualtycareisstressedandincludescareunderfire,tacticalfieldcare,andevacuationofacombatcasualty.

The3dIBCT’sCLSAcademycadrelearnedtwoimportantlessonswhentheyestablishedtheirprogram.Thefirstistohavededicatedfacilitieswithaudiovisualcapabilitiesforthedurationoftraining.Thesecondistosecureland,ammunition,andtrainingresourcestosupportthefieldportionofthecourse.

OfficialCLSbooks,whichareorderedfromFortSamHouston,Texas,takeabout30daystoarrive,sounitsshouldorderthemearlyintheadvancepartypro-cess.Advancepartypersonnelshouldbequalifiedasrangeofficers-in-chargeandrangesafetyofficersearlyonintheactivationprocesstoensurethattrainingisnothinderedbynoncompliancewithpostrangeregulations.

FieldMaintenanceOperationsOneofthemostsignificantchallengesourmainte-

nanceshopshadtodealwithwasthequalityoffacili-tiestheyinitiallyoccupied.Thiswasespeciallytruewithourserviceandrecovery,communicationsandelectronics(C&E),generalsupportequipment,fieldmaintenance,andarmamentshops,whichhadissueswithfacilityinfrastructure,specialtools,andseniorpersonnelinflux.Thefollowingareexamplesofissuesweencounteredorhadtoovercomeinordertomakeourmissionassuccessfulaspossibleusingtheresourc-esandfacilitiesavailabletous.

ThemotorpoolallocatedforourmaintenanceoperationsrequiredmorespaceandtightersecuritythanwereavailableatthetimetheIBCTactivated.Theinstallationwasintheprocessofbuildingourperma-nentbrigadefacilities;however,wehadtooccupytran-sientfacilitiesintheinterim.

TheadvancepartymusthaveadequateexpertiseinthelogisticsrequirementsoftheBSBinordertoestab-lishsemipermanentinfrastructurethatmeetstheunit’sneeds.Ourmotorpoolhadtoofewcagestostoretools,

parts,andgeneralequipmentseparately.Thecageourfieldmaintenancesectionhadforpartswasalsousedtostoreotherequipment.Andourclamshellfacility’sdoorslocked,butthefacilitycouldstillbeenteredthroughtheretractabledoor.

Workordersforbetterphysicalsecuritymeasurestookalongtimetostartandcomplete,includingthoseforourC&Efacility.Over$140,000worthofphysi-calsecurityupgradesstillneededtobestartedbytheDepartmentofPublicWorksinorderforustobeabletofullysupportthebrigade.

WeworkedtoensurethattheC&Efacilitywasincompliancewithregulationsandlocalphysicalsecuritydemands.ToemplaceaC&Eshopinasemipermanentfacility,severalrequirementsneedtobemet,includingreinforcingceilingandwalls,placingbarsonwindows,installinganintrusiondetectionsystem,emplacingrestrictionbarsonair-conditioningducts,andsecuringroofaccesscontrol.Theworkordersontheserequeststakeapproximately15to24monthstocomplete.

Otherneededupgradesincludedupgradingtheamperageofeachpoweroutlet,installingmorepoweroutletsnearworkstations,andincreasingthesquarefootageoftheshopfrom1,050toatleast2,100.

Thelackofstoragecontainersmadeitdifficulttoproperlysecurenewequipmentasitarrived.ThiswascompoundedbythelackofDODAACsfortheunit,whichlimitedourabilitytoorderstoragecontainers

A Soldier from C Company, 125th Brigade Support Battalion, performs a chest compression on an infantry

Soldier during a combat testing lane for the Expert Field Medical Badge. (Photo by SGT Roger Rydell Daniels,

16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

untilthebeginningoffiscalyear2010,eventhoughweactivatedinfiscalyear2009.

Likewise,newequipmentarrivalsdidnotcoincidewithpersonnelinfloworthetrainingscheduleoftheBCT.Someofthecompany’smaintenanceequipment,likeourtoolboxes,didnotarriveuntillaterinthefield-ingprocess.Theidealtimeforthearrivaloftoolboxesandneededmaintenanceequipment(technicalmanu-alsandsafetyequipment)wouldbebeforeanyoftheMTOE[modifiedtableoforganizationandequipment]equipmentrequiringmaintenancearrivesattheunit.

Moreover,ourMTOEdidnotreflectthecriticalrepairequipmentneededtosupportanIBCT,suchasnight-visionspecialtools,storagecontainers,anddistributionboxes.Wewereunabletosubmitanopera-tionalneedsstatementfortheseandotheritemsuntil365daysbeforeanoperationaldeployment.

Thespecialtyshops’MTOEsareoftenmissingthepersonnelandequipmentrequiredtomaintainsomeofthebrigade’sspecializedcommunicationsequipment.IncludingthemontheMTOErequiresearlieridentifi-cationofneededcommercialmaintenanceequipment.Newequipmenttrainingisalsorequiredsothatmain-tainershavetheproperskillsetstousetheequipmentbeforethestartofcollectivetraining.

Atthetimeofitsactivation,the3dIBCThadlessthanadozenvehicles,over250Soldiersoperatingoutof2buildings,andnomotorpool,SSA,oraidstation.Inlessthanayear,weorganizedunits,establishedthelogisticsfootprintofthebrigade,receivedmostofourrequiredequipment,establishedcommandandsup-portrelationshipsbetweenFSCsandtheirsupportedmaneuverbattalions,andbegancollectivetraining.

Ourculminatingeventwasabrigade-levelfieldtrain-ingexerciseinJune.Duringthisexercise,ourbattalionperformedexceptionallyoverthecourseof21daysina

fieldenvironmentwherethedailyaveragetemperatureexceeded100degrees.Wepushedover12,600meals,100,000poundsofice,40,000gallonsoffuel,and60,000roundsofliveandblanksmall-armsammu-nitionandprovidedmaintenance,transportation,andmedicalsupporttoover2,600personnel.Duringa96-hourbrigadeforce-on-forceexer-cise,werelocatedthebrigadesupportareaandsupportedmaneuverele-

mentsthatwereasfaras30kilometersaway.Thelessonslearnedoverthelastyearofouractiva-

tionhavebeenremarkablyeducationalfortheofficers,noncommissionedofficers,andSoldiersofthe125thBSB.WeacknowledgethatwhilewehavetraveledfarsincetheearlydaysofourBCTadvanceparty’soperationatFortBliss,ourunitstillhasalongjour-neyaheadofusaswecontinuecollectivetraining,transitiontobeingthefirstFCS-equippedBCT,andultimatelyentertheforce-availablepool.However,asthingscontinuetochangeintoday’sdynamicoperatingenvironment,wehopethatotherscanbenefitfromourexperiences,avoidsomeofthechallengesweencoun-tered,andfindopportunitiesforexcellence.

lieutenant colonel leon G. pluMMer is tHe coMMander of tHe 125tH briGade support battalion, 3d infantry briGade coMbat teaM, 1st arMored diVision. He Has a bacHelor’s deGree in politi-cal science froM florida a&M uniVersity and a Master’s deGree in adMinistration froM central MicHiGan uniVersity. He is a Gradu-ate of tHe ordnance officer basic course, coMbined loGistics officers adVanced course, coMbined arMs and serVices staff scHool, and coMMand and General staff officer course.

Major eric a. Mccoy is tHe executiVe officer of tHe 125tH briGade support battalion, 3d infantry briGade coMbat teaM, 1st arMored diVision. He Has a bacHelor’s deGree in Mental HealtH froM MorGan state uniVersity, a Master’s deGree in adMin-istration froM central MicHiGan uniVersity, and a Master’s deGree in public policy ManaGeMent froM GeorGetown uniVersity. He is a Graduate of tHe ordnance officer basic course, tHe coMbined loGistics captains career course, tHe coMbined arMs serVices and staff scHool, and tHe coMMand and General staff officer course (coMMon core).

tHe autHors would like to tHank captain GreGory darden, cap-tain jiMMy deer, captain adaM HuGHes, and cHief warrant officer 2 juan dorado for tHeir assistance in deVelopinG tHis article.

Water purification specialists with A Company, 125th Brigade Support Battalion, conduct initial water test-ing as part of the company’s training. (Photo by David Poe, Fort Bliss Public Affairs Office)

MAY–jUNE 2011 41

ouaretheseniorlogisticianinthecommand postthismorning.Itis0800,andyouareabout tobriefthecommanderinhisbattleupdatebrief.Youhavebeenpreparingforthebriefsince0600becausetheslideswereduetothebattlecaptainby0700.Yougetuptobriefthecommanderandstartspoutingoutnumbersandfigures.“Wehave100,000gallonsofJP8and50palletsofbottledwater.Ammoisgreen.Weareexpectingapushfromthesustainmentbrigadelatertonight.Ouroperationalreadinessrateis87percent,”andon,andon,andon.

Youwrapupyourbriefing,andyoufeelprettygoodaboutwhatyoutoldtheboss;afterall,youpulledthedatafromtheBattleCommandSustainmentSupportSystemandverifieditinthelogisticsstatusreport.Surelyitwasgooddata,butthereinliestheproblem:Itwasjustabunchofdata.

Yourcommandersitsbackinhischairandsays,“Sowhat?”Youhavejustfailedyourcommander.Ifastaffofficerbriefsthecommanderandthecommandermustaskaquestioneitherforclarificationorrelevance,thestaffofficerhasfailedinhisjob.

MakingKnowledgeRelevantLogisticiansnotoriouslyneglectknowledgeman-

agement(KM),andthesituationdescribedaboveisjustoneexampleofwhy.Wesustainersarefacedwithmorerawdatathananyotherstaffofficer,andbecauseofthat,weoftenbreakthemostbasicprin-cipleofKM:ensuringthatknowledgeproductsarerelevant,accurate,timely,andusabletocommandersanddecisionmakers.

Beforebriefingcommandersorprovidinglogisticsdatatothedecisionmakers,logisticiansmustanalyzeandfilterthedataandinformationandturnitintoknowledgeforthecommander.ICorpspersonnelrecentlyaddressedthisissueintheirKMplan.Theyrecommendedanalyzinginformationbasedonseveninformationcharacteristicsbeforebriefingcommand-ersordecisionmakers.Thosesevencharacteristicsareaccuracy,relevance,timeliness,usability,complete-ness,brevity,andsecurity.

Sustainersmusttaketheinfiniteamountofdatatheyreceiveandfilteritusingthesesevencharacter-istics.Onlyafterthedataarefiltered,analyzed,and

packagedcorrectlyshouldtheinformationbepro-cessedandpresentedtothecommander.

Onemightarguethatsustainersdonothavetimetoanalyzeallofthelogisticsdatatheyarefacedwithandthattheircommanderwantsinformationassoonasitisavailable.Irecommendaskingthecommanderordecisionmaker,“Whichdoyouprefer:informationnoworknowledgelater?”

Duringthe5thannualArmyOperationalKnowledgeManagementConference,Dr.MarkNissenputitanotherway.Heusedapizzaanalogy:Doesthecommanderwantabadpizzadeliveredfastorabetterpizzathattakesalittlelongertoprepareanddeliver?Mostcommanderswillwantboth.Commanderswantinformationnow,andtheywantittoberight.Thismakesourjobevenmoredifficult,butthroughtheuseofeffectiveKMprocesses,sustainerscanmeetthecommander’srequirements.

Sustainerscanstartbyspeakingthecommander’slanguage.Logisticianstendtospeakdifferentlythantheircommanders,especiallyinmaneuverandfunc-tionalbrigades.Whilewetendtotalkofgallons,daysofsupply,andpercentages,themaneuverandfunction-albrigadecommandersspeakofoffensiveanddefen-siveoperationsandthenumberofmissions.

Sustainersmusttaketheirlogisticsdataandinfor-mationandputitintermsthatthecommandercanapplyimmediately.Forexample,insteadofsaying,“Sir,wearegreenonammunition,andwehave89per-centonhand,”thesustainershouldsay,“Sir,withthecurrentamountofammunitiononhand,wecansustain30missions.”Itisthesamedataandinformation,butitisspokeninthecommander’slanguage—howthecommodityaffectsmissions.Thismayseemsimple,butthewayyoupresenttheinformationisalmostasimportantastheinformationitself.

SharingKnowledgeOneofthesevenprinciplesofKMistofocus

onsharingknowledge.FieldManual(FM)6–01.1,KnowledgeManagementSection,saysthat“knowl-edgesharedispower.”Sustainersdoarelativelygoodjobofsharinginformationandknowledgewithinthelogisticscommunity.Wheresustainersfailtoshareinformationandknowledgeisacrosstheotherwarf-ightingfunctions.

WhyLogisticiansFailatKnowledgeManagement

by Major jiM bunyak

Y

Ensuring that knowledge products are relevant, accurate, timely, and usable to commanders and decisionmakers will lead to unit success.

42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ThebrigadeS–4issynchronizedwiththebrigadesupportbattalion’s(BSB’s)supportoperationsofficer(SPO),andtheBSBSPOissynchronizedwiththesustainmentbrigadeSPO.Butthebrigade’slogisticiansareseldomfullyintegratedandsynchronizedwiththemovementandmaneuvercellorotherstaffsections.ByusingseveralKMtools,sustainerscanbettersyn-chronizelogisticsacrossallwarfightingfunctions.

