T8 B16 Misc Work Papers Fdr- 3-26-03 and 3-18-03 Drafts- Policy Prior to 9-11- One Perspective by Miles Kara

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Commission Sensitive

^LMarch T ,̂ 2003

Policy prior to 9/11, One PerspectiveAn Unclassified White Paper

B yMiles Kara, Professional Staff

Introductory Remarks

This paper provides a purposely brief and necessarily superficial historical

perspective to set the scene concerning U. S. Government (USG) counterterrorism policy.

It identifies key USG players and outlines a suggest course of action to examine USG

policy relevant to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Two Main Actors: One Changed, One Did Not

• International Terrorism. With no particular allegiance to a State (except for

a place to operate), international terrorism changed significantly in the decadeof the 1990's by moving away from State sponsorship to achieve both global

reach an d multi-national composition.

• The Intelligence Community. Tied to the National Security Act of 1947, the

Intelligence Community (1C) did not change it s structure, habits or culture

after the end of the Cold War.

Snapshots that Define the Actors

The IC~and by extension the USG~had new global responsibilities at the end of

the Cold War but was mired in an amalgamation of Fifedoms, Dukedoms, an d Earldoms

with on e Duke anointed in charge of the Kingdom .1 In that amalgamation, collaborations

were marriages of convenience not necessarily tied to a coherent national strategy.2 The1C is not ethnically diverse—perhaps not diverse by any measure—and does not mirror thesociety that it serves.

International Terrorism, on the other hand, achieved global reach and a global

character. For example, nine named individuals are commonly tied to the Hamburg Cell;

four or five potential pilots, tw o associates, and two recruiters. Those nine individuals

represent at least eight nationalities—Egyptian, Emirati, Lebanese, Pakistani, Yemeni,

German, Moroccan, and Indonesian, ethnically diverse by any measure.3

Since i t is USG policy that is at issue the balance of this paper will focus on theU SG supporting cast of players.

1 Fo r example, Bruce Hoffman, Los Angeles Times, Sep 16, 2001, 'Terror's Aftermath: A CounterterrorismPolicy for Yesterday's Threat," 'The country's anachronistic intelligence architecture..."

2 Again, Hoffman, "Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy," www.fathom.com/feature

article based on March 2001 testimony before a House Subcommittee. "America's capabilities.. .remaininchoate an d unfocused." ".. .there still remains the conspicuous absence of an. . .overarching strategy."

3 Th e potential pilots were Atta, al-Shehhi, Jarrah, bin al-Shibh, and Mansour; the two associates were

Bahaji an d Essabar, and the two recruiters were Zammar an d Belfas.




The Main Players.

National Policy concerning counterterrorism and using the 1C as a primary tooldid not seize either the intellectual or the tactical h igh ground concerning the terroristthreat. Post WW II policy, simply put, was to win the Cold War. That was accomplished.However, new challenges em erged including pan-Arabism, a force used to bring aboutthe Soviet withdraw al from Afghanistan.4 No end game existed to deal with that force in

the aftermath and it was co-opted by Usama bin Ladin to globalize5 an d execute a neardecade-long series of attacks against the Un ited States leading up to 9/11.

Two well-placed individuals who transcend adm inistrations and who both,arguably, saw the emerging threat could not mold the existing structure, bend its will, ormove the 1C and the USG away from the 1947 underpinnings. The story of 9/11, USGengagement with international terrorism and, ultimately, USG policy is the story of thosetwo individuals— Richard Clarke and George Tenet. Clarke, via a May 1998 PresidentialDirective, was appointed National C oordinator for Security, In frastruc ture Protection, and

Counterterrorism on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC).6 Tenet became theDirector of Central Intelligence in July 1997. A third individual, Louis Freeh, former

FBI Director, might be added to the short list, but it is Clarke and Tenet who stayed thecourse and were on duty on 9/11.

