ETHNICITY, CONFLICT AND IDENTITY: THE SENSE OF

BELONGING AMONG THE PAKHTUNS OF SWAT,

PAKISTAN

SYED WASIF AZIM

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR

(August 2018)

ETHNICITY, CONFLICT AND IDENTITY: THE SENSE OF

BELONGING AMONG THE PAKHTUNS OF SWAT,

PAKISTAN

Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of

Peshawar, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Award of the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

(August 2018)

Dedicated

to the

triangle of my father, mother

and wife

i

ABSTRACT

Violent conflicts have perpetual and perennial impacts on societies. Ethnic and national

Identities of the people are no exception to this. This research study reflects on the impacts

of conflict and violence on ethnic and national identities. The scarce literature linking

conflict and identities (ethnic and national) argues that conflict and violence „soften‟ or

„harden‟ these identities. Moreover, the bulging literature on post 2001 conflict in Pukhtun

region of Pakistan does not primarily focus on the impacts of this conflict on Pukhtun

ethnic and national identities. Using constructivist theoretical position and the case study of

Swat Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, this study addresses two research questions: what are the

implications of conflict and violence in Swat for Pukhtun ethnic identity? And what are the

consequences of the ongoing conflict for Pakistani national identity? Theoretically the

study refutes the arguments in the literature that identity softens or hardens and argues that

the impacts of conflict and violence on ethnic and national identities are complex and

multi-dimensional. Methodologically, the study is based on an ethnographic field work

comprising in-depth semi structured interviews, focus group discussions, ethnographic

observations and field notes arranged from November 2016 to May 2017 in different

administrative tehsils of Swat. This study proposes that during the conflict, performing

aspects of ethnic identity i.e. cultural code (Pukhtunwali) was affected and transformed in

multiple ways resulting in a perception that „ideal Pukhtunwali is dead.‟ Consequently,

claims to ethnic identity contextually shift to ascribed aspects of Pukhtun identity i.e.

language, land, tribal affiliations, and „birth in a Pukhtun home.‟ Likewise, the conflict

adds to the complexity of Pukhtun ethnic identity by sharpening and straining intra-ethnic

relations among the Pukhtuns. These diverse and multiple impacts can also be witnessed on

different aspects of Pakistani national identity where it is neither lost nor reaffirmed. In this

context, the study posits that there is a contest on the assumed unifying nature of Islam as a

marker of Pakistani identity. Through the discourse of „pride and sacrifice‟, Pukhtuns own

the nation state of Pakistan, yet on the other hand are critical of the state for not

acknowledging and compensating the sacrifices of Pukhtuns in Swat. Similarly, Pakistani

military is considered as an institution which significantly represents Pakistani national

identity by Pukhtuns in Swat. The military‟s persuasive presence in Swat is in question.

Celebrating national days like 23rd

of March and 14th

of August is another significant

aspect of Pakistani national identity. Such impacts have significant repercussions for the

state of Pakistan.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Identity, Conflict, Swat, Pakhtuns, Pakistan

ii

Table of Contents

Abstract i

Acknowledgments vii

Chapter 1: Introduction to the thesis 1

1.1. Theoretical Framework 11

1.2. Research methodology 30

Chapter 2: Conflict, Violence and Culture: The violation of Purdah in Swat 43

Introduction 43

2.1. Conflict and Women Purdah: Militants, Military and IDPs 48

2.2. Conflict, Violence and Home Purdah 57

2.3. Conflict and elder men Purdah 66

2.4. Conflict and locality Purdah 67

Conclusion 69

Chapter 3: Conflict, Violence and Culture: The interplay of Jarga, Committee and

Organization with conflict in Swat 71

Introduction 71

3.1. Jarga, Pukhtunwali, Committee and Tanzeem in Swat 73

3.2. Conflict and violence impacts Jarga, Committee and Tanzeem in Swat 81

Conclusion 99

Chapter 4: Conflict, Violence and Culture: Hujra, Melmastya & Gham-Khadi in

Swat

Introduction 102

4.1. Our Hujra has been deserted: Conflict, Violence, Hujra and Melmastya in Swat 104

4.2. Conflict, Violence and the performance of Gham-Khadi/Marae-Jwandae in Swat 117

Conclusion 127

Chapter 5: Conflict and Violence in Swat: Impacts on the social relationship between

Mashar and Kashar, Badal, Honor-Shame complex and the contextuality-complexity

of Pukhtun ethnic identity 129

Introduction 129

5.1. Mashar and Kashar: Who cares? 131

5.2. Badal and Violence: What happened? 140

5.3. Where is Pukhtun honor? Shame is prevalent 146

5.4. We are Pukhtuns by name: The contextuality of Pukhtun ethnic identity 153

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5.5. Conflict and the complexity of ethnic identity: Intra-ethnic relations in Swat 158

Conclusion 162

Chapter 6: Conflict, Violence and National Identity: Pakistani military and

Pukhtun’s performance of national holidays in Swat

165

Introduction 165

6.1. Conflict and Pakistani Military in Swat 166

6.2. Showing indifference and discontent: Conflict and the celebration of national holidays in

Swat

181

Conclusion 190

Chapter 7: Conflict, Violence and National Identity: Islam, pride, sacrifice and inter-

ethnic relations in Swat 191

Introduction 191

7.1. Conflict and violence in Swat: Islam and Pakistani National Identity 192

7.2. The discourse of Pride, Sacrifice and complains in the Conflict of Swat 202

7.3. Conflict and violence in Swat: Inter-ethnic relations and boundaries 205

7.4. Repercussions for Pakistani state 210

Conclusion 214

Conclusion of the Thesis 216

Implication, Limitations and Future research 225

Bibliography 230

Annexures 247

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, thanks to Almighty Allah for His blessings in completing this thesis. This

research work would not have been possible without the help, support and encouragement

of a number of people and institutions. I am thankful to Higher Education Commission of

Pakistan (HEC) for granting me an „Indigenous PhD Scholarship‟ for my PhD studies and

IRSIP fellowship for my 6 months stay in the University of Washington, Seattle. In

University of Washington Seattle, I am highly obliged to Dr. Cabeiri Robinson, my host

supervisor. Her cooperation and intellectual insights made my stay at Seattle more effective

and fruitful than i have imagined. Professor Nathalie Williams provided me with much help

and support in various ways, especially arranging office in Sociology department and a talk

in the same department along with reading parts of my thesis. Hussain, my roommate in the

US provided much support. He along with Khan Zeb, Jameel Ahmad and his family,

members of Seattle Adabi Mehfil and many other individuals made my stay enjoyable in

Seattle. The International Student office and its staff in the University of Washington

deserve much appreciation for their support, especially Keith Snodgrass of the South Asia

Center needs a word.

In University of Peshawar, I am thankful to the staff at Department of Political

Science, for their support throughout this study. I am highly thankful to Dr Muhammad

Ayub Jan, my research supervisor, for his supervision, encouragement and much support.

This study would never have been possible without his support. He was also extremely

helpful in matters indirectly related to this study and to my time as a PhD scholar. Dr.

Abdul Rauf, Dr Zubair, Dr Sami Raza, Dr Shahida Aman, Dr Noreen Naseer, Dr. Taj

Muharram Khan, Dr. A. Z. Hilali, Dr. Zahid Anwar, also deserves much appreciation for

supporting and helping me in the department of political science. Amir Raza from the same

department must be mentioned here for his hospitality and help in the US, during my six

v

months fellowship. My gratitude also goes to Dr. Andrea Fleshinberg, Dr. Sanaa Alimia,

Dr. Jan, Peter Hartung, Dr. James Caron, Dr Robert Nichols, Dr Isik Kuscu, Dr Vanessa

Tinker and many others, whom I may not have mentioned here.

The clerical staff in the University of Peshawar and specifically at the Department

of Political science was extremely supportive. Israr Ahmed in the account section deserves

special mention. Among others, Murad Khan, Shams ul Amin, Gulfam sahib and Atif were

very much helpful and cooperative. Saeed Ullah lala needs much appreciation for his

support in many different forms. My sincere thanks and gratitude go to some of my close

friends Sajjad Hussain, Wajid Mehmood Khattak, Hassan Shah, Faiz-ul-Ibrar Khattak,

Shabir Ahmad, Meehran and Asif Saleem. Their appreciation, encouragement,

unconditional love and valuable suggestions helped me a lot in completing this thesis.

Field work was the most challenging aspect of this research project. My sincere

thanks and gratitude goes to Dr Sultan-i-Rome from Swat, who proved very helpful during

and after my field work. His guidance and support made this study possible. My gratitude

goes to the people of Swat. In fact, the study is a shared venture of the author and people of

Swat. They deserve every appreciation.

My mother Nizakat Ara Begum, my father Syed Azim Shah and my wife Shakeela

Naz deserve special mention not only for their exceptional love and conviction but also for

their assistance throughout this study. I have no words to thank them in real sense. I am

also thankful to my elder brothers Syed Waqar Azim and Syed Kashif Azim. The

unconditional love and care of my sister also deserve mention and gratitude. I am thankful

to everyone who has supported me in this endeavor.

Syed Wasif Azim

1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

The event of 11 September 2001 and the so-called „war on terror‟ have an enormous

impact on Pakistan, especially its north-western part (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) 1

and former FATA2, where majority of Pukhtuns

3 live and which borders Afghanistan.

Pakistan and its Pukhtun population drew the attention of policy experts, media and

academic inquiries from across the world. However, many of these media reports and the

research studies conducted are distorted, incomplete, essentialist or stereotyped, mainly

because of the lack of access to these conflict zones and the impression of colonial

writings on these studies. In this context, Pukhtuns were soon equated with religious

militants by many, both inside and outside Pakistan and in line with the colonial discourse

a stereotype of a „violent fanatic Muslim militant‟, for Pukhtuns, was spread across,

through media and some academic accounts.

Swat drew the attention of many, when militants started their violent campaign.

Among many peculiarities of this region, one was that it was the only settled area (in

contrast to FATA) which saw the rise of militants in a somewhat organized form. Swat,

which is populated by Pukhtuns, mostly from the Yusufzai tribe, is a district in Pukhtun

majority province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It was a princely state in British India and was

merged in 1969 into Pakistan. Interestingly, before the rise of militants in other parts of

Pakistan, mostly after 2001, a militant organization operated in Swat (since 1990‟s), called

Terek e Nawaz e Shariati e Mohammedi (TNSM: Movement for the imposition of

1 The official name of the province is Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. For this reason, I will use this spelling for the

province but as my research participants use the work Pukhtuns and not Pakhtuns for themselves I will use

„Pukhtuns‟ for them. Moreover, the thesis title, as approved by the university, stands the same with

„Pakhtuns‟.

2 The status of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) was changed after its merger with Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa province in 2018 through an act of the Parliament (Hussain, 2018; Wasim, 2018a, 2018b).

3 Pakhtuns, Pukhtuns, Pashtuns or Pathans are different names of the same people. My research participants

used the word Pukhtuns and that is why throughout the dissertation I use this.

2

Mohammadan Shariah). When militants grouped in Pakistan to form Tehreek e Taliban

Pakistan, (TTP: Movement of Taliban in Pakistan) in 2007, members of TNSM, under the

leadership of Sufi Muhammad and his son in law, Fazlullah, also joined it.

In Swat, these militants started a violent campaign against the State of Pakistan and

called to enforce their strict brand of Islamic Shariah. Violence was spread by militant

bands of Taliban in Swat, through killing, bombing, flogging and beheading people who

could oppose them or who were associated with Pakistani state or government. Social way

of life was impacted severely, and society was soon dominated by terror. Militancy in this

part was linked to both earlier and recent past. The role of people of Swat in the resistance

movement in the name of Jihad by Syed Ahmad Shaheed Bareli was mentioned mainly. In

recent times, Afghan Jihad was the most debated cause of militancy in Swat. However, the

difference of Swat and other Pukhtun regions was the exclusive presence of TNSM. This

movement of 1990‟s and their demand of Islamic Shariah and use of violence to challenge

the then government is part of the debate in Swat.

Government, in a bid to control the situation, did a controversial peace deal with

militants and passed Nizam e Adal regulations in Swat and Malakand (F. Shah 2009).

Courts (called Dar ul Qaza) were setup in Swat and Malakand as part of the deal between

government and militants. The deal and regulations, failed to achieve the aim and targets,

however it provided militants with time to spread to neighboring regions like Malakand

and Buner. The writ of the state was continuously challenged after the deal with

government. Government and its institutions, especially the military, was questioned by

many and was thus moved to act. Like other regions of Pukhtuns, militancy in Swat was

tackled through more violence by Pakistani state and military. A series of military

operation was started in Swat and Malakand, which intensified and prolonged the conflict

for years (from 2007 till this date). The conflict of militants and Pakistani state,

represented by the military, is having implications for Pukhtun society, culture and way of

3

life. Moreover, it is having implications for Pukhtun ethnic and Pakistani national identity

along with repercussions for Pakistani state.

In Pakistan, Pukhtuns constitute the second largest ethnic group and are present

across KP, Baluchistan and the major urban centers such as Karachi and Lahore. As an

ethnic group, Pukhtuns retain multiple identities, like ethnic, national and religious. In

comparison to national and religious identities, Pukhtun ethnic identity is primary one

(Jan, 2010). This ethnic identity is a complex, contested and contextual tool kit of different

aspects and markers (Jan, 2010). It entails both performing and ascribed aspects and

markers along with ethnic relations. In this case, performing aspects refers to Pukhtun

culture, that is Pukhtunwali (or Pukhtu), which is a contested and inconclusive list of

different social, cultural and behavioral codes, values, institutions and practices, including

but not limited to Purdah, Jarga, Hujra, Melmastya, Gham-Khadi, the relationship

between Kashar and Mashar, Badal and Honor-Shame. Likewise, ascribed aspects are in

birth, descent, tribal identity, language (Pukhtu) and land ownership. These aspects

combine to form Pukhtun ethnic identity and are contextual when it comes to preference

of one over the other (Jan, 2010). Moreover, Pukhtun ethnic identity entails ethnic

relations, both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic. Intra ethnic relations refer to inter-tribal or

inter class relations among the Pukhtuns. Inter-ethnic relations refer to the relations

between Pukhtuns and other ethnic groups.

In this line, Pakistani national identity and its imagination forms a compelling part

of the identification process among the Pukhtuns. This thesis divides national identity into

components and markers which are significant in this regard. These components and

aspects include Pakistani military, the celebration of national holidays, Islam, the

discourse of ethnic pride, sacrifice and complains/grievances and inter-ethnic relations.

This project argues that these markers form a compelling part of Pakistani national identity

among the Pukhtuns, especially in the context of recent conflict in the region. Both, ethnic

4

and national identities and their markers, are influenced, impacted and transformed by a

variety of processes and phenomena‟s. Conflict in Pukhtun region is one of these.

The scarce literature on the impacts of conflict and violence on ethnic identity

suggests that conflict and violence „harden‟ or „soften‟ ethnic identity. Moreover, it also

proposes that the impact on national identity is complex and not easy to predict. However,

in this thesis I will elaborate the impact of conflict and violence on identities, both ethnic

and national. I will argue that the impacts of conflict and violence on ethnic and national

identity are complex and multi-dimensional. Conflict and violence affect different

components of ethnic and national identity in multiple ways. In such a context, ethnic

identity neither harden nor soften, but is impacted and transformed in multiple forms.

Moreover, high level of conflict and violence, especially involving a state has significant,

complex and multi-dimensional impact on different markers and components of national

identity. Additionally, this has implications and repercussions for the state as well. To

discuss these arguments, this thesis utilizes the case study of Swat Pukhtuns in the context

of recent conflict in Swat.

The conflict and violence in Pukhtun region, of Swat, is complex as there are

multiple causes and dynamics of it (Ahmed, 2013; Kemp, 2008; Saigol, 2012). Such a

conflict has significant and multiple impacts on Pukhtun society and identity. The

literature on Pukhtun region and society and on the conflict in this region does not address

the question of how this conflict is impacting identities. Though anthropological studies

have focused different aspects of Pukhtun identities (Ahmed, 1977, 1980; Barth, 1969a;

Jan, 2010; Lindholm, 1996) and a bulging literature, both academic studies and media

reports, elaborate the conflict in the region, the linkage between conflict and identity is

missing. Academic studies on the recent conflict are much more focused on the causes of

this conflict and media inquiries are mostly superficial and lack the depth and rigorous.

5

Moreover, a piece of literature hint at transformation in the region and society, however, it

does not explicate the impact of conflict on identities, both ethnic and national.

The conflict and violence in Pukhtun region have multiple impacts for Pukhtun

ethnic identity. Different components of Pukhtun ethnic identity, like culture and ethnic

boundaries/relations, have witnessed different, multiple and complex impacts. This is

because different markers and aspects of Pukhtun ethnic identity have witnessed different

forms of transformations amidst the conflict. Diverse socio-cultural codes, values and

institutions of Pukhtun culture, called Pukhtunwali or Pukhtu, like purdah (seclusion),

jarga (elder‟s council), hujra (guest room for entertaining guests), melmastya (the act of

entertaining guests), gham-khadi (sorrow and joy), relationship of mashar-kashar (elder

and younger), badal (revenge) and honor-shame 4, have witnessed multiple impacts due to

conflict and violence in the region. The complex relationship of Pukhtunwali and conflict

is significant to be explored, keeping in view the heavy debates in the literature on

Pukhtunwali as a significant marker of pukhtun ethnic identity.

A more significant phenomenon in this context is the loss of Pukhtun honour

(nang) in different forms. The traditional literature on Pukhtun society, both colonial and

post-colonial, has debated the centrality of honour to Pukhtun life and culture. Though

transformed, honour and shame complex still forms a central part of the discussion, amidst

the conflict in this region. The impacts on Pukhtun culture and the loss of honour are

developments considered as unfortunate and culturally detrimental by Pukhtuns.

Moreover, these results in the loss of a central performing marker of Pukhtun ethnic

identity.

Referring to studies of Barth, Ahmed and others, it would lead us to conclude that

ethnic identity is lost as performing culture is much central to Pukhtun identity and self.

4 These are literal meanings only. The socio-cultural understanding is complex, however. In

chapters 2,3 and 4 I have explained these socio-cultural codes and values.

6

However, as identification is a contextual process and identity is maintained at any cost,

ethnic identity is not lost, rather claims to ethnic identity shifts contextually to ascribed

aspects, including „birth in a Pukhtun home‟, „tribal identity‟, „land‟, language and

„patrilineal descent‟ (Jan, 2010, pp, 28–29). In this case a more significant development

and perception is that ethnic identity, devoid of culture, is not ideal one. Such a

Pukhtunness is considered as a lesser one in comparison to Pukhtunness claimed in both

performing (culture) and ascribed aspects.

Pukhtun ethnic identity also entails another significant aspect, which also express

the complexity inherent in ethnic identity, that is ethnic relations and boundaries

(Anderson & Strand, 1978; Barth, 1969a, 1998; Edwards, 1990). This may comprise of

intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic. Intra-ethnic relations among the Pukhtuns form a

central part of this aspect and marker of ethnic identity. The studies of Barth and

Muhammad Ayub Jan, have discussed this aspect in detail (Barth, 1969a, 1998; Jan,,

2010). Barth has discussed ethnic boundaries and relations in general and focused more on

inter-ethnic boundaries and relations, while Jan, has explored the intra-ethnic and inter-

ethnic relations in the debates on identification process among the Pukhtuns. The

discussion of intra-ethnic relations and boundaries between khanan and gharibanan, as

intra-ethnic categories, are central to this thesis. The literature on conflict and violence in

the region seems to have little interest in the interplay of conflict in Swat, and general

Pukhtun region, with the relations between khanan and gharibanan. The conflict has

added to the complexity of ethnic identity by sharpening and straining the intra-ethnic

boundaries and relations of Pukhtun ethnic identity. Interestingly, the conflict has not

impacted the inter-tribal aspect of intra-ethnic relations in the case of Swat as the region is

somehow tribally homogenous.

Moreover, Pakistani state has been involved in a nation making project since its

inception of 1947. Being a state of different ethnicities, Pakistan has been facing problem

7

with its nation making project. Moreover, carving a national identity has been at the heart

of this process. Though the literature focuses more on nation making process, official

nationalism and the response of ethnic groups to this process, it misses some important

markers of the imagination of Pakistani national identity among the Pukhtuns in

contemporary Pakistan. The heavy focus on Islam by the literature (and even by the state

of Pakistan) results in least discussion on state institutions, especially the military, the

celebration of national holidays and the discourse of ethnic pride, sacrifice and complains.

That is the reason, I am more concerned with the discussion of military, pride, sacrifice,

complaints/grievances and celebration of national holidays along with the role of Islam to

Pakistani identity. Conflict and violence have multiple repercussions for the imagination

of Pakistani national identity and these different markers. In this case, national identity is

neither lost, nor it hardens or softens as such, but is impacted in multiple forms.

There is literature on Pakistani military in general, however its role and position in

national identity is missing. In the context of conflict in Pukhtun region, military becomes

a central institution representing Pakistani state and becomes significant to the discussion

of Pakistani identity. The military operations, search operations and security check posts

are different aspects and practices of this discussion. The imagination of Pakistani military

as a national identity symbol has been impacted amidst the conflict in Pukhtun region of

Swat. Related to the significance of national symbols, such as holidays, to Pakistani

national identity, there is scarcity of literature as the available literature does not address

this aspect of national identity. However, there is general literature suggesting the

centrality of national symbols and holidays to national identity and consciousness in other

states (Fox, 2006). For this reason, I bring in the debate of national holiday amidst the

conflict in Swat. Moreover, another objective is that Pakistani state and media discourse

claim to have a popularity of national holidays among masses in conflict hit regions.

8

The most debated aspect in this context is the role of Islam as a national identity

marker (Alavi, 1986; Binder, 1986; Iqbal, 2003; Matcalf, 2004; Verkaaik, 2007). Islam is

none the less a central aspect amidst the conflict in Swat. The reason is not only that it

occupies a central position in Pakistani identity, but it is also involved in the conflict in

Pukhtun region as militants use Islam for their activities. The traditional literature

discusses both its unifying and divisive role in this context. However, the discussion of

recent conflict, Islam and national identity is missing from the literature. Moreover, the

discourse of pride, sacrifice and complains/grievances form another aspect of Pakistani

national identity (Jan, 2010, pp, 158–75). The literature argues that through a net of pride

and sacrifice Pukhtuns try to own the state of Pakistan. Though the study of Ayub Jan,

briefly explores this aspect amidst the conflict in Pukhtun region, I try to explicate this

aspect by adding the debates of pride, sacrifice and complains against the role of Pakistani

state (Jan,, 2010). The imagination of Pakistani identity is rather incomplete without the

discussion of inter-ethnic relations and the related power discourse. Some of the literature

on Pakistani nationalism suggests that this discourse dominates the discussion and argues

that in Pakistan national identity is a discourse of power and inter-ethnic rivalries. (Jan,

2010, pp, 158–75). However, the available studies do not investigate the probable

repercussions of conflict in Pukhtun region for this aspect. This is significant for two main

reasons. The conflict is more restricted Pukhtun populated regions, while the areas

dominated by Punjabis, Sindhis, and others are witnessing least conflict and violence.

Moreover, the military is involved in this conflict which is perceived as Punjabi

dominated. Such a peculiar situation demands the discussion of inter-ethnic relations and

rivalries in Pakistan. The recent conflict and violence in Pukhtun region has multiple

impacts and repercussions for these different markers and aspects of Pakistani national

identity.

9

Finally, Pakistani state, being a multiethnic one has been facing problems with

accommodating its ethnic groups since its inception in 1947. The official nationalism and

promotion of national identity has been challenged by ethnic groups of Balochs, Pukhtuns,

Bengalis and Sindhis (Ahmed, 1975, 1998; Alavi, 1986; Jan,, 2010; Khan, 2003; Shaikh,

1989, 2008). Even Punjabis, perceived to be dominating the state of Pakistani den daring

benefits has shown reservations on some aspects of this official narrative. The event of

1971, when Bangladesh was formed, based mostly on a Bengali ethnic identity and

nationalism is witness to that and made Pakistan the first state in post-world war 2 era that

saw disintegration. Interestingly a majority separated from a minority. In this context,

there is still a living insurgency in Baluchistan which is led by Baloch ethnic nationalists

and separatists (Rizwan, Waqar, and Arshad, 2014). The rise of Muslim militants in

Pukhtun region in the last decade and half posed a new threat to Pakistani state where

scholars claimed that this is the rise of Pukhtun nationalism in the garb of religion (Cohen,

2004; Weiss, 1999). Though the conflict is not a nationalist resurgence, it is having

significant repercussions for Pakistan in different forms. Moreover, for the case of Swat, it

is pertinent and much significant to note that Swat was a princely state in British India and

was a state even in 1947. It was later merged in 1969 with Pakistan. Though there are no

signs of irredentism or separatism at all, People in Swat are much nostalgic for the times

of Wali of Swat and Swat state.

Thus, this thesis attempts to address two main research questions, which are what

are the implications of conflict and violence for ethnic identity? And what are the

implications of conflict for national identity. For the case of Swat Pukhtuns in Pakistan,

questions are what are the implications of conflict and violence in Swat for Pukhtun ethnic

identity? and what are the consequences of the ongoing conflict for Pakistani national

identity? These questions are discussed under a theoretical framework while basing on an

10

empirical data collected through a specific research methodology. Below I discuss the

theoretical framework and methodology of this study.

1.1.Theoretical Framework

In this section, I argue that there exists a two-way relationship between conflict and ethnic

identity, where ethnic differences cause conflicts and conflicts impact ethnic identity. The

present debates in theoretical literature are more concerned with discussing the former

phenomena while the latter is mostly ignored. I postulate that very little attention has been

paid to the impacts of conflict and violence for ethnic and national identities, and their

components. Conflicts with specific dimensions may be having impacts worth exploring,

because these adds to the complexity, dynamism and contextuality of ethnic identity

markers. Likewise, conflict also impacts markers and aspects of national identity and the

relationship of an ethnic group with another one and with a nation (promoted by the state).

Moreover, this whole process has repercussions for the state in which these ethnic groups

are present.

Theoretically, my position is different from the available discussion in ethnic and

conflict studies. A part of this available discussion argues that as ethnic identity cannot be

changed, conflict and violence have no significant impact in this regard, while another part

of this literature propose that conflict and violence hardens or softens ethnic identity. I

argue that conflict and violence impact ethnic and national identity and their markers, but

identity is neither lost nor it hardens or softens. Rather I contend that conflict and violence

impacts and transform ethnic and national identity in multiple and dynamic ways by

adding to the complexity and contextuality of its markers. In this thesis, I develop a

theoretical model to explore this phenomenon through the case study of Pukhtuns in Swat

Pakistan.

I postulate that the recent conflict and violence in Swat has impacts on Pukhtun

ethnic and Pakistani national identity. This conflict has violated and transformed Pukhtun

11

culture (Pukhtunwali/Pukhtu) in Swat, which is a marker of Pukhtun ethnic identity and

distinctiveness. In a situation, where Pukhtuns in Swat are unable to practice culture per

social rules, they, knowingly or unknowingly, rely their claim, to ethnic identity, more on

ascribed aspects, which includes birth in a Pukhtun home, tribal descent, language and

land. Thus, ethnic identity is not lost and is still claimed. Moreover, the impacts in

Pukhtun culture and ethnic identity are believed to be socially unacceptable by Pukhtuns

in Swat. Moreover, the conflict adds more to the complexity of Pukhtun ethnic identity by

impacting and sharpening intra-ethnic relations among the Pukhtuns. Thus, conflict does

not as such results in softening or hardening of Pukhtun ethnic identity but impacts it in

multiple and problematic ways.

The conflict in Swat has impacts on Pakistani national identity in Swat. Among the

Pukhtuns in Swat, in the context of this conflict, there are impacts for the imagination of

Pakistani state military, which is considered as the most significant state institution

representing the state and its national identity, Islam, which is central to both Pukhtun

identity and Pakistani national identity, the discourse of pride, sacrifice and complains and

the celebration of state sponsored national holidays. The actions of Pakistani state military

are perceived as socially detrimental and destructive for Pukhtun culture with a stark

ethnic differentiation in the behavior of military men. Likewise, there is least interest in

celebration of national holidays. Islam is marred with a contest on its role, unifying or

divisive. Pride is taken by Pukhtuns in sacrifice for Pakistan, in the form of conflict, but

serious complains are made against the state of Pakistan. Moreover, the conflict has

sharpened ethnic boundaries between Pukhtuns and other ethnic groups (especially the

Punjabis) and relations have been more strained. Thus, it has added more to the

complexity of Pakistani national identity, than just softening of hardening it. Moreover,

the conflict has repercussions for Pakistani state, which has been facing problem with

accommodating its ethnicities in an integrated form since its inception.

12

There are numerous theoretical approaches to the understanding of ethnicity and

ethnic identity. The traditional approach is that of Primordialism, which proposes that

ethnic identity is unchangeable, it is totally fixed, fundamental and rooted in birth (Geertz,

1963; Shills, 1957). This approach has been challenged by different theories and scholars,

like Assimilationism, which argues that ethnic identity is a cultural phenomenon having

socio-cultural roots, asserting that minority ethnic groups after time will assimilate and

integrate in the majority, losing their own cultural and ethnic identity (Boas, 1940; Glazer,

1993; Peach, 1997). However, another theoretical approach Circumstantialism, proposes

on the contrary that ethnic identity is neither rooted in birth nor vanishes away with

interaction of majority groups, but is used by ethnic groups based on interests at specific

circumstances. It is in fact used as a utility for interests, whenever it is advantageous to

members of an ethnic group (Cohen, 1969, 1974; Glazer and Moynihan, 1963). Another

sub approach in this connection is Instrumentalism, arguing that ethnic identity is an

instrument to achieve specific goals (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998).

However, Social Constructivism is another approach, which also forms the basis

of this project. It argues that ethnic identities are socially constructed, changes with

different situations and transform with circumstances. It is not rooted in birth and is not

fixed. Moreover, it is not simply a utility and is not going to vanish away, but it is a social

construction which has a limited plasticity to change. Likewise, identities can be multiple

and individuals as well as groups can have ethnic, national and religious identities at the

same time. Moreover, this theoretical position places agents and groups, both, at the heart

of analysis. Ethnic identity comprises of a tool kit of different markers and aspects,

whereas the saliency of these markers is a contextual process (see Brubaker, 2004; Cornell

& Hartmann, 1998; Eriksen, 2002; Gellner, 1983; Jan, 2010; Jenkins, 2008). Though, my

understating of ethnic identity is close to this theoretical position, I have a critical

approach to it when it comes to the relationship of ethnic identity, conflict and violence.

13

This project understands ethnicity and ethnic identity as procedural, complex,

contested, contextual and socially constructed. It is subjective and includes both culture

and putative descent along with religion and language as its markers. Moreover, ethnic

identity and ethnicity is understood as a process of identification with a significant

discussion on ethnic relations and boundaries (see Eriksen, 2002; Jenkins, 2008; Jan,

2010). In the case of Pukhtun ethnic identity and ethnicity, I endorse the arguments of

scholars that Pukhtun ethnicity and ethnic identity, in different contexts, can be identified with

different markers. It comprise of a „tool kit‟ of different and diverse markers, aspects and

elements including Pukhtu language (see Barth, 1981, p. 105, 1969, p. 119; Grima, 2005;

Bartlotti, 2000; Caroe, 1958, p. 65), Patrilineal descent and tribal identity (see Ahmed,

1980, 84; Rittenberg, 1988, p. 26; Barth, 1959; Anderson, 1975), landownership (see Barth

1959; Rittenberg, 1988, pp, 26–27; Anderson and Strand, 1978; Anderson, 1983, 1978),

Pukhtunwali (Pukhtun culture, also termed as the achieved or performing aspect of ethnic

identity, see Barth, 1969; Jan, 2010; Ahmed, 1980; Lindholm, 1982; Khattak, 2010;

Edwards, 1990) and Islam (see Barth, 1969; Ahmed, 1980, pp, 107–8; Edwards, 1990, p.

97). The contestation and impacts of recent conflict in Swat with some of these markers is the

focus of this thesis. It understands Pukhtun ethnic identity and its markers with this inherent

complexity, contestation and contextuality and focuses these markers to address the question of

impacts on Pukhtun ethnic identity.

Differences in ethnic identities are considered as a major cause of conflicts and

wars. Almost half (45%) of the total wars and violent conflicts by the „cold war‟ and three

fourth (75%) by the end of cold war era were based on ethnic identity and nationalism

(Wimmer and Min, 2006), pointing towards the connection between conflict, violence and

ethnic identity (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009). However, there is a contestation

among scholars, when it comes to the discussion of ethnic identity as a cause of conflict. A

range of perspectives, theories and models have been presented by different scholars and

14

studies to discuss the causes of conflict and violence by different factors linked to ethnic

identity and nationalism. Some of these are „Diversity Breeds conflict model‟ (Huntington,

1993; Sambanis, 2001), „institutional approach‟ (see Wimmer, 2002; Cederman and

Girardin 2007; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009), „greed-opportunity model‟(see

Collier and Anke, 2004) , „Minority-mobilization perspective‟ (Wilkes and Okamoto,

2002; Gorenburg, 2003; Fazal, 2012),„Primordialism‟ (see Geertz, 1963; Horowitz, 1985;

Sambanis, 2001; Varshney, n.d.) and Constructivism (debated heavily, for some aspects

see Deng, 1995; Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Oberschall, 2000, 2007; Kalyvas, 2008; Toft,

2009; Kapferer, 2011; Wimmer, 2013).

This whole stock of theoretical literature mostly ignores the discussion of changes

or impacts by conflict and violence in/on ethnic identity. Kalyvas argues that the empirical

discussions of conflict and its relationship with ethnic identity is least discussed (Kalyvas,

2008b). In this line, among many perspectives, theoretically as well as empirically,

Constructivism is credited to the production of some literature within its framework

related to the changes and impacts in ethnic identity by conflict (Shymonyak, 2014). This

theoretical position proposes that there is a positive link between conflict and ethnic

identity (Brass, 1996). Cleavages and polarization in ethnic identities may cause an ethnic

conflict to start but these identities do not remain the same due to or during the conflict,

rather witness changes and impacts, Constructivism would lead us to argue. Kalyvas

informs that war, conflict and violence are times of disruption and have consequences for

ethnic identities and create dynamics of disruptions, altering the social structure and fabric

of a society and state (Kalyvas, 2008b). According to studies under this perspective, ethnic

identities either „harden‟ or „soften‟ during violent conflicts.

At start of the conflict, not all but few are involved in the conflict as fighters and

many are noncombatants (Mueller, 2000). The civilians (noncombatants) of the society are

ideologically divided as moderates and extremists. The former even if have ethnic identity

15

are not involved in the mainstream violence, while the later are those who are actively

involved in violence. The latter group, as Kaufmann suggests, use violence to cash the

support of moderates and compel them in the situation to side them (Kaufmann, 1996) .

The thesis holds very true for situations where there is no or weakened central authority of

the state and state faces a security dilemma (Shymonyak, 2014). Likewise, Brubaker

argues that some people use a small level of violence to enhance the level of antagonistic

groupism above a threshold level, to generate a wave of violence. Thus, proposing that

violence impulse ethnicity, calling it „ethicized violence‟ (Brubaker, 1998, 2004).

Likewise, conflict and violence make ethnic cleavages more salient, giving space

to the political exploitation of ethnic identities (Gurses and Rost, 2013). Along with that

conflicts have the potential to create ethnic lines that are non-existing during times of

peace in the same societies (Wolff, 2007). For the purpose of safety, in times of conflicts

(and violence) people, who are inactive in respect of ethnic groupings, try to side their co-

ethnics, intensifying ethnic polarizations (Collier and Anke, 2004; Urdal, 2006). Thus,

ethnic identity becomes one of the most salient and prominent social marker of

identification in such societies, especially at times of conflicts and divides societies and

states more than the pre-conflict times (Simonsen, 2005). Thus, these scholars argue that

conflict hardens ethnic identity which further prolong the conflict (Dale, 1997; Dean,

2000; Shymonyak, 2014).

Looking more closely into the different factors within conflict, it can also be

quantitatively hypothesized that the duration of conflict has a significant relationship with

the hardening of ethnic identity. As conflict prolongs with time, more indivuals will

identify themselves with their co-ethnics and the bulk of moderates will keep on melting

towards the extremists. The likelihood of „hardening of ethnic identities‟ is also in direct

relation to the intensity of the conflict. It is usually observed in the start of violent conflicts

16

when it is intense, more people start joining different ethnic groups (Shymonyak,

2014).On the contrary, another position argues that conflict may soften ethnic identity.

On the other hand, some studies also predict that ethnic identities may soften

during contexts of violence and conflicts (Kalyvas, 2008b; Shymonyak, 2014). This

usually happens in conflicts which are prolonged and intense. In such situations, indivuals

side other groups or state against their own co-ethnics. This can be explained through the

phenomena of Ethnic Defection. Kalyvas narrates this phenomenon, in times of violence

and conflict, for indivuals as well as chunks of people from organizations of militants and

rebels. He believes that State as an organization usually present incentive, which can

compel people to shift from their rebel groups and side state against the rebels (co-ethnics)

usually in the form of state led militias (Kalyvas, 2008a; Lyall, 2010).

This also generates new forms and configurations of cleavages and organizations

in society and have complex relationship with already existing tribal, ethnic or indigenous

conflicts/rivalries (Jaffe, 2007; Raghavan, 2007). The severity and significance of the

process of defection and showing the softening of ethnic identity during violence and

conflict can be gauged by the fact that co-ethnics, mostly by forming militias led by state,

usually kill thousands of their fellows in the process, like the Mau-Mau insurgency or in

FATA of Pakistan (The International, 2008; Wazir, 2007; Babar, 2011; Rajan, 2004, p.

267; Branch, 2007). In some cases, people even side ethnic enemies like some Kashmiris

sided Indians, Lebanese Shia sided Israel (state), and Sunnis of Iraq sided United States

against Shias of the country (see Mydans, 1999; Gossman, 2000; Tyler, 2001; Maass,

2005). This can support the argument that ethnic identity softens during conflict and

violence. However, below I argue that conflict impacts ethnic identity and its markers in

different, multiple and complex forms but ethnic identity neither softens nor hardens.

While the above studies and theoretical approaches are important advances in the

study of how conflict might influence ethnic identity, they do not take full account of the

17

inherent complexity and contextuality of ethnic and national identity. Ethnic and national

identity, as discussed in the literature, comprises of different components which are

connected to one another. It is at the same time in the claims of birth, descent or tribe,

culture or the contested ethnic boundaries (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998; Jan, 2010). Even

some of these components of ethnic identity are still more diverse and can comprise of

sub-components like culture can be a set of social values.

Thus, in my thesis, I split ethnic and national identity into components for this

purpose, believing that these are made of different aspects. More specifically I discuss the

impacts for culture and its associated socio-cultural values, symbols and institutions.

Likewise, I discuss the impact of conflict and violence for ethnic relations as well. I

attempt to connect the impacts for these components, markers and aspects to broader

impacts on ethnic identity. Theoretically, I postulate that conflict does not harden or soften

ethnic identity but impacts and changes it in a multi-dimensional, dynamic and complex

way. These impacts and transformations are in each aspect of ethnic identity, like culture

and intra-ethnic relations. Additionally, I contend that conflict and violence may impact

different codes and markers of culture in multiple and dynamic ways again. Some of these

cultural aspects may be lost due to conflict, others reaffirmed more significantly, and some

may be transformed. Moreover, when conflict impacts the performing aspects of ethnic

identity, like culture, claims to ethnic identity shifts to other aspects, mostly the ascribed

ones. Thus, I refute the argument that ethnic identity hardens or softens and adds to the

theoretical argument that ethnic identity is contextual, and conflict adds to this

contextuality even more. Likewise, conflict and violence may impact ethnic relations in

different and multiple forms. Intra-ethnic relations and boundaries are impacted and

silenced or sharpened in various forms, adding to the complexity of ethnic identity.

Conflict, thus, adds to the inherent complexity, dynamism and contextuality of ethnic

identity markers. Likewise, though the components of ethnic identity witness serious

18

transformations and impacts, identity is not lost as there is a limit to the plasticity of ethnic

identity and the centrality of ethnic identity to individual and collective life compels

members of the group to retain it at any minimum standards.

I argue that the conflict in Swat has impacted Pukhtun ethnic identity. The conflict

has multiple and complex impacts on the social structure of Pukhtuns, Pukhtunwali

(performing marker of Pukhtun ethnic identity, the Pukhtun culture) and its codes,

including, but not limited to, purdah, jarga, hujra, melmastya, gham-khadi, the relationship

of kashar-mashar, badal and honor-shame. In regard of Purdah, which is a central

institution and cultural code of Pukhtun culture and ethnic distinctiveness, the conflict of

militants and military has transformed and violated it in many forms. Moreover, some of

its forms have been transformed and impacted more by militants, while others by the

military. Behavior of the military towards Purdah is also differentiated on ethnic lines,

where militants and military are considered as a threat to the traditional culture of Purdah

and are careless in this regard. In the military, Pukhtuns are considered careful to some

extent while Punjabis are considered as „least careful‟. Likewise, there is a complex

interplay of conflict with Jarga, another central institution and marker of Pukhtun ethnic

identity. Jarga has been used and manipulated by different actors of the conflict which has

resulted in halt and defamation of it in the region. In some cases, it has grown in

importance, but its nature and working has been different than the traditional form of it.

Hujra, a central institution of Pukhtun ethnic identity and culture, which performs a

social code of melmastya (serving guests) has been impacted in more diverse forms by the

conflict and in most cases, it has resulted in shutting down of Hujra with a lower presence

today. Moreover, guests have been questioned by actors in the conflict, along with elders

humiliated and dishonored in hujra, which is socially detrimental. Likewise, the social

process of Melmastya has been impacted and its practice has lowered with changes in its

nature. Added to this is the fact that during conflict, actors (militants and military) did not

19

care about the social authority, honour and respect of elders, which, impacted the relations

of kashar and mashar (youngers and elders) in Swat. This is a social distinctiveness of

Pukhtun culture and has a significant relationship with the conflict in Swat. Impacts for

culture are more diverse as Pukhtuns in Swat have not been able to perform sorrow and

Joy (Gham-Khadi) which forms parts of the socio-cultural identity for Pukhtuns in Swat.

Both the violent and nonviolent forms of Badal (revenge) have been impacted. This whole

situation has resulted in the loss of honor and production of shame for Pukhtuns in Swat,

as they have not been able to perform culture which is part of ethnic identity. In some

situations, Pukhtunwali is considered as dead or lost, in others it has been transformed by

the conflict.

The performing aspect of Pukhtun ethnic identity, that is Pukhtunwali, has been

seriously undermined. However ethnic identity is neither lost nor hardened or softened,

amidst the transformation in Pukhtunwali. In such a situation, Pukhtuns in Swat rely more

on the ascribed aspects of ethnic identity. These includes birth in a Pukhtun home, tribal

identity of being from a Pukhtun tribe, land owned in the region, language (Pukhtu) and

descent from a Pukhtun epical leader. Thus, conflict in Swat interplay with the

contextuality of Pukhtun ethnic identity where Pukhtuns try to retain claim to Pukhtunness

(the ethnic identity). Moreover, the conflict in Swat also impacts the intra-ethnic relations

among the Pukhtuns. However, the tribal aspects of these relations are least impacted with

a sharper repercussion for the relations between the categories of khanan and gharibanan.

Thus, the conflict adds to the complexity of Pukhtun ethnic identity. In this thesis I also

identify and debate similar patterns in the impacts of conflict on national identity within

the same broader framework.

There are different theories, scholarly positions and disagreements on the nature,

and formation of nation, national identity and nationalism. Modernist theories assert the

recent, invented and constructed nature of nations, national identities and nationalisms

20

(Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Anderson, 1983), Perennialists theories

emphasizes the permanence of nations (Van den Berghe, 1978; Geertz, 1973; Armstrong,

1982) while the ethno-symbolic framework places ethnic identity, with the role of myths,

memories, values, traditions and symbols, at the heart of its analysis of nation, national

identity and nationalism (Smith, 1986, 1991). For primordialists, Perennialists and ethno-

symbolists, ethnic identity and community is a major point of reference for their theories

of nations and nationalism. Additionally, there is debate on the elite or mass/popular

construction of nation and national identity (Connor, 1994, p. 159; Gellner, 1983, p. 10;

Connor, 1994, 1994). Moreover, the relation of state and nation is also a significant

subject of the discussion. More significant is the presence of a nation without a state

(Guibernau, 2004).

In his seminal work, Benedict Anderson argued that nationalism is a way of

imagining and creating a community, the nation. Nation, he postulates, is an imagined

community which is, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation, conceived as a

whole by its members with a sense of horizontal comradeship (Anderson, 1983, p. 09).

Scholars claim that Anderson‟s thesis about the role of Print capitalism would also

propose that nationalism and national identity had underpinnings in real material

conditions as well (Calhoun, 2016). Likewise, scholars contend that national identity, like

nationalism and nation, is a social construction and invention (Mary, 1990; Calhoun,

2016). Moreover, there is a significant role of institutions that facilitate its imagination,

production and reproduction (Calhoun, 2016). Studies also suggest that the social

construction of national identity originates from everyday life experience mostly

inculcated during socialization (Fu-Lai and Diana Sze, 2008).

A stock of literature suggests for an inconclusive list of the fundamental attributes,

aspects and markers of this national identity. It may include supposed national symbols,

21

language, birthplace, history, blood ties, religion, institutions, music, media, common

origin, ethnicity, historic territory/homeland, common myths, historical memories and a

common mass public culture (Laszlo, 2013; Bar-Tal and Ervin, 1997; Smith, 1991; Levy,

n.d.; Gans, 2003; Grosby, 2005; Yack, 2012; Kiely et al., 2017; Mansbach and Rhodes,

2007; Saigol 2012). Moreover, national identity, Smith argues, has external (territorial,

economic and political) and internal (socialization of the members as „nationals‟ and

„citizens‟ through media and education) functions (Smith, 1991, p. 17). These markers are

not fixed but fluid, are contextual and subject to change (Kiely et al., 2017; Mansbach and

Rhodes, 2007). Moreover, key instruments for such a construction and propagation of

national identity, nation and nationalism are education (Fu-Lai and Diana Sze, 2008) ,

language, discourse (Martin 1995; Wodak et al., 1999) and media (Anderson, p. 1983;

Cottle, p. 2009; Huijser, 2009). Likewise, an individual‟s membership in the nation can be

subjective/voluntary as well as involuntary (Guibernau, 2004; Levy, n.d.; Grosby, 2005;

Yack, 2012). Moreover, there is a contest among scholars on whether a nation give rise to

nationalism or nationalism frame a nation. Smith right argues that, “It is nationalism which

engenders nations, and not the other way around” (Smith, 1998, p. 34). I adopt this later

argument as it is more relevant to the context of Pakistani nation, nationalism and national

identity. Moreover, I also agree with the general contest in the literature.

Related, more specifically, to national identity, scholars propose that national

identity includes both self-categorization and affect. The former refers to identification

and the later to the emotions of a member like „sense of belonging‟ (Reicher, Spears, and

Haslam, 2010). A distinctive feature of national identity, according to Smith, is continuity,

which refers to the ability to transmit and persist through generations (Smith, 1991).

National identity may become more salient in some contexts while not in others.

Moreover, scholars argue that national identity is facing challenges from different

22

processes and aspects such as Ethnic identity and ethnic groups (Woods, Schertzer, and

Kaufmann, 2011; Howard, 2000; Batty, 1997), the process of immigration (Doty, 1996;

Zaval and Cichocka, 2012; Liedy, 2011) and globalization (Croucher, 2004; Brahim,

2004; Ariely, 2012). Additionally, national identities co-exist with other identities, and the

salience of national identities may depend upon a specific context (Hutchinson 2005, 116).

According to Hutchinson, nation-formation is an unfinished and evolving process. All

nations, to a lesser or greater extent, contain plural ethnic repertoires that in the modern

period may become systemized into competing cultural and political projects (Hutchinson,

2005, p. 193). Hence, there can be no final definition of a national identity, he argues

(Hutchinson 2005, p. 111). I endorse this highlighted contestation and complexity in the

nature of nation, national identity and nationalism as inherent. Additionally, I endorse the

argument that national identity shall be discussed keeping in view the different markers

and aspects of it. Moreover, I argue that the relation of conflict and violence, especially

the impacts of conflict and violence on national identity are complex and multiple.

Moreover, the case of Pukhtuns in Pakistan has certain similarities and specifications to

the above discussion.

Conceptually and theoretically, this project endorse the argument Pukhtuns have

Pukhtuns have multiple identities like ethnic (Pukhtun), religious (Islamic) and national

(Pakistani) where ethnic identity is primary in relation to national identity (Jan, 2010).

Moreover, Pukhtuns as an ethnic group have a growing sense of belonging to Pakistan, as

a nation and state. The official Pakistani national identity is constructed and promoted by

the state of Pakistan in the face of ethnic heterogeneity in Pakistan. The official process of

nationalism in Pakistan has been involved in carving a Pakistani nation and national

identity (for general discussion and argument see Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger,

1983; Anderson, 1983). This process of nation and identity formation with the official

nationalism has been challenged by different ethnicities in Pakistan for different reasons

23

and there is least consensus on the success or failure of this project (Khan, 2003; Alavi,

1986; Samad, 1995a; Jan, 2010; Iqbal, 2003; Binder, 1986; Samad, 1995b, 1995a; Jalal,

1995; Verkaaik, 2007). That is the reason, an argument persists that „Pakistan is a nation

in making‟ (Jan, 2010, pp, 173-177).

In this context, there are different views on the genesis of Pakistani nationalism

and is mostly traced to the pre-partition times of British India. „Rational Choice‟ with

„Elite Manipulation‟ is one of the most debated argument in this regard. Scholars of this

argument argue that Pakistani nationalism, nation and national identity construction,

before and after the partition of 1947, has been influenced and driven by the elites of

Pakistan. Language (Urdu), religion (Islam) and culture („Pakistani culture‟) as markers of

Pakistani identity have been promoted by the elites of Pakistan through the use of

education and media (Samad, 1995a, 2007, 1995b; Alavi, 1986; Qureshi, 1969; Alavi,

1986; Brass, 1996; Jalal, 1985, 1995, for a general context see Connor, 1994; Gellner,

1983; Anderson, 1983; Hechter, 1995, 1988; Argley, 1976; Gella, 1976, Martin, 1995;

Wodak et al., 1999).

On the other hand, the „discursive group‟ of scholars argue for the significance of

discursive production of nationalism, nation and national identity in the Pakistani context.

This group of scholars argue that more significant are ideational and normative factors and

the role of Islam with a focus on historical contexts. However, this group of scholars does

not exclusively reject the role of elites, as elites are important in nurturing specific ideas,

norms and forms of Islam (Verkaaik, 2004,2007; Shaikh, 2008,1989; Verkaaik, 2007; Van

Der Veer, 1994 ; Matcalf, 2004, also see Martin, 1995; Wodak et al., 1999). In the post

1971 era, this discourse was shaped and reframed significantly in which some scholars and

intellectuals also assisted to frame this discourse of national identity (Ahsan, 1996; Dani,

1981; on the role of intellectuals and professionals see Anderson, 1983, ch.4; Argley,

1976; Gella, 1976). The official process compelled different ethnic groups in Pakistan, like

24

the „Muhajirs‟, to redefine their own ethnic identities and accommodate themselves in

Pakistan through an ethnic movements and political parties (Shaikh, 2008; Verkaaik,

2004).

It is pertinent to mention that the official discourse of Pakistani state has also been

argued by scholars (Qureshi, 1969; Malik, 1963). Muhammad Ayub Jan, in his thesis

argues that this literature is essentialist in nature as it proposes that there were essential

differences between Hindus and Muslims in India, irrespective of any elite influence or

discursive influences, which developed into a political Muslim nationalism and resulted in

the formation of Pakistan. Nation without religion seems incomplete according to this

perspective. Its concerns about normative discussions is valuable, but it has an excessive

focus on Islam in comparison to some of the most significant factors of ethnic groups

identity in Pakistan as language, culture or social traditions (Jan, 2010, p. 161).