Running estimates.Sustainersmusthavesimplebutdynamicrunningestimates.UsingaMicrosoftPowerPointslidewithanimbeddedExcelspread-sheetiscommonpractice,butthatslideishardlydynamic,andquitefrankly,itisnotarunningesti-mate.Now,Iamnotsayingthatrunningestimatesneedtoberealtime,butaccordingtoFM3–0,Operations,theyneedtobeacontinuousassessment.AssoonasdataaretakenfromtheExcelspreadsheetandpastedintoaslide,theinformationisstatic.

Sustainersshouldleveragetechnologytomaketheirrunningestimatesmorerelevant.TheCommandPostoftheFuture(CPOF)andSharePointoffertech-nologysolutionsforrunningestimates.Whenassess-ingrunningestimates,analyzethetimeandeffortittakestoprepare,update,andsharethoseestimates.Ifyouoryoursubordinatesarespendingexcessivetimeandeffortmaintainingthese,youshouldlookformoreefficientandeffectivesolutions.Furthermore,ifitisdifficultorimpossibletoshareyourinforma-tion,thenitisoflittleuse.

Logistics synchronization meeting.Onceyouhavedevelopedyourrunningestimates,thoseestimatesbecomethefoundationforyourlogisticssynchroniza-tion(logsync)meetingoryoursustainmentwork-inggroup.Fewmaneuverandfunctionalbrigadeseffectivelyusethelogsyncmeeting.Mostbrigades

eitherconducttheirmeetingwithonlylogisticians(excludingtheotherstaffsectionsorwarfightingfunctions),ortheydonotconductalogsyncmeetingatall.

Thelogsyncmeetingisthekeytointegratingsustainmentandsharinglogisticsinformationandknowledge.Inadeployedtheater,time,distance,andlocationmaymakeitdifficulttoconductalogsyncmeeting,butonceagain,sustainerscanlever-agetechnologytohelpfacilitatethemeeting.Virtualmeetingsarecommonandveryeffective.Regard-lessofhowthemeetingisheld,itscontentsaremostimportant.

Whendevelopingyourlogsyncmeeting,startwiththe“7-minutedrill”tojustifytheneedforthemeeting.Itiscalledthe7-minutedrillbecauseyouhave7minutesorlesstojustifytoyourbosstheneedforthemeeting.Byfocusingontheoutputsofthemeeting,youcanshowthecommandthevalueofthelogsyncmeeting.Onceyouhavecompletedthe7-minutedrillandaddedthelogsyncmeetingtothebattlerhythm,developthecontentandstructureofthemeeting.

Quad charts. Aquadchartisanexcellenttooltoensurethatyourlogsyncmeetingandothermeet-ings,workinggroups,andboardsareefficient.Thequadchartisnotanewproduct,butitworkswell.OperationsGroupFoxtrotandtheBattleCommandTrainingProgramrecognizethequadchartasabestpracticewhendevelopingthecontent,structure,andcompositionofyourmeetingsandworkinggroups.

The quad chart is a best practice for developing

the content, structure, and composition of your

meetings and working groups.

Legend

BSB = BrigadesupportbattalionSASMO= Sustainmentautomation

supportmanagement office

FSC = ForwardsupportcompanyPBO = PropertybookofficeSPO = SupportoperationsofficerXO = Executiveofficer

MAY–jUNE 2011 43

Thequadchartclearlydisplaysthepurpose,fre-quency,duration,andlocationinonequadrant.Theinputsandoutputsaredisplayedinanotherquadrantand,equallyimportant,theattendeesarelistedinathirdquadrant.Inthelogsyncquadchartbelow,theattendeesincluderepresentativesfromtheopera-tionsandintelligencesections.Theattendanceofthesepeopleiscriticaltointegratingsustainersintotheoperations.Thelastquadrantsimplyshowstheagendaforthelogsyncmeeting.Noticethatvariousstaffsectionsareinvolvedandfacilitatethesharingofinformationacrossthebrigade.

ImprovingKMPracticesPerhapsthesinglemostimportantmeansofsharing

informationandgainingsituationalunderstandingisthecommonoperationalpicture(COP),whichsustain-erssometimesneglect.LogisticiansfeelthattheyneedtohavetheirownlogisticsCOP(LCOP).FM3–0saysthattheCOPisasingledisplayofrelevantinforma-tionthatissharedbymorethanonecommand.LCOPisnevermentionedinArmydoctrine,andsustainersmustrecognizethatthereisonlyoneCOP.

Wemustincorporatelogisticsinformationintotheunit’sCOP,whichiseasytodowithCPOFandSharePoint.Sustainersmusttaketheinformationfromtheir“LCOP”andcreateviewsanddisplayswithinCPOFandSharePointtodisplaytherelevantlogisticsinformationtothecommander,otherstaffsections,andsubordinateunits.Doingthisinstantlygivescom-mandersanddecisionmakersthesustainmentsitu-ationalawarenesstheyrequire.

AnotherkeyKMprincipleistofosterlearning.Sus-tainersmustcontinuetobealearningcommunity.Wedothisbycapturinglessonslearnedandpassingthemontoourreplacementsorotherunits.Thisisanareawherewecouldallimprove.Alltoooften,unitsorindi-vidualschangesomethingjustforthesakeofchange.

Forexample,inarecentinitial-impressionreportfromIIICorps,itwasnotedthatthecorps“madeaconsciousdecisiontonotuseseveraloftheauto-matedtoolsdevelopedbythepreviousstaff,basedonthelackofpredeploymenttrainingonthetoolsinuseintheater....Inretrospect,severalchangeswerereversedafterlearningthatthepreviousunit’smethodsworkedbest.”Ifwedonotlearnfrompreviousunitsandindividuals,wewillcontinuetolearnthesamelessonsoverandoveragain.

Itisabsolutelycriticalthatsustainerscaptureles-sonslearnedandsharethem.TheArmyhasnumerousmeanstosharetheselessons.TheBattleCommandKnowledgeSystem(BCKS)isonewaytoshareyourexperiencesandbestpractices,andeverysustainershouldbeanactivememberoftheSustainNetforum,whichisanexcellentplacetofindlogisticsinforma-tion,products,andbestpractices.

Butdonotallowreadilyavailablelessonslearnedtoreplaceindividualinnovation.YouwillfindnumerousstandingoperatingprocedureswithinBCKS,butdonotfallintothetrapoftakinganotherunit’sproductandassumingthatitfitsyourorganizationperfectly.Theseproductsshouldbeyourfoundation,butcontinuetoadaptandimprovethembasedonyourtacitknowledge.

Inthecurrentoperationalenvironment,knowledgetransferiscritical.EffectiveKMallowsustolearnmore,faster.Forexample,almosteveryonehaspar-ticipatedinsomesortofreliefinplace/transferofauthority(RIP/TOA),whetheritwasinIraq,Afghani-stan,Kuwait,orsomewhereelse.Normally,theincomingsustainerhasdonesomeresearchbeforetheRIP/TOA.Thisresearchisdonebyemail,telephonecalls,andmaybeevenapredeploymentsitesurvey.

Onceanindividualdeploys,hehaslessthanamonthtolearneverythinghecanfromtheoutgoingofficersandSoldiers.Attheendofthoseshortweeks,theincomingindividualprobablyfeelscomfortableinhisunderstandingofhisdutiesandresponsibilities.

Asthenewguygetsfurtherintohistourandthelastguygoeshome,thenewguyalmostassuredlyrealizesthathehasalotmoretodothanthelastguyshowedhim.Whyisthis?Wasthelastguyjustinahurrytogohome?Probably,butIdoubtheintention-allyignoredquestions.ThebreakdownmostlikelycanbetracedbacktoalackofKMand,inparticular,knowledgetransfer,bothtacitandexplicit.

RetiredGeneralJohnW.HendrixsummeduptheimportanceofKM.Asheaddressedafunctionalbrigadeatitsbattlecommandseminar,hesaid,“It[KM]isalaboriousprocess,butifyoudon’tdoit,itisanaccidentifthisbrigadeworkswell...Ifyoudonotdothisprocess,itisanaccidentifthisbrigadefunctionsproperly.”Hecontinues,“Wearenotaninstitutionthatacceptsaccidentaldecisionmaking.Knowledgemanagementistheprocessbywhichwemakeit[decisionmaking]logical.”

Sustainersprovidecriticalinformationinthisdeci-sionmakingprocess.Wecannotletourselvesgetcon-sumedbydataandneglectourKMresponsibilities.Byanalyzingourdataandinformation,speakingthecom-mander’slanguage,sharingourknowledge,andcaptur-ingandtransferringourlessonslearned,wecanensurethatitisnotanaccidentwhenourunitsucceeds.

Major jiM bunyak is currently a student at tHe arMy coMMand and General staff scHool. He was preViously assiGned to opera-tions Group foxtrot, battle coMMand traininG proGraM, at fort leaVenwortH, kansas. He Has a bacHelor’s deGree in international studies froM frostburG state uniVersity and a Master of loGistics ManaGeMent deGree froM florida institute of tecHnoloGy. He is a Graduate of tHe loGistics executiVe deVelopMent course and tHe arMy knowledGe ManaGeMent qualification course.

44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

RadioFrequencyIdentificationTagsinModernDistributionProcesses

by patricia kelly and catHerine robertello

hemilitaryservicesandtheDefenseLogistics Agency(DLA)haveinvestedmillionsinradio- frequencyidentification(RFID)tagsandinfra-structuresince1996.TheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)hasaimedmostofthisinvestmentatproduc-ingin-transitvisibility(ITV)information,someofwhichisusedtomakesuchdecisionsaswhetherornottoordermoresupplies,redirectcargodelayedenroute,orgetmaterials-handlingequipmentanddownloadteamsready.InJune2007,DODselectedRFIDtechnologytohelptrackassetsacrossitssup-plychain.

UsingRFIDtomodernizelogisticsprocesses—andnotjusttogatherITVinformation—couldresultinsubstantialimprovementsindistributionoperations.WeproposethatDODcouldimproveitsexistingRFIDinfrastructureandinvestmentbyaddingRFIDtodailydistributionprocesses.

FocusontheProcessMorethan3millionactiveRFIDtagsareincircu-

lationtodayinthemilitarydistributionsystem,withapproximately3,100tag-readerdevicesinplaceinKuwait,Iraq,Pakistan,andAfghanistan.DODcustom-ers,especiallytheArmy,couldstartusingthatinvest-mentnotonlytomakebetteruseoftheITVdatabutalsotoreapthegreaterbenefitsofprocessimprove-mentsinsupply,inventorymanagement,andtranspor-tation.ThatiswhereDODwouldgetthebigpayofffromRFID.

DODurgentlyneedstotalITV,butwhatitneedsmorearetheefficientdistributionprocessesthatRFID-enabledinformationsystemscansupport.ITVdatawouldbecollectedasatransactionbyproduct.DODlogisticianshavebeenslowtoembracethepro-cessefficienciesthatRFIDtagsoffer.ByusingjustthecurrentRFIDinfrastructuretosupporttransac-tionsinautomatedsystems,DODcanachievevaluablechangesindistributionbusinessprocesseswithlittleincrementalcost.

TheFrameworkIsThereTheArmy,forexample,hasalreadymadelarge

investmentstoestablishtheaterITVbypurchasingmillionsofRFIDtagsandestablishingthousandsofRFIDtaginterrogator(reader)sites,notonlyatdistri-butionactivitiesbutalsoatmajornodesalongroutes.

T Thetagscostaround$60each.Interrogatorequipmentcancostbetween$2,000and$20,000persite,plus$75anhourforthefieldservicerepresentativestomain-taintheequipment.

Asaresultofthisinvestment,customersinthemilitaryservicesandjointoperationscentershavetheadvantageofanalready-establishedRFIDnetwork.TheyhaveattainedexcellentITVcoverageintheIraqareasofoperationsandgoodcoverageinandaroundAfghanistan.TheradiofrequencyITV(RF–ITV)net-workhasbeeninvaluabletodistributionanddeploy-mentITVinthesetwotheaters.

OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefensepolicystatesthatalltheater-boundshipmentswillbeequippedwithRFIDtagstohelptrackcargo.BoththeU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)andtheArmyG–4directedthatshippersaffixRFID-enabledcontainer-intrusion-detectiondevicestounit-moveequipmentheadedtotheCENTCOMareaofresponsibilitytohelppreventpilferage.

Foryears,DODhasusedRFIDtotrackU.S.-orig-inatingshipmentsastheypasschokepointsalongkeyroutes,throughstrategicports,andalonglinesofcom-municationintothebattlespace.RFIDdatacanbecor-relatedwithinformationoriginatinginsystemsusedindistributionprocesses,givingcommandersmorecompleteinformationonthestatusoftheshipments.Theinformationisavailableinanumberofdifferentsystemsusedbythesupplytechniciancheckingonorders,themovementspecialistassemblingaconvoy,orthecontrollersmonitoringforceflowfromafar-awayheadquarters.