The Process

Traditionally the USG moves actions and issues through an established process

orchestrated by the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Working groups are

established at the staff-action level. The groups periodically brief the DeputiesComm ittee. Positions, options and ideas are vetted and when matured and/or timely arepresented to the Principals. Richard Clarke was the NSC staff member responsible for

counterterrorism in the Clinton administration an d into the Bush administration.. GeorgeTenet was the NSC member representing the 1C. Louis Freeh w as the NSC m emberrepresenting the law enforcement community.

The working group for counterterrorism was called the CSG, variously referred toas either the Coun terterrorism Sub Group or the Counterterrorism Security Group7 or the

Coordinating Sub G roup on Terrorism8. The confusion over the name has historical rootsthat confound the counterterrorism issue. The Institute fo r Defense Analysis (IDA), in a1997 report to the President's Commission on Critical Infras tructure Protection, reportedthat an Interagency W orking G roup on Co unterterrorism was created in the 1970s and

4 See Pillar, Terrorism and Am erican Foreign Policy, as reviewed by J. D aniel Moore,www.cia.gov/csi/studies "The end of the Cold War marked the emergence of num erous ethnic and

sectarian conflicts."5 Again Pillar, "By the mid-1990's a powerful, aggressive Islamic terrorism had evolved, made more lethalby globalization."

6 Crenshaw, 'Terrorism, Security and Power," presented to the 2002 Annual Meeting of the AmericanPolitical Science A ssociation, Au gus t 29-September 1, 2002. Previously, according to the Institute for

Defense Analysis, Clarke was a Special Assistant to the President within the National Security Coun cil.7 Crenshaw, p. 22

8 "Federal S tructures for Infrastructure Protection, Report to the President's Commission on CriticalInfrastructure Portection," 1997, p. 1




organized unde r State D epartment leadership.9 Later, according to the In stitute,"Federal counterterrorism activities [were] coordinated under the NSC's CoordinatingSubgroup on Terrorism (CSG), initially established in NSDD [National Security DecisionDirective] 30 in 1982."10 IDA listed the permanent mem bers of the CSG as "assistantsecretary of equiva lent level officials"11 from State, DoJ, FBI, O SD (ASD/SOLIC), TheJoint Staff (J-3, SOCOM), CIA (CTC) and the Office of the Vice President, augmented

as necessary by representatives for DoT (F AA ), DoE, Treasury (Secret Service,Customs), OMB, HHS and FEMA.

The Congressional Research Service in April, 2001, specified that the "foundationfor current U.S. policy for combating terrorism" was Presidential Decision D irective 39 ,

June 1995.12 CRS further reported that "The NSC principals Committee, the DeputiesCommittee and the Counterterrorism and National Preparedness Policy CoordinatingCommittee (PCC) constitute the major policy and decision making bodies involved in thefederal response to terrorism. The PCC has four standing subordinate groups to

coordinate policy.. .The Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) coordinates policyfor preventing and responding to foreign terrorism, either internationally ordomestically."13

A program called the Interagency Training, Education and After Action (ITEA)Review was implemented at the National Defense University (ND U) to be lead agent forestablishing a program of education and training w hich addresses the need for multi-agency coordination and planning for complex crises.14 ITEA lists the key players asfollows:

NSC

• President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury,Secretary of Defense and the Nationa l Security Advisor

• Statutory advisors: D irector of Central Intelligence and Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff

• Other attendees: Chief of Staff to the President, Assistant to the President forEconomic Policy

• W hen pertaining to their responsibilities: Attorney General and the Director,OMB

Principals Committee (PC)

• Meets at the call of the Chair, the National Security Advisor

9 Institute for Defense An alysis (IDA), "Federal Structures for Infrastructure Protection," Report to thePresident's Comm ission on Critical Infras tructu re Protection, 1997, p. 6.10 IDA, p. 1.11 IDA, p. 4.

12 CR S Report for Congress, "Terrorism and the Military's Role in Domestic Crisis Management,Background and Issues for Congress," April 19, 2001, p. 10.13 CRS , p 13-14.