Thus, Pakistani nation, nationalism and national identity is a continues process of

socio-political construction and reconstruction by the ethnic groups and state elites of

Pakistan. This national identity has material as well as imagined markers, aspects and

factors. Moreover, in this thesis, in the context of conflict and violence in Swat, I am

more interested in different markers and symbols of Pakistani national identity which I

propose to be more significant. Most of these have already been debated as markers of

national identity in general and specific contexts while others have not been debated either

in general or Pakistani context. Significant and central markers of this national identity are

Islam (volumes of literature on this aspect have been produced, for some see Shaikh,

1989; Iqbal, 2003; Binder, 1986; Jan,, 2010; Deol, 1996; Grosby, 1991; Hastings, 1997;

O‟Brien, 1988; Smith, 1973), national symbols such as national holidays (missing from

the literature in Pakistani context, for a general and interesting discussion see Fox and

Miller-Idris, 2008; Fox, 2006; Edensor, 1998), discourses such as that of pride, sacrifice

and complains about the state and nation of Pakistan (Jalal, 1995, pp, 77–84; Verkaaik,

25

2004, p. 50; Jan,, 2010,pp, 164–73; Rittenberg, 1977, p. 69) and state institutions

especially the military in the Pakistani context (for a broader discussion of the role of

institutions see Powell and Dimaggio, 1991; Brubaker, 1996; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008,

p, 543; Brubaker et al., 2006) . Significant and interesting is the discussion of how

different ethnic groups imagine, perceive and relate to this national identity, nation and

nationalism along with the state that constructs, reconstructs and promotes this identity

and nation.

It is significant to mention that state shifts, influences and processes for nation and

national identity formation, construction or reconstruction has been compelling different

ethnic groups in Pakistan to redefine and readjust themselves and their identities and

Pukhtuns are no exception in this regard. In such a context, the recent conflict and

violence is one such process and phenomena that impacts Pukhtun identities, both ethnic

and national. Pukhtun‟s relation and perception with/of Pakistani nation, national identity

and nationalism is significant. As a second largest ethnic group, Pukhtuns have been

retaining both ethnic and national identity. Their ethnic identity‟s relation with Pakistani

state, nation and nationalism has been debated in the literature (Khan, 2003; Jalal, 1995;

Ahmed, 1975, 1985; Jan,, 2010; Cohen, 2004; Weiss, 1999; Jafferlot, 2005; Behuria,

2005). A group of scholars propose that Pukhtuns (as an ethnic group) have integrated

successfully into the state of Pakistan, as Pukhtuns do not show any irredentist demands,

their ethnic nationalism has declined to a greater extent and they are confident and

satisfied at their future in Pakistan (Jalal, 1995, p. 194; Khan, 2003; Ahmed, 1985, 1998).

Another group of scholars disagree with the opinion that Pukhtuns have integrated

into the state of Pakistan and do not have ethnic demands now. This opinion informs that

though Pukhtuns do not show irredentist demands and have „integrating tendencies‟,

Pukhtuns are still making ethnic or ethno-national demands against the state of Pakistan in

the name of religion/Islam (Cohen, 2004; Jafferlot, 2005; Weiss, 1999; Behuria, 2005).

26

Both these arguments however ignores that Pukhtun sense of belonging to Pakistan and

the relationship of Pukhtun identity to Pakistani identity is a complex, contested and

contextual process. Pukhtun ethnicity and identity is neither a phenomenon that is fading

away, nor is so powerfully to demand a separate state. Pukhtun identification is a complex

process in which Pukhtuns retains their ethnic identity as a primary one along with

adopting Pakistani national identity. Pukhtuns merge their Pukhtun ethnic identity with

Pakistani national identity. Pukhtun sense of belonging to Pakistani nation and state is the

most problematic, to be comprehended or predicted, complex and contested part of

identity. Pukhtuns have a growing sense of belonging to Pakistan which is increasing with

time after getting social, economic and administrative benefits from Pakistan (Jan,, 2010,

pp, 154–59). It is this theoretical understanding of Pukhtun ethnic identity, Pakistani

nation, national identity and nationalism that I endorse. Moreover, I will highlight that

most of the discussion, in general on the impact of conflict and violence on ethnic and

national identity is also marred with such simplicity. Moreover, I am more concerned with

the impacts of conflict for these markers of national identity.

Though there is theoretical and empirical literature on the linkage of war and

nationalism (see Conversi, 2015; Evera, 1994; Hall and Malesevic, 2013; Hutchinson,

2005,2017), there is scarcity of literature on the impacts of conflict and violence, not war,

on national identities. Some studies have argued that conflict, violence and insurgent wars

can also affect the national/state level sense of belonging among populations (see Kalyvas,

2008; Darden, 2005; Balcells, 2006), as indivuals have multiple identities and have

national affiliations too. These studies argue that the consequences are not easy to be

predicted (Kalyvas, 2008a).

I endorse this argument partially that the impacts are multiple and complex but the

details of such complexities and multiple impacts are missing from the literature.

Additionally, these studies do not go into the complex details of the impact of conflict and

27

violence on national identity. In this thesis I argue that the impacts of specific conflicts,

involving state military and markers of national as well as ethnic identities (Islam), for

different markers of national identity are significant and worth exploring. Thus, in this

thesis, I elaborate the impacts of conflict and violence in Swat on Pakistani national

identity.

I postulate that, conflict impacts markers and aspects of national identity and the

relationship of an ethnic group with a nation (promoted by the state). Conflicts with

specific dimensions may be having impacts worth exploring as these will be more

significant and diverse, especially if it involves the use of symbols which are central to

national and ethnic identities. Moreover, if the conflict involves state and its institutions,

which are more dominated by one ethnic group, it has significant impacts for national

identity. Conflict and violence in this case may impact different markers of national

identity. It may silence some markers and may add to the significate of others. In this

case, national identity is impacted and transformed but not lost. Moreover, I postulate that,

conflict and violence have repercussions for the state, especially if it is multiethnic with a

history of problems with national integration.

Thus, I argue that, as the conflict-ethnic identity relationship is complex, in the

case of Pukhtuns in Swat, so is the relationship between conflict in Pukhtun region and

Pakistani national identity. There are different and multiple impacts on different markers

and aspects of national identity. National Identity is imagined in different components in

the case of Pakistan, of which some significant and relevant are the focus of this study.

State institutions more generally and military in this case more specifically forms a

compelling part of national identity as imagined in Swat. The ethnic differentiation done

in military, based on the interactions of Swat Pukhtuns with it on daily basis, informs that

state institutions are not perceived as national. The conflict adds more to this perception,

which impacts national identity among the Pukhtuns. Related to military and the ethnic

28

differentiation done in it by the people in Swat, Pakistani state is also blamed for the

disastrous in Swat. A perception in Swat is suspicious of Pakistani state and the national

identity it promotes. Likewise, the celebration of national holidays, as symbols, is as low

as can be imagined. People in Swat try to distance from the elite rhetoric of Pakistani state

and its military by not participating in national holidays, like 23rd

of March and 14th

of

August, as can be expected or as is claimed by the military and Pakistani state.

Religion (Islam) is another significant aspect in this discussion, because of its use

by militants and the fact that Islam is part of Pukhtun ethnic and Pakistani national

identity. I argue that Pukhtuns in Swat try to distance themselves and their Islam from the

form of Islam promoted by militants as well as the Pakistani state, both symbolically and

practically. Here, Pukhtuns take pride in practicing the best version of Islam in comparison

to militants and Pakistani state and military. They also complain of the use of Islam by

state for its interests, more recently after 2001. In this line, the discourse of pride in a

sacrifice for Pakistan, in the form of present conflict, has sharpened more. However, there

are complaints against the state of Pakistan too for using Swat Pukhtuns for her interests

and not compensating and acknowledging Pukhtuns sacrifices property. It is also imagined

that Pukhtuns in Swat were more suitable and able to face this disastrous conflict and save

whole Pakistan from a larger disaster with a claimed that other than Pukhtuns no ethnic

group has this ability to do a sacrifice for state like this, thus owning Pakistani state.

Moreover, the conflict impacts inter-ethnic boundaries and relations between

Pukhtuns and others ethnic groups, especially the Punjabis. As Pukhtun‟s behavior, in the

military, is accepted, believed to be careful of cultural and social values, while behavior of

others, mostly Punjabis, is dubbed as unacceptable and destructive for Pukhtun culture,

this sharpens inter-ethnic rivalry between Pukhtuns and Punjabis. This whole process

generates a debate in which predicting softening or hardening of national identity is not

possible. The impacts are multiple, complex and linked to one another. Moreover, this

29

whole process has repercussions for Pakistani state which is already facing problem with

national integration of different ethnic groups in Pakistan. It is this framework which I use

for my analysis of empirical data from Swat and inform that the data in fact shapes this

theoretical understanding. Below I discuss the Research Methodology of this study.

1.2.Research methodology

In this section I build up a case for my research methodology. It starts from listing the

research questions and themes utilized for doing the field work. After that I explain and

defend the choice of Swat as a field site and case study. Sub-sections, discussing the field

area, access to the region and my experience in the field, follows. In the next sub-section, I

discuss the issue of sampling and collection of data. As ethical issues may come out of this

collection of data, I discuss them in the coming sub-section. After this, I elaborate the

analysis and writing style of my data. In the end, I comment upon the limitation of my

methodology.

This study focuses three main (primary) and many sub (secondary) questions for

the fieldwork. These are formulated on the basis of many sources, including the reading of

different theories and the above given theoretical model/framework, the scholarly

significance of adding literature on the issue, my dissatisfaction with the existing research

on the topic, my own personal experience and observation of Pukhtun region and the

discussions and suggestive guidelines of my university advisor ( for some of these sources

see (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007, pp, 21–24; Currer, 1992; Dey, 2004; Edensor,

1998; Henslin, 1990; Pattillo-McCoy, 1999, pp, 4–5; Pieke, 1996, pp, 1–6). The first

question of the thesis considers the changing patterns of Pukhtun ethnic identity in the

context of violence and conflict in the region. The broader and general question is what

are the implications of conflict and violence for ethnic identity? Specifically, based on the

case study of Pukhtuns, the question is what are the implications of conflict and violence

in Swat for Pukhtun ethnic identity? This question is further divided into field themes and

30

the focus is broadly on the impact of conflict and violence in Swat for culture (the form of

Pukhtunwali practiced in Swat), its components and the ethnic boundary of Pukhtuns in

the region. From culture, I enlist many practices that have been debated in the literature on

Pukhtun culture and society and which i consider significant. These includes the impacts

of conflict and violence for Jarga, Purdah, Hujra, Melmastya, gham khadi, the Relation

between Mashar and Kashar, Badal and honor-shame. Moreover, I also discuss the

impacts of conflict and violence for intra ethnic relations and boundaries. Here my general

question is How can conflict and violence impact ethnic relations? Specifically, for the

case of Pukhtuns, the research question is How has the conflict in Swat impacted intra-

ethnic relations among the Pukhtuns?

The next part of the study considers the impact of conflict for Pukhtun‟s

imagination of Pakistani national identity. The question for this theme is what are the

implications of conflict for national identity? For the case of Pukhtuns, here I question,

what are the consequences of the ongoing conflict for Pakistani national identity. I ask my

participants 5 and discuss with them about Pakistani national identity and its markers. The

components of this national identity are debated here, including Pakistani Military,

celebration of national holidays, Islam, pride, sacrifice, complains and inter-ethnic

relations. I use observation, especially on national holidays to connect the importance and

imagination of these with national identity. Observations of the discussions on military

check-posts during my frequent visits to Swat in public transport vehicles also forms part

of the debate in this area. In the last section, I consider the consequences of this process in

Swat for Pakistani state, where my question is what are the repercussions of conflict and

violence in Swat for Pakistani state? These questions have been addressed through the

case study of Swat. The choice of Swat for this study is deliberate and planned.

5 Throughout the thesis I use the words „Participants‟ or „research participants‟, conceptualizing that the

research is a joint venture of the author and the participants in Swat.

31

Demographically, the census report of 2017 shows the population of Swat 6 to be

2,309,570 with almost 70% (in 1998 it was almost 86%) in rural Swat (1,613,670) and

with a 3.24 growth rate since the earlier census of 1998 (PBS 2017). Based on language,

above 90% Majority of the people in the region are ethnic Pukhtuns. However, there are

other ethnic groups present in minority too. These includes Dardic (known as Kohistanis,

predominantly residing in the northern mountainous areas and have close ethnic ties to

neighboring Chitral), Akhund Khel, Miagan, Syeds, Nooristani, Awans, and Gujjar

(CPPR, n.d.; PPAF, 2015). Among Pukhtuns, the Yousafzai tribe has a majority, since 16th

century invasion of the Yusufzai. 7 There are many clans and sub clans of Yusufzai tribe

6 Presently, Swat district, administratively, is divided into 7 tehsils, which are Kabal, Matta, Kalam, Khwaza

Khela, Charbagh, Babozai and Barikot. Babozai tehsil includes the city of Mingora, the central financial

region of Swat. The new government of PTI and coalition has introduced Local government setup, under

which the district council of Swat consists of 101 members in total, comprising of general members (67),

women members on reserved seats (22), Farmers and workers reserved members (4), minorities (04) and

Youth reserved seats (04) (see http://lgkp.gov.pk/). At lower level, Swat has been divided into 65 Union

Councils and 170 village councils (see http://lgkp.gov.pk/neighbourhood-council/). Moreover, Swat has also

been divided into two main political constituencies, Swat 1 and Swat 2, and seven provincial assembly seats,

(see http://www.pakp.gov.pk/2013/members-directory/by-districts/ and

http://www.pakp.gov.pk/2013/members-directory/by-districts/). 7 It is a general observation that those who are not from the Yusufzai tribe also claim to be Yusufzai because

of the powerful position and history of Yusufzai in the region.

32

here8. As Pukhtuns are majority in number, Pukhtu is the language of majority, almost

93%. In state of Swat, Pukhtu was the official language. However, there are people who

speak other languages like Torwali, Kalami, Khawar (mostly spoken by people in Kalam,

Bahrain and Kohistan) and Gujro (an amalgamation of Pukhtu and Punjabi, spoken by

Gujars in Swat) (PPAF, 2015). Swat was chosen as a case study due to many reasons,

which are discussed below.

Choosing Pukhtuns in general and Swat in particular is a choice that is deliberate.

This is because I contend that the case is significant. I argue that there is a significant

social transformation taking place in the region due to state influence and conflict which is

missed by many studies. Moreover, the general Pukhtun case also presents a good choice

to explore the impacts of conflict and violence for ethnic identity, culture, society and

national identity. Additionally, state involvement in the conflict and the symbol of Islam

used by militants make the case more significant. This is because Islam is part of Pukhtun

identity and Pukhtuns are by majority Muslims. Moreover, Islam is also the most

significant and central marker of Pakistani identity and official nationalism. In the same

way, the presence of military and violence in the region also make the region significant to

be investigated for ethnic and national identity and its repercussions for the state. The

direct presence of Pakistani Military in Swat makes Swat a region that needs to be

investigated for Pukhtun‟s imagination of Pakistani national identity.

Moreover, as the project was aiming at a „conflict hit‟ Pukhtun region, there were

two broader choices, „the tribal area‟ (former FATA) and settled area. FATA was least

accessible as compared to Swat, a settled district, thus Swat was chosen. Moreover, the

choice of Swat was also made since Swat was a princely state in the pre-merger time

(before 1970) and was thus having a peculiar history. At the time of Pakistan movement,

8 Divided into Khels as Nikpikhel, Essa Khel, Doulat Khel, Natu Khel, Nasir Khel, Bostan Khel, Mir Khel,

Sher Khan Khel, Ali Khan Khel and others.

33

led by All India Muslim League, in 1930‟s and 1940‟s Swat was a princely state ruled by

the Wali of Swat. Likewise, in 1947, when British India got independence from the British

and Pakistan was created, Swat was a princely state. It was in 1969 that Swat was merged

into Pakistan. People in Swat perceive that they were already free and independent before

Pakistan was even created. The present discourse can be related to this aspect especially

while this project investigates the repercussions of conflict in Swat for Pakistani national

identity and state of Pakistan. Additionally, despite this significance, there has been more

journalistic literature on Swat since the recent conflict of militants, but very few academic

studies.

Yet another reason is that of the presence of TNSM, the banned militant

organization now, operating in the region since 1990‟s (which has a connection with the

present conflict in the region), which gives the region a historic importance in this regard.

This can be linked to the history of Swat, for supporting militants and violent campaigns

against the state, which makes it interesting. Conclusively, Swat provides a good sample

site for the exploration of linkage of conflict and violence with ethnic and national

identity. Thus, the fieldwork was conducted in Swat. Many areas of Swat were utilized for

the fieldwork, conducted from December of 2016, to April of 2017, including many

villages of Tehsil Matta, Charbagh, Kabal, Khwaza Khela and Babozai.

The traditional literature on Pukhtun region, in both Pakistan and Afghanistan,

considers it a region that is least accessible. Since 2001, with the rise of militant

organizations and the „war on terror‟, the problem of inaccessibility of Pukhtun region in

Pakistan has been intensified. However, I have been able to overcome most of this

problem. As I am from a region, close to this area, speak the same language, share the

same ethnicity and has travelled across many of the Pukhtun dominated areas, including

Swat, the „inaccessible region‟ is to a much more extent accessible to me. However, still

accessing research participants for interviews and discussions have been a different and

34

difficult process, amidst the conflict and violence, military presence, the sensitivity of my

research topic and overall security situation in Swat.

I propose that accessing participants is a strategic process (Atkinson and

Hammersley 2007, p. 46). Though some scholars suggest that in selecting participants for

the research, the researcher shall try to avoid making his students, friends, or

acquaintances as participants, I believe, from my experience, that even some students from

the field area and friends can be interviewed and the information one gets seems to have

no issue. Furthermore, such people were helpful in getting me in touch with other potential

participants. More importantly, in areas of conflict, like Swat, I would not have been able

to get the required interviews for the study if I had not used them as gatekeepers.

These informal gatekeepers were initial point of contacts and main source of

getting to other participants (Atkinson and Hammersley 2007, p. 49). These were mostly

my students (ex as well present) and friends. For making contact, in most of the cases, I

used these gatekeepers and through them I met people and arranged discussions. In some

cases, I stayed for a night and was greeted through „melmastya‟ for extended discussion.

While in some other cases, I have contacted participants through emails directly and have

asked for interviews and discussions (Seidman 2006, p. 47). My experience shows that

accessing participants is more problematic in initial days of the process and may even

prevail till the end (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007, 41).

Though, some research studies use a formal written consent form I never had It. It

was all oral consents and I believe that a written consent in my field area would not have

worked, owing to many reasons. As I have interviewed and discussed with people who

cannot even write or read (English, Urdu or even Pukhtu, as they can speak Pukhtu only),

it would have been problematic. Along with that in such a situation when the conflict is

yet to be over, written consent for an interview in Swat, having questions that may lead to

a security situation, was not possible. It would have seriously affected the size of my

35

sample as well as the results of my study. I took advantage of the importance of „oral

agreements‟ among Swat Pukhtuns.

I attempted to take people sample which cut across classes, clans, educational

qualification, occupation, gender and tribes etc. Purposeful sampling replaced random

sampling in this study to some extent. Self-selection by participants, based on consent,

and limited number of participants were two key features of the fieldwork, which random

sampling could not satisfy (Seidman 2006, p. 51). The concept of generalization was thus

replaced by getting into depth of people‟s experience. Moreover, I did not fix or decide the

number of participants before moving to the field (see (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Rubin

and Rubin, 1995). I experienced that a time reached when I felt that the number of people I

have interviewed and has discussions with are enough and I shall stop. Two general

conditions of „sufficiency‟ (refers to the number of participants, areas and sites etc.) and

„saturation‟ (refers to the level of information) were helpful in this regard (Seidman, 2006,

pp, 54–56). After sampling and accessing the field, many different tools were utilized for

the collection of data.

Several related studies have been conducted in general Pukhtun region and in Swat

since last half a century, utilizing different strategies and methods of collecting data (see

(Barth, 1959; Haroon, 2012; Lindisfarne, 2012; Marsden & Benjamin, 2012; Rome, 2008,

2011; Weiss, 2012). Moreover, Muhammad Ayub Jan (2010) conducted a PhD study that

explored Pukhtun identification process, through an ethnographic research at times of

conflict and flux in Malakand, a region that boarders Swat (Jan, 2010). These studies,

along with many others are helpful, in understanding the tools of data collection, for a

research study in Swat or closely located Malakand, but very few studies (except Jan,

2010) discusses Pukhtun ethnic or national or even religious identity. Additionally, for

many studies, time has changed and the heavy presence of Pakistani state and its military,

along with the violence of militants affect the methodology of any study now. Moreover,

36

some recent studies of conflict times on Swat relies on journalistic opinions, elite‟s

perspectives or those of NGOs reports. These are problematic, as NGOs have own

agendas, the elite perspectives are of little use and media news and reports are mostly

distorted and lack the depth.

The methodology I use in this study draws more on the conceptual and

methodological understandings of Jon E Fox and Miller-Idriss (Fox, 2004, 2006; Fox and

Miller-Idriss, 2008), Paul Atkinson and Martyn Hammersley (Atkinson and Hammersley,

2007), Irvin Seidman (Seidman, 2006) and Muhammad Ayub Jan, (Jan,, 2010) . In

considering the impact of conflict and violence in the region for ethnic identity, I focus

more on non-elites (along with some elites) Swatis and apply ethnographic methods for

collection of data, including interviews, which are unstructured, semi structured, informal

and in-depth (resembling discussions), observation and focused group discussions

(Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007, p.3). I propose that the selection of data collection tools

is very much specific to the case and nature of research in social sciences (Lawrence,

1989). I found the combination useful, instead of using a single tool for collecting data

(Atkinson and Coffey, 2002), though some studies will give more significance to

participant observation, while others to interviewing. Likewise, though such a blend of

different tools can be laborious, time consuming and expensive, in comparison to other

methods of research (Seidman 2006, p. 12), but is required at times.

In this study, I have adopted a type of interview style that is open and unstructured.

It is not based on questions but is structured around themes which I wanted to explore in

my study. Moreover, I have tried to focus individual stories of my participants and

allowed, even sparked, to convert the „interview‟ to an in-depth one and generate a

discussion (see Seidman, 2006)9. I also attempted, thus, to allow my participants to

9 There are different types and forms of interview and the selection of one form depends upon the nature of

the research. There are interviews which are closed ended, structured and standardized ones, while on the

37

„reconstruct their opinion and experience‟, through these interviews termed discussions

(Seidman 2006, 15) . I used unstructured questions, where I had to shuffle the sequence at

times and allowed participants to add questions too. My questions were only triggers of

starting a discussion (in contrast to survey interviews) (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007;

Burgess, 1984, 1988, p.117). The data (information and knowledge) provided by the

participants was then rigorously analyzed and cross checked with other sources.10

The methodology deigned by Fox & Idriss utilizes a survey, before the interviews,

to design the themes for field work, focused group discussions and participant observation

(Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008,pp, 554–56). In my case, I did pre-field interviews and

discussions with local researchers of Swat. These made it possible to reshape, restructure,

transform and add more field questions and areas that were significant yet out of my focus

(Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007,pp, 3–4). Moreover, these helped in designing workable

tools for the collection of data in this context. Though I had to make changes during the

field work, it was not possible to go to the field without any preparation. It was helpful to

have a design prepared and then keep on changing and restructuring it as the conditions

demand (Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007, p. 21; Maxwell, 2004).

Using such methodological tools have natural issues, which cannot be eliminated

completely. Significant from these are „biasness‟ and „influence‟ of the researcher

(Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007, 101). However, an attempt was made to minimize this

influence and biasness. Likewise, another issue is that of recording the interviews, debates

and discussions (Weiss, 1994). Though, recording have several benefits (Seidman, 2006,

pp, 114–15), in my case, it would have hindered the process and affected the opinion of

other hand there are interviews which are opposite to these, being open ended, unstructured and un-

standardized, like „conversations‟ and discussions, see (Seidman, 2006). There are other interviews which

are structured partially and are followed by a discussion.

10 Different philosophical positions discuss this point, see (Atkinson and Coffey, 2002; Atkinson and

Hammersley, 2007).

38

my participants. Due to security situation in the region, recording would have resulted in

quieting of the interviews and discussions of many participants. Moreover, my participants

would not have been able to state clearly and directly their experiences. In a situation

where trust is lacking, due to the conflict, it is not easy to agree participants for un-

recorded interviews and discussions even. The recorded data would have required more

care to be handled in order to avoid any problem to the identification of my participants.

Thus, the data I have taken from field is in the form of field notes. I was able to

take notes while interviewing people or being involved in a discussion. I have used both

English and Pukhtu languages to write down the notes, depending upon the context and

demand of the data. Moreover, at times I have written full comments to quote in my thesis,

at others I have taken a summary of the argument of my participants. In the same way, I

took notes of any observation I was involved in the field. I propose that the research and

collection of data raises ethical issues and concerns.

Ethical concerns are significant areas of any research design (Seidman 2006, 57–

75). There are diverse opinions, regarding the ethical issues in social research and

particularly in ethnography 11

. Some of the areas of these ethical issues are informed

consent, benefits to the participant from the research, privacy of the participants, issue of

covert research, avoiding any harm to the participants, taking care that the participants are

not exploited and consequences for future research etc. (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007,

pp, 209–29). In my case, all the participants joined the research „voluntarily‟. As it was not

possible to have a written consent, an oral consent was always taken from the participants

of the research. All the indivuals were assured of their right to privacy and in fact all the

data taken from the interviews is kept „private‟ and is specifically limited to this study or

other studies by this author. Participants were informed that the data will be used only for

11

These have been categorized by Paul Atkinson and Martyn Hammersley (Atkinson and Hammersley,

2007, pp, 219–20).

39

this study or academic studies by this author and their names and other information will be

kept private (Seidman, 2006, pp, 67–69). In fact, I agree with the argument of Hirsch and

Yow (Hirsch, 1982; Yow, 1994) that the work is a joint venture of the researcher and the

people involved in the research as participants. That is the reason, throughout this thesis I

use the word „participant‟ or „research participant‟.

A care was taken to give due respect to all the participants irrespective of their

social class, or background or gender. I was very conscious about stating any remarks that

could evoke or reinforce racism or ethnic differences or other socio-cultural, gender and

political issues or bias. Research field work was conducted in a way that Swat Pukhtuns

would have a better experience and allow future researchers too (Atkinson and

Hammersley, 2007, pp, 218–19). Moreover, measures were taken to minimize the

potential risk for participants due to the research conducted, especially keeping the secrecy

of information. Likewise, the study is an attempt to maximize the benefits of the research

for the participants and people at large (Seidman, 2006, 13). Some scholars may argue for

covert research as legitimate and differentiate it from spying, I do not use it and I disagree

with such an opinion in totality.

An utmost care was taken that the participants are not harmed during or after the

research (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007,pp, 213). In some cases, even using

pseudonyms can be problematic and the document can easily be traced for people,

especially leaders or prominent people. The publication can have later consequences. Even

a research placed in university library shelf can create problems (Atkinson and

Hammersley, 2007; Wolf, 1991,pp, 216). That is the reason, I have used pseudonyms with

limited key information, which may not be enough to give any clue about the participants.

For example, I note the age limit, not exact age, profession, date and location (as village)

of the meeting of my participants.

40

Mostly, the interviews have been conducted in participant‟s Hujras/Betaks and

most have been private. Moreover, the time, space, location and other such arrangements

were left to the choice of participants and maximum possible flexibility was shown in this

regard (Seidman, 2006, pp, 49–50). With almost all my participants I could develop a

„rapport and trust‟, which enabled me to have in-depth stories of the issues discussed with

them (Seidman, 2006, pp, 96–99). I was able to cross the barriers of ethnicity, class,

language and gender. However, in Pukhtun regions, where gender segregation and women

Purdah is a cultural norm, it was not easy to have women research participants. I was

successful only at the last days of my field research and that is the reason female

interviews and discussions were the last part of my fieldwork. Moreover, I did those

interviews with the assistance of my wife, who is also a research scholar.

Analyzing, managing and writing the data in ethnographic, and generally

qualitative, research is significant (Seidman, 2006, pp, 112–31), yet tough and laborious

parts of the design. This is because the data taken from field is complex and not coherent.

To structure and arrange this very complex social data (which is in the form of

discussions, debates, stories and observations etc.) and make sense of it, requires a great

deal of analytic skills (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007, pp, 193–94). Mostly the data was

analyzed and interpreted manually under different themes. Some of these themes were pre-

planned and pre-written, which I had already thought out with the help of literature, my

supervisor and pre-field interviews, while some even came up during my fieldwork. I

found writing the texts in „thematic‟ style more supportive than „‟chronological‟ style.

These themes were also helpful in organizing my dissertation chapters (Seidman, 2006,pp,

130–31) These were mostly, cultural aspects, social phenomena‟s and general research

themes. With all this effort, the methodology still has limitations.

The research methodology utilized in this project has limitations in many aspects.

Connecting to earlier studies, I propose that, staying for longer periods, like Barth and

41

Lindholm, is almost impossible in Swat today, especially when the project is sensitive in

some respects. For example, asking people about the recent conflict, both militancy and

military operations, cannot be easy without having a high level of trust. Likewise, such

discussions can lead to ugly situations as military is having control and militants are still in

Swat. 12

Along with this, polarization and sensitivity in the region still exists. Another

issue is that Swat is now a region far more expanded and populated. Though, I have tried

to get data from all major areas and the regions hit severely by conflict and have also

attempted to debate and discuss or interview people from all social status, age, gender or

educational level, political affiliations, I accept that I have not done it in an ideal form.

A note on the list of Interviews, Discussions and Observations

The detailed list of my interviewees is provided in annexure 1. This list in annexure 1 is

not conclusive as I could talk to more people which I may not be able to put down here.

This is a list of people I have had longer conversations. I have used pseudo-names.

Moreover, in places, I have given the name of Tehsil or a large city and have not

mentioned the name of village or street etc. Description is brief to avoid tracing of

research participants.

I have used a specific pattern of naming my participants, especially in reference of

age (see annexure 1). Names of all female participants ends with the suffix Khor (sister in

Pukhtu). On the other hand, any name that does not end up with the word Khor is a male

participant. If the name has a suffix lala it shows that the age of participant is between 35

and 45 and if it ends with the word dada it means the participant is elder, per my

parameter, and is aged above 45. Names not having any such suffix represent a participant

with age below 35.

12

Few days before writing these lines, On Saturday 3rd

of February 2018, after a long break of suicide

attacks in the region, one hit the military area in Kabal Swat. This blast killed 11 military personals

including a Captain officer injuring many. It was claimed by the Tehreek e Taliban (Dawn 2018).

42

CHAPTER 2: CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND CULTURE: THE VIOLATION OF

PURDAH IN SWAT

Introduction

Though most of the previous literature, media reports and discussion of non-governmental

organizations overlooks the complexity and multiplicity of forms of Purdah, I argue and

show in this section that Purdah is at least in four forms, named, in this thesis, as women

Purdah (based on dress code), home Purdah, elder men Purdah and locality Purdah 13

.

Linking conflict and Purdah, I postulate that conflict and violence has diverse impacts for

the practice and imagination of Purdah among the Pukhtuns in Swat. These impacts are

considered unfortunate and culturally detrimental and are attributed to militants, military

and the phenomenon of becoming IDPs (of Swatis)14

by my research participants in Swat.

This has also generated a discussion among Pukhtuns in Swat which is linked to other

cultural ideals like „Badal‟ and „Honor/Shame‟, which are considered as the core markers

of Pukhtun ethnic identity and distinctiveness.

In the following arguments, I will contend that there are diverse impacts for

women Purdah by militants and military. Militants are blamed for distorting traditional

Purdah (of dress) by replacing it with a form, such as shuttlecock burqa, which is believed

locally to be borrowed from the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The military is considered

as an institution that is less sensitive of Purdah, encourages freedom of women and

violates traditional Purdah. I also argue that the internal displacement of Swatis, due to

conflict, created situations where women Purdah was violated, and „honor‟ was lost. In the

same line, for home Purdah, I argue that the military has impacted it more than the

militants in Swat. Likewise, the acts of violating home Purdah and the behavior of military

13

The word Purdah has been used in the literature and in social interaction in both Pukhtun and non Pukhtun

societies. However, the names/words used here for these four forms are adopted from my field discussions

and are used by my participants, though I have observed it as a native of Pukhtun region too. 14

Internally displaced people.

43

men is differentiated on ethnic lines, where Punjabis, are considered as „others‟, having a

socially detrimental behavior. In relation to elder men Purdah, I reason that the military in

Swat conflict has violated it and, in many cases, the military is least bothered about elder

men Purdah or honor in wearing sadar. In some areas of Swat, the displacement of people

from one locality to another has impacts for „a specific locality Purdah‟. I also argue that

there is nostalgia among Pukhtuns in Swat for traditional Pukhtun Purdah and the overall

discussion is connected to other cultural features like badal and honour-shame.

The layout follows the same pattern listed above for the arguments and sub

arguments. After this brief introduction, I will refer to literature to discuss succinctly that

Purdah, as a cultural and social practice, is the core and significant ideal of Pukhtun

culture. Then I will elaborate the four forms of Purdah practiced in Swat, to develop a

background for the following sections. Discussion of impacts for women Purdah (dress

code) will follow, first by militants and then by the military. In the last section, impacts for

Purdah by the phenomenon of becoming IDPs will be discussed. After this, the next part

will be an elaboration of impacts for home Purdah by militants and military in Swat. In the

same sequence, the succeeding sub section will discuss the impacts of military for elder

men Purdah and honour, followed by the impacts of conflict for locality Purdah in Swat. I

will connect this whole discussion in the next part to nostalgia for traditional Purdah and

honor of Pukhtuns in Swat. The last sub section is a conclusion of the debate.

Purdah (seclusion/veil) is a traditional and cultural ideal of Pukhtun society,

Pukhtunwali and Pukhtunness (Barth, 1969b, pp, 120–122; Jan,, 2010, p. 31). Purdah

ensures the virility, primacy, autonomy, self-expression and aggressiveness of men (Barth,

1969, pp, 120-122; Ahmed, 1977) and gives, to some extent, anonymity, comfort,

modesty, status and protection to women (Daraz, n.d.). It is linked to the „negative‟ social

biases, cultural practices and the concept of honor, women‟s sexuality (Barth, 1969b, pp.

120–122). The violation of Purdah may lead at times to the phenomenon of

44

revenge/reciprocity (Badal) among Pukhtuns. This revenge is towards anyone who has

violated the Purdah of Pukhtuns women and home, be a Pukhtun or non Pukhtun.

There have been different forms of Purdah among the Pukhtuns in Swat in pre-

conflict times, including women Purdah, home Purdah, elder men Purdah and locality

Purdah. Regarding woman Purdah, traditionally, just before the conflict, most of the

women used to wear a long sheet (called sadar or chadar locally) with some women

wearing a „fashionable burqa‟ 15

. The different forms or colors would show differences

based on age or status etc. Muhammad Ishtiaq, a professor from Swat, commented about

this as such.

“It was mostly white in colour, was a symbol of „better financial position‟ and „good moral

behaviour‟. Anyone not wearing this, was usually termed as morally or financially „weak‟.

It also showed the age level of women based on how they are wearing it. Mostly aged

women will have open face or wear a small one or different colour and few will use the

Afghan Shuttlecock Burqa. Young girls mix sadar with fashionable burqa (different from

shuttle cock) ”(Ishtiaq, 2016).

This elaborative comment of my participant informs that women mostly wear white sadar

which was, along with Purdah, a symbol of good status and good moral character as

women were differentiated by people based on this at times. Moreover, this would also

identify the age difference and difference in Purdah based on ages. Thus, the Purdah of

aged women will be different from younger ones. This negates the militant‟s version of

Purdah which will be same for all age of women.

Likewise, related to home Purdah, as women reside inside the home, men, other

than close relatives and acceptable to the men of the home, are not allowed to enter. If

there is need of any other man (like a doctor etc.) to enter the home, there is a „proper‟

socially acceptable way and procedure for that. The procedure is socially known in which

15

Locally this is called fashionable Burqa, it is also called “Abaya” and seems to have been adopted from

Arab culture as women in Arab countries mostly wear this. Such a Burqa is mostly black in color but can

also be colorful.

45

women of the home moves to a side and let the man/men enter, accompanied by men of

this home, as I frequently observe as a native of the region. An elder in Mingora, Hayat

Khan Dada, explained and symbolically expressed this point.

“In Swat and among other Pukhtuns too there is an important Purdah called Home Purdah

(da kor Purdah). Nobody can even think of entering our home without permission of men

from the home. Before the conflict we were not feeling it much as nobody could dare to

challenge this. I have rarely heard about such happening. When it was violated during the

conflict, we felt it. I can simply tell you that our home ceilings have Purdah even (In

Pakhtu it was وی پرده ىن وګبر ده خو ګزهن ), and they are not seen by men so easily” (Dada,

2017).

The diversity of aspects of Purdah is expanded by a reference to „elders Purdah‟.

This may not be Purdah in a „traditional‟ sense, per the principles of most of the Pukhtuns

or the code of Pukhtunwali. But because I could observe in discussions in the field,

reference to the impacts of conflict situations and even post-conflict ones for this aspect, it

is significant, because among the Pukhtuns, elder men normally wear a sheet/sadar which

has different sizes and colors. This can be a thin one with brownish or white color mostly

and is used as a symbol of being elder, having honour and Pukhtu. This is considered,

along with a traditional cap, symbol of status, honour and Purdah of Pukhtun men. A

Pukhtun elder in Kabal Swat, Shams Dada, mentioned about this aspect.

“As burqa is Purdah for women, sadar is for men. Both shows honour and Pukhtu. It was

common in Swat that a mashar/elder will wear this. Because of this conflict we are

required in some places, like the Judicial complex, to leave these outside the building

while entering and that is why elders as well as Youngers are feeling this as a violation of

honour”(Dada, 2017).

Yet, another form of Purdah that has also grown in importance due to the conflict

in Swat is locality Purdah (da ilaqae Purdah). As a tribe, sub tribe or a larger family used

to be located in a specific area or locality, that would facilitate the broader Purdah of that

area. This would help in maintaining the limited movement of women in the area and

maintaining a social or moral order in the area. Villages close to the urban centers, like

Mingora, has seen intense impacts for this aspect. About the prevalence of or significance

46

of this Purdah, a political activist, Misbah Ullah shared with me, in Nawae Kalae Mingora,

that

“There are a lot of shapes of Purdah. Women and home are mostly discussed. Due to this

conflict, I can tell you about another type which is mostly in areas close to Mingora. In our

village Nawae Kalae and these close by streets we were having a Purdah. As all people,

here were known to us and most were family members, women were able to come out

easily and move from home to home in this locality. This is important type of Purdah and a

social setup that you must observe” (Ullah, 2017).

So far, the discussion has highlighted that Purdah is an important code of

Pukhtunwali and thus one of ethnic identification among the Pukhtuns. Moreover, I have

discussed the four forms of Purdah in Swat, which shows that Purdah is not only a practice

but is an idea that is spread across the society in so many different forms. Some forms of it

are more commonly discussed among people in Swat while others are just cropping up due

to the conflict. Conflict in the region has highlighted these forms of Purdah more. It also

informs that Purdah is a complex social concept having multiple local understandings. All

these forms and their understandings as a cultural symbol has been impacted by the

conflict in Swat.

I argue that all these forms of Purdah have been influenced in one way or the other,

more or less, by the conflict and violence. The first two forms, that are women Purdah and

Home Purdah have been shaped, violated and impacted more than the last two ones, elder

men Purdah and locality Purdah. In these two the first one has been impacted by the

militants as well as the military in diverse ways. The second one has been violated and

impacted more by the state and its military than the militants. Additionally, I will show

that, the actions of both actors of the conflict are dubbed as „socially unacceptable‟, where

the second one also generates a process of ethnic differentiation within the state‟s national

institution of military. Likewise, the phenomena of IDPs, connected with the conflict and

military operation, also has impacts for Purdah and associated Honour-Shame. Though,

significantly, the last two, of elder and specific locality, are less emphasized in the

47

discussions of participants, these have entered the broader concept of Purdah because of

sensitization primarily by the conflict. Below is the elaborative discussion and analysis of

these arguments, starting from women Purdah.

2.1. Conflict and Women Purdah: Militants, Military and IDPs

Significant impacts in women purdah, in Swat, can be analyzed from the comments,

observations and experience of my participants. There are diverse areas of discussion, in

relevance to the militants, in this regard, including, but not limited to, the change in shape

of Purdah, the action of imposing it upon the population, same Purdah for all irrespective

of status or age of women, its attachment with the consideration of Afghan Taliban Purdah

as ideal and the liability of punishment for men and women not complying to this. On the

military side, the behavior of military towards the traditional Purdah and the opposition to

the one imposed by militants is debated mostly, more particular and central are the

programs arranged by state or its military. The phenomena of becoming IDPs due to the

military operation in Swat is discussed as a situation that left no Purdah, honour or Pukhtu.

I elaborate first the impacts by militants, then by the state military and in the last by the

issue of IDPs in this regard.

Related to militants, there is a contestation among participants on the process of

imposition of a specific type of Purdah in Swat. Some participants believe that it was first

suggested, emphasized and then imposed by the Taliban, while others believe that it was

imposed on first order and there was no chance of any suggestion. There are broader

components related to the Purdah setup by militants. A Pukhtun elder, Shams Dada,

during a Focused group discussion in Kabal Tehsil of Swat elaborated that,

“Taliban announced through FM Radio Channel that there is no school, no education and

no government service for women in Islamic Shariah. Women shall leave such activities as

these are against Islamic Shariah. The order of Shariah, Taliban stated, is that women shall

not come out of home. If women need to come out to visit a doctor or to bazar, men shall

accompany them while they shall use Shuttle Cock Burqa only (Emphasis by participant

on the last word)” (Dada, 2017).

48

The comment is elaborative of some significant points related to militant‟s agenda of

Pukhtun women Purdah. Women were banned from coming out of homes, except for

specific reasons, like visiting a doctor. They were allowed to come out only if needed, like

for a doctor, but shall be relying on men of family to accompany them. Moreover, they

shall wear a specific type of burqa/Purdah called shuttlecock burqa, which is considered

by the militants as an ideal type because of its use and imposition by the Taliban

government in Afghanistan. Likewise, Muhtaram Yusufzai, a University lecturer from

Charbagh Tehsil, elaborates about „Taliban agenda‟, the specific type of Burqa and its

adoption from Afghan Taliban as such,

“Taliban initially preached about Burqa as part of their „Purdah agenda‟. This was a

specific form of burqa called shuttle cock Burqa. Due to its attachment with and use by the

Taliban in Afghanistan in 1990‟s it was taken as ideal Islamic Purdah” (Yusufzai, 2017).

Moreover, Shaista Jabeen, a girl working in an NGO in Mingora, recalled about

this aspect and expressed her experience as a woman being target of the Taliban

program of Purdah. She stated that,

“I was in college at that time and can remember when militants initially preached the

importance of Burqa (Shuttle cock) through the FM Radio. On daily basis and mostly on

Friday through the Radio we would listen lectures of Taliban, mostly Fazlullah,

emphasizing the need of Purdah and the Islamic nature of Shuttlecock Burqa. When

Taliban started to have control in Swat they ordered to impose it. In our college (and

sisters/relatives schools) teachers told us to start wearing burqa (Shuttlecock) while

coming to college” (Jabeen 2017).

These two comments elaborate the militant‟s strategy, message and program of women

Purdah along with the procedure of applying it to the population. Militants preached,

emphasized and then imposed this specific version of Purdah. However, on the contrary,

in a FGD Shams Swati, Abdullah Nangyal and Asif Iqbal agreed with the second

perspective that Militants imposed it directly without giving any chance or lessons about it

and told me that,

“When Taliban got some authority in Swat, they imposed shuttle cock Burqa on women

directly in the region and ordered that women shall not come outside of home. But if

49

needed, women shall come out only in Shuttle Cock Burqa” (Iqbal, 2017; Nangyal, 2017;

Swati, 2017).

Though I propose that, from these statements and chronology of the literature it becomes

clear that in the initial days‟ militants preached about women purdah and later imposed it

through orders. More conclusively, five points of Taliban Agenda related to the feature of

Purdah of women and the impacts for it crops up, including, women shall not come out of

home, men shall accompany them if coming out for a „need‟, they shall use shuttlecock

Burqa, Shuttlecock burqa is Islamic as it was used by Afghan Taliban and these orders are

to be accepted. Along with that it is emphasized that though militants changed the shape

and form of traditional Purdah in Swat, they preached (through the FM Radio) first and

ordered later. The order was liable to „punishment‟ by the Taliban, showing that the

impact in a cultural ideal was „forced‟ by them.

About the issue of punishing people who will not accept orders of militants in this

regard, a participant Sadeeq Ullah, a university Student, from a „Far‟ village in Kabal

Tehsil narrated one event where he could observe himself.

“I was coming from the market to home when I saw an Auto (Rickshaw) which was

carrying women who sell clothes by visiting homes in different villages. A man who was

driving the auto was with them as well. As they reached the Taliban‟s post and Taliban

argued that Purdah of women is „improper‟ and despite the orders women are working

outside the home. Thus, they strictly warned the women for a „last‟ chance. The driver was

beaten by Taliban” (Ullah, 2017).

His observation testifies to the fact that militants were serious about their orders and the

change in Purdah culture was imposed. Muhammad Farooq, a practicing doctor, from

Kabal also agreed that

“When Taliban imposed the Shuttlecock Burqa against Sadar, which was used in most of

the Swat, they were serious to have it accepted. If a woman was accompanied by man and

was not wearing this burqa, Taliban humiliated such men by warning them of

consequences” (Farooq 2017).

50

Some of the participants, though very few, accepted that the impact was a good

one and commented that the act of wearing this specific Burqa is good and really Islamic

one, a good majority did not agree. Again, many agreed to the fact that the real problem

was that it was imposed through „force‟ by the militants. Shah Alam Lala commented that,

“When militants imposed Shuttle cock burqa in Swat, it received a mixed response from

people as good and bad. Some people liked it and others disliked both the Purdah and the

fact that it was imposed” (Lala, 2017).

Likewise, Shahid Ahmed, driver in an organization in Mingora, told me about this issue

with elaboration,

“Militants imposed shuttle-cock Burqa, which was good in one sense, because this Burqa

covers women completely and can be called a „true‟ Islamic Burqa, but the issue was that

it was imposed upon women which is not good. I believe the imposition was not right (He

would say in Pukhtu پکار وه نو زبردستۍ .” (Ahmed, 2017).

This illustrates that there were two groups of people in Swat, based on the

perception about shuttlecock burqa as a type of Purdah. One group was not liking this type

of Burqa as they favored the traditional sadar and considered this as brought from

Afghanistan by the militants. The other group liked this type of Purdah and consider it as

better than the traditional one but the fact that it was imposed was considered as „bad and

unacceptable‟. This is interesting again as in many cases the traditional Purdah may be

imposed by men of the family or even as a social compulsion by the society but when it is

imposed by the militants it is considered „bad‟. What literature links Purdah to male

autonomy or „masculinity‟ and men‟s control is in relevance to „family men‟. When it is

imposed by men other than close men, it is far sure considered a socially unacceptable

behaviour and is criticized by many Pukhtuns but if it imposed by family men that is

considered as „social‟ and „cultural‟. Some cases in imposition have also got bad and

issues cropped up between Swatis and the militants. Naz Khor, a working woman of

Mingora recalled,

“When militants imposed Shuttle cock burqa in Swat, the situation was getting worse. I

heard from friends and others that some violent cases happened on this issue in other areas.

51

These were between the Taliban and men who accompanied women who were not wearing

Burqa” (Saira Naz Khor 2017).

The above discussions illustrate that militant‟s actions has impacts for women

Purdah. These impacts are in many forms of which the most visible was the strict

imposition of shuttlecock burqa for all women in Swat. This act of militants is considered

as socially unacceptable and is disliked by people in Swat, considering it as a violation of

Pukhtun women purdah. The story of impacts in women Purdah continues when military

operation is undertaken, and Pakistani military takes control of most of the Swat. Pakistani

military will have impacts in a different form and will try to discourage, as much as

possible, the burqa and Purdah imposed by the militants. Military knowingly or

unknowingly, in the process of discouraging militant‟s Purdah, promote and impose yet a

different version of it. I elaborate this in the next section.

The impacts by military for women Purdah in Swat are in different and diverse

forms. When the military got control after the military operation it started changing things

in Swat. Anything associated with the militants was banned, changed, discouraged or

looked at with suspicion. The changes come up very quickly as military get hold in Swat.

Purdah followed this pattern and a situation was created where shuttlecock burqa was

considered „bad‟ and inappropriate by the military. Discouraging anything associated with

the militants was a strategy adopted by the military. Shuttlecock burqa was discouraged

through a perception that it is a symbol of the militant‟s violence and backward thinking,

though many women would like this type of Burqa to be used. On the contrary as military

try to favor a more modern type of women Purdah that is again disliked by many Swatis.

Moreover, the situation created by military through the programs they arranged

was even promoting a Purdah that was different than traditional one and was considered

by participants as a violation of Purdah. It promoted gender mixing as much as it could

and had little care for the traditions in this regard. Swatis in general as my participants

52

dubbed military as an „outsider‟ that is not at all aware of any social or cultural practice

among the Pukhtuns in Swat. Connected is the fact and perception of cropping up of

NGO‟s when military have hold, and both the NGO and military promote an agenda of

„westernization‟. An elder, Shams Dada, from Kabal recalls,

“When Pakistani military came, it abruptly changed the ambiance suddenly (his Pukhtu

statement was rather شو بدل ېکدم هاحول .). They provided contexts where women Purdah will

be discouraged by them or in their patronage. NGOs emerged in Swat after military

campaign, which makes „we Swatis‟ western. I believe that this military and NGOs are

trying to take our Purdah away from us”(Dada, 2017).

As my field data shows, these sudden impacts and changes by Pakistani military

are in two forms. First, initially due to security situation military banned the use of Burqa

imposed by militants (the shuttlecock) and second military arranged programs where the

traditional Purdah will not be cared. Moreover, Shams Dada statement that these military

men and NGOs are making us western is part of a larger feeling in Swat that military is

allied with western states, like the US, and NGOs are western or funded by the west. Both

these factors are connected to the violation of cultural traditions like Purdah. A university

student. Iqbal commented that,

“Military discouraged Shuttle Cock Burqa. Their opinion was that it is because of the

security reasons. Pakistani military thought that a man from Taliban can easily hide in this

and pose a security threat”(Iqbal, 2017).

However, banning the shuttlecock burqa was probably for a specific time. It was

mostly in the initial days of post military operations period when shuttlecock burqa was

banned and discouraged, the situation today is different but more generally people do not

like that form of burqa now. A participant Israr Gul commented that,

“In individual purdah of women, for „some time‟ shuttle cock Burqa was not allowed. I

can remember that this was in the start days of military „power‟ in Swat, till the military

operation was well over. The military said that this is for security reasons. Today, it is no

issue at all but as far as I think, due to its link with Taliban, the fact that military

discouraged it and common mis-perception of it now, shuttlecock Burqa is not used in

Swat (Gul 2017)”.

53

Interestingly and yet significantly, opinion, observation and personal experience of

even working women about the issue of using shuttlecock burqa or even the fashionable

one in the military times in relation to the attitude of the Pakistani state military was

similar. A girl, Salma Shah Khor, who is working in an NGO narrated that,

“After the harsh and inhuman attitude of the Taliban in every respect, especially Purdah

and Burqa, the Military relaxed it. Now mostly it is fine to wear anything but favorable

was „not to wear Shuttlecock or other burqa even‟. The military and state will favor, in

many ways, a girl or woman who is open face or wearing sadar. Military was suspicious

of shuttlecock burqa as it was inflated with the Taliban. Once a while we were crossing a

military check post, I was wearing burqa, I was searched the most in comparison to other

women by the military and lady police. The searching of women is mostly done by lady

police, standing on a check post with military or inside the cabin, but still searching a

woman is something not good. Let me tell you that searching a woman, even by a lady

police, is considered „bad‟ here and most people dislike it but are compelled. This act

hurtled me at that time and I still remember it.”(Khor, 2017).