ITVDataCouldImproveDistributionThemostfundamentalbitofdatathatanRFIDtag

canprovideisatimestampforasupply-chaineventsuchasatransportationcloseout,whichconfirmsthatanitemhasarrivedatitsdestination.Unfortunately,atransportationcloseoutrarelytakesplaceandnooneinitiatesatracewhenacloseoutdoesnottakeplacebyanestimatedarrivaldate.Infact,thelackofatrans-portationcloseouteventissocommonthatitsoccur-rencegenerallydoesnotraiseconcernsanywhereintheDODsupplychain.UsingRFIDtagstogenerateacloseoutnoticecouldresultintwosignificantsupplychainimprovements:betteruseoftransportationassetsandlowersupplycosts.

©LMI2011.Reproductionforpersonalandeducationalpurposesisauthorized.

MAY–jUNE 2011 45

TaggingNeedsDisciplineDODhasfoundthattheinformationgatheredfrom

tagsdoesnottypicallyprovideacompletepicture.InDecember2009,theProductManagerforJoint-Auto-maticIdentificationTechnology(PMJ–AIT)publishedtheresultsofits2009RFIDsiteanalysis.

PMJ–AIToperatestheDODglobalRF–ITVsys-tem,infrastructure,anddatabase,whichaggregatesRFIDtagdataforallcustomers.TheinterrogatorreadsofRFIDtagsprovidesimplevisibilitydata:itemXpassedlocationYatdateandtimeZ.Inthe2009PMJ–AITsample,only60percentoftagsstayedwiththeircargofromorigintofinaldestination.Ofthe60per-centoftagsthatdidarrive,only16percentcreatedatransportationcloseoutintheRF–ITVsystem.FromanITVperspective,thesearedisappointingstatistics.

TheRFIDtagwritingandreadingdependonmanualprocesses—the“humantouches”thatallowerrorstoenterthesystem.Inaccurateinformationstartsattheshippingorigin.Peoplecanmakemistakeswhentheymanuallyenterdataattheonsetofmovement;tagwrit-erssometimesenterinvalidconsigneesonthetags.Per-sonneldonotalwayssetupinterrogatorsatkeynodesorchokepointlocations.SystemadministratorscanforgettoregisteraninterrogatorthatallowstheRF–ITVservertorecognizethelocationwhereinterrogatorsareread-ingtags.Asaresult,RFIDtagsandtheinfrastructureinplacedonotalwaysprovideaccurateITVinformation.

ForDODtoachieveahigherpercentageoftagssuc-cessfullytriggeringaccurateITVfeeds,theRFIDnetworkwillneedtoconsider“human-factorcorrectivemeasures”tofigureouthowtoimprovetagdataandthereader-networksetups.ConsistentaccuracyisfundamentaltoDOD’sabilitytorelyonRFIDtosupporttransportation-relateddecisionsanditsabilitytouseRFIDformorecomplexsupplychainbusinessprocesses.

UseRFIDinSystemsThatSupportProcessesThemorethan3millionRFIDtagsalreadycirculat-

ingthroughDODdistributionnetworksshouldbeafactorinimprovingbusinessprocessesastheyperformtheirITVfunction.Oncethetagsareintegratedwiththetransactionsandinformationinautomateddistribu-tionsystems,theinvestmentintagsandinfrastructurecouldprovidemoresignificantprocessimprovementdividends.

WhatwillintegratingRFIDtechnologywithasys-temprovide?Itcanreducemanualdataentry,whichproducesadecreaseinerrorsandalsoanincreaseinefficiencybecauseautomaticreadingsavestime.Today’sRFIDtechnologyallowsautomatedcorrelationofinformation,suchaslinkingtagidentificationto

inventory,ordering,orshipmentdata.Thistechnologycanbeusedtoeliminatemanualstepsinabusinessprocessandreducethetimespentsearchingforinfor-mation,humanerroringatheringinformation,andthenumbersofscreensforcompletingtasks.Itcanalsoallowtaskstobecompletedautomaticallyandenableanautomatictransaction.

UsingPassiveRFIDinProcessImprovementAsDODfindstherightpathtoasynchronized,inte-

grateduseofRFIDthroughoutthesupplychain,somecustomersareenjoyingthebenefitsofsuccessful,small-scaleimplementations.ImplementingRFIDuseacrossDODlogisticsallatonetimeisimpossible.However,theseprojectsareproducingtangiblebenefitsanddem-onstratingusesthatbreakbarriers,helpotherstoseethevalueofRFID,andidentifytechnicalsolutionsthatcanbeappliedacrosstheenterprise.

ThesesolutionsmayexistinpassiveRFIDexperi-ments.PassiveRFIDuseslessexpensivetagsthatworkbywaitingforanactivetag(orsomeothersignal)totriggeralimited-rangeradiotransmission.EachoftheserviceshasinvestedinpassiveRFIDequipment,andthreeofthemareshowingparticularpromiseinhowtheyareimplementingthistechnology.TheNavyhasshownthepotentialforapositivereturnontheseinvest-ments.TheAirForceisusingpassiveRFIDtoincreaseitscontrolofspecialitems.AndtheMarineCorpsisstartingtousepassiveRFIDtosupportreceiptofsup-pliesatitslargebases.

Navy. TheNavy,inpartnershipwithDLA,istak-ingadvantageofitsRFIDinvestmentstoimprovebusinessprocessesinHawaii.NavyorganizationsplacedRFIDreadersatreceivingpointsandware-housedoorsthroughouttheirsupplychaininHawaii,andtheyestablishedinterfaceswithdistributionsys-tems.InadditiontousingtheRFID-to-AutomaticInformationSystem(AIS)interfacetoautomatetheirbusinessprocesses,theNavymadeeachtag-readtrans-actionvisibletoitscustomers.

Becausetheyaresatisfiedwiththeprog-ressoftheseimprovementstoshore-basedoperations,Navyordnanceandsupplyexpertsareseekingapprov-altoestablish

This photo shows an Early Entry Deployment Support Kit —a radio-frequency identification interrogator—that is positioned

at a chokepoint for passing cargo and equipment.

46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

RFIDcapabilityonvesselstosupporttheironboardsupplyprocesses.TheNavy’sprimaryhurdleforget-tingonboardRFIDhasbeenthecomplexityofthehaz-ardsofelectromagneticradiationtoordnance(HERO).Moreanalysismustbedone,butrecenttestingshowspassiveRFIDtechnologycanbeusedeffectivelyandsafelywithinNavyHEROlimits.Thisstep,ifadopted,willbringdetailedassetvisibilitytoaverydifficultenvironment—shipboardsupply.

Air Force. TheAirForceisusingRFIDtechnologynotonlytoimproveitsbusinessprocessesbutalsotoaddrigortotheinventorymanagementofsensitiveitemssuchasnuclearweapons-relatedmateriel.AirForceinventoryexpertsareusingthetechnologytocapitalizeonthetimeandeffortinvestedinindividualitemmanagementbyusingpassiveRFIDtags.

Inadditiontorequiringtwo-personidentificationanddocumentationoneachitem,theAirForceisusingpassiveRFIDtohelpwithintensiveitemmanagementinventoryrequirements.Usingahandheldterminal,employeescancompleteaninventoryofanentirewarehousewithinminutes—usuallythetimeittakestowalkupanddowntheaisles.Tagsarealsobeingusedtoidentifywhenitemsaremovedfromoneareatoanotherinsideafacility,betweenseparatefacilities,orbetweeninstallations.Thesystemprovidesanalertwhenitemsarenotreceivedbyareceivinginstallationbytheexpecteddeliverydate.

Afterestablishingtheinventorycapabilitiesfornuclearweapons-relatedmateriel,theAirForcewillbeabletoexpanditsuseoftheequipmenttoincludetaggingandtrackingthemovementofallsupplyitemsintoandoutofthefiveselectedinstallations.

Marine Corps. TheMarineCorpshasequippedeachofitsmainoperatingbaseswiththecapabilitytoreadpassiveRFIDonitemsshippedfromDLAandusetheinformationtodocumentreceivingandon-basedeliver-ies.Oncedistributionmanagerscompletetheintegrationwiththeirinformationsystems,theMarineCorpsexpectstoreduceerrorsandincreaseefficiencybyautomatingprocessesthatarecurrentlybeingcompletedbyhand.

RFIDintheSupplyReceiptProcessDLAprovidesitem-leveltaggingandrollsupcon-

tent-levelinformationonthetagsitaffixestointermo-dalshippingcontainers.Manyofitsprimevendorsdothesame.Muchofindustry’ssupplychainhasshiftedtothepracticeofusing“trustedvendors”toeliminatecostlyitem-levelhands-onpiececountsatreceivingpoints.Assumingthemilitaryservicesadoptthisphi-losophy,militarysupplyfacilitiescoulddownloadaDLAtag’sdatafiletoautomaticallyupdatetransporta-tioncloseoutandinventoryrecordsatreceivingpoints.

TheArmy’sRFID-triggeredtransportationcloseoutscouldbedocumentedintheirtransportationbusinesssystemandroutedtoadatabaseattheArmyMateriel

Command’sLogisticsSupportActivity.TosupportArmysupplyreceiptwithanRFID-triggeredinventoryupdate,theStandardArmyRetailSupplySystem(SARSS)wouldsimplyneedtoacceptanautomatedfilereceiptfromanRFIDtag.Forarrivingcontainersthatanactivity’ssup-plypersonneldonotimmediatelyunload,SARSScouldallowuserstodesignatethatcontainerasastorageloca-tionatthesupplyfacility.ThischangewouldeliminatearecurrenceoftheIraqandAfghanistantheaters’assetvisibilitygapforthemanysuppliesthatarrivedatasup-plynodebutdidnotmovequicklyfromanintermodalcontainerontoaninventoryrecord.

IsItTimeforInventoryPolicyChanges?Theserviceshavepolicyreasonsforrequiringpeo-

pletodosupply-receiptpiececounts,butabusinesscasecouldbemadeforlimitingthesemanualcountstohigh-valueitems.Totransitiontothisinventoryprocesschange,theservicescoulddevelopreasonablerulesthatfocusmanualprocessesonhigh-dollarorcriticalitemsandrelyonRFIDtag-supportedinven-toryupdatesforlow-costitems.ThiswouldrequireDODtoshiftfromtheexistingpolicythatrequires100-percentinventoryaccuracyatanycostforeveryitem.Initsplace,DODwouldneedtoestablishanewpolicythatreliesonperiodicrandomcountsfordeliv-eriesfromtrustedvendorsorsimplyusespackinglistdataforitemcountsformostcategoriesofitems.

DODhasalreadymadeextensiveRFIDtagand

infrastructureinvestments.Ahigherreturnontheseinvestmentscomesfrominstillingdisciplineinalltag-associatedfunctionsandthenintegratingtagreadswiththeautomatedsystemssupportingDOD’ssupplychainprocesses.Thecostofdelayingthesechangesisgreat.Facinganimmediateneedtoreduceoverheadandfindefficiencies,DODnowhasarealopportunitytogetmorevalueoutofitsRFIDinfrastructure—inmoreaccurateITVwithbettersupplychainanddistributionoperations.

patricia kelly is an lMi senior fellow in loGistics, supportinG departMent of defense and departMent of HoMeland security clients. sHe preViously worked for tHe departMent of tHe arMy, G–4, as tHe director for force protection and distribution. sHe Holds a b.a. deGree froM tHe uniVersity of nortH carolina-cHapel Hill, an M.b.a. deGree froM tHe colleGe of williaM and Mary, and an M.s. deGree froM tHe national war colleGe.

catHerine robertello is a senior consultant witH lMi, proVid-inG support to tHe office of tHe secretary of defense, supply cHain inteGration, on supply-cHain policy. sHe is an expert in tHe-ater distribution, supply-cHain, and loGistics processes supported by autoMation systeMs, includinG autoMatic inforMation tecHnoloGy and asset Visibility systeMs. sHe Holds a b.a. deGree froM GeorGe Mason uniVersity and an M.s. deGree in transportation and loGis-tics froM tHe air force institute of tecHnoloGy.

MAY–jUNE 2011 47

RetoolingLeaderDevelopmentintheFinancialManagementSchool

by dr. dennis k. davis

chievingoperationaladaptability—thekeyto successinthe21stcenturyenvironment— requiresArmyleaderswhocanthinkcritically,arecomfortablewithambiguityanddecentralization,demonstrateawillingnesstotakeprudentrisk,andcanadjustrapidlywhenneeded.Theymustbeabletohan-dlehybridthreatsandconductfull-spectrumoperations,andtheymustbeproficientinthelatesttechnologyandcapableofmeldingitwiththeirbasiccombatandoccu-pationalspecialtyskills.