14 NDU w as so designated by the Contingency Planning Policy Coordination Comm ittee (CPPCC) of theNational Security Council




• Executive Secretary: Deputy National Security Advisor

• Attendees: Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense; Chief of Staff,

National Security Advisor

• When pertaining to their responsibilities:Director of Central Intelligence;

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Attorney General; Director OMB

• For international economic issues: Secretary of Commerce; US TradeRepresentative, Assistant to the President on Economic Policy; Secretary,United States Department of Agriculture

Deputies Committee (DC)

• Deputy Secretary of State or Under Secretary for Political Affairs

• Deputy Secretary of the Treasury or Under Secretary for International Affiars

• Deputy Attorney General

• Deputy Director OMB

• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

• Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

• Deputy Chief of Staff to the President/Policy

• Chief of Staff for the Vice President

• National Security Advisor for the Vice President

• Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs

• Add for international economic issues: Deputy Secretary of Commerce,Deputy US Trade Representative, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture

The Small Group, A Variation on a Theme

The Joint Inquiry Staff, through interviews, learned of the existence of "a smallgroup" during th e Clinton administration that apparently emerged after Clarke's

appointment to work the counterterrorism issue. Crenshaw, in discussing the USG

pressure on bin Ladin described a '"small group' of the Cabinet [that] met almostweekly."15 Earlier in her paper she described the decision-making process as

characterized by "secrecy, controversy, and a growing sense of urgency."16 She includedPresident Clinton an d Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering as key participants.PBS17 specified the members of the small group as; "National Security Advisor SandyBerger; Secretary of State Madeleine Albright; Secretary of Defense William Cohen;

Director of the CIA George Tenet; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General HenryShelton; and a high-ranking staff member, counterterrorism czar Dick Clarke."18

Anecdotal evidence from Joint Inquiry Staff interviews suggested that, occasionally,

15 Crenshaw, p. 2216 Crenshaw,p. 18

17 Frontline article after the USG retaliation for the embassy bombings in August , 199818 www.pbs.org The Controversial U.S. Retaliatory Missile Strikes, byOriana Zill.




Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Special Operations/Low IntensityConflict) participated.

Policy Execution

Regardless of the policy forum structure, Substantial U SG counterterrorismactions were based on a Presidential Finding, supplemented by a series of Memoranda of

Notification dealing with Usam a bin Ladin an d Al Qa'ida. According to the Federationof American Scientists,19 "No special activity (of the CIA in foreign countries) may beconducted except u nder the authority of, and subsequ ent to, a Finding by the Presidentthat such activity is important to the national security of the United States." Changes to aFinding require that a written Mem orandum of Notification (MON ) be subm itted to thePresident. "Special Activities" m eans Covert Action which is defined20 as "an activity oractivities of the USG to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad,where it is intended that the role of the U SG will not be apparent or acknowledgedpub licly." Acco rding to the Washington Post after the African Em bassy bom bings inAugust 1998 the President signed a finding to authorize covert action an d then signedthree MON that, "in succession.. .authorized killing instead of captu ring bin

Laden,...added

several of alQaeda's

senior lieutenants and finally approved the shootingdown of priva te civilian aircraft on which they flew."21 According to the Post's reportingthe Small Grou p was active in the Finding/MON process.

A Suggested Course of National Commission Action

Step One. The Com mission should hear, perhaps as a group, from Clarke andTenet, and possibly Freeh. They should appear with m inimal staff or supp orting cast.They sho uld tell their stories in personal detail and recall. The Joint Inquiry report an dfiles (testimony) should serve as the point of departure.

Step T wo. The Staff shou ld establish the written record at both the NSC andwithin agencies since the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, with focus on the

period subsequent to the establishment of Clarke's position as Coordinator in 1998.Step Three. The Staff should interview the "small group and other responsive

individuals to determ ine, at a m inim um the following policy stories:

• Finding andMemoranda of Notification Development;

• Military/CIA Cooperation, to include Predator;

• IC-Law Enforcem ent Cooperation; and

• Presidential B riefing Requirements.ftSfiv*^

Step Four. The Commission should again Mere from Tenet and Clarke, perhaps

deposed.