This comment and experience shows that as Burqa was associated with the militants it is

not liked by the military. Women wearing this may face issues of discrimination on check

posts or so. Searching women and then on such a discriminated scale is considered bad

and unacceptable. All this is attributed to a state institution which generates complains

against the state which is imagined to be controlled by ethnic and cultural „others‟,

nostalgia for traditional Purdah, freedom (limited) to do Purdah in any style and

stereotypic profiling of women as well as men who accompany them. Secondly, military is

„blamed‟ by my participants, who are much conscious about Purdah, of not caring about

norms and values of the society and promoting „openness‟ or giving „freedom‟ to women

mostly in the programs arranged by them or under their patronage. This is again done as a

reaction to the militants who restricted women more than the „traditional parameters‟ even.

This is considered as something which is against the social norms, traditional practices and

„unnatural‟ by many.

54

This also adds to the polarization I mentioned above, where Swatis distance

themselves from the activities of the militants as well as military. In the opinion of

Muhammad Rehman Dada,

“Military has promoted openness by arranging Programs where gender mixing is allowed

and even promoted. I took some female students to such a program once. Though the

students were just school level but as a norm I was caring their Purdah. When I saw that in

the program they must be on stage with boys and that they will be filmed by a camera, I

did not allow this to be for the students and excused the military officers in charge of the

program. I believe, it may be normal for them (the military officers) but it is not for us”

(Dada, 2017).

The level of care about gender mixing is high in most of the Swat and people do not favor

it on a school level even. Moreover, the issue of being in a program on a stage and visible

to everyone with being filmed creates issues that are far the scope of this section, but

having a link with Purdah such actions are avoided at all costs. The statement that it may

be normal for the military men, who are perceived as modern and ethnic others, but is not

normal for people in Swat and is considered as an action that is socially bad is self-

reflective. Likewise, a young man named Ashfaq, who is working in an organization also

attested to this and believed that,

“Pakistani Military has given women freedom, who were „pressed‟ by the Taliban. Now

this liberty has taken women out of that traditional purdah of swat (sadar) in many ways

even. As a reaction I think, this is happening: but with the support of Pakistani military”.

(Ashfaq 2017).

My own observation is also close to this. I was accompanied by Shah Sawar, a

Peshawar University student, for a 23rd

March program held in the famous Wadudya Hall

of Saidu Shareef. The comparing in this program organized by Pakistani military was done

by a boy and girl. Their ages seemed to be in 20‟s. Shah Sawar told me,

“This is my first time seeing such a happening in Swat. I asked him, what was he referring

to? He responded that in Swat a boy and girl are comparing for a program on the stage in

public. There are men here watching them and even they are filmed. He went further and

told me that look at the girl, leave her open face, her hair is open even. This is „new‟ in

Swat, this is „destructive‟ for the culture of Purdah” (Sawar 2017).

55

Even in Saidu Shareef, a major town close to Mingora and hub of professional people, the

action of gender mixing on a stage is perceived as socially bad. The fact that the program

is arranged by military makes it a complaint against the state and its military of impacting

the cultural tradition of women Purdah in Swat. In part, it also affects the number of

people coming to such events, which are never as overwhelming as will be in other cities

of the countries, even on days like 23rd

of March or 14th

of August. The observation is that

limited people linked with military will try to attend such events or those „compelled‟. It

was also possible for me to understand the behavior and reaction of Shah Sawar, as

throughout my field work I have been hearing these comments from different participants

in Swat.

It is believed in Swat that militants imposed and even distorted women Purdah,

military has added to this erosion and discarding of it in Swat. This has implications for

what is considered as a traditional marker of Pukhtun distinctiveness, Purdah. A

compelling opinion about military, in relation to Muslimness and Purdah prevails that they

are irresponsive, with a hidden symbol of reference to „other ethnic groups‟. Fazal Khan in

Charbagh remarked that,

“Military men are also Muslims like us (Swatis), but they don‟t care about Purdah. In

military patronage, many meetings of political people and parties have been arranged in

which I have participated. In such meetings, the military allows gender mixing of men and

women which is against our Purdah. Many times, I have told them about this. Like once I

even told a colonel, that we feel shameful (The Pukhtu phrase was, شرهيګو هنګو ) when we

see such gender mixing and cannot do so.”(Khan, 2017).

This is a complex where Pukhtun Muslimness and culture mix up and where

ethnicity is emphasized through religion. Fazal Khan‟s comment illustrates that military

men are perceived as Muslims like Pukhtuns in Swat but without Purdah, which implies

that Pukhtuns are Muslims with a Purdah culture. It also attests to the perception that

Pukhtuns are better Muslims than ethnic others as military is mostly perceived as non

Pukhtuns and modern Muslims. It also shows that gender mixing is a violation of Pukhtun

56

cultural Purdah which is facilitated by the military. The significant connection is the

feeling of Shame that Pukhtuns may have when they see a violation of their cultural

Purdah on such a scale. Moreover, it emphasizes that despite the complains to the military

high ups about this issue, the military officers seem less bothered, which ultimately adds

to the feelings of military, like militants, as a group impacting the Purdah culture in Swat.

While comparing this attitude of military and state with the militants, Fazal Khan asked,

“Taliban were imposing a form of Burqa which was not from Swat and the act was not

natural. The military discouraged Purdah and allows gender mixing, which is again not

natural. What is then the difference? I think the problem is faced by civilians of Swat as

their culture is being played with” (Khan, 2017).

This remark shows that Swatis feel the loss of their culture due to groups involved in

conflict. It also shows that militants and military are equated in this action of being

responsible for the destruction of cultural ideals of the Pukhtuns and the acts of both are

dubbed as „unnatural‟. This also adds to distancing themselves from both the militants and

military. The discussion of impacts for Purdah in conflict situations in Swat can be taken

ahead by exploring the fact that there are impacts for Purdah of Pukhtun home, where

mostly women reside, and which is linked to honor, sparking a fierce issue of revenge

during „normal‟ (peace) times. I elaborate that in the next sub-section below.

2.2. Conflict, Violence and Home Purdah

I argue that the recent conflict in Swat has multiple impacts for home Purdah. The impact

was lesser in the case of militants than the military. As most of the militants were from

Swat, that they knew the cultural as well as religious symbolism attached with Home

Purdah and they have not needed to do so, they cared about this. On the other hand,

military of the state has often violated home Purdah and the social procedure has not been

cared, because of the security reasons. This is attributed, indirectly to the perception that

military men are not aware of the cultural and social aspects of it as such. Moreover, this is

emphasized by the ethnic differentiation within the state military, where Pukhtuns are

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believed to be caring such aspects while „others‟ are believed to be unaware of it even.

Within the military some Pukhtuns will not violate it while others will have an excuse that

they are compelled by the orders of officers, who are Punjabis or non Pukhtuns. This

generate ethnic differentiation in military for my participants and a supposed sympathy for

such compelled Pukhtuns who work under Punjabi officers. However, the broader debate

of impacts for culture or Purdah is as usual attributed to both the groups, with a „good‟

distance from both. Comments and statements of participants supports such a preposition.

While emphasizing home Purdah, a participant Hayat Khan dada, told me in Swat

that „Our ceilings have Purdah even یو پرده ىن وګبر ده خو ګزهن (refereeing to home

Purdah)‟. As women reside inside the home, men, other than relatives, are not allowed to

enter. Even among relatives, close ones are allowed, and care is taken to allow only male

relatives who are acceptable to the men of the home. If there is need of any other man (like

a doctor) to enter the home, there is a „proper‟ social way for that. Women of the home

shall move to a side and let the man/men enter, accompanied by men of this home. In this

way, men are avoided to enter home at any cost, however if needed a „proper social way‟

is adopted. Violation of home Purdah by anyone can lead to dreadful events as it provokes

the honour-shame complex in the society and that links to social derogation in the society.

As militants were from Swat and could understand the significance of this cultural

and social feature, they did violate it much. Likewise, they may have an understanding that

it can result in resistance against them. In my whole field work, I could not find any event

in my field data related to the militants except one participant, Said Alam, who recalled

that,

“Taliban never broke home Purdah except once as much as I remember. Taliban were

mostly from Swat and their leadership was also Swati, they understand that this is not

according to Pukhtu or Islam. I personally believe that this would have increased

resistance against the Taliban if they had crossed homes or entered them without asking

men”(Lala, 2017).

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However, militants might have violated home Purdah in some cases but not in

many, especially in cases of attacking home of those who were against them publicly or

have been associated as political figures with the government and military. The opinion

related to military of Pakistani state is different in this regard. It is also clothed in ethnic

rhetoric of the people. Along with that its forms are different too and involves complex

dimensions, which I will discuss here. In one form, it was related to the issue of military

posts on top of the hills from where a home is clearly visible. As there are many top areas

in Swat, being mountainous spot, this is an issue in many areas. In a normal situation,

though people of the region would go up as well and homes can be seen but that is

differentiated from the conflict and post conflict situation. Before the conflict, as people

were from Swat, mostly local who knows and care about the cultural restrictions and

would just pass the higher area above homes in conflict. In post conflict situations, it is a

permanent check point of the military who are non Swatis, don‟t have much understanding

of socio-cultural compulsions and focus more on security than culture.

Moreover, the use of technology like a binocular allows the military to violate the

home Purdah of Swatis through the symbolic „gaze‟. The fact that homes and women in

these are clearly visible to those in the check posts develops a relationship between them

and families in the home, where military observer has a more powerful position in

comparison to the helpless position of the families in homes. Moreover, no one in any

family knows for a specific point of time if he/she is being observed or not as they lack

knowledge about this. Likewise, the military has knowledge of who is observing whom

and at which time. Socio-cultural power, control and authority to visit home or observe a

woman can shift from men of the family to men of the military in the form of surveillance

that military men do. Purdah as a practice somehow evaporates in such contexts. As one

person cannot be blamed for this, the military as an institution is blamed.

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This situation was different in the pre-conflict situation. In conflict context, this

process is termed as destructive for Purdah. Saleem Shahid from Kabal pointed towards

this in his statement that,

“In such situations of military control and operations, Home Purdah has been impacted too

much. For example, there are posts of military men on top of some areas here or hills

around. From there all our homes are clearly visible to the military men. This is done in

the name of security but let me tell you that this has not only damaged home Purdah in this

area but has shattered it”(Saleem 2016).

It shall also be mentioned that some evidence points out to the fact that in „Urban‟ areas

this was slightly different and as people were mostly professional and educated, like in

Saidu Shareef, they could complain to the military while people in rural areas, as I will

elaborate below, had little access to tell or complain the military. Shams Swati could

narrate a happening related to this. He informed me that,

“Once the military men went up on a hill top here in this area, from which homes can

easily be seen. People (Swatis) from the area gathered and told them not to do so as it is

not acceptable. This pressure from people, mostly professionals and village elders, could

bring them back”(Swati, 2017).

This shows that the military was at large not caring about this aspect of Purdah or it had no

idea, which is yet more strange. However, in most areas other than Mingora or Saidu

Shareef it has been, and it is normal to have a check post on a high mountain for

surveillance and security. The above statement of Shahid Saleem elaborates that and my

observation of the fact that he, like many, starts the discussion of Purdah with this very

aspect is a powerful opinion.

Other than this „non-physical‟, „virtual‟ gaze, another important aspect of the

linkage of Military and home Purdah have been during the wave of „notorious‟ search

operations after Swatis returned in post military operation times, which is the physical

entrance to a home. Searching homes, with or without informing anyone, at any time and

mostly early morning or dawn, was a normal happening for the military but not for Swatis.

The experience is different for different areas and was severe for initial days or even years

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and in areas far from the center Mingora believed to be militant‟s „hub‟. Shams Swati

could help in differentiating this between different areas, he informed,

“In military, initially, there was no mechanism or practice to announce or ask for search

operation or to knock the door to inform. Initially I will say that they broke Purdah of

home very frequently. There was no one to argue with them and if anyone could, military

would say that this is for security reasons. They were at the peak of operation and were

powerful so much that people could not ask them and even dare to ask. Most of the

operations were at night which is another issue. People would also argue with them and in

discussion in between that why men enter homes? Military shall arrange ladies and

through them they shall do the operation of searching homes, just like police do. This

searching of homes was in the search of Taliban or those who would help them. However

later when the situation calms down to an extent, a mechanism and system was devised.

As the military thought that the real threat, the Taliban, have been cleared, they will inform

before entering home” (Swati, 2017).

This illustrates many connected points and can serve to present the issue, the behavior, the

compliant, the difference in timeline and even the solution to the problem. The argument

that military did not care for most of the time about home Purdah is clear, however the

intensity has been high in initial days than the later days. The behavior of the military of

entering home, without asking and not letting people argue with them is deemed as

something which is socially bad. Moreover, the suggestion is that if the local police can

use women for searching homes or entering it, the military shall do so or at least arrange

such a similar mechanism.

In areas which are rural, or which are dubbed as „hubs of the Taliban‟, the situation

has been different and the fact that home Purdah no more prevailed during a specific time,

is felt with intensity. These areas had been closer to what is termed as the „ideal

traditional‟ Pukhtun codes and Purdah and so the effects are more „severe‟. In Kabal,

elders like Shams Dada will say, “Military never cared about anything like home Purdah,

as they (the military) entered homes without informing anyone. In such a case how do you

mention home Purdah?”(Shams Dada 2017). His question points to the fact that home

Purdah does not exist in reference to the military as military never cared about it. The

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younger generation, like Muhammad Farooq will agree with this and will comment

blatantly that, “Military has „almost‟ discontinued our home purdah because of search

operations (In Pukhtu it was ده ختوو پرده کور ده )”(Farooq 2017). This point can be supported

and elaborated with the statements of many other participants. Fazal Khaliq Lala has his

own view and story to tell.

“Home purdah as it is called, has been broken most of the times. It has not been cared by

the Pakistani military. We could stay in our area during intense conflict and post conflict

times and never left our home. Take our example, it is a shame to tell but it is true. It was

Ramzan (Fasting Month) and I was with family at home. As it was a close time to aftari

(evening time) we all were at home. Suddenly I saw military soldiers in my home and I

was shocked. Believe me I did not notice how and when they came. I told women who

were busy in cooking to hide in the room and went to talk to the military men. This was a

search operation for people called Taliban (with a derogatory expression). Let me tell you

that this has been a frequent happening in Swat” (Lala, 2017).

Being in Swat during the conflict makes his statement more compelling and illustrates

many connected points of my argument. This includes, Home purdah is a social and

cultural norm, military of the state has violated it many times, it is a shame to tell the past

experience in which home purdah was violated in search of people dubbed as Taliban and

this is a normal happening in Swat for the Pakistani military. Likewise, Young men like

Salman Khan are critical of this act but believe that this has lowered now as situation is

getting „normal‟. He told me that,

“Military‟s act was strange and unusual in the initially days as they would frequently break

home Purdah by entering home directly. The problem again was that the search operations

were mostly done at early morning 4 to 5 AM. Thanks God, we are out of this to some

extent now (Khan, 2017)”.

Though, at present such acts by the military are few, these were frequent in start

days of the military takeover of Swat. This socially or culturally unacceptable act of the

state military in any form has repercussions for a variety of different process. In fact, as I

will illustrate, in coming sections of other cultural aspects, actions of both militants and

military are considered as socially unacceptable with the element of loss of honour. This,

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in normal times can generate revenge, which can be violent (badal). Badal is considered as

a due social right in the society and is considered as a form of Justice done. This can be

allowed by tribal elder Jarga at times or can be taken indivuallly without any approval at

other times. Moreover, badal itself is a social and cultural marker of Pukhtun culture and

ethnic identity. In this situation as military is more powerful it is not possible for Swatis to

take Badal. Future prediction is not easy, but I propose that this has repercussions 16.

Moreover, there is an element of ethnic stratification with in the military by people in

Swat, especially when it comes to the discussion of Purdah and conflict. I reflect upon this

aspect below.

In Swat, Pakistani military is imagined as representing the Pakistani state.

Moreover, it is largely believed that military and Pakistani state are Punjabi dominated

(discussed below, pp, 165-180). When such a military violates cultural ideals like Purdah,

it directly generates ethnic differentiation on a major level which is a significant

phenomenon to explore. Below I present an analysis of this aspect in which Pukhtuns are

considered as better than Punjabis as they care about purdah in Swat. Even if they violate

cultural aspects, they were ethnic differentiation between Pukhtuns and „others‟ is clearly

visible in relation to Home Purdah. I start from Asif Iqbal (a student) who believes that,

“Pukhtuns and other ethnic groups, like the Punjabis, within military has behaved

differently. Pukhtuns have not „dishonored‟ us as we are also Pukhtuns. (In Pukhtu it was

کری ده نو کی پښتوى پو بيعستی پښتوى ده ‟. You can easily observe that Pukhtuns care for our

culture while other ethnic groups even do not know about our culture, so how can we even

expect care from them” (Iqbal,2017).

Such statements, observations and feelings have diverse aspects. At one time, it shows the

feeling that Pukhtun culture has not been cared as it is not known to Pakistani state or its

military and „other ethnic groups‟. Likewise, it shows the ethnic stratification done by

16

The elaboration of badal as a socio-cultural and ethnic marker and its interplay with the conflict in Swat is

discussed in a section below „Conflict and Badal‟.

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people in Swat based on their experience with the state institution of military. It also

challenges the state military doctrine of being „national‟ and not ethnic in nature and

seriously disrupts the efforts of Pakistani state and military as a national institution.

Moreover, the violation of Purdah is considered as a violation of honour with the emphasis

that Pukhtuns have not dishonored us because we are also Pukhtuns while others have

done it. Some more comments by people in Swat will consolidate this point. Shams Dada,

an elder, will put it simple by saying that, “In military, those who are Pukhtuns, many of

them, will cooperate with us in many ways” (Dada, 2017).

This also shows instead an element of help and cooperation by the Pukhtuns in

military at a time of stress and crisis with the people in Swat. I can connect this to the

observation of Laiq Dada, another elder from a political party, when he narrates one form

of this cooperation. He told that,

“Once during a military search operation, Pukhtun soldiers and even low ranked officers

could help us. They informed us by simple knocking at our door. When I went out I was

informed that it is a search operation. Let me add one thing, we can easily talk to such

military men who are Pukhtun as they speak Pukhtu, while with the Punjabi officers we

cannot speak fluently as our Urdu is weak. So, they told us to take women to one single

room as we must search the home. After that they came in and searched the home (as usual

nothing was found). Punjabi officers will never do so much of cooperation” (Dada, 2017).

Even if the search operation is considered „notorious‟ and entry of any man to

home as a violation of the cultural and social code, the process to do is comparatively

praised and is given a name of cooperation and help. This is linked to the ethnic

differentiation between Pukhtuns and Punjabis (others) and the language they speak. More

connected is the „sympathy‟ of many Swatis with Pukhtun soldiers working under the

„Punjabi officers‟. Said Alam Lala commented that,

“The behavior of Pukhtuns in Army is better (socially) than other groups. Even if they

cannot do anything for us, they will tell us that „we are helpless in front of Punjabi

officers‟. We feel sorry for them and understand their position” (Lala, 2017).

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Though military is considered as a nation institution by Pakistani state, the data

from Swat shows ethnic differentiation in the institution when it comes to the opinion of

people. There are two ways in which the Pukhtuns in military are able to be ethnically

sided and shown sympathy with. First, Pukhtuns in military help Swatis by taking care of

their culture and social values. Second if Pukhtuns in the military cannot help like this,

they will excuse to Swatis of being helpless, to save their Purdah and honour, in front of

the non Pukhtuns officers. Both these generate ethnic siding with the Pukhtuns and a sense

of otherization for non Pukhtuns in the military. This also impacts the boundary between

Pukhtuns and Punjabis as ethnic groups within the military. Moreover, the second aspect

develops a sense of sympathy for Pukhtuns in military, where Pukhtuns are helpless in

front of others. Likewise, another aspect in this connection is that Pukhtuns in military

request the people of Swat to take care of women Purdah and not to send women to some

of the programs arranged by military as there will be violation of Purdah. This also

develops a sense of positive imagination for Pukhtuns in military against non Pukhtuns.

Muhammad Rahman Dada reveals that,

“Pukhtuns and Punjabis in military are much differentiated here in Swat. Some Pukhtuns

in the military will even tell us about our cultural features especially Purdah and request us

to take care. They request and would say „for God sake, do not send women in some cases,

like the programs arranged by Army, as we don‟t feel good‟ (In Pukhtu it was تو خداي

لګۍ نو خو تو راليګۍ،هنګ هو زنانو اوګورۍ .” (Dada, 2017)

Through this discussion, I have demonstrated that, in comparison to the militants,

the military of Pakistani state has impacted home Purdah more. Ethnic stratification is

done in the behavior of military men, where the state and its military are assumed as a tool

used by ethnic others against Pukhtuns. This is solidified by the remembrance of events

where Pukhtuns in the military will tell Swatis to take care of cultural features, Pukhtuns

will help Swatis during search operations and will excuse at times that they are soldiers

and are helpless in from of officers who are non Pukhtuns. Moreover, a feeling of

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sympathy for such military soldiers, working under non Pukhtun officers is generated

among Pukhtuns in Swat.

2.3. Conflict and elder men Purdah

The conflict in Swat has generated some debate, about the Purdah of men, only elders.

Among the Pukhtuns, elders normally wear a sheet/sadar which has different sizes and

colors. To quote a participant Shams Dada, “As burqa is Purdah for women, sadar is for

men. Both shows honour and Pukhtu ”(Dada, 2017), in this section I will reflect through

some of the field comments about the impacts of conflict in Swat for this. Shams dada in

Kabal noted that,

“Because of this conflict we are required in some places, like the Judicial complex, to

leave these (sadar) outside the building while entering. That is why elders as well as

Youngers are feeling this as a violation of honour”(Dada, 2017).

Though all the elders in all areas may not be wearing sadar it is considered as a symbol of

honour and Purdah. Sadaqat Azim, a participant from Kabal, narrates that

“Elders are required not to wear large sadars. In critical times on check post, military did

not allow these for people who would come without vehicles. At times of body search

elders were required to take these off. In the same way when we enter to buildings have

security issues, we are told to take these off. In some cases, people have to leave these

outside the building and when I see these hanging outside some building, I feel ashamed.

Sadar is a sign of Purdah and honour of elders and those wearing are traditional Pukhtuns

(Azim, 2016)”.

This illustrates at the same time the importance of Purdah of elders, the honour attached to

it and the impact of conflict over it. It is believed that sadar serves as Purdah and honour

for Pukhtun elder men. This is felt with more intensity if an elder is forced to take it off (in

the similar way as it is for women). Wearing it is honour and forced to take it off generates

a feeling of shame. In contrast to militants, the military has in many cases or generally the

government and state in some forms today even compelling elders to take sadar off which

is felt by elders as well as youngers. Shah Sawar told me, “It was ordered that if you

sadar while crossing a post, take it off and have it in hand and walk instead of being in a

vehicle” (Sawar, 2017).

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This is obviously felt shameful both by elders as well as youngers. This order of

the state military based on the perceived security followed a sequence. Saleem, a

university student, explained and narrated the whole sequence of this aspect by saying

that,

“In the conflict peak times, first the military announced that nobody will wear sadar.

Then, after some time they said people can use it but not on a check post. If at times an

elder will wear it while crossing a check post, they used to take him off and search his

body. Then they will rebuke him for not following orders. Even at times, in the peak times,

no one was allowed to wear sadar at his front door of home” (Saleem, 2016).

This comment illustrates the steps taken by military regarding this aspect. All of these are

considered as violating the Purdah and honour of especially the elders. Though the

situation has changed somehow, observations testify that more generally in Swat those

wearing sadar are looked at with suspicion or are considered as less modern, in the same

way as burqa is considered for women. The conflict in Swat, along with internal

displacement across to other districts, caused displacement of Swatis from home village to

other villages for many reasons. This process has impacts for Purdah of a specific locality,

that can be a village or a Mohalla (similar to a large street). I briefly comprehend this

aspect of Purdah below.

2.4. Conflict and locality Purdah

On a broader level for the whole Swat or many parts of it due to the conflict in the region

Purdah of specific locality has been impacted too, which is part of the discussion in Swat.

I have elaborated above that there exists sensitives and discussions which has cropped up

in the conflict and post conflict situations. A tribe or locality has a Purdah setup which

facilitate the mobility of women in that area and the maintenance of social or moral system

in the area though different mechanism. This is apparent traditionally among the Pukhtuns

on tribal basis as well as non-tribal basis and is solidified by the fact that many Pukhtuns

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will not move from one place to another. One tribe or group exists in a particular place.

The recent conflict has impacts for these aspects in discussion of my participants. Through

an example a government officer Ashraf Lala discussed this aspect as,

“In Swat or this area now, after the crisis (conflict) there are people from different areas

and that impact „Purdah system‟ here, which is problematic. I can explain this with an

example of Zia ul Haq period in Lahore. As Zia had a policy of trying to wrap up the

system of „Red light areas‟, instead of relocating people of red-light area, they were

displaced from their locations, which resulted in their spread to areas across the country.

Likewise, „bad‟ people like Taliban and civilians from other tribes, clans and areas have

been compelled to be dispersed from their locations. Now in one area you can have people

from different groups, tribes, clans and „thinking‟ which make it impossible to have

purdah in a village or locality like that of old times. At that time, we used to be a

family/clan or group in one area and it was easy to practice”(Lala, 2016).

This detail is self-explanatory and can be observed in Swat easily where traditionally it

was easy for women to move around in an area believing that all people around are of the

same group. So now in a specific area of Mingora one can see people from different tribes,

groups and eve localities. People from other tehsils will also be here. This makes it

difficult for people of other groups or families to stop them from anything considered as

bad or socially unacceptable. Women feel more unsafe in such areas as the home may be

surrounded by people not from family, tribe or group. Conflict of militants and military

has added to the compulsive mobility of people in Swat. Another connected example of a

more urban area can be given by the comment of Misbah Ullah in Mingora.

“Initially Mingora main area was a bazar and it was an area where people from whole

Swat were present, however in this near village it was not so. After the conflict, this has

also become like a city which is problematic for Purdah. People from every area, tribe,

group and of any „type‟ are present here which does not allow us to have Purdah of this

location” (Ullah, 2017).

Through different examples, Misbah Ullah informed me about the issues they are

facing now and the hardship they face while dealing someone involved in a morally or

socially bad character that „pollutes‟ the whole area. Though I propose that this aspect of

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impacts may not be much prevalent across most of the Swat, some areas are facing this

issue which is connected by people in those areas to the broader discussion of Purdah.

Conclusion

I have illustrated that Purdah is/has been the central feature of Pukhtu/Pukhtunwali, the

Pukhtun culture, which is a part of Pukhtun ethnic identity. The recent conflict and

violence in the region has influenced it in many diverse ways particularly highlighting

diverse forms of Purdah. This includes individual women Purdah, purdah of Pukhtun

home, purdah of elders and Purdah of a specific locality, group or tribe. In conflict

situations, these impacts have been generated by militants as well as military, the two

main parties in the conflict of Swat. I have illustrated above that women in Swat who were

generally using a sadar as a purdah were compelled by militants for a specific Purdah, the

shuttlecock burqa, in individual form and the military was least sensitive of Purdah or

approving of activities resulting in erosion of traditional Purdah, the individual purdah of

women in Swat has been impacted. Likewise, when the military of state, in the name of

security could enter any home as many times as they could with or without informing men

of the home, home Purdah in Swat was „nonexistent‟. The opinion is divided in this

regard, in respect of militants and military, that the actions of military are socially

unacceptable while the militants violated this Purdah in very few cases. Meanwhile the

behavior and activities of military men are differentiated on ethnic lines, imagining the

behavior of Pukhtuns as better than Punjabis in the military and having sympathies for

Pukhtun soldiers under Punjabi officers in such situations. This has repercussions for the

state and inter-ethnic relations in Pakistan.

Moreover, the phenomena of becoming IDPs has also impacted Purdah culture in

Swat in many ways. It is connected to the loss of Purdah, honour and Pukhtu. Likewise,

elder men who were not freely allowed to have a symbolic Purdah by wearing a sadar

mostly in government offices of perceived security issues. This is again felt as an impact

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for Pukhtun elder‟s Purdah and honour and produces feelings of shame. Additionally, the

conflict has left a situation where Purdah in a specific locality is impossible as people from

diverse groups, tribes and regions are present across in Swat after the conflict. Earlier,

before the conflict, people in a specific area were able to have a locality purdah where

mostly people from same group or tribe will reside, allowing for a limited mobility of

women and keeping a moral and social level. This is remembered and felt in Swat in a sad

tone with a nostalgia for „traditional Pukhtun Purdah‟. Below, in chapter 3, I discuss the

interplay of conflict with another Pukhtun cultural ideal, Jarga.

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CHAPTER 3: CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND CULTURE: THE INTERPLAY OF

JARGA, COMMITTEE AND ORGANIZATION WITH CONFLICT IN SWAT

Introduction

In this section of the thesis I discuss the interplay of recent conflict and violence in Swat

with a socio-cultural ideal of Pukhtuns, Jarga. In this regard, I present a set of arguments. I

argue that Jarga has grown in importance in conflict and post conflict situations in Swat

and that is the reason Swat Qaumi Jarga has been active since last decade. This contrasts

with the fact that the use of Jarga was limited in Swat since the consolidation of Swat State

in 1920‟s. I also suggest that militants and military in the recent conflict has stopped many

local/village level Jargas from working at one time and manipulated these for their

interests at other times. During the conflict, militants used Jarga with Islamic Laws to

decide cases and thus fill the gap of justice delivery left by the Pakistani state. However,

when militants observed that some Jargas are supported and used by the government and

military against militants, they stopped jarga from working and targeted (even killed) its

leaders to hamper the role of jarga. On the other hand, military of the state relies more on

the assumption that Jarga is one of the best solutions for enforcing its own decisions and

narratives. That is the reason, military and Pakistani state manipulate and influence Jarga

and has subsequently changed its shape while using it for its own interests.

Pakistani state and military have also introduced and backed organizations and

committees on village basis like the Aman committees and village defense committees. I

also postulate that the nature and working of Jarga and these parallel organizations and

committees in the name of Jarga is far different from that of the traditional ones.

Moreover, these have made Jarga more controversial and subject to criticism.

In this line, I postulate that the conflict and violence in Swat has also impacted the

role, nature and performance of committees and organizations present in Swat for the last

three decades, which were performing some of the role of Jarga after Jarga was subjected

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to pressure from Swat state and Pakistani state. These organizations/committees (mostly

called Tanzeems in Swat) were primarily working for reformation and welfare of the

society but were also used for dispute resolution by people. Many of these are having

limited role now while others have stopped working as the committees formed by

Pakistani state and its military have more authority. In the present discussion in Swat a

notable one is Village defense committee (VDC/VDCs) formed on village level by

Pakistani state military. I argue that the recent conflict has repercussions for such

organizations and committees, which were working in Swat before the conflict. This

whole process has impacts for the tradition of Jarga and the linked committees and

organizations in Swat. It has added to the „defaming‟ and manipulation of a cultural ideal

in Swat which is considered by many participants as a socially unacceptable development.

In this section of the thesis, I reflect upon these themes, in a broader historical context of

Jarga and its position in Swat. Below is the organization of this section.

This section of the thesis starts from a brief discussion of Jarga as a social and

cultural ideal in broader Pukhtun society and its significance in Pukhtun culture and ethnic

identity. Here I also discuss the position of Jarga or other similar/related

organizations/committees in Swat before the Conflict to set a significant historical context

for the later discussion. Most of this will be based on available literature with some of my

own observation, field data and understanding of society in Swat. Having set this

background, I then discuss the dynamics of conflict and Jarga in Swat. I elaborate and

support my arguments with the help of field data, related to the impacts of militants,

military and the broader conflict for Jarga and organizations/committees. I conclude the

discussion by elaborating the „imagined weakness‟ of Pukhtuns in preserving Jarga or

culture in Swat. I also touch upon the centrality of Jarga and freedom to exercise it as an

ideal culture and try to connect this to the broader theme of the thesis.

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3.1. Jarga, Pukhtunwali, Committee and Tanzeem in Swat

Jarga is the name of an assembly and a forum used for consultation, deliberation and

decision making about issues faced by the community and adjudicating Justice in Pukhtun

areas. It has been translated as Council of elders (Ahmed, 1980) and public assemblies

(Barth, 1959, p. 115). Barth termed these as acephalous councils (no executive head,

comprising of land owning Pukhtuns) (Barth, 1959, p. 67, 1959, p. 116) and called Jarga

an „ad hoc meeting‟ for a specific task or an „instituted tribunal‟ (Barth, 1969a, p. 121). It

is a traditional cultural institution of Pukhtunwali and performs diverse functions where

primary one is decision making to adjudicate justice (Ahmed, 1980, p. 90; Ali & Rehman,

2001, p. 51)(Wardak, n.d.). Jarga decisions are mostly based on tribal conventions,

traditions, Islamic Shariah, a combination of both Islam and Pukhtun customs (Ahmed,

1980, pp. 90–91) and principle of justice , made through consensus and unanimity (not

majority) (Taizi 2007, 8) . Most of the decisions of a Jarga are binding (Ahmed, 1980, pp.

90–91). Moreover, only men of the society take part in the proceeding of Jargas.17

Jarga

has multiple forms and types (see Ahmed, 1980, p.90; Ali and Rehman, 2001, pp.50–57;

Wardak, n.d, pp.6–14). Its members can be Pukhtun elders, chiefs, Khans, land owning

Pukhtuns, religious Clergy and other people of influence. A member in Jarga can also be

selected by a village to represent them in a clan, or by a clan to represent it in a tribe and

so on (Rome, 2013, p.97). In the case of Swat, it is pertinent to reflect upon the similarities

17

Against this traditional practice, there are some exceptions, like in Swat, a lady, named Tabassum Adnan,

has formed a Khwaindo Jarga (Sister‟s Jarga) constituting only of women and mostly concerned with the

issues of women. This runs in the form of an organization now, See (AFP 2013; The Express Tribune 2013;

Zakaria 2016) . In the official jarga in Afghanistan, which also serves as a parliament, women members are

present too. Moreover, there is an “All India Pukhtun Jarga E Hind” in India which claim to represent the

Indian Pukhtuns and is headed by a lady named Yasmeen Nigar Khan (http://www.mpositive.in/tag/all-

india-pashtun-jarga-e-hind/ , https://www.hindustantimes.com/kolkata/now-frontier-gandhi-s-descendant-to-

urge-modi-to-stand-by-pakhtunistan/story-Q1W0AsNd7QCyGeX8B9S8MM.html ).

73

and differences of Jarga with this ideal form discussed in the literature along with the

manipulative role of Swat state and Pakistani state.

Though some of the literature assumes the popularity and somewhat „romantic‟

role of Jarga in Pukhtun region, in Swat its position was different even before the conflict

(before 2007). Historically, since 16th

century, Jarga was working on regional level, called

Swat Jarga or Loya Jarga of Swat, and on village level or tribe/clan level for centuries in

Swat till the 1920‟s. In 19th

and 20th

century it was used for the selection of ruler of Swat.

After the consolidation of Swat state in 1920‟s the ruler of Swat minimized the role of

Jarga, both on upper and lower level 18

and made it subservient to the orders of the ruler

and his officials. This minimized the authority and role of Jarga in Swat. After merger

with Pakistani state, the introduction of PATA regulations brought in the role of

beauracracy of Pakistani state. Though a Jarga was to be constituted, per PATA

regulations, the manipulation of Jarga existed at the hands of Pakistani beauracracy. On a

lower level, people used Jarga as a dispute settlement mechanism because of the low trust

on Pakistani state‟s judiciary. Likewise, reformative and welfare organizations also

emerged in the last decade of previous century which performed different roles and

functions including dispute settlements along with helping in events of sorrow and Joy

(Gham-Khadi), welfare and reformatory work in the society. This process of formation of

organizations and committees was somehow inspired by the traditional setup of Jarga and

the vacuum left by the abolition of Jarga and poor governance system of Pakistani State. I

argue that, from 2007 to 2017, Jarga and similar organizations/committees have witnessed

a different phase where conflict impacts their nature, working and functions.

Thus, for Swat, I identify four chronological and historical stages based on the

presence and working of Jarga in the history of Swat. These are „pre-Swat state stage

(starting from the 16th

century Yusufzai settlement in Swat)‟, „Swat state stage‟ (from

18

By upper I mean on the level of whole Swat region and lower I mean village level.

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1920 to 1969), „post-merger stage (1970 to 2006)‟ and the recent conflict stage (2007 to

2017). The first stage mentioned is more similar to the Jarga that traditionally operated in

some Pukhtun areas and is considered as an ideal. In Swat, this Jarga evolved with the

social setup that was framed by the Yusufzai tribe when it invaded Swat. It was used to

elect/select rulers for the region or head of forces/lashkars against invading forces (Rome,

2017).

The second stage of Jarga was a shift from the one which operated for almost 3 to

4 centuries in Swat in many forms till the 20th

century. In 1915, a jarga (Loya Jarga of

Swat) first installed Abdul Jabbar Shah (grandnephew of Akbar Shah) as a leader of Swat

and then replaced him with Miangul Abdul Wadud in 1917 (Barth, 1985, p. 39) 19

, after

Abdul Jabbar Shah was charged of religious heterodoxy (Barth, 1981, p. 177). Miangul

Abdul Wadud soon formed the centralized Swat state (for details of Swat state see (Rome,

2008) in which Jarga had a minimum role and authority. This is because once the state

was formed, centralized and consolidated to some extent, state officers were doing the task

Jarga was responsible for (Barth, 1959, p.115). Probably, due to the fear of being replaced

by Jarga as a ruler, Abdul Wadud (the Wali of Swat) curtailed this authority of Jarga too.

Though Jarga was still present at a lower level in villages and was used by the state under

localized Pukhtun culture (riwaj), the ultimate authority rested with state officials (Barth,

1985, p. 57). 20

19

Some sources propose that he was elected by Loya jarga in Kabal, Swat in November 1918 see

http://www.royalark.net/Pakistan/swat.htm.

20 That is the reason, to study and understand Jarga in traditional setup in 1950‟s, the Norwegian scholar

Fredrick Barth used Thana of Malakand (nearby but outside Swat) as a field sample and propose that it is

similar to the one practiced in the stage before Swat state was formed (Barth, 1959, p.115). He reports that

men with inherited land were members of Jarga. There are two types of jarga based on level of Jarga, Jarga

at village level and another larger one for all the region (to which people from village will send

representatives). To emphasize equality in such Jargas, he argues, members set in circle on the ground and

everybody has a right to speak. Moreover, there is no speaker or head in Jarga. The decisions or discussions

75

In Swat state times, Mian Gul Abdul Wadud, the ruler of Swat, allowed Jarga to

work at a lower level and formulate its own laws and „codes of conduct‟ (Dasturul Amal).

Different Jargas had different interpretations of Pukhtunwali and thus different codes of

conducts, all broadly conceived to have been following Pukhtun code of culture (Rome,

2006, p. 09). These Jargas and their code of conducts were working alongside the state

sponsored Sharia courts which were headed by Qazis and worked on Islamic Sharia. The

ultimate authority in this confusion was that of the Wali of Swat (ruler) and his officials,

who would use a politicized version of Pukhtun code of Dasturul Amal (Fleischner 2011,

03). This process undermined the traditional authority of Jarga. As an elder participant

named Spen Dada, who worked under the second Wali of Swat, commented during my

field work,

“There used to be a local Jarga in swat, of elders from the village, ده کور کلی جرګو . Jarga

best operated when there was no central authority in Swat. When Swat state was formed, it

lost its importance in „national‟ sense (Dada, 2017).

However, when Swat state was merged with Pakistan in 1969, Jarga witnessed a

new change. For some time, there was a judicial vacuum and confusion in Swat, as on one

hand the merger of Swat state put an end to the Qazi court system, on the other hand

Pakistani state laws were not extended directly. This vacuum was filled (partially) when

Pakistani government implemented PATA (Provincially administered Tribal areas)

regulations in 1975 21

. In this setup a jarga was constituted by the government, consisting

of local landed notables, who would decide cases among people of the area under the

supervision of a „tehsildar‟ (the revenue officer from bureaucracy). Under PATA

are concluded not by voting but through an unopposed decision and the council continues for days of session

till that. Barth mentions that there is a Jarga of each tribe or clan too (Barth, 1959, p. 67)(Barth, 1985, p. 74).

21 These were challenged in the late 1980s in a petition to the Peshawar High Court pleading for the abolition

of the PATA Regulation. The Peshawar High Court gave its verdict in Feb 1990 in favor of the petition. The

federal government then appealed in the Supreme Court which gave its decision after four years, declaring

PATA Regulations as unconstitutional.

76

regulations cases were referred to Jarga but Jarga decisions were manipulated mostly by

the government and its beauracracy in the region (Rome, 2011, pp. 63–64). Appeal against

the jarga‟s decision could not be made in a state court, but to the deputy commissioner and

ultimately to the NWFP 22

home secretary (Hussain, n.d.). This approach affected the role

of Jarga, which was already seriously impacted by the rulers of Swat state. This had

impacts for the provision of Justice in the region.

In this context, Jarga and some local organizations in its forms worked both on

village and all Swat level in some areas as judicial apparatus and as a forum for linking

people of Swat to the Pakistani government and its beauracracy. It is significant to note

that Jarga operated as a forum and as an organization, not as a traditional ideal in most of

the Swat for a long time after the introduction of Pakistani state system. Muhammad

Ishtiaq, a participant from Kabal Swat, who is a college Professor, told me in Saidu

Shareef,

“Jarga, operated as a forum, not as a traditional mechanism in Swat after the introduction of

Pakistani state system. This forum was used by Swatis as they did not had access to State

institutions. Thus through this forum people conveyed their issues and problems to the state of

Pakistan” (Ishtiaq 2016).

This minimization of the role of traditional Jarga by Swat State and Pakistani State was

also termed as a problem by people in Swat. This is because, people could not rely on the

slow governance system of Pakistani state, they had to solve issues and disputes by

forming temporary committees. Ashraf Lala, a government officer from Kabal told me,

“Jarga was not present here and it was problematic in a sense that we had temporary

settings based on individual cases. State system was slow and Jarga was already

discontinued”(Lala, 2016).

This process also provided an impetus to the introduction of organizations and

committees for the tasks performed earlier by Jarga. These were reformative and welfare

22

North West Frontier Province (NWFP) renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in 2010.

77

organizations but were also used for solving issues of the community, resolving disputes

and personal enmities. Moreover, it is also interesting to note that Jarga saw

transformations under the Pakistani state system but resisted and even in such situations it

was present in some areas/villages of Swat. It was for sure not discarded completely. As in

1980‟s, on a village level, Charles Lindholm reported the existence of a village jarga

(which he called a council of elders and respected men from elite families) (Lindholm

1982, 75). He reports the division of Jarga on different levels, where the top level is that of

the village, which is divided into three neighborhoods. These in turn are subdivided into

wards. These wards must be represented in a village jarga, he writes (Lindholm 1982, 78–

79). Such an opinion was also expressed by a participant Muhammad Ishtiaq, who is a

college professor in Swat, when he elaborated that,

“Although the political and communal role of Jarga ceased to work, the people still

used Jarga in its other forms and for its other functions. For example, Jarga was used both

in Swat State and post Swat State time for conciliations between enemies and resolving

disputes but by individuals on their own. It had no state backing or authority. As the state

institutions and machinery were working and were functional, though not effectively after

the merger of Swat State, this function and use of Jarga was not on a large or mass scale.

It however worked and functioned in different ways”(Ishtiaq, 2016).

While this situation continued, which was not favorable to Jarga, in the later part of

this stage, in late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s, organizations and committees, mostly called the

reformative (Islahi) and welfare (falahi) committees and organizations (Tanzeems) took

some of the role of Jarga. Though these committees were primarily focusing reformative

and welfare work in the society, people used these (very recently) to help each other in

Gham-Khadi (sorrow and Joy) and to decide about issues and cases in the same pattern of

Jarga. Muhammad Ishtiaq, my research participant and a college professor, told me,

“In 1980s and onward, committees or organizations with the names

like islahi and falahi Tanzim‟s, technically called Community Based Organizations

(CBOs), came into being, performing different functions, one of which has been disputes

resolution. The use and function of committees in Gham-khadi is a recent development

78

too. The emergence of such tanzims or organizations got momentum in and after 1990s so

as to work mostly on the village level for welfare and also disputes resolution. However,

on the whole, the people then too bring most of the cases and disputes to the courts for

trial” (Ishtiaq, 2016).

As Jarga was already weakened more and more, organizations and committees took some

of the tasks at village level but there was no such committee for the entire Swat region.

Some areas were not having such a committee setup, while other committees were not

most effective to be used by most of the people in Swat. However, a level of the tasks of

Jarga was taken up by these organizations and committees. This narrative of committees

and organizations/Tanzeems taking up some of the tasks of Jarga is popular in Swat. For

example, another participant named Said Alam Lala, who is a member of VDC (Village

Defense Committee) from Kabal also commented, “Mostly Jarga was replaced by

Tanzeem here. This Tanzeem, at local level, was taking most of the decisions for people in

solving disputes or other related issues” (Lala, 2017).

Some of such committees and Tanzeems (few) worked efficiently and not only

individuals but government courts also used them to decide cases. This was due to the

reason that such committees were more local and thus effective in solving issues along

with the fact that people had more trust in informal mechanism than the formal ones.

Likewise, the mechanism was effective as it was quick and lesser expensive than the

courts, operated by Pakistani state. Participants in Swat mentioned some of such

committees and their role. Muhammad Ishtiaq, from Swat mentioned one such committee

in particular by saying that,

“Among such Tanzeems/organizations, Islahi Committee Kanju, also called Islahi wa Falahi

Committee Kanju, earned great reputation for its work in disputes resolution and has notable work

to its credit in this regard. Because of its reputation, later the courts also started to refer or send

cases to this committee for resolution/conciliation” (Ishtiaq, 2016).

79

It is significant to note that some of these Tanzeems and committees are

temporary, which are formed for a specific issue, but most are permanent ones with

resemblance and differences to Jarga. As many of these work as permanent bodies and

have organizational structures, they are not like Jarga in the traditional sense. In most of

these, village elders or people having influence in the society are given membership which

somehow resembles Jarga though it is not of land owning Pukhtuns only. Abdullah

Nangyal, a participant from Saidu Shareef pointed to the aspect of elders being members

of the committees by saying that, “Tanzeem was here not the Jarga at local level in our

village. This would solve issues whose members were elders of the village” (Nangyal,

2017). Misbah Ullah, another participant from Nawae Kalae, close to Mingora, also had

the same opinion about the committee. He told me, “Jarga was not here in the traditional

sense. However, few elders used to form committee and solve issues. These were elders of

major families in the area”(Ullah, 2017).

In most of the cases, the main task was, like Jarga, solving disputes. Likewise,

another similar aspect was that one member per large family was given representation, to

have a cross representation of families. Shahid Saleem, from Kabal commented that,

“Here in our area it is a committee, which is not permanent and have no permanent members. It is

established for short time on temporary basis for a particular issue. The temporary members are on

the basis of family, so one family sends one representative (Saleem, 2016)”.

This point was also touched upon by a participant Sadaqat Azim from Kabal, where this

family membership committee is operating and where his family is represented by his

father or uncle. He told me,

“Committee is present in the form of an organization Tanzeem. One member from every large

prominent family in this area is taken. There are 5 major families here. That committee tackles

larger issues of this village (Azim, 2016)”.

There also exists a sense of competition and pride among some local areas of these

committees. Ashraf Lala from Kabal, termed his village Tanzeem in Kabal as the best by

80

remarking that “Committee or Tanzeem in our village was the best one in Swat” (Lala,

2016). These comments testify to the presence of organizations/Tanzeems and committees

in Swat before the conflict as well as after the conflict. My own observation of many such

Tanzeems is also attestation of the presence of these organizations.

Thus, it can be concluded that after the state pressures, Jarga witnessed minimum

significance and use in Swat. Moreover, if it was present on all Swat level, it was seriously

manipulated by the rulers of Swat state and the beauracracy of Pakistani state. Likewise, it

partially resisted this state pressure and was present in villages and wards on a lower level

as an alternative to state institutions. However, the pressure did create a lower use of Jarga

by people and even a lower trust on Jarga as the aspects of its manipulation was open to

the people. Moreover, as people had low trust in Pakistani state system of Justice and

courts, some of the space created was filled by organizations and committees which were

primarily focusing reformative and welfare work but were also used by people of the

region for solving disputes and enmities. In some cases, even courts used to send them

cases for settlement. Some of these were temporary, while others were permanent bodies.

Jarga in Swat, along with these committees and organizations, have been impacted by the

recent conflict and violence in the region since 2007. I consider this as the fourth and most

recent phase of Jarga, organizations and committees in Swat.

3.2. Conflict and violence impacts Jarga, Committee and Tanzeem in Swat

Related to the interplay of Jarga (and other similar organizations called Tanzeems) and the

recent conflict and violence I postulate that the manipulation of these continued and was

rather reinforced in a different form during the conflict in Swat. During the last decade, in

the conflict and violence of Swat, Jarga was impacted on both the lower and upper level

along with the organizations and committees. These impacts, the manipulation and use for

interests has been by different actors in the conflict, including the militants, Pakistani

81

state, its military and local elites of Swat. These impacts are in diverse forms, including

the killing of Jarga members by militants, use of jarga with Islamic Laws by the militants,

stopping Jarga and organizations from working and even bypassing these, introducing

parallel Jarga and committees with the backing of Pakistani military, manipulation of

Jarga for own interests by the state and its military and the increase in significance of

Jarga on an upper level to raise voice for the region in the present context. The whole

process has impacts for the „traditional symbolism‟ and functions of Jarga and its linkage

to Pukhtunwali and Pukhtun ethnic identity and opens a significant discussion of how

much is Jarga central to Pukhtun society and ethnic identity.

Moreover, it is interesting to reflect upon the historic position of Jarga in Swat and

its comparison to the traditional form of it along with the recent use by Pakistani state

assuming it to be a workable mechanism. Likewise, this interplay has generated criticism

for militants and Pakistani state of using Jarga for their own interests whereas Jarga may

not be valid in this situation or its use by Pakistani state and military may defame it. Even

though, the form of Jarga existing in Swat at this stage is by no parameter equivalent to the

traditional one, it is still assumed to be an ideal mechanism by some of the elites in Swat

and Pakistani state military. Below I first discuss Jarga and then organizations/committees

in the present context.

Related to Jarga, I argue that the recent conflict in Swat has halted Jarga at one

time while militants and Pakistani state military have manipulated Jarga for their interests

at other times. This has larger implications for people in the region as there was no

replacement for the tasks Jarga was performing initially and later the, manipulation by

Pakistani state was considered as a defamation of Jarga. Moreover, it has even intensified

the importance and use of Jarga in Swat in some forms. Swat Qaumi Jarga on an all Swat

basis has been active since the military operations in Swat. It has grown in significance

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and is trying to gain its social, cultural and political importance assumed by many in and

outside Swat. However, the conflict has also added many transformations to Jarga.

Initially, Jarga was used by militants and it later challenged them too. Militants

used Islamic Shariah in some Jarga and their courts in Swat. As Jarga and similar forum

was effective to solve enmities and problems, it was increasing support for militants.

Moreover, abolishing it directly may have caused a backlash to militants, so Jarga was

manipulated and used but not abolished by militants. The use of „Islamic Shariah‟ by

militants in Jarga was a blend of social values, culture, religion and the strategy of

militants (as people were accustomed to accepting decisions of such institutions like

Jarga). In a way, militants were also giving an impression to the locals that they are taking

care of the cultural aspects of the region. This in fact impressed many people in the region

and added to the effective use of this strategy by the militants. Islam Yusufzai, a

University Student and my participant from Swat was even feeling „nostalgic‟ for this

aspect of militants. He said,

“Militants very effectively used Jarga to decide issues and cases. This was a care of culture and

decisions were quick and free of cost. I still think it was a better part of militant‟s agenda, though I

differ many of militant‟s activities (Yusufzai, 2016).

Significantly, in some areas of Swat, Jargas were held with militants, requesting

them not to fight with government forces like police and military in the streets of Swat.