Equippingourforceswiththecompetenciesthatmatchtoday’scomplex,ambiguous,andmultithreatoperatingconditionsultimatelydependsontheArmy’sabilitytoformandexecuteaviableleaderdevelop-mentprogram.TheArmyLeaderDevelopmentStrategy(ALDS)fora21stCenturyArmy,releasedattheendof2009,advocatesabalancedapproachtothethreepillarsofleaderdevelopment—training,education,andexperience—throughadeliberate,continuous,sequential,andprogressiveprocess.TheFinancialManagementSchoolattheSoldierSupportInstituteatFortJackson,SouthCarolina,iscogni-zantoftheArmy’sneedsandtheALDSblueprintandisrevampingandenhancingitsleaderdevelopmenteffortsaccordingly.

Experience,Education,andTrainingAmongthemostimportantchanges,theFinancial

ManagementSchoolhasrevisedthecareermapsforfinancialmanagement(FM)officersandnoncommis-sionedofficers.WhileitispossibleforFMSoldierstobesuccessfulbytrackinginasinglecorefunc-tion,FMleadersbelieveitishighlyimportantthatFMSoldiersacquirenearlyequalamountsoffinanceoperationsandresourcemanagementexperience.Forofficers,timeincommandalsoremainscentraltocareerdevelopment,althoughthespecificassignmentmatterslittle.

Thecareermapsstronglyencourageeducationaswell,particularlyoutsideoftheArmysphere.Certifi-cations,suchasaCertifiedDefenseFinancialManagerorCertifiedGovernmentFinancialManager,graduateandpostgraduatedegrees,andtrainingwithindustryarekeytoexpandingtheFMSoldier’sexperiencebaseandsharpeninghisprofessionalskills.

TheFinancialManagementSchoolalsoisrevampingitsprogramsofinstructiontoreflecttherequirements

A ofthecurrentenvironment.Inaccordancewiththenewgeneralguidingprinciples,theschoolismorefrequentlyemployingtheexperientiallearningmodelinasmall-group-instructionsetting.Thisallowsstudentstoserveasassistantinstructorsandsharetheirknowledgeandfirsthandexperienceswiththeirpeers.Theschoolisalsointegratingactive-basedandproblem-basedlearningmethods,whichusethepatternofproblem,plan,test,andreflect.Earlyresultsindicatethatthismethodologyproducesbet-tercomprehension.

TheFinancialManagementSchoolisseekingabetterbalancebetween“training”and“education.”Trainingfocusesonequippingthestudentwithspecificskillsthatenablehimtoperformspecifictasksforwhichsuccess,failure,andcompletionareclearlymeasurable.Educationisbroader;itintro-ducesthestudenttogeneral,fundamentalconceptsandthepracticeofcriticalthinking,bothofwhichareessentialintoday’sunconventionaloperationalenvironment.

IntherapidlyevolvingconditionsofIraqandAfghanistan,forexample,Soldiershaveencounteredsituationsthatwerenotpartoftheirtrainingineithertheschoolhouseortheunit.Intheseinstances,theirabilitytousecriticalthinkingtosolveaproblem,asopposedtotryingtoapplyapatsolutionorprocedure,greatlyincreasestheirchanceofsuccess.

CoursesThatReflectConditionsontheGroundTheFinancialManagementSchoolisadapting

coursematerialsaswell.OperationsinIraqandAfghanistanhaveclearlydemonstratedthepotentialofmoneyasa“weaponsystem”—thatis,moneyasawarfightingtoolthatisequallyessentialtoachiev-ingtacticalandstrategicobjectivesasaStrykervehicleoraHellfiremissile.Wherecivilsocietyandtheeconomyhavebeenseverelydamagedorcompletelydestroyed,injectingmoneythroughpub-licworksprojectsrebuildsthebasicinfrastructurerequiredfordailylifetoflourish(suchasroads,schools,sanitation,power,andmedicalfacilities)andhelpstoestablishtrustwiththelocalpopulace.Asprojectscreatejobs,directlyorindirectly,cashflowsintolocalpeople’spockets,kick-startingtheeconomyandprovidinganincomealternativetoillegalorenemyactivity.

48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

U.S.forceshaveprimarilyusedtheCommander’sEmergencyResponseProgram(CERP)toleveragethepoweroffinancialresources.ToensurethatFMSoldiersarepreparedtohelpcommanders“deploy”thisimportantweaponassoonastheyenteranareaofoperations,theFinancialManagementSchoolcurricu-lumnowprovidesin-depthCERPinstruction,includ-inginformationonlegallimitationsandtheproperadministrationoffunds.

TheFinancialManagementSchoolalsoisworkingwiththeprivatesectortodevelopabankingcourse.InIraqandAfghanistan,Soldiershavetakenasignificantroleinbuildingbankingsystems,whicharevitaltoamodern,thrivingnationbutwereabsentinbothcoun-tries.TheschoolintendstoexpandtheArmy’straining-with-industryprograminbanking.

IraqandAfghanistanhaveclearlydemonstratedtheimportanceofunderstandingregionalcustomsandcul-ture,bothintermsoffightingtheenemyandwinningthesupportoflocalcivilians.AspartoftheArmy’sCultureandForeignLanguageStrategy,theFinancialManagementSchooladdedaculturaladvisertothestaffinJune2010.

Theadviserisasubject-matterexpertonSouth-westAsia(whichincludesSaudiArabia,Yemen,theUnitedArabEmirates,Oman,Qatar,Bahrain,Kuwait,Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan,Tajikistan,Kazakhstan,Afghanistan,andPakistan)andcurrentlyprovidescul-turalawarenessinstructiontotheBasicOfficerLeaderCourseandtheCaptains’CareerCourse.Theschoolintendstoexpandculturalandforeignlanguageinitia-tivesandproductsforstudents,sharpeningtheprogrameachsuccessivesession.

AswitheveryotherSoldier,financialmanag-ersmustbereadyforthephysicalconditionsontheground.TheFinancialManagementSchool’scurriculumthereforeincludesVirtualBattleSpace2(VBS2).Agame-basedtrainingplatform,VBS2helpsSoldierslearnhowtoanticipateandrespondtotacticalsituationsakintothoseinIraqandAfghani-stan,suchasencounteringanimprovisedexplosivedevice(IED),bymovinginashared,immersive,first-personenvironment.

ReplicatingtheOperationalEnvironmentReplicatingtheoperationalenvironmentis

essentialtoproperpreparation.ToensurethatFMSoldiersunderstandhowtheywillperformtheirdutiesintherealworldandcanintegratetheirtraining,education,andculturalawareness,Finan-cialManagementSchoolcoursesculminatewithafieldtrainingexercise(FTX)attheSoldierSupportInstitute’sWarriorTrainingArea(WTA).Astate-of-the-artfacilitythatmirrorsthedesignofforwardoperatingbasesinIraqandAfghanistan,theWTAengagesstudentsinfull-spectrumoperationsand

allowsinstructorstoevaluatethestudents’abilitytosurviveandexecutetheirmission.

Soldiersmustprovetheirproficiencyinthevari-oussystemsandsoftwareoftheirprofession,suchasEagleCashCard,PaperCheckConversion,theDeployableDisbursingSystem,andtheCommercialAccountsProcessingSystem.InadditiontoFM-specifictasks,theFTXincludesconvoyoperations,defenseagainstIEDattacks,andinteractionwith“local”citizens.TheWTAalsoprovidesasettingfortestingnewfinancialmanagementconceptsandinitia-tives,suchastheviabilityofusingcellphonestocon-ductbankingoperations.

Tostrengthenfinancialmanagementtrainingfur-ther,theFinancialManagementSchoolandtheSoldierSupportInstitute,inconjunctionwiththeArmyTrain-ingandDoctrineCommand,areexploringthepossibil-ityofexpandingtheWTAandmakingitthefinancialmanagementequivalentoftheNationalTrainingCenteratFortIrwin,California.AllFMunitswouldberequiredtocompleteafieldexercisetherebeforedeploying,andthefacilitywouldbeusedforregularsustainmenttrainingaswell.

TheFinancialManagementSchooliscommittedtocontinualself-evaluationtoensurethateverythingitdoesbettersourSoldiersandkeepsthempreparedforallofthechallengestheymayface.TheschoolwilllistentoandintegrateintoFMdoctrine,training,andeducationthebestideasfromjuniorSoldiersandseniorcivilianandmilitaryleadersalike.ThatinputwillbeespeciallyimportantastheschoolconsidersaredesignofitsCaptains’CareerCourse.

TheFinancialManagementSchoolalsowillseektoexpandopportunitiesforFMSoldierstogainexpe-rienceandknowledgefromtheprivatesectorandnonmilitaryinstitutionsofhigherlearning.Exposingstudentstofreshthinkinganddifferentperspectiveshasprovencriticaltohelpingthemadapttotoday’senvironmentandwillcertainlyremainso.

Ultimately,thedynamicandambiguousstateofmodernwarfareisunlikelytochangeanytimesoon,ifever.Thefrequencyofdecentralizedoperationsundoubtedlywillcontinuetoincrease,raisingtheresponsibilitybarforjuniorleaders;thetypesofmis-sionsthatFMtroopsconductwillcontinuetomorphandtreadintothenontraditional;andtherequirementforforward-deployedFMSoldierswithinandbeyondthewirewillgrow.Nomatterthesituation,FMSol-dierswillbereadytoapplyeconomicandfiscalpowerandgiveU.S.andcoalitioncombatantcommandersthedecisiveedgetheyneed.

dr. dennis k. daVis is tHe deputy coMMandant of tHe financial ManaGeMent scHool.

MAY–jUNE 2011 49

NCO Professional Development Model

Title of Career Management Field: Financial Management

CMF Number: 36 (MOS 36B)

THE FOLLOWING ARE ONLY RECOMMENDATIONS: You will have to tailor your self development e�orts to the availability of courses at your installation. Alternate methods of achieving CMF course recommendations are possible (examinations, correspondence courses, and ACE -recommended credits). The position titles in your organization maydi�er from the below stated positions. Due to space constraints, all duty \positions were not listed below.

See DA Pamphlet 600 -25 for position Career Progression Plans. See DA Pamphlet 611 -21 for position data.

Ranks,Skill Levels (SLs),

and DutyAssignments

InstitutionalTraining

Recommanded NCOES-Related

Courses

Recommended CMF-Related

Coursesand

Activities

Private ---Specialist/Corporal

SL 10

SergeantSL 20

Recruiter, Drill Sergeant, AITInstructor, Writer, Small Group Leader

Sta� SergeantSL 30

Sergeant First ClassSL 40

Senior Financial Operations Manager,Deputy Finance O�cer

Senior AIT Instructor, Career ManagementNCO, Senior Small Group Leader,

AC/RC Adviser, Inspector General

Master Sergeant Sergeant Major SL 50 - 80

Team Leader Section LeaderDetachment, Platoon Sergeant First Sergeant

Resource MGT NCO, Financial Management Advisor, Finance Operations Advisor, Senior Financial Management Advisor, SeniorFinancial Management Inspector

Chief Career Management NCO, USASMA , Senior Trainer

BCTAIT

WLC ALC SLC USASMC

Prior to WLC:SSD Package 1

Prior to ALC:SSD Package 2

Prior to SLC:SSD Package 3

Post SMC:SSD Package 5

Recommended CMF-Related

Certi�cationor Degree Goal

AA/AS in: Accounting, Finance, Business Management, Economics, Marketing, Mathematics, Communications, Public Administration, Public Budgeting, Banking, Business Administration, Information Systems, Computer Science, Management Information Systems BY THE 12TH YEAR OF SERVICE

BA/BS in: Accounting, Finance, Business Management, Economics, Marketing, Mathematics, Communications, Public Administration, Public Budgeting, Banking, Business Administration, Information Systems, Computer Science, Management Information Systems BY THE 16TH YEAR OF SERVICE

ACCP - Army Correspondence Course Program (DA Pam 351-20)

APPROVED BY: Commandant, U.S. Army Financial Management School DATE: 23 February 2010 UPDATED: 27 January 2010

Skill Level 101. Fiscal Law Course2. FM AIT Accounts Payable,3. Travel Admin/Entitlements4. Accounts Payable Adm Course5. ACCP: 805A D15, 805A D24

Skill Level 201. Disbursing Operations 2. Enhanced Defense Financial Manager’sTraining (EDFMT)3. PPBES 4. ACCP: 805A M25 5. PCAM

Skill Level 301 Army Comptroller Course 2. RMBC, RMTC3. ACCP: 805A D22, 805A D50, 805A D524. ICAM

Skill Level 401. Executive Comptroller Course 2. Contracting O�cer’s RepresentativeCourse (COR)3. Senior Sta� NCO Course

Skill Level 501. Defense Decision Support Course2. Defense FinancialManagement Course 3. Senior Resource Manager’s Course4. Senior Sta� NCO Course

Financial ManagementClerk/Technician,

(all FM disciplines)

Self-Development Domain

Institutional Domain

Operational Domain

Financial Management Analyst (all FM disciplines)

Senior Financial Management Analyst(all FM disciplines)

RecruiterDrill Sergeant

Professional Certi�cation

Prior to SMC:SSD Package 4

Cost Management Certi�cate CourseDefense Comptrollership ProgramMaster’s Degree Recommended

FM Systems Training

IATS, DTS, DDS, EDA, GFEBS DDS, GFEBS, RMT,, CEDMS, WAWFLIW, CASHLINK

The Financial Management School has revised the career maps for financial management officers and noncommissioned officers. The maps combine education, training, experience, and self-development to produce Soldiers who are adaptable and think critically.