19 FA S extract from Na tional Security Decision D irective 286 as posted on the FAS website20 Title 50, Chapter 15, Section 413b USC.21 Gelman, The Washington Post, "The Covert Hunt for bin Laden, Broad Effort Launched After '98

Attacks," December 19, 2001.




March 18, 2003

Policy prior to 9/11 , One Perspective

An Unclassified White Paper

B yMiles Kara, Professional Staff

Introductory Remarks

This paper provides a purposely brief and necessarily superficial historical

perspective to set the scene concerning U. S. Government (USG) counterterrorism policy.It identifies key USGpliers and outlines a suggest course of action to examine USG

policy relevant to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The paper draws on the

recent work of Paul Pillar, former Deputy Chief of the Counterterrorism Center; Bruce

Hoffma n, RAND Corporation; and Martha Crenshaw, WJesleyan University. The

author's understanding of terror and counterterrorism is grounded in the 1970's work of

Brian Jenkins, RAND Corporation, Supplemented by than contemporary research ofRoger Darling, then State Depar tmentXand Dr. Tom Grassey, now Professor of Ethics,

N a v y War College. Writ large, that unders t and ing is that terror, especially politicalterror, is theatre. Successfully practiced th e intent is to/mesmerize an audience and toprovide a stronger adversary, typically a government , pie opportunity to "strangle in its

ow n strength."1

Two Main Actors: One Changed, One Did Nc

• International Terrorism. With no p

a place to operate), international terroris

of th e 1990's by moving away from Statreach an d multi-national composition.

ilar allegiance to a State (except forkc h a n g e d significantlyin the decade

>nsorship to achieve both global

• The Intelligence Community. Tied to the National Security Act of 1947, the

Intelligence Community (1C) did not cr/ange it s structure, habits or cultureafter the end of the Cold War.

Snapshots that Define the Actors

Th e 1C—and by extension th e U S G — h a d dew global responsibilities at the end of

th e Cold W ar but was mired in an amalgamation of Fifedoms, Dukeetoms, and Earldomswith on e Duke anointed in charge of the Kingdom.2 In that amalgamation, collaborations

were marriages of convenience n ot necessar i lyf t ied to a coherent nationkl strategy.3 The1C is not ethnically diverse— perhaps not diver/e by any measure-and doe

society that it serves.

n ot mirror th e

1 Dr. Tom Grassey, 1976, Insurgency Revisited2 Fo r example, Bruce Ho f f man, Los Angeles Timed Sep 16, 2001, 'Terror's Aftermath: A CoiinterterrorismPolicy fo r Yesterday'sThreat," 'The country's anachronistic intelligence architecture..."3 Aga in , Hoffman, "Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy," www.fathom.com/ffcature

article based on March 2001 testimonybefore/House Subcommittee. "America's capabilities... remaininchoate and unfocused." ".. .there still remains th e conspicuous absence of an . . .overarching strategy."

—~ioo




International Terrorism, on the other hand, achieved global reach and a globalcharacter. For example, nine named individuals are commonly tied to the Hamburg Cell;

four or five potential pilots, tw o associates, and two recruiters. Those nine individualsrepresent at least eight nationalities—Egyptian, Emirati, Lebanese, Pakistani, Yemeni,German, Moroccan, and Indonesian, ethnically diverse by any measure.4

Since it is USG policy that is at issue the balance of this paper will focus on the

USG supporting cast of players.

The Main Players.

National Policy concerning counterterrorism and using the 1C as a primary tooldid not seize either the intellectual or the tactical high ground concerning the terroristthreat. Post WWII policy, simply put, was to w in the Cold War. That was accomplished.

However, new challenges emerged including pan-Arabism, a force used to bring aboutthe Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.5 No end game existed to deal with that force in

the aftermath and it was co-opted by Usama bin Ladin to globalize6 an d execute a near

decade-long series of attacks against the United States leading up to 9/11.