Militants were requested to use specified places for their violence. Interestingly, this was

effective in some cases and militants accepted the request, so these areas were saved, to an

extent, from violence. This may be because initially militants were strategically imposing

their version of Shariah and authority by not losing the social acceptance of people in

Swat. Moreover, the same role of Jarga was acquired in other areas and mostly elders

thought to use Jarga for the same purpose, which militants did not accept. As violence

erupted, militants needed public spaces to extend their authority. Thus, militants did not

83

accept such Jargas, their demands and their decisions anymore. Laiq Dada, an elder from

Mingora narrated about this as such,

“People tried to gather against the militants. This was against militants but not with government.

We were trying to be neutral. We also did a Jarga with militants, requesting them to fix a place with

military and government and fight there, not in our streets. This was effective somehow and

militants accepted it, so our area was saved to an extent. Nothing was destroyed by militants here

like other places of Swat. People in some other areas also did so but militants did not accept it”(

Dada, 2017).

Interesting aspects can be seen in this experience. It shows that in many areas people were

against the activities of the militants but at the same time they were trying to be neutral in

not siding the government or later its military. Their target was to save Swat, their people

and land, in fact their neighborhoods in some cases. More significant was the use of Jarga

as a tool, to which militants already had some familiarity. The Jarga, which normally

comprises of the elders was effective, especially when these were not aligned with the

government and military. It worked for areas like those of Laiq Dada and saved their place

from the violence of militants.

When militants started spreading violence in Swat, Jarga and other similar

organizations were, in most areas, the only tool to debate about militant‟s activities and to

hinder militant‟s progress. An issue was that most of the members of Jarga and

organizations were not united themselves on the issue amidst the polarization in society.

Moreover, it is a fact that militants had some support in the society, so it was not possible

to develop a consensus against them. Also, in most of the Jargas the issue was the

imposition of its decisions. As „authority‟ imbalance had occurred and was swiftly

occurring, Jarga was unable to exercise its decisions and had to be suggestive only. „Jarga

was just a suggestive body to the government and had no mechanism to frame laws or

impose their decisions‟, many participants in Swat agreed. Likewise, when militants had

„full‟ control of the region, Jarga was expected to adopt another significant and crucial

place and in some areas. Jarga played an important role and resisted the violent progress of

84

militants. Some of these Jargas were significant as they declared that Swatis shall be

against militants but not with government and military. The aim of these Jargas were to

work for the alleged betterment of the people of Swat and to avoid or stop violence in the

region.

When opposition started to grow against militants mostly by Khans and elites of

Swat, an attempt was made by these Khans to use Jarga and tribal force (Lashkar) in

opposition to militants. Some of these were backed by the Pakistani state, its government

and military. Due to the conflict, society in Swat was polarized and it was not possible for

any forum to be neutral or work without the support of militants or military, Jarga could

not remain neutral too. Likewise, Pakistani government was interested in using forums

like Jargas for their own interests in Swat. Thus, Jarga and its members were targeted by

militants, without any care for elders or youngers. Militants in a move to control matters

anticipated the situation and to hamper the attempts of some Swatis to use Jarga to unite

local people against militants, killed effective Swatis. To add to this was the fact that these

Jargas were manipulated and supported by Khans/elites of Swat and Pakistani state

government. That is the reason, militants targeted these Jargas and their members. Any

member believed by militants to be most central and most influenced by the state was

targeted the most. The Pukhtu comment by my participants was „ده سر سړے يي يوړو‟ (man

who is the head (important and can lead) has been taken or killed). Laiq Dada, an elder

from Mingora commented, “Militants killed those people from Swat who were effective in

this regard ده سر سړے يي يوړو‟.(Dada, 2017).

Specifically, any Jarga or committee (and its members), which was formed at the

behest of a Khan/elite or Pakistani state or which was supported by Pakistani state was at

the hitlist of the militants. A participant, Muhammad Farooq, along with others, agreed

with the fact that many committees (especially the peace committees) and Jargas were

85

targeted by militants, because they were headed or even formed by local khans, who were

backed by the government and its military. He commented,

“Militants bypassed all these, committees, jargas and organizations etc. There were reasons for this.

For example, one reason was that many of these were headed by local khans, who were not

supportive of militants and were rather supported by the government (Farooq, 2017)”.

Some of the Jargas, which initially tried to be „neutral‟ amidst the polarization of

militants and military in Swat, has been the target of a different and intense type of killing.

Anyone attached to such a Jarga or more generally for peace, were/are targeted in target

killing by „unidentified/unknown men‟. Pakistani state blame militants of this act and

claims that these unidentified men are militants who target people gathering for peace or

voicing for the people of Swat. However, conspiracy theories surround such characters of

unidentified men, where many people blame both militants and Pakistani state. Yusuf

Khan, a local Khan and elder told me in Dherai Swat,

“People felt the need of Jarga. They also gathered for peace. Those who gathered for this purpose

were targeted. There was a Loya Jarga held at the place of Zahid Khan in Mingora. He assisted its

arrangement. He was targeted but was safe 23

. A lawyer who addressed the Jarga was later killed.”

(Khan, 2017).

People in these jargas who were significant to represent Swatis and present their issues

across the region, outside Swat, were targeted by unidentified men, claimed to be

militants. Muhammad Rehman Dada, a social activist and elder told me, “During the

conflict, Jargas were targeted. People who were important in Jargas were targeted by the

militants. This directly impacted the link between Swatis and government/State” (Dada,

2017).

23

Zahid Khan is one of the fiercest critics of militants (and even the military) in Swat. He was the president

of Swat Hotels association and has been part of the Qaumi Jarga as well as peace Jarga in Swat. He has been

targeted multiple times by „unidentified men‟.

86

Many Jarga and people from Swat were initially trying to be neutral, to restore

peace and keep Swat safe from violence from any side, be it military or militants. Soon

due to the violent situation it was not possible to do anything without the support of

militants or Pakistani state military. Such people, amidst the polarization, were thus

considered as against both these, militants and military. When both these groups started

expanding, people were frightened and could not be „neutral‟. Some people would still

resist for some time (and may change their position later) but were targeted multiple times,

where many were killed and many injured, as Zahid Khan (referred to in the above

comment) or Afzal Khan lala24

(mentioned in the comment below). Iqbal lala, told me in

Kabal Swat about this and the connection of Jarga,

“A Jarga was also framed against militancy. Afzal Khan Lala was its head. Most of the people of

this Jarga were later on targeted. This was in military times even as in that time we complaint to

them, but they did not do anything. We are made to obey them in this (Lala, 2016)”.

It was/is not possible for Jarga or its members to be neutral or against both

militants and military. In case of such targeted killings, people believe that if these are

done by the militants, state military does not act promptly to stop it. This process

developed more need for a Jarga out of the influence of militants and Pakistani state

military and also culminated in a significant role of Jarga in the context of conflict.

Muhammad Ishtiaq from Swat, told me that, “With conflict, Jarga took an important

shape, as in times of fear, people needed it” (Ishtiaq, 2016)

Though it was needed by people in Swat, Jarga and its members could not remain

neutral and most were supported and rather manipulated by the Pakistani state. Without

this support, for some time, Jarga was unable to perform its function, and this had

implications for the process of voicing people of Swat. Moreover, as this Jarga was for this

24

Afzal Khan Lala was a Political leader of a Pukhtun ethnic nationalist political Awami national Party, and

a traditional Khan of Swat. During the conflict in Swat his family was targeted, and the government

suggested him to leave Swat, but he stayed in Swat. He was supported by government and the military for

his security and was many at times targeted by the militants.

87

specific cause and not for deciding enmity cases or adjudicating justice, linking people of

Swat to Pakistani state/government and the outside world was crucial. Traditionally Jarga

and its members would connect state with people in one sense and would take issues of the

people ahead in another. With the fact that Jarga was halted or stopped initially, it created

a gap between the state/government and people of Swat. Moreover, the voice of people of

Swat was not heard outside in a very crucial time. Saleem lala pointed this out,

“As Jargas and elders were targeted by militants at first and „unknown men‟ later, there was no one

to link people to the state. There was no one to inform other people, outside Swat, about the issues

of the people of Swat” (Lala, 2016)

This has implications for the society and people of Swat in this specific context.

Significantly when military operations were done in Swat in 2007-2008 and onwards and

government installed some of its authority in Swat, Pakistani government, state and

military started impacting Jarga in a different form.

As narrated above, initially, to counter the intense conflict and violence of the

militants, mostly Khans, some influential elders and political elites of Swat formed Jargas

by the name of „Peace Jarga‟. These were used to gather Swatis against the militants and

discuss/decide strategies to counter them. Added to this were the formation of Peace

Committees Aman Committees, which were backed by the government because of their

anti-militant‟s attitude. In some areas of Swat, these committees formed a „tribal‟ force

called Lakhkar, consisting of 1200 to 2000 men, provided with guns by the Khans. Critics

termed this action as a source of breading more violence by distributing weapons among

civilians 25

.

This use and manipulation of Jarga and Tribal force (Lakhkar) against militants by

Khans and Pakistani state, its government and military in Swat has been controversial.

These Jargas and forces are termed by some as a process of taking Swat back the way on

the line of societal advancement as Swat is not a traditional Tribal society now. Moreover,

25

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/02/swat-vallley-pakistan-taliban-militias

88

these have repercussions for the future of the region as people were armed in Lahkars.

Likewise, these Jargas, mostly, are devoid of the traditional nature and role of Jarga and

are formed by the Pakistani state military/government, not by the people of Swat, which

actually impacts Jarga itself. Sultan I Rome, a scholar from Swat, who has written

extensively on the historical as well as contemporary Swat, notes about a form of Jarga

formed in the context of conflict by saying that “Some Jargas in the name of peace Jargas

have been formed, by and at the behest of the army” (Rome, 2011, p. 73). Further he

writes,

“These Jargas, formed in Swat in the post-Taliban scenario are devoid of the ingredients and

characteristics (of traditional Jargas). Not only these Jargas are maneuvered, one way or the other,

but the decisions made and pronounced by them are also maneuvered. Hence their decisions also

lack the essence and spirit as well as the force and legitimacy of the traditional one”(Rome, 2011, p.

74).

Both the statements point towards the role of conflict in shaping and rather using Jarga and

its name. Peace Jarga 26

is the target here, which was also closely related to Peace

committees Aman Committees which emerged after Pakistani military cleared parts of

Swat. The statement is too clear that such a use of Jarga and its name by the Pakistani state

is a process that has impacts. These are formed and used by Pakistani state and its military.

Moreover, the decisions are even made by the Pakistani State, which is against the tribal or

traditional conventions of Jarga. They lack the spirit and legitimacy of traditional Jarga

because people know the force behind these. Likewise, as these are manipulated or formed

by the state and its military, militants have been targeting members of such Jarga with full

force.

In this process, though Jarga was manipulated by the Pakistani state and some of

the elites of the swat, it started functioning and holding its meetings and thus gained more

popularity. Fazal Yusufzai in Kabal think that it is gaining its old position and

26

‘Nikpi Khel Aman Jarga‟ was one famous along with others (see

https://tribune.com.pk/story/78502/owning-peace-in-swat/).

89

significance. He expressed that, “In crisis times, it was tried to hold Jarga, but it was not

easy. Example of Swat Peace Jarga can be taken. I think Jarga is gaining its old position

slowly now” (Yusufzai, 2017).

90

However, this old position is not the traditional one mentioned in the literature on Jarga. In

one way or the other these Jargas are influenced, manipulated and biased. Sultan I Rome

points to this significant aspect that such Jargas lack the spirit of traditional Jarga as these

are formed or influenced by the Pakistani state military. Most of these are non-

representative in nature (Rome, 2011) . There has been different Jargas since the conflict

in this regard, from which „Swat Qaumi Jarga‟ has been the most active one, while others

have some presence.

91

Swat Qaumi Jarga is operating with a constant engagement for the last decade

now. It has been holding sessions and press conferences on many issues of Swat, most

particularly the recent conflict, the issue of military presence and building a cantonment in

Swat 27

. I have met some of its members too during my field work. In initial days when

militants were growing, this Jarga urged the government to take steps to curb militants in

the region. One Jarga demanded „exemplary punishment‟ for militants and their leaders,

including Sufi Muhamad. This Jarga also criticized the military for treating Swatis as

„third-rate‟ citizens. The Jarga claimed that like the security forces, Swatis too have

rendered huge sacrifices for peace in Swat and should be treated in better ways now

(Khan, 2010) 28

. Swat Qaumi Jarga also suggested government security forces not to

negotiate with militants till they were unarmed. It also demanded that the military should

vacate the educational institutions and private homes, which it has taken as camps during

the military operations. An interesting point to be noted in this connection was the demand

of people from military, to give authority to civil law enforcement agencies such as the

police. It also demanded that Swatis should be treated fairly and with dignity on check

posts, and Pukhtun cultural values shall be taken care of while doing search operations etc.

(Forum, 14 October, 2013).29

27

For some recent media reports on this aspect see (Rehman n.d.; Dawn 2012; Correspondent 2014b,

2014a) and a website http://zamaswat.com/ which reports as a local media outlet in Swat. Some videos

„Swat Qaumi Jarga‟ on YouTube also shows the press conferences of this Jarga.

28 Members of the Jarga were Mukhtar Khan Yousafzai, Sher Shah Khan, Mohammad Ali Khan, Darvesh

Khan, Khwaja Khan, Abdul Qahar, Malak Riaz, Ziauddin, Khursheed Kakaji, Omar Ali, Zahid Khan, Fazal

Maulla and Dr Tariq Khan.

29 It was led by Sher Shah Khan in Mingora Swat.

92

In 2014 Swat Qaumi Jarga offered conditional support for the establishment of a military

cantonment in Swat. The Jarga was held in Wadudya Hall in Saidu Sharif Swat, and was

attended by officials of the civil administration of Malakand division and Swat district,

people‟s elected representatives, elders and leaders of political parties etc. The Jarga

declared that it will support the establishment of cantonment in Swat, if it is assured that

the military will remain in the cantonment and check posts will be guarded by local police.

Some members also demanded the „easier examination‟ of Swatis on check posts

(Correspondent 2014b). 30

However, some people in Swat claimed that initially Swat

Qaumi Jarga and similar ones declared in a meeting that military shall at all leave Swat if

it considers that the operation has been successful. Local administration and local cultural

institutions will work in Swat. If the military insists, the Jarga proposed, to stay in Swat it

shall declare that the operation was not successful, and militants are still a threat in Swat.

However, the Jarga decision was not allowed to be public and Pakistani state officials

called another meeting of the Jarga of members who supports Pakistani state. Thus, a

declaration was passed in a conditional support of military presence in Swat and building a

cantonment 31

.

30

The Jarga was significant in the sense that it was attended by the veteran politician Afzal Khan Lala,

Malakand division commissioner Afsar Khan, MPAs Fazal Hakeem Khan and Dr Haider Ali Khan, Swat

deputy commissioner Mehmood Aslam Wazir, SRSP director Ihsan Ullah Khan and Buner political leader

Afsar Khan and others (https://www.dawn.com/news/1150427)

31 See https://www.dawn.com/news/478537 and https://www.dawn.com/news/1150427.

93

These points, some of my participants comments and the cited works of Sultan I

Rome attests to the fact that Jarga, has been used as a tool by elites of Swat and Pakistani

state in this regard. This has added to the manipulation of Jarga, which is against the

traditional form of it. Beside manipulation, many Jargas are even formed by the

government and state of Pakistan or few elites of Swat. The composition, nature and

function of these Jargas are far different from the traditional ones. This adds to the

defaming of Jarga on one side and romanticize Jarga on the other side, though it may not

be as relevant and functional as it was earlier in Swat. Moreover, this process has

implications for Jarga, its traditional position and the society of Swat 32

. Committees and

organizations which were present in Swat before the conflict has also witnessed similar

implications. Below, I elaborate the interplay of conflict with organizations/Tanzeems and

committees in Swat.

As I have elaborated above, the vacuum which was left by the abolishment and

weakness of Jarga by Swat state and Pakistani state, was filled partially by organizations

and committees in Swat. These were primarily working as reformative (islahi) and welfare

organizations (falahi) but were also used by people for some of the tasks of Jarga. These

were formed on somewhat similar patterns of Jarga. That is the reason, in any discussion

of Jarga in Swat, the debate of Committees and Tanzeems is significant. In the context of

conflict in Swat, most of the old committees and organizations have not been able to

perform the tasks they were performing earlier due to the conflict, especially deciding

cases of enmities. Moreover, the significance of committees to the conflict in Swat has

32

Other than Swat Qaumi Jarga many other Jargas, with different names have been formed, which all claim

to represent „all the people of Swat‟ One Jarga in 2007 which resisted the military operation and the use of

force in Matta Tehsil of Swat, especially in Gat Piyochar (a remote mountainous village, at the junction of

Kabal and Matta tehsil, believed to be a training center of militants). This comprised of religious and

political (elected) leaders, who demanded to resolve the issue through negotiations. Members of the Jarga

claimed that there was no training center or militants in Matta Tehsil. Swat Qaumi Aman Jarga demanded

that Military action should be targeted, instead of indiscriminate shelling (Dawn, 2009).

94

been amplified by the introduction of controversial committees by the Pakistani state and

its military in the name of Village Defense Committees (VDCs). VDCs have bypassed all

of the old committees and organizations because of the support of military. Moreover,

VDCs have grown more controversial and are manipulated by the state of Pakistan, which

adds to defaming of reformative and welfare committees as well. There is a specific

linkage of the post conflict situation to VDCs.

Initially, against the militants some local elites (mostly Khans) formed Peace

Committees other than the reformative and welfare committees and organizations already

present. There was no support from the Pakistani state and military at this time, however

these Khans and committees were against the militants. When government (particularly

the military) took control of Swat after military operations, it replaced these Aman

committees by Village defense committees (VDCs), which were formed and assisted by

government and the military. These were constituted on village basis with a main job to

keep an eye on militants in their respective villages and inform law-enforcement agencies

of any suspicious person in their areas. Members of VDCs enjoy protocol and have a

special card through which they enjoy this protocol. These cards are issued by Pakistani

military and the committees are assisted fully by the military. Due to the fact of

attachment with the military, all VDC members are on the hit list of the militants.

Militants in the name of „unidentified gunmen‟ have been targeting these people severely.

Many of its members have been killed and many injured after targeted shooting 33

.

As a significant part, in some areas, like Bara Bandae of Swat, there was seen a

public poster display between the VDC members and militants. As the militants posted

posters naming members of the committee and warning them of consequences for joining

33

An unofficial data reveals that over 50 village defense committee members or peace activists have been

killed by suspected militants from 2009 to 2016 (Khaliq 2016). Media has reported some of these killings.

See (Khaliq, 2014, 2016; Express Tribune, 2014).

95

VDC of Pakistani military, the VDC members also responded by posting posters and

telling militants to come out of hideouts and fight them in open. Members of VDC

claimed that the villagers are in their support against the militants (The News 2010)34

.

However, the opinion of Swatis is divided on the support for VDCs, its nature and

working. Some of my participants were viewing these VDCs as significant for peace in

Swat, while many were suspicious and critical of these. To them members of VDCs have

become more powerful now and are „elites‟ in this regard. This is because of the support

by military, the most powerful section in Swat. Along with that, personal enmities and

revenge may be taken by these members from anyone, which put a question mark on these

committees and their members. Significant for this present study is the process of lowering

the role and function of existing committees, organizations and Tanzeems in one place and

replacing these in another case.

This process is expressed in different statements of my participants in Swat along

with the media reports. Participants in Saidu Shareef, during a focused group discussion,

expressed that old committees (mostly called committee system) are left only to help

people in Sorrow and Joy as they are unable to solve enmities or discuss important issues

now. The elaborative comment of one participant, Hamdard Shah was,

“After the conflict, it (committee system) was replaced by Aman Committee. Whose members were

targeted by militants. In most areas that is now replaced by Village defense committees. Tanzeem

has got very weak now. They are only remained to help people in sorrow. Tash gham tha patae di.

Government committees are powerful. These also performs the role of Tanzeem in solving

disputes” (Shah, 2017).

Village defense Committees have grown powerful and Tanzeems have got so weak that

they are left to help people in sorrow, (A reference to the weak position of Tanzeem). This

weak position started when conflict reached its peak times and soon it was unable for these

organizations and committees to work at all. As the society was polarized, violence was

34

https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/amp/268988-militants-in-swat-paste-warning-posters.

96

spread, and authority shifted, such organizations lost their functional capacity. Muhammad

Iqbal lala, an official of such a Tanzeem, commented that, “In conflict, like Jarga,

organization was only holding corner meetings as it was not possible to challenge people

of conflict (militants and military)” (Lala, 2017). An elder, Laiq Dada summarized the

relationship of conflict, Jarga and VDC in a statement, “Jarga has been finished now and

has been replaced by VDC committee, which operates in Swat now” (Dada, 2017). This

opinion is repeated by almost everyone in Swat and the media reports also mentions these.

Iqbal Lala from Kabal Swat told me, “There is a committee, made by Army and

government called village defense committee, VDC, which has replaced Jarga, Peace

committees and Tanzeems”(Lala, 2016).

However, the performance of these committees, the way these works, the behavior

of their members, their position to replace existing Jargas organizations and committees or

being parallel to these Jargas and organizations and the fact that these are formed by and

operated by the military are aspects which are interesting and where the opinion is

somehow divided. Some Swatis, but very few, believes that VDCs are more efficient than

Jarga, are required in Swat and that Tanzeems were not very effective. On the other hand,

majority of the participants in Swat were of the opinion that VDCs and its members are

not efficient as claimed. Moreover, its membership and the criteria are objected because it

does not follow any social, cultural or institutional rule and is based on loyalty towards

Pakistani government and military. Likewise, the behavior of its member and the elite

status they are gaining with the involvement in misuse of authority is another criticism on

such committees. Some participants even claimed that VDCs are not natural or needed but

are an „imposition‟ upon Swatis in comparison to Jarga or Tanzeem which are considered

as cultural and local and thus „natural‟. Moreover, the status of its members is not very

appreciable. Muhammad Mudasir, like others, agreed in a Focused group discussion in

Kabal Swat,

97

“Military, Government and Pakistani state, has formed VDCs as a replacement of Aman

committees. In fact, VDCs were imposed upon Swatis by the military. Members of these VDCs

enjoy protocol from the government and even military and have a special card issued by the

military (Mudasir, 2017)”.

One aspect of this protocol is that VDC members can skip a queue on a military check

post. There is a special line on military check posts, through which only government

officials can cross and VDC members are entitled to this too. As military security check

posts are part of the whole experience of people in Swat, this aspect of VDC members

crops up in discussions mostly in a negative tone. It is also pertinent to note that some

Swatis and especially ones who are Khans favorable to the military or members of the

VDCs will claim that VDCs are not replacement of Jarga and that military allows Jarga

too. Fazal Khan from Charbagh said that, “Militants shattered Jarga, while Military

allows it. There is no compulsion by the military on Jarga or any Tanzeem” (Khan, 2017).

Even if it is accepted that VDCs are not replacement of village Jargas,

organizations or committees and that the military has no issue with it, the general situation

of conflict and the promotion and backing of VDCs along with the authority that these are

having are aspects that literally gives an impression that these have replaced village Jargas

and existing organizations/committees. Moreover, popular opinion in Swat is not

consistent with Fazal Khan‟s position. The way Jarga and Tanzeem has been undermined,

Peace committees allowed to be formed and then replaced with the VDCs and even the

recent use of Jarga by military for its own interest points to a situation that is compulsive.

Moreover, conflict in Swat is a phenomenon that has brought many more

characters to the society of Swat, which indirectly affect the role of Jarga, Tanzeem and

committees. These are fear, hatred and enmities, which have grown more due to the

violence, conflict and the recent role of VDCs. During conflict people in Swat have used

the authority of militants and military for personal interests and taking family or tribal

revenge. Likewise, VDCs and its members have been exercising authority vested by the

98

Pakistani state which they have been using for revenge or for targeting people too,

knowingly or unknowingly.35

There is lack of trust among people in a village now and

enmities and hatred is spread across, which hinders the function of Tanzeem. Ashraf Lala

from Kabal believes that,

“Crisis has impacted Tanzeem here and nowadays its functions are not well up to the mark. After

crisis, there is fear in minds of the people. Enmities and hatred are common now. This also affects

Tanzeem system here”(Lala, 2016).

This whole phenomenon has impacts for the nature, function and position of

organizations/ committees/ Tanzeems in Swat. The voluntary committees and

organizations have been nonfunctional in most areas now or are bypassed by others

formed by Pakistani state and not Swatis. The new committees are considered as an

imposition. This also testifies to my preposition that, like Jarga, organizations and

committees have also been impacted and defamed. Below I conclude my discussion of

conflict and its interplay with Jarga/Organizations and committees in Swat.

35

In a later section I will discuss Conflict and its relationship with Revenge in Swat, pp 137-143.

99

Conclusion

In this scenario, due to the conflict in Swat, on one side Swat Qaumi Jarga is trying to

emerge with a more significant and active role, on the other side village Jargas and

Committees/Tanzeems have grown weaker and most have been forced to stop work. Most

of its tasks are handled by state and government along with committees like Village

Defense Committees, which are connected to the authority center of Pakistani state.

However, the issue that is significant is that most of these changes are not wanted and are

considered as socially „bad‟. Moreover, some of these impacts are due to Pakistani state

and its military, considered as non Pukhtuns and non Swatis, thus „outsiders‟. A critical

opinion also points to the fact that Jarga is manipulated and used by elites of Swat,

Pakistani government and state, though it may not be much effective in this context and its

history of manipulation and low existence in Swat. Likewise, the manipulation of Jarga

has been a common practice, both by militants and military in Swat, which is much

criticized by Pukhtuns in Swat. The controversial position of VDCs adds to the complexity

of debate.

The transformation in Jarga and its types, also informs that Jarga as well as

Pukhtunwali is not a static cultural code but is dynamic in its nature and working. The

symbolic or practical use and acceptance attests to the argument that Jarga can resist crisis

and conflicts and is central to the socio-cultural understanding of Pukhtuns in Swat. The

persistence of Jarga, its different forms or shapes and similar organizations/Committees

and Tanzeems and lesser reliance of people on government and state laws, testify that

Jarga has a crucial symbolic significance and Pukhtuns have retained it for their ethnic

identity. At times of crisis, the importance of Jarga, especially on a higher level, increases

more and the recent conflict testifies to this argument.

As an impact, the number of Jargas has reduced to the lowest number on village level.

The attendance in Jarga has also got lowered, except some, like the Swat Qaumi Jarga. This has

100

also resulted in lowering the ability and effectiveness of Jarga for handling issues and resolving

enmities among the population. The significance has lowered with a shut down in some areas. A

female participant, Shazia Noor Khor, commented that, “Jarga has been finished in some

areas after the conflict, while in others it is still there but lowered in significance as it

cannot work like earlier” (Khor, 2017).

In Swat, this is connected to the weakness of Pukhtuns, their culture and their

organizations. People perceive that they have become weak, owing to militants and then state

military, and are unable to hold Jargas, operate organizations and impose decisions. This is

connected to the weakness of forums framed by Swatis and the relative strength of the

forums framed earlier by militants and now by the military. Misbah Ullah commented that,

“Jarga and Committee has been replaced in post crisis period by VDCs and local

government system. The conflict situation has made us weak, because we cannot stop this

change”(Ullah, 2017). Likewise, Abdullah Nangyal told me in an FGD in Saidu Shareef

about the weakness of Tanzeem in comparison to VDC for work in conflict or post

conflict times,

“After the conflict Tanzeem has got very weak now. It only helps people in Sorrow Times. The

Village Defense Committees are powerful and perform the role of Tanzeem too in solving disputes.

So Tanzeem has got no use and significance.” (Nangyal, 2017).

Its significance in such a situation for culture, ethnic identity and society is emphasized

with a reference to others. The perception that elders were free to form and operate Jarga

or indigenous forums like organizations and committees and impose their decisions was a

sign of „good‟ and ideal Pukhtun culture still exists. Moreover, the inability to do Jarga,

impose its decisions, stop its manipulation and replacement with state sponsored

committees is a sign of being lesser or weak Pukhtuns. This perception is common, mostly

among the elders, along with others and is always coupled with the need for reinventing

the traditional culture of Jarga. In the worlds of an elder participant, Rehman Dada,

101

“We were devoid of Jarga and Pukhtunwali by these people (militants and military). We

are Pukhtuns without Jarga, poor Pukhtuns. As our elders were free to exercise Jarga and

Pukhtu, they were ideal Pukhtuns. If we have to survive we must develop our culture and

adopt Jarga” (Dada, 2017)

This is a simple illustration of Jarga being central, as mentioned in the literature, to

Pukhtun culture, Pukhtunwali/Pukhtu and ideal Pukhtun behavior. The relevance of Jarga

and being a core ideal of culture makes it an important part of ethnic identity and cultural

distinctiveness and the links of impacts and changes in Jarga to the disturbance in ethnic

identity and pride in being Pukhtuns with such cultural values are important and

significant aspects. This has repercussions for the impacts in ethnic identity of Pukhtuns in

Swat as culture is central in ethnic identity and Jarga has been central to culture. Below I

add another layer to this story of impacts of conflict for culture by elaborating the case of

Hujra, Melmastya and gham-khadi.

102

Chapter 4: Conflict, Violence and Culture: Hujra, Melmastya and Gham-Khadi in

Swat

Introduction

In this section of the thesis, I argue that, amidst the conflict and violence, Pukhtuns in

Swat were unable to maintain the ideal role of Hujra, which encompassed the hosting of

male guests and offering them Melmastya (the socio-cultural practice of entertaining

guests), training and educating Pukhtun youngsters/kashars by the elders/mashars for a

Pukhtun way of life, discussing various topics of interests to a family, village or the

community and as a place for gatherings in times of sorrow and Joy festivals (marae-

jwandae or gham-khadi). This ideal role of Hujra is central to Pukhtu/Pukhtunwali. The

resultant perception in this regard, in Swat, is that „hujra culture is dead now in its ideal

sense‟. I postulate that at the peak of conflict, it was affected the most and the

repercussions can be seen even today. Moreover, many dimensions of „fear‟ and the

„limits on freedom of practices in Hujra‟ are some of the connected significant processes.

Related to the impacts of militants and military, my argument is that, though they had

different approaches, both have substantially contributed to the „deserting of Hujra‟ and

declining of Melmastya. Although in very few cases militants tried to stop people from

sitting in Hujra, they mostly controlled the discussions, activities and sittings in it. On the

other hand, military did not stop people from Hujra as such but the security situation and

the fact that a guest can be questioned by the military, forced the shutting down of Hujra

(or seriously limiting its use) and increased inability to perform Melmastya. I contend that

this phenomenon has repercussions for the traditional culture of Hujra and Melmastya and

is linked to the discussion of honour, Pukhtunwali/Pukhtu and Pukhtun ethnic identity in

Swat.

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Likewise, related to the interplay of conflict and violence in Swat with Gham-

Khadi (Sorrow and Joy), I present a set of arguments. I postulate that there are multiple

impacts on the performance and symbolic position of gham-khadi in Swat. Pukhtuns, in

Swat, have not been able to perform and maintain gham-khadi celebrations, which are

central to the performance and maintenance of Pukhtun ethnic identity and an „ideal‟

Pukhtun behavior. Moreover, the intensity of impacts for gham-khadi is directly

proportional to the intensity of conflict and violence in a specific locality. In the context of

performance and attendance in the events of gham, these impacts have fluctuated between

the case of „no funeral‟ for someone and „much more attendance‟ in a funeral of another

one. On the contrary, the number of people attending Khadi/like marriage was mostly

lower than normal. The restrictions on activities in khadi, the lowering of financial

position of people in Swat and the general situation of conflict are important factors that

contribute to this. Moreover, I propose that „fear‟ plays a significant role in this context. It

is also a strong perception in Swat that gham dominates khadi, as Swat is in gham for a

decade, with no place for celebrations.

I also argue that militants and military had somehow different approaches to and

impacts for gham-khadi. Militants banned music and other celebrations in khadi,

considered as unislamic by them. While, in relation to gham, militants were not imposing

many restrictions. However, women were not allowed to come out in public and travel

alone, which affected women‟s performance of both gham and Khadi. Military, on the

other hand, were allowing the performance of both, but with restrictions. These restrictions

of the military made the performance of khadi more painful for Pukhtuns in Swat. I also

argue that gham-khadi is getting normalized but some of its aspects have been changed

permanently and the memory of inability to perform these during the intense conflict is

still there. This phenomenon, I postulate, has repercussions for Pukhtun culture and ethnic

identity.

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The section is divided as such. In the first sub-section I refer to some of the

literature on the meaning, function and socio-cultural/ethnic significance of Hujra and

Melmastya. Here I touch upon the imagination, perception and practice of Hujra and

Melmastya in Swat. In the next sub-section, I very specifically focus the impacts of

conflict and violence in Swat for Hujra by focusing militant‟s and then military‟s attitude

towards these and its repercussions for Melmastya. Following this, the next sub-section

elaborates the broader and more general impacts of conflict in Swat for Hujra and then

Melmastya with a discussion of the centrality of „Fear‟ to this process.

Next, I discuss gham-khadi as a performance tool and symbol of Pukhtun culture

and ethnic Identity. After this, I shift to discuss the impacts of recent conflict and violence

in Swat for the performance and symbolic position of gham. In the next sub section, I

discuss the interplay of conflict (of militants and military) with the performance and

celebrations of khadi. In the last sub-section, I conclude the discussion with an elaboration

of the linkage to Pukhtunwali, which is central to Pukhtun ethnic identity.

4.1. Our Hujra has been deserted: Conflict, Violence, Hujra and Melmastya in Swat

Hujra is an institution and a socio-cultural code of Pukhtu/Pukhtunwali and Pukhtun

society, which can be literally translated as „male guest room‟. Though, primarily and

ideally it is concerned with hosting male guests and offering them melmastya (the socio-

cultural practice of entertaining guests), it can also serve as a training and educating place

for Pukhtun youngsters (youngers/kashars are educated for a Pukhtun way of life,

Pukhtunwali, by the elders/mashars). Moreover, it has been used by some politicians and

khans for political purpose too (Ahmed, 1977, p.65; Lindholm, 1982, pp, 445–68; Barth,

1959, p.80). It can serve to host any discussion related to various topics of interests to a

family, village or the community. In addition, it serves as a place for gatherings in times of

sorrow and Joy festivals (marae-jwandae or Gham-khadi).

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Likewise, Melmastya is literally translated as hospitality and is one of the most

significant socio-cultural value and code in Pukhtun region. It is practiced both in Hujra

and at home, where men are mostly served in Hujra and women at home. Melmastya have

different political, economic (Barth,1959b;1969b) and socio-cultural functions and

aspects. A Pukhtun is „guest friendly‟ „ وی دوست هېلوو . A guest is served with great care

and respect by Pukhtuns, both wealthy and poor (Ahmed, 1980, p. 90; Edwards, 1996, p.

67). Melmastya is ideally offered to anyone including strangers, where they are mostly

offered food, boarding and lodging as part of melmastya (Barth, 1969b, pp, 120–121;

Rome, 2013a, p. 95). The food and services offered in melmastya can be used to show or

express the financial position of the host and thus serves for personal prestige and self-

aggrandizement (Spain, 1962, pp, 47–52). It can be used by some to express socio-cultural

behavior of greeting guests with a specific manner and warmth (Rome, 2013a, p. 95). The

protection of a guest also falls within melmastya and is deemed obligatory (Rome, 2013,

p.96). Men and women both are involved in this process of melmastya. Pukhtun women

arrange food with pride and enthusiasm for a woman guest in home and male guest outside

the home, in hujra, and consider it part of Pukhtu/Pukhtunwali to arrange the „best food‟

for the guest.

The perception of socio-cultural and symbolic significance of hujra and Melmastya

in Swat is similar to the broader Pukhtun region. The practice was also like the traditional

culture before the conflict in Swat. Here, hujra and associated betak (small guest room)

was present in both rural and urban areas. The traditional hujra is still present in most of

the areas of Swat, which is larger as compared to betak. Moreover, betak is closer to home

as compared to hujra. Additionally, hujra consists of many rooms while betak is a single

guest room. betak is in fact mostly, personal and is present in urban setup, but is also

spreading in rural areas now, while hujra is mostly used by a village or clan or by a

khan/leader if personal. Betak is more affordable for many while Hujra is not and that is

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why hujra is mostly limited now to leaders and khans. Melmastya is offered both in hujra

and betak and the focus is on melmastya rather on the differentiation of hujra or betak. My

research participants agreed that around three decades back, hujra started changing into

betak in some rural and most of the urban areas of Swat. However, in most rural and some

urban areas, khans and other „well off‟ Pukhtuns have both hujra and betak. The

transformation from hujra towards betak is taking place across the region.

Significantly, this aspect of transformation and differentiation of hujra and betak

was trying to dominate the discussion in Swat. Ashraf Lala, a government officer from

Swat told me that, “Hujra was converted to betak in pre-crisis time”(Lala, 2016).

Likewise, in some areas, private shops are also serving as places where people gather and

discuss issues at evening. Among many participants Sadaqat Azeem told me that, “Around

three decades back hujra started changing into betak. People these days also gather in

shops. Some people use shop as betak too”(Azim, 2016). His family also runs a small

shop and he (and his brother) use this shop as a betak, though they have a small hujra and

betak too. I have been to such shops, along with hujras and betaks, during my fieldwork in

Swat.

Moreover, the rural-urban divide, within Swat, is also affecting this dynamic of

hujra and betak, where hujra culture is present more in rural areas while betak has replaced

it more in urban areas. Likewise, Swatis also compare this division of rural-urban to

broader Pukhtun region. A lecturer from Mingora commented on this aspect, “This

cultural aspect of Hujra is affected by rural-urban divide. Rural and urban places are

having difference in this respect. Urban areas have more betaks and rural areas have

more hujras” (Swati, 2017). However, in Swat, even in Urban centers or areas close to

urban centers, like Mingora bazar or Kabal or Matta Bazar, there are traditional Khans and

politicians who have Hujras. These are kept by their followers and „servants‟. These hujras

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are used as a symbol of traditional culture and serve political means. Likewise, as most of

the Swat is still more rural than urban, there can be seen many hujras. Moreover, both

hujra and betak serves as primary sites of offering melmastya.

Significantly, the concept of melmastya and its position was the same across the

rural-urban divide before the conflict and people still take pride in serving guests. Swat

was termed, by many Swatis, as „guest friendly‟ da melma dost because of the culture of

melmastya. Interestingly, before the conflict, this guest could be anyone from any place,

even strangers or travelers, who would stay in hujra. This was/is considered as an ideal

Pukhtun behavior. However, the recent conflict and violence in Swat has impacted some

of these aspects of melmastya, hujra and betak. I elaborate these impacts below.

Conflict in Swat has many dimensions which impacted the performance of culture

of hujra and melmastya. Due to the environment of security, suspicions and fear, Pukhtuns

in Swat were not able to entertain guests in many cases. Many hujras and betaks were

forcefully closed during the conflict. Likewise, in many hujras there was no one to sit,

especially at evening, which is the popular time of it. The repercussion today is that if

there is a guest, hujra will be open, either closed. Guests, other than clearly known to the

host, are not welcome now. During the conflict, no one took the risk of being humiliated

(he or his guest) at the hands of militants and military and people still has that memory, so

they avoid taking risks. Another significant impact is that, in most cases, elders do not sit

in Hujra or betak now and do not come out to greet guests, other than their personal ones.

One of the main reasons of this is that, during the conflict, elders were not „properly‟

(socially) honored and treated by militants and military. This whole process has directly

affected the culture of and sittings in hujra and associated melmastya, among the Pukhtuns

in Swat.

I postulate that most of the impacts are considered, by majority participants, as

socio-culturally negative. In very few cases, some participants had different personal

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experiences and observations. In this case, one of these participants was also mentioning

positive impact of the conflict in Swat. Sadeeq Ullah, who is from a rural village in Kabal,

along with negative aspects of the conflict and violence, shared the positive impact of it.

This is specific to his area but can be broadly observed in other areas of Swat too. Due to

the presence of military in his area, people can go easily to hujra, despite their

involvement in personal family enmities. The presence of military in the area ensures, for

them, that no one from their traditional enemies, harm them. Likewise, law and order

situation has improved for them due to the presence of Pakistani state military. Thus,

going to hujra and performing the culture has increased. His illustrative comment was as

such,

“A positive impact is that before conflict in our areas it was not easy to go to hujra and if

we wanted to go, we had to take arms, because of the enmities and thieves etc. Now we

have got rid of that with no worries of enemies and thieves. Visiting Hujra and performing

the culture has improved” (Ullah, 2017).

On the contrary, there is a long list of socially negative, unwanted and significant impacts

of conflict and violence in Swat for Hujra culture and associated Melmastya. Militants and

military, two major actors in the conflict of Swat, have a different and specific approach in

this regard.

When militants were spreading violence in most of the Swat, Swatis, who would

sit in hujra, were questioned by them. Thus, it was not possible for people to sit in hujra,

especially at late night, the popular time of hujra. hujra culture declined fast during this

time. Though militants never shut hujra as such, in most parts of Swat, its activities were

restricted, and people were frightened to sit late. To monitor the activities of hujra,

militants had „spies‟ and „sympathizers‟, who would inform them. Discussions on current

issues (like the conflict and crisis) were stopped. In few cases, at peak times, militants

even banned people from sitting in Hujra after evening.

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The attitude of militants and the humiliation of people by them, along with

stopping people from activities in hujra, was even termed as a „torture‟ by some people in

Swat. Misbah Ullah in Nawae Kalae, Mingora told me that, “Just one hujra was open here

in our area, even during the crisis. Others were closed and deserted. People were tortured

by the militants (Ullah, 2017)”. Due to this phenomenon of restricting the sittings in hujra,

people in many areas made gatherings more personal. They used to shut the doors of hujra

and betak, both for the militants and for the public. After such a gathering was over,

people would lock hujra and move to homes. This contrasts with the fact that before the

conflict Hujra used to be open every time and gatherings were open to public. Among

many participants, an elder Laiq Dada, from Nawae Kalae, told me in his hujra that,

“Before conflict, we used to sit here in Hujra. The door of Hujra was open all the time. In

militants time we had to lock then” (Dada, 2017).

Restricting people from different activities termed as un-Islamic by the militants

was a common happening. Militants would come to Hujra and keep a check on the leisure

time of people, which affected the limited freedom, people, especially youngers, had in

hujra. Smoking was mostly exemplified by my research participants in Swat along with

Music and watching Television. Shahid Ahmed, a driver in an organization told me in

Fizzagut about this as, “Militants used to come to hujra and stop people from smoking etc.

and used to insult the shopkeeper who would sell it too. There was no freedom in Hujra

for us” (Ahmed, 2017). Playing and listening to music, of any type, and watching TV, of

any kind, were at the top of the list of banned activities in Hujra or other places. Among a

list of participants, Muhammad Mudasir, from Kabal, told me in a single statement that

“Militants were not allowing music and TV” (Mudasir 2017). The severity and intensity of

the situation was that militants entered hujra to check its activities, especially for those

termed as „banned and un-Islamic‟. Moreover, only „restricted talk‟ was allowed in Hujra

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as the discussion on sensitive issues, like the conflict, was monitored and saying anything

against the militants was banned. This seriously undermined the gatherings in hujra.

Shereen lala, a local journalist from Mingora, was able to connect these themes to the

nostalgic memory of a peaceful time, before the conflict. He told me,

“Before the conflict there was peace, so gatherings were common in hujra, along with

music, films, TV etc. There was freedom to do all these activities. In conflict, what was

allowed in hujra was „restricted talking‟. Militants even entered Hujras to monitor its

activities” (Lala, 2017).

This perception of freedom may also be linked to one of the core and ideal value of

Pukhtun identity, that is autonomy (Barth, 1969b; Edwards, 1990; Jan,, 2010). Autonomy

in a limited sense even is expressed as a central feature of Pukhtun life and identity and

limiting this autonomy is complained of in such a context. Likewise, this situation resulted

in reduction of entertaining guests, Melmastya, as people were not able to even maintain

Hujra or keep it open. Moreover, no one could take risk of the insult of his guest because

that is felt as a loss of honor at the hands of militants. This process of impacts is somehow

amplified, when Pakistani military enters Swat during the military operations. Pukhtuns in

Swat and their culture of hujra confronts a different situation in this context.

Pakistani state military also banned people from sitting in hujra and betak after

evening, especially in the initial days of post military operation period. However, later the

attitude of military towards hujra or guests got „better‟ (socially acceptable) as they

adopted somehow to the culture of Swat. Military also added to the decline of hujra

culture and its specific activities and functions. Fear was still prevalent, especially when

some incident would occur, like an attack or blast on military or the targeting of a VDC

(village defense committee) member. In such situations, military would search the whole

village, including home and hujra. Moreover, in such search operations one issue, along

with others, was the problem of communication between people in Hujra and military

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men. As many people in villages of Swat can only speak and understand Pukhtu, or some

can speak and understand a specific accent of Urdu, it was not easy to communicate and

interact with the military. Moreover, if someone could speak Urdu, as he would be

nervous and not fluent, it was problematic. This impacted the culture of hujra. Muhammad

Mudasir, from Kabal, recalled,

“When military was here, it was not convenient to be in Hujras at late night. Military

stopped us from Hujras, especially when some incident would occur. In such post incident

stages in many Hujras it was a language problem too to interact with the military by local

people” (Mudasir, 2017).

Moreover, announced and unannounced, curfews in a specific locality were

affecting this cultural aspect. In the words of Asad Khan Lala, “Due to curfews of the

military, the culture of Hujra and melmastya was impacted. Military imposed restrictions

for some time, especially during curfews. They would check hujras and do search

operations”(Lala, 2017). Restrictions on the limited freedom in Hujra and the searching of

it are both actions perceived as socially unacceptable and impacts the number of people

coming to Hujra. Moreover, the initial behavior of military was beyond comprehension for

the people of Swat. Military would search hujra and ask people questions about their

identification. People were asked to show National Identity Cards (NICs) in their own

village Hujra which was felt deeply insulting and contributed to the lowering of Hujra

culture in Swat. Laiq Dada an elder from Nawae Kalae told me that,

“When Pakistani Military came to Swat, during search operations they used to check Hujra

too. They used to check cards (NICs). While we were required to show cards, I asked a

Subedar sahib the reason behind such a demand. In return I was rebuked and insulted (

Dada, 2017)”.

In such a context, it was not easy for people to come to Hujra and be insulted. When an

incident would occur near Hujra or in the same village, it would become more difficult for

people to maintain Hujra. Military used to check the village, especially Hujras and events

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used to occur where people were insulted or not treated properly. To be required to show

his identity in his village or his own Hujra by a military man perceived as „other‟ was

insulting and was always avoided by the residents. It was not possible to argue with the

military as there was risk of being insulted and dishonored and may result in physical

harm. If an elder was insulted, it resulted in lowering of the number of people (both elders

and youngers) coming to Hujra, especially after evening. The behavior of military is

believed to have somehow changed later and is different today. Probably military men

adopted to the culture of Swat. Moreover, it may be because the military now believe that

the threat of militants has somehow subsided and that civilians can be trusted to some

extent. This was reported by many participants, including, Shahid Ahmed, a driver in an

NGO, “Military did disturb Hujras initially as they did not understand the culture of the

region. They would come and do checking which was not appreciated by local people.

However, now their behavior is somehow better in dealing with us” (Ahmed, 2017).

Such an observation and opinion are always based on the comparison of past and

present or near past and far past. Likewise, the initial behavior, attitude or activities of the

military in past are considered as bad and socially unacceptable. Among many other

participants, I quote Taimur Yusufzai a University Lecturer from Swat, who told me,

“When military came, they initially did not allow us to sit in Hujras, especially at late

evening. But later on they got fine and have not imposed anything as such”(Yusufzai,

2017). Even if the behavior of military has got better as perceived in Swat, the conflict of

both militants and military has deep repercussions for Hujra culture in Swat, which can be

felt even today.

Moreover, I postulate that, „Fear‟ plays a significant role. This fear has been (and

is) of an „unlimited things‟. This includes the fear of militants, military, being insulted,

being questioned and so on. In a society where honor is so valuable, insult can do a long-

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lasting harm. Likewise, this fear can be for a guest in Hujra or for the host himself and his

family members. Militants or military men can come to Hujra and ask people about their

identity where people may even be searched in Hujra. This was (is) fearful for Pukhtuns in

Swat. This fear did not allow people to come to Hujra or have a guest in hujra late at night.

Yusuf khan is a Khan in Dherai, he told me, “Hujra is deserted. Limited people sit here

now. People in the Hujra and the Hujra itself are searched. Because of this People fear

now”(Khan, 2017).

This fear, once created, was significant and the presence or absence of militants

(and later the military) become the same because of the perception that they (militants or

military men) are present around. This constant fear was stopping people from coming to

Hujra, which resulted in decline of the culture. It was severe in more sensitive areas. The

comment of Taimur Yusufzai, from Charbagh, was “Initially militants used to be here in

our streets, which was frightening”(Yusufzai, 2017). Likewise, when people started

getting back to Hujra, after the military operations, they still had „fear‟ in mind. Such

people in Swat are reminded of this fear, with constant intervals, when someone is target

killed even this day. Fazal Yusufzai a young local small business holder from a very rural

village explained this. He said,

“In crisis, due to fear we stopped going to Hujra. For the last two to three years we are

back to that hujra again. No one stop us from going there but out of fear we did so. Some

events occurred/occurs that increases our fear. For example, one of our friends, was killed

while going home from Hujra. After that we had to be careful while going to Hujra

(Yusufzai, 2017)”.

Such situations, compelled people to stay at homes and discouraged them to attend Hujras.

Taimur Yusufzai told me, “Even before sun-sit we are in home”(Yusufzai, 2017). In

comparison to youngers, elders were more sensitive. Even today, they do not go to Hujra

and try to discourage youngers too. Muhammad Rehman Dada, a School principal in

Swat, told me,

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“Hujra has been deserted now. We do not sit there ourselves and do not let our own

youngers to stay late at night or after evening in Hujra now. Even at very early morning we

do not go out from home, till dawn (Dada, 2017)”.

As fear has been central in the whole conflict, it has affected Hujra and its culture

too. In this context, fear contributed to the decrease in hujra attendance in Swat.

Conclusively, the traditional culture of attending Hujra by men has been seriously

impacted. In this context, interesting replacements of Hujra are coming up and are getting

more popular. A small shop in a village can be a place where people would sit, mostly

after evening, instead of Hujra or Betak. Besides discussions on different issues, it can also

be used to offer Melmastya. If a shop is run by a youngster, mostly his youngster friends

will come and if by an elder mostly elders will come. However, it cannot be an exact

replacement of Hujra and betak because of its size, nature and cultural position, and many

elders may not like their youngers to sit in a shop. Moreover, the general time of hujra

used to be from evening till late night before the conflict. Nowadays, the time has

squeezed much and ends up at evening. Thus, hujras or betaks are mostly closed after

evening.

Interestingly, some people, mostly khans and their younger generations, are used to

holding of big gatherings in Hujra. Some of these used to have many hujras, where people

from the village would sit for hours till night. As due to the conflict people are not coming,

in post conflict situation they have started using TV or „Cable‟ to attract people. They are

trying to attract youngsters now as elders are never going to be back to Hujra with the

same zeal as earlier. Salman Khan told me,

“We had three Hujras here in our area as each of my uncle had his own. Those used to be

full of people, youngers, elders etc. Discussions, gossip stories, of the day spent, would be

the topics. Now people don‟t come out after the conflict to Hujra. To attract young people,

we have brought a TV and Dish cable to the Hujra. The environment of the Hujra has also

been impacted now and elders never come out (Khan, 2017)”.

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In such situations, when hujra was closed, along with other effects of it, the most

direct and significant has been its negative and detrimental impact on the ideal and

traditional culture of Melmastya.

The phenomenon, of conflict and violence, has significantly affected the traditional

culture of melmastya, which many of the participants discussed and where I have my own

observation too. Since Hujra is a space primarily utilized for serving guests and

performing Melmastya, the above developments have direct impacts on the practice of

Melmastya. Due to reduction in Hujra attendance in Swat, melmastya is also affected. The

situation of conflict has affected the practice of attending guests. People in Swat, more

symbolically state that their doors (of hujra) are closed for guests now. A female

participant, Saira Naz Khor, told me that, “Melmastya has suffered here. The doors are

closed now for unknown guests”(Khor, 2017). This point was also elaborated by another

female participant who believes that Melmastya has decreased for known people even and

in some situations, they are compelled to tell a guest to leave their Hujra. Shazia Noor

Khor, told me in Kabal,

“There is almost no Melmastya now for non-acquaintances. Melmastya, even for known

people, has been damaged. This is because trust has diminished, and we fear too. During

the conflict, we had to tell a guest to leave Hujra because of the security issue. Which is

not Pukhtu at all (Khor, 2017).