Legend

AA/AS = Associate of Arts/Science degreeABO = Army Budget OfficeACCP = Army Correspondence Course ProgramACE = American Council on EducationACOM = Army commandAIT = Advanced individual trainingALC = Advanced Leader CourseASCC = Army service component commandBA/BS = Bachelor of Arts/Science degreeBCT = Basic combat trainingBOLC = Basic Officer Leader CourseCCC = Captains Career CourseCEDMS = Corporate Electronic Document Management SystemCERP = Commander’s Emergency Response ProgramCMF = Career management fieldCONOPS = Concept of operationsDA = Department of the ArmydL = Distance learningDDS = Defense Dissemination SystemDTS = Defense Travel SystemEDA = Electronic Document AccessFM = Financial managementFMC = Financial management centerFMTC = Financial Management Tactical CourseGFEBS = General Fund Enterprise Business SystemIATS = Integrated Army Travel SystemICAM = Intermediate Cost Accounting and Management CourseKD = Key and developmentalLIW = Logistics Information WarehouseNCO = Noncommissioned officerNCOES = Noncommissioned Officer Education SystemOSD = Office of the Secretary of DefenseOST = Operational support teamPCAM = Principles of Cost Accounting and Management CoursePPBC = Planning Program Budget CommitteePPBES = Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution SystemRMBC = Resource Management Budget CourseRMT = Resource Management ToolRMTC = Resource Management T actical CourseSLC = Senior Leader CourseSMC = Sergeants Major CourseSSD = Self-structured developmentUSAFMCOM = U.S. Army Financial Management CommandUSASMA = U.S. Army Sergeants Major AcademyXO = Executive officerWAWF = Wide Area Work FlowWLC = Warrior Leader Course

50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heArmycontinuestofacechallengesinitsabilitytosustainanall-volunteerforce andremaintheworld’spremierland-basedfightingforce.Inits10thyearatwar,the Armymustbeversatileenoughtoadapttooperateinaworldofpersistentconflictthatisexpectedtocontinuefortheforeseeablefuture.Itisworkingtomeetthischallengebybuildingaversatileandagilecampaign-capableexpeditionaryArmy.1However,thecumula-tiveeffectoffightingtwowarshasputtheArmyoutofbalance.

TheArmyisoutofbalancebecausethelogisticsdemandonourforcescontinuestoexceedthesustainablesupply.SeniorArmyleadersunderstandthemagnitudeofthischallengeandhavecraftedavisionandstrategytomeetcurrentandemergingchallenges.ThisstrategyisarticulatedineachArmyposturestatementsince2008andisgroundedinfourkeyimpera-tives:sustain,prepare,reset,andtransform.(Seesidebarbelow.)

Thepurposeofthisarticleisnottodebatethemeritsofthisstrategybuttohighlighttheneedtointegratethefourimperativesintoaholisticandsynergisticframeworkforrestoringandsustainingbalance.

TheChiefofStaffoftheArmy,GeneralGeorgeW.Casey,Jr.,testifiedbeforeaSenatesubcommitteeinFebruary2008ontheeffortsrequiredtotransformtheArmy.Inhisremarks,

TheArmyOutofBalanceby dr. roMuald a. stone

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

T

To restore balance and enhance readiness, the Army must consider its institutional culture while developing a strategy to align its four key imperatives.

TheArmy’sFourImperatives

Sustain. To sustain the all-volunteer force, the focus is on recruitment and retention; care of Soldiers, families, and civilians; care for wounded warriors; and support for the families of fallen Soldiers.

Prepare. To prepare our force, the focus is on readying Soldiers, units, and equipment to succeed in the current conflicts; adapting institutional, collective, and individual training to enable Soldiers to succeed in combat and prevail against adaptive and intelligent adversaries; ensuring Soldiers have the best available equipment both to protect themselves and to maintain a technological advantage over our adversaries; and continuing to focus on growing the Army, training, equipping, and better supporting the Army Force Generation process.

Reset. To prepare Soldiers, families, and units for future deployments and contingencies, the Army must reset the force to rebuild the readiness that has been consumed in operations. To reset our force, we are revitalizing Soldiers and families; repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing equipment; and retraining Soldiers.

Transform. To provide the combatant commanders dominant, strategically responsive forces capable of meeting diverse challenges across the entire spectrum of 21st century conflict, the Army must transform the force. Transforming includes adopting modular organizations, accelerat-ing the delivery of advanced technologies, operationalizing the Reserve component, restationing forces, and transforming leader development.(Source: 2009 Army Posture Statement)

1GeorgeW.Casey,“OpeningRemarksSenateAppropriationsSubcommitteeonDefense,”27February2008,<http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2008/02/27/7825-opening-remarks-senate-appropriations-subcommittee-on-defense/>,accessedon28September2009.

MAY–jUNE 2011 51

GeneralCaseynoted,“OurSoldiers,ourfamilies,oursupportsystems,andourequipmentarestressedbythedemandsoftheserepeateddeployments...We’recon-sumingourreadinessasfastaswecanbuildit.”2

ThestrategytorestorebalanceandenhancetheArmy’sreadinessmustconsidertheinstitutionalcul-turethatcurrentlyexistsintheArmy.Thechangelit-eratureisclear:Anystrategicplanorchangeinitiativeisunlikelytobesuccessful—thatis,implementedandsustained—unlessanappropriateorganizationalcultureisinplacetosupporttheplan.IftheArmyistosuc-ceedinrestoringbalance,seniorArmyleadersmustclearlyunderstandandeffectivelymanagetheculturalaspectsofanytransformationeffort.

AreviewoftheArmyposturestatementsfor2005to2011revealsadeclineintheemphasisoninstitutionalculture.Inthe2005and2006ArmyPostureState-ments,theword“culture”ismentionedeighttimeseach.Ineachcase,theculturecentersontheorganiza-tionasaninstitutionalculture.Forexample,the2005documentsays,“Likeanylarge,complexorganizationcommittedtoachievingtransformationalchange,oureffortstochangeourculturewillprovetobeourtruemeasureofsuccess.”3

Insubsequentposturestatements,weseeamarkeddeclineinemphasisoninstitutionalculture.Inthe2007statement,theword“culture”appearsfivetimes;however,threeofthoseinstancesdonotrelatetoorga-nizationalculture.Mostdisturbingisthefactthatnei-therthe2009northe2010posturestatementsmentionorganizationalculture.Thosestatementsincludean

addendumonArmyculturethatfocusesmoreoncul-turalandindividualawarenessofouradversariesthantheroleinstitutionalcultureplaysinexecutinganykindoftransformation.

Whyisthissignificant?IftheArmytrulyhopestoachievebalanceby2012,itmustnotoverlookthecriti-calroleinstitutionalcultureplaysinthisprocess.

WhatIsInstitutionalCulture?Institutionalcultureis“acomplexsetofshared

beliefs,guidingvalues,behavioralnorms,andbasicassumptionsacquiredovertimethatshapeourthinkingandbehavior;theyarepartofthesocialfabricoftheorganization—itsgeneticcode.Assuch,institutionalculturedrivestheorganizationandguidesthebehaviorofeveryoneinthatorganization—howtheythink,feel,andact.Inotherwords,thecultureformsabehaviortemplate.”4TomDavisandMichaelJ.Landasuccinctlycapturetheessenceofcultureinthefollowingexcerptfromtheirarticle:

Thefactorswhichdefinecultureareinpartinternal,derivingfromtheuniquecharacteroftheorganizationand,inpartexternal,deter-minedbythebackgroundandexperiencesman-agersandemployeesbringtotheenterprise.Cultureisamajordeterminantofproductivity;itshapesorganizationalresponsestoexternalpressures;andsuppressesorenhancesthecoop-erativeeffortleveloftheworkforce.Culturehasasignificantbottom-lineeffectonorgani-zationaleffectiveness,profitability,andshare-holdervalue.5

2Ibid.3FrancisJ.HarveyandPeterJ.Schoomaker,“AStatementonthePostureoftheUnitedStatesArmy2005,”OfficeoftheChiefofStaff,U.S.Army,Washington,D.C.,6February2005,p.3.4RomualdA.StoneandJoyceMasonDavis,“ChangeManagement:Implementation,Integration,andMaintenanceoftheHRIS,”inMichaelJ.KavanaghandMohanThite,

Human Resource Information Systems: Basics, Applications, and Future Directions,SAGEPublicationsInc.,ThousandOaks,California,2009,p.219.5TomDavisandMichaelJ.Landa,“TheStoryofMary:How‘OrganizationalCulture’CanErodeBottom-LineProfitability,”The Canadian Manager,Vol.25,No.4,Winter

2000,p.14.

This chart identifies the Army’s current unbalanced state, the desired future state, and the key imperatives necessary to restore the Army to balance.

52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

CultureshapeshowtheArmy“viewstheenviron-mentandadaptstomeetcurrentandfuturechallenges.”6Wheneverthereisanincongruitybetweenthecurrentcultureandthegoalsofachangeinitiative,theculturealwayswins.7Forthisreason,manychangeinitiativesareultimatelyunsuccessfulbecausetheylacksufficientculturalsupporttogetpeopletoembraceandimplementthechange.

CultureandArmyImperativesTheArmyinstitutionalcultureshouldbethelinch-

pinthatholdsthefourimperativestogether.CultureisthekeytotheArmy’sstrategytoachieveandsustainbalance.Fundamentally,changeisallaboutorganiza-tionsandpeopledoingthingsinnewwayswithregardtobehaviors,organization,andprocesses.“Whenlarge,complexorganizationspursuegenuinetransformationalchange,atruemeasureoftheirsuccessistheabilityofleaderstoproperlyfocus(andtoreorientifneeded)people’sattitudes,actionsandbeliefs—whichguidebehaviorandestablishthetrueoperatingcultureoftheorganization.”8

ThecenterofgravityforrestoringbalanceresidesintheArmyinstitutionalculture.TheArmyneedstoplaceinstitutionalculturebackintotherestoringbalanceequation.BypayingcarefulattentiontotheArmy’svalues,beliefs,andbehavior,wecancreatethenecessaryenvironmentthatsupportsachievementofthefourimperativestorestoreandsustainbalance.

TheArmyisfacedwithaconstantlychangingglob-alsecuritylandscape.Consequently,culturesthatfitoldneedsmustgivewaytoculturesthatfitthedynam-icsofcurrentconflicts.Thechallengeperpetuallyfac-ingtheArmyisnotindefiningorshapingitscurrentculturebutinconstantlyadaptingitsculturetothenewrealitiesofthe21stcentury.DavidUlrichprovidesthisusefulmetaphortoilluminatethatimportantpoint:

Justaspeople’sclosetsandatticsmaybestuffedwithmementosofsentimentalvalue,organiza-tionsmaypreserveoldculturesthatfeelcozybutbecomeburdensomebyfailingtorespondtochange.Closetsmustbecleaned;atticsmustbeseentoholdremnantsofthepast;andorganiza-tionsmustlearntoletgoofoldcultureswhennewonesbecomenecessary.9

Clearly,awidevarietyofpeopleandculturalissuesplayahugeroleinanychangeeffortortransformation.Culturecan“notonlystopachangeeffortdeadinitstracks,itcanalsopropelittogreatheights.Wisdom

duringorganizationaltransformationisunderstandingthepowerofcultureandhowtogetittoworkforyouinsteadofagainstyou.”10

HowdoyougetthousandsofSoldiersandcivil-ianemployeessuddenlytochangetheirmostbasicassumptionsabouttheArmy?Afterall,thebeliefsandattitudesthatmakeupaculturefilterintoeverythingwedo.Andso,thisisthechallengeforArmyleaders:Donotlosesightoftheimportantroleofcultureinthetransformationparadigm,andcontinuetoshapeandnurtureanArmyculturethatiscongruentwiththerealitiesofthechangingenvironment.JohnP.Kotteremphasizestheimportanceofcultureinchangeinitia-tivesinthispassage:

Changesticksonlywhenitbecomes“thewaywedothingsaroundhere,”whenitseepsintotheverybloodstreamoftheworkunitorcorporatebody.Untilnewbehaviorsarerootedinsocialnormsandsharedvalues,theyarealwayssubjecttodegradationassoonasthepressuresassociatedwithachangeeffortareremoved.11

Researchprovidesfurtherevidencethatcultureisakeyfactorinanorganization’ssuccessandasignificantlimitingfactorinmanagingchange.Transformationleadersrecognizethat“significantstrategicorstructuralrealignmentcannotoccurifitisnotsupportedbytheorganization’svaluesandbehavioralnorms.”12

ThisviewisfurthersupportedbyRosabethMossKanter,whosuggeststhatmanagingchangeinanorga-nizationrequiresthatpeoplefindtheirstabilityandsecurityinthecultureanddirectionoftheorganiza-tion.13Therefore,understanding,analyzing,andeffec-tivelymanagingallaspectsoftheinstitution’scultureisparamountinsupportinganychangeinitiative.

