T8 B3 Boston Center Peter Zalewski Fdr- 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 753

8/14/2019 T8 B3 Boston Center Peter Zalewski Fdr- 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 753

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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEM E M O R A N D U M FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation A dministration (FAA) Boston C enter Field Site Interview withPeter Zalewski, A ir Traffic Control Specialist Area C.Type of event: InterviewDate: Monday, September 22, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Number: 8Location: FA A Boston A ir Route Center, Nashua, N ew HampshireParticipants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FA A Senior Attorney [(781) 2387045]Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Please refer to the recorded interview for a complete account.

Zilowski has been with the FAA since 1982. He has been with ZBW for his entire career,bu t spent a short period of t ime with Area E.On 9/11 Zilowski took a position at Hampton 31 at about seven o'clock, he then wentover to R46 Boston High Sector (24k ft. and above). A A 11 was handed off to him, and heclimbed the flight first to FL 280, then to FL 290 for normal spacing procedures. H eturned AA11 twe nty degrees right to expedite th e c l imb, and A A 11 responded. Fairlysoon thereafter he climbed them to FL 350, but AA11 did not respond. H e tried callingAA11 again, since he wanted to turn AA11 back on course. AA11 started to move intothe arrival route fo r Logan, and Zilowski became concerned. Zilowski changed histransmitters and receivers to check his own equipment, and when everything checked outhe attempted to reach AA11 on the 121.5 guard code. H e checked previous sectorfrequency, and tried to contact th e f l ight 's company to establish communication.Zilowski became even more concerned as AA11 started to approach another sector'sairspace.As these factors persisted an d Zilowski still did not hear from th e pilot of AA11, he notedthat th e situation w as highly unusual. When th e transponder had first shut off, Zilowskihad told his supervisor, John Shippani, quietly. H e then explained to Shippani what hehad done to attempt to comm unica te wi th AA11. A t this point hijac king had not occurredto Zilowski. H e kept track of A A 11 s primary, and still had no reading on its altitude. A sAA 11 starts to turn Zilow ski heard a strange voice over the f requency. He noted thatsince he had experience at air route with heavy international traffic, an Arabic pilot 's

C O M M I S S I O N SENSITIVEU N C L A S S I F I E D


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UNCL AS S IF IE DC OMMISSION SENSIT IVEvoice wasn ' t unusua l to h im . But in this sector , Zi low ski noted that most pi lo ts areAmerican, so he t hought th e Arabic voice was out of place. Zi low ski could no tdist inguish th e message in the first t ransmission. It was the second t ransmission that heheard clearly. H e "screamed" to his supervisor, an d to ld him of the hijack. H e p u t AA11on the loudspeaker for the section. He had no RA to assist, an d asked for an immediate"D" side. He concentrated on l is tenin g for com municat ion from AA11 and, once GregTichini became his RA, gave T ichini all the planes in his sector. Zilowski firmly bel ievesthat the comm unication from the hijacker was meant for the passengers to hear, and isadamant that it did not come from th e American Airl ines p i lot keying th e microphone ,Zilowski also stated that UAL 175 heard the transmission from AA11 since they were onth e same frequency. After th e second communication Zilowski thought AA11 w asheaded back to Logan Airport, and was worried that it would turn back into thedepartures. H e wanted to get another supervisor since he did not think Shippani w astaking the situation seriously, and stated that he requested Bo b Jones pu ll tapes to checkthe transmission.When AA11 co ntinued on a southbound heading Zilowski thought it was headed toKennedy. He gave the handoff to Athens Area B pu t Athens hadn't cleared the airspaceyet, Athens p icked up Zilowski ' s point out , but Zilowski kept monitoring the frequencyin case of a further transmission.Zilowski handed control of his airspace over to Tichini once Athens took over trackingth e flight. Zilowski then left th e building for a break. Zilowski was in fo rmed of the firstWTC hi t from his parents, and stated he imm ediately knew i t was AA11 . Tich in i to ldZilowski of the second W TC hit of UA L175.

9/11 Personal Privacy

Zilowski ex p l a in ed to Com mission staff that "Nordo" indicates no radio, whereas"Norac" ind ica tes no rad io comm unica t ion . So AA11 was of f ic ia l ly Norac. Zi low ski a lsoexplained that when a transponder goes off the co m p u t e r wil l au tomat ica l ly a t tr ibu t e adata tag with a call sign to the primary.Post 9/11 Zilowski bel ieves the air t rave l is safer , and bel ieves supervisors and the FAAtake securi ty mu ch more seriously. H e noted that p i lots should be more invo lved instaying aware of the need fo r continued vigilance, and is worried th e "system"m aybecome complacen t as t ime distances mem ory from th e attacks. H e noted that th e rapportbetween p i lots and ATCs is go ing away, and bel ieves there should be more interact ionbetween the two groups to bet ter secure ai r traffic.