Trust, fear and the security issues all crop up due to the conflict and violence in

Swat. Moreover, failing to provide Melmastya is considered as a deviation from

Pukhtunwali/Pukhtu culture. Ishfaq Lala, among many other participants, reflected upon

this too. His argument was that, “Due to security reasons even today, we cannot have a

stranger (such as a traveler) as a guest. Before the crisis we would have anyone as a guest

(Lala, 2017)”. Comparison, again, is with the times before conflict where everyone was

offered Melmastya. However, at the present or during conflict, Melmastya is selective.

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The above comments also illustrate that conflict and violence has both direct and indirect

impacts for Melmastya along with Hujra and Betak. Significant impacts can be witnessed

in the case of gham-khadi, another central aspect of Pukhtun socio-cultural life.

4.2. Conflict, Violence and the performance of Gham-Khadi/Marae-Jwandae in Swat

Gham-Khadi (Sorrow and Joy) is an important and significant cultural ideal, social value

and an ethnic identity marker among the Pukhtuns. Pukhtuns visit one another in times of

gham and khadi, for mourning and celebration respectively and engage in social

interaction. Social and political importance and cultural symbolism are the primary aspects

of gham-khadi. Gham-Khadi exchanges involve performative rituals, that affirm a

member‟s place in society through the maintenance of complex social networks and taking

part in constructing and maintaining their ethnic identities (Schweiss, 2012). Traditionally,

Gham-Khadi is considered as a social compulsion for both Pukhtun men and women. It is

an important aspect for understanding behavioral patterns, cultural assumptions of

Pukhtunwali and the boundary aspects of ethnic identity (Jan,, 2010, pp 109-120). Gham-

khadi is a continuous and constant feature of social, cultural and even political life of a

Pukhtun (Ahmed, 2005, pp. 930–931). It encompasses several events, ranging from death

and marriage to visiting someone who is ill or a kid‟s circumcision ceremony, birth of a

child, condolence on following an election defeat, or felicitations to winners etc. (Amineh

Ahmed 2005, 942; Schweiss 2012, 19). Among these events, however, there exists a

hierarchy, in which marriages are the ultimate Khadi and funerals as the most important

gham events (Schweiss, 2012, p.19).

Any event of gham-khadi, if missed is later compensated with Mubaraki for Khadi

and dua for a gham, which affirms the significance of performing it. Different factors

make up a specific crude criterion for measuring the discharge of gham-khadi and its

associated Pukhtunness. More interestingly, gham-khadi attendance is then reciprocated

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later, by both men and women (Ahmed, 2005, p. 946). It is a social compulsion and is

performed to avoid shame (sharam) or dishonor (Ahmed, 2005, pp. 952-953). The honour

of an individual as well as a family, in such cases of arranging khadi or people coming for

gham, is tied to the success of the event and that depends upon the number of people

coming to the event (Ahmed, 1980, pp. 243–288; Barth, 1959, p. 32). A large attendance

maintains honour, while scant attendance may lead to the ostracism of the person whose

gham/khadi it is (Ahmed, 2005, p. 943). Those who perform gham-khadi are termed as

„true Pukhtuns‟ and are thought to be sensitive to their Pukhtunness (Schweiss 2012, pp,

21–22). On the contrary, anyone not performing gham-khadi is looked down upon and is

believed to be a „lesser Pukhtun‟. Conclusively, I argue that performing gham-khadi is a

significant marker of Pukhtun culture and ethnic identity. Moreover, the performance and

symbolic presence of gham-khadi was similar in Swat before the conflict. People even this

day engage in maximum of these events to affirm their place in the society and maintain

their Pukhtunness. Different processes and phenomena, including the conflict and violence

impacts it in different ways.

The recent conflict and violence in Swat have hampered the performance of Gham-

khadi in different direct and indirect ways. From the list of indirect impacts, the lowering

of financial position of the people, due to conflict in Swat, is one. In the argument of

Misbah Ullah, a local political activist from Nawae Kalae, “As financial positions of the

people have weakened due to the conflict and crisis, activities of Khadi have grown weak

too” (M. Ullah 2017). Conflict in Swat has impacted economy of the region in so many

different ways, more particularly the tourism industry has been impacted, which was one

of the main sources of income for people in the region. This has seriously impacted the

financial position of business and middle who cannot spend more on traditions in Khadi.

Among many participants, Said Alam Lala from Kabal, commented that, “As economy has

been negatively impacted, this has indirectly impacted gham khadi. Though the culture of

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gham-Khadi has been altered by many factors, financial position has been the primary

reason”(Lala, 2017). This indirect impact of conflict for gham-Khadi (especially Khadi) is

part of the debate in Swat. Some, like Ibrar Shah Lala, a political worker from Mingora,

would say that, “Marriage etc. traditional culture has now gone. Financial position is one

issue”(Lala, 2017), while many others, like Spen Dada, an elder from Swat, will argue that

economic position is more responsible for the impacts in Khadi culture, especially, than

the conflict itself directly. He said, “economic positions of people have impacted this, not

mostly the conflict” (Dada, 2017).

Another aspect, in the story of indirect impacts of conflict for gham-khadi, is the

decline in role of committees and organizations (discussed above in chapter on conflict

and jarga) which were responsible for helping people in gham-Khadi. As conflict and

violence impacted the performance of organizations and committees, it indirectly impacted

the process of gham-khadi in the region. In such situations where security was an issue,

volunteer members of these organizations and committees were not ready to take any

security risk. Among many participants, Islam Yusufzai a university student in Nawae

Kalae Mingora commented that, “There used to be a committee in our area for gham-

khadi, which would help people in arrangements. Now its activities are limited and that

affects the gham-khadi celebrations” (Yusufzai, 2016). This phenomenon has negatively

impacted the celebration of gham-khadi in the region. On the other side, other than, such

indirect impacts, there are many significant and direct impacts by the conflict in this

regard. In some cases, the broader situation of conflict has impacted the performance of

gham-khadi, while in other cases specific approaches of militants and military have

impacted this aspect of Pukhtun culture in Swat.

An overwhelming majority of my research participants in Swat agreed that people

do not engage much in gham-khadi rituals these days, as a repercussion of many factors

including the conflict. Conflict and violence in Swat, along with many other factors, has

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resulted in reduction of the practice of gham-khadi in the region. During the peak times of

conflict, gham-khadi rituals were halted in most of the Swat. In other situations, it has

lowered in frequency and its nature has been impacted. Saira Naz Khor, who is a female

lecturer from Swat, narrated her family experience as such,

“There was no gham-khadi in conflict. At the death of our own cousin, during

conflict, we were informed four days later. As there was no communication due to the

conflict and the security situation was bad, we could not attend the gham of our

cousin”(Khor, 2017).

Due to the lack of communication or the poor existence of it, it was not easy to inform

people of gham-khadi events. Moreover, it was not easy to travel for gham-khadi

celebrations. This situation impacted the number of people going for gham-khadi events.

A participant, named Naveed Khan lala, a shopkeeper from Matta, told me that “The

number of people going to gham-khadi celebrations have been very low, especially during

the conflict” (Lala, 2017).

Though, in some areas and contexts where/when the conflict was low in intensity,

experience and observation has been different, the inability to perform gham celebrations,

significantly funerals, is always mentioned by participants in Swat. This is due to many

connected reasons for different times. For a long time, people feared as there was a risk of

a funeral being blasted by the militants, especially of a VDC member, personal of security

forces or a local Khan who is opponent of the militants. In this regard, one such event is

mostly quoted by Swatis, which happened in a high school in Mingora on the funeral of a

DSP of police36

. Among many participants, I quote Mudasir Swati, a university lecturer

from Mingora,

36

There was a suicide attack on a DSP, Javed Iqbal, funeral, who was killed in Lakki Marwat and whose

funeral was blasted in Haji Baba School Mingora then on 28-29 February 2008. At least 30 to 38 were killed

in the blast on his funeral, though some estimates believe at least 60 were killed (See

https://www.dawn.com/news/291713,http://zamaswat.net/2017/02/27/haji-baba-school-blast-9th-

anniversary/).

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“The significant change is that few people now attend funerals, due to fear of conflict

times. This fear is due to many events. For example, the suicide attack on the funeral of

DSP Javed after he was killed in a terror attack earlier. In his blast, many were killed from

one family. In Khadi, changes are due to media along with the conflict” (Swati, 2017).

This happened with most of the funerals of police officers, tribal elders or even later the

VDC members. Due to fear, people avoided attending such a gham celebration and

funeral. In most cases, very few people used to attend such funerals and as a tactic the time

of the funeral of some were changed without notifying people. Taimur Yusufzai,

University lecturer, from Charbagh, told me,

“Gham-Khadi has been impacted much. In intense conflict, there was only Gham. Due to

blasts in funerals, as a tactic to avoid attack on the funeral, time of the funeral of an ANP

politician was changed suddenly” (Yusufzai, 2017).

In the same line, gham, especially funerals, of those alleged as militants have

attracted few people. This has been due to the fear of Pakistani state and military. In most

of the cases, as Human Rights commission of Pakistan has reported too, militants killed by

Pakistani state were dumped in mass graves with human rights violations (HRCP 2009;

Human Rights Watch 2010; Khursheed, Faheem, and Marwat 2016). There was no funeral

of such people, though they had families in Swat. Moreover, there was no one to offer or

arrange funerals, when for almost three months people were pulled out of Swat and were

IDPs in different areas of the province. Shereen lala, a local journalist from Mingora,

among many, told me that, “some funerals, mostly of militants or alleged militants, were

offered by very few”(Lala, 2017). Some of the participants even reported that those who

attended the funerals of alleged militants, were missing for some time, after which people

did not attend such funerals. Shahid Saleem, a university student from Kabal, informed me

that,

“Gham has been impacted. Three things are important, first when a funeral was fired,

people feared to attend others. Second, people from Swat are missing or were made

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missing, who attended funerals of militants. Third, of some people and in some cases,

government (military) ordered not to announce for funerals in crisis times (Saleem 2016)”.

In such a context, lowering of the performance of gham becomes an understood

phenomenon. Most significant event of gham, that is funeral, becomes painful to maintain.

The conflict and violence of militants and military has witnessed the killings of many in

Swat, including innocent civilians (along with militants and military men). Amidst the

conflict and violence, nobody was going to take a security risk to take part in funerals and

other events of these gham. Such a time is remembered with a sad tone. A female

participant, Shazia Noor Khor, who is a school teacher, told me in Kabal, “Many

innocents were killed in this conflict. No one could mourn their deaths in traditional

manner. Moreover, as the committee was not working, there was no one to help people of

the village in Gham-Khadi”(Khor, 2017). Similar was the comment of Qudrat Lala, a

government officer in Kabal, that “In some cases, during crisis times, two or three people

had to gather and attend funeral”(Lala, 2016). A participant, Asif Iqbal, who is a

university student, told me about his own family experience, “My grandfather died during

the conflict. There was no one to help us even. It was painful for us. About ten individuals

participated in the funeral” (Iqbal, 2017). During such an intense conflict and violence, it

was not possible to arrange a funeral for someone. Shahid Ahmed, who is a driver, in an

organization in Fizzagut, claimed that many dead bodies were buried in a single grave and

there was no performance of gham-khadi because of constant curfews. He told me,

“During crisis (conflict) almost nothing of gham-khadi was performed as such. This was

due to recurring curfews and the security situation. We have seen people who were dead,

killed in conflict, and as many as five buried in a single grave” (Ahmed, 2017).

Moreover, attendance in gham and funerals was also impacted by the polarization in

society. As the society was polarized, it influenced the decision to attend a gham and

funeral. People who were pro militants did not attend funerals of men who were/are from

armed services or who were/are pro military. On the other hand, people who were pro-

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government participated in greater number in such funerals and vice versa. Muhammad

Farooq, during an FGD told me in Kabal “Gham is must but attendance became problem

as people were polarized of being pro militants or pro Government. In curfews, it was not

possible to attend Funerals of anyone” (Farooq, 2017). Even if the context of inability to

perform gham was for a limited time, it has resulted in impacts which can be seen even

today. The transformations which occurred are long lasting while the specific time is

remembered with helplessness.

Moreover, on the contrary and interestingly, in some cases of gham and funeral,

the opposite happened. The funerals of some people, despite their low socio-economic

status, have witnessed enormous gatherings. The number of people in such cases has been

more than normal. There are different reasons of which „sympathy‟ for the person dead

because of the perception that he was innocent is primary one. Such happenings have been

more in post military operations times. To quote Ishfaq Lala, a social and political worker

from Mingora, “Many funerals were more crowded, for example one man was killed in a

curfew, his funeral was crowded more than normal”(Lala, 2017). Another participant,

named Fazal Yusufzai, a local small business holder of Kabal, told me that, “One of the

members of a VDC was targeted and in his funeral, we saw too many people. It was a

huge gathering ”(Yusufzai, 2017). This has been an unusual happening in the context of

traditional gham-khadi culture. As funeral occupies the most significant place in gham

activities, the impacts for this are most debated. Moreover, the performance of gham

activities was limited only to funerals and even that was painful for people in Swat. Other

minor gham events have been least performed in this situation.

Though, in some cases the approach of militants and military may be

differentiated, in majority of the cases, general conflict is the focus of such debates. In this

line of differentiation, my data attests that when militants took some control of specific

areas of Swat, opponents were strictly and even brutally handled by them. Most of their

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opponents were killed by them, along with civilians. Due to the fear of militants, no one

would touch the dead bodies, though such dead bodies used to be hanged in squares or laid

on roads for days. Offering funerals of such people was impossible and risky for everyone.

So, there used to be no one to mourn or perform funeral and no one was allowed by the

militants. In other cases, only few, as two or three men, came to offer the funerals of such

people by taking security risks.

On the other hand, when military was exercising some control in Swat, especially

in the post military operations period, it‟s approach to some of the activities, other than the

general situation, was strange. For example, in some areas and in sometimes, military

ordered that people shall take permission for a funeral. This may be because of the

security situations or keeping a check on activities in the region, people felt it was odd for

them. Laiq Dada, a local elder politician from Nawae Kalae, told me that “in conflict we

were required by the military to take permission even for funerals. It was strange for

us”(Dada, 2017). In this scenario, it was not easy to perform gham. Moreover, along with

gham, khadi celebrations have also been impacted.

The dynamics of khadi were also impacted in similar connected ways by the

conflict in Swat. Due to many direct and indirect reasons, people avoided to invite many

people for celebrations, though huge gatherings serve as symbol of social and economic

status. Likewise, militants and military stopped people from different activities, which

were central to the performance of khadi celebrations. Moreover, the exposure to areas and

cultures outside Swat during internal displacement also added to many changes in khadi

celebrations. The general conflict in Swat has reduced income of people which made these

huge gatherings unaffordable. The widespread prevalence of violence in Swat also

affected the celebrations of gham-khadi.

Khadi celebrations, during and after the conflict have become simple. Shereen lala

Local journalist Mingora “Khadi has become austere”(Lala, 2017). In such cases the

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passion and interest of people lowered, and celebrations became limited. According to a

female participant, Shazia Noor Khor, “Now that enthusiasm has lowered. In marriage,

there is not much ostentation or aerial firing etc.”(Khor, 2017). There are numerous

direct and indirect causes of this phenomenon. An indirect cause is linked to the lowering

of financial position of Swatis due to the conflict. Due to conflict, financial position of

people has been impacted, especially the business sector and the tourism industry in Swat,

it affected the celebration of Khadi. This added to the erosion of culture which at many

cases was demanding more finances. Ibrar Shah lala, who is a political worker from

Mingora told me that,

“The traditional culture of khadi like Marriage etc. has now ended up. Financial position is

one major reason of this. Another major reason is that due to the conflict people from

different backgrounds live in an area which impacts the tradition of khadi (Lala, 2017).”

As I have elaborated above, people from different backgrounds, groups, families and tribes

living in an area affect the cultural aspects of Purdah (discussed above in the chapter on

conflict and Purdah), it also affects the khadi culture. Traditionally, a single family or

group or tribe was living in a specific area and celebrating Khadi for a long-time span of

almost a month was possible, due to the conflict it is not possible now. People from

different backgrounds (tribes, groups or families) does not allow for the long traditional

celebrations in an area.

In the same manner, another indirect development of the conflict also impacted it.

The conflict of Swat caused the internal displacement of people in huge numbers. Majority

of Swatis were compelled to leave Swat and move to other districts of the province

especially Swabi, Mardan and Charsadda etc. The exposure from those areas also affected

the dynamic of khadi in Swat as Swatis learnt different traditions from people of these

areas. Before the conflict, people from Swat, due to specific geography, had not travelled

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so far, for so long, in such numbers. Salman Habib, a private school teacher from Swat,

along with many participants told me that,

“Khadi has been impacted due to the conflict in Swat. This is because new innovative

traditions have entered these celebrations. This is due to visits of Swatis to other areas like

Charsadda, Mardan etc. while we were IDPs.” (Habib, 2017).

Likewise, for such marriage celebrations, during the conflict, due to the lack of

communication and the presence of many military check posts, it was not easy to invite

many people or attend khadi events in huge numbers. Moreover, people avoided going to

events because of the bad experience they had for an earlier event. Among many

participants, I quote Shahid Saleem, a university student from Kabal, for his family‟s

experience,

“It was crisis times, shortly afterwards the military operations, that we had to travel for a

khadi event which was in the noon. As roads were blocked at many places, we had to go

on a long track. The existence of check posts and the travel through long track took us time

and we hardly reached there at evening instead of noon (with a smile) (Saleem, 2016)”.

Added to this trauma, people took to attend events, was the fact that some central activities

like playing music, doing aerial firings, arranging fireworks and celebrating for weeks in

marriages used to central in marriages and other khadi celebrations were discarded in

many cases. The general situation of conflict and gham in Swat affected the time span of

celebrating khadi events. The time spent in celebrating happiness generally shrunk form 2-

4 weeks to 2-4 days. A small business holder, Fazal Yusufzai, told me in Kabal,

“Before conflict, in khadi celebrations, there used to be music and happiness, now, due to

conflict, situation has changed. Thus, it is not so now. The loss due to conflict has affected

it. Marriage celebration are a day or two now, before conflict it used to be for

weeks”(Yusufzai, 2017).

Moreover, music was banned by the militants for a long time and people feared to play it

later even. People also avoided playing music because of the perception that Swat is in

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gham since many years. Shahid Saleem, a university student in Kabal, along with a

number of participants, told me that “Militants ordered not to play music in gatherings”

(Saleem 2016). Another participant, Sadaqat Azim, a university student from Kabal,

connected this aspect to the perception that Swat is in gham and music is lost. He told me,

“Music was totally banned by militants. Swat is still in gham, so khadi and music are

gone” (Azim, 2016). Moreover, stopping music in khadi events made it similar to gham

for many people. Without music, both new and traditional, khadi was termed by many as

gham and this was correlated with the times of militants control in Swat. Asad lala, a

politician from Mingora told me that, “In militant‟s time, Khadi was like gham (Lala,

2017)”. This restriction of music was considered by many as the only significant impact of

conflict, especially of militants, for khadi. Muhtaram Lala, an elder, during an FGD, told

me in Kabal, “Khadi is not impacted too much by the conflict for long. It was mostly

impacted in militant‟s time by them. Traditional music (Tang Takor ) was even banned

and not allowed” (Lala, 2017). That is the reason people blame militants, more than the

military, for impacting the celebration of khadi. As central activities of khadi were banned

and termed unislamic by the militants, this undermined the celebration of khadi.

However, there is differentiation in the approach of militants and military Militants

announced these orders for limiting activities of khadi, through the FM radio, and thus

people were mostly ready for such orders. For military, it was mostly direct orders and

people were not ready. Muhammad Farooq, from Kabal told me during an FGD,

“In Khadi, in most cases, the problem again was that people were not prepared for the

orders and compulsions of military. On the other hand, for militant‟s orders, people were

somehow ready as since FM Radio was used to instruct people about the agenda of

militants”(Farooq, 2017).

Militants stopped music in events, but military mostly banned aerial firings and fireworks.

Since music is coupled by aerial firing and fireworks in celebrations of khadi events, this

aspect was more dominant in the relation of military with the performance and celebration

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culture of khadi. According to Muhammad Farooq, from Kabal, “In Khadi, military

stopped aerial firing and fireworks etc.” (Farooq, 2017) and Asad lala, a politician from

Mingora, “Military imposed restrictions on firing etc.” (Lala, 2017). As a conclusion,

both the actors, militants and military, have impacted the celebration and performance of

khadi, like gham, in Swat.

Moreover, being central to the performance of Pukhtun culture, it has

repercussions for Pukhtun ethnic identity and distinctiveness. Likewise, it is considered as

a social compulsion and is retained to a maximum possible level. A local politician, Fazal

Khan, told me in Charbagh,

“In crisis times, it was almost stopped. People were unable to attend funerals; so many

dead bodies were buried in back yards of homes. However, we also resisted and still have

many old traditions in this regard as gham-khadi is much needed for our social and cultural

life (Khan, 2017).

The society in Swat is trying to restore old traditions and people are attending such events

and perform gham-khadi. Moreover, social life in Swat is coming to normal and same is

with the performance of gham-khadi. Fazal Khan, a local politician from Mingora, told me

that “In conflict times the performance of gham-khadi was halted. Now it has returned

back (Khan, 2017)” Same was the opinion of Muhammad Rehman Dada, an elder from

Charbagh, who told me that “In crisis (conflict) times it was halted but people participate

now” (Dada, 2017). In the same line, Yusuf Khan from Swat told me, “Gham-khadi

culture had been impacted much due to the conflict. However, Swatis are active, both

socially and Politically. So they attend gham-khadi festivals” (Khan, 2017).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that hujra and melmastya are both significant and

central aspects of Pukhtun socio-cultural life and markers of ethnic identity. Moreover, I

argued that the recent conflict and violence in Swat has impacted the culture of hujra and

melmastya in different and multiple forms. hujra and melmastya have witnessed impacts

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which are far reaching, and which affect their nature, functions and dynamics. Such

complex impacts significantly undermine and transform the culture of hujra and

melmastya. The repercussions are even evident to this day and this has direct links with

Pukhtu (Pukhtun culture) as hujra and melmastya are deemed central to Pukhtun culture.

The efforts of revival and remorse shows the centrality of hujra and melmastya to Pukhtun

ethnic identity. Moreover, the loss of hujra and melmastya in some areas is not only

repented but is considered as the loss of Pukhtu and Pukhtun ethnic identity. Though

affected by the conflict and violence, hujra and melmastya have not been completely

discarded as they are deemed central to Pukhtun culture and ethnic identity.

Likewise, I have demonstrated that the cultural performance of gham-khadi in

Swat has witnessed significant transformations during and after the conflict. In some

cases, it has been halted, in others it has been performed differently. Moreover, the

repercussions are both permanent and temporary ones. The transformations and impacts

for these are remembered in Swat with helplessness. Moreover, most of the impacts are

considered as seriously undermining the culture of gham-khadi itself and as negative

(socially). Pukhtuns have a traditional culture of reciprocity in performing gham-khadi,

which has also been impacted as badal (social reciprocity) has not been possible. Conflict

and violence in Swat have also impacted other cultural ideals of the Pukhtuns, like the

social distinction and relation between youngers and elders (kashar and mashar) and badal.

Below I discuss these aspects in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 5: CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN SWAT: IMPACTS ON THE

SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MASHAR AND KASHAR, BADAL,

HONOR-SHAME COMPLEX AND THE CONTEXTUALITY-COMPLEXITY OF

PUKHTUN ETHNIC IDENTITY

Introduction

In this chapter, I present my arguments about the impact of conflict and violence on social

relationship between mashar and kashar, badal, honor-shame and the contextuality of

Pukhtun ethnic identity markers. I argue that conflict and violence, of militants and

military, in Swat, has impacted the social relations between mashar and kashar, a claimed

hallmark of Pukhtun society and culture. The conflict and both of its actors (militants and

military) have not cared for the authority and respect of mashars. Militants, who were

mostly kashars, have challenged, humiliated and even killed most of the mashars,

considered by them as pro-Pakistani state and government. Likewise, Pakistani state

military did not care about the respect and honor of mashars. Moreover, the shutting down

and disturbing of hujra has affected the learning and training process of kashars.

Consequently, this has repercussions for the social position of mashars and the relations

between mashars and kashars.

Linking conflict, violence and badal, I argue that badal is significant factor in the

conflict of Swat. Many indivuals, families and even „groups/categories‟ took badal from

others in the garbage of this conflict. As militants were powerful in a time, people joined

them to use their „tag‟ and took badal from their opponents. In post military operations

period, many people have used their relationship with Pakistani state and its military to

take badal from their opponents. I postulate that this phenomenon has impacted the socio-

cultural symbol and practice of badal and has defamed this cultural value. Moreover, this

has also added to the already stereotypic and violent projections of badal. In the context of

conflict in Swat, it became easy for some Swatis to take badal while impossible for others.

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Both individual as well as collective badal is left for many, which people intend to take in

the future. Moreover, Pukhtuns in Swat also connect this to their honor.

Further, I argue that as Pukhtuns in Swat have lost some cultural ideals during the

conflict, while others have been significantly transformed, like Purdah, Jarga,

hujra/melmastya, gham-khadi, the relationship of mashars and kashars and badal, they feel

to have lost their honour (nang) and Pukhtunwali/Pukhtu. The loss of honour, has shifted

the social balance of honour-shame complex towards shame. I propose that „shame‟, is

prevalent among many, both men and women, especially those who are sensitive or

mashars. The loss of honour and Pukhtu (the culture) has devoid Pukhtuns of an ethnic

identity marker. Moreover, I argue that during the conflict‟s peak times and after that,

Pukhtuns are relying more on ascribed aspect of Pukhtunness, where ethnic identity is not

lost. Lineage (the title of being Pukhtun by birth), tribal identity, land and language as

ascribed markers of ethnic identity owes more significance now. The relative importance

for ascribed Pukhtunness has increased as this is the only marker for Pukhtuns in such a

context and thus the conflict adds more to the contextuality of ethnic identity markers.

However, I propose that ethnic identity which is claimed in both culture and ascribed

aspects is considered as an ideal one. On the other hand, ethnic identity claimed only in

ascribed aspects and devoid of the practice of Pukhtun culture is an identity which is not

ideal and whose Pukhtunness is lesser than the ideal one. For some of the Pukhtuns, this

ethnic identity is not an identity at all, as culture is lost, for others ascribed aspects still

work to affirm their claim to ethnic identity.

Moreover, the recent conflict and violence in Swat has impacted intra ethnic

boundaries and relations among the Pukhtuns. I postulate that, though the conflict has not

impacted the inter-tribal dimensions, it has a significant relation with the contestation,

boundaries and relations between the categories of khanan and gharibanan. These relations

have been somehow sharpened and strained. Thus, the conflict also adds to the complexity

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of Pukhtun ethnic identity. I expand these arguments below with a reference to some of

the relevant literature.

I have divided this chapter into sections and sub-sections. In the first section, I

discuss the impact of conflict in Swat for the social relationship of mashar and kashar. In

sub-sections i refer to some of the literature related to the centrality of this socio-cultural

and ethnic aspect of Pukhtun society. Then, I elaborate the impacts of conflict on the

relations of mashars and kashars in Swat. I also discuss the specific approaches of

militants and military towards mashars and kashars during and after the conflict in Swat.

In the next section I explore the relationship of conflict and violence in Swat with badal. In

sub sections I start from reflecting upon some of the literature, that focuses badal as a

socio-cultural ideal of Pukhtun culture and society. It also elaborates the performance of

badal among the Pukhtuns. In the next sub-section, i discuss the interplay of conflict and

violence with badal in Swat. Here, I elaborate the impacts of conflict, of militants and

military, for badal in Swat.

Following this, in the next section I demonstrate the linkage of conflict in Swat

with honour-shame. In the first sub section, I discuss the socio-cultural aspect of honour-

shame complex with reference to Pukhtun society. In the next sub-section, I discuss the

prevalence of shame and loss of honour among the Pukhtuns in Swat, in the present

context. After this, in the next section, I discuss the contextuality of ethnic identity

markers in the context of present conflict in Swat. In the last section, I explore the impact

of conflict in Swat for the intra-ethnic relations among the Pukhtuns. The complexity of

ethnic identity is part of this discussion. The chapter closes with a conclusion.

5.1. Mashar and Kashar: Who cares? Conflict and the relations between mashar and

kashar

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Age consideration and its social expression in two categories of Mashar and Kashar 37

play an important role in structuring social positions and authority in Pukhtun society.

There is a cultural distinction between these two categories of mashar and kashar.

Moreover, the discussion is always occupied by the debates regarding mashars and their

honour, respect and authority. These categories are not only based on ages but are social,

cultural, tribal and even political in nature. Traditionally a mashar used to be white

bearded, called Spen Gerai, but this is not always the case. A mashar can be one in family,

tribe, society or the community. In tribal sense, they may be appointed by the government

(called Malak) or by the tribe through a Jarga. Moreover, some mashars may gain

authority and be self-appointed. On a more social level, irrespective of the tribal or

government designation, being mashar is a contextual process. Likewise, more generally

anyone senior in respect of age is also considered as mashar.

A mashar, irrespective of his „caste‟ or tribe or occupation etc., must be respected

by the kashar who is subordinate and obedient. Mashar holds absolute authority in a

limited sphere and is tasked with making decisions related to family and tribal, cultural or

political affairs, where his decisions are always expected to be honored and accepted by

the kashars. If the decision of mashar is challenged or rejected, the kashar is termed as

disobedient and disrespectful and is looked down upon because he is perceived of being

least careful about Pukhtun values and is considered as a „lesser Pukhtun‟ (Saeed 2012,

139–40). Likewise, mashar/mashars have more access to different forums and usually

speak on behalf of the community (in Jarga or with government) (Saeed, 2012, p. 203). In

tribal setup, mashars are entitled to authority and access because of many reasons,

including the inheritance of this title, possession of land, tribal descent (Barth, 1959, p.72),

being from a powerful family, having illustrious ancestors (from the family of a Khan) and

37

Can be translated as elder and younger, senior or junior, however these are not the correct expressions as

the terms are socio-cultural ones.

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an ability to provide protection to the smaller landowners (Lindholm, 1996, p. 78). Akbar

S Ahmed has also reported such a relationship in his study among Pukhtuns of Mohmad

Agency (Ahmed, 1980, pp, 143–145). Conclusively, there exists a social, cultural and

tribal position of mashar with a distinction from kashar.

Linked to the conflict in the region of Pukhtuns (especially Waziristan), Mariam

Abou Zahab argues that the conflict is basically a war of Kashar against Mashar in the

society as elders have been enjoying authority since centuries and this time youngers have

challenged their authority in the name of religion (Zahab, 2013). Though I believe that the

conflict is Swat does not testify, solely, to this argument, it is a fact that most of the

militants (not all) were young and those who were targeted, were social, cultural or

political elders, masharan. However, it is also observed that among militants the same

social distinction was visible, even after assigning a younger member as head of the

organization. Elders who have more knowledge, understanding and experience, were thus

given roles to dispense justice, frame policies or do diplomacy, if required. Being on the

streets, disseminating information or other activities requiring „following‟ and „obedience‟

were given to kasharan, mostly younger ones. Significant dynamics and impacts of the

recent conflict and violence for this socio-cultural feature can be outlined.

Opinion in Swat is diverse, regarding the impacts of conflict for the socio-cultural

distinction and position of mashar and kashar. Moreover, the debate is mainly occupied by

the discussion of supposed care and respect for the honor and authority of mashars. Some

(though few) of the participants claimed that the Swat society was already free from the

authority structure of mashars. Ishfaq Lala, a political worker from Mingora, told me that,

“We were already free from this authority system” (Lala, 2017). However, such an

opinion is not a majority one. On the contrary, a majority and overwhelming opinion of

research participants in Swat inform that the conflict in Swat has impacted the relations of

mashars and kashars and its actors (militants and military) have not honored mashars in

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most of the cases. This aspect has played a major role in the conflict and thus has been

impacted in different forms. For some (like Iqbal Lala from Kabal) the impacts are too

clear and even family relations have been impacted due to the conflict in Swat, set aside

mashars and kashars. He told me, “mashar-kashar relations have been impacted too

much. Even son and parent‟s relation have been impacted” (Lala, 2016). Moreover, there

is a strong perception in Swat, that even today, as a repercussion; people don‟t care for the

respect and honor of mashars. Fazal Khan told me in Mingora that, “There has been no

care for mashars during the conflict and it is prevalent even now. Even spen gerai were

not cared and honored. That is why today people don‟t care for spen gerai much”(Khan,

2017).

This phenomenon of disrespect and dishonor for the mashars is attributed to

everyone involved in the conflict, both militants and military, and is thus referred to the

general conflict in Swat. In many cases, mashars have been tainted and disgraced, showing

them no respect, as required in the socio-cultural setup. Among many, Fazal Yusufzai

from Kabal, told me, “Too many cases of tainting mashars. Kashars have not been caring

mashars during the conflict. The old culture has changed now” (Yusufzai, 2017).

Likewise, among many participants, Islam Yusufzai, a university Student from Mingora,

told me, “Mashars have been dishonored” (Yusufzai, 2016), while Misbah Ullah from the

same town informed me that, “The relations have been disturbed too much. The

distinction between mashar and kashar has finished now” (Ullah, 2017). In the words of

Shereen Lala, a local journalist from Mingora, “No body during the conflict cared this

aspect” (Lala, 2017).

Moreover, the conflict has impacted Hujra, which in turn impacts the relations

between mashars and kashars. In the first place, when Hujra culture and its sittings were

impacted (see pp,) it had repercussions for the relations of mashars and kashars. Hujra was

a space shared by both mashars and kashars, where mashars used to train kashars for a

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Pukhtun way of life. Thus, the shutting down of hujra and the phenomenon of mashars

leaving to attend hujra, impacted the relations of mashars and kashars. Hayat Khan Dada,

a local mashar and politician from Mingora told me,

“Mashar-kashar relations have been impacted by the conflict. This is linked to the

phenomenon of shutting hujra where informal and social education was given to kashars.

As that process was hampered, it affected the relations between mashars and kashars.

Along with this, the society of Swat has been shattered and people are not united now.

Thus, the social distinction has not been possible in the post conflict situation” (Dada,

2017).

At a time of such a social decay and limited social training of kashars, the line between

mashar and kashar is seriously eroded. This impacts the relations between mashar and

kashar and decreases the care for the respect and honor of mashars. In the words of Shahid

Ahmed, from Mingora, “The relations of mashars and kashars have been impacted as the

gap between both has almost finished. Shame has diminished” (Ahmed, 2017).

Significantly, as Shahid Ahmed commented, the phenomenon is tied to shame. Moreover,

the act of not honoring and differentiating mashars is considered as socially damaging.

Ibrar Shah Lala, from Mingora told me,

“The distinction between mashar and kashar was not properly cared during the conflict.

Elders (Spen Gerai) were not accepted and differentiated as elders. Actors in the conflict

used to do what they wished which is really wrong/bad” (Lala, 2017).

The distinction between mashar and kashar and then honoring mashar, especially Spen

Gerai, is a central social aspect of the society, the loss of which is termed as wrong and

which produces shame for individuals. While linking this phenomenon, of dishonor and

disrespect of mashars and distinction between mashar-kashar, to the times before conflict,

Mudasir Swati, a university lecturer from Mingora, commented that, “There used to be

distinction between mashars and kashars earlier, before the conflict. Now the honor and

respect for elders have decreased” (Swati, 2017). Resultantly, conflict contributed to the

diminishing process of distinction between mashar and kashar and strained the relations

between them.

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Significantly, this process has been two sided. Not only that kashars donot care

mashars, as an impact mashars also do not care for kashars. Qudrat Lala, told me in Kabal

that, “The relations between kashars and mashars have been impacted both ways, as now

both the classes don‟t care about this distinction” (Lala, 2016). Because of the situation of

conflict, both mashars and kashars now take least care of each other. Moreover, there can

be analyzed, differences between the approach of militants and military in this regard.

Generally, both militants and Pakistani state military have not cared about any distinction

between mashars and kashars, when they had limited control over Swat. For some Swatis,

militants harmed and disturbed this the most, while for others Pakistani state military did

so. However, a majority and compelling opinion is that both are responsible in different

forms.

Dealing with elders was a problem for many young militants, when militants were

trying to install their authority in Swat. Opinion of my research participants is divided, as

many, an overwhelmingly majority, revealed that militants were devoid of ethics and

morality in some cases even, while others, very few, argued that, based on their

experience, militants were „good‟ as they cared this distinction of mashars and kashars.

Laiq Dada, an elder from Mingora, told me that “Many militants were good in this sense

that they cared about the honor of elders” (Dada, 2017). However, it is a fact that

militants wanted to remove all elders who were influential, could possibly challenge them

or were pro Pakistani state and government. Militants cared the honor of those elders who

could not challenge them and were not pro-state and pro-government. Moreover, militants

were strict towards those who could do so. Such mashars were dishonored and killed in

many cases.

In this context, I postulate that, militants strategically cared the honor and respect

of mashars in Swat. On the contrary, as a strategy, in some cases, militants cared this

distinction of mashars and kashars and tried to honor and respect mashars. In the family

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experience of Saira Naz Khor, from Mingora, is seen such an opinion. She told me, that

“Militants cared about the distinction of mashar and kashar in Swat society. My father,

who is a mashar and member of Jarga has been honored by militants in many cases”

(Khor, 2017). Such an experience has been very personal and individual. Moreover, if

mashars were not much against militants, they were cared and differentiated. In this line,

Taimur Yusufzai, a university lecturer informed me in Charbagh, that “In this connection

of mashars and kashars, militants were good as they cared this distinction. Mashars were

treated with honor by militants”(Yusufzai, 2017). For some of my research participants,

this distinction, care and honor came later and were not so in start days of militants control

in Swat. Thus, many participants commented that militants were initially not responsive to

these dynamics but later became careful. Among these, Muhammad Rehman Dada told me

in Charbagh, that “Militants did not care about mashar and kashar initially. However,

later they did care. Militants were mostly devoid of ethics and morality even” (Dada,

2017). Muhammad Rehman Dada‟s opinion is based on his and his student‟s experience

with the militants. Based on this experience, in which militants were not caring mashars

and women, he termed militants as devoid of morality.

Moreover, as a strategy again, militants killed those mashars who could challenge

them. From many comments, I quote Fazal Khan from Charbagh,

“The relation of mashar and kashar was impacted too much. The honor of mashars was not

cared by the militants. Militants wanted to remove all mashars who were influential and

could challenge them. As a consequence, now a day, kashars don‟t care about mashars”

(Khan, 2017).

This aspect has also been reported regularly in the media and news. Militants, in a move to

grab authority, dishonored and killed many mashars. This impacted the position of

mashars and created a vacuum in the society and has repercussions for the relations of

mashars and kashars. As militants had few mashars themselves and were mostly kashars,

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dealing mashars was a problem for them. Among many participants, Muhammad Mudasir,

told me about this aspect and militant‟s strategy in Kabal,

“In militant‟s time in Swat, the dynamics of mashars and kashars was impacted. Dealing

mashars was a problem for many young/kashar militants. Later, the top leadership of

militants decided to have mature militants for public dealing, especially dealing mashars”

(Mudasir, 2017).

However, the initial attitude of militants imprinted a perception that the distinction

between mashar and kashar has been eliminated from the societal understanding of Swat.

Abdullah Nangyal, a college student told me in Saidu Shareef, “The conflict in general

and militants particularly, has finished the distinction of mashar and kashar from the

society of Swat” (Nangyal, 2017). Not caring the distinction between mashar and kashar,

not honoring mashars properly and even killing them has a repercussion that majority

people in Swat now don‟t care this distinction and honor of mashars. Moreover, this has

impacted the societal relations between mashars and kashars negatively. Likewise, the

other powerful significant actor of the Swat conflict, Military, has also impacted this

socio-cultural aspect in different, yet socially detrimental, forms.

Initially, in post military operation times, due to security reasons, Pakistani state

military did not care about this distinction of mashar and kashar. Later, they started caring

to some extent, however still in many cases mashars are not treated „properly‟. Military

used to check Identification cards of mashars, which was termed as socially

„unacceptable‟. On unavailability of cards on check posts or in Hujras etc., mashars and

spen geri were humiliated even, violating the respect for elders. Many in Swat comment,

with a derogatory expression that for military there was no difference between kashar and

mashar and they treated all Swatis alike. This expression is impulsed by the perception

that military does not bother to care this distinction and is always suspicious of people is

Swat. Ishfaq Lala, a social worker told me in Mingora that, “Military think of all of us as

enemies with no care of mashar or kashar. Military do not bother to do so” (Lala, 2017).

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Likewise, military men started respecting mashars in many cases, if not all, after they

spent some time in Swat. Muhammad Rehman Dada from Charbagh commented that,

“initially military did not care about this distinction in Swat. Later, they started respecting

mashars” (Dada, 2017).

The most notorious aspect of this story is the observations and experiences of

people on military check posts, especially when a security accident happens in Swat.

There are countless stories and observations which demonstrate that mashars are not

treated properly on such check posts. Some of the initial Jargas in Swat also demanded the

military to have a respectful behavior with people of Swat especially mashars. On such

check posts, kashars, even kids are also mistreated. I quote the personal observation of

Shahid Saleem, a university student from Swat,

“I witnessed it myself, when a mashar (spen gherai) was rolled on the ground and insulted

due to unavailability of CNIC on a military check post. Likewise, on another check post

due to some problem a kashar, almost a kid, was slapped. Military men don‟t talk in a

good tone with mashars. They abuse mashars as well as Kashars” (Saleem, 2016).

These treatments can be due to different reasons, like the unavailability of CNIC, wearing

a sheet/sadar or talking on phone while on a military check post etc. Such an insult of a

mashar (in front of a kashar) adds to the erosion of distinction and social relations between

mashar and kashar. Abdullah Nangyal, a college student from Saidu Shareef, commented,

“Military as well as militants do not care in this regard. The distinction has been

eliminated” (Nangyal, 2017).

As a repercussion of the events and actions elaborated above, people feel the loss

of self-respect in Swat. Asad Lala, a politician from Swat, told me in Mingora, “Both

militants and military have impacted this aspect a lot. This has damaged our self-respect

even” (Lala, 2017). Moreover, the level of trust between mashars and kashars has been

damaged and decreased. Yusuf Khan told me in Dherai Swat, “Both militants and military

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did not care about this distinction. This phenomenon has repercussions for the trust

between mashars and kashars” (Khan, 2017). As another repercussion, kashars do not

accept the decisions of mashars now. The respect for mashars and their decisions has

enormously decreased, if not finished. Salman Habib, a school teacher told me in

Charbagh, “Kashars don‟t accept what mashars tell them. They do not obey and accept the

decisions of mashars now” (Habib, 2017). The conflict and the events have also affected

the mentality and psychology of kashars which has changed their behavior. Saira Naz

Khor, a female college lecturer, told me in Mingora that “The conflict has affected the

psychology of mostly the kashars and their behavior has changed now” (Khor, 2017).

Overall the conflict in Swat has impacted the social understanding and relations between

mashars and kashars as social categories in the society of Swat. Below I demonstrate the

relationship of conflict in Swat with the socio-cultural code of badal.

5.2. Badal and Violence: What happened?

Badal, literally translated as revenge/reciprocity, is a significant socio-cultural feature of

Pukhtun society. It has diverse social meanings and manifestations (Spain, 1985, p. 64;

Quddus, 1987, p. 67; Ibbetson, 1993,p. 58). Badal is paid preferably better than the way

received (Rome, 2013b, p. 93). The different forms of badal, depends upon the act,

situation and the persons involved. For example, in one of its forms it can be violence in

killing someone, in another it can be a compensation, yet in another one it can be

forgiveness, performed in response to diverse social actions (Rome, 2013b, p. 94).

Likewise, badal in the society is considered as a due right and in fact obligatory, both in

actions that are „bad‟ and „good‟. Its extreme form, mostly misunderstood as the only one,

is killing a man or any man from an opponent‟s family, tribe or sub tribe. Significantly

badal is not time bound (Rome, 2013b, p. 94). Likewise, badal can be „negative‟ as well as

„positive‟ (Rome, 2013b, pp, 94–95). Sultan I Rome, a scholar from Swat, contends that

the positive aspects of badal are more significant than some of its negative ones. He also

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argues that because of this, badal has been part of Pukhtun social and ethnic system since

long (Rome, 2013b, pp, 94–95). Badal, in its broader forms, is a compulsion. Anyone not

complying to badal in social activities, „good‟ or „bad‟, is looked down upon, not

considered as a „true Pukhtun‟, is denied the right to be called Pukhtun (Rome, 2013b, pp.

93–94). The recent conflict and violence in Swat have impacted this socio-cultural

imagination and practice of badal.

Badal is a significant socio-cultural aspect of the conflict and violence in Swat.

There are diverse and multiple patterns in this regard. The impacts of conflict for badal are

multiple as are the linkages of it with conflict. This linkage is so strong that it has become

deceptive for some scholars, who argue that the conflict in Pukhtun region is based on

badal, where Pukhtun in Pakistan are using the name of Taliban for their revenge from the

state of Pakistan, for breaking its tribal and Pukhtun structure (Ahmed, 2013, pp, 74–75).

On the contrary, however, some scholars argue that such an understanding of badal in this

context is „reductionist‟ and represent a colonial imprint. Moreover, I postulate that these

studies do not consider the complexity of the conflict and the multiple dimensions it is

having, besides being reductionist. Likewise, this understanding of badal „dehumanizes‟

Pukhtun with an unchangeable culture of wars, tribal vandalism, primitive, uncivilized,

traditional and revenge seeking, thus incompatible with so called modern world (Saigol,

2012; Taj, 2008a, 2008b).

On the contrary, I partially agree with the opinion of scholars like Rome and Taj

(Khattak, 2010; Khattak, Mohammad, & Lee, n.d.; Rome, 2013; Taj, 2008a, 2008b) both

from Pukhtun region, that revenge among Pukhtun can have different forms in different

contexts from different areas, accepting that violence can be one form of it not the

essential one (Taj, 2008a). Militants (as well as the state military) are not following the

code of revenge as annunciated in Pukhtunwali, the Pukhtun code, as they are killing

innocent people, children and even women, which never has been part of revenge (Taj,

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2008a). Moreover, the violence of Taliban is incompatible with any of these standards of

cultural revenge. These are only criminal acts, Farhat Taj argues (Taj, 2008b). Conflict in

Swat has multiple aspects in relation to badal as understood in Pukhtun socio-cultural

system.

Many indivuals, families and even „groups/categories‟ took badal from others in

the garbage of this conflict in Swat, both through the militants and military, which has

repercussions for badal as a cultural code. This has been due to many reasons. For

example, for many people in Swat, who were unable to take badal form their influential

and powerful opponents, it was a chance. In the words of Qudrat Lala, from Kabal Swat,

“There are many cases of taking badal in the crisis (conflict). For many people in Swat, it

was a chance to take badal” (Lala, 2016). This is a perception, which is common in Swat.

However, this perception is coupled with the argument that the conflict was not solely

based on badal. College and University Students during an FGD agreed to this in Saidu

Shareef. One participant in this group, Hamdard Shah, told me that,

“Badal has been working in this conflict in Swat. However, the conflict solely is not based

on badal, though, many people have used both militants and military to take badal from

their opponents. This phenomenon has occurred in too many cases”(Shah, 2017)

This has impacted the broader imagination of badal as a socio-cultural practice in the

region. When badal is used on such a scale, the process impacts it on the same scale.

Sadaqat Azim, a participant from Kabal commented that, “Badal worked in the conflict of

Swat and was impacted too during it”(Azim, 2016). This use of badal and the impacts for

it are both in militants as well as military‟s time of influence in Swat.

As militants were powerful in the initial time of conflict, people joined them or

showed them sympathy, to use their „name‟ and take badal from their opponents. Mudasir

Swati, a university lecturer in Swat, told me that,

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“People used to point out their opponents to militants by dubbing these as „people who

side the military‟. Thus, militants would then target such people. In the garb of militancy,

many people thus took badal.” (Swati, 2017)

Anyone dubbed as a government security employee of military or police or their spy was

at a high risk from militant‟s side. When, someone allied with the militants testifies about

such a person, the risk increases. Thus, for such people taking badal became easy. Some

even joined the group of militants for this purpose. Mudasir Swati narrated the story of

one of his friends, in this regard, “One of my friends was having some land disputes. When

Taliban took control and command of Swat, he joined Taliban for some time and took

badal from his opponents” (Swati, 2017).

As militants were having authority in the region, people joined them or showed

them sympathies and then dubbed their opponents as „people of the government and

military‟ or „people against militants‟. Thus, these people took badal from their opponents

through militants. Significantly, many participants termed this act as wrong and bad.

Moreover, many estimated that such cases will come up in future once the situation gets

somehow normal. Naveed Khan Lala told me in Matta Swat,

“Cases of badal will come up to the surface once the military leave. Many people have

done wrong by pointing their opponents to militants and later to military. People have

given names of their opponents or those they don‟t like, which is not good for the society

of Swat”(Lala, 2017)

In future, these cases may come up and result in a sequence of actions based on badal.

This can have repercussions for the society of Swat and the social understanding of badal.

This action can also be specified because, other than individuals, families and

classes/groups have been involved too in such actions. In initial days of the conflict,

militants were trying to attract a class of Swat who was not having much wealth and land.

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This category of people, called gharibanan 38

, were made to believe that the other category

of people, called khanan, has taken their share of land from them, which was earlier

divided equally among all in Swat. In this context, gharibanan were mostly attracted

towards militants. People in Swat claimed that some of these militants were planning of

land redistribution between khanan and gharibanan in Swat. However, most of the khanan

were backed by the state and its military later. During the conflict of Swat, gharibanan

took badal from khanan, perceived to be oppressive towards them. Fazli Akbar Dada, a

retired government servant told me in Kabal,

“Badal has been impacted much during the conflict in Swat. This is because, poor people

got authority and could take badal from Khans. This was somewhat possible and even easy

for them. They successfully used this crisis/conflict to take badal. There are other

individual cases of badal too”(Dada, 2016).

Majority of the people in Swat, attracted by the militants were from the category of

gharibanan. People from this category got a chance in the form of conflict to take badal

from the khanan.

On the contrary, some of the khanan, during my fieldwork, believed that there

existed a peaceful relationship between khanan and gharibanan (mostly agricultural

workers on the fields of khanan). This opinion was coupled by the argument that some

people involved in the conflict were only trying to disturb this peaceful relationship for

their own interests. Fazal Khan Lala, a traditional khan and politician from Mingora, told

me about this,

“There existed a peaceful and good relationship between us and our farmers. We used to

help them, and they helped us by cultivating our fields. During this conflict in Swat people

used some of them to disturb our peaceful relations” (Lala, 2017).

There exists, however, a contestation among these categories in Swat and opinion from

both the categories differ enormously. On a similar pattern, of khanan and gharibanan,

38

The plural of gharib, literally translated from Pukhtu as poor, gharibanan refers to poor but can be treated

as a category as opposed to Khanan, the plural of khan, wealthy (see Jan 2010, pp, 76–104).

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some families have also used the conflict to take badal from other families in their family

feuds. Iqbal Lala, a school teacher and social activist from Kabal, told me

“Badal has been an active factor in the conflict of Swat. Even families used this crisis for

taking badal from other enemy families. This was through both militants and military. This

continues even today” (Lala, 2016).

After militants, military was used too by people in Swat for taking badal. In post military

operations period, many people have used their relationship with Pakistani state, its

government and military to take badal from their opponents. Shahid Saleem, a university

Student from Kabal, commented that, “Many people have used this crisis (conflict) to take

badal. People used military to take badal from others (opponents/enemies). Some people

do so even today”(Saleem 2016). The same pattern was repeated in military‟s time of

influence, especially after the military operations. Mudasir Swati, a university lecturer,

also told me, “As it happened during militants time, it happened in military times too” (

Swati, 2017).