RestoringBalanceandInstitutionalCultureInordertorestoreandsustainbalance,thefour

imperativesandtheinstitutionalculturemustbeinalignment.Thisalignmentisconveyedwitharrowsinthechartatright.Allofthe“arrows”shouldbepointinginthesamedirection—thatis,alignedwithoneanother.

Manyorganizationaltransformationeffortsoftenfailtomeetplannedexpectations.Thismayoccurifthecultureandanyofthefourimperativesarenotfullyalignedandinterdependent.AnykindofmisalignmentcanputtheefforttorebalancetheArmyinjeopardyofnotachievingthedesiredoutcome.Forexample,ifthe

6MichaelB.Siegel,“Militarycultureandtransformation,”Joint Forces Quarterly,Issue49,2dQuarter2008,p.103.7DarylR.Conner,Leading at the Edge of Chaos: How to Create the Nimble Organization,JohnWiley&Sons,Inc.,NewYork,1998,p.207.8MarkD.RockeandDavidP.Fitchitt,“EstablishingStrategicVectors:ChartingaPathforArmyTransformation,”TheInstituteofLandWarfare,AssociationoftheU.S.Army,

April2007,<http://www3.ausa.org/pdfdocs/special/may07.pdf>,accessedon28September2009.9DaveUlrich,Human Resource Champions,HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,Boston,1996,pp.177–178.10LarryE.SennandJohnR.Childress,“WhyChangeInitiativesFail:It’stheCultureDummy!”Senn-DelaneyLeadershipConsultingGroup,Inc.,London,p.1.

MAY–jUNE 2011 53

strategyforoneimperativesuffersbecauseofresourceconstraints,theArmy’splansfortheremainingimpera-tiveswillbeaffectedandsomaytheoverallstrategytorebalancetheArmy.

Moreover,iftheArmy’sbehavioralnormsremainunchanged,themisalignmentitselfisenoughtoleadtodifficultiesinsuccessfullyexecutingthechange.Thesekindsofmisalignmentsputachangeeffortindangerofnotachievingthedesiredoutcome.Whatisrequiredisalignment—gettingallthearrowstoallpointinthesamedirectioninordertoachievetheultimategoalofrestoringbalance.

ThefourimperativesandArmycultureareintegralcomponentsofanytransformationprocess.Culture,althoughdifficulttomeasureprecisely,isarealandverypowerfulforceinhowtheArmyachievesbal-ance.Tothisend,theneedtorepositioncultureinthe

overallArmystrategyisunderscored.Thereisadirectandpowerfullinkbetweenthewaypeoplethinkandbehave(howpersonnelworktogether)andtheArmy’soverallperformance.Futureposturestatementsandactionplansneedtoplacerenewedemphasisoninsti-tutionalcultureasanimportantelementintheArmy’sparadigmfortransformationsothatwearebetterposi-tionedtoexecuteourstrategyandgoalsinthisimpor-tantarea.

dr. roMuald a. stone is a faculty MeMber at tHe arMy Man-aGeMent staff colleGe. He Has a bacHelor of business adMinistra-tion deGree froM california state uniVersity, fullerton, a Master of business adMinistration deGree froM tHe uniVersity of west florida, and a doctor of business adMinistration deGree froM noVa soutHeastern uniVersity. He is a coautHor of tHe book ManaGinG orGanizational cHanGe.

11JohnP.Kotter,Leading Change,HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,Boston,1996,p.14.12J.KerrandJ.W.Slocum,Jr.,“ManagingCorporateCultureThroughRewardSystems,”AcademyofManagementExecutive,Vol.19,No.4,November2005,p.130.13RosabethMossKanter,The Change Masters: Innovation and Entrepreneurship in the American Corporation,Simon&Shuster,NewYork,1983,p.123.

The four imperatives and the institutional culture need to be aligned in order to restore the Army’s balance.

54 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

ProspectingtheFrontiersofLogisticsResearch

by dr. cHristopHer r. paparone and GeorGe l. topic

neofthemostimportantaspectsofprofessional educationfor“enterprise”logisticiansis research.Researchnotonlyhelpstodeveloptheintellectualandproblem-solvingskillsleadersneed,butitalsoallowsthemtofocusonkeyissuesandmakemeaningfulcontributionstothecommunity.Researchprojectsofferstudents,practitioners,andfacultiestheopportunitytoexplore,compare,andcriticallyassessavailableliterature,considercontemporaryissuesfromanenterpriseperspective,andreportconclusionstoleaders,fellowpractitioners,andthescholarlyresearchcommunity.

Ourintentistofirstdescribeourviewofthe“frontiersofenterpriselogistics”andthenpresentideasthatwillconstituteausefulcollectionofpropo-sitionsforresearch.Wehopethatourofferingwillspurinterestinthesetopicsandproducesomecre-ativeandusefulresearchpublicationsfortheenter-prise.Wealsowishtoencouragediscussionaboutlogisticsresearchanddiscoverotherideasfrommem-bersacrosstheenterprise.

TheEnterpriseLogisticsFrontierWearecarefultousethemetaphor“frontier”when

attemptingtodefine“enterpriselogistics”becausewearenotsureoftheboundariesofthislooselycoupled,interorganizationalnetworkofprofessionallogisticiansrepresentingmanyinstitutions,cultures,andnations.

ReflectingonourNation’srecentexperienceinrespondingtotheearthquakeinHaiti,wewereencouragedbythevastarrayofinternationallogisticsrespondersthatmetthechallengesofacquiring,stor-ing,anddistributingcountlesssuppliesandprovid-ingengineeringandmedicalsupportandothervitallogisticsservicestoaddresstheterriblesufferingofsomany.Manypeople,includingsomeofourenterprisecolleagues,maynotbeawarethattheU.S.DepartmentofDefense(DOD)logisticscommunityseesitsroleinthesecircumstancesasworthyoftheterm“corecompetency.”Nolongerareoverseasdisasterreliefandsupporttodomesticcivilauthoritiesconsideredancil-laryDODmissions.

Inthisregard,weseeourdefenselogisticscommu-nitybecomingpartofawidercommunityoflogisticians

O (the“enterprise”)that,asasetofotherwiseautono-mousorganizations,comestogethertoreachgoalsthatnoneofuscanreachseparately.(Weadaptedthisdefi-nitionfromRupertF.Chisholm’s1998book,Develop-ing Network Organizations: Learning from Practice and Theory.)

Consideringthiscontext,webelievethattheenter-priselogistics“frontier”offersatremendousarrayofopportunitiesforlogisticians—includingstudentsandfacultyatmilitaryandcivilianinstitutionsandopera-tionalpractitioners—tothinkabout,explore,expand,refine,andassessideas,issues,practices,processes,andinnovations.Theirresearcheffortscanbepower-fulforcesforthedevelopmentofnewknowledge,insights,andpractices.

Weshouldalsopointoutthatsuchresearchisnottheexclusivepurviewofprofessionallogisticians.Fresheyes,eclecticideas,alternativeviewpoints,andbroaderperspectivescomefrommanyofthebestpaperswehaveseeninrecentyears—paperswrittenbyothersnottraditionallyseenasenterprisemembers.

Wealsoseektoaddressthevariousformsofinquirythatwouldconstituteenterpriselogisticsresearch.Beforewegettoourrecommendedproposals,wewanttofirstdescribeatypologyforresearchthattheenter-prisemightfinduseful.Thistypologyrelatestothetypesoftasksanddegreesofuncertaintythatthatthelogisticsenterprisefacesasitconductsoperations.

ResearchRootedinanOrganizationalTaskTypologyOnewaytolookatthedifferenttypesofresearch

opportunitiesthatareavailableisthroughthetypesoftasksthatareundertakenbyanenterprise.Weshouldnotethatthiscategorizationcanbeviewedasuniver-salasopposedtosimplyappliedwithinourfield.AsCharlesPerrowdescribesinhis1986seminalbook,Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay,weseelogisticstasksperformedbytheenterpriseasfallingintofourtypes:routine,engineering,craftwork,andnonroutine,or“emergent,”tasks.Eachtypeanswersadifferentformofresearchquestion.

Thefirst,routinetasks,involveorganizationalstandingoperatingprocedures,rules,processes,andcentralizedauthoritiesthatarelearned,established,and

The authors present 10 propositions for research by logisticians who constitute the wider community of “enterprise logistics.”

54 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

MAY–jUNE 2011 55

enforcedtoaddressdiscrete,recurrentproblemsandtogetexpectedresults.Forlogisticswork,thesewouldincludesetorderingprocedures,managingintermodaltransportationcapabilities(bothin-houseandout-sourced),positioningcapabilitiesatthepointofneed,andsoon.

Whiletheseactivitiesarerelativelyeasytoeffi-cientlycontrolfromacentralizedorganizationalperspective,enterpriselogisticsshouldnotexpecttodeveloplarge-scaleefficienciesbycontrollingroutineworkacrossthenetwork.(Although,paradoxically,logisticiansshouldbeawareofeachother’stightly-coupledroutinesinacollaborative,looselycoupledway.)TheanalogymaybehowbanksoperatethroughtheirindividualhierarchicalcontrolsyetcanbepartofinterorganizationalfinancialnetworkssuchasVisaorMasterCard.

Operationsandsystemsanalysis-styleresearch,affordedbyLeanandSixSigmatechniquesandotherscientificmanagementmodels,wouldbeappropriateforresearchinroutinetasks.Theprincipalquestionforthisresearchwouldbehowtoincreaseefficiency.

Engineeringtasks,thesecondtype,addresscompli-cated,interdependentconstructionsoftightlycoupled,integratedlogisticssystems,includingthedevelop-mentofinventorymanagementsoftware;designandmanufacturingofspecializedtransportationandser-vicetechnologiestoenabledistribution;andexpertise,equipment,andsuppliesundervariousconditionsasso-ciatedwithsuchfactorsasdemandhistory,weather,terrain,andsecurity.

Imaginetryingtointegratealreadycomplicatedlogisticssystemsinsideeachparticipatingorganiza-tionacrosstheenterprise;thisislikelyuntenable.Probablythebesttheenterprisecanhopeforthesekindsoftasksisaninterorganizationalappreciationforthecomplexityofvarioussystemsandforfind-ingopportunitiestoexchangeideasandimproviseoffeachotherwhileparticipatingtogetherinplanningorexerciseprograms.

Yetscientific-oriented,systems-of-systemsresearchanddevelopmentandlessonslearnedresearchdoben-efitatleasttheinternalorganizationofpartnersthatmakeuptheenterprise.Thekeyquestionishowtobestreengineerroutinetasklinkagestoworkunderavarietyofconditionsaheadoftime.

Craftworkrepresentstasksofathirdkindandincludestasksthatchangeaccordingtothesituationathand;hence,thereisaloose-couplingevenwithinasingleorganization,letaloneanetworkoforganiza-tions.Craftwork(asthenameimplies)embodiesacertaincreative,artful,andaestheticquality.Craftworktypicallyinvolvesputtingroutineandengineeredtaskstogetherinnewways.Thisiswhatimprovisationaltheoristscall“bricolage”—puttingoldthingstogetherinnewadhocways.

Whenenterpriselogisticiansfindthemselvesdeal-ingwiththeuniqueconditionstheyface,theircraft-workiscustomized,whethertogether(looselycoupled)orsingly,throughcollaborativeinquirymethods.Qual-itativecase-studyresearchthatseekstodocumenttherich,historicdescriptionsofthesesortsofcollectivecraftworkwouldhelptheenterpriseimmensely.Thisisatypeofresearchthatwebelieveisunderrepresentedinlogisticsliterature,andourhopeistoencouragebothacademiciansandpractitionerstohelpbuildalibraryofinsightsansweringthequestion,howuniquelogisticschallengeswereapproachedusingknowledgeandcapabilitiesathand.

Nonroutineoremergenttasks,thefourthcategory,aresimilartocraftwork.However,thecomplexityofthesetasks(theyhaveahighdegreeofinteractivenessandinterconnectednesswitheachotherandwithenvi-ronmentalvariables)makesperformingthemhardertocontrolfromthepointofviewofcentralizedmanage-ment(centralizedbothinternallyinorganizationsandbetweenorganizations).Here,“network-centricity”(ordecentralizedself-organizing)becomesessential.Theenterpriseparticipantsatvariouslocationsmayoperatetogetherasimprovisationaljazzmusicianswouldplay(withneithersheetmusicorchestrationoraconductor).

Here,logisticiansfocuson“actionresearch”thatinvolvesexperimentingwithactionbeforemakingdecisions(anddecisionsareparticipativeandalwaystentative).Admittingitsignorance(becausenooneknows),managementfocuses(withahumilitythatmaybethesubjectofalogisticsethicsresearchstudyinitself)onthequalityofthenetworkconnectionsthatcanservetopromotenear-real-timecollaborationandincreasesharingofactionlearning.