C O M M I S S I O N S E N S I T I V EUNC LASSIFIED


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Commission SensitiveMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withPeter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C.Type of event: Recorded InterviewDate: Monday, September 22, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Number: 8Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New HampshireParticipants - Non-Comm ission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 2387045]Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey BrownNOT E: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

BackgroundZalewski has been with the FAA since 1982. He has been with Boston CenterArea C (Boston Sector) for his entire career, but spent a short period of time w ith Area E.

Because of shift swaps he had worked u ntil 11pm the night before and then came back onduty on 9-11 as the Radar Con troller, Boston H igh Sector (24,000 feet and above), R46.Morning of 9-11

Zalewski started at the H amp ton, R31, sec tor at about seven o'clock and thenwent over to R46. AAl 1 was handed off to him routinely from Bosox Sector (loweraltitude), and he climbed the flight first to FL 280, then to FL 290 for norm al spacingprocedures. He turned AAl 1 twenty degrees right to expedite th e climb, and AAl 1responded. Fa irly soon thereafter he directed them to FL 350, but AAl 1 did not respond.He tried calling AAl 1 again, since he wanted to turn AAl 1 back on course. AAl 1 startedto move into the arrival route for Logan, an d Zalewski became concerned. Zalewskichanged his transmitters and receivers to check his own equipment, and when everythingchecked out he attempted to reach AAl 1 on the 121.5 guard c ode. He checked previoussector frequency, and tried to contact the flight's company to establish communication.Zalewski became even more concerned as AAl 1 started to approach another sector'sairspace.

These factors persisted and Zalewski still did not hear from the pilot of AAl 1.He told Staff that the situation was highly unusual. W hen the transponder shut off


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Zalewski q uietly told his supervisor, Jon Schippani, about that additional developmentand explained to him what he had done to attem pt to communicate with AA11.At that point the possibility of a hijacking had not occurred to Zalewski. He kepttrack of AA 11 s primary, but had no reading on its altitude. As AA 11 started to turnZalewski heard a strange voice ov er the frequency. Since he had experience on an airroute with heavy international traffic (Area E), an Arabic voice wasn't unusual to him.But in Boston sector, he told S taff that most pilo ts are American, so he thought theArabic voice was out of place.Zalewski c ould not distinguish the message in the first strange transmission. Itwas the second transmission that he heard clearly. He "screamed" to his supervisor, andtold him of the hijack. He put the AA11 frequency on the loudspeaker for the section. Hehad no RA to assist, and asked for an immediate "D" side. [A "D" side at Boston Centeris a Radar Associate who assists the Controller] He concentrated on listening forcommunication from AA11 and, once Greg Taccini became his RA , gave Taccini all theplanes in his sector to handle.Zalewski firmly believes that the communication from the hijacker was meant forthe passengers to hear, and is adamant that it did not come from the American Airlinespilot keying the microphone. Zalew ski also stated that UAL 175 m ust have heard thetransmission from AA11 since they were on the same frequency. After the secondcommunication Zalewski thought AA11 was headed back to Logan Airport, and wasworried that it w ould turn back in to the departures. He wanted to get another supervisorsince he did not think Schippani was taking the situation seriously, and stated that herequested that Bob Jones [Quality Assurance] pull tapes to check the transmission.When AA11 continued on a southbound heading Zalewski thoug ht it was headedto Kennedy. He gave a handoff on AA11 to Athens Sector, Area B, but Athens hadn'tcleared the airspace yet. Athens picked up Z alewsk i's poin t out, but Zalewski kept

monitoring the frequency in case of a further transmission. [Note: even though Zalewskihanded off AA11 the airplane remained on the R46 frequency and had to be monitoredfrom that positon.]Zalewski hand ed control of his airspace over to Taccini once Athens took overtracking the flight. Zalewski then left the building for a break. Zalewski was informed ofthe first WTC hit from his parents, and stated he immediately knew it was AA11. Taccinitold Zalewski of the second WTC hit of UAL175.


Additional PointsZalewski explained that "Nordo" indicates no radio, whereas "Norac" indicatesno radio comm unication. So AA11 was officially Norac. Zalewski also explained thatwhen a transponder goes off the computer will autom atically attribute a data ta g with a

call sign to the primary.Post 9/11 Zalewski believes ai r travel is safer, and believes supervisors and the


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FAA tak e security mu ch m ore seriously. H e noted that pilots should be m ore involved instaying aware of the need for continued vigilance, and is worried the "system" maybecome com placent as time distances m emory from the attacks. He no ted that the rapportbetween pilots and ATCs is going away, andbelieves there should be more interactionbetween the two groups to better secure air traffic.[Staff Note: Zalewsk i broke down at this point and he was given the opportunity tocollect his thoughts. When the interview reconvened Staff made the offer to continuewith the recorder off. Zalewski gratefully accepted th e offer and the followinginformation is based on notes only.]H is Personal Experience

Zalewski reiterated that the second unusual communication was "not good," it"scared the hell out of me." He screamed for the supervisor, "Jon, ge t over here rightnow." He had no Radar Associate and tried to get the AA11 frequen cy on speaker and"tried to do 95 things at once." He did not "hear" the phrase "w e have some planes" atthe time it was spoken. Subsequently, the "FBI didn't talk to him."