Two well-placed individuals who transcend administrations and who both,arguably, saw the emerging threat could no t mold the existing structure, bend its will, or

move the 1C and the USG away from the 1947 underpinnings. The story of 9/11, USGengagement with international terrorism and, ultimately, USG policy is the story of thosetwo individuals—Richard Clarke and George Tenet. Clarke, via a May 1998 PresidentialDirective, was appointed National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, an d

Counterterrorism on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC).7 Tenet became theDirector of Central Intelligence in July 1997. A third individual, Louis Freeh, formerFBI Director, might be added to the short list, but it is Clarke and Tenet who stayed the

course and were on duty on 9/11.

The Process

Traditionally the USG moves actions and issues through an established processorchestrated by the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Interagency Working Groups(LAWG) are established at the staff-action level. The lAWGs periodically brief theDeputies (DEPSECDEF and equivalent). Positions, options and ideas are vetted and

when matured and/or timely are presented to the Principals (Cabinet Members,primarily). The NSC is the final arbiter. Richard Clarke was the NSC staff member

responsible fo r counterterrorism. George Tenet was the NSC member representing the

1C. Louis Freeh was the NSC member representing the law enforcement community.

4 Thepotential pilots were Atta, al-Shehhi, Jarrah, bin al-Shibh, and Mansour; the two associates were

Bahaji and Essabar, and the two recruiters were Zammar and Belfas.5 See Pillar, Terrorism and American Foreign Policy, as reviewedby J. Daniel Moore,www.cia.gov/csi/studies "The end of the Cold W ar marked the emergence of numerous ethnic andsectarian conflicts."6 Again Pillar, "By the mid-1990's a powerful, aggressive Islamic terrorism had evolved, made more lethalby globalization."7 Crenshaw, 'Terrorism, Securityand Power," presented to the 2002 Annual Meeting of the AmericanPolitical Science Association,August 29-September 1, 2002. Previously, according to the Institute forDefense Analysis, Clarke was a Special Assistant to the President within the National Security Council.




The IAWG for counterterrorism is called the CSG, v ariously referred to as either

the Counterterrorism Sub Group or the Counterterrorism Security Group8 or theCoordinating Sub Group on Terrorism9. The confusion over the name h as historical rootsthat confound the counterterrorism issue to the point that the National Intelligence Officer

for Warning is not responsible for terrorism warning.10 That responsibility was assumedby the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) when it stood up in 1986, and is managed by the

Community Counterterrorism Board (CCB) which acts as an umbrella for the InteragencyIntelligence Committee on Terrorism. The Subcommittee on Warning, chaired by theState Diplomatic Security Bureau operates the National Warning System for terroristthreats.

The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA ), in a 1997 report to the President'sCommission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, reported that an Interagency WorkingGroup on Counterterrorism was created in the 1970s and organized under StateDepartment leadership.12 Later, according to the Institute, "Federal counterterrorismactivities [were] coordinated under the NSC's Coordinating Subgroup on Terrorism(CSG), initially established in N SD D [National Security Decision Directive] 30 in1982."13 IDA listed the permanent m embers of the CSG as "assistant secretary of

equivalent level officials"14 from State, DoJ, FBI, OSD (ASD/SOLIC), The Joint Staff (J-3, SOCOM), CIA (CTC) and the Office of the Vice President, augmented as necessary byrepresentatives for DoT (FAA ), DoE, Treasury (Secret Service, C ustoms), O MB, HHSand FEMA.

The Congressional Research Service in April, 2001, specified that the "foundationfor current U.S. policy for combating terrorism" was Presidential Decision Directive 39,June 1995.15 CRS further reported that "The NSC principals Committee, the DeputiesCommittee and the Counterterrorism and National Preparedness Policy CoordinatingCommittee (PCC) constitute the major policy an d decision making bodies involved in thefederal response to terrorism. The PCC has four standing subordinate groups tocoordinate policy...The Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) coordinates policyfor preventing an d responding to foreign terrorism, either internationally ordomestically."16

The CRS terminology is accepted as the name for the CSG. By whatever nameCSG deliberations, as an entity and w ithin the various agencies that participated, are thekey to understanding USG policy toward and actions concerning the internationalterrorist threat over time.