Onecouldarguethatdocumentingactionresearchissimilartoqualitativeformsofresearchincraftwork.However,thefocusismoreonenterpriselearningabouttheprocessofreframing,innovating,andimpro-visingwhileinthefield—notnecessarilyusingwhatisknowninnewwaysbutinventingnewknowledgeaswell.Inactionresearchassociatedwithemergenttasks,thequestionishowtogainandreportinsightsaspractitionersreflect-in-action.

Whileanyofthesetasktypescanofferamplefieldsforfertileresearch,ourhopeisthatenterpriselogisticsresearcherswillinfactattempttosynthe-sizeallfacetsofthesetaskssotheyareabletodiag-noseandprescribeapplicableandrelevantformsofresearch.Thetypesoftasksareofcoursenotmutu-allyexclusive,andinfact,elementsofallofthetasktypesprobablycanbefoundinanyresearchproject.Itisaquestionofemphasisorfocusthatwehopetohaveresearchersconsider.

Wealsobelievethatthecommunityshouldencour-ageabalancebetweenthedifferenttypesoftasks.Itisourcontentionthat,todate,theemphasisinlogistics

MAY–jUNE 2011 55

56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

researchhastendedmoretowardroutineandengi-neeringtasksthataremeasurable,andinmanycasesfalsifiable,usingthescientificmethod.Whileclearlyvaluablebothascontributionstotheliteratureandasalearningmethodology,qualitativeresearchoncraft-workandemergenttasksoffersgreatpotentialaswell.

10PropositionsforResearchAlthoughthereis,oratleastshouldbe,avirtually

limitlesssupplyoftopicsforresearch,wewantedtoaddressatleast10thatmayhelpspurtheeffort.WeconsideredframingthefollowinglistasaLetterman-style“TopTen,”butwechosenottopresumethattheseareinanypriorityorder—thenumbersarejustthereforreference.Ourpropositionscanbeconsideredasawholeorasplaceswhereanynumberofmorefocusedthesescanbedrawn.Inthatregard,weofferthefollowingchallengesfortheenterpriseresearcherfromaDODpartner’spointofview.

1. Logisticsefficiencyisproblematicbecausetheenterprisewillalmostalwaystaketheformofaloose-lycoupled“adhocracy”—adynamic,entrepreneurial,andimprovisationalorganizationthatself-organizesbasedoncommonvalues(suchastheneedtosustainandprotectinnocentlife).

2. Congressprovidesmostdefensefundingtothethreeservicedepartments.Defenselogisticssystemsthereforemayhavetotradeefficienciesassociatedwithroutineandengineeringtaskswhileobfuscatingcentralizedcontrolacrossafullrangeofoperationsthatincludecraftworkandemergenttasks.

3. Defensesupporttocivilauthoritiesandtoover-seasdisasterreliefrequiresDODlogisticstoservemanyunpredictable(craftworkandnonroutine)tasksrequiredbyvictims,localauthorities,stategover-nors,otherFederalagencies,orothernations.Thus,designingorganizationsfordefenselogisticstooper-ateunderconditionsofambiguityanduncertaintyisproblematic.

4. DOD“globalforcemanagement”policiesandprocessesaresupposedtofieldandsustaintherightjointcapabilitiesattherighttimeforapportionmentorallocationtothecombatantcommands.Demandsforefficiency(gettingthetaxpayerthebestvalue)andeffectiveness(givingtheoperationalcommandersreadyforces)oftenpresentcompetingorevenconflict-ingvaluesandtasks.

5. Aglobalviewofsupplychainmanagement(fromobtainingrawmaterialsworldwidetoreformingtrans-portationsystemsandlogisticseducation)revealsacomplicatedwebofpotentialfailuresforenterpriselogistics.

6. Nationalandnongovernmentallinesofcom-municationcanbethreatened(air,land,sea,naturaldisasters,andsoforth)andforcedtocompeteforinlandresources(suchashost-nationsupport,local

contractors,ports,androads)withnoprospectofcen-tralizedcontrol.

7. ThehostareainfrastructureandDODorga-nizationaldesignsforjointlandoperationsmaybeunderdevelopedandunpreparedtoeffectivelyandefficientlysupportenterprisereception,staging,andonwardmovementandprovidedecentralizedlogisticsactivities.

8. U.S.logisticsorganizations(toincludeU.S.andhiredlocalcontractors)playanimportantroleinprovidingreliefandcreatingorsustaininglegitimategovernance.Yettheytypicallyarenotsystemicallydesignedinanappropriatefashion,andlogisticiansarenotpreparedbyservicedepartmentorjointpro-fessionalmilitaryeducationtoassumethismissionas“normal.”

9. Futureconcepts(whitepapers,jointoperatingconcepts,integratingconcepts,andsoforth)aresup-posedtodrivelogisticsorganizationstochangetomeetthecomplexityandambiguityoffutureopera-tionalcontexts.Yethistorydemonstrateswehavebeenunabletoforecastcraftworkandnonroutineformsofworkveryeffectively,ifatall.

10. Logisticshistoryisimportantbutunderem-phasizedintheenterprise(inDOD’scase,serviceandjointprofessionalmilitaryeducation).Historyisimportantnotbecauseitprovidestemplatesforthefuture,butprincipallybecausewell-interpretedhistoryteachesushoweachoperationalcontextisuniqueandcallsforcriticalandcreativethinking,especiallywhendealingwithcraftworkandcomplex,non-routinetasks.

Werecognizethattheseproposalsmaybeincom-pleteandlackprioritizationinthegreaterenterprise,yetwefeelcompelledtoexpressourviewsandsharethemwithotherswhostudyandoperateinthefron-tiersofenterpriselogistics.Ourhopeistobeseenascollegialsothatwemayatleastbeginconversationsamongourfellowenterpriselogisticiansaboutthesesortsofproposalsandperhapsaddressresearchinotherterms.Weinviteandencouragecriticalreviewsofbothourconstructionofenterpriselogisticsandourtasktypology,aswellasour10researchproposals.

dr. cHristopHer r. paparone is an associate professor in tHe arMy coMMand and General staff colleGe’s departMent of joint, interaGency, interGoVernMental, and Multinational operations at fort lee, VirGinia. He is a retired arMy colonel and Has a pH.d. deGree froM pennsylVania state uniVersity.

colonel GeorGe l. topic, usa (ret.), is tHe Vice director in tHe center for joint and strateGic loGistics at tHe national defense uniVersity. He serVed as a quarterMaster officer for 28 years on actiVe duty and for 3 years as tHe deputy director for strateGic loGistics on tHe joint staff.

56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

MAY–jUNE 2011 57

ArmyChangesFacilityStandardstoImproveEnergySecurity

AsofOctober2010,theArmychangeditspoli-ciesonenergyefficiencyforbuildingsinanefforttobecomea“netzero”energyconsumerby2030.ThepolicychangesaimtoprovidetheArmywithenergysecuritybyultimatelyensuringthattheservicecancontinueitsmissionwithoutrelyingonthecivilianpowergrid.

AmongthechangesarerevisionstotheMemoran-dumforSustainableDesignandDevelopmentPolicyUpdate(EnvironmentalandEnergyPerformance),fromtheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforInstal-lations,Energy,andEnvironment.Therevisionssetplanning,programming,budgeting,design,andbuild-ingrequirementsthatreduceenergyconsumptionforfacilitiesbyincorporatingsustainabledesignanddevelopmentprinciplesbasedonguidancefromtheAmericanSocietyofHeating,Refrigeration,andAir-ConditioningEngineers.

SomeofthestrategiestheArmywillusetoreduceenergyandwaterconsumption,optimize

energyefficienciesandperformance,andreducenegativeimpactsontheenvironmentincludecoolroofs,solarwaterheating,andstormwatermanage-ment.TheArmyCorpsofEngineers’preliminaryanalysisofthenewconstructionstandardsindicatesthattheArmyshouldseeanenergysavingofupto45percent.

TheArmyhasalsosetgoalstoreplaceallincandes-centlightingonArmyinstallationswithinthenext5yearsandtopurchaseonlyhigh-efficiencylightbulbsforitsownedandleasedfacilitiesandstructures.

Thoughtimelineshavenotyetbeenset,theArmyisalsoconsideringplansfor“netzero”waterandwasteconsumption.

ArmyContractingCommandRenamesMajorContractingCentersbyLocation

On19January,theArmyContractingCom-mandrenameditssevenmajorcontractingcenterstoreflecttheirgeographiclocations.Thecenters’namesnoware—

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

ArmyReserveUnitFieldedFirstPalletizedLoadSystemA1Trucks

The 730th Transportation Company, 311th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), Army Reserve, received the first palletized load system A1 trucks fielded to the Army during a first-unit-equipped ceremony on 4 February at the Joint Forces Training Base in Los Alamitos, California. The 730th will receive 60 of these trucks to support local and long-distance line-haul operations. The new vehicles feature increased survivability and mobility and improved performance compared to their predecessors. In this photo, Soldiers demonstrate how the truck can load and unload equipment more quickly than previous truck variants. (Photo by Department of the Army)

58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

o ArmyContractingCommand-NationalCapitalRegion,formerlyNationalCapitalRegionCon-tractingCenter,atAlexandria,Virginia.

o ArmyContractingCommand-Picatinny,formerlyJM&L[JointMunitionsandLethality]Contract-ingCenter,atPicatinnyArsenal,NewJersey.

o ArmyContractingCommand-AberdeenProvingGround(C4ISR)[Command,Control,Commu-nications,Computers,Intelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance],formerlyCECOM[ArmyCommunications-ElectronicsCommand]Con-tractingCenter,atAberdeenProvingGround,Maryland.

o ArmyContractingCommand-AberdeenProvingGround(SCRT)[Soldier,Chemical,Research,andTest],formerlyRDECOM[Research,Devel-opmentandEngineeringCommand]ContractingCenter,atAberdeenProvingGround.

o ArmyContractingCommand-Redstone,formerlyAMCOM[ArmyAviationandMissileCommand]ContractingCenter,atRedstoneArsenal,Alabama.

o ArmyContractingCommand-Warren,formerly

TACOMContractingCenter,atWarren,Michigan.o ArmyContractingCommand-RockIsland,former-

lyRockIslandContractingCenter,atRockIslandArsenal,Illinois.Thecontractingcentersprovideacquisition,con-

tracting,businessadvisory,productionsupport,anddepot-levelmaintenanceservicesinacquiring,field-ing,andsustainingArmyweaponsystems,services,andSoldiersupport.

LargestFuelShipmentofOperationEnduringFreedomDeliveredtoRemoteBaseinAfghanistan

Over2daysinJanuary,threeC–17GlobemasterIIIaircraftairdroppedatotalof20,000gallonsofJP8fueltothesupportbattalionofTaskForceCurrahee,101stAir-borneDivision,nearForwardOperatingBaseWazaKhwainthePaktikahprovinceofAfghanistan.Themissionpro-videdtheremotebasewitha30-daysupplyoffuel—thelargestdeliverytoaremotelocationduringOEF.

Eachplanedropped40bundles,foratotalof120,witheachpalletcontainingfour55-gallondrumsof

Army Training and Doctrine Command Pam-phlet (TRADOC Pam) 525–8–2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept For 2015 (ALC 2015),publishedinJanuary2011,setsavisionforhowtheArmywilltrainandeducateSoldiersandleadersinindividualknowledge,skills,attributes,andabilitiestoexecutefull-spectrumoperationsinaneraofpersistentcon-flict.ALC2015suggestsasetofcapabilitiesthatguidesthedevelopmentofanenhancedlearningenvironmentcenteredonthelearnerandonprovid-ingaccesstorelevantlearningcontentthroughoutSoldiers’careers.

Inatablespanningover6pages,ALC2015pro-posesthattheTRADOCCampaignPlanincludeanumberoftraining-relatedactions,including—o Convertingmostclassroomexperiencesintocol-

laborativeproblem-solvingeventsledbyfacili-tatorswhoengagelearnerstothinkaboutandunderstandtherelevanceandcontextofwhattheylearn.

o Changinginstructorandfacilitatorselectionandassignmentprocessestoincreasequalityandattractthebestcandidatesthrougharigorousselectionprocess.

o Establishingarangeofcapabilitiesthatsupportthelearner-centric2015learningenvironment.Suggestedcapabilitiestosupportthe2015learn-

ingenvironmentincludeablendedlearningapproachthatincorporatesvirtualandconstructivesimulations,

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

gamingtechnology,orothertechnology-deliveredinstructionandaplantoputmobiledigitaldevicesintothehandsofallSoldiersnolaterthan2013.

TRADOC Pam 525–8–3, The U.S. Army Train-ing Concept 2012–2020,publishedinJanuary2011,describesthetotalArmyorganizationaltrainingrequirementsandcapabilitiesneededtogenerateandsustainunitstrainedinfull-spectrumoperationstosucceedintheoperationalenviron-mentinconditionsofuncertaintyoverextendedperiods.Theconceptposesandanswersthesequestions:o HowmusttheArmychangeitsunitconstructto

enablecommandersandleaderstoeffectivelyandefficientlytrainadaptiveunitstomeettheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)readinessobjectivetoconductfull-spectrumoperationsinthefutureoperationalenvironmentfrom2012to2020?

o WhatcapabilitiesshouldtheArmyprovidecom-mandersandleaderstoenablethemtoexecuteARFORGEN-basedtrainingplansneededtogen-erateandsustainfull-spectrumoperations-trainedunits?TheconceptalsoarticulateshowtheArmyissyn-

chronizingitseffortsintheoperationalandinstitu-tionaldomainstocreatethistrainingenvironment.