On the other side of this line, there are many Pukhtuns in Swat, who have been

unable to take badal from militants and military, who have both violated Pukhtun culture

and dishonored people. The violation of Purdah may lead at times to the phenomenon of

revenge/reciprocity (Badal) among Pukhtuns. This revenge is towards anyone who has

violated the Purdah of Pukhtuns women and home, be a Pukhtun or non Pukhtun.

Likewise, the violation of other cultural aspects, like the honour of a guest as part of

melmastya, by militants and military, in normal times can generate revenge, which can be

a violent badal. Badal is considered as a due social right in the society and is considered as

a form of Justice done. Moreover, future prediction is not easy, but I propose that this has

repercussions. Likewise, in non-violent forms paying badal is also a cultural aspect of the

society. Pukhtuns have a culture of reciprocity in performing gham-khadi for example,

which has also been impacted as badal (social reciprocity) has not been possible. Conflict

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and violence in Swat have also impacted the broader concept and performance of badal, as

a social and cultural aspect. Moreover, this adds to the defaming process of badal as a

socio-cultural aspect of the society.

5.3. Where is Pukhtun honor? Shame is prevalent

In some Asian and African societies, honour-shame complex has been the core of socio-

cultural life. It has been the defining factor of ethnic identity (mostly Tribal). This

complex code defines prestige, reputation, trustworthiness and a good and reliable status

in the society. In many areas, it has been directed mostly to women, however, on the other

side of this dichotomy, are men. Moreover, in most of the cases, it is related to the notion

of female chastity and is maintained through the seclusion of women (Purdah). As a

dichotomy, it is also linked to the masculinity of men (Blok, 1981, 2001)39

.

In Pukhtun‟s case, honour can be translated as nang/ghairat/izzat/namus, where

Pukhtunwali/Pukhtu is termed as a „code of honour‟. Anthropological studies of Akbar S

Ahmed, Fredrick Barth , Raj Wali Shah Khattak and others have mentioned about this

nang and honour (Ahmed, 1977; Barth, 1969a; Khattak, 2010; Khattak, Mohammad, and

Lee, n.d.). Ahmed argues that „Nang society‟ is one based on the concept of honour

(Ahmed, 1977). Likewise, Barth writes, Pukhtunwali, the value Pukhtun code is based on

the emphasis of male autonomy and agility, self-expression and aggressiveness in a

syndrome what might be summarized under the concept of honour (izzat)” (Barth, 1969a).

Nang is significant among Pukhtuns, because it plays a vital role to preserve national

honour and „independence‟, esteem and honour of self, family (women), tribe and

homeland. That is the reason arms are even taken up for this cause. A Pukhtun is required

to be a nangylae, having nang and honour. Anyone not having this character is looked

down upon and is considered as having no nang, bae nanga, considered as worthless (

39

For criticism of this concept see (Cornwall and Lindisfarne, 1994; Herzfeld, 1987).

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Rome, 2013b, p. 99). Likewise, on the other side of this dichotomy is sharam (shame)

(Khattak, Mohammad, and Lee, n.d.). Significantly, honour and shame are linked to almost all

features of Pukhtunwali and contribute to make the complex Pukhtun culture

(Pukhtunwali/Pukhtu). This discussion of honour-shame complex is also significant in the present

debate of culture and conflict in Swat.

Linking conflict, honour and shame, I postulate that there is a perception in Swat

that there is little left, among Pukhtuns in Swat, of claiming honour and there is more to be

ashamed of. Pukhtuns in Swat perceive that they have lost honour in all forms, while the

expressions in the discussion on this subject are not „normal‟. Moreover, Pukhtuns in Swat

are shameful of what has happened to their culture due to the conflict of militants and

military. In times when Jarga was stopped and humiliated, Purdah violated, women made

IDPs, badal impacted, mashars dishonored and even killed, hujra closed and Melmastya

shut down, Pukhtunwali saw transformations which resulted in the feelings, among

Pukhtuns of Swat, of being „lesser Pukhtuns‟ (not ideal) as compared to the time when

there was no conflict and violence. A participant, Daud Khan, summarized this in these

words,

“We have lost honour in every sense of this word. Purdah, Jarga, respect of elders and

badal have all been defamed. These were even used against us and today we have lost it.

We are shameful but what can we do? We are helpless. We miss our nang and ghairat

which was only in Pukhtunwali ” (Khan, 2016).

The use of culture against Pukhtuns and the repercussions of this process for culture are in

the form of loss of culture and honour. Moreover, Pukhtuns in Swat are helpless as they

could not counter militants, Pakistani state and it‟s military. Nang, ghairat and Pukhtu has

been lost and this phenomenon has produced shame. The transformations in culture,

Pukhtunwali, are dubbed as the destruction of it and are linked to honour. A female

participant commented that “Due to conflict, Swatis have lost Pukhtu, ghairat and honour.

Culture has been destroyed and this is shameful for us. Pukhtuns are not those Pukhtuns

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now ” (Khor, 2017). Some participants also informed me that many sensible and elder

Pukhtuns „weep‟ at the loss of honour and comment that „loss of honour is greater than

loss of life‟. They are deeply moved at what has happened to them, their women and land.

Self-esteem has been lost in this context. Mudasir Swati, a University Lecturer from Swat,

told me,

“Sensible people feel this loss of honour too much. Some of them even weep at their

present situation and of what has happened to them. Especially, when Swatis were IDPs,

people were made to stand in line for ration and food. This has hurt people‟s self-esteem

and has been a torture for them. This has also decreased the respect and honour of people”

(Swati, 2017).

The phenomenon of becoming IDPs and the way Purdah of women and home has been

impacted are central and significant aspects of this discussion. Said Alam Lala, told me in

Kabal,

“Honour has been impacted too much. Two main aspects are „standing in lines for food‟ in

IDP camps and „military entering and checking homes‟ of many Swatis, mostly civilians,

who were not even militants. This is shameful for Pukhtuns in Swat and it obviously hurts

our honour” (Lala, 2017).

Moreover, the conflict as a whole and the military operation in particular caused

internal displacement of Swatis in the province, outside the district, in which they were

termed as IDPs. During this stage Swatis were ordered to leave homes by the military and

government and is thus attributed more to the military in Swat than the militants. The

conflict in Swat has also caused the phenomena of Swatis becoming „IDPs‟, in which

around 2 million people were forced (involuntary) to leave homes. Some people and

families had to live in IDPs camps in districts of Mardan, Charsadda, Swabi, Peshawar etc,

while others moved to homes of relatives and many searched rented homes outside the

conflict hit Malakand region. This was considered as one of the greatest internal

displacement in recent human history and the greatest for Pakistan after that of 1947

(Safdar, 2009; iDMC, 2009,p.1; Najam U Din, n.d, p.5; Khursheed, Faheem, and Marwat,

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2016, pp 52-53). Though the discussion of broader impacts of this for lives of people is

out of the scope of this study, I discuss its impacts for Purdah and link honour to it,

through the discussions I have with people in Swat. A local journalist told me in Mingora,

“Purdah and honour has been impacted too much due to the conflict. The phenomena of

becoming IDPs are the most significant reason for this. Those people who became IDPs

and lived in camps had to feel shame” (Lala, 2017).

Because of its connection to the loss of Purdah and honour and the production of Shame it

is given primary importance by some in Swat. The loss of Purdah and honour is very

dominant in narratives in Swat. Three women working in an NGO during an FGD in

Mingora told me about this issue by simply putting it as, “What is called Purdah or

traditional Purdah was no more there in IDP camps. Women lost Purdah when they had

to live in tents in IDP Camps” (Khor, 2017; Khor, 2017; Khor, 2017).

When Swatis became IDPs, they had to stand in lines for getting foods, women,

elders and men all had to do so to get food and other necessities. Standing in line for a

Pukhtun, then elder or women was against the whole life lived traditions, pride and

culture. This violated Purdah for women and honor for men and is believed to have been

no more in lives. The phenomenon of becoming IDPs, leaving home, living in IDP camps

or homes outside their own home, standing in lines for food and necessities of lives

imprint upon Swatis that they lost honour. Moreover, the loss of honour of specially of

men as they were unable to bread their families or provide a condition for the ideal culture

is prevalent. This has also resulted in the feelings of shame among Swatis, both women

and men.

This opinion was repeated by many other research participants in different ways.

Salman Habib from Charbagh commented that “Honour has been impacted too much.

Especially due to the loss of Purdah” (Habib 2017). Another participant, Laiq Dada told

me in Mingora that “Honour and respect have been impacted too much. An example of

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that is the loss of Purdah” (Dada 2017). The phenomenon of violating home Purdah,

security checking and IDPs are termed as significant and crucial. Asad Lala from Mingora

summed this up,

“The phenomena of becoming IDPs have changed our norms now. In fact, it has made us

beggars, by standing us in lines for food etc., Our honour and self-esteem has been

impacted by this We have been compelled to change our culture” (Lala, 2017).

In the whole debate, the discussion of the phenomena of IDPs occupies a central and

significant place. An overwhelming majority of my participants linked this discussion with

IDPs. Shereen Lala, a local journalist from Swat commented that, “The loss of honour

shall be linked to the phenomena of becoming IDPs” (Lala, 2017). Moreover, the

reference to Purdah was a reference to the honour attached to women. Taimur Yusufzai, a

University lecturer from Charbagh told me that, “Honour has been impacted too much by

the conflict. By every possible definition, we have lost our honour and have been ashamed.

The most significant aspect is that of the loss of honour through women” (Yusufzai,

2017).

For some research participants, honour is equivalent to „independence‟. Though

this independence was always limited, it was due to social and cultural constrains. Even if

it was due to Swat state, the state was considered as one made and operated by people of

Swat. Moreover, in Pakistani state times, the state was allowing cultural and social

activities. When, the state and its military, or the conflict contributed to the loss of culture

and honour, it curtailed the independence of practicing Pukhtun culture. Muhammad

Farooq told me in Kabal “We have lost our honour, izzat and independence” (Farooq,

2017).

For those who are comparatively elders and have been practicing the culture for

long without any compulsion, it is a time of extreme sadness and remorse. For others who

are young and can adopt easily, it is less sensitive. An elder, Muhamad Rehman Dada, told

me in Charbagh that “Elders are extremely sad at what has happened to us due to this

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crisis. There is a strong feeling of loss of honour and culture. Youngers are less sensitive

in this case and can adopt with the situation easily”(Dada, 2017). In the same line, Hayat

Khan Dada, a mashar told me in Mingora, “People feel this too much, especially those

who are sensitive” (Dada, 2017).

As a repercussion, many in Swat will consider such people (even themselves), who

have lost honour and culture, as lesser Pukhtuns or not Pukhtuns at all. This is because of

the centrality of honour to Pukhtun socio-cultural imagination in Swat and the fact that

Pukhtunwali is corelated with honour. Salman Khan, a participant from Dherai Swat, told

me, “No one can be termed as a Pukhtun now. A Pukhtun without honour/ghairat is not a

Pukhtun” (Khan, 2017).

There are various factors responsible for this. As I have elaborated in section on

cultural ideals above, militants, military, Pakistani state and government and the general

conflict are all considered as responsible for this. Significantly the perception in Swat is

that these factors are outsiders, mostly, and none of these comprises of the majority

Swatis. Moreover, if Swatis or Pukhtuns are involved, they are compelled by others.

Sadeeq Ullah from Akhun Kalae in Kabal, told me that “Honour and respect has been

reduced too much now. This is by both the militants and military. I have personal

experience with both militants and military” (Ullah, 2017). Likewise, Ibrar Shah Lala,

from Mingora informed that military is more responsible, “Honour has been impacted too

much, mostly due to the activities of military in Swat” (I. S. Lala 2017). For Shah Alam

Lala, a political worker of PTI, Pakistan Tehreek I Insaf, (in stark opposition to ANP,

Awami National Party), ANP government is responsible. He said, “Honour has been

impacted due to the conflict. Government is responsible for this, especially of the time of

conflict from 2008-2013” (Lala, 2017).

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Moreover, Pakistani State and its government is blamed of forcing Swatis in a

conflict situation and then not caring them properly, especially when they were IDPs.

Mudasir Swati, a University Lecturer from Swat, commented that,

“State and government policies of check posts and in IDP camps are responsible. These

have hurt people‟s self-esteem and have been a torture for the people. Government would

have designed other better and more appropriate ways for this”(Swati, 2017).

The general conflict is also blamed by many, without any distinction of militants, military

and government. This is because the factors and actors responsible for this phenomenon

are all directly or indirectly associated with the conflict.

The loss of honour and respect has obviously resulted in the production of the

other side of this social balance that is shame/sharam. The phenomenon of becoming

IDPs, standing in lines for food in IDP camps and the loss of honour are factors that

contributed to the production of shame/sharam among Pukhtuns in Swat. Shams Swati, a

college senior student in Saidu Shareef, commented that,

“Pukhtuns are ashamed now. We Swatis have been dishonored and are feeling ashamed.

Standing for food in lines in IDP camps has resulted in this shame for us. In the same way,

fighting for food in IDP camp has taken our honour” (Swati, 2017).

Likewise, a general comment was that of Muhtaram Lala from Kabal, “People feel that

they have lost honour and are ashamed now” (Lala, 2017). The discussion so far has

demonstrated the loss of culture and the transformations in its different codes, values and

customs. In such a context, the performing aspect of Pukhtun ethnic identity is lost in its

ideal form. However, I argue below that ethnic identity is not lost but is contextually

claimed in ascribed markers. The discussion follows below.

5.4. We are Pukhtuns by name: The contextuality of Pukhtun ethnic identity

I have argued above that during conflict in Swat it has not been possible to practice

Pukhtun culture/Pukhtunwali in some cases, while in others its ideals have seen such

transformations which threaten the very traditional nature of these. Refereeing to scholars

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like Barth, Ahmed and others, who claimed an ideal Pukhtun in the practice of

Pukhtunwali, considering it the most significant marker of Pukhtun ethnic identity, in this

section I discuss Pukhtun‟s claim to ethnic identity in the context of present conflict in

Swat. The guiding question for this section is, if Pukhtuns have lost the performing aspect

of Pukhtunness, how are they claiming their ethnic identity now? I postulate that the

conflict has added to the contextual nature of Pukhtun‟s ethnic identity markers. In this

case, claims to ethnic identity somehow shifts to ascribed aspects with a minimum of

practicing Pukhtunwali (the culture). Ascribed aspects may include „birth in a Pukhtun

home‟, „tribal identity‟, „land‟ and „patrilineal descent‟. However, I postulate that this

ethnic identity, which is devoid of culture, is not ideal one. Such a Pukhtunness is

considered as a lesser one in comparison to Pukhtunness claimed in both performing

(culture) and ascribed aspects. Below, I reflect upon patrilineal descent, tribal identity and

land as factors of ascribed Pakhtun ethnic identity in the wake of recent conflict in Swat. I

refer to some of the literature first and discuss the present context of conflict later.

Muhammad Ayub Jan, in his PHD dissertation argues that, Pukhtun ethnic identity

entails both performing and ascribed aspects, (Jan, 2010). Patrilineal descent, birth in a

Pukhtun home, landownership and tribal status are some of the markers of ascribed aspect

of Pukhtun ethnic identity. This ascribed Pukhtun ethnic identity is „exclusive‟ (where as

performing is inclusive) and is drawn from blood ties and birth in a Pukhtun family (Jan,

2010, 138). It refers to the right of being Pukhtun from patrilineal descent as the sons of an

assumed epical head of the Pukhtuns (also believed to be the first Muslim), Qais Abdur

Rashid. In the specific case of many in Swat and Malakand from the Yusufzai Pukhtun

tribe it is „Yusuf‟, the tribal chief from whom the tribe originates. This right is in birth, in

the home of a Pukhtun, and through different genealogical steps reaches either Yusuf or

Qais. „Mythical‟ Genealogies are often used to claim descent among Pukhtuns. Land

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ownership is also based on this aspect. Land was distributed among tribes and clans in

Swat through the system of WESH 40

.

Related to Patrilineal descent, Barth argues that it is an important ethnic identity

marker of Pukhtuns. To him, it is the only principle of Ascription (with others of

performed Pukhtunness) (Barth, 1959, 1969b). The prevalence of genealogies, both among

land owning and non-land owning Swatis has also been reported by Barth (Barth, 1959,

pp. 24–28). Likewise, Ahmed has argued that the most important and exclusive marker

and condition of claiming Pukhtun ethnic identity is patrilineal descent. Ahmed argues that

the loss of any feature (even land) cannot take a Pukhtun‟s identity if he can trace himself

through father to any of the main Pukhtun tribes. He writes, I shall define a Pukhtun, whether

he is living in Pukhtun areas or not, speaking Pukhtu or not, as one who can trace his lineage

through the father‟s line to one of the Pukhtun tribes, and in turn to the apical ancestor (Ahmed,

1980, p. 84). Rittenberg also argues that Pukhtuns place patrilineal decent to be the most

important feature of Pukhtun identity (Rittenberg 1988, p. 6). A significant addition to this

debate is by Jan (2010). He argues that there is an internal contestation on these factors among

Pukhtuns in Malakand. This contestation is informed by discourses on history as well as land

acquisition and population pressure in Malakand (Jan, 2010, pp, 141–44). My own

understanding is closer to the proposition of Jan, (2010) and I contend that the recent conflict in

Swat adds to this contestation and contextuality of Pukhtun ethnic identity markers.

In the wake of recent conflict in Swat, Pukhtuns claim ethnic identity more by their

tribal affiliations, genealogies of descent, birth in a Pukhtun home and land (mostly by

Khanan, landed ones) etc. At a time when performing aspects are impacted, ascribed

aspects are used to claim Pukhtun ethnic identity and Pukhtunness is asserted. Moreover, I

40

A land redistribution system between different clans of the Yusufzai tribe which prevailed in

most of the Swat prior to the formation and consolidation of Swat state in 20th century

http://www.valleyswat.net/literature/society/wesh.html

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agree with the argument of Jan, (2010) that Pukhtunness is contextual and the primacy of

markers of ethnic identity is a contextual process. Jan, wrote about Professor Tair that

„Pukhtuns in future may need to refer to their genealogical charter for membership to the group

more than now (Jan, 2010, pp, 139–40) seems true in this context. Related to this aspect, Swat

Pukhtuns, in a blunt and simple manner express themselves, yet complex, we are Pukhtuns

by name (In Pukhtu mung pa nume Pukhtana u.). This comment is simple yet complex and

can have different interpretations. In a more sophisticated way this express the

significance of Pukhtunness in ascribed aspects of Pukhtun ethnic identity. I demonstrate

this below.

I argue that during the conflict‟s peak times and after that, Pukhtuns are relying

more on ascribed aspect of Pukhtunness, where ethnic identity is not lost. Lineage,

descent, the title of being Pukhtun by birth and other such markers, owes more

significance now. The relative importance for ascribed Pukhtunness has increased as this

is the only marker for Pukhtuns in such a context. Pukhtuns claim ethnic identity as a birth

right. However, I propose that ethnic identity which is claimed in both culture and

ascribed aspects is considered as an ideal one. On the other hand, ethnic identity claimed

only in ascribed aspects and devoid of the practice of Pukhtun culture is an identity which

is not ideal and whose Pukhtunness is lesser than the ideal one. For some of the Pukhtuns,

this ethnic identity is not an identity at all, as culture is lost, for others ascribed aspects still

work to affirm their claim to ethnic identity. Likewise, the loss of culture and cultural

ideals forms a compelling part of this discussion. A participant Fazal Yusufzai narrated

that,

“I can hear mashars and sensible people in Swat saying that, we are not Pukhtuns now. I

agree with this because culture and ideals of Pukhtu are gone. They are finished. We are

asked about our own identity now by the outsiders, like the military, who are not Pukhtuns

themselves”(Yusufzai, 2017).

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The point that some Swati mashars feel that they are not Pukhtuns now informs us about

the perception that Pukhtuns in Swat do not consider themselves as „true Pukhtuns‟. This

is because of the loss of cultural ideals of Pukhtunwali. Moreover, the second aspect of

asking Pukhtuns about their identity refers, in a derogation, to the phenomena of

questioning people in Swat about government issued identity cards (CNICs) mostly by the

military of Pakistan. Moreover, in many cases, as I have elaborated in the sections of

Purdah, Hujra etc., Pakistani state military also ask people about their identity during a

security search operation. As military men are perceived as others, this act of the military

generates a feeling of shame and loss of identity. A female lecturer from Swat, Saira Naz

Khor commented that “These conditions show two things. Pukhtuns are Pukhtuns by name

now and Pukhtuns even do not know that they are Pukhtuns, having a pride and history.

Pukhtuns do not have any sense even” (Khor, 2017).

As performing aspect of Pukhtunness has been somehow lost, Pukhtuns are not

considered as real Pukhtuns. Such Pukhtuns are termed as „Pukhtuns by name only‟. These

Pukhtuns do not practice Pukhtun culture but are born in the home of a Pukhtun, are

considered as Pukhtuns. Moreover, the remarks are mostly derogatory as the loss of

culture and honour is a phenomenon of shame. The derogation in this opinion can be

judged by the statement of Said Alam Lala, from Kabal, who said, “We are Pukhtuns just

by name now, not actions” (Lala, 2017). The comment expresses the perception among

Swatis that they have lost the performance of Pukhtunness. Similar was the comparison of

Ibrar Shah Lala, “Our culture is gone, and we are left Pukhtuns by name” (Lala, 2017).

Shahid Ahmed, a driver in an organization, informed, “Ghairat and Pukhtu has been lost.

Pukhtuns are Pukhtuns just by their names” (Ahmed, 2017). A similar opinion, regarding

the loss of Pukhtunwali was that of Yusuf Khan from Dherai, “Pukhtuns in Swat are

Pukhtuns just by name. Pukhtunwali has been lost” (Khan, 2017).

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Such comments inform that, though culture/Pukhtunwali is lost, ethnic identity is

not lost. It is reaffirmed in birth in a Pukhtun home. Other than this, for some of the

Pukhtuns in Swat, land becomes significant. As land has been distributed, traditionally,

based on lineage and tribal status, it bonds land with tribal descent. An elder, named Spen

Dada, who worked under the Wali of Swat, termed Pukhtunwali as dead and reflected

upon the importance of land by saying that,

“As Pukhtunwali is dead now, I mean finished, I identify Pukhtuns with land, Dawtar.

Those having share in land from centuries are Pukhtuns and those not having land since

that time are not „real Pukhtuns ” (Dada, 2017).

Anyone having family or tribal land since the traditional distribution of it are termed as

Pukhtuns, as these are also having tribal status and a Pukhtun lineage. Moreover,

according to Spen Dada, it is significant in times of crisis when Pukhtun culture has not

been performed. However, on the other hand, many from Swat, who are not traditional

khans, donot have land, are poor (gharibanan) or represent classes devoid of place on

genealogies, use other markers of ethnic identity to lay claim to ethnic identity and

reaffirm it. For example, language is one such marker, which is used by both landed and

non-landed Swatis. Qudrat Lala of Kabal connected Pukhtu language and the loss of

Pukhtun culture by saying that, “Anyone who speaks Pukhtu is a Pukhtun. Other than this,

ideal culture has been discarded now” (Lala, 2016).

Significantly and on the contrary, some research participants in Swat were even of

the opinion that Swatis are better Pukhtuns than most others. This is in relation to sustain

themselves amidst the conflict and violence and the process of cultural recovery in Swat. It

is imagined that people in Swat are trying to recover from the conflict and culture and are

trying to gain the old and traditional position. Among others, Salman Habib from

Charbagh commented that,

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“Swatis still argue that they are better and good Pukhtuns. Pukhtuns in swat are trying to

regain their old social and cultural status, after the conflict. However, there are feelings of

sorrow and sadness in Swat due to the conflict” (Habib, 2017).

Moreover, some Swatis perceive that they are more materialistic and can adopt to

circumstances quickly. This opinion is more popular about younger generation of Swatis.

Likewise, people have a longing for mashars and older generation who were caring more

about their ethnic identity and culture than these youngers. Fazal Khan, told me in

Charbagh, “Those Pukhtuns, and their Pukhtu and ghairat are all dead now (lost). They

were caring about culture and identity. People have become very materialistic now and do

not care much” (Khan, 2017). People who are mashars and who lived a generation ago

were considered as better Pukhtuns, by people like Fazal Khan. Moreover, there is always

a nostalgia for earlier people and times in the region when Pukhtun culture was perceived

to be ideal. The conflict has also added to the complexity of Pukhtun ethnic identity in

Swat. Below I reflect upon the impact of conflict on intra-ethnic relations among the

Pukhtuns in Swat.

5.5. Conflict and the complexity of ethnic identity: Intra-ethnic relations in Swat

The previous literature, both on Pukhtun and non Pukhtun societies, has explored the

boundary aspects of ethnic identification in a group. This literature has discussed both

intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic boundaries of ethnic identity (Barth, 1969b; Cornell &

Hartmann, 1998; Jan,, 2010; Wimmer, 2013). Barth‟s study is considered as a pioneering

one in the introduction of ethnic boundaries to this discussion of social and ethnic

organization of societies. Barth argues that, different ecological, economic and political

circumstances and factors can influence the cultural stuff within an ethnic group and

transformation can be brought in this, however the boundary is constantly maintained by

members of the group, as a dichotomy between „us‟ and „them‟ (Barth, 1969a, 1998).

Moreover, a significant point is that members construct and maintain multiple boundaries

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at a time, as within the group and against other groups, termed as intra-ethnic and inter-

ethnic (Jan, 2010, 21). Likewise, sometime ethnic boundaries can overlap with religious as

well as sectarian ones. However, I try to emphasize intra-ethnic relations more than

boundaries as such. By intra-ethnic, this project understands the relations between

different tribes and clans in Swat along with those of Khanan and Gharibanan as

categories. In this regard, the present conflict in Swat has impacted both the intra ethnic

relations.

The intra ethnic discourse and contestation of categorizations of Khanan and

Gharibanan is a prominent aspect of the present conflict and violence in Swat. The specific

relation of this conflict with the already existing contestations between the categories of

Khanan and Gharibanan in Swat is peculiar and needs an elaboration. On the other hand,

there is least significance of the relation of inter-tribal dynamics with the conflict in Swat.

That is why, many research participants, like Fazli Akbar Dada from Kabal commented

that, “Inter-tribal conflict or say relations have not been impacted in this crisis in

Swat”(Dada, 2016) and Shah Alam Lala from Mingora, that “There is nothing like inter-

tribal in this conflict of Swat” (Lala, 2017). In the same line, research participants, like

Fazal Khan from Charbagh, informed that there have been family dynamics attached to the

conflict but not tribal. He said, “There are not much of inter-tribal aspects in the conflict

of Swat. This may have happened in some family cases” (Lala, 2017). Taimur Yusufzai

from Charbagh, argues that the role of religious clergy is more prominent that any

connection of the conflict with tribal dynamics. He told me that “Even the role of mullahs

(religious clergy) is more prominent that that of the tribal conflict in Swat” (Yusufzai,

2017). One significant reason of this aspect is that the area of Swat is by majority occupied

by the Yusufzai tribe. Moreover, this tribe has been dominating the region. Inter-tribal

aspects and conflicts in this regard does not exist much and has not been significant in the

context of present conflict in Swat. Iqbal Lala, a mashar from Kabal, commented that, “As

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in Swat, majority Pukhtuns are from the Yusufzai tribe and this tribe dominates the region,

the inter-tribal dynamics has not been impacted” (Lala, 2016).

On the contrary, categories of khanan and gharibanan, which somehow existed in

the region and reported in the literature (like Jan, 2010), played a role and were impacted

significantly. A significant discussion with my research participants is occupied by this

aspect. This is because, majority of the militants in Swat were from the category of

gharibanan, landless or poor. Likewise, most of the traditional Khans from Swat were

against militants and were supporting Pakistani state, its government and the military. This

resulted in a perception that the conflict in Swat is a class war of gharibanan against the

khanan, which I argue is a simplification of the conflict in Swat. However, this dynamic

played a significant role and was used as a strategy by the militants.

Militants, by majority gharibanan, were against khanan in Swat, for many reasons.

One significant was that majority of the khanan supported Pakistani state, its government

and military. In fact, enmity of militants towards Pakistani state and government

transferred to enmities towards khanan. However, the fact that khanan had a lavish living

style and occupied much of the land in Swat were reasons for being targeted by militants.

Asif Iqbal, a university student and political activist from Saidu Shareef, told me during a

focused group discussion,

“There has always been a conflict between Khanan and Gharibanan in the region. Most of

the militants are poor too. Militants have targeted Khans and their families by killing many

from them. But in this conflict, still it was not much prominent to call it a conflict between

khanan and gharibanan. This is because Khanism has been weakened in urban localities of

Swat and is now present in few and very far areas of Swat”(Iqbal, 2017).

In this discussion, however, I do not fully agree with the statement that „Khanism has been

weakened in Urban localities of Swat and is now present in few and far areas of Swat‟.

During my field work and general visits to Swat, I could observe that traditional Khans

still occupy a prominent role in the society and politics of Swat. Even in the Urban

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centers, like Mingora there are many politicians who are traditional Khans. Though, a lot

of factors contribute to the social and political change among people in the region, this

dynamic still holds in the region. Moreover, in rural areas this is more prominent than in

the Urban areas of Swat.

Interestingly, some of the militants, I was informed during fieldwork, were

planning for land redistribution in Swat. This was due to the perception, among militants,

that Khanan in Swat has occupied the shared land of all Swatis. The abolition of WESH

along with other factors resulted in khanan having more land and gharibanan having no

land, these militants perceived. This opinion was not very overwhelming and was more

specific to rural areas, where militants had comparatively stronger presence. Sadeeq Ullah,

from Akhun Kalae, a rural area of Kabal told me,

“In our area, 70% of this factor of Khanan and Gharibanan was used. Militants were by

majority Gharibanan and were on the side of Gharibanan. They were much against the

Khanan. Some militants, whom I had personal interactions, from this area, were claiming

that they are going to control whole Swat soon and will then take revenge from Khanan

and will redistribute the land. Many from Gharibanan were thus attracted towards the

militants. This was effective as our areas are agricultural and Khanan-Gharibanan

dynamics is significant” (Ullah, 2017).

This claim could not be cross checked during my field work. Moreover, militants could

not practice this, because military soon launched an operation and weakened the control of

militants. However, it seems that militants used this dynamic as a strategy. This aspect,

along with quick and free dispensation of justice, was attracting a section of society

towards the militants. Said Alam Lala, from Mingora, informed me that “This dynamic

was not much here. The Khanan and Gharibanan opposition and dynamics were only used

for interests by many in the conflict” (Lala, 2017). This use by militants was possible due

to many reasons, one of which was that Pakistani state authority was weak. In the words of

Yusuf Khan, from Dherai Swat, “The dynamics of Khanan and Gharibanan was

effectively used by the militants as Pakistani State was weak” (Khan, 2017). This also

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reaffirms the point that the relations of khanan and gharibanan were not strained to a

higher level but were used by militants as a strategy towards their goal. In the same line,

Fazal Khan, a local Khan and politician told me in Mingora,

“The relationship of Khanan and Gharibanan, was used a lot by the militants. The peaceful

relationship of Khans and Ghareebs was disturbed by them. Hatred was developed through

violence and then this was used. Before the conflict, Khans and their workers used to

cooperate with each other, but now it has been much disturbed due to this use by the

militants”(Khan, 2017).

Though, the relationship between Khanan and Gharibanan has never been so peaceful, as

claimed by Fazal Khan, it was not so strained too. The use of this cleavage and difference

was strategically utilized by the militants, which also affirms that there existed some

differences between these categories. In the summarized words of an elder from Mingora,

Spen Dada, “The differences between Khanan and Gharibanan were not from the primary

reasons of this conflict. However, when the movement of militants got some success, the

dynamics of Khanan and Gharibanan got involved”(Dada, 2017). Such an opinion negates

the perception that the conflict in Swat is a class war and reaffirm the argument that the

crisis of khanan and gharibanan has not been the primary cause of conflict in Swat but

were only used by militants. In this process the boundaries between khanan and

gharibanan were more sharpened and impacted due to the manipulative use by militants. I

conclude this chapter below.

Conclusion

In this section of the thesis I have demonstrated that the conflict in Swat has repercussions

for the social position of mashars and kashars and the relations between them in the

society. The fact that militants were mostly kashars of the society but had gained authority

was a social upside down for the society of Swat. This phenomenon has added to the loss

of authority, respect and honour of mashars. As a mashar is not respected and obeyed, a

kashar is not cared too, as he is blamed of not respecting mashars. Likewise, as military

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was bothered only about the security perspective, they were least careful about any

distinction of mashars and kashars, especially on the security check posts. Along with this,

the shutting down of hujra also impacted this socio-cultural ideal. People of Swat, believe

that this has in fact dismantled the social balance of the society and has resulted in the loss

of an ethnic identity marker and cultural code, which was very peculiar to the region.

Moreover, I have demonstrated that the phenomena of using badal for interests and

taking badal through the conflict of militants and military is having repercussions for

badal, as a cultural feature, and for the society of Swat. Moreover, other cultural features

have been violated and people were even killed during the conflict, it can generate a wave

of badal. On the other side, people in Swat have been unable to take badal from militants

or military. This adds to the defaming and stereotyping of badal as a socio-cultural and

ethnic feature. As badal, in any form, has been a central marker of ethnic identity and

Pukhtunwali, this process has repercussions for Pukhtun ethnic identity and Pukhtun code

of honour.

I discussed that the loss of honour/nang and the prevalence of shame/sharam, due

to different aspects of the conflict in Swat, is a significant point to ponder upon. I have

also demonstrated that the practice of Pukhtunwali, the Pukhtun code of honour and

culture, was halted for some time, while it has witnessed transformations which produces a

perception that Pukhtunwali is dead now. At a time when Pukhtuns in Swat have become

bae nanga, have lost Pukhtu and honour, how are they claiming Pukhtun ethnic identity?

Being a significant and crucial marker of ethnic identity, this process can lead us to

propose that ethnic identity has been lost. However, in such a context ethnic identity is not

lost but is rather claimed through ascribed aspects and the contextuality of emphasis on

different aspects of ethnic identity is reaffirmed. I argued that claims to ethnic identity

persists, but through ascribed aspects. This includes language (Pukhtu), land and

patrilineal tribal descent. However, such Pukhtuns consider themselves and other such

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Pukhtuns as lesser Pukhtuns and no ideal ones. On the contrary, Pukhtuns who lived

earlier and practiced Pukhtun culture are considered as better and ideal Pukhtuns. This is

because such Pukhtuns had both performing and ascribed aspects of ethnic identity.

Moreover, I have also demonstrated the relationship of conflict and violence in Swat with

the dynamism of gharibanan and khanan as categories. The tense relations between khanan

and gharibanan have been exploited by militants in the conflict which has somehow

sharpened the boundaries and strained the intra-ethnic relations between them. The

conflict has thus added to the complexity of Pukhtun ethnic identity.

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CHAPTER 6: CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY:

PAKISTANI MILITARY AND PUKHTUN’S PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL

HOLIDAYS IN SWAT

Introduction

In this section of the thesis, regarding the impacts of conflict and violence for Pakistani

national identity, I argue that conflict and violence in Swat impacts the imagination of

Pakistani national identity in multiple forms. The conflict in Swat affects Pukhtun‟s

imagination of Pakistani identity in multiple ways. The impacts of conflict are quite

significant on various markers of national identity. I argue that the imagination of

Pakistani military is a significant aspect of national consciousness and identity. I propose

that this is because military‟s pervasive presence in Swat for the last decade. Moreover,

Swatis encounter military men almost on daily basis and their imagination of the conflict

and national identity is incomplete without military. Likewise, I argue that the socially

negative behavior of the military, the ethnic stratification done in the behavior of military

and Punjabi domination of it is significant points of the debate in Swat. Likewise, another

significant factor in this discussion is the diminishing interest in celebration of national

holidays, like 23rd

of March and 14th of August. Pukhtuns in Swat take least interest in

celebrating national Pakistani holidays by showing their discontent to the „popular‟ state

and media narrative, which assume that, after the military operations in Swat, Pukhtuns in

Swat are more enthusiastic in celebrating these holidays.

This section is organized into sub-sections, based on these arguments. Below, I

reflect upon the impacts of conflict in Swat for Pakistani military and its role in the

imagination of Pakistani national identity in Swat in the present context. In the next sub

section, I discuss the celebration of national holidays as part of the national imagination

among Pukhtuns in Swat. In the end, I conclude the discussion.

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6.1. Conflict and Pakistani Military in Swat

In this section, I argue that Pakistani state institutions, especially the military, form a

compelling and significant marker of Pakistani national identity. In the case of Pakistan

and specifically in the context of present conflict in Swat, Pakistani military (a state

institution) is central. I postulate that the imagination of Pakistani national identity is

incomplete without a mention of the role and perception regarding Pakistani military in

Swat. This is due to many reasons. I propose that the most significant in this regard is that

Pakistani military is a main actor in the conflict and violence of Swat, that has prevailed

for the last decade in Swat. It is a state institution that Swatis confront on daily basis and

even many times a day. At times of intense conflict, Swatis had to interact with soldiers of

military after every few kilometers of distance on the problematic „security check posts‟. It

is also an institution that controls authority in Swat even today. Moreover, in general,

Pakistani military has been a dominant state institution in Pakistan, which is claimed, by

the state of Pakistan, to be a national institution.

The composition of (especially ethnic), the performance and role of Pakistani

military and the discussions of law and order situation in Swat, along with the presence of

security check posts, are important areas to this project. An overwhelming majority of

Pukhtuns in Swat perceive Pakistani military as an institution that strongly represents

Pakistani state and nation. It is this military that mirror Pakistan, Pakistani state and

Pakistani nation to Swat Pukhtuns in Swat. The conflict, as a repercussion, has two major

impacts for Pakistani military as a national identity marker. The conflict has added to the

significance of Pakistani military as a national identity marker in Swat. Moreover, the

phenomena of ethnic differentiation done in the military, the presence of security check

posts and the issue of law and order are areas that impacts the role of Pakistani state

military in a negative way, as a national identity marker. This has repercussions for

Pakistani national identity. Pukhtuns in Swat are predominantly occupied with the

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perception that Pakistani military is Punjabi dominated (Punjabae fauj is the Pukhtu

phrase used), not just by population but also by power dynamics. Moreover, the present

perception of Pakistani military is compared to the position this institution was having

before the conflict, which was dubbed as „good‟ and respectful. This is because, military,

before the conflict, was perceived as an institution sincere with Pakistan and central in the

protection of territorial as well as ideological boundaries of Pakistan. Below I substantiate

these arguments with my empirical data.

Though there is literature on Pakistani military, but its role in national identity and

consciousness is missing. I argue that Pakistani military is significant to the imagination of

Pakistani national identity, among the Pukhtuns in Swat. Related to the question of

military as a national identity marker or representing Pakistani state in the present context

in Swat, there are two major opinions among Pukhtuns in Swat. One perception, which is

stronger, is that it is almost impossible to imagine Pakistani national identity and state

without the military, while the other opinion is that sense of belonging to Pakistani

military does not constitute Pakistani identity in totality, though it is a major institution

that represents Pakistani nation and state in Swat. This latter perception is based on

different arguments, like the military‟s (weak) role in wars or the prominence of other

markers like religion etc. About this later perception, among others, a university student,

Islam Yusufzai, told me in Mingora, that “Pakistani Army is not the entire country

(Pakistan). Pakistani Army‟s role is weak in different wars in history. Majority of Army

men are Punjabis, who don‟t care for feelings of others” (Yusufzai, 2016). Likewise, Laiq

Dada an elder and political worker from Swat argued that, other than Pakistani military,

there are important markers too. He said, “Pakistani military is not the entire Pakistan.

There are other things as well which are important. Islam is one such” (Dada, 2017).

Likewise, Ashraf Lala, a government official from Kabal stated that, “Pakistani Army is

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not the sole marker of Pakistani identity. But it is a major part in this discussion of

Pakistani identity and Pakistani state as it is a major institution of Pakistan” (Lala, 2016).

On the contrary, for an overwhelming number of my research participants,

Pakistani military completes the imagination of national identity and state to an extent that

it becomes impossible to imagine Pakistan without its military. This is a powerful

argument amidst the conflict in Swat and military‟s role in it. Shahid Saleem, a university

student in Kabal was of the opinion that, “Pakistani Army is equated with Pakistani nation

and Pakistani State by majority in Swat” (Saleem, 2016). Moreover, Salman Habib, a

private school teacher from Charbagh, commented that, “Pakistani military is very

important institution of Pakistan and central for its identity. I think that if there is no

military, there is no Pakistan” (Habib, 2017). Likewise, among others, Fazli Akbar Dada,

an elder, told me in Kabal, that, “Majority people in Swat believes that Pakistani Army is

representing Pakistani State and Pakistani nation” (Dada, 2016). Similar was the

comment of Shahid Ahmed, a driver in an NGO, that, “Military is equal to Pakistani state.

As a Pakistani identity marker, it is equally important for all ethnic groups in Pakistan”

(Ahmed, 2017).

In such a context, when Pakistani military is perceived and imagined to be a sole

representative of Pakistani national identity and state or as a significant marker of this

identity promoted by the Pakistani nation state, its role and behavior in the present conflict

in Swat becomes significant. Any action of Pakistani military is assumed as an action of

Pakistan state and nation. I argue that there is difference of opinion related to the behavior,

actions and role of Pakistani military in this regard, however majority opinion is critical of

the role and behavior of Pakistani military, which impacts Pakistani national

consciousness among the Pukhtuns in Swat. Some, like Misbah Ullah, a local political

activist from Mingora, argue that the actions of Pakistani military are guided by specific

patterns and interests (Ullah, 2017).

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Opinion, regarding the acts and role of Pakistani military, in this context, is

divided, where majority of Pukhtuns in Swat disapprove of the behavior, role and acts of

Pakistani military in sharp words. However, there is a minor, lenient opinion about the

military too and different reasons are presented in this regard. Shabir Khan, a local Khan

and politician from Charbagh, argued that military has been involved in defense of

Pakistan and that shall be appreciated. He said, “We appreciate Pakistani military for its

work related to the defense of Pakistan” (Khan, 2017). Fazal Khan a local politician and

Khan from Mingora also appreciated an aspect of the military by saying that, “Military is

like a think-tank and I appreciate that” (Khan, 2017). Likewise, Spen Dada, an elder also

appreciated the sacrifices of Pakistani military and told me in Mingora, “I appreciate

sacrifices of Pakistani military in Swat” (Dada, 2017).

Few of my research participants were not explicitly favoring the actions and role of

Pakistani military, but they were carving reasons for the behavior of military. Salman

Habib, a Private school teacher from Charbagh told me,

“Actions of the military, in Swat, were/are actually based on the situations they were/are

confronted. This is important for bringing peace in the region. Military is also having very

good and central role in whole Pakistan along with that in Swat” (Habib, 2017).

Moreover, some argued that the problem, generally, is with all militaries in the world, not

just Pakistani military. It was perceived that, militaries across the globe are against peace

and just spread destruction. Their business compels them to tackle the situation with force

which is not normal for citizens. This was all linked to the security check posts or search

operations, which are two main contexts of Swatis confronting the military. Shams Dada,

an elder in Kabal, “Everywhere in the world and always armies are against peace and use

forces, as far as we think as per we think” (Dada, 2017). Muhammad Rehman Dada, a

political activist from Charbagh, elaborated a different yet connected aspect. He told me,

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“Military has a uniform role across the world in every state. They do things by force which

is sometime important for unity. However, unity is not possible through this, in the long

run. In long run people shall be involved and made understood about security. Such a use

of force can bring bad name to the military too and will have negative results”(Dada,

2017).

The use of force, violence and other similar acts are perceived bad and negative. That is

the reason, acts, behavior and role of the Pakistani state military is critically gauged and is

rejected with a discontent, by an overwhelming number of my research participants.

Moreover, this discontent is believed to be towards the nation and state that Pakistani

military is perceived to be representing. The excessive use of force sometimes by the

military against militants as well as Swatis is considered as „cruel‟. Even, some Swatis

have informed the military about such complaints but little is seen to be changing. Ashraf

Lala, Kabal, a government official told me in Kabal,

“Pakistani military has done many brutalities and now there is a widespread hatred among

people for this military. Once a major sahib (military officer) asked me about people

perception of the military in Swat. I told him that people do not like the behavior of

military men and disapprove it. He asked me why? I replied him „because of your

(military‟s) activities” (Lala, 2016).

There is an overwhelming perception in Swat (and generally in Pakistan) that Pakistani

military take less care of such views. Civilian complaints are given lesser importance and

military‟s interests are given more. Moreover, the disapproval towards Pakistani military

can/may transform into disapproval towards Pakistani state and nation, per the opinion of

my participants. Thus, acts of such a military, which heavily represents state in Swat, has

repercussions for the position of Pukhtun in Pakistani nation and state. This can be more

significant in future, as Fazli Akbar Dada, an elder from Kabal, told me,

“Due to the recent conflict and especially the role of Pakistani state and its military, the

layman and majority opinion in Swat is that Pukhtuns are moving away from the state of

Pakistan. In future this may create problems for Pakistan as the relations between Swat

Pukhtuns with the State of Pakistan have been impacted negatively” (Dada, 2016).

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Though a mathematical calculation of this relation or any irredentism is not possible, the

conflict and Pakistani state and military‟s involvement in it with such a behavior impacts

the imagination of Pakistani national identity among the Pukhtuns. Likewise, it also

impacts the problematic relationship between Pukhtuns and Pakistan. Data from Swat

suggests, thus, that there is a strong interplay of Pakistani national identity, Pukhtuns

relation with Pakistan, the recent conflict and the role of Pakistani state military. This

interplay is informed by the dubious role of Pakistani state and its military along with the

perception (and even the fact) that authority still rests with the military. Iqbal Lala, a social

activist from Kabal, told me,

“Relations of Pukhtuns in Swat with Pakistan have been impacted. Here, a teacher, whom

I know, was target and killed because he was critical of Army‟s involvement in Swat.

Anyone critical of them (the military) is targeted. Authority is still with Army, both in

Pakistani state and Swat. The role of Pakistani State and military is problematic. Pakistan

and Army is viewed with suspicion. One even cannot decide if militants and military are

friends or foes” (Lala, 2016).

This bold and strong opinion is much popular among many in Swat and has repercussions

for Pakistani identity and Pukhtuns-Pakistan relations. Many in Swat are critical and

suspicious of target killing in the region and its assumed relations with Pakistani military.

Some like Sadaqat Azim, a student form Swat, argue that, “Whenever situation in an area

gets better, people demand that Army shall leave now as the security situation is fine. In

these times military start target killing people and claim that Army is still needed to stay in

Swat” (Azim 2016). Such a view of Pakistani military is usually compared to the situation

before the conflict and the argument that the position of Pakistani military was not always

imagined like this. Muhammad Ashfaq, an NGO Employee, told me,

“We used to respect military men from our heart before the conflict. Now we don‟t respect

much and if we do so it is out of fear. People from this region are not going to be recruited

in Army. I think army wanted to recruit people from the region but only one boy came for

recruitment. Interestingly people from Swat want to join Army only as officers, not

soldiers, owing to the authority edge one can have in this situation in swat”(Ashfaq 2017).

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The respect for Pakistani military men has changed because of the recent conflict in Swat.

That is the reason people do not like to be recruited in Pakistani military, except in officer

ranks. This opinion is strong in Swat and I have an observation that people from Swat are

somehow attracted to the authority of military officers, especially due to this position in

the present context of Swat. Though, this situation may not have been different before the

conflict, respect for the military has decreased and people do so out of fear. Similar

opinion was expressed by Fazal Yusufzai, a local business holder from Kabal, “Before

conflict we respected military more than any institution in Pakistan. Now it is not so.

Security, check posts, military behavior and role in Swat has hampered our love” (

Yusufzai, 2017). Closely related is the opinion of Hayat Khan Dada, a local Politician

from Mingora, “Pakistani military, in past, was respected and trusted too much but not

now. The level of trust and respect has lowered. Like the Baluchs, Pukhtuns in Swat are

also having little respect for military now”(Dada, 2017). Comparison with Baluchs, from

Baluchistan province, is significant because of the insurgency in Baluchistan.

Moreover, the military‟s control of power in ruling Pakistan is discussed in

relevance to its role and control in Swat. Bad experience with the military creates feelings

of discontent towards it, with an emphasis on the situation before conflict in Swat. Saira

Naz Khor, a female participant from Swat, told me in Mingora,

“Job of Pakistani military is to protect boarders and do defense of the country. But it is

ruling the country. This is disturbing for us in Swat. Our experience with Pakistani military

is not very cordial. They believe that they are elite. I wanted to be in Army before the

conflict, but now I think I will never join military” (Khor, 2017).

Such a transformed image, with complains and discontent towards the Pakistani military

due to the conflict is also considered having repercussions for Pakistani state. Mudasir

Swati, a university lecturer from Mingora, also commented on this aspect, by saying that,

“Before crisis, image of the military was fine and good, however it has changed now.

Now people in Swat complain much about the military men. Pakistani state shall focus on

this, because this can be affect the state”(Swati, 2017).

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Moreover, this specific behavior of the military can be analyzed and divided by

considering some factors like time, context and ethnic perceptions. Initially military‟s

behavior was „strange‟ for the people and nobody could even talk to them. While in later

stages the behavior was „better‟ as compared to the initial intense stages. Military,

initially, thought of all of us like „terrorists‟, Swatis claimed. Later, when they spent some

time in this region, they came to know that we are not terrorists and their attitude got

better. In general, Swatis complain about the behavior of military men and it is suggested

by people in Swat that the State of Pakistan and its military shall take care of their

grievances as it can have consequences for Pakistani state. Shams Swati, a senior college

student and activist, told me that, “Initially army‟s behavior was strange. Nobody could

dare to ask them anything” (Swati, 2017). A very elaborative and in the context, comment

was that of Asad Lala, a politician from Swat. He told me in Mingora that,

“Military, initially, thought of all of us like terrorists. Later, when they adopted to this

region, they came to know that we are not terrorists. Now their attitude is better. The

military‟s presence was required during the war in Swat. Since conflict has receded now,

after 10 years, military shall claim victory and leave Swat” (Lala, 2017).

This opinion is overwhelming in Swat; however, some people can state this categorically

while others mention these aspects indirectly. Military behavior has somehow normalized,

per the perception of many in Swat. However, the larger question of staying and building a

cantonment in Swat is still in discussions. The role and performance of military is

questioned and its stay in Swat is debated. Moreover, the military is criticized of not being

categorical about its success or failure in reference to staying in Swat. A female

participant, Khalida Yusuf Khor, commented in Mingora, “There is a mixed experience of

us with Pakistani military. At times it has been good, at times it has been bad. Mostly the

practices of military are not approved of” (Khor, 2017). Though the behavior and acts of

Pakistani military men are rejected by Pukhtuns in Swat, there is a prominent element of

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ethnic stratification, which is significant for this whole discussion of conflict and national

identity.

Despite the claims of Pakistani state and its elites (especially the military) that

Pakistani military is a national institution, with an important role in the nationalism project

of the state, majority and popular perception among Pukhtuns in Swat is different.

Though, some of my research participants argue that military is a national institution and

the behavior, interaction and approach of military men is the same (all socio-culturally

negative and bad), a majority and compelling opinion in Swat informs about the stark

differentiation among military men on ethnic lines. Pukhtuns in the military are

differentiated from ethnic others, especially the Punjabis, in the military, in Swat. I have

argued above (pp, ) in the section on culture and conflict that Pukhtuns in Swat are critical

of the military because of its non-sensitive behavior towards the culture of the people.

Here I am concerned about the impact of this process, in relevance to security check posts

and military operations as two main aspects of the military as an institution, for Pakistani

national identity. In most cases in Swat anyone who is not a Pukhtun is dubbed as a

Punjabi, in the military (and in general) on such check posts (or during search operations).

Anyone who speaks Pukhtu or a specific ascent of Urdu is recognized as a Pukhtun and all

others are termed as Punjabis, because of the powerful position Punjabis have in Pakistan

and the military. This also point to and reaffirm the thesis that Punjabis are considered as

the most powerful ethnic group in Pakistan (Verkaaik, 2007).