Zalewski feels wronged and that undue heroic credit has gone to the pilot ofAA11, John Olangowski. "The keying part is a myth," Zalewski said. People do notknow what happen ed. Som eone in the building had talked to the me dia about events andZalewski went to the front office and said, "I wan t to know w ho did this, find him andfire his ass."Zalewski is proud of his career. In 22 years he "never had an operational error,unusual in this building." "People" claimed that controllers talked to the media and atranscript was out in the pub lic domain. He recalled that a controller offsite was held onThursday (Sep 13) and he recalls saying in that forum, "that's not right," "that's not what

I remember." His point was (and is) that his story has never been told and that the storyin the public domain is not accurate. He only talked to Tom Brokawhe was asked todo so and he said he would.At that point Zalewski returned to the main story. He said to Schiappani, "Whatare they saying?" "What are they saying?" (the cockpit communications) He recalledthat "Jon goes away." [Note: Schiappani saw his role as the go between to the watchdesk and he focused his efforts on keeping his supervisors informed.] UA175 was on hisfrequency and AA 11 had not gone off the frequency. He asked for a "D" sideimmediately. Jon "had sauntered off. . .no sense of emergency." "I wanted a supervisorimmediately." He recalled that other controllers looked at him as if he was crazy.

[Staff Note: At this juncture Zalewski voluntarily made the statement "Here's a gay airtraffic controller" shouting and screaming. Staff made no comment and did not pursuethe issue.]

He wanted the speaker on "loud" so that everyone could hear what he wasexperiencing. He went to Greg (Taccini) his RA and he was helpful but was "freakingou t himself." At that point man agem ent combined sectors and took all the planes andgave them to Greg so that AA11 was singly on that on e frequency.As ab ove, his first thought was that AA11 was "returning to the airport," an dthought "Boston." But then he asked himself the question, why aren't they shutting


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traffic off . He then got a supervisor [other than Schiappani], I "finally go t one." Hewanted "someone w ith me, someone behind me... .1 could make the decisions." QualityAssurance had been notif ied and Bob Jones came to the Sector. Zalewski said, "I freakedout on him" and said, "some one has to pull these fucking tapes," "right now."He did not understand th e first transmission, "they [hijackers] weren't even

talking to us." He volunteered that, m inus th e cockpit communications, he would nothave considered it to be a hijacking until much later.Returning to the arrival of Jones, Zalewski said, "he got it." "H e felt what I felt."After Jones called bac k wit h the results of the re-listen [we have some planes] we beganshutting of f t raf f ic . He said, "You see Mineta on TV saying we shut of f t raf f ic . That 'sno t what happened."Zalewski thought "h e [AA11] was going to JFK, that 's exactly w hat I thought."Another supervisor came over [other than Jones], he "didn't ge t it." Then cam e the thirdtransmission [approximately 0933] and Mark O'Neil said, "that's really scary." Afterthat the "place got quiet." Even though he had handed of f AA11 to Sector R38 he kept

watching.After th e first impact Zalewski was ta ken off position and he went to his car andcalled his parents. He was alone in the parking lot and "he knew i t was AA11," but didno t equate AA11 to terrorism. He had to hang up on his parents. At that point GregTaccini cam e out to the parking lot and said he had seen a second aircraft impact andknew i t was UA175. Zalewski's response was "who is 175," "you worked him." I neverclimbed him," he was stuck at FL 230.Zalewski said th e union realized they had to do something. I though I "was goingto have a nervous breakdown." They brought us into the union office and I "could hardlywrite a statement." He asked, "get th ese people aw ay from me." [Note: Zalewski'sstatement is dated November 2, 2001

Zalewski's Observations (In response to a question abou t recomm endations he mighthave)Zalewski stated that "security has gone overboard."He asked rhetorically why pilots aren't given letters. W e [controllers] are alwaysmonitored. Where is the check and balance with the pilots? Earlier, Zalew ski hadcharacterized "NORDO" as a common occurrence because of pilot inattentiondrinkingtheir coffee and doing other things.


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T8 B3 Boston Center Peter Zalewski Fdr- 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 753