MAY–jUNE 2011 59

fuel.Asthebundleslanded,SoldiersfromTaskForceCurraheecollectedandstoredthepalletstoprepareforthenextdrop.

AccordingtoLieutenantColonelStacyMaxey,theairmobilityliaisonofficerforCombinedJointTaskForce101,themissionwasaperfectexampleofhowjointoperationsshouldwork.“FromtheArmyriggerswhopalletizedtheJP8,toaerialportersandloadmasterswhoputthepalletsontheplane,totheC–17crewthatdeliversthesupplies,rightdowntotheArmycontingentherewhorecoveredthesupplies—thiswasatotalforcemissionprovingweareallin.”

Thefuelwasdeliveredwhilethebasehadonly11daysworthoffuelleftonhand,andairdeliveryistheonlymethodofsupplyavailabletothebase.Becauseofalackofroadwayinfrastructureandsecurity,convoyshavenotresuppliedthebasein3years.

Fuelshortagestoremoteoperatingbasessuchasthisoneonlymakeithardertoimprovesecurity.“Withoutthisresupply,wecan’trunourvehicles,wehaveno(securityforce)patrols,wecan’tcommunicate,”saidLieutenantColonelDavisPreston,commanderofthesupportbattalion.“Fueliscriticaltooursurvival,andtheseairdropsmakeitpossibletosustainthemission.”

ArmyFiscalYear2012BudgetRequestReflectsDeclineinContingencyOperationsSpending

PresidentBarackObama’sproposedbudgetfortheArmywassubmittedtoCongresson14February.Thefiscalyear(FY)2012budgetrequesttotals$215.974billion,a$29.552billion,or12percent,decreasefromtheFY2011request.Closetoone-thirdofthefund-ing,32.9percent,isrequestedforoverseascontingencyoperations(OCO).ThePresidentisasking$71.107bil-lionforOCO,adecreaseof$30.987billion,or30.35

percent,fromtheFY2011OCOrequest.ThePresidentisalsoaskingfora$144.867billionbasebudget,anincreaseof$1.435billion,or1percent,overtheFY2011baserequest.

Spendingrequestsbymajorcategory,includingOCO,are—o Militarypersonnel:$63.580billion(adecreaseof

3.33percentfromtheFY2011request).o Operationandmaintenance:$89.793billion(15.97

percentlessthantheFY2011request).o Procurement:$24.343billion(down19.58percent).o Research,development,test,andevaluation:$9.693

billion(adecreaseof7.54percent).o Militaryconstruction:$4.290billion(down30.82

percent).o Familyhousing:$682million(up11.62percent).o JointImprovisedExplosiveDeviceDefeatFund:

$2.799billion(down19.24percent).o Chemicaldemilitarization:$1.63billion(up2.39

percent).o AfghanistanSecurityForcesFund:$12.8billion(up

10.16percent).o IraqSecurityForcesFund:$0(down100percent

fromtheFY2011requestof$2billion).InFY2012,theprocurementrequestincludesfund-

ingfortheacquisitionof—o 75UH–60BlackHawkhelicoptersfor$1.597billion.o 48CH–47Chinookhelicopters,including33new

and15rebuilthelicopters,for$1.36billion.o 10,053parachutesfor$68.392million,including

8,959advancedtacticalparachutesystems,144jointprecisionairdropsystems,and950advancedemer-gencybailoutparachutes.

o 18systemsfromthemine-protectionvehiclefamily,including5Panthermediummine-protectedvehiclesand13vehicle-mountedmine-detectionsystems,for$56.671million.

o $293.7milliontorecapitalizemine-resistantambush-protectedvehiclesandroute-clearancevehicles.

o 11,607inthefamilyofheavytacticalvehicles,including115heavyexpanded-mobilitytacticaltrucks(HEMTTs),1,062HEMTTlightequipmenttransporters,154heavyequipmenttransportsystems,2palletizedloadsystemtrucks,2,095containerroll-in/outplatforms,548enhancedcontainerhandlingunits,and7,785movementtrackingsystems,totaling$674.508million.

o 1,503trucksand950trailersforthefamilyofmedi-umtacticalvehiclesfor$444.03million.

o Recapitalizationof1,362up-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehiclesfor$161.631million.

o 494petroleumandwaterdistributionsystemsfor$75.457million.

o 3ForceProvidermoduleswith4powergenerationkits,6cold-weatherkits,and8ForceProviderExpe-ditionaryTriconsetsfor$68million.

Soldiers from Task Force Currahee recover fuel delivered by air to Forward Operating Base Waza Khwa in Afghanistan.(Photo by MSgt. Adrian Cadiz, U.S. Air Forces Central Public Affairs)

60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

o 226field-feedingsystems,including160multi-temperaturerefrigeratedcontainersystemsand66assaultkitchens,for$26.860million.

o 15mobileintegratedremainscollectionsystemsfor$7.384million.

o 444mobilemaintenanceequipmentsystems,includ-ing404shop-equipmentcontactmaintenancesys-tems,40hydraulic-systemtestandrepairunits,andthefieldingofstandardautomotivetoolsetstotheArmyNationalGuard,for$41.701million.

o Twocommercial-off-the-shelffixed-wingaircraftwithassociatedmilitarymodificationsfor$14.572milliontosupportoperationalsupportairlift,specialelectronicmissionaircraft,specialmissionaircraft(utility),andtrainingrequirements.

o Onejointhigh-speedvessel(JHSV)for$223.845million.TheJHSVprovidesintratheaterliftofper-sonnel,supplies,andequipmenttoimprovedportsandotherdischargesites.TheArmyhasalsorequested$10.080millionto

supporttheprovisioningofindustrialfacilities(PIF)andlayawayofindustrialfacilities(LIF)programs.PIF

supportstheupgradeandreplacementofGovernment-ownedproductionequipmentthatistechnicallyoreconomicallyobsolete.LIFpreservestheArmy’sabilitytorespondwhenincreasedproductionisneededwhilekeepingactiveproductioncostsdown.

Research,DevelopmentandEngineeringCommandDeploysTaskForcetoAfghanistan

TheArmyResearch,DevelopmentandEngineeringCommand(RDECOM)deployedTaskForceWarriortoAfghanistaninJanuarytobetheArmy’scommandcen-terforscienceandtechnologyforOperationEnduringFreedom.ThemissionofthetaskforceistoprovidetimelysolutionsandanswerstotechnicalproblemscomingfromSoldiersintheater.

TaskForceWarrioriscomposedof32militaryandcivilianpersonnel,includingengineers,scientists,shopforemen,machinists,andadministrativeandsupplystaff,from8researchcentersfromacrosstheUnitedStates.TheRDECOMpersonnelarebasedatBagramAirfieldinAfghanistanandduringtheir6-month

UnitSupplySpecialistsUseMobileApplicationsforTraining

ApilotprogramattheArmyQuartermasterSchoolissupplyingadvancedstudentsoftheUnitSupplySpecialist(92Y)coursewithmobiledevicesandtailoredapplicationsthatletthemcontinuelearn-ingoutsideoftheclassroomandaccesslessonswhenunforeseencircumstanceskeepthemfromtheclass-room.

Theprogram,initiatedinJuly2010,isnowinitssecondphase.TheprogramisslatedtobecompletedinJuly.ItwillallowtheArmyCombinedArmsSup-portCommand(CASCOM)toevaluateifmobileapplicationscanbeusedmoreextensivelyfortrain-ing.AccordingtoMatthewMacLaughlin,Jr.,chiefoftheTechnologyIntegrationBranchatCASCOM,themobilecurriculumforthe92Ycourseincludeslessonplans,checksonlearning,manuals,andapodcastlibraryconsistingofinformationonthesmall-armsinventorythatstudentswillencounter.

AsimilarprogramisunderwayattheArmyOrd-nanceSchool,wherestudentsintheExplosiveOrd-nanceCourseareusingsimilardevices.

InadditiontosupportingtheArmyLearningCon-cept2015bymakingcourseslessdependentonloca-tion,themobiledevicesalsocouldsubstantiallycutpaperreproductioncostsbyusingdigitalmediaforclassroommaterials.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Unit supply specialist students at the Army Quartermaster School are engaged in a pilot program that gives them access to iPhone-based course material. (Photo by Keith Debois, CASCOM and SCoE Public Affairs)

MAY–jUNE 2011 61

deploymentareresponsibleforestablishingtheFieldAssistanceinScienceandTechnologyCenter.

ThecenterwillhelpSoldiersfocusrequirementssothatRDECOM’stechnicalstaffcanbetterunderstandthespecificneedsofSoldiersontheground.

PhilipA.ConnellyAwardWinnersAnnouncedTheDepartmentoftheArmyG–4andtheChairman

oftheBoard,InternationalFoodServiceExecutivesAssociation,jointlyannouncedthewinnersofthe2011PhilipA.ConnellyAwardson15December.

TheannualprogramrecognizesexcellenceinArmyfoodservicethroughtheevaluationoffoodpreparation,taste,nutrition,service,andsanitationpractices.The2011PhilipA.ConnellyAwardwinnersareasfollows:

o Smallgarrisoncategory:CampZamaDiningFacil-ity,CampZama,Japan.

o Largegarrisoncategory:FreedomInnDiningFacil-ity,FortMeade,Maryland.

o ActiveArmyfieldkitchencategory:126thTranspor-tationCompany,330thTransportationBattalion,FortBragg,NorthCarolina.

o ArmyReservefieldkitchencategory:824thQuar-termasterCompany(HeavyAirdropSystems),362dQuartermasterBattalion,FortBragg,NorthCarolina.

o ArmyNationalGuardfieldkitchencategory:SupportCompany,216thEngineerBattalion,Cincinnati,Ohio.InMarch,tworepresentativesfromeachwinning

andrunner-upteamalsoreceived1weekofculinaryartstrainingattheRobertMorrisUniversityInstituteofCulinaryArtsinChicago,Illinois.

Writing for Army SustainmentIfyouareinterestedinsubmittinganarticletoArmy Sustainment,hereareafewsuggestions.Beforeyou

beginwriting,reviewapastissueofArmy Sustainment;itwillbeyourbestguide.Thenfollowtheserules:oKeepyourwritingsimpleandstraightforward(tryreadingitbacktoyourselfortoacolleague).oAttributeallquotes.oIdentifyallacronyms,technicalterms,andpublications(forexample,FieldManual[FM]4–0,Sustainment).oDonotassumethatthosereadingyourarticlearenecessarilySoldiersorthattheyhavebackgroundknowledge

ofyoursubject;ArmySustainment’sreadershipisbroad.oSubmissionsshouldgenerallybebetween800and4,000words.(ThewordlimitdoesnotapplytoSpectrum

articles.SpectrumisadepartmentofArmySustainmentintendedtopresentresearched,referencedarticlestypicalofascholarlyjournal.)

InstructionsforSubmittinganArticleoArmySustainmentpublishesonlyoriginalarticles,sopleasedonotsendyourarticletootherpublications.oObtainofficialclearanceforopenpublicationfromyourpublicaffairsofficebeforesubmittingyourarticleto

ArmySustainment.Includetheclearancestatementfromthepublicaffairsofficewithyoursubmission.Excep-tionstotherequirementforpublicaffairsclearanceincludehistoricalarticlesandthosethatreflectapersonalopinionorcontainapersonalsuggestion.

oSubmitthearticleasasimpleMicrosoftWorddocument—notinlayoutformat.Wewilldeterminelayoutforpublication.

oSendphotosandchartsasseparatedocuments.MakesurethatallgraphicscanbeopenedforeditingbytheArmySustainmentstaff.

oSendphotosas.jpgor.tiffiles—atleast300dpi.Photosmaybeincolororblackandwhite.PhotosembeddedinWordorPowerPointwillnotbeused.

oIncludeadescriptionofeachphotosubmittedandacronymdefinitionsforcharts.oSubmityourarticlebyemailtoleeealog@conus.army.milorbymailto—

EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENTARMYLOGISTICSUNIVERSITY2401QUARTERSRDFTLEEVA23801–1705.

Ifyoumailyourarticle,pleaseincludeacopyonCDifpossible.

Ifyouhavequestionsabouttheserequirements,pleasecontactusatleeealog@conus.army.milor(804)765–4761orDSN539–4761.Welookforwardtohearingfromyou.

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Official Business

o The10thSustainmentBrigadeinIraqo ArmyExplosiveOrdnanceDisposalEntryRequirementso LOGCAPDemystifiedo FeedingtheForceOnePlatoonataTimeo TheaterExpressProgramo BSBPartnershipWithAfghanCounterpartso ClassIV:FromManufacturertoForwardOperatingBaseo ARFORGENRiskso 103dExpeditionarySustainmentCommando ABCA:ACoalitionThatWorks

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