There are two broad opinions among Pukhtuns in Swat, one is a majority and

compelling and the other a minor one. Majority opinion in this regard, was based on the

perception that the behavior of Pukhtuns as better than „others‟, where Pukhtuns in

military were believed to be helping Swatis in such situations of stress. The moral support

and the socially acceptable behavior of Pukhtuns in the military was appreciated and used

to differentiate from Punjabis in the same military. Some Pukhtuns in military even

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informed Swat Pukhtuns about the care of cultural features, showing that they are

conscious of Pukhtun culture and social values, while others are not. On the other hand,

the minority opinion is based on the observation that, the behaviour of Pukhtuns and

Punjab‟s in military may not be very different. Even to this group of people, when there is

a Pukhtun on a check post or during an operation, they feel more confident and secure.\.

This is, in addition to the behaviour, linked to the language and communication issue.

Such Swatis feel more confident and protected in respect of Sindhis and Punjabis etc. in

the same place. Some of my research participants, though not a majority, that Common

Pukhtuns are stuck in between as they are equally targeted by both Pukhtuns and Punjabis

in military and obviously by the militants. Moreover, this phenomenon cannot be

separated from the discussion of check posts, as such a behavior is observed on such

security check posts or during military search operations in Swat. Sadeeq Ullah, a

university student from Kabal, informed me that „Some Pukhtuns in military are good,

some are not. There is almost no difference in the behavior of military men on a check

post, between Pukhtuns and others” (Ullah, 2017).

I argue that experience and perception in Swat, about the military, is incomplete

without the discussion of military security check posts. In the post-military operations

scenario, and even during the military operations times, check posts have been a constant

presence on different points in Swat. Some of these military check posts have been

permanent ones, which are present till this date, while others have been temporary, which

are installed mostly when a security event happens. Some of the permanent ones have

been across different entry points of Malakand and Swat. The number of these has reduced

since the military operations. Some of my research participants were able to predict the

number of these in hundreds in post military operations times. Most of the people from

Swat confront these on daily basis if they have to travel for school, college, university,

bazar or any work. Some may confront many check posts in a single travel.

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On most of these check posts in Swat (Malakand and Peshawar and other areas)

CNIC is checked along with questions asked about the reason and destination of travel. In

other cases, anyone entering an area is registered on a check post with data taken from all

CNICs of people travelling in a vehicle, mostly the public transport. Ironically those

travelling in personal vehicles or small public vehicle like cars are mostly, if not all times,

skipped from this data entry and lengthy interrogation in many cases. On most of these

check posts, one can observe long queues of vehicles, as checking takes a „good deal‟ of

time. Moreover, on most permanent check-posts, there are express lanes, which allow

people having a government service card or military issued line cards. On such lanes, the

number of vehicles is lesser as compared to the other ones and it allows government

officials to move quickly. However, the behavior of military men on both these forms of

lanes is termed as „discouraging‟ and „negative‟. Moreover, discussion on such posts and

the opinion regarding these posts form a significant part of the perception and experience

of Pakistani military.

I postulate, in this context, that a compelling number of my research participants

consider these check posts as useless and a hurdle in their daily routine. Moreover, it is a

strong perception that none of the militants have been caught on such check posts, while

civilians are tortured, humiliated, dishonored and teased on these. Experience for majority

is bad, both men and women and both young and elders, with a strong ethnic stratification

among military men on such check posts. Behavior and approach of Pukhtuns is somehow

accepted, while that of Punjabis is strongly rejected. Check posts also provide us a space

to look into the ethnic imbalance (both perceived and real) in Pakistani state military.

Moreover, Pukhtuns in Swat are critical of these in different forms. Though not majority

or overwhelming, there exists a perception in Swat, which propose that such restrictions

by the military and security check posts are required. This perception avoids commenting

on the behavior of military personals and the fact that most of militants use alternative

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routes. Moreover, such an opinion, which is very minor, is based on an ideological

perspective or a privileged position the individual enjoys due to military or due to the

security situation that prevails in Swat, thus trying to avoid discussion on sensitive issues.

Spen Dada, an elder from Mingora, commented that, “Check-Posts are important for

security of the people. Check-posts are needed. Due to check-posts, people feel secure.

Moreover, as there is no other alternative option, this is the only option in Swat” (Dada,

2017).

However, such an opinion and perception are never a majority one. Popular

perception is in contrast and opposition to this and consider check posts a disturbance and

useless where Pukhtuns in Swat feel ashamed and dishonored. Due to security control by

the military, such a perception is not reported in the media. However, recently people,

especially educated activists, have been reporting and stating such a discontent on social

media sites. Additionally, such an opinion is also informed by the (least) utility of such

check posts. In the words of a female participant, Saira Naz Khor,

“I have really bad experience of check posts. I don‟t like these check posts at all. These are

useless. They (security personal on the check-post) do not care about women, elders,

children or patients, both in normal situations and in curfews. In curfews, even women

deliveries, have been done in vehicles on the way as military was not allowing people to

cross check-posts” (Khor, 2017).

Discussion in Swat informs that such happenings of not caring women, children or elders

are considered as bad and a problem for people in the region. Moreover, such a perception

is used to show a strong discontent towards both the military men and the security check-

posts. Sadeeq Ullah, a university student from Kabal also commented that, “Check posts

are problematic. Even women have to wait on such check-posts” (Ullah, 2017). Reference

is always to women, children and elders, which are expressed to show the humiliating

nature of these check-posts. A strong comment was that of Islam Yusufzai, a university

Student from Swat,

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“There are many such events, almost on daily basis. Once I was travelling in a public

vehicle with my sister and mother. On a check-post a military man came to bus to check

CNICs. I was observing that he was gazing at my sister and mother. This was hurting me”

(Yusufzai, 2016).

Mentioning women and girls, in such a context, in such a manner, is significant as there is

honor attached to women by people. Moreover, the response and the perception that „this

was hurting me‟ show the grave negative nature of check posts. Moreover, as these only

hinder the civilian‟s business, militants do not try to use any route having a check post for

their travel. The comment of Ishfaq Lala, was that “Check posts shall be finished

completely. This is because, people who are problematic (like militants) use other routes

and not the check posts” (Lala, 2017). To quote, Laiq Dada, a local political worker and

an elder, among many, “Military check post is useless as militants use alternate routes.

These check posts just disturb us” (Dada, 2017). A very similar comment was that of

Fazal Yusufzai, a local business holder from Kabal,

“I do not like check post because I feel humiliated at such check-posts. Militants will never

come through these check-posts. They always use alternate routes. Such check-posts only

disturb us, common Swatis” (Yusufzai, 2017).

It is in this context, that many from Swat, like Sheeren Lala, a local journalist from

Mingora, commented that “I think check-post is a torture for Swatis. No militant has been

caught on any check post yet” (Saleem, 2016). Muhammad Rehman Dada, an elder from

Charbagh, was able to connect this aspect of check posts to writ of the government,

authority of military and dishonoring of Swat Pukhtuns. He told me,

“I agree with Maulana Fazlu Rahman‟s (a Pakistani politician and head of JUI-F)

statement about check post that until now no militant has been caught on these check

posts. I think that these are just disgracing Pukhtuns of the region. I question the

performance and output of these check-posts? There is no output of these check-posts.

Army want us to feel writ of the government and state and use these tactics to claim their

dominancy and power” (Dada, 2017).

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Interestingly, as I have argued above on section on Purdah, pp 41-68, the position of

military men on a top post tower is dominant in comparison to a helpless Pukhtun below

in his home; similar is the case with check posts on the ground. Check posts reminds

people in the region of the presence of Pakistani state, government and its military.

Moreover, along with this, such check posts regulate the powerful vs powerless positions

of military and civilians respectively. In a way, military is trying to claim and compel

Pukhtuns in Swat to accept their dominant and powerful position. Moreover, as mentioned

above these check-posts are considered shameful by many. Hayat Khan Dada, an elder

from Mingora, elaborated that,

“People in the region have been disturbed and are in pain. About security check-posts,

Jarga also criticized these along with search operations. Jarga argued that this is shameful

for us. There are many issues in this case, for example the behavior of security personals

on check posts. They do things which are not necessary at all” (Dada, 2017).

Significantly, some of my research participants were trying to link the presence of these

check posts to restriction on freedom and rights along with a comparison to other parts of

Pakistan, especially Punjab and its capital Lahore. According to Asad Lala, Politician from

Jamaat I Islami Swat,

“I visited Lahore some time ago. In Swat we have check posts till Dargai (Malakand).

From Dargai to Lahore, nobody asked me anything nor was I checked at any check post.

However, when I reached back to Dargai, I was asked about my identity on the check post.

We (Swatis) feel like slaves, as we are not free. As militants restricted our freedom,

military is doing the same. We want human rights like other people of Pakistan” (Lala,

2017).

Such a comparison informs us of the strong opinion among Pukhtuns that Punjabis are

more powerful and in peace than Pukhtuns. Moreover, this also gives rise to the

conspiracy concept that Pakistani state and its Punjabi military is having hands in the

conflict of Swat and in other Pukhtun regions. My own experience of Swat, Peshawar and

Lahore is very much the same. Pukhtuns in Swat have been complaining of this limitation

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of freedom to exercise culture or travel in Swat or in Pakistan. Such a comparison and the

phenomenon of just teasing people from Swat at the check posts can also be seen in the

experience of Fazal Khan, a local Khan from Mingora. He told me, while we were sitting

in his Hujra on a rainy day,

“I suggest these check posts shall be on boarders of Swat only, not inside Swat. This is

because these check-posts disturb us inside Swat and create problems for us while

travelling in Swat. Military men on such check-posts only disturb and tease us. For

example, once I was asked by a military man on a check-post if my car is having break oil

or not? To this I smiled but also got angry. On another check-post, once I was asked about

my job. I told the military man that I have no job. He asked me, if I am not having any Job,

how I am having such a nice car? This was irritating for me. I think Swat is a paradise for

these people and they are jealous of us. As in Punjab these soldiers are weak financially,

they don‟t have non-custom paid cheap cars and their land is not beautiful as well” (Khan,

2017).

Such a comment even ignores the fact that there are Pukhtuns in the military too. The

imagination among Pukhtuns in Swat is that military men form Punjab (especially the

south of it) are disturbing us, while others, like Pukhtuns, are not doing so. As Pukhtun

land and especially Swat is beautiful, people in the region are well off to an extent and

most have cheap non-custom paid cars, this is paradise, to which these Punjabis military

men are jealous of. Thus, their behavior and remarks are derogatory which disturb us.

Questions and interrogation on such check posts are useless and out of the context. The

phenomenon generates a sense of ethnic stratification, within the military, which is linked

to the powerful position of Punjabis in the military. Moreover, based on individual

behavior, many from Swat, like Shahid Ahmed, a driver in an NGO, “Some military men

who are Pukhtuns are good on check posts, while others are not good” (Ahmed, 2017).

Moreover, such security check posts and the behavior of military men generate a

strong criticism towards military men, which can at time be abusive. People consider such

military men as devoid of ethics. As a direct reference, again is to the fact that women are

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searched on such military posts, which impacts the honor of men and is considered as

socially detrimental. Shahid Saleem, a university student in Kabal, told me,

“I have a very bad experience of such military check posts. When we returned to Swat

after military operations, we countered hundreds of these. I feel very bad while crossing a

military check post. Checking people and in crisis times even women was common, which

is humiliating and bad” (Saleem, 2016).

Significantly, the behavior of Pukhtuns in Swat, due to this humiliation, also turns bad and

people try not to cooperate with military men on such check posts. Muhammad Ashfaq, an

NGO Employee, commented that,

“I have bad feelings, while crossing check posts. I don‟t like check posts at all. I become

angry at such check-posts and feel humiliated and dishonored. I think almost everyone in

Swat has such feelings. As a reaction, we do not talk in good tone with military men on

such check posts” (Ashfaq, 2017).

Conclusively, such an experience informs us of the relationship between Pukhtuns

and Pakistani state institutions, which forms a significant part of Pakistani identity in the

context of conflict in the region. Moreover, amidst this, the issue of building a permanent

military cantonment in Swat is significant. Yet interestingly as Pakistani military has

claimed victory (self-acclaimed) against the militants in Swat, and initially promised to

leave Swat, many Swatis ask that why is military not leaving? And why is it building a

permanent cantonment? These debates among Pukhtuns have repercussions for the

imagination of Pakistani national identity and state as imagined among Pukhtuns in Swat.

I take this discussion forward and link the debates of conflict, sacrifice and ethnic pride to

the impacts of conflict for Pakistani national identity.

6.2. Showing indifference and discontent: Conflict and celebration of national

holidays

In this section, of the thesis, I postulate that Pukhtuns in Swat through the participation

and non-participation in national holidays approve of or show disagreement to Pakistani

state projection of its national identity. National symbols, like the celebration of national

holidays, form a significant part of national identity in this regard. I argue that a majority

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of the Swatis are least bothered about the celebration of national holidays. The number,

enthusiasm and willingness to participate in such holidays have decreased amidst the

conflict in the region. Moreover, this is in discontent to the claims of Pakistani state and its

military that after „defeating‟ militants Pukhtuns in Swat are much welcoming Pakistani

state, its military and national holidays. Moreover, in opposition to the media discourse

that Swatis participate in such national events in huge numbers, I postulate that the number

of people participating in such events and the number of such events shows the discontent

of Pukhtuns in Swat to such assumed national celebrations. Moreover, based on my own

observation in Swat, such events are mostly controlled and arranged by the military and

not the civilian administration. Below I discuss these arguments.

Symbols like national flags, banners, national songs, speeches, chants, statues, and

landmarks are important symbols, which serve to connect people to the nation and create a

sense of belonging to the nation. These symbols can be visualized and even heard on

specific rituals and commemoration days, creating national cohesion among the masses

(Fox 2006; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, 545). On the other hand, Fox also argues that such

events can even be inverted by masses to assert their own views and productions of both

national, ethnic and non-national narratives by staging protests, struggles, chanting anti-

national slogans and even burning flags (Fox ,2006, pp, 21–22). Fox and Idris rightly pints

out, that such events of holidays and sports can even miss some important messages of

people who do not show up or have no interests in such events signs and symbols. Thus,

we may fail to capture the whole or maximum picture of everyday national hood or ethnic

hood of the masses. This can present a partial version of the phenomena‟s and can only

involve those present, either physically or virtually (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008, 548).

Too, the abilities of such symbols and even rituals to attract masses and contribute to

national solidarity can vary with time and contexts. Symbols that are low with such

abilities, at times become one of the most important at other times(Fox and Miller-Idriss

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2008, p. 548). Additionally, the importance and the use of these symbols to frame and

reframe national narrative and attachment by valuing them or ignoring others has been

studied from elite perspective and still the intersection of these with everyday lives of

masses needs to be scholarly focused (Fox, 2006). In this context, I discuss Pakistani

national holidays celebrated in Swat. I attempt to reflect from the interviews conducted

with my research participants and my observation of some events.

The state of Pakistan has been using „national‟ symbols as part of its nationalism

project. This includes established ones like a national flag and celebrated ones like

national holidays. Two very important national holidays in this regard are 23rd

of March

and 14th

of August, along with many others41

. On 23rd

March 1940 the famous Lahore

resolution was passed, which is called Pakistan resolution in Pakistan. This resolution was

passed in the annual gathering of All India Muslim League and demanded for separate

state/states for Muslims of British India. Pakistani state discourse celebrates this day as an

achievement of Indian Muslims which later culminated in the formation of Pakistan.

Likewise, 14th

of August is the most celebrated national holiday in Pakistan. On 14th

of

August 1947, Pakistan was formed as an independent state in British India. These events

and holidays can provide us with contexts, where people‟s busy engagement with the

nation and state can be observed. Moreover, it can also inform, us of the discontent

citizens are having with the state and its national imagination. It is significant to reflect

upon the use of such symbols and events amidst the present conflict and violence in

Pukhtun region of Swat.

In pre-conflict Swat, these national holidays, especially 14th

August, was

celebrated with great joy. Mostly in schools and colleges programs used to be held. Young

41

The date of birth (25th

of December) and death (11 September) of Muhammad Ali Jinnah (mostly called

the Quaid e Azam) and date of birth of Muhammad Iqbal, the national poet, (9 November) are some other

important days to be commemorated.

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students used to start arrangements a week before and the event was celebrated with zeal.

There was comparatively more enthusiasm among Pukhtuns in Swat in this regard. This

opinion is much compelling in Swat and an overwhelming majority of my research

participants told me about this. Saira Naz Khor, a female participant from Mingora,

commented that, “Earlier we celebrated such holidays with „patriotism‟. We enjoyed it

with happiness” (Khor, 2017). There was a sense of patriotism and happiness in this case.

This was also the case with elders even, not only women or young men. Laiq Dada, an

elder and a local political worker told me, “Before the conflict we used to celebrate with

enthusiasm” (Dada, 2017). Similar was the opinion of young men like Shahid Ahmed, an

NGO driver, that, “In Pre-conflict times we used to celebrate with enthusiasm” (Ahmed,

2017). Moreover, the educated young class was also having similar opinion. Among

many, Muhammad Ashfaq, an NGO employee from Swat told me that, “Before the

conflict we celebrated these days with enthusiasms and used to arrange flags” (Ashfaq

2017). Likewise, Fazal Yusufzai, a local business man from Kabal, informed me that,

“Before the conflict, 14th

of August was celebrated with great zeal. We were free and

participated like Eid” (Yusufzai, 2017). Comparison with Eid, the Islamic religious

festival, makes the opinion much stronger. Moreover, that time and celebration was

equated with the freedom people were having, which is absent now. Ibrar Shah Lala, a

local politician from Mingora, was of the opinion that, “We used to freely celebrate it

before the conflict”(Lala, 2017). People used to make arrangements weeks before in order

to celebrate these days, especially 14th

of August with great zeal. Muhammad Rehman

Dada, an elder from Charbagh, told me that, “We used to spend at least two weeks i.e.

from 1st to 14

th August to celebrate 14

th August. There was enthusiasm and zeal to

celebrate”(Dada, 2017).

These opinions and comments inform us that people in Swat celebrated such

national holidays with some enthusiasm and zeal. Moreover, there was supposed and

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limited freedom to do these activities. These holiday celebrations were utilized to generate

a sense of belonging to Pakistani nation and state. However, due to the present conflict and

violence in Swat, Pukhtuns are least bothered about the celebration of these national

holidays. This is in contradiction to the claims of Pakistani state and its media (both public

and private) This is due to the reasons I have been discussing in this thesis above. This

affects Pukhtuns sense of belonging to Pakistani nation and state. Below I elaborate this

argument.

The conflict and violence in Swat and associated phenomena‟s have impacted the

celebration and imagination of Pakistani national holidays. In the present context, the

activities of Pakistani state and its institutions are adding to the lowering of such

celebrations. I postulate that Swat Pukhtuns, by non-participation in such events, show

discontent to the state project of official national identity. My own observation on such

national holidays in Swat and the comments of my research participants form an opinion

that the conflict has directly as well as indirectly impacted the celebration of these national

holidays. A female participant, Saira Naz Khor, told me in Mingora,

“Now programs on these days are arranged by military in Swat, not by Swatis themselves.

Celebrations on such days are mostly imposed upon us. So, such days are celebrated when

ordered by the military. We don‟t enjoy these, but most people are compelled” (Khor,

2017).

Such a perception, that a particular kind of celebration of these days is imposed by the

military, adds to the lowering of participation and interests in these. Moreover, these are

attended by people who are mostly influenced by the military, both directly and indirectly.

Taimur Yusufzai, a university lecturer from Charbagh, informed that, “Some people

celebrate these, those who are influenced” (Yusufzai, 2017). Moreover, Ibrar Shah Lala, a

local politician from Mingora and Shereen Lala, a local journalist told me that, there is

impression of imposition in these celebrations (Lala, 2017; Lala, 2017). Such an

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impression of imposition limits the freedom to celebrate these days and adds to lowering

of people‟s interests in these.

My own observation on 23rd

March 2017 was also similar to such a perception.

Significantly all the three programs I could find were arranged by military and none was

by civilian administration. A military man in Matta tehsil told us that the civilian

administration is unable to arrange such programs. “This program was initially of the

civilian government, but they could not arrange it”, he informed us. This might have been

in reference to security measures, because, in such programs security is more than normal.

About the discontent and non-celebration of 14th

of August, Shahid Saleem, a university

student told me about this aspect in Kabal,

“National holidays and national events are celebrated by very few in Swat now. It is

usually an indirect influence by the military, to attend such events. Once on 14th

August I

was in hostel in my university. I was the only one in hostel room and the whole hostel was

outside to celebrate it, while I was not”(Saleem, 2016).

Such a discontent is not situational, is overwhelming in Swat and is directed towards the

state of Pakistan. On the other side as argued by some participants above, some people in

Swat have to attend it out of compulsion and fear and not by their own sweet will. Shahid

Ahmed, a driver in NGO was of the opinion that, “Very specific people celebrate such

national holidays. People fear and do not celebrate willingly. There is least interest in

celebrating even 14th

of August” (Ahmed, 2017). This aspect is dominant in Swat and the

reference to force and compulsion is often made.

Moreover, there is also a perception among Pukhtuns in Swat that Swat was a

„free‟ state even on 23rd

March 1940 and 14th

August 1947. That is why, Swatis argue that

they shall not be compelled to celebrate independence on 14th

of August. Muhammad

Farooq, a medical doctor from Kabal informed that,

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“When we were children, we celebrated these holidays, but when we grew up we came to

know that even on 14th

August 1947 and before that on 23rd

March 1940 we had our own

free state. Thus, these days are not relevant to us Swatis. People don‟t like to go to such

programs. We shall not be compelled”(Farooq, 2017).

Additionally, even some people attempt to celebrate as well but not with the state and its

military. These people try to arrange private programs on such occasions but face different

issues. Shams Swati, a senior college student and activist, told me,

“These national days are not celebrated much now a day. Once we were trying to arrange a

program on 14th

of Augusts but all halls were already booked by the military, as there are

few halls here, so we had no hall to arrange and celebrate 14th

August. We also did not

want to celebrate it in a program already arranged by the military. Another problem in

many areas is that there is curfew for security. We celebrated Independence Day on 15th

then” (Swati, 2017).

Such a happening is not odd since the conflict in Swat. There can be many reasons, as

mentioned above about the booking of all main halls, including the fact that mostly on 14th

of August there can be curfew or other security reasons. On 14th

of August 2017, in many

areas of Swat it was reported on some of the indigenous media outlets as well. In some of

the schools in Swat, administration as well as students had arranged for the program of

14th

Augusts. Such schools decorate the schools for the event. However, on the night

between 13th

and 14th

of August, administration (civilian and military) announced that

there will be no program in a specific area due to security threats. Thus, all such schools

and organizations celebrated Independence on 15th

of August with discouragement in the

name of security. Such an experience in part of the debate in Swat.

I also emphasize that such events are significant. Attending them align people to

the specific state narrative, while any discontent shows a rejection of that narrative or at

least an indifference to that. Moreover, a public discontent may not be easy for anyone.

Hayat Khan Dada, an elder and local politician from Mingora told me,

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“The celebrations of such national holidays are low now, though these are very important

for Pakistan. Swat Qaumi Jarga once announced that if the state and its military continued

to treat us like this, we will boycott 14 August celebrations publicly. I was part of this

Jarga too. Members of the Jarga were fearing even to narrate the decision of jarga and I

was chosen to spell the declaration. I did it but feared. There was a list of demands from

military and government in this declaration” (Dada, 2017).

To narrate further that, in post-conflict situation, the celebrations of both these

significant national holidays have lowered, I utilize my own observation of 23rd

March

2017 along with my constant contact with research participants on 14th

of August42

. On

23rd

March 2017, I could hardly see a single Pakistani flag in Mingora bazar. I travelled

for hours in Swat from Matta tehsil to Mingora, but I could not see many celebrations

against popular media and Pakistani state discourse. There was hardly one program in

each Tehsil. In Matta tehsil there was one program in Matta Degree College. Likewise,

there was one in Mingora and one in Saidu Shareef. Most of these programmes were

controlled and are specific, where entry was given to people who applied earlier and were

selected days before the program. This is mostly done on reference from men who are in

military or government. However, some, very few, programs were public and open to

everyone. Significantly all the programs arranged on that day were by military and none

was by civilian administration.

In Matta tehsil, when I reached the event location (Matta Degree college) I was

surprised that the program is not open to public as such. A military man asked us (I was

accompanied by a research participant), after checking a list, “On whose reference are you

people here?”. We told him that we are students and want to attend the program.

Moreover, we asked him if the program is arranged by the military. He replied that we

have selected people for the event already and we have a list with us. The situation was

tense with extra security by the military, both in uniform and without uniform. Moreover,

42

As I was on a fellowship abroad, I could not attend events on 14th

of August.

189

the derogatory remark was that the program has been arranged by the military because the

civilian administration was unable to arrange this program.

On the other side, in the main financial and professional hub of Swat, Mingora and

Saidu Shareef, we observed two programs. One event on this 23rd

March was arranged in

Wadudya Hall in Government postgraduate Jehanzeb College Saidu Shareef while the

other one was a rally that ended in Swat Press club Mingora. The event in Wadudya hall

was open to Public, though the security presence of Pakistani military was overwhelming.

Provincial police were also present on the event venue. The hall was hardly half packed

and the estimated number of participants for the time we were there ranged from 200 to

300. The rally, which ended up in Swat Press club Mingora, was ironically arranged by a

banned outfit, Jummat ud dawah Pakistan. The aim was to portray Pakistan as an Islamic

republic and Kashmir as integral part of Pakistan. The number of people who participated

in that rally was hardly 100 to 200. In front of the press club, one of the leaders of this

organization gave a concluding speech as well. Other than these two events, there was no

sign of, or enthusiasm related to the celebration of 23rd

March as a national day.

On the contrary, 14th

of August normally witness more citizen engagement across

Pakistan in comparison to 23rd

of March. Same is the case with Swat. However, as I have

elaborated above, in some of my research participants‟ comments, the celebration of 14th

of August is not much popular in comparison to other parts of Pakistan or Pukhtun regions

like Peshawar, Charsadda or Mardan etc. Moreover, such celebrations are also marked

with critical questions of „freedom‟ and „independence‟ in relevance to the presence of

military and check posts. However, such critical questions are not part of the mainstream

media discourse but are posted on some of the indigenous websites or media outlets and

social media. Bazars, like that of Mingora, witness a good number of people coming to

celebrate 14th

of August.14th

of August 2017 witnessed more crowd than 23rd

of March

2017. Mingora bazar was decorated with Pakistani flags and the night before people from

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different walks of life and different political parties came out. People on this occasion

were hopeful for peace in Swat and that is why celebrations are increasing. For few of my

research participants, old setup is trying to restore back. Salman Habib, a private school

teacher from Charbagh, commented that, “In crisis the celebrations were low as security

problems were there. However now celebrations are growing and old situation is trying to

restore” (Habib, 2017). However, for such a huge population and amidst the claims of

Pakistani state and military, presence of such a minority still reflects upon the discontent

of the majority towards Pakistani state‟s narrative.

Conclusively, I argue that majority of the people in Swat do not celebrate or bother

to celebrate national events and holidays. Moreover, a strong opinion questions the

celebrations of these along with the bad experience in celebrating these. This shows

discontent towards state promoted official narrative that Swat Pukhtuns are more pro-

Pakistan now. Conclusively, the imagination and adoption of Pakistani national identity

has been impacted due to the conflict and violence in Swat.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have demonstrated the impacts of conflict and violence in Swat on the

imagination of Pakistani identity among the Pukhtuns. Pakistani military, amidst the

conflict in Swat, occupies a central and significant position in the imagination of Pakistani

national consciousness and identity. I have demonstrated and argued that the socially

negative behavior of the military, the ethnic stratification done in the behavior of military

and Punjabi domination of it is significant points of the debate in Swat. Likewise, another

significant marker and aspect is the celebration of national holidays. I argue that interest in

is diminishing in celebration of national holidays, like 23rd

of March and 14th of August.

Pukhtuns in Swat take least interest in celebrating national Pakistani holidays by showing

their discontent to the „popular‟ state and media narrative, which assume that, after the

military operations in Swat, Pukhtuns in Swat are more enthusiastic in celebrating these

191

holidays. I elaborate that national holidays, against the Pakistani state and military‟s

narrative, are least celebrated and a popular discontent is shown by not showing interest in

these.

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CHAPTER 7: CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: ISLAM,

PRIDE, SACRIFICE AND INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN SWAT

Introduction

In this section of the thesis, regarding the impacts of conflict and violence for Pakistani

national identity, I discuss Islam, pride, sacrifice, complains and inter-ethnic relations as

aspects of national identity. I argue that Islam is the significant in this debate because of its

centrality to Pakistani national identity, Pakhtun‟s ethnic identity and militant‟s discourse.

I contend that, amidst the conflict in Swat, Pukhtuns try to distance their form of Islam

(linking symbolic and practical aspects of it) from that of Pakistani state and militants.

Moreover, Pukhtun‟s form of Islam is considered closer to that of the state with a sharp

distance from that of the militants. Pakistan state, religious clergy and militants are blamed

of and criticized for using Islam for their interests. The divisive role of Islam has been

complicated in relation to its unifying role in this case.

Moreover, I also propose that the discourse of ethnic pride, sacrifice and

complaints against the state of Pakistan forms the next part of the tool kit of national

identity, especially in this context. Pukhtun‟s relation to other ethnic groups and Pakistani

state is informed by the sacrifice in the form of conflict for Pakistani nation and state.

Pukhtuns in Swat articulate the discussion in a way to inform that the conflict is a sacrifice

of Swat Pukhtuns for the entire Pakistan. Swat Pukhtuns take pride in the fact that only

Pukhtuns can pay heavily in the form of a sacrifice for Pakistan. However, Swatis also

complain of the behavior of Pakistani state and its government of being less responsive in

acknowledging and compensating their sacrifices to Pakistan. The imagination of

Pakistani national identity is thus impacted by the presence of conflict and violence in

Swat. The conflict in Swat has also impacted another significant marker of Pakistani

national identity that is inter-ethnic relations, especially Pukhtun-Punjabi relations. The

involvement of Pakistani state, perceived to be dominated by the Punjabis and involved in

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socially and culturally detrimental practices, has repercussions for Pukhtun-Punjabi

relations. Ethnic boundary and relations have been sharpened and strained and national

identity impacted.

This section is organized into sub-sections, based on these arguments. Below, I

reflect upon the impacts of conflict in Swat for Islam as a national identity marker.

Followed is the discussion of ethnic pride, sacrifice and complains against the state of

Pakistan as part of Pakistani national identity in Swat, in the next section. In the last sub

section, I discuss inter-ethnic relations amidst the conflict and violence in Swat. In the end,

I conclude the discussion.

7.1. Conflict and violence in Swat: Islam and Pakistani National Identity

The significance and centrality of Islam to Pakistani nationalism and national identity has

been extensively discussed in the literature (Metcalf, 2004; Qureshi, 1969; Shafqat, 2007;

Shaikh, 1989; Van Der Veer, 1994, pp. 195–197; Verkaaik, 2007, pp. 232–233).

Moreover, such centrality is marred by a contested understanding, where for some it is a

unifying factor while for others it is a divisive one (Iqbal, 2003; Qureshi, 1969; Shaikh,

1989, pp, 10–11). Likewise, none of the arguments in the literature concerning religion as

unifying or divisive phenomenon completely satisfy the case of Pukhtun identification

with Pakistan (Jan, 2010, p.52). Muhammad Ayub Jan argues that, Pukhtuns do not

internalize any sectarian message. Moreover, other ethnic groups are perceived to be lesser

Muslims rather than Muslims of a particular sect or ideology by the Pukhtuns. Pukhtuns

differentiate between their Muslimness and that of ethnic others. Additionally, Pukhtuns

find it difficult to accommodate to a Pakistani identity that is exclusively constituted of

Islamic identity and rather propound an identity that allows ethnic expression and

Muslimness (Jan, 2010,p. 152).

Based on my field data and understanding of the literature, in this sub-section, I

argue that Islam, as a Pakistani national identity marker, in Pukhtun‟s imagination, has

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witnessed multiple and significant impacts due to the recent conflict and violence in Swat.

I postulate that the recent conflict in Swat, involving Pakistani state (with Islam as a

central marker of its national identity) and militants (who uses Islam for their violence)

has repercussions for Islam as a central aspect of Pakistani identity. In the present context,

there are three identifiable forms of Islam including „Islam imposed by the militants‟,

„Islam promoted by the Pakistani nation state‟ and „Islam perceived to be practiced by

majority Pukhtuns in Swat‟. In this context, I contend that, Pukhtuns try to distance their

form of Islam (linking symbolic and practical aspects of it) from that of Pakistani state and

militants. Moreover, Pukhtun‟s form of Islam is considered closer to that of the state with

a sharp distance from that of the militants. Along with that, Islam promoted by militants is

considered as one lacking a complete essence and relying only on justice system and is

thus sharply disowned. Likewise, this Islam of the militants is also out rightly rejected

because of its perceived violent nature. On the other hand, Islam promoted by Pakistani

state is blamed of being an Islam just by name (symbolic), with no or minimum practice.

Pukhtun‟s Islam, imagined to be practiced by majority in Swat, is one that is practical,

complete and peaceful and thus better than both militants and Pakistani state. Moreover,

the comparison between Islam of Pukhtuns and ethnic others has been somehow

dominated by the discussion of Islam promoted by the militants and that of Pakistani state.

I argue that this discourse informs us of the impacts, conflict have, for the Pakistani

national identity, with Islam as a central marker.

Likewise, Islam is still one of the most significant markers of Pakistani national

identity. The recent conflict in Pukhtun region has added to the significance of Islam. The

role of Islam has become more significant yet problematic, because of its use by militants

for their interests. I propose that, though Islam form a web that attempt to connect

Pakistanis from different ethnicities and the state of Pakistan assume its unifying role, the

role of Islam is marred with a problematic contestation. Elites and leaders in Pakistan

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(mostly the religious clergy) are blamed of using Islam as a dividing factor by promoting

„sectarianism‟ in the country. Likewise, Pukhtuns in Swat are somehow critical of the claimed

use of Islam as a unifying factor by Pakistani state, amidst this conflict. The debate that Islam is

used by Pakistani state and the religious clergy for its interests, has been more sharpened, which

corelates with the argument that Islam somehow plays a divisive role (Shaikh, 1989, 2008;

Verkaaik, 2007). This has consequences for Pakistani national identity, imagined in Islam. Below

I elaborate these arguments.

My field data from Swat also suggests that Islam is a significant marker of

Pakistani national identity among the Pukhtuns. An overwhelming majority of my

research participants attested that Islam is a significant marker of Pakistani national

identity in Pukhtun‟s imagination. Moreover, it was also substantiated that Islam attempts

to connect Pukhtuns with the nation state and other ethnic groups in Pakistan. Shah Alam

Lala, a Politician from Dherai, commented that, “Islam is the most important factor of

national identity” (Lala, 2017). Among many others, Shahid Saleem, a university student

in Kabal, was of the opinion, that, “Islam is central to Pakistani identity” (Saleem, 2016).

Many reasons are presented in the support of this claim, of which significant ones are „the

historical context of Pakistan movement‟, „the Islamic constitution of Pakistan‟ and „the

fact that majority in Pakistan are Muslims‟. Fazal Yusufzai, a local business holder in

Kabal emphasized, “Islam is central in Pakistani identity because it was the main factor in

1947. Independence of Pakistan was based on Islam” (Yusufzai, 2017). Some, like

Khalida Yusuf Khor, a female participant from Mingora, referred to the constitution of

Pakistan by saying that, “Islam is central to Pakistani national identity. Even the

constitution of Pakistan is Islamic” (Khor, 2017).

However, the role of Islam to unite Pakistanis as a „nation‟ is inherent with a

contestation and opposition. For some Pukhtuns in Swat, Islam can play a role to unite all

Pakistani, while for others it may not be so significant, as the cultures and social systems

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are different for different ethnic groups in Pakistan. From the first group, Said Alam Lala,

a VDC member, was of the opinion that, “Islam is central and probably the only marker

to unite all Pakistanis (Lala, 2016). Likewise, Fazli Akbar Dada, an elder from Kabal,

argued that Islam is a central unifying factor in Pakistan. He told me, “The role of Islam is

significant as a unifying factor in Pakistan” (Dada, 2016). Muhammad Rehman Dada, an

elder, added Urdu language, along with Islam, as main factors that can unite all Pakistanis.

He told me, “Islam and Urdu are important and significant factors for the unity of

Pakistanis”(Dada, 2017).

Along with this, a significant debate informs us of the least unifying and even

divisive role of Islam. However, this role is not considered as an inherent problem with

Islam but is due to the lack of proper use of it by Pakistani state and the religious clergy. It

is a strong perception that Islam has not been used properly by the state of Pakistan and its

religious clergy for this purpose. Pakistani state and religious clergy have used Islam,

instead, to divide the society. Sectarianism and factionalism are blamed, which hurts the

unifying role of Islam in Pakistan. Yusuf Khan is a traditional Khan in Dherai. He told me,

“Islam is powerful as it can play a positive role to unify Pakistanis. However, Islam has up

to now divided Pakistanis and the role of state is involved in this. Deobandi vs Barelvis

and others are common. Unity among people of Pakistan is out of sight” (Khan, 2017).

Similarly, a female research participant, Saira Naz Khor, was of the opinion that, “Islam is

central to Pakistan, but we have divided it into different sects” (Khor, 2017). Beside the

argument that Islam has been marred with sectarianism or intra-sectarianism even, the role

of Pakistani state is blamed in another form as well. This is because of the perception that

Islam has been adopted by Pakistani state only in its symbolic form and not practical. Shah

Alam Lala, a politician from Dherai, commented that,

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“Islam can unite us all Pakistanis, if adopted by the state in a practical way. As the practice

and interpretation of Islam is different for different people, Pakistani State shall adopt best

practices of Islam and people shall then follow the state. However, I think that it is still far

from reality” (Lala, 2017).

This argument has been, in one way or the other, expressed in many comments of my

research participants. Pakistani state is suggested to adopt better practices of Islam so that

others, in Pakistan, shall follow her as well. Moreover, state is blamed by almost everyone

in Swat for not using Islam properly as a unifying factor in Pakistan. In the words of

Muhammad Ashfaq, an NGO employee, “Islam can be used for unity in Pakistan. But up

to now it has not been used or has not been successful due to the lack of state interest in

the proper use of it. This leave space for the Islamic version of militants”(Ashfaq, 2017).

As Pakistani state has left her work to religious clergy, this religious class uses it

for personal interests. These „mullahs‟ (religious clergy) are blamed of creating

differences in the society. Laiq Dada, an elder and a political worker, told me, “Islam of

all of us is the same but there are still some issues, because mullahs have divided us” (

Dada, 2017). Moreover, Fazal Khan from Mingora, informed me that, “Islam can be used

for unity by the state, but we don‟t have learned people in religious studies. Mullah‟s

instead have created differences among us all” (Khan, 2017). Thus, state and religious

clergy, are both blamed of not properly using Islam as a unifying factor in Pakistan.

Moreover, it is argued that Islam can serve as a marker of national identity to unite

Pakistanis from different ethnic groups. The recent conflict in Swat and the use of Islam

by militants makes it more important to explore Pukhtun imagination of Islam promoted

and imposed by the militants and that of the state.

Islam was used by militants to lay claim to their violent activities. There is a

compelling perception among Pukhtuns in Swat that militants used Islam for their interests

only and were least careful about „true Islam‟. Initially, militants were claiming to bring

Islamic Shariah and a quick Justice system which was attractive for people in the region.

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Saira Naz Khor commented that, “Militants Islam was mostly focused on Purdah and

Justice System in Swat” (Khor, 2017). Some research participants, including Salman

Habib, a Private school teacher from Charbagh termed militant‟s practice of Islam as a

setup of Justice and not Islam at all. This perception was elaborated further by arguing that

Swatis were attracted to militants in initial days because of their quick justice system and

not Islamic practice. Salman Habib told me in Charbagh, that “Militant‟s setup was

actually based on justice system, not Islam at all. Swatis accepted militants because of this

aspect, as their decisions were quick and swift” (Habib, 2017). This opinion was

somehow repeated with additions by others, like Said Alam Lala, a VDC member from

Kabal. He argued that militants were not following Islam or its code, they were in fact

used by „someone‟ for a specific purpose. He commented, that “Islam of militants was not

Islam at all. It was just a system. In fact, militants were used by others in the name of

Islam”(Lala, 2017).

This argument was more substantiated by the fact that militants used force and

violence. This use of force and violence created a perception in Swat that militants are not

following Islam but are instead following their vested interests. Fazal Yusufzai, a local

business holder in Kabal told me,

“Initially militants claimed to bring Islamic Shariah in Swat and Pakistan. That was

attractive, and people thought it was good and right to have Shariah. But later, in practice

it was different, and militants followed their own interests. They were imposing things by

force which was disliked by people in Swat”(Yusufzai, 2017).

As militants used Islam and its symbols for their movement, they justified violence in the

name of Islam. A sharp opposition to militants and their version of Islam grew due to this

use of violence. Militant‟s form of Islam, based on violence and force, and is thus rejected

by an overwhelming number of my research participants in Swat. Sadaqat Azim, a

university student in Kabal, told me, “Militants used force and violence, which is not

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acceptable”(Azim, 2016). Among many others, Shahid Ahmed, a driver in an NGO, told

me in Mingora, “Militants used to impose their version of Islam by force and violence,

which is not good” (Ahmed, 2017). Iqbal Lala, a social activist from Kabal was of the

opinion that, “Militants have a different narrative which is rejected by majority Pukhtuns

in Swat because we do not accept violence or force in the name of Islam” (Lala, 2016).

Likewise, Khalida Yusuf Khor, a female participant was critical of Islam projected by

militants too. She told me, in Mingora, that, “In Islam, violence is not acceptable and thus

we reject Islam of the militants. I believe that these militants are not Muslims even and

what they practice is not Islam” (Khor, 2017). Mustafa Lala, a political worker from

Mingora also argued, conclusively, that “Majority in Swat are not extremists and they

don‟t like the Islam promoted by militants” (Lala, 2017).

Moreover, there is a strong perception in Swat that initially people were attracted

to the militant‟s version of Islam however violence and force, to impose their brand of

Shariah, changed attitude of the people. A university lecturer, Mudasir Swati, elaborated,

“Before militants started killing, Swatis liked their Islam and their message and

considered this as a better Islam. However, violence changed people opinion. People then

started disliking militant‟s version of Islam” (Swati, 2017). In the same way, Sadeeq

Ullah, a university student from Kabal, was of the opinion that, “Militants were fine in the

start days but when they got violent it became problematic. People in Swat agree that

violent and forced Islam is not good”(Ullah, 2017). Militant‟s Islam, based in violence,

was thus rejected in Swat.

These comments and elaborations testify to the argument, I have presented above,

that Pukhtuns in Swat reject Islam imposed by militants and try to keep a distance from

the form of Islam claimed by militants in Swat. The perception of Swat Pukhtuns about

the form of Islam promoted by Pakistani state is significant too. There is an interesting

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debate regarding the Islam promoted by Pakistani state for its national identity in the

context of present conflict of Swat.

Significantly, Pukhtuns in Swat, try to distance from the form of Islam promoted

by Pakistani state too. Moreover, the blames against Pakistani state, of using Islam for its

interests, forms an important part of this discourse. Pakistani state (especially its

„establishment‟) is blamed, in Swat, of using Islam as a tool. Historically it has been used

against ethnic nationalism (and nationalists) in Pakistan and that creates suspicions in

minds of Swatis, of Islam being used in Swat for specific interests by the state of Pakistan.

Taimur Yusufzai, a university lecturer told me in Charbagh,

“Islam has only been used as a tool by establishment in Pakistan. They have been using

Islam against ethnic nationalism and nationalists in Pakistan. The example of Baluchistan

can be given. People here in Swat now don‟t trust Islam of either militants or state” (

Yusufzai, 2017).

About the state use of religion, and giving space to others of using it, a university lecturer,

Mudasir Swati, elaborated, that “Government and state shall also take control of Mosques

as mullahs use them. Ironically, state has been using religion itself in Pakistan” (Swati,

2017). Moreover, state is also blamed of not taking up its responsibilities in this regard,

besides using Islam for its interests. This dubious role of the Pakistani state is criticized of

giving space to the promotion of any version of Islam by anyone, including militants.

Asad Lala, a politician from Swat told me in Mingora, “State has not taken up its

responsibility in this regard. Its Islam is just symbolic. As state has created space, people

adopts everyone‟s Islam, like Sufi Muhammad etc.” (Lala, 2017). Such a perception

creates a feeling of hostility towards the symbolic Islam promoted by Pakistani nation

state. Along with this, the Islam promoted by the nation state of Pakistan, is termed as

Islam „by name only‟ and symbolic, by many of my research participants in Swat. The

comment of Shabir Khan, a local khan from Charbagh, was that, “Pakistan was formed in

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the name of Islam, however now a day, Islam is just by name in Pakistan” (Khan, 2017).

Likewise, Laiq Dada, an elder from Kabal was of the same opinion, “State Islam is just by

name/verbal, with no practice”(Dada, 2017). In the same way, elites/ leaders of Pakistan

are blamed of not practicing Islam. Fazal Yusufzai, a local business holder in Kabal also

emphasized that “Leaders of Pakistan don‟t practice Islam themselves” (Yusufzai, 2017).

Thus, a criticism on the role of Pakistani nation state in this context is that Islam promoted

by the state is not implemented in its essence and is mostly, thus, unpracticed. Sadaqat

Azim, a university student in Kabal, was of the opinion that “Problem with Islam of

Pakistan is that it is not implemented and is without a practice”(Azim, 2016). Moreover,

as the state is perceived as weak, its practice of Islam is also considered as weak. Shahid

Ahmed, a driver in an NGO, told me in Mingora, “State Islam is weak like the state”

(Ahmed, 2017). Besides this, the influence of West is also considered as a problem with

the form of Islam promoted by the Pakistani state. Among such opinions was that of

Shams Dada, an elder from Kabal. He told me,

“Islam promoted and adopted by the State of Pakistan is wrong. As state is influenced by

the West, its laws are state laws and not Islamic. Thus, Islam of the state is not practical

and only to appear to be Islam” (Dada, 2017).

Conclusively, such an Islam promoted by the state of Pakistan is not liked by an

overwhelming majority of Pukhtuns in Swat. Salman Habib, a Private school teacher, from

Charbagh said that, “State Islam is not liked in Swat” (Habib, 2017). Thus, Pukhtuns in

Swat try to distance from and criticize the form and version of Islam promoted by the

nation state of Pakistan. In this context, while trying to distance from the form of Islam

imposed by militants and promoted by Pakistani state, Pukhtuns in Swat consider their

Islam as better due to many reasons.

Islam, in general, and that of Swatis in particular is viewed as a religion of practice

and peace, while that of the state and militants are blamed of lacking these properties

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respectively. The comment of Shabir Khan, a local khan from Charbagh, was that, “Islam

of common Pukhtuns in Swat is better. Others are just by name” (Khan, 2017). Pukhtun‟s

form of Islam is considered as „real‟ in comparison to others. Said Alam Lala, a VDC

member, told me in Kabal, that “Real Islam is only among Pukhtuns. Pukhtuns are better

Muslims in comparison to state Islam and militant‟s Islam” (Lala, 2017). This Islam of

common Pukhtuns (an attempt to distance from militants) which is perceived as „real‟ in

Swat is having many components that attempt to differentiate it from state version of

Islam and that of the militants. It is simple and practical, as Ashraf Lala, a government

official from Kabal, informed that, “People of Swat follow a simple Islam” (Lala, 2016),

which is rooted in performance of basic Islamic prayers. According to Qudrat Lala of

Kabal, “People in Swat are following Islam too much. Pukhtuns offer prayers and fast

much, while in other areas of Pakistan this is not much practiced. Thus, our Islam is

better”(Lala, 2016). Along with the practice of prayers, Islam of Pukhtuns is considered as

peaceful. Saira Naz Khor commented that, “Islam of Pukhtuns in Swat is peaceful and that

is why i like this version of Islam” (Khor, 2017). Moreover, the perception prevails that

Pukhtun culture also makes Pukhtun‟s better Muslims in comparison to others. A

university lecturer, Mudasir Swati, elaborated, “Islam is a religion of peace and

brotherhood. Pukhtuns in Swat also believe that Pukhtunwali is more strict than Islam

which makes their Islam better”(Swati, 2017). Moreover, significantly, due to violent

nature of Islam imposed by militants, Pukhtuns consider their version of Islam closer to

that of the state, in comparison to that of the militants. Shahid Saleem, a university student

in Kabal, was of the opinion, that, “State Islam and Islam of Swatis have many

similarities. Islam of Pukhtuns and that of militants have many differences” (Saleem

2016).

Conclusively, Pukhtuns in Swat try to distance from both militant‟s and state

Islam, in the context of present conflict in Swat. Islam imposed by militants is considered

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as one which is not complete and is violent. Islam of Pakistani state, on the other hand, is

marred with the perception that it is used by the state for its vested interests. Pukhtuns in

Swat argue that their form of Islam is better than both as it is practical and non-violent.

Moreover, in this debate, Pukhtuns Islam is considered closer to that of the state, with a

greater distance from militants. Such processes have impacts for the imagination of

Pakistani national identity rooted in Islam. Impacts for other markers of national identity

are also significant. State institutions, especially the military, are another significant aspect

of Pakistani national identity as imagined in Swat in the present context.

7.2. The discourse of Pride, Sacrifice and complains in the Conflict of Swat

In this section, I argue that, beside Islam and Pakistani military, the debate of pride,

sacrifice and complaints forms another marker and aspect of Pakistani national identity,

among Pukhtuns in Swat, that attempt to generate a sense of belonging to Pakistan. The

context of conflict has added to the significance of this marker. Pukhtuns in Swat take

pride in a sacrifice for Pakistan in the form of this conflict. Moreover, it is a perception

that other ethnic groups in Pakistan would not have been able to do so. Thus, Pukhtun

ethnic pride increases amidst the conflict in the region. Swat Pukhtuns are perceived to

have saved Pakistan from a greater „disaster‟ by giving their lives in sacrifice in the form

of this conflict. On the contrary, there is a significant opinion among Pukhtuns in Swat,

which informs us of the least response of Pakistani state in acknowledging and

compensating Pukhtun sacrifice and the inter-ethnic power dynamics are some areas in

this regard. This opinion informs that Swat Pukhtuns understand the „game‟ played by the

Punjabi dominated state of Pakistan in which Swatis have been destroyed to save „Punjab‟.

Likewise, Pukhtuns in Swat are much explicit about the loss of Pukhtuns in Swat and

gains to ethnic others in this context. Swat Pukhtuns complaint against the state of

Pakistan and its institutions for not properly acknowledging, accepting and compensating

this sacrifice. Below, I briefly expand these themes.

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Pukhtun sense of belonging to Pakistan is informed by the reference of Pukhtuns to

pride and sacrifice (Jan, 2010, pp, 164–65). Pukhtuns in Swat articulate the discussion in a

way to inform that the conflict is a sacrifice of Swatis for the whole Pakistan. Taking pride

in the fact that only Swat Pukhtuns are able to pay heavily in the form a sacrifice for

Pakistan in respect to others, Swat Pukhtuns try to own the state of Pakistan and generate a

sense of belonging. Fazal Yusufzai, a local businessman from Kabal was of the opinion

that, “Pukhtuns are talented in this regard and can sacrifice for the country. Other ethnic

groups cannot do so. Pukhtuns love this land and that is why have sacrificed for it”

(Yusufzai). Pukhtuns are considered as more suitable to sacrifice than ethnic others

because of their „natural‟ love for land. This sacrifice is rooted in historical list of

sacrifices, which Pukhtuns have made for Pakistan in different wars like the Kashmir war

and the 1965 war. Moreover, wars in which Pakistan apparently lost, are not mentioned,

for example the 1971 war. Fazal Khan, a local politician from Mingora, informed me

about this by saying that, “Pukhtuns have sacrificed a lot for Pakistan, Kashmir war, the

1965 war etc. are proofs of it”(Khan, 2017). This sacrifice has always been for Pakistan.

Mustafa Lala was of the opinion that this was done to save and defend Pakistan. He said,

“This all seemed part of the great game and was played to defend Pakistan” (Lala, 2016).

Moreover, the pride is emphasized by considering Pukhtuns as more fit for sacrifices.