8 Crenshaw, p. 22

9 "Federal Structures for Infrastructure Protection, Report to the President's Commission on CriticalInfrastructure Portection," 1997, p. 1

10 Joint Inquiry Staff research11 IDA, p. 7-8.

12 Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), "Federal Structures for Infrastructure Protection," Report to thePresident's C omm ission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997, p. 6.13 IDA, p. 1.14 IDA, p. 4.

15 CRS Report for Congress, 'Terrorism and the Military's Role in Domestic Crisis Management,Background and Issues for Congress," April 19, 2001, p. 10.16 CRS, p 13-14.




The Small Group, A Variation on a Theme

The Joint Inquiry Staff, through interviews, learned of the existence of "a smallgroup" that apparently emerged after Clarke's appointment to work th e counterterrorism

issue. Crenshaw, in discussing the USG pressure on bin Ladin described a '"small group'

of the Cabinet [that] met almost weekly."17 Earlier in her paper she described thedecision-making process as characterized by "secrecy, controversy, and a growing senseof urgency."18 She included President Clinton an d Under Secretary of State Thomas

Pickering as key participants. PBS19 specified the members of the small group as;

"National Security Advisor Sandy Berger; Secretary of State Madeleine Albright;

Secretary of Defense William Cohen; Director of the CIA George Tenet; Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton; and a high-ranking staff member,counterterrorism czar Dick Clarke."20 Anecdotal evidence from Joint Inquiry Staff

interviews suggested that, occasionally, Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense,(Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) participated.

Policy Execution

Regardless of the policy forum structure, Substantial USG counterterrorismactions were based on a Presidential Finding, supplemented by a series of Memoranda ofNotification dealing with Usama bin Ladin and Al Qa'ida. According to the Federation

of American Scientists,21 "N o special activity (of the CIA in foreign countries) may beconducted except under the authority of, and subsequent to, a Finding by the Presidentthat such activity is important to the national security of the United States." Changes to a

Finding require that a written Memorandum of Notification (MON) be submitted to thePresident. "Special Activities" means Covert Action which is defined22 as "an activity or

activities of the USG to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad,where it is intended that the role of the USG will not be apparent or acknowledgedpublicly." According to the Washington Post after th e African Embassy bombings in

August 1998 the President signed a finding to authorize covert action and then signedthree MON that, "in succession.. .authorized killing instead of capturing bin

Laden,...added several of al Qaeda's senior lieutenants and finally approved the shootingdown of private civilian aircraft on which they flew."23 According to the Post's reportingthe Small Group was active in the Finding/MON process.

A Suggested Course of National Commission Action

Step One. The Commission should hear, perhaps as a group, from Clarke and

Tenet, and perhaps Freeh. They should appear without staff or supporting cast. They

17 Crenshaw, p. 22

18 Crenshaw, p. 18

19 Frontline article after the USG retaliation for the embassy bombings in August, 199820 www.pbs.org 'The Controversial U.S. Retaliatory Missile Strikes, by Oriana Zill.21 FA S extract from National Security Decision Directive 286 as posted on the FAS website22 Title 50, Chapter 15, Section 413b USC.23 Gelman,The Washington Post, 'The Covert H u n t for bin Laden, Broad Effort LaunchedAfter '98

Attacks," December 19, 2001.




should tell their stories in personal detail and recall. The Joint Inqu iry report and files

(testimony) should serve as the point of departure.

Step Two. The Staff should establish the written record at both the NSC andwithin agencies since the first World T rade Center attack in 1993, with focus on theperiod subsequen t to the establishment of Clarke 's position as Coordinator in 1998.

StepThree.

The Staff should interview the "small grou p and other responsiveindividuals to determine, at a minimum the following policy stories:

• Finding andMemoranda ofNotification Development;

• Military/CIA Cooperation, to include Predator;

• IC-Law Enforcement Cooperation; and

• Presidential Briefing Requirements. «

Step Four. The Comm ission should again he*£ from Tenet and Clarke, perhapsdeposed.

Documents

T8 B16 Misc Work Papers Fdr- 3-26-03 and 3-18-03 Drafts- Policy Prior to 9-11- One Perspective by Miles Kara