Misbah Ullah, a local political worker from Mingora, commented that,

“Pukhtuns and then Swatis were probably selected for this „Job‟ because Pukhtuns are

powerful. They can sacrifice. Pakistani state was compelled for the defense of Pakistan, to

do all this. However, „outsiders‟ benefited more than local people of Swat” (Ullah, 2017).

In Swat, such a discussion is never complete without a mention of complains. As is

evident in the comment of Misbah Ullah, above, that Swatis did not benefit this sacrifice

while non-Swatis benefited. Complains against the state and its elites form a significant

part of this whole discussion. The complexity and problematic nature of Pukhtun sense of

belonging to Pakistan and Pakistani national identity is complemented by the discussion of

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complains against the state and its elites. This has been reported in the recent literature

(Jan, 2010), however the recent conflict and violence in Swat has enormously added to

this aspect of Pukhtun‟s imagination of Pakistani national identity and state. The literature

informs that Pukhtuns imagine Pakistani state as an institution to which they belong, but at

the same time an entity which does not recognize their sacrifices and is heavily controlled

by other ethnic groups, mostly Punjabis (Jan, 2010, p. 165). Such a perception is very

strong in Swat, amidst this conflict and violence. There are complains in Swat that

Pakistani state does not acknowledge and compensate their sacrifices „properly‟.

In this context, many Pukhtuns, in Swat, argue that the recent conflict and violence

was one imposed upon Pukhtuns in general and Swatis in particular. In fact, Swat

Pukhtuns were made to sacrifice for Pakistan. Many will question and complain the

sufferings they have faced during this conflict in Swat. Muhtaram Lala, an elder from

Kabal, elaborated upon this aspect by saying that,

“We did sacrifice, became IDPs, stood in lines for food, and still accepted the state of

Pakistan. There are many more miseries to mention. Then why are we treated like this?

Why all this happened in Swat? The whole conflict seems a game played. There was

funding from outside of Swat and may be from government side” (Lala, 2017).

The perception that conflict was a planned game, played against Pukhtuns in Swat is

narrated with helplessness and deep complains. Pakistani state is blamed of being less

responsive for compensating Pukhtun‟s sacrifices to Pakistan. Moreover, in such a

context, when the state is blamed by many for the cause of conflict in Swat, it is also

blamed of not fulfilling its job in the post conflict situation. Asad Lala, a politician from

Swat, commented that,

“The conflict has confiscated many human rights of people in Swat through check-Posts,

curfews and military operations. This has decreased our trust in the state of Pakistan. State

is like mother for its citizens, but Pakistani state is not fulfilling its role. Its job is to protect

us not to do what it has done in Swat. A perception has developed in Swat that state was

having hands in all this”(Lala, 2017).

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Such strong words and opinions express the deepness of complains against the state.

Pakistani state is blamed of having hands in this conflict and of not acknowledging

sacrifices. Moreover, Pakistan is blamed for not performing its job, which in this case is

protecting its citizens in Swat. This process also adds to the diminishing of trust in

Pakistani state. Compensation for the conflict goes in hands of Pakistani state but not to

Swat. Salman Khan told me in Dherai,

“This peaceful place (Swat) was burnt. Investment, Tourism and economy were all

impacted. The main aim seems to form a cantonment in Swat. So, I blame Pakistani state,

its government and agencies. Funding from the US and West were eaten by few people of

Pakistan and nothing was given to Swatis”(Khan, 2017).

Thus, through the discourse of such complaints against the state and its governmental

agencies Pukhtun sense of belonging is problematized further, where the role of Pakistani

state is criticized. The conflict and violence thus impact the imagination of Pakistan, its

national identity and Pukhtun sense of belonging to it. The (least) celebration of national

holidays forms another significant part of this discussion.

7.3. Conflict and violence in Swat: Inter-ethnic relations and boundaries

The previous literature, both on Pukhtun and non Pukhtun societies, has explored the

boundary aspects of ethnic identification in a group. This literature has discussed both

intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic boundaries of ethnic identity (Barth, 1969b; Cornell &

Hartmann, 1998; Jan,, 2010; Wimmer, 2013). Barth‟s study is considered as a pioneering

one in the introduction of ethnic boundaries to this discussion of social and ethnic

organization of societies. Barth argues that, different ecological, economic and political

circumstances and factors can influence the cultural stuff within an ethnic group and

transformation can be brought in this, however the boundary is constantly maintained by

members of the group, as a dichotomy between „us‟ and „them‟ (Barth, 1998). Moreover, a

significant point is that members construct and maintain multiple boundaries at a time, as

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within the group and against other groups, termed as intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic (Jan,

2010, 21). Likewise, sometime ethnic boundaries can overlap with religious as well as

sectarian ones. However, I try to emphasize the inter-ethnic relations more than

boundaries as such. By inter-ethnic relations and boundaries, I understand the relations

and boundary between Pukhtuns and other ethnic groups, especially the Punjabis.

Likewise, recent literature reports that Pukhtun sense of belonging to Pakistan is

heavily informed by the direct reference to interethnic relations and power dynamics (Jan,

2010, pp, 164–65). I endorse this argument and argue that the discussion of inter-ethnic

relations and power dynamics significant amidst the conflict in Swat. Naveed Khan Lala, a

local shopkeeper from Matta, was of the opinion that, “Pakistani identity is nothing just

claims of Pakistani state and its elites. Power and violence are central in Pakistan” (Lala,

2017). The recent conflict and violence in Swat has impacted inter-ethnic boundaries and

relation, a marker of Pakistani national consciousness. I postulate that, from inter-ethnic,

the conflict has significant repercussions for the relations between Pukhtuns and ethnic

others, especially the Punjabis. The involvement of military imagined by Pukhtuns to be

dominated by Punjabis and Punjab Province has a direct correlation with this aspect.

Moreover, the perception that Pakistani state, dominated by the Punjabis, is also involved

in this conflict of Swat, impacts these relations. The relations have been somehow

strained, and the boundaries sharpened in a complex manner. Thus, the conflict also adds

to the complexity of Pukhtun ethnic identity. I expand these arguments below with a

reference to some of the relevant literature.

Conflict in Swat has significantly impacted the inter-ethnic relations among

Pukhtuns in Swat. Though, by inter-ethnic relations I mean the relations between Pukhtuns

and other major ethnicities in Pakistan like the Balochs, Sindhis and Punjabis, in Swat the

discussion is dominated by the relations between Pukhtuns and the Punjabis. Significantly,

Punjabi domination is perceived with such a dominant voice that ethnic others are all

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dubbed as Punjabis. Moreover, among Pukhtuns in general and Swat in particular, there is

a strong opinion that power is controlled by Punjabis and the recent conflict has added to

this perception. Pakistani state is perceived to be controlled and dominated by Punjabis.

This perception is utilized for the claim that there is no violence in Punjabi dominated

province of Punjab while there is conflict and violence since a decade in Pukhtun areas.

Said Alam Lala, a VDC member from Kabal, commented that,

“It was a planned game imposed by the Punjabi establishment of Pakistan. South Punjab is

full of Taliban, but we do not see anything there. Punjabi Taliban were the first I

encountered. However, the destruction is faced by us in the form of huge internal

displacement and killing of our elders” (Lala, 2017).

Such an opinion informs about the perception that Punjabi dominated

establishment of Pakistani state is playing a negative role in this context. Moreover, the

existence of Punjabi Taliban has been reported even in the media. Still Punjab province is

mainly out of any conflict and violence. Moreover, the disadvantageous position of

Pukhtuns is substantiated by the perception that the destruction is faced by Pukhtuns.

Muhtaram Lala from Kabal told me that “The role mainly is of Pakistani state. As

Punjabis are dominated, so it is not happening there. Punjabis are controlling it and using

it in Pukhtun areas”(Lala, 2017). Pakistani state is thus dominated by ethnic others, the

Punjabis, with a perception that Pukhtun region is witnessing violence in while Punjab

province is safe. Moreover, it is an overwhelming opinion that Punjabis are using this

conflict and violence against Pukhtuns in Pakistan.

In such a situation, there are multiple reasons and ways that the conflict impacts

inter-ethnic relations and boundaries. Significant discussion revolves around two main

aspects, Punjabi ethnicity and the role of Punjabi dominated military in Swat. Punjabi

establishment, Punjabi dominated Pakistani state, Punjabi dominated political parties and

Punjabi dominated province (Punjab) are all blamed in one way or the other as involved in

the recent conflict in Swat. Moreover, military which is imagined as Punjabi dominated

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has a significant role in the conflict of Swat. Pukhtun‟s sympathies and behavior in the

military, is attributed as „good‟ and Punjabi‟s behavior as „not acceptable‟, within the

military. Moreover, the interaction and behavior of „Punjabi dominated military‟ is seen in

ethnic terms (discussed above in some section on Pakistani military). This impacts the

boundary and relations between Pukhtuns and Punjabis and somehow sharpens it, which I

elaborate below.

Most of the participants in Swat were critical of the fact that conflict is spread only

in „Pukhtun land‟ and not outside, like Punjab. This is also considered as an attestation to

the Punjabi domination and control of the whole process of conflict. This sharpens the

inter-ethnic rivalry, both on part of the elites and intellectuals and public at large.

Likewise, the Punjabi dominated PML (N), which is ruling party of Pakistan and Punjab

province today, is also seen with a double and suspicious role in this regard. Until

militants started threatening areas of the Punjab, the provincial government of Punjab

came out in clear opposition to the Taliban. Many in Pukhtun region were critical of the

role of this party and provincial government and related this to the observation that

Pukhtun land is used in this whole process and till Punjabis are not threatened, militants

were not a serious issue for Punjabis and Punjab (the central part of Pakistan).

Likewise, as the state is believed to be dominated by the Punjabis and any move by

the state is also perceived as one by the Punjabi establishment or the ethnic group.

Moreover, this group and the state dominated by Punjabis is perceived to be involved in

using Pukhtuns for their interests, be these Punjabi interests or state interests. This is a

strong perception in Swat, in the context of present conflict and personal experience and

observation is used to substantiate this claim by my research participants. Among many of

my research participants, I quote Misbah Ullah, from Mingora, who argued that “For the

defense of Punjabi dominated Pakistan, Pukhtuns in Swat were used. „Outsiders‟ benefited

more from this conflict at the cost of local people of Swat” (Ullah, 2017) . Likewise,

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Abdullah Nangyal, a senior college student, was more explicit about Punjabis as an ethnic

group and using Pukhtuns easily after the conflict. He told me, “Punjabis are using

Pukhtuns easily now, due to the conflict by dubbing us as terrorist” (Nangyal 2017).

Many perceive that Pukhtuns are simple people and are deceived easily by ethnic others,

like the Punjabis. In the words of Laiq Dada, a politician from Mingora, “Pukhtuns are

simple people and are deceived in the name of Islam by Punjabis” (Dada, 2017). In this

line, some of the research participants, like Fazal Yusufzai, from Kabal, argued that

though Punjab is close to India, the traditional enemy of Pakistan, still it is in peace. On

the other side, even if Pukhtuns and Swat are far from India, they are still in conflicts. He

told me,

“Pukhtun characters are used by ethnic others to finish Pukhtuns through such conflicts.

Punjab is in peace, though it is near India on the boarder, Pakistan‟s enemy. Though, we in

Swat are far from India, but are impacted the most in the form of conflicts. This is

paradoxical” (Yusufzai, 2017).

As the state promotes a narrative where India is an enemy and is involved in conflicts in

Pakistan, the response here is that such a narrative is paradoxical. Research participants,

like Fazal Yusufzai, argue that if this is a fact then such conflicts must be more in Punjab,

closer to India and on the boarder, than in a far area like Swat. Iqbal Lala from Kabal

commented that, “As Punjabis are dominated in Pakistan, it is not happening there in

Punjab. Actually, Punjabis are controlling this game and are using Pukhtuns” (Lala,

2016). This also reimposes the perception that Pakistani state has hands in the conflict and

its Punjabi elites are using it for their own interests. Said Alam Lala, told me in Kabal,

“This game has been imposed by Punjab. South Punjab is full of Taliban, but we don‟t see

anything there. These Punjabi Talibans were the first I encountered. This whole game was

played in the name of Islam by the Punjabis” (Lala, 2017).

Such verifiable and non-verifiable arguments form a strong perception among Pukhtuns in

Swat. These observations are utilized to form conspiracy theories, which are common in

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the wake of present conflict in Swat. These reinforce the already existing perception

among Pukhtuns that Pakistan is dominated by Punjabis and Pukhtuns are used for their

interests. This adds to the already strained relations between Pukhtuns and Punjabis.

Moreover, the experiences and interactions of Swatis with Pakistani state military

also adds to this process. The literature reports that Pukhtuns perceive Pakistani military as

Punjabi (dominated by the Punjabis as an ethnic group). My research data from Swat

testifies to this argument. My participants in Swat have an overwhelming feeling that

military is Punjabi dominated. However, a significant point in the recent context is that,

despite any presence of military in the past, this time Pakistani state military is present in

good numbers. The recent discussion of even building a containment in Swat, the Cadet

college and Army public school and the existence of military check posts, makes it

significant to probe into the phenomenon of inter-ethnic discussion in the present context

in Swat. I have argued above (sections on culture, pp) the behavior of Pakistani state

military is not considered as socially acceptable and is rejected along with the

phenomenon of ethnic stratification done in military men. Such experiences and

observation of the military adds to sharpening of inter-ethnic boundaries and relations in

Swat.

A research participant, Fazli Akbar Dada told me that, “I believe that military is

dominated by the Punjabis and this affects Pukhtun-Punjabi ethnic relations in a long

run” (Dada, 2016). Likewise, Shahid Ahmed commented that, “As some military men,

who are Pukhtuns, are good on check posts, while others, who are Punjabis, are not good,

this sharpens inter-ethnic boundaries and relations” (Ahmed, 2017). Such a perception

informs that the presence of military in Swat adds to the sharpening of inter-ethnic

relations in Swat, especially between Pukhtuns and the Punjabis. The overall situation of

conflict in Swat adds to the sharpening of ethnic (intra and inter) relations and boundaries

among the Pukhtuns. The discussion to this point illustrates the impacts of conflict and

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violence in Swat for Pukhtun ethnic and Pakistani national identity, which has

repercussions for Pakistani state. Below I reflect upon this aspect.

7.4. Repercussions for Pakistani state

On one side Pukhtuns complaint against the state of Pakistan and its institutions while on

other side Pukhtuns own the state of Pakistan. Pakistani state is blamed of using Swat for

its own interests. The role of Pakistani state and its military is considered doubtful.

Moreover, the acts of Pakistani state and military are considered as socially inappropriate.

Additionally, Pakistani state is blamed of not acknowledging and compensating Pukhtuns‟

sacrifices. Moreover, the conflict, in which Pakistani state has hands, is blamed of

defaming Islam. The celebration of national holidays also shows a strong discontent

towards Pakistan. For some Pukhtuns in Swat, they have distanced more from Pakistani

state. In the words of Taimur Yusufzai, a university lecturer from Charbagh, “The

humiliation and torture we have faced, like Palestinians in Israel, has distanced us from

Pakistan” (Yusufzai, 2017). However, many in Swat still claim to be more „patriotic‟ than

another Pakistani. Even some will compare their situation with that of Baluchistan, where

an insurgency is still alive. Among others, Salman Habib, a private school teacher from

Charbagh, elaborated that, “People from Swat are more patriotic if you compare them

with people from other areas, like Baluchistan. Swatis still somehow love Pakistan in spite

of this violence and military operations” (Habib 2017). There is still a perception among

Pukhtuns in Swat that love for the state does not finish, despite the complains. Fazal

Yusufzai, a local business holder in Kabal, informed that, “Love with country does not

finish at all. Even if Pakistan wages a war with India now, we are ready to sacrifice for

Pakistan” (Yusufzai, 2017).

I propose that the processes and phenomena discussed and argued above has

repercussions for Pakistani state, which is involved in carving a national identity and

countering ethnic nationalisms. Based on the analysis of above sections, I contend that

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there are three forms of repercussions for Pakistani state, in this context. These are linked

through the discussion of impacts for ethnic identity, ethnic relations and national identity.

The conflict and violence in Swat, in which Pakistani state is blamed to be having hands

and a dubious role, has impacted Pukhtun ethnic identity. I have argued above that conflict

in Swat has negatively impacted and transformed some of the cultural aspects in the

region. Moreover, other cultural aspects have been annulled as it was impossible to

practice these during the conflict. Due to the impacts in culture, conflict adds to the

contextuality of ethnic identity markers. Along with militants, Pakistani state and its

military is considered responsible for these processes. The behavior of this military is

differentiated too and is perceived to be controlled by ethnic others, mostly the Punjabis.

Stark ethnic differentiation is done within the military in many cases. These processes

directly impact the state of Pakistan, which has been unsuccessful to peacefully manage

ethnic diversity. Such a state is blamed of using Pukhtun cultural aspects against Pukhtuns

and devoicing Pukhtuns of their culture. The conflict in turn adds to the dubious role of

Pakistani state and makes it more demanding and problematic for the state to manage

ethnic relations and diversity in the country.

The conflict has also added more to the already strained ethnic relations in

Pakistan. The relations between different ethnic groups have never been of co-existence

and peaceful. Being an ethnically diverse state and dominated by a single ethnic group,

makes Pakistan susceptible to ethnic conflicts, violence and rivalries. Punjabis are

considered as the most dominated since 1947, to which Bengalis, Pukhtuns, Sindhis and

Balochs have resisted in one form or the other. Along with Pakistani state, its institutions,

especially the military and civilian beauracracy, are also perceived to be dominated by

Punjabis. The involvement of such a military and state in the conflict of Swat, directly

impacts the relations between Pukhtuns and Punjabis. Straining of inter-ethnic relations

has direct repercussions for Pakistani state. It becomes too problematic for Pakistani state

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to keep these relations peaceful in such a context. Moreover, actions of institutions are

directed towards the state itself and all blames are reverted to Pakistani state.

The third form of repercussion for Pakistani state, in this connection, is through the

impacts of conflict and violence in Swat for national identity. As the conflict involves the

use of Islam and military, it has a direct link with Pakistani state and its national symbols.

Though, the state is owned through a discourse of sacrifice, it (and its Punjabi dominated

elites) is also blamed of not acknowledging and compensating sacrifice of Pukhtuns.

Moreover, though Pukhtuns are critical of the form of Islam promoted by the militants,

there is a distance from the version of Islam promoted by the Pakistani state and its elites

too. Pakistani state is also blamed for using Islam for its own interests. Such a perception

has repercussions for the process of nation formation and national identity promotion of

the Pakistani state. The national integration process of Pakistani state is hampered amidst

such opinions among the Pukhtuns in the wake of recent conflict in Swat. Pukhtun‟s

integration process into the state of Pakistan has been negatively impacted by this conflict.

Moreover, this debate also informs the state inability to carve more for national cohesion

and identity. Such repercussions are significant for Pakistani state. In this context, it

becomes more problematic for Pakistani state to manage its ethnic diversity or integrate all

ethnic groups into the assumed „nation‟ and state of Pakistan. The national integration and

cohesion process of Pakistani state is seriously impacted and in fact hampered as the

relations between different ethnic groups and Pakistani national state are strained.

In this context, the historical period of Swat State is remembered with nostalgia,

for the achievements of that state. Some of the informal discussions and my observation in

Saidu Shareef, specifically, attest that younger educated class of this region is more

nostalgic of Wali‟s times. The stories they have heard from elders and the situation they

have faced during the conflict compels them to admire Wali and his state. At times, such a

sentiment is expressed in supporting political figures of his family. Research participants,

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though few, from other areas were commenting on this aspect. Sadaqat Azim, a university

student told me, “We Wish to have Wali sahib‟s time” (Azim 2016). Mudasir Swati, a

university lecturer in Swat, informed that, “People now wish to have Wali sahib‟s time”

(Swati, 2017). This is mostly based on stories, factual as well as non-factual, of peace,

prosperity and development of Wali of Swat‟s time and rule. Said Alam Lala, a VDC

member in Kabal, told me, “Wali sahib time was better because of peace and prosperity”

(Lala, 2017). Likewise, Yusuf Khan, from Dherai Swat, commented that, “The State of

Wali e Swat was a large state though, but was controlled by him and had peace and

Justice. Nobody could hide from him. It seems impossible to have that time again” (Khan,

2017). Such a comparison is significant as Pukhtuns in Swat are blaming Pakistani state

and it‟s military for their inability to find out hidden militants in Swat who had shattered

the peace of Swat. Shah Alam Lala, a politician from Dherai, told me, “I feel nostalgic for

Wali Sahib Time. That time was peaceful. We wish and praise him. People supported him

and stood by him. Law and Order was best. There was speedy justice” (Lala, 2017). Such

a perception is popular in Swat. However, such a perception is not feasible to translate into

any irredentism, though it informs us of the impacts for Pakistani state.

Conclusion

In this chapter I elaborated the impacts of conflict on some of the markers of Pakistani

national identity and consciousness, including Islam, the discourse of pride, sacrifice and

complaints and inter-ethnic relations. I argued that Pukhtuns try to distance their form of

Islam from the Islam promoted by Pakistani state and militants, where Pukhtun‟s form of

Islam is considered closer to that of the state with a sharp distance from that of the

militants. I also contended that Pakistani state, religious clergy and militants are blamed of

and criticized for using Islam for their interests. Moreover, I also proposed that Pukhtuns

in Swat consider the conflict in Swat as a sacrifice of Swat Pukhtuns for the entire

Pakistan. Swat Pukhtuns take pride in the fact that only Pukhtuns can pay heavily in the

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form of a sacrifice for Pakistan. I also illustrated that Swatis also complain of the behavior

of Pakistani state and its government of being less responsive in acknowledging and

compensating their sacrifices to Pakistan. I have also, demonstrated above that, the

involvement of Pakistani state, perceived to be dominated by the Punjabis and involved in

socially and culturally detrimental practices, have repercussions for Pukhtun-Punjabi

relations, which have been sharpened and strained. Thus, I explored the impacts of conflict

on Pakistani national identity. In the end I also discussed the repercussions for Pakistani

state.

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Conclusion of the Thesis

This thesis dealt with the impacts of conflict and violence on the identification of

Pukhtuns in Swat. It was restricted to the discussion of how conflict and violence, since

2007, has impacted Pukhtun ethnic and Pakistani national identity. To address this

theoretical question, I was involved in theoretical debates of conflict impacting ethnic and

national identity. Moreover, another related concern of this study was about the

repercussions of this conflict for Pakistani state. I argued that there is little scholarly

theoretical discussion on the impacts of conflict and violence on ethnic and national

identity. Moreover, I postulated that the present discussion offers little understanding in

this regard by proposing that ethnic identity either hardens or softens (Shymonyak 2014).

In contrast, I elaborated, through Pukhtun case, that conflict and violence can impact both

ethnic and national identity, in a complex and multidimensional forms. The impacts are

multiple and occur in every, or most, of the components and markers of ethnic and

national identities. Moreover, these multiple impacts in multiple markers may not result in

softening or hardening of ethnic and national identity. I argued that the conflict can

seriously undermine performing aspects of ethnic identity. Additionally, my concern

regarding the present literature, attempting to link conflict, violence, culture and ethnic

identity is that it has been treating culture and ethnic identity a whole, despite the various

components these comprises of. Thus, while dealing ethnic and national identity I have

divided these into various significant aspects, components and markers, mainly the

performing and ascribed markers. I argued that, after the loss or transformation of

performing aspect/marker of ethnic or national identity, due to conflict and violence,

claims to identity shift more to other aspects of identity, mostly the ascribed ones. Thus,

conflict and violence add to the contextuality of identity markers. Likewise, I postulated

that ethnic relations and boundaries, both intra and inter-ethnic, are also impacted and the

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conflict may add to the sharpening of these ethnic relations. Theoretically, the conflict

adds to the complexity, contextuality and contestation of ethnic and national identity and

the markers they comprise of.

Relating to the particular case of Pukhtuns, I postulated that the conflict and

violence has seriously undermined Pukhtunwali, the performing marker of Pukhtun ethnic

identity (Jan, 2010; Barth, 1969a; Rome, 2013b). Complex and multiple impacts, changes

and transformations can be witnessed in Pukhtunwali/Pukhtu. I have outlined significant

impacts in some of the socio-cultural aspects of Pukhtu including Purdah, Jarga, Hujra,

Melmastya, Gham-Khadi, the relations between Kashar and Mashar, badal and honour-

shame. These cultural aspects have been significant and central as the literature has

already reported (Rome, 2013b; Jan, 2010; Barth, 1969a, 1998, 1981; Lindholm, 1996,

1982; Ahmed, 2006, 2005; Ahmed, 1977, 1980; Grima, 2005; Khattak, 2010; Khattak,

Mohammad, and Lee, n.d.). However, the impact of conflict and violence on such cultural

markers, claimed by these studies as central, is missing. That is the reason I have

attempted to outline the impacts of conflict in Swat for Pukhtun culture and argued that the

conflict has serious impacts and transformations in Pukhtunwali, while developing a

perception among Pukhtuns that Pukhtun culture, in traditional sense, is dead now.

Linking conflict and Purdah, I postulated that conflict and violence has diverse

impacts for the practice and imagination of diverse forms of Purdah among the Pukhtuns

in Swat. I have also outlined different forms of Purdah, at least four, which were mostly

missing from the literature. The literature has been treating Purdah in relevance to women

only, particularly to the dress code. In my thesis I have charted a list of forms of Purdah

including women Purdah, home Purdah, men Purdah and locality Purdah. Moreover, while

discussing the impacts of conflict on Purdah, I have debated the impacts for all these four

forms of Purdah. I have argued that these impacts are considered unfortunate and

culturally detrimental and are attributed to militants, military and the phenomenon of

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becoming IDPs. It has not been possible for Pukhtuns in Swat to perform and maintain

purdah, on which scholars agree being central part of Pukhtun culture (chapter 2).

Jarga has been considered as another central and significant part of Pukhtun culture

and has been discussed extensively in the literature along with its role in settling conflicts

and disputes (Taizi, 2007; Wardak, n.d.; Jan, 2010; Rome, 2013b; Barth 1998, 1969a,

1981). The literature, both on Jarga and the recent conflict, is not more sensitive to the

potential impacts of conflict on Jarga itself. In this thesis (chapter 3) I have elaborated the

linkage of Jarga and conflict in Swat. I argued that Jarga has grown in importance in

conflict and post conflict situations in Swat and that is the reason Swat Qaumi Jarga has

been active since last decade. I also discussed that militants and military in the recent

conflict has stopped many local/village level Jargas from working at one time and

manipulated these for their interests at other times. I elaborated that militants have used

these for interests but any Jarga against the militants was stopped by them. I also pointed

out that military of the state relies more on the assumption that Jarga is one of the best

solutions for enforcing its own decisions and narratives. That is the reason, military and

Pakistani state manipulate and influence Jarga and has subsequently changed its shape

while using it for its own interests. I debated that Pakistani state and military has also

introduced and backed organizations and committees on village basis like the Aman

committees and village defense committees. I also postulated that the nature and working

of Jarga and these parallel organizations and committees in the name of Jarga is far

different from that of the traditional ones. Moreover, these have made Jarga more

controversial and subject to criticism with a weakening of its traditional position. The

influence of Pakistani state and militants on Jarga is considered detrimental for the

position of Jarga in Pukhtun culture.

The traditional and recent literature on Pukhtun culture has debated cultural

features of Hujra and melmastya (Jan, 2010; Rome 2013b; Barth, 1969a; Ahmed, 1980;

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Lindholm, 1996). A theme that cropped up in some of the literary circles among Pukhtuns

was the use of cultural features of melmastya against the Pukhtuns in different forms in the

recent conflict in broader Pukhtun regions. However, the academic studies missed the

important dimension of conflict impacting Hujra and melmastya as central cultural

features. In this thesis (chapter 4) I argued that amidst the conflict and violence in Swat,

Pukhtuns in Swat were unable to maintain the traditional culture of Hujra. Coupled with

other factors, the resultant perception in this regard, in Swat, is that „hujra culture is dead

now in its traditional sense‟ and has resulted in declining of Melmastya. Although in very

few cases militants tried to stop people from sitting in Hujra, they mostly controlled the

discussions, activities and sittings in it. On the other hand, military, too, did not stop

people from Hujra as such but the security situation and the fact that a guest can be

questioned by the military forced the shutting down of Hujra and increased inability to

perform Melmastya. I contend that this phenomenon has repercussions for the traditional

culture of Hujra and Melmastya and is linked to the discussion of honour,

Pukhtunwali/Pukhtu and Pukhtun ethnic identity in Swat.

Another feature and socio-cultural marker of Pukhtunwali which has been debated

in recent literature especially in relevance to the performance of Pukhtun women and

ethnic identity is gham-khadi/mrae jwandae/sorrow and Joy (Ahmed, 2006, 2005; Grima,

2005; Schweiss, 2012). The conflict in Swat has multiple impacts for the performance and

symbolic position of gham-khadi in the society of Swat. Pukhtuns, in Swat, have not been

able to perform and maintain gham-khadi celebrations, which are central to the

performance and maintenance of Pukhtun ethnic identity and an „ideal‟ Pukhtun behavior

(chapter 4).

The impacts for Pukhtun culture are multiple and more complex as other markers

of Pukhtu have been impacted too. The social relations between Mashar and Kashar, a

claimed hallmark of Pakhtun society and culture are another socio-cultural code and value

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of Pukhtun society and culture. I argued, in this thesis (chapter 5) that the conflict and both

of its actors (militants and military) have not cared for the authority and respect of

mashars. Militants, who were mostly kashars, have challenged humiliated and even killed

most of the mashars, considered by them as pro-Pakistani state and government. Likewise,

Pakistani military men did not care about the respect and honor of mashars too.

Another socio-cultural code is Badal, which has been discussed in the literature,

both colonial and non-colonial, mostly in its violent form, as a significant marker and

aspect of Pukhtun culture (Ibbetson, 1993, p. 58; Quddus, 1987, p. 67; Spain, 1985, p. 64).

Moreover, there are diverse opinions regarding badal and the recent conflict or in general

about the violent and nonviolent forms of it (Rome, 2013b, 93) The literature has debated

the relevance of badal and conflict in Pukhtun region (Ahmed, 2013, 74–75; Saigol, 2012;

Taj, 2008a, 2008b; Khattak, 2010; Khattak, Mohammad, and Lee, n.d.; Rome, 2013). The

impact of conflict and violence on the performance of badal has been out of much focus

and that is the reason in this study I have discussed this aspect (chapter 5). I have

elaborated that many indivuals, families and even „groups/categories‟ took badal from

others in the garb of this conflict. As militants were powerful in a time, people joined them

to use their „tag‟ and take badal from their opponents. In post military operations period,

many people have used their relationship with Pakistani state and it‟s military to take

badal from their opponents. I postulate that this phenomenon has impacted the socio-

cultural symbol and practice of badal and has defamed this cultural value and impacted its

dimensions. Moreover, this has also added to the already stereotypic and violent

projections of badal.

A central and significant yet nostalgically felt aspect and cultural value is honour

and the antagonistic cultural code shame. Honour is translated as

nang/ghairat/izzat/namus, and shame as sharam. This has been at the center of most

anthropological studies, both traditional and recent as Pukhtunwali is considered as „code

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of honour‟ (Ahmed, 1977; Barth, 1969; Khattak, Mohammad, and Lee, n.d.; Khattak,

2010; Rome, 2013). The loss of, transformation in and undermining of Pashtunwali and its

features has resulted in the loss of Pukhtun honour and the production of shame (chapter

5). This loss of honour and Pukhtu (the culture) has devoid Pukhtuns of a central marker

of ethnic identity.

The question that confronts is “has ethnic identity been lost or is till claimed”? I

argued in Chapter 5 of this thesis that the claim to ethnic identity is made mostly through

ascribed aspects. As ethnic identity is shared in claims of performing aspects (Pukhtun

culture), ascribed aspects (birth in a Pukhtun home, descent, tribal identity and land etc.)

and ethnic relations (Jan, 2010; Barth, 1998, 1969; Rittenberg, 1988; Ahmed, 1977, 1980),

ethnic identity is not lost due to the loss of or transformation in performing aspects of

Pukhtun ethnic identity. Thus, situationally and contextually claim to ethnic identity shifts

more to the ascribed aspects (chapter 5). Theoretically, conflict may add to and reinforce

the contextual nature of ethnic identity as demonstrated in this particular case. It also leads

to the argument that ethnic identity is impacted, transformed and shaped in multiple forms

and areas, where the preposition of hardening and softening may not broaden our

understanding (Shymonyak 2014).

The literature on Pukhtun ethnicity in particular and ethnicity in general has

discussed the inherent complexity of ethnicity in reference to ethnic boundaries and ethnic

relations, both intra ethnic and inter-ethnic (Barth, 1998, 1969a; Jan, 2010; Edwards,

1990; Wimmer, 2013, 2008; Zimer, 2003; Anderson and Strand, 1978). The recent

literature, in particular the study of Muhammad Ayub Jan (Jan, 2010) has explored the

intra-ethnic boundaries and relations between the categories of Khanan and Gharibanan in

the Pukhtun populated region of Malakand. The concern that is missing from the literature

is the impact of recent conflict and violence in the region on these intra-ethnic relations

among the Pukhtuns. Above (chapter 5) I argued that the conflict has added more to the

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complexity of ethnic identity markers by impacting and sharpening intra-ethnic relations

and boundaries, especially between the categories of Khanan and Gharibanan. Moreover,

there has been least impact on inter-tribal relations due to several reasons, significantly

because Pukhtuns in Swat are by majority comprising of a somehow dominant tribe of

Yusufzais in Swat. In other regions, populated by Pukhtuns or non Pukhtuns, such inter-

tribal relations may be impacted due to conflict and violence. Thus, conflict and violence,

adds to the contextuality of ethnic identity markers by compelling members of the ethnic

group to lay claim to ethnic identity through ascribed aspects and increases the complexity

of ethnic identity by reinforcing the intra-ethnic relations between categories within the

same ethnic group. I also refute the argument that ethnic identity neither hardens nor

softens.

A conflict that involves the use of Islam, a central marker of national identity

promoted by the state and closely linked to ethnic identity of the ethnic group, and military

of the state, dominated, in number and influence, by a particular ethnic group, has direct

and significant repercussions and impacts on the national identity promoted by the state.

Moreover, this impact on national identity may not result in softening or hardening of this

identity but the impacts are multiple and diverse and relates to impacts and

transformations in different aspects and markers of the identity. Significantly, to explore

such impacts, national identity shall be looked at from these different markers. The

literature is least sensitive, in general as well as particular case of the Pukhtuns and

Pakistan, in this regard, while some studies suggests that such impacts are not easy to be

explored, though general discussions on state practices and ethnic responses have been

debated (Kalyvas 2008a; Ahmad 1996; Rittenberg 1988; Eriksen 2002; Hobsbawm 1990;

A. Khan 2003; Fazal 2012; Gellner 1983; Fox 2004, 2006; Brubaker 1998). This concern

has been the center of this study.

224

In this thesis (chapter 6 and 7), I argue that the impacts of conflict, involving

symbols and markers of national identity and ethnic identity and state, on national identity

are significant multiple and worth-exploring. In the case of Pukhtuns in Pakistan, the case

is yet more central to the understanding of conflict and national identity as Pakistani state

has been involved in carving a national identity which has been objected by different

ethnic groups in Pakistan (Jan, 2010; Khan, 2003; Alavi, 1986; Amin, 1988; Binder, 1986;

Khan, 2016; Cohen, 2014; Farzana, 1989; Iqbal, 2003; Verkaaik, 2007). In such a context

two chapters (chapter 6 and 7), above, have discussed the impacts and interplay of the

recent conflict in Swat with Pakistani national identity and its different markers. I argued

that Pakistani national identity, as imagined and viewed among the Pukhtuns in Swat, have

witnessed multiple and diverse impacts. Central and significant markers of national

identity in this context are Islam, Pakistani military, the discourse of pride, sacrifice and

complaints, inter-ethnic relations and the celebration of national holidays.

In this thesis (chapter 7), I argued that conflict impacts the role and position of

Islam as a marker of Pakistani national identity. Islam has been at the heart of Pakistani

national identity and Pakistan‟s official nationalism (Iqbal, 2003; Binder, 1986; Farzana,

1989; Alavi, 1986; Matcalf, 2004). The conflict in Pukhtun region has added more to the

contested role of Islam, as a unifying and decisive factor. Pukhtuns try to distance from

and reject the form of Islam promoted by both militants and Pakistani state. Religious

clergy and Pakistani state are both blamed for using Islam for the interests and not using it

for unifying Pakistanis from different ethnicities. Such a phenomenon impacts the role of

Islam as a marker of Pakistani national identity and amplifies the divisive role of Islam.

Similarly, some of the literature has already hinted the significance of pride and

sacrifice for Pakistani national identity from Pukhtun‟s perspectives (Jan, 2010). I argued

that the debates and discussions regarding Pukhtun ethnic pride of sacrifices and

complains against the state of Pakistan amidst the conflict in the region are significant

225

areas of Pakistani national consciousness among the Pukhtuns (chapter 7). Pukhtuns

debate the conflict as their sacrifice for Pakistan and thus own the state of Pakistan.

Moreover, Pukhtuns take an ethnic pride in this sacrifice and argue that other ethnic

groups in Pakistan, like the Punjabis, would not have been able to sacrifice so heavily for

Pakistan. On the other side, grievances against the state of Pakistan are overwhelming, in

which Pakistani state is blamed of having hands in the conflict and of not acknowledging

and compensating Pukhtun sacrifices for Pakistan (chapter 7). Moreover, significantly

Pakistani state is blamed of being controlled by ethnic others, especially the Punjabis.

Such a phenomenon has sharpened the inter-ethnic relations between Pukhtuns and

Punjabis which has direct repercussions for Pakistani national identity (chapter 7).

The position, organizational structure and the role in Politics of Pakistani military

has been extensively debated in the literature (Siddiqa, 2016; Haqqani, 2005; Shah, 2014;

Cloughley, 2000; Nawaz, 2009). However, a very significant aspect of the military is its

role in national consciousness and national identity, which is missing from most of the

literature. This aspect has grown in significance due to the recent conflict in Pukhtun

region. I postulated (in chapter 6) that the role of military in operations against the

militants, the security search operations, the presence of security check points and the fact

that military is still present in the region in heavy numbers adds more to the significance

of Pakistani state military as a marker of Pakistani national identity. Moreover, the ethnic

stratification done in the military by Pukhtuns in Swat is a significant phenomenon.

Pukhtuns in the military are considered as careful about Pukhtuns and their culture while

behavior of the Punjabis is dubbed as socially negative and destructive for Pukhtun

culture. Such a phenomenon questions the assumed „national‟ character of the military and

impacts Pakistani identity as imagined among the Pukhtuns (chapter 6).

Another marker and aspect of national identity and national consciousness which

has been discussed in some literature is national symbols, including national flags, sports

226

and holidays (Fox 2004, 2006; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). However, the literature on

Pakistani nationalism and national identity has missed this aspect. I argue in this thesis

(chapter 6) that the celebration of national holidays is a significant area in this regard. Two

important national holidays have been discussed by this thesis, 23rd

of March and 14th

of

August in relevance to the present case. Pukhtuns in Swat, amidst the conflict and violence

in the region, and despite the claims of Pakistani state and military, take least interest in

celebrating these national holidays. Though 14th

of August witnessed more people in

comparison to 23rd

of March and in comparison, to previous year, the least number of

people participating in such events shows the popular discontent of Pukhtuns in Swat

towards Pakistani state national holidays. Moreover, the celebrations have decreased since

the conflict where the situation was somehow different before the conflict. Many in Swat

argue that Swat was independent even before 1947 and thus its people cannot be

influenced to celebrate 14th

of August and 23rd

of March while many are nostalgic of the

era of Wali of Swat. Conclusively, the thesis argued that conflict and violence in Pukhtun

region of Swat has complex and multiple impacts on Pukhtun ethnic and Pakistani national

identity with repercussions for Pakistani state.

Implication, Limitations and Future research

This project has certain implications of which some have already been discussed and

pointed out in different sections of the thesis. The thesis has extensively shown that there

is scarcity of literature discussing the impacts of conflict and violence on ethnic and

national identity. Moreover, this discussion is significant in many forms. The theoretical

literature falls short of any explanation in this regard. Thus, the thesis is a significant

addition to the theoretical and empirical discussion on how conflict might impact ethnic

and national identity. Moreover, such a theoretical focus can help understand similar cases

in different regions, in Pakistan or outside Pakistan. Additionally, the thesis has argued

such impacts in ethnic and national identity may have repercussions for the ethnic groups

227

as well as the state that represents the national identity. These repercussions are more

significant as they can impact the relations of specific ethnic groups with others and with

the state. This has indirect implications for the security, development and internal politics

of state along with the government structure of the state. This discussion has been least

debated in the empirical as well as theoretical literature.

Though this project has a non-policy approach it has still both policy and academic

implications. The study is a significant addition to the recent literature on the issues in

Pakistan especially the recent conflict and violence that has affected its Pukhtun

population. Moreover, the literature on conflict is bulging but lacks any discussion of how

it is affecting the cultural and ethnic lives of the population. Thus, the thesis adds to the

understanding of conflict and its impacts on Pukhtun ethnic identity. Additionally, though

there is literature on Pakistani nationalism and its political aspects, the discussion of some

key and developing markers is missing. There was a need of filling this gap in the

literature which the present study has attempted. The significant areas of Pakistani national

identity like the celebration of national holidays and Pakistani military have been out of

scholarly focus. Moreover, the repercussions of this conflict for economy and security of

Pakistan have been the only focus of academic and non-academic inquiries but the linkage

of this debate to the impacts in ethnic and national identity was missing. This study has

attempted to link these debates.

The research arguments have implications for framing policies as well as future

academic research. The conflict in Pukhtun region, in which Pakistani state and her

military is involved, is having implications for Pukhtun ethnic identity and Pakistani

national identity. These can be directly and indirectly linked to the repercussions for

Pakistani state and the policies planned in this regard. I would rather claim that Pakistani

state has been least sensitive of any disruption of culture and ethnic identity. Though

previous literature has been pointing towards this aspect of Pakistani state‟s policies

228

impacting Pukhtun ethnicity and culture, along with those of other ethnic groups, Pakistani

state has been least sensitive in respect to this conflict and violence in the region.

Moreover, the impacts this time are abrupt and sudden and has an element of being

imposed upon Pukhtuns, which creates detrimental perceptions regarding Pakistani state

and its military. Thus, it is highly desirable that state policies be in line with the issues that

are produced as a result of these. It is pertinent to mention that such policies have been

highly criticized by Pukhtun youth now more expressively. The rise of Pukhtun Tahaffuz

Movement (PTM) can be seen in this context. Much support for the movement has been

from educated youth from the conflict hit regions.

Academically, the study has other implications too. There has been least academic

concern in earlier studies regarding the impacts of conflict for Pukhtun ethnic identity and

Pakistani national identity. The study can act as advancement towards further research in

conflict studies, ethnic studies and Pakistan studies. The theoretical claim of this study can

be „generally‟ utilized in understanding issues of conflict and ethnic/national identity

across Pakistan in particular and other societies in general. However, as societies and

cultures are much diverse, the framework may not be applied in totality. For the case of

Balochs in Pakistan, this methodological and theoretical framework can be valuable, and

the study can act as a guideline.

The project, as it stands, has both methodological and non-methodological

limitations. It is pertinent to mention that the study has a limitation when it comes to

conducting fieldwork and doing interviews or discussions. It was not possible to stay in

Swat for longer like traditional ethnographers due to the sensitivity of this project and the

security situation in Swat with the fact that military still control the region. Along with

this, polarization and sensitivity in the region still exists. The stay was divided into shorter

229

periods of presence in Swat as a week or even less for one trip. Several trips were thus

planned.

The research study was limited in many other aspects too. The initial limitation

was that of the geographical space and ethnic dimensions. As the study was limited to

Pukhtuns in Pakistan and then in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the district

of Swat, I did not explore the issue in other regions of the province or of Pakistan.

Pukhtuns also claim to be a majority in Afghanistan but the present study was limited only

to Pakistan. Likewise, there is a good number of Pukhtuns in the province of Baluchistan

too but as a limitation this study was confined to the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Additionally, it is significant to state that while dealing conflict and Pukhtun ethnic group

there was a choice of the regions comprising tribal districts now. But as access to this

region was far more problematic, Swat was chosen. At the time of my fieldwork and

research the region of tribal districts was heavily populated, and even it is so this day, with

military men and was still an active conflict zone. Thus, due to sensitivity of the topic and

the precarious situation in the region, a geographical focus was necessary and thus Swat

was chosen.

Moreover, ethnically, as the focus of the study was Pukhtun ethnic group, it

avoided to deal with or take any input from other ethnic groups both in Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa province and outside the province. Though it will be significant to explore

this issue among the Balochs in Pakistan who have been living in an active insurgency for

the last 5 decades. Due to the relative advantage of being from Pukhtun ethnic group and

the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pukhtuns were selected for this study and not the

Balochs. Similar patterns can also be studied among the Muhajirs in Karachi.

Based on the investigation of the above topic this study intends to outline some

potential areas for future research studies, both inside and outside Pakistan. There is a

need to advance the theoretical discussion of how conflict and violence impact ethnic and

230

national identities. This can be done through different theoretical and empirical studies in

diverse regions. Afghanistan, Turkey, India, Iraq and other regions with conflicts and such

ethnic peculiarities can serve as potential areas of future research. The involvement of

military, especially dominated by an ethnic group or perceived so, will be more significant

cases. This will significantly help to advance the academic understanding of how conflicts

impact ethnic and national identities. Moreover, the repercussions for this variety of states

shall also be studied, being highly significant.

In Pakistan and close by Afghanistan and even in India similar studies shall be

highly valuable, for which this present study can act as a guideline. I would suggest a

similar study on Baluchs in Baluchistan and Muhajirs in Karachi. In Pakistan these two

ethnic groups, along with Pukhtuns, have witnessed conflict and violence in military

operations. However, studies in Baluchistan on such sensitive issues can be risky too, in

view of the situation there. Such studies will contribute not only to the understanding of

conflict-ethnic/national identity linkage but also to the understanding of conflict in the

region. Such similar studies will also shed light on the repercussions of involving military

for Pakistani state. A study dealing the repercussions for Pakistani state can also of high

significance for academic as well as policy interests. Moreover, I propose that a study

based on the above arguments, dealing the impacts of such conflict for federation in

Pakistan and across will be highly significant and much needed.

231

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248

ANNEXURE 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWS, DISCUSSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

S.

No

Name ‘Description’ Gender Age Locality Interview

date

1. Muhammad

Ishtiaq

A college Professor Male 50-60 Mingora 16/12/2016

2. Saleem Lala A College Lecturer Male 40-50 Kabal

16/12/2016

3. Waqar

Ahmed

University Student Male 30-40 Mingora 10/12/2016*

4. Sadaqat

Azim

University Student Male 20-30 Kabal 30/12/2016

5. Iqbal Lala A teacher and social

activist

Male 40-50 Kabal 30/12/2016

6. Fazli Akbar

Dada

Retired government

servant

Male 70-80 Kabal 30/12/2016

7. Ashraf Lala Government Officer Male 40-50 Kabal 31/12/2016

8. Qudrat lala Barber/ hairdresser Male 35-45 Kabal 31/12/2016

9. Shahid

Saleem

University Student Male 20-30 Kabal 31/12/2016

10. Islam

Yusufzai

University Student Male 20-30 Mingora 31/12/2016

11. Misbah

Ullah

Local Political Activist

from an Islamist Party

Male 40-50 Mingora 1/1/2017

12. Mudasir

Swati

University Lecturer Male 35-45 Mingora 26/1/2017

13. Said Alam

Lala

Member of a committee Male 40-50 Kabal 26/1/2017

14. Salman

Habib

Private School Teacher Male 30-40 Charbagh 27/1/2017

15. Muhamad

Rehman

Dada

School Principal

Male 45-55 Charbagh 27/1/17

16. Taimur University lecturer Male 30-40 Charbagh 27/1/2017

249

Yousafzai

17. Shabir Khan Local Khan Male 45-55 Charbagh 27/1/2017

18. Fazal

Yusufzai

Local small-scale

businessman

Male Kabal 28/1/2017

19. Yusuf Khan Traditional Khan Male 50-60 Dherai 28/01/2017

20. Muhammad

Ashfaq

NGO Employee Male 25-35 Dherai 28/01/2017

21. Salman Khan Master degree holder,

who is unemployed

Male 30-40 Dherai 28/01/2017

22. Shah Alam

lala

Local Politician Male 45-55 Dherai 28/1/2017

23. Shahid

Ahmed

Driver in an NGO Male 30-40 Mingora 28/1/2017

24. Laiq dada Local Political worker

who belongs to ANP

Male 50-60 Mingora 29/1/2017

25. Mustafa lala Local Worker who

belongs to JI

Male 40-50 Mingora 04/02/017

26. Asad lala Local Politician from

Mingora who belongs to

JI

Male 40-50 Mingora 4/02/2017

27. Ishfaq Lala Social Worker

Male 40-50 Mingora 4/2/2017

28. Spen Dada An elder, retired from

government service,

who worked under the

Wali in 1960‟s

Male 70-80 Mingora 4/02/2017

29. Fazal Khan Local Khan Male 40-50 Mingora 4/02/2017

30. Shereen Lala Local Journalist Male 35-45 Mingora 5/02/2017

31. Hayat Khan

Dada

Political Activist Male 50-60 Mingora 5/02/2017

32. Sadeeq Ullah University Student Male 20-30 Kabal 5/2/2017

33. Ibrar Shah

Lala

Local Political activist

Male 40-50 Mingora 5/2/2017

250

34. Danish

Yusufzai

Shopkeeper Male 30-40 Matta 23/3/2017

35. Naveed

Khan Lala

Shopkeeper Male 40-50 Matta 23/3/2017

36. Shazia Noor

Khor

School Teacher Female 30-40 Kabal 28/04/2017

37. Saira Naz

Khor

College Lecturer

Female 30-40 Mingora 28/04/2017

Focused Group Discussions

FGD 1

Name

1. Shams Swati

2. Abdullah Nangyal

3. Asif Iqbal

4. Hamdard Shah

Description

Student political

Activist

College Student

University student

College Student

Age

20-25

20-25

20-25

20-25

Gender

Male

Male

Male

Male

Location of the

discussion

Saidu Shareef

Discussion

Date

25/1/2017

FGD 2

Name

1. Muhtaram lala

2. Iqbal lala

3. Shams Dada

Description

An elder

An elder

An elder

Age

40-50

40-50

45-55

Gender

Male

Male

Male

Location of the

discussion

Kabal

Date of the

Discussion

26/1/2017

FGD 3

Name

1. Muhammad

Mudasir

2. Muhammad

Farooq

3. Israr Gul

Description

A Medical

Doctor

A Medical

Doctor

A University

Student

Age

30-40

30-40

25-35

Gender

Male

Male

Male

Location of

the

discussion

Kabal

Date of the

Discussion

26/1/2017

FGD 4

Name

1. Shah Sawar

2. Muhammad

Shah

3. Fazal Khaliq

Lala

Description

A University

Student

A local

Shopkeeper

A local

Shopkeeper

Age

20-30

30-40

35-45

Gender

Male

Male

Male

Location of

the

discussion

Matta

Date of the

Discussion

22/3/2017

FGD 5

Name

1. Shaista Jabeen

Khor

2. Khalida Yusaf

Khor

3. Sameena Shah

Employee in

an NGO

Employee in

an NGO

Employee in

Age

25-35

25-35

25-35

25-35

Gender

Female

Female

Female

Female

Location of

the

discussion

Mingora

Date of the

Discussion

28/04/2017

251

Khor

4. Shazia Noor

Khor

an NGO

Employee in

an NGO

Internet discussions

Name

Description

Age

Gender

Source

Date

1. Shahid Saleem University

Student

25-35 Male Social Media Different

dates in

October

2017

2. Muhammad

Ishtiaq

College

Professor

50-60 Male Email

Conversations

November-

December

2017

3. Sheraz Farooq University

Student

20-30 Male Social Media Different

dates in

November

2017

4. Shehzad

Ahmad

University

Student

20-30 Male Social Media Different

dates in

October

2017